G.R. No. 151931.

September 23, 2003

ANAMER SALAZAR,, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Order1 of the
Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,2 dated November 19, 2001, and its Order3 dated
January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof
and to allow her to present evidence thereon.

On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused
Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 7474 which reads
as follows:

That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud by
means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d]
PRUDENTIAL BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount
of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON
O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said checkas payment of 300 cavans of rice
obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said check was issued
and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the
amount called for therein and without informing the payee of such circumstance; that when said check was presented
to the drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused payment for the reason of
ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite demands, accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make
arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 c räläwvi rtual ibrä ry

Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution

On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave the private complainant
Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena
Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was
a good check. The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was
dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such
dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi
Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against Uncollected Deposit).

After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court5 alleging that she
could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an indorser of the check
issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the
indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check,
Nena Jaucian Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the
petitioner replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the issuance
of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for DAUD,
which in banking parlance means drawn against uncollected deposit. According to the petitioner, this means that the
account had sufficient funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.

The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence.

On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering
her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase. The trial court ruled
that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between
the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the
private complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian
Timario who remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the check
was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article
315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial courts judgment reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is
hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y.
Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.6 cräläwvi rtua lib räry

Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the
decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Court. On January 14,
2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.

In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her demurrer to evidence
was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity to adduce evidence
to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of
the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party,
she should have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.

The Petition Is Meritorious

According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or
exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information, the filing fees therefor
shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.

Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause
of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on
the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or
information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.

Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with
the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist.7
cräläwvirt ualib rä ry

The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended party.
The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is
merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are
primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty
for the vindication of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action
between the private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.8 crä läwvirtuali brä ry

Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal action for
the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a
criminal action, the private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The
second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the
defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.

The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect
of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence.9Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal.

The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to
prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused
shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial,
the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:

SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which
attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by
his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. 10
cräläwvirtu alib räry

The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) where the court declared
that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is
extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor.

After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or
without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his
evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule reads:

Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right to present
evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a
non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The prosecution may oppose the motion
within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.

If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10)
days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar period from its receipt.

The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be
reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment.

In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a demurrer to evidence
without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis
of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence,
he has the right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his
demurrer is denied by the court.

If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the
civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the
accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on
the civil aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process
is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:11c räläwvirtual ibrä ry

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or
tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.12 cräläwvirtual ibrä ry

This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the
trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case,
and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their sur-
rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a
provisional remedy in the case.

(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court
directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified.

Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the evidence of the
prosecution and the accused.

In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. The
civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by the private offended party of
the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the
criminal action.

The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order granting the
demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil. However, the court rendered
judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private
complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied
her right to due process.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January
14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to
set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on
the civil aspect of the case and for the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of
the parties if they opt to adduce any.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179611 March 12, 2013

EFREN S. ALMUETE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Section 6,1 Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure allows promulgation of judgment in absentia and
gives the accused a period of fifteen (15) days from notice to him or his counsel within which to appeal; otherwise,
the decision becomes final.2

This Petition for Review on Certiorari3 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the May 4, 2007 Resolution4 and
the September 4, 2007 Resolution5 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502.

Factual Antecedents

This case is an offshoot of People v. Court of Appeals,6 docketed as G.R. No. 144332 and promulgated on June 10,
2004.

Efren D. Almuete (petitioner), Johnny Ila (Ila) and Joel Lloren (Lloren) were charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, with violation of Section 687 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, otherwise
known as the "Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines," as amended by Executive Order (E.O.) No. 277,8docketed
as Criminal Case No. 2672.9

On the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment, petitioner’s counsel informed the trial court that petitioner and
Lloren were ill while Ila was not notified of the scheduled promulgation.10 The RTC, however, found their absence
inexcusable and proceeded to promulgate its Decision as scheduled.11 The dispositive portion of the September 8,
1998 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, namely, Efren S. Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended, they are each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, as minimum period to 40 years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum period. Costs against the said accused.

SO ORDERED.12

Accordingly, the RTC cancelled the bail bonds of petitioner, Ila and Lloren13 and issued warrants of arrest against
them.14

Petitioner and his co-accused moved for reconsideration, questioning the validity of the promulgation, the factual
and legal bases of their conviction, and the correctness of the penalty imposed.15

On October 12, 1998, the RTC denied their motion for lack of merit.16

Instead of filing an appeal, petitioner and his co-accused filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
49953, with the CA.17

On May 19, 2000, the CA granted the Petition and disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. On the basis of the evidence on
record, accused Efren S. Almuete should be, as he is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him.

The court a quo is ORDERED to re-promulgate the decision in the presence of the accused Ila and Lloren, duly
assisted by counsel of their own choice, after notice and allow them to appeal. Let the complete records of this case
be remanded to the court a quo.

SO ORDERED.18

The acquittal of petitioner prompted the People of the Philippines to elevate the case to this Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 144332.

On June 10, 2004, this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal and reinstated the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision
and its October 12, 1998 Order, to wit:

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated September 8, 1998
and its Order dated October 12, 1998 are REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.19

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated
January 17, 2005.20

On February 15, 2005, this Court issued an Entry of Judgment.21

Unfazed, petitioner filed a second and a third Motion for Reconsideration, which were denied by this Court in its
March 28, 2005 and November 9, 2005 Resolutions, respectively.22
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Clarification23 on whether he could still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998
Decision. This Court noted without action his Motion for Clarification in its July 26, 2006 Resolution.24

On December 13, 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Repromulgation25 of the September 8, 1998
Decision.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC, in its January 17, 2007 Order,26 denied the Motion for Repromulgation.

Petitioner sought reconsideration but the RTC denied the same in its February 20, 2007 Order.27

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari 28 with the CA. On
May 4, 2007, the CA rendered its Resolution29 which dismissed the Petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration30 was likewise denied by the CA in its September 4, 2007 Resolution.31

Issues

Hence, this recourse, with petitioner raising the following issues:

1. Whether x x x the Decision of the RTC convicting petitioner Almuete of the charge against him passed the
requisite conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Whether x x x the promulgation of the Decision of the RTC convicting the petitioner was valid despite the
absence of the petitioner and regardless of petitioner’s intention to be present at the promulgation of the
Decision.

3. Whether x x x the Honorable CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it acquitted petitioner Almuete
in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

4. Whether x x x the judgment of acquittal by the Honorable CA bars further proceedings and that to do so
would constitute a violation of petitioner’s constitutional right against double jeopardy.

