CHARLES L. ONG, Petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE Cacho and Lauro Cacho.
cho and Lauro Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25,
2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
76085, which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002
Decision[2] of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan,
Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-023, and the
November 20, 2006 Resolution [3] which denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his
behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers,
namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for
Registration of Title[4] over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in
Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of
five hundred seventy four (574) square meters, more or less.
They alleged that they are the co-owners of the subject lot;
that the subject lot is their exclusive property having
acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista
and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is
presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful
possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for
more than thirty (30) years.
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of
the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration
of title. Respondent asserted that neither applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed
to adduce any muniment of title to prove their claims; that
the tax declaration appended to the application does not
appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of
recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the
period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is
part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of
private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in
favor of petitioner and his brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant
indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant
(sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was
owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine
who acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from
Cynthia Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover
the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting the
land to spouses Tony C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in
turn sold the same land to herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the name of
the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its taxes
has (sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the possession
and ownership of the applicant and her (sic) predecessors-
in- interest over the same parcel of land has (sic) been
continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of ownership
before the filing of the instant application for registration on
[July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General
Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the registration
of a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897 approved
by the Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid,
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred
Seventy Four (574) square meters, subject of the application
for registration of title, in accordance with Presidential
Decree No. 1529, in favor of CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf
and as representative of his brothers namely, ROBERTO L.
ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the Solicitor
General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino
Domingo Jr., the Office of the Land Registration Authority,
Quezon City, as well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the decision of the court a quo granting the
application for registration of title of applicants-appellees is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of
Appeals found that the subject lot is part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. Thus, it was
incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they possessed the
subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by law.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in adverse possession of
the subject lot in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945
or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529. It
noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner
presented is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not
fairly claim possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was
petitioner able to prove that he or his predecessors-in-
interest actually occupied the subject lot prior to the filing of
application for registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER
WITH HIS BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L.
ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND CEZAR L. ONG,
HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE
REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND
REGISTRATION CASE NO. 99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSION OF THE FORMER SPECIAL
FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL
PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS CORRECT.[7]
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (“Property Registration Decree”),
as amended, provides —
SEC. 14. Who may apply. –The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law,
applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the
subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[8] These requisites involve
questions of fact which are not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Factual findings of the court a quo are generally
binding on this Court except for certain recognized
exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the
Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings.[9] After a
careful review of the records, we sustain the findings and
conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The
Report[10] dated January 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands
stated that the subject lot is “within the alienable and
disposable zone as classified under Project 50 L.C. Map No.
698 and released and classified as such on November 21,
1927.”[11] This finding is, likewise, embodied in the
1
Report[12] dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of
Page
Environment and Natural Resources Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO)
and the blue print Copy[13] of the plan covering the subject
lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the
subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on
August 24, 1998,[14] who in turn purchased the same from
spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16,
1997.[15] The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia,
Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho,
on July 10, 1979.[16] The earliest tax declaration which was
submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No.
25606[17] issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin
Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations are
not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner and a
claim of title over the subject property.[18] Even if we were to
tack petitioner’s claim of ownership over the subject lot to
that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses
Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this
would fall short of the required possession from June 12,
1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals,
possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable
lands of the public domain because the law requires
possession and occupation. As held in Republic v.
Alconaba:[19]
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it
includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law
adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact
that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as
a party would naturally exercise over his own property.[20]
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the
subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in
1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the
subject lot.[21] No improvements were made thereon and the
most that they did was to visit the lot on several
occasions.[22] Petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest, Tony
Bautista testified that he and his wife never actually occupied
the subject lot from the time they bought the same from
spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen in
1997.[23] Aside from these two testimonies, no other
evidence was presented to establish the character of the
possession of the subject lot by petitioner’s other alleged
predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, petitioner’s evidence failed
to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed
and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration
required by law.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing
evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the
land is of the nature and duration required by
law.[24] Unfortunately, petitioner’s evidence do not constitute
the “well-nigh incontrovertible” evidence necessary in cases
of this nature.[25] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not
err in reversing the Decision of the trial court and in denying
his application for registration of title over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is DENIED. The April 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085 which reversed and set
aside the January 16, 2002 Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case
No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
NELSIE B. CAÑETE, RONA ANAS, MILAGROSA APUAN,
ERLINDA AQUINO, GODOFREDO AQUINO, CORITA
BARREDO, TESSIE BARREDO, JESUS BATRINA,
ALBERTO BUENAVENTURA, BONIFACIO
BUENAVENTURA, EUSEBIO CAPIRAL, MARIO
CAPIRAL, LOLITA CAPIRAL, ELENA CAPIRAL, LETICIA
CAPIRAL, RENATO CAPIRAL, ELY CABANGON, ERWIN
CATALUNA, JESSIE CONRADO, JOEL CONRADO,
NARCISIO CONRADO, RICARDO CALAMPIANO,
ALUMNIO CORSANES, NILO COLATOY, MARJETO
DAYAN, HENRY DIAZ, SALVACION ESMANDE,
REYNALDO FUENTEBELLA, GERRY GEQUILLANA,
DELSIE GARCIA, NERISSA GONZALES, VISITACION
JUNSAY, ESTELA JOVEN, JOSE LANZUELA, MARLON
MALANGAYON, RENATO MARCELO, ANITA MARZONIA,
MARCELINO MONTALBO, AMADO MULI, JR., LEONITA
MULI, EDUARDO OLVIDO, ALMARIO PACON,
ASUNCION PACON, SALVACION PAGAYUNAN, ESTER
PANTALEON, SHERLITA RABE, ANITA REYES,
MEDELYN RIOS, BERTITO RIVAS, ENGRACIA RIVERA,
GERALYN RIVERA, ARMANDO RIVERA, MA. MERCY
SHERVA, ALEXANDER SANGALAN, ERNESTO
SANTIAGO, JOY SANTIAGO, ELENA TALION, JOE
RANDY TRESVALLES, ELIAS VALENZUELA, GERRY
VALENZUELA, LILIBETH VALENZUELA, JOSEPHINE
VICTORINO, JOJO VICTORINO, MAXIMINO VICTORINO,
NOEL VICTORINO, REYNANTE VICTORINO, ROBERTO
VICTORINO and JOVITO VILLAREAL, represented by
NELSIE B. CAÑETE, Petitioners, vs. GENUINO ICE
COMPANY, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SATIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 64337 entitled “Genuino Ice Company,
Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P. Evangelista, Nelsie B. Cañete,
et al.,” and its Resolution[2] dated June 26, 2002, dismissing
petitioners’ “Second Amended Complaint” in Civil Case
No. Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City.
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a
complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-
140441;[3]14399;[4] RT-94384 (292245);[5] RT-94794
(292246);[6] and 292247.[7] Petitioners alleged that said titles
are spurious, fictitious and were issued “under mysterious
circumstances,” considering that the holders thereof –
including their predecessors-in-interest – were never in
actual, adverse and physical possession of the property,
rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property
under the Friar Lands Act.[8] Petitioners also sought to nullify
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the
foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were
derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss[9] on the ground that the complaint states no cause
of action because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest;
that no relief may be granted as a matter of law; and that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies, but it
was denied by the trial court. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a “Second Amended
Complaint”[10] which sought to annul, in addition to the titles
already alleged in the original complaint, TCT Nos. 274095
and 274096;[11] 274097 and 274098;[12] and 274099.[13]
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following
causes of action, as well as the remedy sought to be
obtained, thus:
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-
in-interest are among those who have been in
actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous
possession in concept of owners of unregistered
parcels of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay
Culiat, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which parcels
of land are more particularly described as follows:
2
Page
(1) “A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668, situated
at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x.”

(2) “A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669, situated
at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x.”
5. That the above-described real property is a portion
of a friar land known as “Piedad Estate,” which
property is intended for distribution among the
bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to the Friar
Lands Act.
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having
originated or derived from Original Certificate of
Title No. 614 were issued by the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer certificates
of title are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious
and null and void, for the following reasons: (a)
that no record of any agency of the government
shows as to how and in what manner was OCT
614 issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings
whatsoever, whether judicial or administrative, can
support defendants’ claim that the above-
described property originated from OCT 614; and
(c) that the transfer certificates of title over the
above-described property were issued under
mysterious circumstances for the above-named
defendants and their so-called predecessors-in-
interest never had any actual, adverse, physical
possession of the said property, thus, not allowed
to acquire title over the property in litigation
pursuant to the Friar Lands Act.
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates
of title of the above-described property, which
transfer certificates of title are null and void, for
reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph 6
hereof x x x;
8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said
transfer certificates of title in violation of the Friar
Lands Act and other existing laws are prejudicial
to plaintiffs’ rights over the above-described
property.
9. That equity demands that defendants’ transfer
certificates of title as specified in Paragraph 7
hereof be declared fictitious, spurious and null and
void ab initio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all
transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants’ transfer
certificates of title over the property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel defendants’ transfer certificates of title and all transfer
certificates of title derived therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the
property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar
Lands Act and other existing laws.[14]
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint on the following grounds:
a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on
the allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real
parties in interest who may bring suit to cancel defendants’
(including respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations
and prayer of the complaint, no relief, as a matter of law,
may be granted;
b) Prescription has set in;
c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-
95-22834 and Q-95-23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs
against a different set of defendants but which involve the
same subject matter, cause of action and allegations of the
plaintiffs, with respect to the cancellation of OCT 614 and
succeeding titles derived from it. Said complaints have since
been dismissed by Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, the dismissal of which is the subject of a
pending certiorari proceeding in the appellate court.[15]
On January 3, 2001,[16] the trial court denied respondent’s
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Its
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied hence
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondent’s petition for
certiorari and dismissed petitioners’ Second Amended
Complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the
instant petition raising the following issues:
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE COMPLAINT FILED BY
THE PETITIONERS WITH THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL
CASE NO. Q-99-36483 DOES NOT STATE A
VALID CAUSE OF ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE PETITIONERS ARE
NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF “EXHAUSTION
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES”; and,
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND DENIED
PETITIONERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT.[17]
We deny the petition.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City,
a Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by the
Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de
Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd., and the
Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in
Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26,
1904.[18]
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in
the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the
provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally into
874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the
course of disposition, the number of lots increased to
1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of
Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as
1910 and records show that even before the Second World
War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed
of.[19] The Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the
mass of the public domain and has become private land duly
registered under the Torrens system following the procedure
for the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act
496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad Estate are no longer
lands of the public domain.[20]
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as
his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights
to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial,
as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were
bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands,
pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States,
approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but
from certain companies, a society and a religious
order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only “actual settlers and
occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the
Government” were given preference to lease, purchase, or
acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and
occupation of persons before the government acquired the
lands. [21]
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require
that every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical
form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate
facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or
defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere
evidentiary facts.[22] And in all averments of fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be
stated with particularity.[23]
3
Page
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine
the nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of
the courts. This is because the complaint must contain a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action and must specify the relief
sought. No rule is better established than that which
requires the complaint to contain a statement of all the facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. Additionally,
Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court provides that in all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. In the case at bar, while there are allegations of
fraud in the above quoted complaints, the same are not
particular enough to bring the controversy within the SEC's
jurisdiction. The said allegations are not statements of
ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the
rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from
mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General
allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and
reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise,
allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal,
ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts
showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law.[24]
“Ultimate facts” means the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are so essential
that they cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate.[25] “Cause of
action” has been defined as an act or omission of one party
in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;[26] and its
essential elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created; 2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and 3) an act or
omission on the part of the named defendant violative of the
right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation
of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not
extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action.[27] In the resolution of a motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the
complaint as well as its annexes must be considered.[28] The
test in such case is whether a court can render a valid
judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and
pursuant to the prayer therein.[29]
Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states
a cause of action against a defendant or the action is
premature is one of law. The trial court can consider all the
pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence
on record. However in so doing, the trial court does not rule
on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes
such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review
of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these
documents would not involve a calibration of the probative
value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to
the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the
facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what
would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions
of law, and not questions of fact.
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and
jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a
complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on
the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before
it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take
cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because
they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The
said decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal
system, and failure of any court to apply them shall
constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute in
accordance with law, and shall be a ground for
administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.[30]
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need
for particularity and incipient substantiation in the petitioners’
Second Amended Complaint.
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 – of which all the other
subject titles are derivatives – is null and void, has been
proven wrong. As has been held in Pinlac and other cases,
OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the
name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the
provisions of Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of
Natural Resources, which was specifically tasked to
investigate the historical background of the Piedad Estate,
found that as early as the period prior to the Second World
War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had already been disposed
of.
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens
system of land registration, which means that all lots therein
are titled.
Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires
land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-
interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by
reason of occupation from time immemorial, which means
that petitioners’ claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession of the subject property is really of no
moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest
were actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands
were acquired by the Government, and whose rights were
not disregarded even though they were in occupation of the
same before the government acquired the land; yet, no
period of time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.
