(Legal Ethics)

Brion, Jr. vs. Brillantes, Jr.

A.C. No. 5305 March 17, 2003

Facts:

Petitioner Marciano P. Brion, Jr., in this petition for disbarment, avers that respondent violated the
court’s decree of perpetual disqualification imposed upon respondent Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. (in
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr.) from
assuming any post in government service, including any posts in government-owned and controlled
corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of
the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy Agreement.

Respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as well as the Special Consultancy
Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense that under Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract
shall not be considered government services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules
and regulations.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent has transgressed the letter and spirit of the court’s decree in
the Atienza case.

Held:

By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee, albeit in the guise
of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter and spirit of the Court’s decree
in Atienza.

The Court finds that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and functions of a non-
advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA. As stated by petitioner in his reply,
there is a difference between a consultant hired on a contractual basis (which is governed by CSC M.C.
No. 27, s. 1993) and a contractual employee (whose appointment is governed, among others, by the
CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointment and other Personnel Actions). The lawyer’s primary duty as
enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote
respect for law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal
orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to
any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and controlled
corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy contract.

Hence, Atty. Brillantes was suspended and ordered to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(Php10,000.00).
Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February
12, 1990]
16OCT
[Per Curiam]

FACTS:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath. Required by this Court to answer the
charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court
granted respondent’s motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and
Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for
a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971
for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered
by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney’s fees from
the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on
June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of
Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales]
defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.

HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:
The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to
pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for
reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client’s rights is champertous [citation omitted].
Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to
carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in
dispute [citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the
lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.