5. Whether x x x the denial of the RTC of petitioner’s motion for re-promulgation is in order, the denial being
based on an inappropriate

Administrative Order of this Honorable Supreme Court (Administrative Order No. 16-93).32

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner maintains his innocence and asserts that he was wrongly convicted by the RTC because his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt.33 He argues that his conviction was based on circumstantial and hearsay
evidence as he was convicted only because he owns the truck containing the lumber.34 Thus, he contends that his
earlier acquittal by the CA was proper,35 and that his acquittal can no longer be assailed without violating the
principle of double jeopardy.36

Petitioner likewise assails the validity of the promulgation of the judgment against him since it was made in his
absence.37 He insists that he had a valid reason for not attending the promulgation of the judgment as he was
suffering from stress, anxiety, and some physiological disturbance, and thus, was advised to rest.38 He also claims
that the RTC’s denial of his Motion for Repromulgation was not proper.39 Hence, a repromulgation of the judgment
should be made to allow him to avail of his right to appeal.40

Respondent’s Arguments

The Solicitor General, on behalf of the People, contends that the issues and arguments raised by petitioner may no
longer be entertained as these have been addressed in People v. Court of Appeals,41 which is already the "law of
the case."42 He likewise points out that the promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under Section 643 of Rule
120 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,44 and that the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Repromulgation of the
September 8, 1998 Decision is proper as the same is in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 16-93.45

As to petitioner’s right to appeal, respondent opines that petitioner’s right has prescribed,46 as the same should have
been filed within 15 days from the time he or his counsel received a copy of the September 8, 1998 Decision instead
of filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.47

However, notwithstanding the finality of petitioner’s conviction, respondent recommends that the penalty be modified
by reducing the same to six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL).48

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The denial of the Motion for
Repromulgation is in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 16-93

Administrative Circular No. 16-93, issued on September 9, 1993, provides that:

TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

RE: PROCEDURE AFTER AFFIRMANCE OR MODIFICATION BY SUPREME COURT OR COURT OF APPEALS

OF JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES
To ensure uniformity in the procedure to be observed by the trial courts in criminal cases after their judgments of
conviction shall have been affirmed or modified by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, attention is invited to
the decisional and statutory guidelines set out hereunder.

1. The procedure for the promulgation of judgments in the trial courts in criminal cases, differs from that prescribed
for the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals where promulgation is effected by filing the signed copy of the
judgment with the Clerk of Court who causes true copies thereof to be served upon the parties. The procedural
consequence of this distinction was reiterated in Jesus Alvarado, etc. vs. The Director of Prisons, to wit:

By sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 (now Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 51) in relation to section 17 of Rule 120 (now
Section 17 of Rule 124), a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records
are remanded to the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.

In the case of People vs. Sumilang (44 Off. Gaz., 881, 883; 77 Phil. 764), it was explained that "the certified copy of
the judgment is sent by the clerk of the appellate court to the lower court under section 9 of rule 53, not for the
promulgation or reading thereof to the defendant, but for the execution of the judgment against him," it "not being
necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant, because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney had
already been notified thereof in accordance with sections 7 and 8, as amended, of the same Rules 53 (now sections
9 and 10 of Rule 51)," and that the duty of the court of first instance in respect to such judgment is merely to see
that it is duly executed when in their nature the intervention of the court of first instance is necessary to that end.

2. The practice of requiring the convict to appear before the trial court for "promulgation" of the judgment of the
appellate court should, therefore, be immediately discontinued. It is not only an unauthorized surplusage entailing
unnecessary expense, but it could also create security problems where the convict was already under detention
during the pendency of the appeal, and the place of confinement is at some distance from the station of the court.
Upon receipt of the certified copy of the judgment of the appellate court if the convict is under detention, the trial
court should issue forthwith the corresponding mittimus or commitment order so that the prisoner may be
considered remitted or may be transferred to the corresponding prison facility for confinement and service of
sentence. When the convict is out on bail, the trial court shall immediately order the bondsman to surrender the
convict to it within ten (10) days from notice and thereafter issue the corresponding mittimus. In both cases, the trial
court shall submit to this Court proof of the execution of judgment within fifteen (15) days from date of such
execution. (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

It is clear from the foregoing that the practice of requiring convicts to appear before the trial courts for promulgation
of the affirmance or modification by this Court or the CA of judgments of conviction in criminal cases is no longer
allowed. Hence, we find no error on the part of the RTC in denying the Motion for Repromulgation of the RTC’s
September 8, 1998 Decision which was reinstated in People v. Court of Appeals.49

The promulgation of judgment is valid.

Petitioner’s attempt to assail the validity of the promulgation of the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision must likewise
fail as this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Court of Appeals.50 As this Court has explained,
there was no reason to postpone the promulgation because petitioner’s absence was unjustifiable.51 Hence, no
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the RTC in promulgating its Decision despite the absence of petitioner.52

It bears stressing that the June 10, 2004 Decision of this Court has attained finality. In fact, an Entry of Judgment
was made by this Court on February 15, 2005.

Petitioner’s right to appeal has prescribed.

As to whether petitioner may still appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision, we rule in the negative.

In People v. Court of Appeals,53 this Court reversed petitioner’s acquittal by the CA as it was made with grave abuse
of discretion. This Court explained that an acquittal via a Petition for Certiorari is not allowed because "the authority
to review perceived errors of the trial court in the exercise of its judgment and discretion x x x are correctible only by
appeal by writ of error."54 Thus, in filing a Petition for Certiorari instead of an appeal, petitioner availed of the wrong
remedy. Thus:

In this case, the RTC rendered judgment finding all the accused, respondents herein, guilty of the crime charged
based on the evidence on record and the law involved, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment as
provided for in P.D. No. 705, in relation to Articles 304 and 305 of the Revised Penal Code. They had a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at law to overturn the decision as, in fact, they even filed a motion for reconsideration
of the decision on its merits, and for the nullification of the promulgation of the said decision. Upon the trial court’s
denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners had the right to appeal, by writ of error, from the decision on
its merits on questions of facts and of law. The appeal of the petitioners in due course was a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. In such appeal, the petitioners could question the findings of facts of the trial court, its
conclusions based on the said findings, as well as the penalty imposed by the court. It bears stressing that an
appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review and that the appellate court can reverse any errors
of the trial court, whether assigned or unassigned, found in its judgment. However, instead of appealing the decision
by writ of error, the respondents filed their petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the decision of the trial court on
its merits. They questioned their conviction and the penalty imposed on them, alleging that the prosecution failed to
prove their guilt for the crime charged, the evidence against them being merely hearsay and based on mere
inferences. In fine, the respondents alleged mere errors of judgment of the trial court in their petition. It behooved
the appellate court to have dismissed the petition, instead of giving it due course and granting it.

The CA reviewed the trial court’s assessment of the evidence on record, its findings of facts, and its conclusions
based on the said findings. The CA forthwith concluded that the said evidence was utterly insufficient on which to
anchor a judgment of conviction, and acquitted respondent Almuete of the crime charged.