Petitioners’ Second Amended Complaint betrays no more
than an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by
documentary or other exhibits; the allegations therein
partake of conclusions of law unsupported by a particular
averment of circumstances that will show why or how such
inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete with
sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts
that are not found therein. While there are allegations of
fraud upon the claim that the subject titles were fictitious,
spurious and obtained under “mysterious circumstances,”
the same are not specific to bring the controversy within the
trial court’s jurisdiction. There is no explanation or narration
of facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be
fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of the
Rules that the circumstances constituting fraud must be
stated with particularity; otherwise, the allegation of fraud
would simply be an unfounded conclusion of law. In the
absence of specific averments, the complaint is defective, for
it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for
the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they
are bona fide occupants of the subject property within the
contemplation of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been
in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of
the property, although it is not stated for how long and since
when. In their second amended complaint, they seek
judgment –
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the
property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar
Lands Act and other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject
property – despite their alleged adverse possession – but
only to be adjudged as the “bona fide occupants” thereof. In
other words, petitioners concede the State’s ownership of
the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties
in interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for
cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is
correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor
General, may institute such suit. Jurisprudence on the
matter has been settled and the issue need not be
belabored. Thus –
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the
proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint,
praying as it did for the cancellation of the transfer
certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were
derived from a “spurious” OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect
the validity of said title. While private respondents did not
pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we
agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will
have the same result of reverting the land to the government
under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that
only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in
that case held:
4
“The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on
Page
Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e.,
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it
alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that
he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment of
the defendant’s title, because, even if the said title were
canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced
therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the amendment,
would revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint
the plaintiff makes no pretense at all that any part of the land
covered by the defendant’s title was privately owned by him
or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is admitted
therein that the said land was at all times a part of the public
domain until December 18, 1964, when the government
issued a title thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is
any person or entity to relief, it can only be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiff’s own averments negate the
existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom that
whatever right might have been violated by the defendant
belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-
appellant argues that although his complaint is captioned as
one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated
therein several causes of action based on his alleged rights
of possession and ownership over the improvements, on
defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the
land, and on the damages allegedly incurred by him
(plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the improvements. These
matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether
or not defendant-appellee’s title should be canceled or
amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an effort to
make out a cause of action in relation to the said focal
issue. Indeed, the principal relief prayed for in the amended
complaint is the cancellation or amendment of defendant-
appellee’s title.”[31]
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. “Interest” within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The interest
of the party must also be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest.[32]
If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere
inchoate interest in the properties covered by the subject
titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact that if the
questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted
to the State, they would probably or possibly be given
preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the
property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not
the “interest” required by law that grants them license or the
personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does
the privilege belong.
On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
suffice it to state that since petitioners do not possess the
necessary interest to prosecute the case for cancellation of
title in the courts, neither do they have the right to pursue
administrative remedies outside thereof. They are not the
owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It has not
been shown by their complaint that they have previously
taken steps to avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands Act,
since all they seek, should the questioned titles be nullified,
is to be declared bona fide occupants of the property
covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any
indication that they possess the qualifications necessary to
enable them to avail of the preference granted under the Act.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners’ contention that
respondent belatedly filed the petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely
abused its discretion when it entertained and resolved the
same.
The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying
respondent’s motion to dismiss the Second Amended
Complaint was received by the respondent on January 16,
2001. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on
January 18, 2001 which was denied on February 28,
2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion for
reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it
filed a Notice to File Petition for Certiorari. On April 2, 2001,
the petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of
Appeals. Clearly, the same was timely filed hence, the
appellate court correctly entertained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64337 dismissing petitioners’ “Second Amended
Complaint” in Civil Case No. Q-99-36483 and the
Resolution dated June 26, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, PETITIONER, VS.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become
formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the
informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a
generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it
has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from
Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to
title these people and have not been able to do so
effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems in
Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In
Peru, the informals have means of proving property
ownership to each other which are not the same means
developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have
their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and their
own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly
stated in the maps which they use for their own informal
business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to
Peru, and you walk by field after field—in each field a
different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what
private property is all about. The only one who does not
know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a
"common law" and an "informal law" which the Latin
American formal legal system does not know how to
recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine
government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the
facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide
definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original
registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court
confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land
Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground.
The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as
the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our
current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in
addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part is
primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the
Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our
public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us
from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application
for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as
Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in
Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324
square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased
the property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
5
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for
Page
more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of
(RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear
on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare
property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino
had four sons- Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban-
the fourth being Aristedes's grandfather. Upon Lino's death,
his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban's wife, Magdalena, had
become the administrator of all the properties inherited by
the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them
in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which
originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. [5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not
cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that
he "also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of the
testimony given by Mr. Velazco."[6] The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial
was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
"verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per
Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982."[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application
for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy
One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square
Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other
proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is
of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property
belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had
been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect
title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application
of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree any period of
possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the
appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR
certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored
in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's
ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court
of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the
decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court,
rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed
down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals
is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court
therein which had directed the registration of the property
had no jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice
of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling
doctrine, especially when the property in question is
agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural
lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the
alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The
Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments,
to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it
sufficient that such classification occur at any time
prior to the filing of the applicant for registration
provided that it is established that the applicant
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed
private land and therefore susceptible to
acquisition by prescription in accordance with the
Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in
character either because of its use or because its
slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil
Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the
subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their
respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of
the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement
in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter
dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial
hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court
applied Naguit and adopted the same observation that the
preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was
patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that
for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945.
Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent
rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural
Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable land of the public domain for more than 30
years ipso jure converts the land into private property, thus
placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to
them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of
the public domain so long as, at the time of the application,
the property had already been "converted" into private
property through prescription. To bolster their argument,
petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling in Republic
6
v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
Page
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to
Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that
under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive
prescription of properties of the State refers to "patrimonial
property," while Section 14(2) speaks of "private lands." It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that
presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for
registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-
year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said
period should be reckoned from the time the public land was
declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to
the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject
property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. For a full understanding of the provision, reference
has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification
and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President
is authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or
mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain are further classified according to their uses
into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or
for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable,
or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites
and for public and quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her
name of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of "by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles"
through "judicial legalization."[22] Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details
and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites
stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present
wording in 1977 when the law was amended by P.D. No.
1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D.
No. 1073. First, the term "agricultural lands" was changed to
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." The
OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of
the lands that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the
case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, "agricultural
lands" are a mere subset of "lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition." Evidently, alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain are a larger class than
only "agricultural lands."
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed
from possession for "thirty (30) years immediately preceding
the filing of the application" to possession "since June 12,
1945 or earlier." The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to
register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona
fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty
(30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act
No, 141 is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws
relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision
reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration
Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public
Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer
to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier." That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been
repealed or mooted. That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act
and Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant
comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may
apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more
descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the
possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the
right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.
It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that
has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
has been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect or
7
complete his title by applying with the proper court for the
confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
Page
corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-
quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles,
and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is
indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn,
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree
recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding
original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of
an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section
48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period
within which one may exercise the right to seek registration
under Section 48. The provision has been amended several
times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It
currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following
section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond
December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of
this Chapter:Provided, That this period shall apply only
where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12)
hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time
designated by the President in accordance with Section
Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised
in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be
construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under
this Chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the
President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) may be
availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property
Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that
for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not
enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-
interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and disposable
character of the property must have been declared also as of
12 June 1945. Following the OSG's approach, all lands
certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945
cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication
was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located.[25] Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if
we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness
of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
it merely requires the property sought to be registered as
already alienable and disposable at the time the application
for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the
application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release
the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is
that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the
property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the
State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if
in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case,
then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section
14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary
pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit,
absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of
virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually
declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under
a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors
under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial
confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant,
especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the
scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since
the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in
the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the
notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly
overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Court's
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used
therein concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case
of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated
that "[a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the
[s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession..." That
statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly
erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited
in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The
application therein was ultimately granted, citing Section
14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not
establish any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948,
thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1). It is not
even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein
had claimed entitlement to original registration following
Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular
ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect
to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved
situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12
June 1945. The Court's interpretation of Section 14(1)
therein was decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt
as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final
word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor
of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished
from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals[27] since in the latter, the
application for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though
pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two.
Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the
ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of
possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain
land that was declared alienable and disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it,
and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at
registration in Ceniza should have failed. Not so.
8
Page
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found
to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated
December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the
real character of the land subject of private respondents'
application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of
regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence,which is
true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and
Forestry to contest the application of appellees on the
ground that the property still forms part of the public domain.
Nor is there any showing that the lots in question are forestal
land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law
would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title,
it did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as
the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private
respondents were able to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even
before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are
exceptions, petitioner did not show that this is one of
them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent
member who authored Bracewell, sanction the registration
under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared
alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days
after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza,
the application for registration was filed nearly six (6)
years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine
(9) years before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed
in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference
which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with
respect to Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion
concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize,
and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer
to it as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and
the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.[30] There is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[31] With such conversion, such property may now fall
within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike
in this case where petitioners have based their registration
bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence
definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far
back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on
prescription as the possible basis for application for original
registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article
1113 which provides legal foundation for the application. It
reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public
domain are patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to
acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public
domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive
prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The
Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or
mineral lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code
concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by
ordinary prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through
extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith,[34] as well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly provides that persons "who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to the Civil
Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil
Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the
acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical
question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2)
does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has
acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the
"thirty-year" period, additional complexities relating to
Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge.
For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-
year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957,
which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by
granting the right to seek original registration of alienable
public lands through possession in the concept of an owner
for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
9
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
Page
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of
P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning
point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-
year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at
least by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription
under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription
under the Civil Code-ordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1137, is completed "through uninterrupted adverse
possession... for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith."
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule,
Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At
present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is
the law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated
under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference
between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep.
Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil
Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately
preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any
qualification as to whether the property should be declared
alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such,
throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither
statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No.
1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our
earlier finding with respect to the present language of
Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those "who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws" to
apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is
derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section
14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription
under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with
respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the
principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly,
we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription,
as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section
14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of
Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code
is thus: "[p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription." The identification what consists of patrimonial
property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote
in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in thepreceding article, is
patrimonialproperty
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally
includes property belonging to the State, cannot be the
object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce
of man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared
alienable and disposable or not, are property of public
dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a
declaration by the President or any duly authorized
government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of
the public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable
and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from
property of the public dominion into patrimonial property?
After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable
lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article
1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further
provides that patrimonial property of the State may be
acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
"[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that
controls how public dominion property may be converted into
patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion
property. For as long as the property belongs to the State,
although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of
the national wealth".
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by
the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to
Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to
be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of
acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where
the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope
and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands
already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment
of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the
lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the Regalian
doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned
by the State, although declared alienable or disposable,
remain as such and ought to be used only by the
Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty
of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in
10
accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to
change the law, which is the province of the legislative
Page
branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be
illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227,
entitled "An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc.," is more
commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law
authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort
Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting
the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases
Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn
is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41]The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps,
in whole or in part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are "alienable
and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws
and regulations governing sales of government
properties."[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject
military lands have become alienable and disposable.
However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the
BCDA law itself expressly makes the reservation that these
lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion
of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44] Such
purpose can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420(2). Thus,
at that time, the lands remained property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status
as alienable and disposable. It is upon their sale as
authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity
that such lands become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because
they are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly
promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, would the period of possession prior to the
conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be
reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from
ruling that the period of possession before the public domain
land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of
completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public
dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly
within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code,
there is no way that possession during the time that the land
was still classified as public dominion property can be
counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and
justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the
basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles
registration on the basis of prescription. Registration
under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land
Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made
available both by the Property Registration Decree and
the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-
year period under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The
period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns
a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is
based on thirty years of possession alone without
regard to the Civil Code, while the registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil
Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the
Civil Code should not apply as well to Section 14(1).
Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it
ultimately is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior
nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to
adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when it
enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a
clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that
provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with
respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth
today is seeing how our land registration procedures
correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil
Code, is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over
property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by private persons through
prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which
states that "[a]ll things which are within the commerce of
man are susceptible to prescription," and that [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription."
There are two modes of prescription through which
immovables may be acquired under the Civil Code. The first
is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article
1117, requires possession in good faith and with just title;
and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of
ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a
person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State
through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any
apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time,
there are indispensable requisites-good faith and just title.
The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the
Civil Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for
themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the
purposes of prescription "when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other
real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right." Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission
of ownership, and which would have actually transferred
ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with
delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title
necessarily precludes the applicability of ordinary acquisitive
prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for
the argument is that "the State, as the owner and grantor,
could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the
completion of the required period of possession."[47]It is
evident that the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor
referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one
from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive
prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange,
donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary
prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of
possession preceding the classification of public dominion
lands as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of
computing prescription. But after the property has been
become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run
11
in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has
been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial
property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the
Page
person in possession for the periods prescribed under the
Civil Code acquires ownership of the property by operation
of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes
the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal
next step is the registration of the property under the Torrens
system. It should be remembered that registration of
property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but
merely a mode of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption
of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent
that the registration system then did not fully accommodate
the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under
the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the
completion of a period of possession ordained under the
Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No.
