Republic of the Philippines And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman

SUPREME COURT in the unauthorized practice of law.7

Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 7269 November 23, 2011
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-Lacsamana (Noe-
Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, while
Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana
alleged that Ulaso’s deed of sale over the property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was
annulled, which resulted in the filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), San Juan, docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel.
Another case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty. Liza Dela Rosa
(Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself as Busmente’s collaborating
counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine
times from 25 November 2003 to 8 February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the
court orders and notices specified Dela Rosa as Busmente’s collaborating counsel. Noe-
Lacsamana alleged that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, she discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant for a
few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela
Rosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with the help of Regine
Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmente’s former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his signature in the Answer 1 presented as
proof by Noe-Lacsamana was forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found
that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she represented Ulaso as Busmente’s collaborating
counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela
Rosa no longer worked for him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from
employment. The IBP-CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the
pleadings of the case, were all sent to Busmente’s designated office address. The IBP-CBD
stated that Busmente’s only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former secretary
Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmente’s staff,
alleging Macasieb’s failure to endorse pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to
Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulaso’s case in her affidavit
and that there was no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings
and notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working at
Busmente’s office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a Motion to Lift
Order of Default that she signed. However, even if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela
Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmente’s allegation that Dela
Rosa was able to illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and only
due to Dela Rosa’s connivance with Macasieb. As regards Busmente’s allegation that his
signature on the Answer was forged, the IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to
coordinate with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was
forged but he failed to submit any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from
the time he reserved his right to submit the report.
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the Bar,
misrepresented herself as Busmente’s collaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The only
question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of
law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa’s employment in his office ended in 2000 and that Dela
Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through connivance with Macasieb,
another member of Busmente’s staff. As pointed out by the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that
Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003. Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulaso until
2005. Pleadings and court notices were still sent to Busmente’s office until 2005. The IBP-CBD
noted that Dela Rosa’s practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmente’s office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No. 9284. The 7
December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No.
9284 showed that Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that
Order, Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8 February
2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue representing Ulaso in the case,
considering Busmente’s claim that Macasieb already resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to
the files in Busmente’s office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271, submitted a
copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer submitted in Civil Case No.
9284 and the specimen signatures submitted by Busmente were not written by one and the
same person. The report shows that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned
signature in the Answer. The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other
documents signed by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and
Motion to Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a
letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29 August 2003
addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed by Busmente. Busmente failed
to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only
came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire about its status.
Busmente’s allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie
B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718 BPI Office Cond.
Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case which have been filed by
IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectment
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases mentioned in the Complaint-
Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the notices or other court
records as our legal counsel the same could not be taken against us for, we believed in good
faith that she was a lawyer; and we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to
us (sic), she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any pleading which
she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO
BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or
hearings;
f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in relation to Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the following elements of the offense are not
present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party;
3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;

The IBP-CBD recommended Busmente’s suspension from the practice of law for not less than 4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,3 the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which is not so in the
period of Busmente’s suspension to six months. instant case.

Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report 4 from the NBI stating that
the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample signatures submitted to its
office, showed that they were not written by one and the same person. In its 14 May 2011
Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board of Governors denied Busmente’s motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rosa
in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in consideration of
his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding one’s self out as a lawyer may be shown by
acts indicative of that purpose, such as identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in
representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general
practice of law.6
g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA we never ask her
whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice law in the Philippines; it would have
been unethical and shameful on our part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she
has legal qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short, she gave us
paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil Case No.
9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.
Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient evidence to prove
that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP, modifying the recommendation of the IBP-
CBD, that Busmente should be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmente’s personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant.1âwphi1 Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

The Court explained:

