ECHEGARAY VS.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (1998)

PER CURIAM

FACTS:

Petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common-law spouse's 10 year-old daughter, and was
sentenced to death. His conviction was upheld in 1996. Meanwhile, in 1998, Congress passed RA 8177
which changed the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection.
Pursuant to such law, the DOJ also promulgated the IRR for it.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the
respondents from carrying out the execution of the former. He cited the following grounds: 1) RA 8177
violates the proscription against cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment 2) violation of Philippine
international treaty obligations 3) undue delegation of legislative power 4) a discriminatory law.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether RA 8177 violates proscription against 'cruel, degrading, or inhuman' punishment? NO

2. Whether RA 8177 is a violation of Philippine international treaty obligations? NO
3. Whether RA 8177 is an undue delegation of legislative power? YES
4. Whether RA 8177 is a discriminatory law? YES

RA 8177 upheld as constitutional, except for Sections 17 and 19 of the IRR.

RATIO:

ISSUE 1

The main argument of the petitioner is that 1) RA 8177 does not provide what drugs should be used for
the injection, the dosages, and the procedure in administering, 2) The law is uncertain on the date of
exeuction of the convicted person, 3) possible 'botched' executions and other mistakes in adminstering
drugs make lethal injection 'inherently cruel'.

The Court first held that the death penalty per se does not constitute a form of cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment. It cited Harden v. Director of Prisons, saying that punishments are cruel when
involving torture or a lingering death, but that punishment of death is not cruel.

It also rejected the argument about uncertainty of date of execution, citing Section 1 of the Law which
provides a time period of no less than a year but no more than 18 months after the judgment imposing
the death penalty becomes final and executory.

It also rejected the third argument saying that 1) Petitioner did not present any evidence that the drugs
to be used are unsafe/ineffective, and merely cited situations in the U.S in which lethal injection cases
allegedly resulted in 'prolonged and agonizing death', 2) Section 1 of the Law actually requires all
personnel involved in the execution to be trained prior to the task, 3) Most importantly, the infliction of
pain in lethal injection is 'merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does
not fall within the constitutional proscription'.
In other words, what is forbidden is not the suffering necessary involved in any method in extingushing
life. Since one of the standards of a society's decency is the 'response of the country's legislature to
(death penalty), as long as the death penalty is contained in laws, the death penalty should be held to be
constitutional.

The Court also added that the definition of 'cruel and unusual' is evolving, depending on society itself.
Since
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaningas public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw itsmeaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of amaturing society.

ISSUE 2

The Court held that the 'Second Optional Protocol to the international Convenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty' was never signed nor ratified by the Philippine
government. Meanwhile, the interpretation of the UN Human Rights Committee (based on General
Comment #6) is that State parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty totally, only to limit its
use.

ISSUE 3

Section 19 ('Execution Procedure') of the IRR was held to have allowed the Justice Secretary to 'abdicate
the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections'. It was also held that the said Section, which forbids those subject to execution from
viewing the 'Execution Manual', as violative of Section 7 of the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE 4

Section 17 ('Suspension of the Execution of the Death Sentence') was held to be discriminatory.
Originally, Section 25 of RA 7659 allowed for the suspension of the execution in cases of pregnant
women or those who gave birth in less than a year. Section 17 removed the 'one year period'. The Court
held that being a mere IRR, it should be in harmony with the law itself.