1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the
requisites for alienable public lands acquired through
ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably
did not preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap was
lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself,
establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of
persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with
Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original
registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership
over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as
follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or
through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12
June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have
been alienable and disposable during the entire period of
possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership
of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration
that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be
an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or
the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person's uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to
establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the
subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945
or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their
possession, according to their own evidence—the Tax
Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year
1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as
basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
service or for the development of the national evidence,
conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness
of the legal doctrines established in this decision.
Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of today's
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that
is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The
social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court
would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino
people if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared
alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit
and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-
called "Third World" countries. This paradigm powerfully
evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the
reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to
bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free
patent, have proven unattractive due to limitations imposed
on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has
emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive means
to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, yet even that system,
as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have
individually or exclusively held residential lands on which
they have lived and raised their families. Many more have
tilled and made productive idle lands of the State with their
hands. They have been regarded for generation by their
families and their communities as common law
owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of
according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for
the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself
considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It
could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of
land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the
settlement of such lands which in legal theory are lands of
the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble.
This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the
requisites for the conversion of public dominion property into
12
patrimonial.
One's sense of security over land rights infuses into every
Page
aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the
person's family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life
 [26]
and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches Malabanan which was allegedly marked as Exhibit "I." It See note 3.
to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem. appears, however, that what was provisionally marked as
[27]
Exhibit "I" was a photocopy of the deed of sale executed by 380 Phil. 156 (2000).
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Virgilio Velazco in favor of Leila Benitez and Benjamin
[28]
Court of Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution Reyes. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides Also known as Republic v. Court of Appeals, 440 Phil.
dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been 697 (2002).
as to costs. formally offered. The offer is necessary because it is the
[29]
duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his judgment Id. at 710-712.
SO ORDERED. only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
[30]
the trial. Thus, Malabanan has not proved that Virgilio or See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1113.
Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Eduardo Velazco was his predecessor-in-interest." Rollo, pp.
[31]
Tinga, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Peralta, and Bersamin, 39-40. See e.g., Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16
JJ., concur. October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of
[6]
Chico-Nazario, J., Pls. see concurring and dissenting Rollo, p. 74. Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
opinion. 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v.
[7]
Brion, J., see dissenting opinion. Id. at 38. Emphasis supplied. Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
Puno, C.J., and Leonardo-De Castro J., joins the concurring
[8] [32]
and dissenting opinion of Justice Nazario. Penned by Associate Justice Marina Buzon of the Court of See Article 1134, CIVIL CODE.
Corona, J., joins the dissenting of Mr. Justice Brion. Appeals Fifth Division, and concurred in by Associate
[33]
Quisumbing, J., on official leave. Justices Edgardo Sundiam and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa. See Article 1137, CIVIL CODE.
[9] [34]
G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183. See Article 1117 in relation to Article 1128, Civil Code.
See also Articles 526, 527, 528 & 529, Civil Code on the
[10]
See rollo, p. 11. conditions of good faith required.
[1]
"Hernando de Soto Interview" by Reason Magazine dated
[11] [35]
30 November 1999, at G.R. No. 144507, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442. See Article 1117, in relation to Article 1129, Civil Code.
http://www.reason.com/news/show/32213.html (Last visited,
[12] [36]
21 April 2009). Through a Resolution dated 5 December 2007. See rollo, Citing Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 65663, 16
p. 141. October 1992, 214 SCRA 604, 611; Republic v. Court of
[2]
More particularly described and delineated in Plan CSD- Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August 1994, 235 SCRA 567,
[13]
04-017123. Records, p. 161. Id. at 186-187. 576; Group Commander, Intelligence and Security Group v.
Dr. Malvar, 438 Phil. 252, 275 (2002).
[14]
[3]
But see note 5. G.R. No. 157466, 21 June 2007, 525 SCRA 268.
[37]
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, immediately before
[15]
[4]
Id. G.R. No. 166865, 2 March 2007, 459 SCRA 271. its amendment by Rep. Act No. 1942, reads as follows:
[16]
[5]
The trial court decision identified Eduardo Velazco as the G.R. No. 147359, 28 March 2008, 550 SCRA 92. "Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
vendor of the property, notwithstanding the original interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
[17]
allegation in the application that Malabanan purchased the G.R. No. 173088, 25 June 2008, 555 SCRA 314. notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
same from Virgilio Velazco. See note 3. In his subsequent the public domain, under abona fideclaim of acquisition of
[18]
pleadings, including those before this Court, Malabanan or G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 178 SCRA 708. ownership, except as against the Government, since July
his heirs stated that the property was purchased from twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
[19]
Eduardo Velazco, and not Virgilio. On this point, the G.R. No. 154953, 16 June 2008. prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
appellate court made this observation: conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
[20]
Section 6, Com. Act No. 141, as amended. essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
"More importantly, Malabanan failed to prove his ownership certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter."
[21]
over Lot 9864-A. In his application for land registration, Section 9, Com. Act No. 141, as amended.
[38]
Malabanan alleged that he purchased the subject lot from Again, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended
[22]
Virgilio Velazco. During the trial of the case, however, Section 11, Com. Act No. 141, as amended. by Rep. Act No. 1942, was superseded by P.D. No. 1073,
Malabanan testified that he purchased the subject lot from which imposed the 12 June 1945 reckoning point,
[23]
Eduardo Velazco, which was corroborated by his witness, OSG Memorandum, p. 13. and which was then incorporated in Section 14(1) of the
Aristedes Velazco, a son of Virgilio Velazco, who stated that Property Registration Decree.
[24]
Eduardo was a brother of his grandfather. As aptly observed Section 47, Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
[39]
9176. See Vllarico v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 136438, 11

13
by the Republic, no copy of the deed of sale covering Lot
9864-A, executed either by Virgilio or Eduardo Velazco, in November 2004, 442 SCRA 110.
[25]
favor of Malabanan was marked and offered in evidence. In R. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed.,

Page
[40]
the appealed Decision, the court a quo mentioned of a deed 1995) at 182. Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec.7.
of sale executed in 1995 by Eduardo Velazco in favor of
[41]
Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 4(a). Mario Malabanan (Malabanan), petitioners' predecessor-in- (3) By lease; and
interest. The land subject of the instant Petition, being
[42]
Rep. Act No. 7227, Sec. 7. alienable and disposable land of the public domain, may not (4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
be acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil
[43]
Id. Code, nor registered pursuant to Section 14(2) of the (a) By judicial legalization; or
Property Registration Decree.
[44]
Section 2, Rep. Act No. 7227. (b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis
At the outset, it must be made clear that the Property ours.)
[45]
See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1128. Registration Decree governs registration of land under the
Torrens system. It can only identify which titles, already The afore-quoted provision recognizes that agricultural
[46]
A. TOLENTINO, IV CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES existing or vested, may be registered under the Torrens public lands may be disposed of by the State, and at the
(1991 ed.) at 26; citing 2 Castan 175. system; but it cannot be the source of any title to land. It same time, mandates that the latter can only do so by the
merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.[1] modes identified in the same provision. Thus, the intent of
[47]
Memorandum of the OSG, p. 21. the legislature to make exclusive the enumeration of the
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree allows modes by which agricultural public land may be disposed of
[48]
See Angeles v. Samia, 66 Phil. 44 (1938). "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by by the State in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as
prescription under the provisions of existing laws," to apply amended, is not only readily apparent, but explicit. And,
[49]
Act No. 496. for registration of their title to the lands. undeniably, the enumeration of the modes for acquiring
agricultural public land in the said provision does not include
[50]
See Section 19, Land Registration Act, which allowed Petitioners do not fall under such provision, taking into prescription, in the concepts described and periods
application for registration of title by "person or persons account that the land they are seeking to register prescribed by the Civil Code.
claiming, singly or collectively, to own the legal estate in fee is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, a
simple." fact which would have several substantial implications. Neither the Civil Code nor the Property Registration Decree
can overcome the express restriction placed by the Public
[51]
See note 24. First, Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree Land Act, as amended, on the modes by which the State
clearly and explicitly refers to "private lands," without may dispose of agricultural public land.
[52]
See Section 118, Com. Act No. 141, as amended. mention at all of public lands. There is no other way to
understand the plain language of Section 14(2) of the The Public Land Act, as amended, is a special law
"Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, Property Registration Decree except that the land was specifically applying to lands of the public domain, except
units, or institutions, lands acquired under free patent or already private when the applicant for registration acquired timber and mineral lands. The Public Land Act, as amended,
homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance ownership thereof by prescription. The prescription therein being a special law, necessarily prevails over the Civil Code,
or alienation from the date of the approval of the application was not the means by which the public land was converted a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that
and for a term of five years from and after the date of to private land; rather, it was the way the applicant acquired "where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a
issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become liable title to what is already private land, from another person particular case, the one designed therefor specially should
to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the previously holding title to the same.[2] The provision in prevail." Generalia specialibus non derogant.[4]
expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on question is very clear and unambiguous. Well-settled is the
the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical As for the Property Registration Decree, it must be stressed
associations, or corporations. language, there is no reason for interpretation or that the same cannot confer title to land and can only
construction, but only for application.[3] confirm title that already exists or has vested. As has
No alienation, transfer, or conveyance of any homestead already been previously discussed herein, title to agricultural
after five years and before twenty-five years after issuance With the understanding that Section 14(2) of the Property public land vests or is acquired only by any of the modes
of title shall be valid without the approval of the Secretary of Registration Decree applies only to what are already private enumerated in Section 11 of the Public Land Act, as
Agriculture and Commerce, which approval shall not be lands, then, there is no question that the same can be amended.
denied except on constitutional and legal grounds." acquired by prescription under the provisions of the Civil
Code, because, precisely, it is the Civil Code which governs And, third, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was
rights to private lands. amended several times, changing the period of possession
required for acquiring an imperfect title to agricultural public
Second, Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, land:
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended,
reads: Under the public land act, judicial confirmation of imperfect
title required possession en concepto de dueño since time
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural immemorial, or since July 26, 1894. Under C.A. No. 141,
purposes can be disposed of only as follows: this requirement was retained. However, on June 22, 1957,

14
Republic Act No. 1942 was enacted amending C.A. No. 141.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: (1) For homestead settlement; This later enactment required adverse possession for a
period of only thirty (30) years. On January 25, 1977, the

Page
I concur in the majority opinion in dismissing the application (2) By sale; President enacted P. D. No. 1073, further amending C.A.
for registration of a piece of land originally filed by the late No. 141, extending the period for filing applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
December 31, 1987. Under this decree, "the provisions of
Section 48 (b) and Section 48 (c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these
provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable land
of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the
applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945."[5] (Emphasis ours.)
Prior to Presidential Decree No. 1073, imperfect title to
agricultural land of the public domain could be acquired by
adverse possession of 30 years. Presidential Decree No.
1073, issued on 25 January 1977, amended Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act by requiring possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable land of the public domain since
12 June 1945 or earlier for an imperfect title. Hence, by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1073, the requisite period
of possession for acquiring imperfect title to alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is no longer determined
according to a fixed term (i.e., 30 years); instead, it shall be
reckoned from a fixed date (i.e., 12 June 1945 or earlier)
from which the possession should have commenced.
If the Court allows the acquisition of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain by prescription under
the Civil Code, and registration of title to land thus acquired
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, it
would be sanctioning what is effectively a circumvention of
the amendment introduced by Presidential Decree No. 1073
to Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Acquisition of
alienable and disposable land of the public domain by
possession would again be made to depend on a fixed term
(i.e., 10 years for ordinary prescription and 30 years for
extraordinary prescription), rather than being reckoned from
the fixed date presently stipulated by Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended.
There being no basis for petitioners' application for
registration of the public agricultural land in question,
accordingly, the same must be dismissed.
I, however, must express my dissent to the discussion in the
majority opinion concerning the contradictory
pronouncements of the Court in Republic v.
Naguit[6] and Republic v. Herbieto,[7] on imperfect titles to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
acquired in accordance with Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, and registered pursuant to Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
According to Naguit, a person seeking judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, need only prove that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land is alienable and disposable at the
time of filing of the application for judicial confirmation
and/or registration of title. On the other hand, it was held
in Herbieto that such a person must establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since 12 June 1945 or earlier,
and that the subject land was likewise already declared
alienable and disposable since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The majority opinion upholds the ruling
in Naguit, and declares the pronouncements on the matter
in Herbieto as mere obiter dictum.
As the ponente of Herbieto, I take exception to the
dismissive treatment of my elucidation in said case on the
acquisition of imperfect title to alienable and disposable land
of the public domain, as mere obiter dictum.
An obiter dictum has been defined as an opinion expressed
by a court upon some question of law which is not necessary
to the decision of the case before it. It is a remark made, or
opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause,
"by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not
directly upon the question before him, or upon a point not
necessarily involved in the determination of the cause, or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or
argument. Such are not binding as precedent.[8]
To recall, the Republic of the Philippines opposed
in Herbieto the registration of certain parcels of land of the
public domain in the names of Jeremias and David Herbieto,
based on two grounds, one substantive and the other
procedural, i.e., (1) the applicants for registration failed to
prove that they possessed the subject parcels of land for the
period required by law; and (2) the application for registration
suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately
owned by two applicants.