The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be
limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves
upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the
profession enjoin him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of,
or to make possible the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC August 19, 2009
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court - BRANCH 81,
ROMBLON, ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE
PRACTICE OF LAW.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M.
Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which query the
latter referred to the Court for consideration. In the course of its action on the matter, the Court
discovered that the query was beyond pure policy interpretation and referred to the actual
situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence, was a matter that required concrete action on the factual
situation presented.
The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as
amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).
This provision places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency,
and those already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after
separation, in engaging in the private practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No.
6713 provides:
SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions; or
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above,
but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.
In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent engage in
private practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his
official duties, but a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last
paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position
that he is liable to exploit, but a non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position of
possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?"1
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1,
2008. Thereafter (and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted
provision), she engaged in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in
several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon.
Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an
incumbent public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long
as this practice does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a
public official or employee who has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government
service like her, is prohibited from engaging in private practice on any matter before the office
where she used to work, for a period of one (1) year from the date of her separation from
government employment.
Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise
of clout, influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may
use in the private practice of his profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case,
since she had already resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She
advanced the view that she could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81
of Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict
with her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following
observations when the matter was referred to him:
The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-honored principle of
public office being a public trust." Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public
officials and employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism;
and (c) justness and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism
that "[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of
their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government
employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity,
moral ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.21avvphi1
Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this case to the
Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and recommendation. 3 The OCAT
took the view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority
for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision
of law.4 and further observed:
The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after the phrase "provided
that." It may indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase "engage in the private practice
of their profession" should be prefatory sentence that public officials "during their incumbency
shall not" be disregarded. However, read in its entirety, "such practice" may only refer to
practice "authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception to the prohibition against the
practice of profession. The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a
memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of law."
The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and
employees from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and
unlawful act, accords with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in
Article XI of the Constitution …
The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that
in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over
the former.5[Footnotes omitted]
With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel – the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent
judicial employee and which limits such outside employment to one that "does not require the
practice of law."6 The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have
intervened while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service. 7
In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution dated
November 11, 2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular
on the practice of profession during employment and within one year from resignation,
retirement from or cessation of employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required the
Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i) verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel
during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her resignation in February 2008, and (ii)
submit to the Court a report on his verification.8
In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch
81 of Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:
(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo M.
Macalam, et al. on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as
counsel for the plaintiffs; (2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo
Malasa, et al., on (sic) February, 2008, as counsel for the plaintiff; (3) Civil Case No. V-1396,
entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, on February 21, 2008, as counsel for the
plaintiff; and (4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps. Mariano
and Olivia Silverio, on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the defendants.
Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and
she filed a Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of
our November 11, 2008 Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of
Branch 81 records. As well, she informed the Court that she had previously taken the following
judicial remedies in regard to the above query:
1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had been
dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) – a recourse taken when undersigned
was still a private practitioner; 2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the
RTC of Manila, which had been also dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4,
2008 (Annex B) – a recourse taken when undersigned was already a public prosecutor
appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took her oath of office as such on August 15,
2008.[Emphasis supplied]
She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases "so that
eventually, the Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the
above petitions which is, why is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par. thereof,
apparently contains an express prohibition (valid or invalid) on the private practice of
undersigned’s law profession, before Branch 81, while on the other hand not containing a
similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigned’s practice of profession, before the same
court, as a public prosecutor – within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?"
OUR ACTION AND RULING
Preliminary Considerations
As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of
determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and
form (as the Court does not give interpretative opinions 9 but can issue circulars and
regulations relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts 10 and in the exercise of its
administrative supervision over all courts and personnel thereof11), but also with the task of
responding to admitted violations of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple
recourses on the same subject.
After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of
the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the
present administrative matter a finished task, subject only to confirmatory closure when the
OCA reports the completion of the undertaking to us.
Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and immediately
after her resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run
away from under the cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for declaratory relief,
whose dismissal she manifested she would pursue up to our level. We note that at the time
she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch
81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her
in any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law cannot excuse any resulting
violation she committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing before her own Branch
and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.
Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were
dismissed, and her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed
before the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the "court
declined to exercise the power to declare rights as prayed for in the petition, as any decision
that may be rendered will be inutile and will not generally terminate the uncertainty or
controversy."12The second, filed with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila, was dismissed for being an
inappropriate remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch 54, Manila, on
December 4, 2008.13 Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling on
Atty. Buffe’s actions, as no actual court case other than the present administrative case, is now
actually pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffe’s recourse
to this Court and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable
answer to her query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.
A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffe’s actions relates to
possible objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal
directive to Atty. Buffe to explain why she should not be penalized for her appearance before
Branch 81 soon after her resignation from that Branch. The essence of due process is the
grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be
heard.14The records of this case show that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard with respect to
her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to our November 11, 2008 directive for
the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffe’s appearances before
Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the Branch records.
Her legal positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this Court; first, in
her original letter-query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process
consideration needs to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her appearances
in her previous Branch within a year from her resignation.
The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public
officials and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice
of their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can
engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private
practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not
conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private
practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within
the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited
period applies with respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used
to work with.
The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and
serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government
transactions between a former government official or employee and his or her former
colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the observance and the
efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to serve the public. 15
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
also applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the "outside employment" that
an incumbent court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:
Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the
following requirements:
(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts
or conducts business with the Judiciary; (b) The outside employment can be performed outside
of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s
duties and responsibilities; (c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law;
Provided, however, that court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or
resource person in law schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing officials duties; (e) The outside employment
shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government, unless specifically
authorized by the Supreme Court.
Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside
employment reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not
accept outside employment. [Emphasis supplied]
In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of
law is covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically
mentions any outside employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,16 we
defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage
in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.17 Under both provisions, a common objective is
to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may wittingly or unwittingly
use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her familiarity with
court personnel still with the previous office.