The appellate court acted with grave abuse of its discretion when it ventured beyond the sphere of its authority and
arrogated unto itself, in the certiorari proceedings, the authority to review perceived errors of the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment and discretion, which are correctible only by appeal by writ of error. Consequently, the
decision of the CA acquitting respondent Almuete of the crime charged is a nullity. If a court is authorized by statute
to entertain jurisdiction in a particular case only, and undertakes to exercise the jurisdiction conferred in a case to
which the statute has no application, the judgment rendered is void. The lack of statutory authority to make a
particular judgment is akin to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In this case, the CA is authorized to entertain and
resolve only errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

A void judgment has no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-
existent. It cannot impair or create rights; nor can any right be based on it. Thus, respondent Almuete cannot base
his claim of double jeopardy on the appellate court’s decision.55 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, petitioner’s right to appeal the RTC’s September 8, 1998 Decision has long prescribed. Consequently, the
said Decision is no longer open to an appeal.

The penalty imposed must be modified.

Nonetheless, we agree with the suggestion of the Office of the Solicitor General that the penalty imposed by the
RTC in its September 8, 1998 Decision must be modified. Concededly, this case is an offshoot of G.R. No. 144332
which the Court decided on June 10, 2004 which found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in acquitting
Almuete.

Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by E.O. No. 277, provides that:

Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without
the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships,
associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable,
and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the
part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code state that:

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed[s] the latter amount, the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. (Emphasis
supplied)

xxxx

Art. 310. Qualified theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than
those respectively specified in the next preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse
of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis
supplied)

Perusal of the records would show that the trial court imposed the penalty as prescribed in Article 310 which is two
degrees higher than those specified in Article 309.56 This is erroneous considering that the penalty prescribed in
Article 310 would apply only if the theft was committed under any the following circumstances: a) by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or b) if the stolen property is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or
consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or c) if the
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance. None of these circumstances is present in the instant case. Thus, the proper imposable
penalty should be that which is prescribed under Article 309.

In this case, the amount of the timber involved is ₱57,012.00. Since the amount exceeds ₱22,000.00, the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods57 should be imposed in its maximum period58 plus an additional
one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000 pesos in excess of ₱22,000.00 or three more years.59 Thus, the correct
imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between eleven (11) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is one degree lower than that prescribed by the
law. In this case, the minimum penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, which is
anywhere between two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

This Court is not unaware of the rule that "a final judgment may no longer be altered, amended or modified, even if
the alteration, amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law and regardless of what court, be it the highest court of the land, rendered it."60 However, this Court has
suspended the application of this rule based on certain recognized exceptions, viz:

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most
mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the
other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.61

In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner. If his penalty of
imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years of
reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to the
proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6
years of prision correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in this
case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own Rules or except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong showing that a grave
miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will not hesitate to relax the
same in the interest of substantial justice."62 Suspending the Rules is justified "where there exist strong compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof."63 After all, the Court’s "primordial
and most important duty is to render justice x x x."64

Surely, this is not the first time that the Court modified the penalty imposed notwithstanding the finality of the
assailed decision.

In People v. Barro,65 Benigno Barro (Benigno), Joel Florin (Florin) and Joel Barro (Joel) were charged with murder.
After trial, the trial court convicted them as charged. Only Benigno and Florin filed their notice of appeal. Joel failed
to appeal as he escaped from confinement. Hence, the trial court’s Decision insofar as Joel is concerned had
become final and executory. In the Court’s Decision of August 17, 2000, the appeal filed by Benigno and Florin was
found without merit. However, the Court noted that as regards Joel, the penalty imposed by the trial court was
"outside the range"66 of the penalty prescribed for the offense. Consequently, the Court modified the penalty
imposed on him notwithstanding that the same had already become final and executory. The Court ratiocinated that:

Joel Barro, below 15 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for murder is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Two degrees lower is prision correccional maximum to prision
mayor medium. Joel Barro escaped from jail, hence, he is disqualified from the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. He should, therefore, be meted the straight penalty of eight years which is within the medium period
(6 years 1 month and 11 days to 8 years and 20 days) of the said penalty. The trial court erred in imposing the
penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 8 months because it is outside the range of said penalty. The records show
that Joel Barro did not appeal. However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal was a
nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on the accused can be corrected to make it
conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final and executory
and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law.67

In Estrada v. People,68 petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa. While the trial was pending, petitioner
jumped bail. Understandably, during the promulgation of judgment in 1997, petitioner was absent. Two years later,
or in 1999, petitioner was arrested. She then moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision. The same was
denied for having been filed out of time. Thus, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA which was
denied. Hence, petitioner brought the case before this Court. In its Decision dated August 25, 2005, the Court ruled
that petitioner’s trial in absentia was proper; that she was not denied due process; and that the denial by the trial
court of her motion for reconsideration was proper as the same was filed beyond the reglementary period. However,
the Court noted that the penalty imposed by the trial court (which is 12 years of prision mayor to 24 years as
maximum) on petitioner was erroneous. As computed by the Court, considering that the amount defrauded is only
₱68,700.00, the proper minimum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "6 months, and 1 day of
prision correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium
period"69while the proper maximum imposable penalty should only be within the range of "10 years, 8 months and
21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period."70 Hence, notwithstanding the finality of the trial
court’s Decision, the Court modified the penalty imposed, as the same was outside the range prescribed by law.

In Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,71 this Court also modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner
notwithstanding the finality of the trial court’s Decision based on the observation that the penalty imposed by the trial
court was erroneous because it was outside the range prescribed by law. The Court ruled thus:

However, the Court noted a palpable error apparent in the Joint Decision of the trial court that must be rectified in
order to avoid its repetition. The trial court erroneously included an additional one day on the maximum period of
arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the range of said penalty. The duration of
arresto mayor is only from one month and one day to six months. Adding one day to the maximum penalty will place
it within the range of prision correccional.

Moreover, imposing the maximum penalty of imprisonment of four years, four months and one day of prision
correccional is also incorrect as it is outside the range of the penalty imposable in this case. x x x

xxxx

The error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law
as it is within the Court’s duty and inherent power. x x x

xxxx

Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in
accordance with the law and nothing else. It is not tantamount to a reduction in order to be favorable to the petitioner
nor an increase so as to be prejudicial to him.72

In People v. Gatward73 the Court explicitly stated that by merely modifying the penalty imposed, it is not reopening
the case; neither is it saying that there was error in judgment. In the same manner, in this case, we are not
reopening G.R. No. 144332, much more reversing it. Thus:

x x x In the case of U Aung Win, and the same hold true with respect to Gatward, the penalty inflicted by the court a
quo was a nullity because it was never authorized by law as a valid punishment. The penalties which consisted of
aliquot one-third portions of an indivisible penalty are self-contradictory in terms and unknown in penal law. Without
intending to sound sardonic or facetious, it was akin to imposing the indivisible penalties of public censure, or
perpetual absolute or special disqualification, or death in their minimum or maximum periods.

