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THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY:
REFORMULATION AND TEST OF THE
SELF EVALUATION ARGUMENT*
JOHN F. STOLTE
Northern Illinois University
tion was calculatedfor subjects in all relations nipulated positional power variable was
of extended profitoverlap. Averageprofit was dummy coded in two ways: one procedure
calculated separately for each of the three provided a within-structure comparison, where
negotiationsegments taken singly, and across the A, position (N = 18) was coded 1 and the
the three segments taken as a whole. other positions (A2, A3, and A4) (N = 54) were
A second dependentvariablewas the level of grouped and coded 0; a second dummy coding
a subject's perceived self-efficacy. Following procedure provided a between-structure com-
Franksand Marolla(1976),the potency dimen- parison, where position A, in the "unilateral
sion of the semanticdifferential(Osgoodet al., monopoly" (N = 18) was coded 1, and position
1957)was used as an indicator.After the final B1 in the "closed social circle" (N = 18) was
transaction period, each subject answered a coded 0. When relative mean profit was re-
postexperimentalquestionnairein which "my gressed on positional power, the dummy cod-
self in the experiment"was listed as a concept ing procedure reflecting between-network dif-
to be rated on a series of semanticdifferential ferences was used, because within-network
scales. On each of a set of bipolar adjective differences in profit level are not statistically
scales (e.g., "weak-strong," "delicate- independent (i.e., one subject's profit fixes
rugged,"etc.), a subjectchecked one of seven what the other can achieve). However, when
spaces. An average self-efficacy (potency) the analysis focused on perceptions of self-
score was computedfrom the responses each efficacy and fairness, which are statistically
subject made to the separate scales. The independent within networks, the dummy
maximumscore was 7 and the minimumwas 1, coding procedure showing within-network
and higher scores imply a higher level of per- comparisons was used.'0
ceived self-efficacy.
A third dependent variable was a subject's Results: Effect of Relative Positional Power on
judgment of the fairness of her own terms of Terms of Exchange
exchange. Semantic differential procedures
were used to construct an indicator. In the The data displayed in Table 1 support the first
postexperimentalquestionnaire,"my own total hypothesis, which predicted that the extent to
level of profit" was listed as a concept to be which the terms of exchange will favor an actor
rated on a set of bipolaradjective scales con- is directly proportional to that actor's relative
sisting of "fair-unfair" and "inequitable- positional power. Relevant to this prediction is
equitable." An average judged fairness score the comparison of the mean profit levels
was computedfromthe responses each subject negotiated by subjects at position A, in the
made to the separate scales. The maximum "unilateral monopoly" network with the mean
score was 7 andthe minimumwas 1, and higher level of profit negotiated by subjects in posi-
scores imply higherlevels of fairness imputed tions A2, A3, and A4 in the same structure. As
by subjects to the terms of exchange each shown in Table 1, for the negotiation segments
negotiated.9 taken singly' and taken together, the mean
profit achieved per transaction by subjects at
position A, was higher than that achieved by
Analysis
subjects at positions A2, A3, and A4. While
Datadescribingsubjectslocated at position A1, these mean profit levels are not statistically
and positions A2, A3, and A4 in the "unilateral independent, each was shown to depart signifi-
monopoly"networksas well as datadescribing cantly (by a single-sample t-test) from the ex-
subjects at B1 in the closed social circle net- pected value (6.5), under the assumption of no
works were used in the analysis. Regression difference. Thus, the within-network data
techniques (Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973) show a consistent, marked effect of relative
were applied to test the hypotheses. The ma-
10 Explicit knowledge of relative exchange ratios
9 The use of semantic differentialproceduresto was also manipulated.In half the networks,subjects
scale "fairness"is not an ideal solution.The reliabil- were providedwith informationabout the exchange
ity of such a measureis not known. However, such ratios that were actually negotiated right after the
procedureshave strongface validityin the context of negotiationsand before they filled out the postex-
the problembeing investigated,and I am awareof no perimental questionnaire. Analysis showed that
alternativewell-testedproceduresfor measuringthe knowledgehad small (main and interaction)effects.
perceived fairness of an experimental exchange In general, knowledge simply confirmed what the
ratio. Traditionally,equity has been conceptualized subjects already strongly suspected on the basis of
and operationalizedin terms of objective input/ the give-and-takeof negotiation.Since the effects of
outputratios. Whateverthe value of this traditional this variableare tangentialto the present work, the
objectiveapproachto measuringequity, it will not do results of the analysis includingit are not reported
for studying fairness as it relates to subjectively here. The results of that analysis are, however,
sensed legitimacy. availablefrom the authoron request.