After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel ceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its
subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty.
Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.
Atty. Buffe’s Situation
A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffe’s admission that she
immediately engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated
in Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this
provision and only objects to its application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that
she cannot practice before her old office – Branch 81 – for a year immediately after
resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in matters where a conflict of interest
exists between her appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of Court. She
believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and
employees as against those already separated from government employment.
Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7
(b)(2) as a blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what
we have explained above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials
and employees from the practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for
clerks of court to practice their profession. By way of exception, they can practice their
profession if the Constitution or the law allows them, but no conflict of interest must exist
between their current duties and the practice of their profession. As we also mentioned above,
no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their profession, as they are in fact
expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel from
doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffe’s basic
premise is misplaced.
As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately
after her separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other
prohibitions under Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of court’s limitation is that she cannot
practice her profession within one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In
a comparison between a resigned, retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand,
and an incumbent official or employee, on the other, the former has the advantage because
the limitation is only with respect to the office he or she used to work with and only for a period
of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only where specifically allowed by the
Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of interests exists. This analysis
again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basic premises.
A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffe’s approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law
and her readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We
find it disturbing that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her
position by referring to the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after
separation from their judicial employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law
and appeared as private counsels before the RTC branches where they were previously
employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude on Atty. Buffe’s part and, to our mind, only
emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall," this provision must be strictly complied
with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she
had about Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
however, does not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad
enough to include it.18 Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not
essential to bring his or her act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically
prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct. 19 Thus, we find Atty. Buffe liable under
this quoted Rule.
We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby violated
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully
practised law within the prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just
left. Canon 7 states:
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]
By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she
cited and wanted to replicate – the former court officials who immediately waded into practice
in the very same court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal
profession by openly disobeying and disrespecting the law. 20 By her irresponsible conduct, she
also eroded public confidence in the law and in lawyers. 21 Her offense is not in any way
mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her transgressions by writing the Court a
letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions for declaratory relief, all of
them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that at some point she
would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not promote
public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. 22
Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa
loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 23 In several cases, the Court has
disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts
on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,24 the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further
investigation after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct;
the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was
also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of
several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi
in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they
claimed in their cases.25 The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the
matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.26
Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, 27 that no evidentiary hearing is
required before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already
established by the facts on record.
We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta 28 where we
punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-
cause order for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due
process is satisfied as long as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be
disciplined.29
Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,30 the respondent was disciplined and punished for contempt
for his slurs regarding the Court’s alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the
basis of his answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the
respondent did not deny making the negative imputations against the Court through the media
and even acknowledged the correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per curiam
decision, we justified imposing upon him the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:
The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority
of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a
professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task
and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part
which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice
constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against
him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power. 31
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal
investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its
disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to
be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on
the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court.
A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 32 The appropriate penalty on an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. 33
In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCAT’s observation
that Atty Buffe’s letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the
prohibition on the practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713.
Ignorance of the law, however, is no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of
the legal profession soon after one’s separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the
examples she cited, it is time to ring the bell and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot
allow this practice to continue.1avvphi1
As we observed earlier,34 Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various
fora in expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713.
She formally lodged a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her
successive petitions for declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility
of embarrassment and confusion through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed.
Although this is not strictly the forum-shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has
done is something that we cannot help but consider with disfavor because of the potential
damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it could have spawned. This is a point
against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have exercised because of the
OCAT’s observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the prohibition
after separation from the service.
Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of ₱10,000.00,
together with a stern warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing
other acts of professional misconduct.35 This penalty reflects as well the Court’s sentiments on
how seriously the retired, resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should
regard and observe the prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to
work with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of
professional misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of this violation and the commission of
other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt with more severely. Let this Decision be
noted in Atty. Buffe’s record as a member of the Bar. SO ORDERED.
B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, Complainant,
vs.
EDWIN L. RANA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit.
A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar
examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees
as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre ("complainant") filed
against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled
oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the
charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has
not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As
such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent
of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan") without the latter
engaging respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a
ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath
but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against
him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint
against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent
him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as
a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001
pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains,
however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney"
in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He
submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001
signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is
politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the
losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Comment and refuted the claim
of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to
Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao ("Estipona-Hao") filed a
petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel
for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC,
complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath
as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent’s Comment) reiterating his claim that the
instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC’s Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in
the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively
participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the
MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer’s oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes
that respondent’s misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the
Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny
his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the
lawyer’s oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of
Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed
as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated
that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had
"authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before the MBEC and similar
bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty. Edwin L.
Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the
candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was
entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the
REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the
petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by
members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service
which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself "counsel"
knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel"
knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be
a member of the Philippine Bar.3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice
of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations,
if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license. 5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the
Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the
unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s
oath.1âwphi1 However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing
the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent
to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the
secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001
addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan,
respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." 10 Vice-Mayor Relox
accepted respondent’s resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not
support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies.
While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice
law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN,
JR., President of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association,
Inc., of practicing law without having been previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo
S. Abad could not deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following
lame explanation:

1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ... prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the
bar, paid his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by Official Receipt No.
8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No.
8128793, ... and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No. 83740,... .

2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of Court of the Honorable Supreme
Court, included the respondent as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the
Bar as shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...

3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while waiting for my turn to take
my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in
the Office of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo Mendoza told me that
Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M. Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr.
Jorge Uy (Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief Justice told me that
I have to answer the Reply and for which reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further
suspended. *

4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the
Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;

5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable Supreme Court may take upon
my Prayer to determine my fitness to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980 informing the
respondent of an Annual General Meeting together with my Statement of Account for the year
1980-1981, ... .

6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26, 1979 and my Reply to Mr.
Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking
of my name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and therefore a
Member in Good Standing, I paid my membership due and other assessments to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official Receipt No.
110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise respondent paid his Professional Tax
Receipt as shown by Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .

7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter also
included the name of the respondent as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and
directors for the year 1981-1982, ... .

8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by the fact that on January 8,
1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified
Notice and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981; notifying the Court of
this fact with a prayer that herein respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the
Bar;

9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated Bar for his 1981-1982
membership due and other assessment for which the undersigned paid as shown by Official
Receipt No. 132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .

10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for 1981 as shown by Official
Receipt No. 3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as a Certificate of Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City
Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has narrated do not constitute
his admission to the Philippine Bar and the right to practise law thereafter. He should know that
two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138,
Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e),
Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred (P500.00) pesos payable to
this Court within ten (10) days from notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days
imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005 possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.
LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF IBP DUES. The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation
does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of
DECISION the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required
payment of the annual dues.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no
one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
practice, the member is engaged in.

In his letter,1 dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership
dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005.
dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the
He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA in
the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could have been
December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be
discontinued.
assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in government service, and
neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the USA. As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the
process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of
their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment. 2
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.