This was not a case of a court rendering an erroneous judgment by inflicting a penalty higher or lower than the one
imposable under the law but with both penalties being legally recognized and authorized as valid punishments. An
erroneous judgment, as thus understood, is a valid judgment. But a judgment which ordains a penalty which does
not exist in the catalogue of penalties or which is an impossible version of that in the roster of lawful penalties is
necessarily void, since the error goes into the very essence of the penalty and does not merely arise from the
misapplication thereof. Corollarily, such a judgment can never become final and executory. 1âwphi1

Nor can it be said that, despite the failure of the accused to appeal, his case was reopened in order that a higher
penalty may be imposed on him. There is here no reopening of the case, as in fact the judgment is being affirmed
but with a correction of the very substance of the penalty to make it conformable to law, pursuant to a duty and
power inherent in this Court. The penalty has not been changed since what was decreed by the trial court and is
now being likewise affirmed by this Court is the same penalty of reclusion perpetua which, unfortunately, was
imposed by the lower court in an elemental form which is non-existent in and not authorized by law. Just as the
penalty has not been reduced in order to be favorable to the accused, neither has it been increased so as to be
prejudicial to him.

Finally, no constitutional or legal right of this accused is violated by the imposition upon him of the corrected
duration, inherent in the essence and concept, of the penalty. Otherwise, he would be serving a void sentence with
an illegitimate penalty born out of a figurative liaison between judicial legislation and unequal protection of law. He
would thus be the victim of an inadvertence which could result in the nullification, not only of the judgment and the
penalty meted therein, but also of the sentence he may actually have served. Far from violating any right of U Aung
Win, therefore, the remedial and corrective measures interposed by this opinion protect him against the risk of
another trial and review aimed at determining the correct period of imprisonment.74

Also, it would not be amiss to mention that the Office of the Solicitor General prayed for the modification of the
imposable penalty.75

Finally, pursuant to Section 11(a),76Rule 122 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, the favorable modification
of the penalty should likewise apply to petitioner's co-accused who failed to appeal.77

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The May 4, 2007 and the September 4, 2007 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98502 are hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, for reasons stated above, the
September 8, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 2672, is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. The accused, namely, Efren S.
Almuete, Johnny Ila y Ramel and Joel Lloren y dela Cruz are each sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125299 January 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:

On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y Catama @ "Neneth"
were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. 1 The
information reads:

That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another
eleven (11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of
the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members of the North
Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two
(2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom
agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting
between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong
City.

On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco
Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members.
P/Insp. Cortes designated P03 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the
team as perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom,
gave the team P2, 000. 00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 — a
one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills 3 — as money for the buy-bust operation. The market
price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. P03 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their
serial numbers in the police blotter.4 The team rode in two cars and headed for the target area.

At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1)
kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed P03 Manlangit to
wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate.5 An
hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where P03 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting.
"Jun" took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to P03 Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on
him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth.6 "Jun" led the
police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.

The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his
associate.7 SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house.
Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps
was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's"
house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.

Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth."8 The policemen
arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned
them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y
Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from
"Jun" plus the ten (10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.9 The
bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams. 10

The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao. Florencio Doria, a
33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the morning, he was at the gate of his house
reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many
"Totoys" in their area and as the men questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any
"Totoy." The men took accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community.
When accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point out the
house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to
"Totoy's" house.

Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later identified as P03
Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked around the house for about three
minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house and they saw
Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there.
Curious onlookers and kibitzers were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men
were already inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found a
carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw box on top of the table. The box was open and had something inside.
P03 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the car. They were brought to police
headquarters where they were investigated.

Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his acquaintance,
Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This
closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife.11

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5, 1995, she was at her
house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband and five (5) children, namely, Arvy,
aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5, and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant
woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a
housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son,
Arvy, left for school at 6:45 A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay
to school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson remained
standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they headed for home. Along the
way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping water when a man clad in short pants and
denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She
found out later that the man was P03 Manlangit.

Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about a box on top of the
table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a piece of green straw. The men
opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not know anything about the box and its contents.

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend of her husband, and
that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She denied the charge against her and
Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her person.12

After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found
the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death and pay a
fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA
GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.

According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations
of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234
SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions
of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:

The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person
who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons

collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime.

the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y
BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
 The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.

Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City
Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.

Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.

SO ORDERED. 13

Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH
DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-
BUYER.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA

FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE. 14

Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY
OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST WAS CONDUCTED.

II

THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO
DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS
OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS
RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF
RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 15

The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the apprehension of
accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of
her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom.

Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an
offense.16 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due regard to constitutional and legal
safeguards.17

Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American doctrine that evolved
from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of crimes, particularly liquor and
narcotics offenses.18 Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and
application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal law.19 It also took off from a spontaneous moral
revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might
otherwise resist.20

In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it is understood as
the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal
prosecution against him.21 The classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v.
United States,22 the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and
planning of an offense by an officer, and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated
it except for the trickery, percuasion or fraud of the officers."23 It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of percuasion,
trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to commit a crime; and
(b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials rather than that of the innocent
defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement officer.24

It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or
about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of
another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career.25 Where the
criminal intent originates criminal in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission
of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had.26 Where,
however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that
a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of
the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary
to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be convicted.27 The law tolerates the use of decoys
and other artifices to catch a criminal.

Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense28 that can be raised by an accused and partakes of the nature of a
confession and avoidance.29 It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the burden of providing sufficient
evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense. Once established, the burden shifts to the
governmet to show otherwise.30 When entrapment is raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of
state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States 31 to determine
whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the
offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. 32 All relevant
facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the
crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime.33 The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct 34 and reflects an
attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."35 If the accused
was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment
defense will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.36 Some states, however, have
adopted the "objective" test. 37 This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case of Grossman v. State 38 rendered
by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the
nature of the police activity involved and the propriety of police conduct.39 The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police
conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. 40 The test of entrapment is
whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the
offense;41 for purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the simple
opportunity to act unlawfully. 42 Official conduct that merely offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or
importuning,43 or appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not. 44 Proponents of this test believe that courts must
refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been established, the
methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should
not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.45 Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the accused and law
enforcement officer and the accused's response to the officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its commission are
considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would on a normal person.46

Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is claimed that the
"subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e, if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to
commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be deemed
impermissible.47 Delving into the accused's character and predisposition obscures the more important task of judging
police behavior and prejudices the accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past
crimes and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted
with inordinate inducements.48 On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the need for
considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by the police, may have an
important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police and and their agents was proper. 49 The
undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member
of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.50

Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the United States now
combine both the "subjective" and "objective"51 In Cruz v. State,52 the Florida Supreme Court declared that the
permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to
whether the accused was predisposed to commit the crime.53 In Baca v. State,54 the New Mexico Supreme Court
modified the state's entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or, that the police
exceeded the standards of proper investigation.55 The hybrid approaches combine and apply the "objective" and
"subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.