338 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
positional power.on the relative terms of ex- eral monopoly:'had a higherlevel of perceived
change negotiatedby subjects. self-efficacy(X = 5.15) thansubjectslocated in
Otherdata shown in Table 1 and data shown positions A2, A3, and A4 in that structure(X =
in Table 3 are also relevant to Hypothesis 1. 4.33). Further,the regressionresults displayed
Table 1 contrasts the average profit level in Table 3 show'that positional power had a
achieved by subjects at position A1 in the significanteffect on self-efficacy perceptions,
"unilateralmonopoly" with that achieved by as predicted,and that position accounts for 10
subjects at position B1 in the "closed social percent of the variance in those perceptions.
circle." For each negotiationsegment, and for The third hypothesis predicted that a sub-
the segmentstaken as a whole, subjectsat po- ject's perceptions of the fairness of her own
sition A1negotiateda mean profitlevel signifi- terms of exchange (negotiatedexchange ratio)
cantly higherthan that negotiatedby subjects would not vary with that actor's relative posi-
in position B1. Thus, the between-network tional power. The data presented in Tables 2
comparisonsalso supportthe first hypothesis. and 3 are clearly contraryto this expectation.
Bivariate regressions were calculated to de- As Table 2 shows, subjects in position Al
terminethe magnitudeof the effect. As Table3 judged the fairness of their own terms of ex-
shows, position accounts for between 26 and change to be higher (X = 5.52) than did sub-
33 percentof the variancein profitlevel across jects in positionA2, A3,and A4 (X = 4.55). The
the three segments of negotiation. Again, the regressiondata presented in Table 3 show the
data show the expected effect of relativeposi- difference to be significant, with positional
tionalpoweron the relativetermsof exchange. power accounting for 10 percent of the vari-
ance in a subject'sperceptionsof fairness. The
Results: Effects of Positional Power on results are clear. Hypothesis three is not sup-
Self-Efficacy Perceptions and Judged Fairness ported.
of Own Terms of Exchange
The second hypothesispredictedthat the level CONCLUSIONS
of self-efficacy an actor achieves through While the results do not supportthe reformu-
negotiationacross a series of transactionswill lated self-evaluationargument,they stimulate
be directlyproportionalto that actor's relative furtherthinkingwhichcan shed additionallight
positional power. As indicated in Table 2, on the topic at issue and lay a basis for future
subjects located in position A, in the "unilat- research. An account of the data must ac-
Table 2. MeanPerceivedSelf-EfficacyandJudgedFairnessof OwnTermsof Exchangeby PositionalPower
Position Al in the Unilateral Positions A2, A3, A4 in the
Monopoly (N = 18) Unilateral Monopoly (N = 54)
X SD X SD
Perceived Self-Efficacy 5.15 .88 4.33 1.12
JudgedFairness of Own
Terms of Exchange 5.52 1.11 4.55 1.34
THE LEGITIMATION OF STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 339
Table 3. Regressionsof RelativeTermsof Exchange,PerceivedSelf-Efficacy,and JudgedFairnessof Own
Terms of Exchange on PositionalPower
Metric Standardized
Relative Terms Coefficient Coefficient
of Exchange b B d/f F r2
First Segment 2.56 .51 1/34 11.86** .26
Second Segment 3.33 .57 1/34 16.55*** .33
ThirdSegment . 3.49 .57 1/34 16.52*** .33
Across All Segments 3.83 .57 1/34 16.66** .33
PerceivedSelf-Efficacy .90 .38 1/70 7.90** .10
JudgedFairnessof Own
Terms of Exchange .89 .30 1/70 7.65** .10
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.