On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment 3 stating inter alia: that membership in
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a
the IBP is not based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
Roll of Attorneys as long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
rights.
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by the IBP Board of
Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections 9 and 10,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,10 in this wise:
been upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy
of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation . . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
of the Court's directives for all members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it
the bar. It maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to
as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary termination and reinstatement of the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of
membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
IBP Board of Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive arbitrary.
status for its members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will
exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual dues. But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
In his reply4 dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
Board of Governor's Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of
lawyers regardless of whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues with conditions,11 one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of
suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection clause and the due process them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues would
indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is
WHEREFORE, petitioner's request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is
without income derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of
ordered to pay P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years
annual membership dues would constitute deprivation of property right without due process of
1977-2005, within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a
law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither
warning that failure to do so will merit his suspension from the practice of law.
injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive status, nor to the community
where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
SO ORDERED.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his
dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil
Service from 1962-1986 and he was working abroad from 1986-2003?

We rule in the negative.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as

distinguished from bar association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in
which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the
Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well
as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the
State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be
members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional
responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.5

The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer
population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine
qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the
Supreme Court.6

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession
in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program – the
lawyers.7

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the
integration of the Philippine Bar 8 - which power required members of a privileged class, such
as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and purposes
of integration.

The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar,9 thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is
attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a
tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an
incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be
 Republic of the Philippines While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
SUPREME COURT consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be
Manila utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
EN BANC
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013 honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before
the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what
he had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-
fledged member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner. it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When, in spite of this
knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete
RESOLUTION all the requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
SERENO, CJ.:
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect
Medado (Medado). contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt 29 and must be reached after the filing of charges
and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law,
in 19791 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of
we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge
82.7.2
pertaining thereto has been filed against him.

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the
(PICC) together with the successful bar examinees. 3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys 5 given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.6 CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and
that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. 7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a
lawyer";8 and "the matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,
and was subsequently forgotten."9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited. 10
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent
the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in
accordance with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we
cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after
receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized
practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year
period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is
sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the
Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that
he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on
21 September 201212and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4
February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It explained that, based on his
answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR
after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for
his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to
practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
SO ORDERED.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin
to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for
the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar
Confidant why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung
anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a
combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right
thing to do. I have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary. 16

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice
of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully
admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that
petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he
has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine
National Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation. 19

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, 20 this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by
characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment."22

We disagree.
G.R. No. 169517 March 14, 2006

ROGELIO A. TAN, NORMA TAN and MALIYAWAO PAGAYOKAN, Petitioners,

vs.
BENEDICTO M. BALAJADIA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is an original petition1 for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan, Norma Tan and
Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto Balajadia.

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with the
Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and
violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners
from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a
"practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building,
Session Road, Baguio City."2 However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant3 and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines4 showed that respondent has never been
admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect
contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment,5 respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit
that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty.
Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavit.6 It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-
affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one for
the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 o’clock in the morning and another for the parking
incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Respondent
insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking incident correctly alleged
that he is "a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City."7 However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock parking
incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing
lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino’s
complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing lawyer
based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City," which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit 8 admitting the mistake in the
preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-
affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations
with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention
of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply,9 petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt
for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the
blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

The sole issue for resolution is whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

x x x x.

In several cases,10 we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an
attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are
punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the
orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the
rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence
makes it clear that he intended to commit it. 11

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never intended
to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the
secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that
gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in
paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the
result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his
client;12 appearing before court hearings as an attorney; 13 manifesting before the court that he
will practice law despite being previously denied admission to the bar; 14 or deliberately
attempting to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full
knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.15