As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the accused caught
in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,56 we acquitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after
finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in order to
prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a
saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded
significance to the fact that it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium
den where both of them could smoke this drug.57 The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible."58 In People v. Abella,59 we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining
the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The police officer offered "a
tempting price, . . . a very high one" causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found that there was
inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no
evidence sufficient to convict the accused.60 In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, 61 we convicted the accused
after finding that there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs
secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the accused had
already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer did not induce the
accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of
Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.62

It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng 63 we first laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-
vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,64 we held:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while
instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his
way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by
the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence
or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of
a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was
formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate
notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief
in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a "spotter,"
detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary. 65
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v. Galicia,66 the
appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation." The instigator
practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In
entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the
lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan.67 In People v. Tan Tiong,68 the Court of Appeals further declared that
"entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.69

The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court in People v. Tiu
Ua.70Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public
policy and illegal.71

It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to instigation or inducement
in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense available to the accused. It is instigation
that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.72 To determine whether there is a entrapment or instigation,
our courts have mainly examined the conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to
commit the crime. The "objective" test first applied in United States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar
cases.73 Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the
"subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,74 we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence
of the accused's membership with the notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous his convictions of other
crimes 75 and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that
the accused did not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v. Yutuc 76 thereby sustaining his defense that
led to his acquittal.

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics operations. In
recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust
operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling
laws are regulatory statutes.77 They are rules of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the
affairs of society, and their violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.78 They are not the traditional type of criminal
law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently wrongful
and immoral. 79 Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals,
but against public order.80 Violation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole and is generally unattended with
any particular harm to a definite person.81 These offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many
devices and subterfuges to avoid detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he
condemns acts mala prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that
government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved
individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be present at the time the
offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.82

Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential informant system breeds
abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers
and gamblers also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informant himself maybe a drug
addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that
government is secretly mated with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is
not an inspiring one.83 Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law
enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion — harassment, extortion,
vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This Court has taken judicial
notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases84 where we observed that it is a common modus operandi of corrupt
law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.85 The use of shady
underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or
property of trusting and ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have
compelled this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases.86 Criminal activity is such that stealth and strategy,
although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable police methods as the
coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme Court of California in People v. Barraza,87

[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping,
false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring
from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is
condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal
class,' justifies the employment of illegal means. 88

It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty by law
enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should not by
itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights of the individual.89 It is the
duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless
enforcement.90 Courts should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an
innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.91

We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported
transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer
and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.92 The manner by which the initial contact was made,
whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny
by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts
into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all
factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement. 1âw phi 1.nêt

In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially contacted accused-
appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by PO3 Manlangit who posed as the
buyer of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for
one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of
marijuana to P03 Manlangit.

PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straightforward and categorical manner and his credibility was not
crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, P03 Manlangit's testimony was corroborated on its
material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal
to the prosecution. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and
preserve their invaluable service to the police.93 It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies
selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers,94 or there
are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,95 or that only the
informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,96 the testimony of the informant may
be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.97 There is
no need to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by
prosecution witnesses.98

The inconsistencies in P03 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police officers' testimonies are
minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the
buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was
paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.

Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3 Manlangit was actually
identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants' apprehension, the Narcom agents placed
this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten
(10) bricks inside. This is why the carton box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial
court. The one (1) brick recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and
marked in court. Thus:

ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:

Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to
identify that box?

A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven
pieces of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.

Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.

PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box. . .

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:

Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are
now dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was
handed to him by Jun?

COURT So be it.

ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out them after item
from the box showed to him and brought in front of him.

COURT Noted.

Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?

xxx xxx xxx

A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.

Q Point to the court, where are those markings?

A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.

PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the
signature.

Q Whose signature is that?

ATTY. VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the
fiscal as to what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?

PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your
Honor, despite reconsideration.

COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it
has done to the court.

ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.

A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.

COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"

A Yes, your Honor.

Q What makes you so sure?

A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked
before I brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.

Q What are you sure of?

 A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.

Q What makes you so sure?

A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and
before we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and
this be marked as Exhibit "D?"

COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."

Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and
figures on this plastic?

A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this
Exhibit "A."

Q How about this one?

A I don't know who made this marking, sir.

PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.

Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."

A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made
these markings, sir.

PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed. . .

ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it
appears D-394-95 also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I
want to make it of record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.

COURT Noted. The court saw it.

Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper
wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams
SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"

COURT Tag it. Mark it.

Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given
to you by whom?

A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.

Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?

xxx xxx xxx

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to
Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to
the house of Neneth, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 99

The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun" at the corner of
Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic wrapping were marked as
Exhibits "D," "D-l," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred seventy (970) grams. 100

We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that P03 Manlangit and his team waited for almost one hour for
appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00 strains credulity. Appellant cannot
capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana in the case at bar did not change hands under the
usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a
simultaneous exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug between the poseur- buyer and the
pusher.101 Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. 102

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed
in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
 (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx 103

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust
operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. 104

The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of
marijuana and marked bills are different matters.

Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such
warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 105 The rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure
may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following
instances: 106 (1) search incident to a lawful arrest;107 (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; 108 (3) search in violation
of customs laws; 109 (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; 110 (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. 111

The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure
of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a search warrant. It is claimed, however,
that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident
to her lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated
in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3
Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:

ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:

We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.

Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given
to you by whom?

A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.

Q How about, the other items that you were able to recover?

ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis
for that question.

COURT There is. Answer.

A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to
Jun the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to
the house of Neneth, sir.

Q Whereat?

A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.

Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?

A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust
money, sir.

Q You mentioned "him?"

A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave
her, sir.

Q And what happened?

A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust
money, sir.

xxx xxx xxx 112

SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:

Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?

A To arrest her, sir.

Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling
Neneth was there?

A Yes, sir.

Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?

A I saw her outside, sir.

Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?

A She was 'sa bandang poso.'

Q Carrying a baby?

A No, sir.

Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her
outside the house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the
house?

A No, sir.

Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house
doing her daily chores. Am I correct?

A I just saw her outside, sir.

Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit
approached her?

A PO3 Manlangit, sir.

Q You did not approach her because P03 Manlangit approached her?

A Yes, sir.

Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit
was taking place, you were just in the side lines?

A I was just watching, sir.

Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely
according to you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?

A P03 Manlangit, sir.

Q Manlangit got the marijuana?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the money from Aling Neneth?

A I don't know, sir.

Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?

PROSECUTOR:

There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there 's no testimony on that.

ATTY. VALDEZ:

I was asking him precisely.

PROSECUTOR:

No basis.