The Court, in Herbieto, addressed the procedural issue first,
and held that the alleged infirmity in the application
constituted a misjoinder of causes of action which did not
warrant a dismissal of the case, only the severance of the
misjoined causes of action so that they could be heard by
the court separately. The Court though took note of the
belated publication of the notice of hearing on the application
for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto, the hearing
was already held before the notice of the same was
published. Such error was not only procedural, but
jurisdictional, and was fatal to the application for registration
of Jeremias and David Herbieto.
The Court then proceeded to a determination of the
substantive issue in Herbieto, particularly, whether Jeremias
and David Herbieto possessed the parcels of land they wish
to register in their names for the period required by law. The
Court ruled in the negative. Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as amended, on judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
requires possession of alienable and disposable land of the
public domain since 12 June 1945 or earlier. Given that the
land sought to be registered was declared alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963, and the period of
possession prior to such declaration should not be counted
in favor of the applicants for registration, then Jeremias and
David Herbieto could not be deemed to have possessed the
parcels of land in question for the requisite period as to
acquire imperfect title to the same.
The discussion in Herbieto on the acquisition of an imperfect
title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
which could be the subject of judicial confirmation,
was not unnecessary to the decision of said case. It
was not a mere remark made or opinion expressed upon a
cause, "by the way," or only incidentally or collaterally, and
not directly upon a question before the Court; or upon a point
not necessarily involved in the determination of the cause; or
introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument, as
to constitute obiter dictum.
It must be emphasized that the acquisition of an imperfect
title to alienable and disposable land of the public domain
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended,
was directly raised as an issue in the Petition in Herbieto and
discussed extensively by the parties in their pleadings. That
the application of Jeremias and David Herbieto could already
be dismissed on the ground of lack of proper publication of
the notice of hearing thereof, did not necessarily preclude
the Court from resolving the other issues squarely raised in
the Petition before it. Thus, the Court dismissed the
application for registration of Jeremias and David Herbieto
on two grounds: (1) the lack of jurisdiction of the land
registration court over the application, in light of the absence
of proper publication of the notice of hearing; and (2) the
evident lack of merit of the application given that the
applicants failed to comply with the requirements for judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended. This is only in keeping with
the duty of the Court to expeditiously and completely resolve
the cases before it and, once and for all, settle the dispute
and issues between the parties. Without expressly
discussing and categorically ruling on the second ground,
Jeremias and David Herbieto could have easily believed that
they could re-file their respective applications for registration,
just taking care to comply with the publication-of-notice
requirement.
Of particular relevance herein is the following discourse
in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals[9] on what constitutes, or
more appropriately, what does not constitute obiter dictum:
It has been held that an adjudication on any point within the
issues presented by the case cannot be considered as obiter
dictum, and this rule applies to all pertinent questions,
15
although only incidentally involved, which are presented and
decided in the regular course of the consideration of the
case, and led up to the final conclusion, and to any
Page
statement as to matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is,
or might have been, made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result
reached might have been the same if the court had held, on
the particular point, otherwise than it did. A decision which
the case could have turned on is not regarded as obiter
dictum merely because, owing to the disposal of the
contention, it was necessary to consider another question,
nor can an additional reason in a decision, brought forward
after the case has been disposed of on one ground, be
regarded as dicta. So, also, where a case presents two (2)
or more points, any one of which is sufficient to determine
the ultimate issue, but the court actually decides all such
points, the case as an authoritative precedent as to every
point decided, and none of such points can be regarded as
having the status of a dictum, and one point should not be
denied authority merely because another point was more
dwelt on and more fully argued and considered, nor does a
decision on one proposition make statements of the court
regarding other propositions dicta.
An adjudication on any point within the issues presented by
the case cannot be considered a dictum; and this rule
applies as to all pertinent questions, although only
incidentally involved, which are presented and decided in the
regular course of the consideration of the case, and lead up
to the final conclusion, and to any statement in the opinion
as to a matter on which the decision is predicated.
Accordingly, a point expressly decided does not lose its
value as a precedent because the disposition of the case is
or might have been made on some other ground, or even
though, by reason of other points in the case, the result
reached might have been the same if the court had held, on
the particular point, otherwise than it did.[10]
I submit that Herbieto only applied the clear provisions of the
law and established jurisprudence on the matter, and is
binding as a precedent.
Section 14(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, explicitly
requires for the acquisition of an imperfect title to alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, possession by a
Filipino citizen of the said parcel of land since 12 June 1945
or earlier, to wit:
Section. 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
x x x x
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis ours.)
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, by
substantially reiterating Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, recognizes the imperfect title thus acquired
and allows the registration of the same, viz:
Section 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(Emphasis ours.)
Meanwhile, jurisprudence has long settled that possession of
the land by the applicant for registration prior to the
reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
cannot be credited to the applicant's favor.[11]
Given the foregoing, judicial confirmation and registration of
an imperfect title, under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, respectively, should only be granted when: (1) a
Filipino citizen, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural land of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since 12 June 1945, or earlier; and (2) the land in
question, necessarily, was already declared alienable and
disposable also by 12 June 1945 or earlier.
There can be no other interpretation of Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended, and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, which would not run afoul of
either the clear and unambiguous provisions of said laws or
binding judicial precedents.
I do not agree in the observation of the majority opinion that
the interpretation of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, adopted in Herbieto, would result in
absurdity. Indeed, such interpretation forecloses a person
from acquiring an imperfect title to a parcel of land declared
alienable and disposable only after 12 June 1945, which
could be judicially confirmed. Nonetheless, it must be borne
in mind that the intention of the law is to dispose of
agricultural public land to qualified individualsand not
simply to dispose of the same. It may be deemed a strict
interpretation and application of both law and jurisprudence
on the matter, but it certainly is not an absurdity.
Stringency and prudence in interpreting and applying
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, is well
justified by the significant consequences arising from a
finding that a person has an imperfect title to agricultural
land of the public domain. Not just any lengthy occupation of
an agricultural public land could ripen into an imperfect
title. An imperfect title can only be acquired by
occupation and possession of the land by a person and
his predecessors-in-interest for the period required and
considered by law sufficient as to have segregated the
land from the mass of public land. When a person is
said to have acquired an imperfect title, by operation of
law, he acquires a right to a grant, a government grant
to the land, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. As such, the land ceased to be part of the
public domain and goes beyond the authority of the
State to dispose of. An application for confirmation of
title, therefore, is but a mere formality.[12]
In addition, as was emphasized in Herbieto, Section 11 of
the Public Land Act, as amended, has identified several
ways by which agricultural lands of the public domain may
be disposed of. Each mode of disposing of agricultural
public land has its own specific requirements which must be
complied with. If a person is not qualified for a judicial
confirmation of an imperfect title, because the land in
question was declared alienable and disposable only after
12 June 1945, he is not totally without recourse for he could
still acquire the same by any of the other modes enumerated
in the afore-quoted provision.
Regardless of my dissent to the affirmation by the majority of
the ruling in Naguit on Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, I cast my vote with the majority, to DENY the
Petition at bar and AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2000 of the Court of
Appeals dismissing, for absolute lack of basis, petitioners'
application for registration of alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.
[1]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108998, 24 August
1994, 235 SCRA 567, 576.
[2]
As in the case where the land was already the subject of a
16
grant by the State to a private person, but the latter failed to
immediately register his title, thus, allowing another person
to acquire title to the land by prescription under the
Page
provisions of the Civil Code.
[3]
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Court of Appeals, 327 passed. Because the majority has not used the standards (a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain
Phil. 1048, 1052 (1996). set by the Constitution and the Public Land Act (PLA),[2] its to the United States have applied for the purchase,
conclusions are based on a determination on what the law composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
[4]
See De Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 397, 408 ought to be - an exercise in policy formulation that is beyond domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and
(1998). the Court's authority to make. have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in
connection therewith, but have, with or without default upon
[5]
Public Estates Authority v. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 901, The discussions of these grounds for dissent follow, not their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if
909-910 (2000). necessarily in the order these grounds are posed above. such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied
and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their
[6]
G.R. No. 144057, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 442. Prefatory Statement applications.
[7]
G.R. No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183.. Critical to the position taken in this Dissent is the reading of (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
the hierarchy of laws that govern public lands to fully in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
[8]
Delta Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 342 Phil. understand and appreciate the grounds for dissent. notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
173, 186 (1997). the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
In the area of public law, foremost in this hierarchy is ownership, except as against the Government, since July
[9]
429 Phil. 194, 203-204 (2002). the Philippine Constitution, whose Article XII twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
(entitled National Economy and Patrimony) establishes and prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
[10]
1 C. J. S. 314-315, as quoted in the dissenting opinion of fully embraces the regalian doctrine as a first and overriding conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
Tuason, J., in Primicias v. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71, 125 (1948). principle.[3] This doctrine postulates that all lands belong to essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
the State,[4] and that no public land can be acquired by certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[11]
See Almeda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85322, 30 private persons without any grant, express or implied, from
April 1991, 196 SCRA 476, 480; Vallarta v. Intermediate the State.[5] Significantly, subsection (a) has now been deleted, while
Appellate Court, 235 Phil. 680, 695-696 (1987); subsection (b) has been amended by PD 1073 as follows:
and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 232 Phil. 444, 457 (1987), In the statutory realm, the PLA governs the classification,
cited in Republic v. Herbieto, supra note 7. See grant, and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section
also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 238 Phil. 475, 486-487 the public domain and, other than the Constitution, is the 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
(1987); Republic v. Bacus, G.R. No. 73261, 11 August 1989, country's primary law on the matter. Section 7 of the PLA amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only
176 SCRA 376-380; Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. delegates to the President the authority to administer and to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
38810, 7 May 1992, 208 SCRA 428, 434; De la Cruz v. dispose of alienable public lands. Section 8 sets out the have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 898, 904 (1998), Republic v. De public lands open to disposition or concession, and the possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
Guzman, 383 Phil. 479, 485 (2000). requirement that they should be officially delimited and his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
classified and, when practicable, surveyed. Section 11, a acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
[12]
See National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, very significant section, states that -
G.R. No. 45664, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 41, 54. Complementing the PLA is the PRD.[6] It was enacted to
Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be codify the various laws relating to property registration. It
disposed of only as follows and not otherwise: governs the registration of lands under the Torrens System,
as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.
(1) For homestead settlement; Section 14 of the PRD provides:
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; SECTION 14. Who May Apply. — The following persons
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title; may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION (5) By judicial legalization; for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
(6) By administrative legalization (free patent) their duly authorized representatives:
BRION, J.:
Section 48 covers confirmation of imperfect title, and (1) Those who by themselves or through their
I concur with the ponencia's modified positions on the embodies a grant of title to the qualified occupant or predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
application of prescription under Section 14(2) of the possessor of an alienable public land. This section provides: continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
Property Registration Decree (PRD), and on the denial of the occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
petition of the Heirs of Mario Malabanan. SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
I dissent in the strongest terms from the ruling that the to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands

17
can be made after June 12, 1945, in accordance with this Court of First Instance of the province where the land is by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Court's ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
Naguit (Naguit).[1] Effectively, what results from this decision certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or

Page
is a new law, crafted by this Court, going beyond what the wit: abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
Constitution ordains and beyond the law that the Legislature
 under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Subsection (1) of Section 14 is a copy of, and appears to
have been lifted from, Section 48(b) of the PLA. The two
provisions, however, differ in intent and legal effect based on
the purpose of the law that contains them. The PLA is a
substantive law that classifies and provides for the
disposition of alienable lands of the public domain. The
PRD, on the other hand, specifically refers to the
manner of bringing registerable lands, among them
alienable public lands, within the coverage of the
Torrens system. Thus, the first is a substantive law, while
the other is essentially procedural, so that in terms of
substantive content, the PLA should prevail.[7]
Significantly bearing on the matter of lands in general is the
Civil Code and its provisions on Property[8] and
Prescription.[9] The law on property assumes importance
because land, whether public or private, is
property. Prescription, on the other hand, is a mode of
acquiring ownership of land, although it is not one of the
modes of disposition mentioned in the PLA.
Chapter 3, Title I of Book II of the Civil Code is
entitled "Property in Relation to the Person to Whom it
Belongs." On this basis, Article 419 classifies property to be
property of public dominion or of private ownership. Article
420 proceeds to further classify property of public dominion
into those intended for public use, for public service, and for
the development of the national wealth. Article 421 states
that all other properties of the State not falling under Article
420 are patrimonial property of the State, and Article 422
adds that property of public dominion, no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State. Under Article 425,
property of private ownership, besides patrimonial property
of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of
all property belonging to private persons, either individually
or collectively.
Prescription is essentially a civil law term and is not
mentioned as one of the modes of acquiring alienable public
land under the PLA, (Significantly, the PLA - under its
Section 48 - provides for its system of how possession can
ripen into ownership; the PLA does not refer to this as
acquisitive prescription but as basis for confirmation of
title.) Section 14(2) of the PRD, however, specifies that
"[t]hose who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws" as among
those who may apply for land registration. Thus,
prescription was introduced into the land registration
scheme (the PRD), but not into the special law
governing lands of the public domain (the PLA).