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney or
that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s deliberate intent to
misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to
be more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and

circumspect in his future actions.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines For consideration now is petitioner's fifth plea for reinstatement filed on June 1, 1979 in
SUPREME COURT addition to a letter-petition addressed to Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando dated November
Manila 3, 1979. In his Petition, Juan T. Publico avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in
Manila was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who accompanied him to
EN BANC school and enrolled him in a grade level above his qualifications in spite of his demonstrations;
that the misrepresentation committed about his academic records was not his own fault alone,
but was precipitated by his uncle, who as member of the faculty of the Catanduanes Institute
February 20, 1981
had access to the records of the school; that being merely sixteen years of age, he could not
be expected to act with discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later
IN RE: PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS, JUAN T. on caused his disbarment; that he had conducted himself in a manner befitting a member of
PUBLICO, petitioner. the bar; that he had striven to serve the people and the government as shown by the positions
he held as Municipal Attorney of San Miguel, Catanduanes, Deputy Register of Deed of
Catanduanes, Election Registrar of the Commission on Elections, and Editorial Assistant in the
Editorial Staff of the defunct House of Representatives, and presently as faculty member of the
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Polytechnic university of the Philippines, a State University.

Three Petitions for the reinstatement of Juan T. Publico in the Roll of Attorneys, have been
filed: (1) by Juan T. Publico himself dated May 28, 1979; 2) by the President and twelve
members of the faculty of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Manila,
where Juan T. Publico is also a faculty member, filed on June 1, 1979; and 3) by the San Page
723 Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila through its President, Vice-
President and Directors on April 23, 1979.
The records disclose that Juan Tapel Publico filed a petition to take the Bar Examination in
1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar Examination. His uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel opposed the
petition alleging that his nephew is not a person of good moral character for having
misrepresented, sometime in 1950, when he was sixteen (16) years of age, that he was
eligible for Third Year High School, University of Manila, by utilizing the school records of his
cousin and name-sake, Juan M. Publico when, in actual fact, petitioner had not completed
Grade VI of his elementary schooling, much less, First and Second Year High School. When
required to file a formal Complaint, Dulcisimo Tapel instituted an administrative case against
his nephew for falsification of school records or credentials.
In the meantime, Juan T. Publico took the 1960 Bar Examination, passed it, took the lawyer's
oath, and signed the Roll of Attorneys.
The administrative case was referred to the Court's Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras,
Jr., for investigation and report. On September 10, 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel moved to drop the
complaint on the ground that his witnesses had turned hostile. The Motion was denied,
however, as the complainant's witnesses had already testified. Upon the termination of the
hearing, the Legal Officer-Investigator submitted a Report with the following findings and
recommendation:
Additionally, petitioner submitted evidence purporting to show his honesty and integrity and
other manifestations of his good moral character, particularly, the Resolution dated March 30,
1979 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Catanduanes Chapter (Annex A); the Resolution
dated April 16, 1979 of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Miguel, Catanduanes (Annex B); the
letter of the Municipal Mayor of San Miguel, Alejandro T. Tatel addressed to the late Chief
Justice Castro dated April 17, 1979 (Annex B-1), all attesting to his good character and
standing in the community and his capability as a lawyer. Further submitted are certifications
issued by the different government offices Court of First Instance of Catanduanes (Annex C);
Catanduanes Integrated National Police Command (Annex F should be D); Office of the
Provincial Fiscal at Virac, Catanduanes (Annex F), and First Municipal Circuit Court, Bato-San
Miguel, Bato, Catanduanes (Annex E), certifying that petitioner has not been accused nor
convicted of any crime.
The petition filed by the President and Faculty of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines
reiterated the same circumstances as those stated by Juan T. Publico in his own Petition and
further professed that Atty. Publico is a competent and proficient teacher; that his moral
integrity and honesty are beyond reproach; that to require him to comply with what he missed
in the steps of the educational ladder would be meaningless and without any value as it is not
intended to benefit him nor the system of education; and that non-formal education has already
been recognized and given its equivalence in the scheme of formal education. The petition
also mentioned the names of some great men who had been school dropouts, but who did not
let this fact deter them from attaining success in their respective fields.
The petition filed by the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic Association in Metro Manila is
substantially of the same tenor and added that petitioner was re-elected President of that
Association for four years from 1972 to 1975 inclusive.

No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.