COURT:

Sustained.
 Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the
records, the amount of P1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth.
That's right?

A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.

Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not
the one who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?

A I saw it, sir.

Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?

A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.

Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth.
Is that what you are trying to tell the Court?

A No, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ:

I am through with this witness, your Honor. 113

Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there
was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit."114 In fact,
she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.

Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause"
which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion."115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.116 A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.117

Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused.
PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response
to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money was.118 Appellant Doria did not point to appellant
Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This
identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in
pushing drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house,119 with or without her knowledge, with or
without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds
to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless
arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal
offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.120

Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and
home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain
view, making its warrantless seizure valid.

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
even without a search warrant and maybe introduced in evidence.121 The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.122 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area.123 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he
came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.124 The object must be open to eye and
hand125 and its discovery inadvertent.126

It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the
object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in
plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be seized.127 In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer
could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.128 It
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.129

PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:

ATTY. VALDEZ:

So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?

A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q This carton, according to you was under a table?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?

A Yes, sir.

Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?

A It was open, sir. Not like that.

COURT

Go down there. Show to the court.

INTERPRETER

Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.

A Like this, sir.

PROSECUTOR

Can we describe it?

ATTY. VALDEZ

Yes.

PROSECUTOR

One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.

COURT

Noted.

Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q And got hold of this carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?

A I asked her, what's this. . .

Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?

A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and
he asked "Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?"
sir.

Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked,
is it not [sic]?

A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.

Q Who got hold of this?

A I was the one, sir.

Q You were the one who got this?

A Yes, sir.

Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was
already retrieved by Badua?

A Yes, sir.

Q You went inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

Q You did not have any search warrant?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that
Mrs. Gadao was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you
did not know whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?

A Yes, sir.

Q How far was this from the door?

A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.

Q Under the table according to you?

A Yes, sir, dining table.

Q Somewhere here?

A It's far, sir.

PROSECUTOR

May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?

A Here, sir.

Q What you see is a carton?

A Yes, sir, with plastic.

Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?

A Yes, sir.

Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?

A Yes, sir.

Q That is all that you saw?

A Yes, sir.

PROSECUTOR

For the record, your Honor. . .

Q You were only able to verify according to you . . .

PRESECUTOR

Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it . .

.

ATTY. VALDEZ

That's a piece of plastic.

PROSECUTOR

By reading it, it will connote . . . this is not a piece of plastic.

ATTY. VALDEZ

What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?

PROSECUTOR

With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of
plastic may be big or a small one, for record purposes.

COURT

Leave that to the court.

PROSECUTOR

Leave that to the court.

 Q The only reason according to you, you were able to . . . Look at this, no even
Superman . . . I withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the
contents here. And according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?

A Yes, sir.

Q Siopao?

A Yes, sir.

Q Canned goods?

A Yes, sir.

Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?

A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may . . .

Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could
possibly be.

A It's the same plastic, sir.

ATTY. VALDEZ

I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the
information. Let the prosecutor do that for you.

COURT

Continue. Next question.

xxx xxx xxx 130

P03 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there by
appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao until
appellant Doria name her and led them to her.131 Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's house, P03
Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and
underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something wrapped in plastic.

In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because
he himself checked and marked the said contents.132 On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely
presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A
close scrutiny of the records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly
manifest its contents to a viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old
newspaper and placed inside plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color.133 PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on
cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what
the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents.134 It was not immediately apparent to PO3
Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution.135 It was fruit of the poisonous tree and
should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.136

The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana137 was found in the house of accused-appellant
Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.138 Apropos is our ruling in People v.
Aminnudin,139 viz:

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said,
'I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself. 140

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act
No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of a prohibited drug" with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10 million, to wit:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

xxx xxx xxx

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the
sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the drug, i.e.,
the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.141 The prosecution has clearly established the fact that in
 consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered nine hundred
seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The prosecution, however, has failed
to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-appellant Doria in the sale of said drug.
There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua must be
imposed.142

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as a Special Court in
Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:

1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., please see concurring opinion.

Separate Opinions

PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion;

I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. This Decision rightfully
brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been
modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.1 I just wish to outline some guidelines on when an arrest or a
search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help, especially to our law enforcers who are often
faced with actual situations that promptly call for their application.

Valid Arrests

Without Warrants

Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without a warrant is lawful. It
states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx

I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently misapplied and misinterpreted,
not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and lawyers as well.

At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the
fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section
5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let me elaborate.

1. In Flagrante

Delicto Arrests

Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.2 The accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.3

It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears suspicious. Thus, in the
recent en banc case of Malicat v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court, through now Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., held
that the fact that the appellant's eyes were "moving very fast" and looking at every approaching person were not
sufficient to suspect him of "attempting to commit a crime," much less to justify his arrest and subsequent search
without a warrant. The Court said that "there was nothing in [Malacat's] behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion" that he was armed with a deadly weapon. In other words, there was no
overt physical act on the part of the suspect, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was
committing or attempting to commit one. There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police officers to arrest or
search him.

The same was true in People v. Mengote,5 where the arresting police tried to justify the warrantless arrest of the
appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious. The "suspicious" acts consisted of his darting eyes and the
fact that his hand was over his abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification, stated: "By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually
being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.6

In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly indicative of a criminal act. If
there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the suspect cannot be validly apprehended under this
paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time be undertaking a felonious enterprise.

This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin 7 and again in People v. Encinada.8 In both cases, the
appellants were arrested while disembarking from a ship, on account of a tip received from an informant that they
were carrying prohibited drugs. The Court invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that at the moment of
their arrests, the appellants were simply descending the gangplank, without manifesting any suspicious behavior
that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. To all appearances, they were not committing a crime; nor
was it shown that they were about to do so or had just done so. There was, therefore, no valid reason for their
arrests.

Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the distinguished Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado in People v. Montilla,9 when he upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest of the appellant while the
latter was merely alighting from a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla could not have been perceived as
committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a traveling bag and a carton. He did not exhibit
any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he was
embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was no outward manifestation that he had just committed or was
committing or attempting to commit an offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid
because he was caught in flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him down was his implied
waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest.

2. "Hot Pursuit"

Arrests

Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests.10 Here, two elements must also concur prior to the
arrest: (1) and "offense has in fact been committed," (2) the arresting officer "has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested . . . committed [the offense]." In effecting this type of arrest, "it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in
fact or actually have been committed first. . . . The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.11

Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense, they must have
direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was
committed. AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested, indicating that he perpetrated
the crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect committed the crime will not suffice. The arresting
officers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts showing that the suspect performed the criminal act.
Personal knowledge means actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime.12

In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain individuals or groups were
engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of
the lawmen. In People v. Burgos,13 a certain Masamlok informed police authorities that the appellant was involved in
subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such information and without securing a judicial warrant, the police
proceeded to appellant's house to arrest him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and
subversive materials.