A starting point in considering prescription in relation with
public lands is Article 1108 of the Civil Code, which states
that prescription does not run against the State and its
subdivisions. At the same time, Article 1113 provides that
"all things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided;
property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription." The provisions of Articles 1128 to 1131 may
also come into play in the application of prescription to real
properties.
In light of our established hierarchy of laws, particularly
the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution, any
consideration of lands of the public domain should start
with the Constitution and its Regalian doctrine; all lands
belong to the State, and he who claims ownership
carries the burden of proving his claim.[10] Next in the
hierarchy is the PLA for purposes of the terms of the
grant, alienation and disposition of the lands of the
public domain, and the PRD for the registration of
lands. The PLA and the PRD are special laws supreme
in their respective spheres, subject only to the
Constitution. The Civil Code, for its part, is the general
law on property and prescription and should be
accorded respect as such. In more concrete terms,
where alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are involved, the PLA is the primary law that
should govern, and the Civil Code provisions on
property and prescription must yield in case of
conflict.[11]
The Public Land Act
At the risk of repetition, I start the discussion of the
PLA with a reiteration of the first principle that under the
regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony. Otherwise expressed, all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.[12] Thus, all lands that
have not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.[13] We should never lose sight
of the impact of this first principle where a private ownership
claim is being asserted against the State.
The PLA has undergone many revisions and changes over
time, starting from the first PLA, Act No. 926; the second
public land law that followed, Act No. 2874; and the present
CA 141 and its amendments. Act No. 926 was described in
the following terms:
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands," for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine
Islands remained in the government; and that the
government's title to public land sprung from the Treaty
of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain
and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all
lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the
government and the friar lands.[14]
This basic essence of the law has not changed and has
been carried over to the present PLA and its amendments.
Another basic feature, the requirement for open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable public land under a bona fide claim
of ownership also never changed. Still another consistent
public land feature is the concept that once a person has
complied with the requisite possession and occupation in the
manner provided by law, he is automatically given a State
grant that may be asserted against State ownership; the
land, in other words, ipso jure becomes private land.[15] The
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title shall
then follow, based on the procedure for land
registration.[16] It is in this manner that the PLA ties up with
the PRD.
A feature that has changed over time has been the period for
reckoning the required occupation or possession. In the first
PLA, the required occupation/possession to qualify for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title was 10 years preceding
the effectivity of Act No. 926 - July 26, 1904 (or since July
26, 1894 or earlier). This was retained up to CA 141, until
this law was amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942
(enacted on June 22, 1957),[17] which provided for a simple
30-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. This period did not last; on January 25, 1977,
Presidential Decree No. 1073 (PD 1073) [18] changed the
required 30-year possession and occupation period
provision, to possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. PD 1073 likewise
changed the lands subject of imperfect title, from agricultural
lands of the public domain to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain. PD 1073 also extended the period for
applications for free patents and judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles to December 31, 1987.
The significance of the date "June 12, 1945" appears to
18
have been lost to history. A major concern raised against
this date is that the country was at this time under Japanese
occupation, and for some years after, was suffering from the
Page
uncertainties and instabilities that World War II brought.
Questions were raised on how one could possibly comply
with the June 12, 1945 or earlier occupation/possession
requirement of PD 1073 when the then prevailing situation
did not legally or physically permit it.
Without the benefit of congressional records, as the
enactment of the law (a Presidential Decree) was solely
through the President's lawmaking powers under a regime
that permitted it, the most logical reason or explanation for
the date is the possible impact of the interplay between the
old law and the amendatory law. When PD 1073 was
enacted, the utmost concern, in all probability, was how the
law would affect the application of the old law which provided
for a thirty-year possession period. Counting 30 years
backwards from the enactment of PD 1073 on January 25,
1977, PD 1073 should have provided for a January 24, 1947
cut-off date, but it did not. Instead, it provided, for unknown
reasons, the date June 12, 1945.
The June 12, 1945 cut-off date raised legal concerns; vested
rights acquired under the old law (CA 141, as amended by
RA 1942) providing for a 30-year possession period could
not be impaired by the PD 1073 amendment. We recognized
this legal dilemna in Abejaron v. Nabasa,[19] when we said:
However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of
possession and occupation required by the Public Land
Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. No. 1073 in 1977, the
requirement of said P.D. that occupation and
possession should have started on June 12, 1945 or
earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds
that the grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by
operation of law, then upon Abejaron's satisfaction of the
requirements of this law, he would have already gained title
over the disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine
laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al., that the law cannot impair vested rights
such as a land grant. More clearly stated, "Filipino
citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-
interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073
on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least
since January 24, 1947" may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
From this perspective, PD 1073 should have thus provided
January 24, 1947 and not June 12, 1945 as its cut-off date,
yet the latter date is the express legal reality. The
reconciliation, as properly defined by jurisprudence, is that
where an applicant has satisfied the requirements of Section
48 (b) of CA 141, as amended by RA 1942, prior to the
effectivity of PD 1073, the applicant is entitled to perfect his
or her title, even if possession and occupation does not date
back to June 12, 1945. For purposes of the present case,
a discussion of the cut-off date has been fully made to
highlight that it is a date whose significance and import
cannot be minimized nor glossed over by mere judicial
interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns; the
full legislative intent must be respected.
In considering the PLA, it should be noted that its
amendments were not confined to RA 1942 and PD
1073. These decrees were complemented by Presidential
Decree No. 892 (PD 892)[20] - issued on February 16, 1976 -
which limited to six months the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.[21] Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed by
Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3344. Section 3 of PD 1073 totally
disallowed the judicial confirmation of incomplete titles to
public land based on unperfected Spanish grants.
Subsequently, RA 6940[22] extended the period for filing
applications for free patent and judicial confirmation of
imperfect title to December 31, 2000. The law now also
allows the issuance of free patents for lands not in excess of
12 hectares to any natural-born citizen of the Philippines
who is not the owner of more than 12 hectares and who, for
at least 30 years prior to the effectivity of the amendatory
Act, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or
tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition.
Congress recently extended the period for filing applications
for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
RA 9176 from December 31, 2000 under RA 6940 to
December 31, 2020.[23]
Read together with Section 11 of the PLA (which defines
the administrative grant of title to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain through
homestead settlement and sale, among others), RA 6940
and RA 9176 signify that despite the cut-off date of June
12, 1945 that the Legislature has provided, ample
opportunities exist under the law for the grant of
alienable lands of the public domain to deserving
beneficiaries.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the
Property Registration Decree
As heretofore mentioned, PD 1529 amended Act No. 496 on
June 11, 1978 to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property. Its Section 14 describes the
applicants who may avail of registration under the Decree,
among them -
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws
These subsections and their impact on the present case are
separately discussed below.
Section 14(1)
Section 14(1) merely repeated PD 1073 which sets a cut-off
date of June 12, 1945 and which, under the conditions
discussed above, may be read to be January 24, 1947.
The ponencia discussed Section 48(b) of the PLA in relation
with Section 14(1) of the PRD and, noted among others, that
"under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until
December 31, 2020." This is in light of RA 9176, passed in
2002,[24] limiting the filing of an application for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title to December 31, 2020. The
amendatory law apparently refers only to the use of Section
14(1) of the PRD as a mode of registration. Where
ownership right or title has already vested in the possessor-
occupant of the land that Section 48(b) of the PLA grants by
operation of law, Section 14(2) of the PRD continuous to be
open for purposes of registration of a "private land" since
compliance with Section 48(b) of the PLA vests title to the
occupant/possessor and renders the land private in
character.
The ponencia likewise rules against the position of the
Office of the Solicitor General that the public land to be
registered must have been classified as alienable and
disposable as of the cut-off date for possession stated in
Section 48(b) - June 12, 1945. In doing this, it cites and
reiterates its continuing support for the ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Naguit that held:[25]
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12,
1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located. Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if
we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG's view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
19
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
Page
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section
14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be
registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet
deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length
of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.
xxx
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals, wherein the Court noted that while the claimant
had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972
that the lands in question were classified as alienable
and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did
not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his
application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property
was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this
case, where the application was made years after the
property had been certified as alienable and disposable,
the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
As it did in Naguit, the present ponencia as well
discredits Bracewell. It does the same with Republic v.
Herbieto[26] that came after Naguit and should have therefore
overtaken the Naguit ruling. In the process,
the ponencia cites with approval the ruling in Republic v.
[27]
Ceniza, penned by the same ponente who
wrote Bracewell.
While the ponencia takes pains to compare these cases, it
however completely misses the point from the perspective of
whether possession of public lands classified as alienable
and disposable after June 12, 1945 should be credited for
purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the PLA, and of
registration under Section 14(1) of the PRD. These cases,
as analyzed by the ponencia, merely granted or denied
registration on the basis of whether the public land has been
classified as alienable and disposable at the time the petition
for registration was filed. Thus, except for Naguit, these
cases can be cited only as instances when registration was
denied or granted despite the classification of the land as
alienable after June 12, 1945.
The ruling in Naguit is excepted because, as shown in the
quotation above, this is one case that explained why
possession prior to the classification of public land as
alienable should be credited in favor of the possessor who
filed his or her application for registration after the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable, but
where such classification occurred after June 12, 1945.
Closely analyzed, the rulings in Naguit that
the ponencia relied upon are its statutory construction
interpretation of Section 48(b) of the PLA and the observed
ABSURDITY of using June 12, 1945 as the cut-off point for
the classification.
Five very basic reasons compel me to strongly disagree
with Naguit and its reasons.
First. The constitutional and statutory reasons. The
Constitution classifies public lands into agricultural, mineral,
and timber. Of these, only agricultural lands can be
alienated.[28] Without the requisite classification, there can
be no basis to determine which lands of the public domain
are alienable and which are not; hence, classification is a
constitutionally-required step whose importance should
be given full legal recognition and effect. Otherwise
stated, without classification into disposable agricultural land,
the land forms part of the mass of the public domain that, not
being agricultural, must be mineral or timber land that are
completely inalienable and as such cannot be possessed
with legal effects. To allow effective possession is to do
violence to the regalian doctrine; the ownership and control
that the doctrine denotes will be less than full if the
possession that should be with the State as owner, but is
elsewhere without any authority, can anyway be recognized.
From the perspective of the PLA under which grant can
be claimed under its Section 48(b), it is very important to
note that this law does not apply until a classification
into alienable and disposable land of the public domain
is made. If the PLA does not apply prior to a public land's
classification as alienable and disposable, how can
possession under its Section 48(b) be claimed prior such
classification? There can simply be no imperfect title to be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or
alienable because, in the absence of such classification, the
land remains unclassified public land that fully belongs to the
State. This is fully supported by Sections 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10
of CA 141.[29] If the land is either mineral or timber and can
never be the subject of administration and disposition, it
defies legal logic to allow the possession of these
unclassified lands to produce legal effect. Thus, the
classification of public land as alienable and disposable is
inextricably linked to effective possession that can ripen into
a claim under Section 48(b) of the PLA.
Second. The Civil Code reason. Possession is essentially
a civil law term that can best be understood in terms of the
Civil Code in the absence of any specific definition in the
PLA other than in terms of time of possession. [30] Article 530
of the Civil Code provides that "[O]nly things and rights
which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the
object of possession." Prior to the declaration of alienability,
a land of the public domain cannot be appropriated; hence,
any claimed possession cannot have legal effects. This
perspective fully complements what has been said above
under the constitutional and PLA reasons. It confirms, too,
that the critical difference the ponencia saw in
the Bracewell and Naguit situations does not really exist.
Whether an application for registration is filed before or after
the declaration of alienability becomes immaterial if, in one
as in the other, no effective possession can be recognized
prior to the declaration of alienability.
Third. Statutory construction and the cut-off date - June
12, 1945. The ponencia assumes, based on its statutory
construction reasoning and its reading of Section 48(b) of
the PLA, that all that the law requires is possession from
June 12, 1945 and that it suffices if the land has been
classified as alienable at the time of application for
registration. As heretofore discussed, this cut-off date was
painstakingly set by law and should be given full
significance. Its full import appears from PD 1073 that
amended Section 48(b), whose exact wordings state:
SECTION 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section
48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby
amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only
to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru
his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Under this formulation, it appears clear that PD 1073 did not
expressly state what Section 48(b) should provide under the
amendment PD 1073 introduced in terms of the exact
wording of the amended Section 48(b). But under the PD
1073 formulation, the intent to count the alienability to June
12, 1945 appears very clear. The provision applies only to
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain that is
described in terms of the character of the possession
required since June 12, 1945. This intent - seen in the direct,
continuous and seamless linking of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain to June 12, 1945
under the wording of the Decree - is clear and should be
respected.
Fourth. Other Modes of Acquisition of lands under the
PLA. Naguit's absurdity argument that
the ponencia effectively adopted is more apparent than real,
since the use of June 12, 1945 as cut-off date for the
20
declaration of alienability will not render the grant of
alienable public lands out of reach. The acquisition of
ownership and title may still be obtained by other modes
Page
under the PLA. Among other laws, RA 6940, mentioned
above, now allows the use of free patents.[31] It was
approved on March 28, 1990; hence, counting 30 years
backwards, possession since April 1960 or thereabouts may
qualify a possessor to apply for a free patent. The
administrative modes provided under Section 11 of the PLA
are also open, particularly, homestead settlement and sales.
