Procter and Gamble Asia Pte Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
204277, May 30, 2016
From this perspective, the Aichi Doctrine could not have been overturned by subsequent cases before this Court that were decided based on another issue and the application of a different doctrine or rule of law. In the same vein, the cases cited by PGAPL are irrelevant to the present case, because they did not rule on the jurisdictional and mandatory nature of the 120- and 30-day periods. Indeed, Aichi is the prevailing doctrine on the matter of mandatory compliance with the 120- and 30-day periods in the filing of judicial claims of tax credit or refund before the CTA. However, in the manner of most rules, the Aichi Doctrine is also subject to exceptions. In accordance with the equitable estoppel principle under Section 246 of the NIRC, we ruled in San Roque-Taganito that there are exceptions to the strict rule that compliance with the Aichi Doctrine is mandatory and jurisdictional, one of which is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03. If the CIR issues a ruling, either a specific one applicable to a particular taxpayer or a general interpretative rule applicable to all taxpayers, and, as a result, misleads the taxpayers affected by the rule, into filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA, the CIR cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA's assumption of jurisdiction over such claim. ||
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philex Mining Corp., G.R. No. 233942
February 21, 2018
Lest it be misunderstood, the benefit given to the taxpayer to determine when
it should complete its submission of documents is not unbridled. UnderRMC No. 49- 2003, if in the course of the investigation and processing of the claim, additional documents are required for the proper determination of the legitimacy of the claim, the taxpayer-claimants shall submit such documents within thirty (30) days from request of the investigating/processing office. Again, notice, by way of a request from the tax collection authority to produce the complete documents in these cases, is essential.|||
Considering that the administrative claim in this case was filed on 17
December 2013, RMC No. 54-2014 is clearly not applicable. Instead, RMC No. 49- 2003 applies, in which case, Philex relatively has control in determining whether its claim is complete with supporting documents for purposes of commencing the 120- day period for the CIR to decide. We emphasize that the CIR neither gave notice to Philex that its documents were inadequate, nor ruled to deny Philex's claim for failure of the latter to substantiate its claim. It is also worth noting that the CIR acknowledged in this petition that Philex had already submitted the supporting documents even prior to the date of filing the application. With the previous submission of supporting documents, it is only logical to conclude that the subsequent filing by Philex of the application effectively perfected its claim for refund/credit. Thus, the counting of the 120-day period should be reckoned from 17 December 2013, the date Philex filed the application for refund/credit. On this date, Philex may be said to have "submitted complete documents to support its application" for refund of excess unutilized input VAT. Thus, reckoned from this date, the CIR had 120 days to decide, or until 17 April 2014. Without any action or notice from the CIR as of 17 April 2014, the claim of Philex was deemed denied. It follows that Philex had 30 days, or until 17 May 2014, to file a judicial claim. The cause of action of Philex is the inaction of the CIR which is deemed a denial of its claim.
Callman Gottesman, Maria Mattiello and Paul J. Peyser v. General Motors Corporation and E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company, 436 F.2d 1205, 2d Cir. (1971)