The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, since the information
came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed out that at the time of his arrest, appellant was not in
actual possession of any firearm or subversive document; neither was he committing a subversive act.14 His
warrantless arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the instances in Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the
Rules of Court.

Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification that the arresting officer "received
an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard M/V Sweet
Pearl." The Court categorically stated that such "[r]aw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a
warrantless arrest."15 And since, at the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be
ascribed to appellant, there was no valid justification for his arrest.

To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses for which the culprit could be
arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos,16 there were strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a
suspected member of the New People's Army (NPA), while he was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital.
He alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest without a warrant, because he was not then committing
any offense nor were there any indications that he had just committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact
confined in a hospital.

The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently charged, was a continuing offense. For
purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA member "did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, . . .
simply because he was, at the time of his arrest, confined in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike other so-called 'common'
offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion
are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until
the overriding object of overthrowing organized government is attained.17

In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the searches conducted
subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to the invalid search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g.
marijuana or unlicensed firearm), were considered inadmissable as evidence against the person wrongfully
arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted without a judicial warrant must be prcceded
by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly issued therefor.
To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote these inspiring words from the
precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos:18

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.

Valid Searches

Without Warrant

The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and seizure may be conducted.
The only allowable instances in which a search may be conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to
lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) searches incidental
to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and frisk.19

1. Search Incident

to Lawful Arrest

Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for dangerous
weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is, however, limited
to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended to or made in a place
other than the place of the arrest.20

2. The "Plain View"

Doctrine

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position
where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently
comes across (or sees in plainview) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such
officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.21

3. Search of

Moving Vehicles

The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified by practicability, viz.:22

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

xxx xxx xxx

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form
in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains they furnish for
successful commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift escape
unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control and
reasonable search on highways or other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader
than their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to
which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a
highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

4. Customs Searches

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without warrants, for
purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the
Code specifically allows police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law.23

5. Search With Consent

Waiver of any objection to the unresonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to the rule against
a warrantless search.24 The consent to the search, however, must be express knowing and voluntary. A search
based merely on implied acquiescene is not valid, because such consent is not within the purview of the
constitutional gurantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances.25
 6. Stop and Frisk

The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v. Ohio.27 The idea is
that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should be applied has been laid down as follows:28

. . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behaviour,
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.

As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere suspicious
behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him.29

A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 30 and in Manalili v. Court of
Appeals.31 In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police,
observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobby manner along the city
cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police
experience, such suspicious behaviour was characteristic of persons who were "high" on drugs. The Court held that
past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to
investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be
admissible in evidence.

Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity of a judicial warrant for
any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed. Foremost in our minds must still be every person's
prized and fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our Constitution.

WHEREFORE, I vote to ACQUIT Appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama, as well as to REDUCE the penalty of
Appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.

Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring opinion;

I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. This Decision rightfully
brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been
modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla.1 I just wish to outline some guidelines on when an arrest or a
search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help, especially to our law enforcers who are often
faced with actual situations that promptly call for their application.

Valid Arrests

Without Warrants

Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without a warrant is lawful. It
states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

xxx xxx xxx

I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently misapplied and misinterpreted,
not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and lawyers as well.

At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the
fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section
5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let me elaborate.

1. In Flagrante

Delicto Arrests

Sec. 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests.2 The accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the
arresting officer. There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.3
It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears suspicious. Thus, in the
recent en banc case of Malicat v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court, through now Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., held
that the fact that the appellant's eyes were "moving very fast" and looking at every approaching person were not
sufficient to suspect him of "attempting to commit a crime," much less to justify his arrest and subsequent search
without a warrant. The Court said that "there was nothing in [Malacat's] behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion" that he was armed with a deadly weapon. In other words, there was no
overt physical act on the part of the suspect, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was
committing or attempting to commit one. There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police officers to arrest or
search him.

The same was true in People v. Mengote,5 where the arresting police tried to justify the warrantless arrest of the
appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious. The "suspicious" acts consisted of his darting eyes and the
fact that his hand was over his abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification, stated: "By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually
being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.6

In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly indicative of a criminal act. If
there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the suspect cannot be validly apprehended under this
paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time be undertaking a felonious enterprise.

This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin 7 and again in People v. Encinada.8 In both cases, the
appellants were arrested while disembarking from a ship, on account of a tip received from an informant that they
were carrying prohibited drugs. The Court invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that at the moment of
their arrests, the appellants were simply descending the gangplank, without manifesting any suspicious behavior
that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. To all appearances, they were not committing a crime; nor
was it shown that they were about to do so or had just done so. There was, therefore, no valid reason for their
arrests.

Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the distinguished Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado in People v. Montilla,9 when he upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest of the appellant while the
latter was merely alighting from a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla could not have been perceived as
committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a traveling bag and a carton. He did not exhibit
any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he was
embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was no outward manifestation that he had just committed or was
committing or attempting to commit an offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montilla's arrest was valid
because he was caught in flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him down was his implied
waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest.

2. "Hot Pursuit"

Arrests

Sec. 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on "hot pursuit" arrests.10 Here, two elements must also concur prior to the
arrest: (1) and "offense has in fact been committed," (2) the arresting officer "has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested . . . committed [the offense]." In effecting this type of arrest, "it is not enough
that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in
fact or actually have been committed first. . . . The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.11

Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense, they must have
direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was
committed. AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested, indicating that he perpetrated
the crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect committed the crime will not suffice. The arresting
officers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts showing that the suspect performed the criminal act.
Personal knowledge means actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime.12

In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain individuals or groups were
engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of
the lawmen. In People v. Burgos,13 a certain Masamlok informed police authorities that the appellant was involved in
subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such information and without securing a judicial warrant, the police
proceeded to appellant's house to arrest him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and
subversive materials.

The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, since the information
came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed out that at the time of his arrest, appellant was not in
actual possession of any firearm or subversive document; neither was he committing a subversive act.14 His
warrantless arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the instances in Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the
Rules of Court.

Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification that the arresting officer "received
an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard M/V Sweet
Pearl." The Court categorically stated that such "[r]aw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a
warrantless arrest."15 And since, at the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be
ascribed to appellant, there was no valid justification for his arrest.

To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses for which the culprit could be
arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos,16 there were strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a
suspected member of the New People's Army (NPA), while he was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital.
He alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest without a warrant, because he was not then committing
any offense nor were there any indications that he had just committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact
confined in a hospital.

The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently charged, was a continuing offense. For
purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA member "did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, . . .
simply because he was, at the time of his arrest, confined in the . . . [hospital]." "Unlike other so-called 'common'
offenses, i.e., adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion
are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until
the overriding object of overthrowing organized government is attained.17

In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the searches conducted
subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to the invalid search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g.
marijuana or unlicensed firearm), were considered inadmissable as evidence against the person wrongfully
arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted without a judicial warrant must be prcceded
by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly issued therefor.