Fifth. Addressing the wisdom - the absurdity - of the
law. This Court acts beyond the limits of the
constitutionally-mandated separation of powers in giving
Section 48(b), as amended by PD 1073, an interpretation
beyond its plain wording. Even this Court cannot read into
the law an intent that is not there even your purpose is to
avoid an absurd situation. If we feel that a law already has
absurd effects because of the passage of time, our role
under the principle of separation of powers is not to give the
law an interpretation that is not there in order to avoid the
perceived absurdity. We thereby dip into the realm of policy
- a role delegated by the Constitution to the Legislature. If
only for this reason, we should avoid expanding -
through Naguit and the present ponencia - the plain meaning
of Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by PD 1073.
In standing by Naguit, the ponencia pointedly discredits the
ruling in Herbieto; it is, allegedly, either an incorrect ruling or
an obiter dictum. As to legal correctness, Herbieto is in full
accord with what we have stated above; hence, it cannot be
dismissed off-hand as an incorrect ruling. Likewise, its ruling
on the lack of effective legal possession prior to the
classification of a public land as alienable and disposable
cannot strictly be obiter because it responded to an issue
directly raised by the parties. Admittedly, its ruling on
jurisdictional grounds could have fully resolved the case, but
it cannot be faulted if it went beyond this threshold issue into
the merits of the claim of effective possession prior to the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable.
To be sure, Herbieto has more to it than the Naguit ruling
that the ponencia passes off as the established and
definitive rule on possession under Section 14(1) of the
PRD. There, too, is the undeniable reason that no
definitive ruling touching on Section 14(1) can be
deemed to have been established in the present case
since the applicant Heirs could only prove possession
up to 1948. For this reason, the ponencia falls back on
and examines Section 14(2) of the PRD. In short, if there
is a perfect example of a ruling that is not necessary for
the resolution of a case, that unnecessary ruling is
the ponencia's ruling that Naguit is now the established
rule.
Section 14(2)
Section 14(2), by its express terms, applies only
to private lands. Thus, on plain reading, it does not
apply to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain that Section 14(1) covers. This is the difference
between Sections 14(1) and 14(2).
The ponencia, as originally formulated, saw a way of
expanding the coverage of Section 14(2) via the Civil Code
by directly applying civil law provisions on prescription on
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. To
quote the obiter dictum in Naguit that the ponencia wishes to
enshrine as the definitive rule and leading case on Sections
14(1) and 14(2):[32]
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years. With such conversion, such property may now fall
within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may
have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
The ponencia then posits that Article 1113 of the Civil Code
should be considered in the interpretation of Section
14(2). Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides:
All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
The application of Article 1113 assumes, of course, that (1)
the Civil Code fully applies to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain; (2) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, these properties are patrimonial and are therefore
"private property"; and (3) assuming that the Civil Code fully
applies, that these properties are within the commerce of
men and can be acquired through prescription.
I find the Naguit obiter to be questionable because of the
above assumptions and its direct application of prescription
under Section 14(2) to alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain. This Section becomes relevant only once
the ownership of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain vests in the occupant or possessor
pursuant to the terms of Section 48(b) of the PLA, with
or without judicial confirmation of title, so that the land
has become a private land. At that point, Section 14(2)
becomes fully operational on what had once been an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Hierarchy of Law in Reading PRD's
Section 14(2)
The hierarchy of laws governing the lands of the public
domain is clear from Article XII, Section 3 of the Constitution.
There are matters that the Constitution itself provides for,
and some that are left for Congress to deal with. Thus, under
Section 3, the Constitution took it upon itself to classify lands
of the public domain, and to state that only agricultural lands
may be alienable lands of the public domain. It also laid
down the terms under which lands of the public domain may
be leased by corporations and individuals. At the same time,
it delegated to Congress the authority to classify agricultural
lands of the public domain according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. Congress likewise determines, by
law, the size of the lands of the public domain that may be
acquired, developed, held or leased, and the conditions
therefor.
In acting on the delegation, Congress is given the choice on
how it will act, specifically, whether it will pass a general or a
special law. On alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, Congress has, from the very beginning, acted
through the medium of a special law, specifically, through
the Public Land Act that by its terms "shall apply to the lands
of the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shall be
governed by special laws." Notably, the Act goes on to
provide that nothing in it "shall be understood or construed to
change or modify the administration and disposition of the
lands commonly called `friar lands' and those which, being
privately owned, have reverted to or become property of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration and
disposition shall be governed by laws at present in force or
which may hereafter be enacted."[33] Under these terms, the
PLA can be seen to be a very specific act whose coverage
extends only to lands of the public domain; in this sense, it is
a special law on that subject.
In contrast, the Civil Code is a general law that covers
general rules on the effect and application of laws and
human relations; persons and family relations; property and
property relations; the different modes of acquiring
ownership; and obligations and contracts.[34] Its general
nature is best appreciated when in its Article 18, it provides
that: "In matters which are governed by the Code of
Commerce and special laws, their deficiency shall be
supplied by the provisions of this Code."
The Civil Code has the same relationship with the PRD with
respect to the latter's special focus - land registration - and
fully applies civil law provisions in so far only as they are
allowed by the PRD. One such case where the Civil Code is
expressly allowed to apply is in the case of Section 14(2) of
the PRD which calls for the application of prescription under
existing laws.
As already explained above, the PLA and the PRD have
their own specific purposes and are supreme within their
own spheres, subject only to what the higher Constitution
21
provides. Thus, the PRD must defer to what the PLA
provides when the matter to be registered is an alienable
Page
and disposable land of the public domain.
Application of the Civil Code
In its Book II, the Civil Code has very clear rules on property,
including State property. It classifies property as either of
public dominion or of private ownership,[35] and property for
public use, public service and those for the development of
the national wealth as property of the public dominion.[36] All
property not so characterized are patrimonial property of the
State[37] which are susceptible to private
ownership,[38] against which prescription will run.[39]
In reading all these provisions, it should not be overlooked
that they refer to the properties of the State in
general, i.e., to both movable and immovable
properties.[40] Thus, the Civil Code provisions on
property do not refer to land alone, much less do they
refer solely to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. For this specie of land, the PLA is the
special governing law and, under the Civil Code itself,
the Civil Code provisions shall apply only in case of
deficiency.[41]
This conclusion gives rise to the question - can alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain at the same time be
patrimonial property of the State because they are not for
public use, public purpose, and for the development of
national wealth?
The answer to this question can be found, among others, in
the interaction discussed above between the PLA and PRD,
on the one hand, and the Civil Code, on the other, and will
depend on the purpose for which an answer is necessary.
If, as in the present case, the purpose is to determine
whether a grant or disposition of an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain has been made, then the PLA
primarily applies and the Civil Code applies only
suppletorily. The possession and occupation that the PLA
recognizes is based on its Section 48(b) and, until the
requirements of this Section are satisfied, the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain remains a State
property that can be disposed only under the terms of
Section 11 of the PLA. In the face of this legal reality, the
question of whether - for purposes of prescription - an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is
patrimonial or not becomes immaterial; a public land, even if
alienable and disposable, is State property and prescription
does not run against the State.[42] In other words, there is
no room for any hairsplitting that would allow the
inapplicable concept of prescription under the Civil
Code to be directly applied to an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain before this land
satisfies the terms of a grant under Section 48(b) of the
PLA.
Given this conclusion, any further discussion of the
patrimonial character of alienable and disposable public
lands under the norms of the Civil Code is rendered moot
and academic.
From the prism of the overriding regalian doctrine that all
lands of the public domain are owned by the State, an
applicant for land registration invoking Section 14(2) of the
PRD to support his claim must first clearly show that the land
has been withdrawn from the public domain through an
express and positive act of the government.[43]
A clear express governmental grant or act withdrawing a
particular land from the mass of the public domain is
provided both in the old and the prevailing Public Land
Acts. These laws invariably provide that compliance with the
required possession of agricultural public land (under the
first and second PLAs) or alienable and disposable land of
the public domain (under the prevailing PLA) in the manner
and duration provided by law is equivalent to a government
grant. Thus, the land ipso jure becomes private land. It is
only at that point that the "private land" requirement of
Section 14(2) materializes.[44]
Prescription
In my original Dissent (in response to the original ponencia),
I discussed ordinary acquisitive prescription as an academic
exercise to leave no stone unturned in rejecting
the ponencia's original conclusion that prescription directly
applies to alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under Section 14(2) of the PRD. I am happy to note
that the present ponencia has adopted, albeit without any
attribution, part of my original academic discussion on the
application of the Civil Code, particularly on the subjects of
patrimonial property of the State and prescription.
Specifically, I posited - assuming arguendo that the Civil
Code applies - that the classification of a public land as
alienable and disposable does not per se signify that the
land is patrimonial under the Civil Code since property, to be
patrimonial, must not be for public use, for public purpose or
for the development of national wealth. Something more
must be done or shown beyond the fact of classification.
The ponencia now concedes that "[T]here must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public use or
the development of the national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public domain begin to run."
I agree with this statement as it describes a clear case when
the property has become private by the government's own
declaration so that prescription under the Civil Code can
run. Note in this regard that there is no inconsistency
between this conclusion and the hierarchy of laws on lands
of the public domain that I expounded on. To reiterate, the
PLA applies as a special and primary law when a public
land is classified as alienable and disposable, and
remains fully and exclusively applicable until the State
itself expressly declares that the land now qualifies as a
patrimonial property. At that point, the application of
the Civil Code and its law on prescription are
triggered. The application of Section 14(2) of the PRD
follows.
To summarize, I submit in this Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion that:
1. The hierarchy of laws on public domain must be
given full application in considering lands of the
public domain. Top consideration should be
accorded to the Philippine Constitution, particularly
its Article XII, followed by the consideration of
applicable special laws - the PLA and the PRD,
insofar as this Decree applies to lands of the
public domain. The Civil Code and other general
laws apply to the extent expressly called for by the
primary laws or to supply any of the latter's
deficiencies.
2. The ruling in this ponencia and in Naguit that the
classification of public lands as alienable and
disposable does not need to date back to June 12,
1945 at the latest, is wrong because:
a. Under the Constitution's regalian
doctrine, classification is a required step
whose full import should be given full
effect and recognition; giving legal effect
to possession prior to classification runs
counter to the regalian doctrine.
b. The Public Land Act applies only from
the time a public land is classified as
alienable and disposable; thus, Section
48(b) of this law and the possession it
requires cannot be recognized prior to
any classification.
c. Under the Civil Code, "[O]nly things and
rights which are susceptible of being
appropriated may be the object of
possession." Prior to the classification of
a public land as alienable and
disposable, a land of the public domain
cannot be appropriated; hence, any
claimed possession cannot have legal
effects.
d. There are other modes of acquiring
22
alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under the Public Land
Act; this legal reality renders
Page
the ponencia'sabsurdity argument
misplaced.
 e. The alleged absurdity of the law
addresses the wisdom of the law and is
a matter for the Legislature, not for this
Court, to address.
Consequently, Naguit must be abandoned and rejected for
being based on legally-flawed premises and for being an
aberration in land registration jurisprudence. At the very
least, the present ponencia cannot be viewed as an authority
on the effective possession prior to classification since this
ruling, by the ponencia's own admission, is not necessary for
the resolution of the present case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant,
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSIONER and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor
General Octavio R. Ramirez and Atty. Baltazar Llamas
plaintiff-appellee.
Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration
Commissioner.
ESGUERRA, J.:
This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court
of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration and
resolution of the pure question of law involved.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of
Title was filed by the Republic of the Philippines
(represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the
following:
3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and
defendant Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices
are at España Extension, Quezon City and Davao City,
respectively. "(are included in this complaint, the first being
the public Official charged under the law with the approval )."
subdivision surveys of private lands while the second is the
Official vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles,
pursuant to the provisions of Act 496, as amended,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of
Luisa Villa Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City
of Davao containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY TWO SQUARE
METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City,
issued in her name;
5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime
caused the subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into
two lots designated as Lots Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-
B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-69322 which was
approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on March
17,1967;
6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No.
379- B-2-B-1 contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters
while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2 contains an area of 577,679
Square Meters or a total area of 607,779 Square Meters,
which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original area
covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the
name of said defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;
7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by
the Land Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille
was able to secure an order from the Court of First Instance
of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No. 9969, directing the
Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province of
Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439
and thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof
TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887;
8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned
registered Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886
therefor, in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and on the same
date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and issued TCT No.
18887 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille;
9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which
includes the aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square
Meters, was not in accordance with law for lack of the
required notice and publication as prescribed in Act 496, as
amended, otherwise known as the Land Registration Law;
10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square
Meters as a result of the approval of the subdivision survey
(LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a portion of the Davao River
which dried up by reason of the change of course of the said
Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public domain;
and
11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 18887 which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of
Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-69322, wherein the excess
area of land belong to the public domain (not private land) is
null and void ab initio.
On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao-
City filed her answer averring that she, "in the performance
of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith effected the
registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No.
379B-2-B-2 and the issuance of corresponding TCT No.
18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor, respectively, in view of
the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order
of the Court of First Instance of Davao to correct the area in
Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the same and to
issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".
On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their
answer admitting the allegations contained in paragraphs 1,
3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in
area of the land was acceded to and concurred in by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and the same
was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance
of Davao; that they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No. T- 1439 in the
name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but
that TCT No. T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu
thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor of Gaudencio
Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been
cancelled and several Transfer Certificates of Title were
issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area was
made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and
that Luisa Villa Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein
defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was entitled under
the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area
of her original land as her own.
On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land
Registration prays for a judgment on the pleadings and
avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the subject
matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved
therein was approved by the then Commissioner of Land
Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on February 19,
1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio
Noblejas, issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register
of Deeds throughout the Philippines to, among others, deny
the registration of subdivision plans with increased or
expanded areas and to withhold the issuance of the
corresponding titles, or if the plans have already been
registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take
appropriate steps for their cancellation.
Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants,
tried to intervene in the case as movant-intervenors but they
23
were denied standing in court by the trial court in its order of
August 16,1969.
Page
On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court
their "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" and pray that judgment be
rendered by the trial court on their case based on their
stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the
parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective
attorneys, and unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully
submit the following stipulation of facts and allege:
1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28,
1916 in the Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of
Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page 40 under Original Certificate
of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 317, in the
name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa Villa
Abrille;
2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said
property was inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 was issued in the name of
said Luisa Villa Abrille;
3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision
plan Psd-69322 by the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886
and 18887 were issued by the defendant, Register of Deeds
of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto attached
as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;
4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was
subsequently cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19077 was issued in the
name of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in good faith and
for value;
5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also
approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV,
through an Order dated March 27, 1967, copy of which order
is hereto attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof;
6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the
Report of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner,
copy of which report is hereto attached as Annex "C" and
made integral part hereof;
7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
18887 was by virtue of an Order of the Court of First
Instance, Branch 1, in Special Proceedings No. 1357,
entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of Luisa Villa
Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were
issued to the following named persons, to wit:
(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;
(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;
(c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;
(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;
(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;
(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;
(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;
(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;
(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;
(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;
which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a
subdivision plan LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the
defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, copy of which
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto attached as
Annex "D" and made integral part hereof;
8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the
area of Lot 379-B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge
of the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner and the
court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV;
9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been
affected or prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa
Villa Abrille as the registered owner holds property adjacent
to the parcel of land in question;
10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins
Lot 379-B-2-B and abuts the Davao River;
11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully
planted with coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by
the defendants, through their predecessor-in-interest;
12. That the increase in area could have taken place very
long time ago as the coconuts planted thereon had long
been fruit bearing;
13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not
contain any portion of the increase in area;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-20701; T-20713; and T-20690
contain the increase in area; while all the other certificates of
title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 do not
contain any increase in area;
15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order
Annex "B" was without notice to the Director of Lands.
The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January
27, 1970, which reads as follows:
This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of
title instituted by the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Director of Lands, against the Estate of Luisa Abrille,
represented by Huang Siu Sin, Administrator, the Land
Registration Commissioner and the Register of Deeds of the
City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin,
Josefino Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap
Tong Ha, heirs, they were directed to appear and to
substitute for the intestate estate and they did.
The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:
xxx xxx xxx
The increase in area of the land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 5609 of the Register of Deeds of
Davao in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna and
subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T. 1439 in
the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. T-20725 in the name of Milagros Huang,
T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-20713 in the
name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang
Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square
meters, or 82,127 square meters.
The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille
in order to include the increase in area was a petition for
approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-79322
recommended by the Commissioner of Land Registration in
his Report, and for issuance of new title under Section 44,
Act 496, as amended, filed with this court, which was
assigned to Branch IV.
Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the
aforesaid remedy was sought, notice before the hearing is
required. The parties admit that there was no notice to the
persons interested, including the Director of Lands, before
the petition was heard.
Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-
20713 and T-20690 even assuming arguendo that the same
belonged to the owner of the land to which it is adjacent by
the simple expediency of a petition for approval of
subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a
subdivision of a registered land under Section 44 of Act 496
does not authorize the inclusion of land or area not
embraced in the titled or in excess of what is stated in the
24
title. And the approval by the Court of such subdivision plan
does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to
the area stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title
Page
under Section 112 of Act 496 would be a valid remedy 1.
The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent
estate, might have acquired a registrable title to the land in
question but to bring it under the operation of the Land
Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act 496
should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by
continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of
ownership And even assuming that the land is an accretion,
the fact that the riparian estate is registered does not bring
ipso facto effect its accretion thereto under the operation of
the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration of the
land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of
competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and
hearing, has been issued by the Commissioner of Land
Registration and transcribed by the Register of Deeds of
Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or original
registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner.
And the only way by which a title to the land in question can
be issued for the first time is for the Land Registration
Commissioner to issue a decree of registration based upon
final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction
after trial.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-
20713 and T-20690 and directing the Register of Deeds of
Davao to issue new certificates of title in lieu thereof after the
portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land
involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in
accordance with law.
Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant
Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille brought the case on appeal to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in its
Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R.
No. 47438-R) to this Court for consideration and final
disposition.
Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in
holding the approval of Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of
no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice to
interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-
20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant that
since the government agencies having to do with lands know
all the time the increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-
69322, and the government agencies concerned tolerated if
not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in
area, defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the
effect of the allegedly wrong procedure or step taken in the
approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan. Besides,
defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that
the legal remedy taken by them in seeking the approval of
their subdivision plan concerned was well within the law,
particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as
amended.
Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the
approval of the subdivision plan, with the increase in area,
by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission
does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that
the issuance of the four transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the increased
area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the
conformity of the Land Registration Commissioner and the
subsequent order of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the
required giving of notice to all parties interested in
defendant-appellant's petition for approval of subdivision
plan was not at all followed,
Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in
order to arrive at a judicious disposition of the case at bar, is
whether or not the lower court erred in ordering the
cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-
20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased
area in question totalling 82,127 square meters.
After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in
controversy, We are of the opinion and so hold that the lower
court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-
20690 which admittedly covered the increased area of
82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-
71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.
Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in
petitioning the court for the approval of their Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the
questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to
say the least, unwarranted and irregular. This is so, for the
increased area in question, which is not a registered land but
formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere
mistake in area of the original registration of the tracts of
land of the defendant-appellant formerly belonging to and
registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna. In order to bring this increase in area,
which the parties admitted to have been a former river bed of
the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the
Land Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations
of land title should have been filed Instead of an ordinary
approval of subdivision plan.
It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of
Act 496, which the predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa
Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is good only
insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant
case, part of the tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127
square meters, has not yet been brought under the operation
of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of
Subdivision Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was
without notice to all parties in interest, more particularly the
Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or
incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered
under Act 496, the following requisites should all be
satisfied:
1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed
private surveyor;
2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;
3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application
by the Court;
4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial
hearing together with all the documents or other evidences
attached thereto by the Clerk of Court to the Land
Registration Commission;
5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and
date and place of the hearing in the Official Gazette;
6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and
those known to have interests in the property by the sheriff;
7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether
named in the notice or not;
8. Hearing of the case by the Court;
9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;
10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the
decision final and instructing the Land Registration
Commission to issue a decree of confirmation and
registration;
11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land
Registration Commission;
12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the
corresponding Register of Deeds, and
13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the
registration book and the issuance of the owner's duplicate
original certificate of title to the applicant by the Register of
Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.
Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been
complied with, the lower court committed no error in its
appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
25
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin,
JJ., concur.
Page
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,
defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against
Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for
judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner
of the parcel of land described in the second paragraph of
the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of
Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land
is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d)
sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as
damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands
denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as
special defense, alleged that the land in question was a
property of the Government of the United States under the
administration and control of the Philippine Islands before its
sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with
law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties,
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment
declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land,
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the
certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela
Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this
appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The
holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between
the plaintiff and defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of
land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding
that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said
parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the
Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the
certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the
Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said
sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new
trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio
Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, tho
Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12,
reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After
having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and
the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin
Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it
(Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale,
Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan"
on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered
thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid
the price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio
Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption,
except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when
Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover
the possession of said land (Exhibit C), wherein after
considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court
rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against
Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having
failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in
question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15,
1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said application, Valentin
Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years
(Exhibit P). After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition
of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue
of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August
31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela
Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required
Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he
refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry
and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua,
Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the
case being one of title to real property (Exhibit F and M).
Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the
questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of
error.lawphi1.net
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has
been in possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through
his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about
forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible
entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she
had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914,
Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin
Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and
through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is
taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made
said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880,
it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and
occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond
the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid
down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case
of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U.
S., 449 1), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there
is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by
the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain
openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26,
1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of
Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond
the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling
the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or
control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect,
and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question
being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot
maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in
dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private
property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial
sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an
action to recover possession thereof and hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the
judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed in all
its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns,
and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME
PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
26
NARVASA, J.:
Page
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari
from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano
and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title
under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public
Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums
up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this
wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by
Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to
the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on
the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9),
Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding
was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are
cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of
1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29,
1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land
relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
dates back before the Philippines was discovered by
Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the
same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from
1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels
who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land
on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already
considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether
with the alienable or disposable public land or within the
public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has
introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00)
Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were
seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to
be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon,
Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite
from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation
came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land
bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of
Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and
which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government
of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these
findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he
asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly
applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV
prohibits private corporations or associations from holding
alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to
exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was
reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a
bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of
the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and
affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and
Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in
question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their
progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time
immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period
and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their
title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that
Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is
disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than
Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is
whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to
Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the
prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands
of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000
hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of
the lands at the time of institution of the registration
proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other
hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set
of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a
domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of
which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in
Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been
possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their
predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the
outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976,
Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court,
assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person,
27
was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or
natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
Page
titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be
public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to
any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because
it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b),
Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to
be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title
subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we
should not make any distinction or qualification. The
prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a
Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The
proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30,
1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing
the line of cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in
1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed
and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and
undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without
the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct,
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the
principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak,
in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880
for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private
individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title
to those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time
and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under
the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient
family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or
better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to
mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because
expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of
section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all
the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government
were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical
possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an
agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter
VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the
grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain
and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela
Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made
was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby
acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned,
likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de
Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and
affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
11
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942,
which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and
by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested
on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of
public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the
Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law,
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity
of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land which is of the
character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible
to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at
the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and
registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply
recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but
only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation
of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here
are indications that registration was expected from all, but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever
made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already
private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a
perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in
the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the
1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically
"public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels
and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually
confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land
Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in
the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit
corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public
land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of
so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or
lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares.
The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation
proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of
the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested
before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions
28
then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held,
in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot
impair vested rights.
Page
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a
vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be
abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of
the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to
purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one
thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition
action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in
constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested
rights. 'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of
a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of
the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation
to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law
for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the
said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to
obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands
vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were
instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as
simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a
defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting
the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to
be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of
Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in
the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the
1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in
themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid
subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same
benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so
holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be
reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding
precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of
cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held
by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land
Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the
mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following
that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land
subject of this appeal was already private property at the
time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby
acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme
is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than
substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent
in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's
application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows
only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to
apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and
would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming
that there was a technical error not having filed the
application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the
land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and
vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the
great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to
conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the
lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying
for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s
of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But
this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas
the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained,
with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the
rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in
the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of
comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no
precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of
searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as
the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the
proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect
title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV,
Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph
in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered
as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the
appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome,
and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my
dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is
the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein
to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time
(from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the
29
filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to
Page
the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors confers
an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases
to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for
brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-
cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this
concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such
possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris
et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the
public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by
a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any
other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court
in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have
been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of
his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal
of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court)
and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns
the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29,
1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We
reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive
prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or
by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance
of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the
public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such
as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra,
"the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public
lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly
stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them
and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or
acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands
are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased
the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis
of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition
against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of
1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous
assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from
them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the
community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon,
Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite
created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and
transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of
the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and
issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the
period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable
and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has
always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly
and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the
deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31,
1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly
extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of
procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and
own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the
opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the
particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal
question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken
up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solution would be to decide the matter as if the application
under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I
assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural
result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority
ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased
to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such
applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural
persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess
public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But
when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory
period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow
the letter of the law that they file the applications for
confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
30
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
Page
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by
the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed
by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with
the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so
converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by
them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-
about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases)
just for the purpose of complying on paper with the
technicality of having natural persons file the application for
confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part,
provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares
....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and
constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly
applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original
Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge,
CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple
terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a
certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can
sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it
should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts
for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt
from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application
on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only
citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply
for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that
there was a technical error in not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their
sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application
being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the
great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the
statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can
apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title
to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York
State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d
688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L
Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done
a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a
whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which
will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the
former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may
not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of
no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against
the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction,
the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the
precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute
is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs.
Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited
in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition
express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to
take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid
down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court
in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982]
and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-
31
Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
Page
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my
dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is
the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein
to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time
(from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was
reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title' by
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to
the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private
individual personally and through his predecessors confers
an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases
to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for
brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-
cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this
concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such
possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris
et de jure established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the
public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by
a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be
of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of
the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any
other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court
in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have
been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of
his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal
of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court)
and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove'
(acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply
to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by
earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns
the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto which
failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29,
1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public
lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without the
necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The
land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent
corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not
affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public
lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly
stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private
property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them
and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or
acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the
dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public lands
are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased
the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis
of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition
against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of
1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous
assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time
immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from
them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the
community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon,
Isabela to which it donated part of the land for the townsite
created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and
transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of
the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in
confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and
issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and
validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the
period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable
and disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has
always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such]
unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly
and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been
converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the
deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31,
1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly
extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply
thereunder for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of
procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice
would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both
admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and
own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold
or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from the
majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the
opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional
defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person
rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the
particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable
obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach
followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal
question raised, instead of being deferred and possibly taken
up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic
solution would be to decide the matter as if the application
under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I
assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente
Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural
result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority
ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion
that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased
to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already
private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
32
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional
provision that no private corporation or association may hold
Page
alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such
applications to natural citizens who may prove their
undisputed and open possession of public lands for the
required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural
persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as
corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess
public lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That
juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But
when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory
period of possession, the Act confers on them a legally
sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow
the letter of the law that they file the applications for
confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure
cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as
stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by
the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed
by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with
the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so
converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by
them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the
corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-
about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done
after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases)
just for the purpose of complying on paper with the
technicality of having natural persons file the application for
confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part,
provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares
....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and
constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly
applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original
Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court
of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge,
CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism
should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple
terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a
certificate of title over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can
sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it
should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the
Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts
for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt
from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application
on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only
citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply
for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that
there was a technical error in not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the
original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their
sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application
being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the
great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names
and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now."
(Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the
statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can
apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV,
Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title
to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A
construction adopted should not be such as to nullify,
destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York
State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d
688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L
Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective
law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done
a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably
possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a
whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
under which the statute or provision being construed is
defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a
statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which
will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the
former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may
not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of
no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against
the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction,
the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the
precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law
from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision of a statute
is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs.
Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited
in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
33
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition
express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to
take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid
Page
down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat
that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court
in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982]
and related cases.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CORAZON
NAGUIT, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Seeking to review
the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The
appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998,
which granted the application for registration of a parcel of
land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.
The facts are as follows:
On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age
and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of
Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a
parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The
parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D,
Nabas Cadastre, AP – 060414-014779, and contains an
area of 31,374 square meters. The application Seeks judicial
confirmation of respondent’s imperfect title over the
aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the
application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the
government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date,
however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the
court issued an order of general default against the whole
world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the
government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of
land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax
Declaration No. 3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his
rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made
by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or
1956.[5] Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a
deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who
thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted
Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements,
planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina
trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then
50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on
the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land
surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles
by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-
in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept
of owner without any objection from any private person or
even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public
prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to
present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to
appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27,
1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed
in the name of Naguit.[6]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for
was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15,
1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director
Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Region VI.[7] However, the court denied
the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February
18, 1998.[8]
Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order
of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On
February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.[9]
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision
dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in
toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question
of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000. [10]
The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals
contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding
that there is no need for the government’s prior release of
the subject lot from the public domain before it can be
considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of
P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of
Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required
period.[11]
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is
necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable
and disposable before the applicant’s possession under a
bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing that the property
which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must
first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared
alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or
disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing
original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It
expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) – that
the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). “Since June 12,
1945,” as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase “under a bonafide claim of ownership.” Generally
speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and
not those distantly or remotely located.[13] Ad proximum
antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
34
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if
we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative
amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view,
Page
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared
alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of
unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually
inoperative and even precludes the government from giving
it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness
of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even
considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1)
is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered
as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the
time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as
it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the
property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic
v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein, the Court noted that “to
prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.”[15] In that case, the subject land
had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable
in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable status of
the land, compounded by the established fact that therein
respondents had occupied the land even before 1927,
sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that
the subject property was released and certified as within
alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that while the claimant
had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that
the lands in question were classified as alienable and
disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not
succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application
in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared
alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the
application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.
A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those
which form part of a reservation for provincial park
purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into
ownership.[20] It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21]forest land
is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how
lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such
lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence,
the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the
Court of Appeals.[23]
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the
lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration
through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file
the application for registration derives from a bona fide claim
of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by
reason of the claimant’s open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to
register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona
fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty
(30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which
pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new
starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land
Act does refer to “agricultural lands of the public domain,”
while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
“alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.” It
must be noted though that the Constitution declares that
“alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands.”[24] Clearly, the subject lands under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and
the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12,
1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of “those who have acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.”
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential
rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years.[26] With such conversion, such property may now fall
within the contemplation of “private lands” under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being
been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor
may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it
having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years
old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is
no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by
the lower courts.
The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding
that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner
for the required period. The argument begs the question. It
is again hinged on the assertion—shown earlier to be
unfounded—that there could have been no bona fide claim
of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was
declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC
and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply
for registration owing to the continuous possession by her
35
and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The
basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court
Page
generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts.
Notably, possession since 1945 was established through
proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations
executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the
possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one’s sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces
his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues
to the Government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land
by the respondent can be traced back to that of her
predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or
for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of
doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept
of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any
opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-
Nazario, JJ., concur.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002,[1] which affirmed
the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,[2]granting the
application for land registration of the respondents.
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto
brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23
September 1998, a single application for registration of two
parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in
Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They
claimed to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots,
which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.[3] Together
with their application for registration, respondents submitted
the following set of documents:
(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of
respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot
No. 8423, in the name of respondent David; [4]
(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots; [5]
(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need
for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots; [6]
(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on
the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject
Lots; [7]
(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its
finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and
disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963; [8]
(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property
(ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias,
covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No.
941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No.
8423, also issued in 1994; [9] and
(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by
spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling
the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to
their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and
David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias,
while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David. [10]
On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents'
application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that:
(1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse
possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did
not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots
were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation.[11]
The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at
8:30 a.m.[12] All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots
were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing.[13] A copy of
the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a
conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the
bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion,
Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located.[14] Finally, the
Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02
August 1999[15] and The Freeman BanatNews on 19
December 1999.[16]
During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC
issued an Order of Special Default,[17] with only petitioner
Republic opposing the application for registration of the
Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel,
proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of
Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and
to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.
On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment
ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of
respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent
David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on
02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to
issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots. [18]
Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, to the Court of Appeals.[19] The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed
the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:
In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land
sought to be registered has been classified as within the
alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article
1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively
provides that "All things which are within the commerce of
men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of
patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription"
and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables
also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith."
As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their
parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands,
36
subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos,
coconuts, and other trees (Judgment dated December 21,
Page
1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or
their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed
the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming
arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only
from June 25, 1963 or from the time the subject lots had
been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone,
still the argument of the appellant does not hold water.
As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable
since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23,
1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus
susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of
Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater right, entitled
to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of
P.D. 1529 which allows individuals to own land in any
manner provided by law. Again, even considering that
possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963,
the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable,
herein appellees have been possessing the subject parcels
of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner,
for 35 years already when they filed the instant application
for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court
finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.[20]
The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and
reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22
November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:
First, respondents failed to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of
owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the
petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to
25 June 1963 cannot be considered in determining
compliance with the periods of possession required by law.
The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable
only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also
alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling
in Republic v. Doldol,[21] where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public
Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased,
requires that possession of land of the public domain must
be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired
through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal
infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two
parcels of land individually and separately owned by two
applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended,
that the application for registration of title to land shall be
filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a
single application only in case they are co-owners. While an
application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only
when the subject parcels of land belong to the same
applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land
are co-owned) and are situated within the same province.
Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by
a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the
proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed
to comply with the procedure for land registration under the
Property Registration Decree, the proceedings held before
the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over
it.
I Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that
the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the
application for registration filed by the respondents but for
reasons different from those presented by petitioner
Republic.
A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not
affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the
Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners.
Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the
individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.
Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity
committed by the respondents was fatal to their case,
depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear
their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on
this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,[22] to wit:
. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-
compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule
that said defects have not invested the Court with the
authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the
manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed,
thereby rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.
This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in
this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the
respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to
proceed with and hear their application for registration of the
Subject Lots.
The Property Registration Decree[23] recognizes and
expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a
single application by several applicants for as long as they
are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be
registered;[24] and (2) the filing of a single application for
registration of several parcels of land provided that the same
are located within the same province.[25] The Property
Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present
situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for
two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and
individual registration of the parcels of land in their
respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for
such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court
to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the
of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient."
Considering every application for land registration filed in
strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a
single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application
for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC
constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties.
Instead of a single or joint application for registration,
respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately,
should have filed separate applications for registration of
Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a
question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with
the case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for
dismissal thereof.[27] Instead, under the Rules of Court, the
misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the
power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the
case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the
misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against
said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present
Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu
propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is
regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the
misjoinder when the application for registration was still
pending before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner
Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by
filing a motion for severance of the causes of action and
parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.
B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the
publication requirements mandated by the Property
Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with
jurisdiction as a land registration court.
37
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in
the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC
Page
over the land registration proceeding, this Court,
nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of
the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from
assuming jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration.
A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,[28] and
jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be
constructive seizure of the land through publication and
service of notice.[29]
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that
the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the
application for land registration by means of (1) publication;
(2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial
Hearing shall be made in the following manner:
1. By publication. – City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for
initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall
cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the
Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to
all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved
including the adjoining owners so far as known, and "to all
whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall
not be granted.
Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section
23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides
that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still
affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals[30] that publication in a newspaper of general
circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to
validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or
applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration
Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements
of publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial
Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of
the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential
and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the
same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the
compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation, thus "
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general
circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law
already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette
as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already
Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In
sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration
cases, the consequences of default orders issued against
the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice
in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory
construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and
posting.[31]
In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC,
and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.
While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the
Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially
released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The
Freeman Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu
the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December
1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.
Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date
of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and
ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published
in The Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject
Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late
for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial
hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration,
and to present his claim and evidence in support of such
claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-
oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial
hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred
from contesting respondents' application for registration and
even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant
thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special
Default on 03 September 1999.
The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the
newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no
publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to
such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to
constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration
thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December
1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of
respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02
February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999
final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to
issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both
null and void for having been issued by the MTC without
jurisdiction.
II
legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not
have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents'
application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it
necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period
of possession for acquiring title to public land.
Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the
statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only
alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by
purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in
his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner
since 1950.[32]
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted
by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are "within
Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC
Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed
Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932
dated June 29, 1992."[33] The Subject Lots are thus clearly
part of the public domain, classified as alienable and
disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied, from the government;[34] and it is indispensable that
the person claiming title to public land should show that his
title was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.[35]
The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the
public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands,
and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State.[36] It
explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may
be disposed, as follows:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease;
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).[37]
Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by
separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are
specific requirements and application procedure for every
mode.[38] Since respondents herein filed their application

38
been complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due Period of Possession before the MTC,[39] then it can be reasonably inferred that
process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of
widely read and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.

Page
delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published Respondents failed to comply with the required period of
therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or
incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares,[40] may
be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073, which reads –
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the
Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming
to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 shall be
entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities,
respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or
legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section
48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition,
the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on
25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date
when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and
disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession; such
possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the
land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply
thereto.[41] It is very apparent then that respondents could not
have complied with the period of possession required by
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire
imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of
Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that
respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Property Registration Decree. According to the Decision of CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED.
the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC
14(4) of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order,
to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID.
ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED.
Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-
interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when SO ORDERED.
they filed their application, have acquired title to the Subject
Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo,
relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.[42] Sr., JJ., concur.
Tinga, J., out of the country.
The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act.
Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists
a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public
Land Act, the presumption always is that the land applied for
pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors
only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect
title or continuous, open, and notorious possession.[43] As
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the
Subject Lots respondents wish to register are undoubtedly
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and
respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.
However, it must be clarified herein that even though
respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the
Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for
judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in
accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for
Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads –
SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal
representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or
interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in
every case present an application to the proper Court of First
Instance, praying that the validity of the alleged title or claim
be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to
them under the provisions of the Land Registration Act.[44]
Hence, respondents' application for registration of the
Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial
requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and
the procedural requirements under the Property Registration
Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of
ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types
of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands
of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public
Land Act may be considered a special law[45] that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an
39
established rule of statutory construction that between a
general law and a special law, the special law prevails –
Generalia specialibus non derogant.[46]
Page
Wherefore, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is