To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote these inspiring words from the
precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos:18

The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation
of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the
requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the
situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set
back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection.

Valid Searches

Without Warrant

The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and seizure may be conducted.
The only allowable instances in which a search may be conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to
lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to the "plain view" doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) searches incidental
to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a "stop and frisk.19

1. Search Incident

to Lawful Arrest

Section 12 of Rule 126 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for dangerous
weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is, however, limited
to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended to or made in a place
other than the place of the arrest.20

2. The "Plain View"

Doctrine

The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position
where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently
comes across (or sees in plainview) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such
officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.21

3. Search of

Moving Vehicles

The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified by practicability, viz.:22

The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

xxx xxx xxx

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle . . . Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form
in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains they furnish for
successful commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift escape
unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control and
reasonable search on highways or other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader
than their use in so-called 'bootlegging' or 'rum running,' which in itself is no small matter. While a
possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of
which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to
which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those
against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of
common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper
administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a
highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be
determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

4. Customs Searches

Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without warrants, for
purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the
Code specifically allows police authorities to "enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any
trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law.23
 5. Search With Consent

Waiver of any objection to the unresonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to the rule against
a warrantless search.24 The consent to the search, however, must be express knowing and voluntary. A search
based merely on implied acquiescene is not valid, because such consent is not within the purview of the
constitutional gurantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive
circumstances.25

6. Stop and Frisk

The "stop and frisk" concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v. Ohio.27 The idea is
that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a
person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latter's outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapons. The strict manner in which this notion should be applied has been laid down as follows:28

. . . where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behaviour,
he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial
stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault
him.

As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere suspicious
behavior would not call for a "stop and frisk." There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with the police
officer's experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him.29

A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals 30 and in Manalili v. Court of
Appeals.31 In Manalili, the law enforcers who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police,
observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobby manner along the city
cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police
experience, such suspicious behaviour was characteristic of persons who were "high" on drugs. The Court held that
past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to
investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in the suspect's possession was held to be
admissible in evidence.

Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity of a judicial warrant for
any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed. Foremost in our minds must still be every person's
prized and fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our Constitution. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, I vote to ACQUIT Appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama, as well as to REDUCE the penalty of
Appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado to reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000.

G.R. No. 196390 September 28, 2011

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner,

vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful
ownerwho is not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and before
judgment.

Antecedents

On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No.
91651 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory
portion of the information for which reads as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding each other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell,
trade, deliver and give away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained
in six (6) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when
subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous
drug.2

Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-
209, with the information alleging:

That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following:
 a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules containing white powdery
substance contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams,
which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as "Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;

b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance with total recorded
net weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for
presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;

c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-
yellow folded paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;

d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of
54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.3

In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence.
He averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-
drug effects from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to
return his personal effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed that his personal effects be
tendered to the trial court to be returned to himupon verification.4

On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and Objection,5 proposingthereby that
the delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the
trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of
the City Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission of
the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of
dangerous drugs.

On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1)
photograph the abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and
the return should be fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused,
Richard S. Brodett and Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.

SO ORDERED.6

PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit,
to wit:

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order
of the Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.

SO ORDERED.7

Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the
orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:

xxxx

Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of
Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra
S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of
dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the
subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

xxxx

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous.
Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is
to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation
is consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, PDEA appeals.

Issues

Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent
of the framers of R. A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car,
registered under the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused Brodettduring a
legitimate anti-illegal operation and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the Motion to Return
Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had
belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was
under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.
In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any question of law that warranted a review by
the Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the
proceeds or instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless
such proceeds or instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely
mistaken in its reading that the third person must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the
commission of the crime; and that PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition for review.

The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing

property confiscated in criminal proceedings

It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to
order upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents,
papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or
possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused must not profit from his
crime, or must not acquire property or the right to possession of property through his unlawful act.12 As justification
for thesecond, to return to the convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or
proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband again.13 Indeed, the
court having jurisdiction over the offense has theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime,
such disposition being an accessory penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third
person not liable for the offense that it was used as the instrument to commit.14

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to
the Government.15 But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it
can be said to be within its jurisdiction.16

According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by
authority of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a
search warrant, the personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that
which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat which has been used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.17 If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure
may be made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the
commission of an offense.18 Should there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized
is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its
possession is but a matter of course,19 except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A proper court may order the return
of property held solely as evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a criminal
prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the case is finally terminated.21

Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the
property was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial court has the power to return property held as
evidence to its rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the Government.24 Property
used as evidence must be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is
then subject to forfeiture or other proceedings.25

II

Order of release was premature and made

in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165

It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of
the criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.

In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all
the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other assets
obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are
the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of
confiscation and forfeiture any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of
Myra S. Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra
S. Brodett has been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of
dangerous drugs. Applying Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the
subject Honda Accord may not be exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative
but to apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine
that the first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being
called only when such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted
to where a provision of law peremptorily calls for application.

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous.
Being so, there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is
to remove doubt and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation
is not consistent with the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.26 (emphases are in the original text)

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act,
including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential
chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:

Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties
or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. –
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the
cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry
with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act,
including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the
particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act,
but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of
Section 21 of this Act.

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately
schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and
properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be
found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is
a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.

During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may
be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and
no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same.

The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to
pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the
property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the
above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.27

There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to
the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, which states:

Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with
which it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they
be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful
commerce shall be destroyed.

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose,28 concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction with rape,
although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:

xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the
commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this
Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the
said car should be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in replevin case. xxx29

Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments
belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture
of the goods seized.30

However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection submitted on August 27,
2009 in the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there
throughout the duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible
evidentiary value. The Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to
bethe vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the
commission of the violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of
the framers of R. A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the law
because it had been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion
to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if
the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because
she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It
insists that the car is a property in custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.

We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.

We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when
the criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at
that pointof the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly
forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has been
confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional
Trial Court.Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain in
custodialegis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165, would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any other
article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the
judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.

The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the
RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To
release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might
not fill in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language
of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.

Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears
thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal
Case No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug
evidence except the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:

The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar.
The Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the
glaring blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down
to the presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as
it is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the
crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.

The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered returned to
the accused.

The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money confiscated from both accused
are ordered escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper
disposition. (emphasis supplied)33

The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to render further action upon it
superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of
confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense,
in order to clarify the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165.34 This the Court must
now do in view of the question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of
repetition in the future.35
1âw phi 1

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No.
9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the
rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.

SO ORDERED.