To recapitulate, respondent Juan Tapel Publico (son of Francisco Publico) studied at Buhi
Elementary School, Bato, Catanduanes, until Grade VI, but finished only Grade V in said
school, because on February 1, 1950, or before the end of the school year 1949-1950, he left
said school and came to Manila. Once in Manila, he enrolled in Third Year high school at the
University of Manila. Required by the school authorities to submit his school records for Grade
VI elementary and First and Second Year high school, he sent for the records of his cousin
Juan Marino Publico (son of Gabriel Publico).
For all the foregoing, we find and so hold that respondent falsified his school records, by
making it appear that he had finished or completed Grade VI elementary and First and Second
Year high school, when in truth and in fact he had not, thereby violating the provisions of
Sections 5 and 6, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar examinee
or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary, high, pre-law and law school, prior to his
admission to the practice of law.
The criterion for reinstatement has been stated as follows:
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion
of the court, The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that
the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the
applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of
good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into
consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5
Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443). 1

Wherefore, the undersigned Investigators hereby recommend that respondent's name be Almost nineteen (19) years, by February 23, 1981, shall have elapsed since petitioner was
stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys. barred from exercising his profession. Cognizant that the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the indicative
principle, 2 we find that the evidence submitted by petitioner, particularly, the testimonials
In this Court's Resolution of February 23, 1962, the name of Juan T. Publico was stricken off
presented on his behalf, as listed heretofore, his good conduct and honorable dealings
the Roll of Attorneys.
subsequent to his disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious
organizations, render him fit to be restored to membership in the Bar, and that petitioner has
Approximately eleven years later, or on June 28, 1973, Juan T. Publico filed a Petition for been sufficiently punished and disciplined. 3
Reinstatement alleging that he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have
any knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to strike his name from
WHEREFORE, petitioner Juan T. Publico is hereby ordered reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.
the Roll of Attorneys until March 1969, when after taking his oath of office as Municipal Judge
of Gigmoto, Catanduanes, he was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case
against him; that he was shocked and humiliated upon learning of the said Resolution; that he SO ORDERED.
resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and transferred to Manila. He then
prayed that the Court allow his reinstatement taking into consideration his exemplary conduct
from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the community the numerous awards,
resolutions and/'or commendations he received, which were incorporated in the Petition, and
particularly, for the sake of his children. The Court denied the Petition. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration claiming that he had been sufficiently punished already, but again this was
denied by the Court for lack of merit.

On April 17, 1974, Juan T. Publico filed his second Petition for Reinstatement stating that the
Complaint for disbarment against him had been withdrawn by the complainant, but that the
Legal Officer-Investigator proceeded with the hearing ex parte; that he was unable to cross-
examine the witnesses against him as he was unaware of the ex-parte proceedings until he
was informed by the Legal Officer-Investigator about the same; that he had suffered so much
already and to let him suffer perpetual disqualification would not be in consonance with the
program of the New Society. He prayed that his name be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys, or
that the case be reopened so that he could cross-examine the witnesses against him and clear
himself of the charges. This Court denied his Petition in its Resolution of April 23, 1974.

On November 17, 1975, Juan T. Publico wrote to the Chief Justice imploring his assistance
that he may be given another opportunity to enjoy the privileges of a lawyer, and requesting
that a hearing be held where he could personally plead for his reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys. Again, this Court denied the aforesaid letter-petition.

Petitioner filed a fourth petition for reinstatement on July 8, 1976 stating that he had remained
a person of good moral character and had an exemplary social standing in the community
where he resides, as shown by his election to various positions in different associations: as
peace officer of Barangay 593, Zone 58 of the City of Manila (Annex A of the petition),
President of the Stallholders and Vendors Association of Pamilihang Sentral ng Sta. Mesa, Inc.
(Annex B), re-elected President of the Altura Elementary School General Parents-Teachers
Association (Annex C), and re-elected President of the San Miguel (Catanduanes) Civic
Association in Metro Manila (Annex D). He also alleged that his moral character and integrity
had remained irreproachable, that he had been more than sufficiently punished and had been
undergoing economic difficulties because of his disbarment. In its Resolution of August 3,
1976, this Court denied the Petition with finality.
 Republic of the Philippines WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
SUPREME COURT ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.
Manila
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,

vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970
bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before be could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them and
that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to many her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and
July 1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when
they were both in their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to
sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael
Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.1 It was after the child was born, complainant alleged,
that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar examinations. Their
relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust in him and their
relationship ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman. Hence,
this petition.

Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by
deposition in 1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Dismiss the case citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello
seeking to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant
filed her comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present
case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondent's motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on September 17, 1979.2 Respondent's third motion to
dismiss was noted in the Court's Resolution dated September 15, 1982.3 In 1988, respondent
repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay,
Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good standing in the
community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to
take his oath as a lawyer.4

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant
to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to
take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the required fees.5

Respondent's hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response
to complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993,
the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that
respondent be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child
with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion
of respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify
suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.7

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang8 quite relevant because mere intimacy between a
man and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and
devoid of any deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of such
relationship a child was born out of wedlock.9

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently
consensual. We do not find complainant's assertions that she had been forced into sexual
intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate relations
refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent
young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of
his dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because
of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter
and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it
seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has
been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this time
there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
Supreme Court of Arizona,En Banc.
IN RE: James Joseph HAMM, Applicant.
No. SB-04-0079-M.
Decided: December 07, 2005
James Joseph Hamm, Tempe, In Propria Persona. Monroe & McDonough, P.C., by Lawrence
McDonough, Tucson, and Juan Perez-Medrano, Phoenix, Chair Attorneys for the Committee
on Character & Fitness. Charles W. Wirken, President, Helen Perry Grimwood, President-
elect, Jim D. Smith, First Vice President, Daniel J. McAuliffe, Second Vice President, Edward
F. Novak, Secretary-Treasurer, Robert B. Van Wyck, Chief Bar Counsel, Phoenix, Attorneys
for Amicus Curiae State Bar of Arizona. Michael D. Kimerer, Marty Lieberman, Amy L. Nguyen,
Phoenix, Carla Ryan, Andrew Silverman, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae, Arizona
Attorneys for Criminal Justice. Andrew P. Thomas, Maricopa County Attorney, by Andrew P.
Thomas, Phoenix, Attorney for Amicus Curiae Maricopa County Attorney's Office.
OPINION
¶ 1 James Hamm petitioned this Court, pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 36(g), 17A
A.R.S.,1 to review the recommendation of the Committee on Character and Fitness (the
Committee) that his application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona (the Bar) be denied.
Having reviewed the record and the Committee's report, we conclude that James Hamm has
failed to establish the good moral character necessary to be admitted to the practice of law in
Arizona and deny his application.
I.
¶ 2 In September 1974, James Hamm was twenty-six years old and living on the streets of
Tucson. Although he previously had attended divinity school and worked as a part-time
pastor, Hamm describes his life in 1974 as reflecting a series of personal and social failures.
In 1973, he had separated from his wife, with whom he had a son. Although he had no
criminal record, he supported himself by selling small quantities of marijuana and, again
according to Hamm, he used marijuana and other drugs and abused alcohol.
¶ 3 On September 6, 1974, Hamm met two young men who identified themselves as college
students from Missouri. The two, Willard Morley and Zane Staples, came to Tucson to buy
twenty pounds of marijuana. Hamm agreed to sell it to them, but apparently was unable to
acquire that quantity of marijuana. Rather than call off the transaction, Hamm and two
accomplices, Garland Wells and Bill Reeser, agreed to rob Staples and Morley of the money
intended for the purchase. On September 7, Wells gave Hamm a gun to use during the
robbery. Later that day, Wells and Hamm directed Morley and Staples to drive to the
outskirts of Tucson, purportedly to complete the drug transaction;  Reeser followed in another
vehicle. Both Wells and Hamm carried guns;  Morley and Staples were unarmed. Hamm
sat behind Morley, the driver, and Wells sat behind Staples. At some point, Hamm detected
that Staples was becoming suspicious. As Morley stopped the car, and without making any
demand on the victims for money, Hamm shot Morley in the back of the head, killing him. At
the same time, Wells shot Staples. Hamm then shot Staples in the back as he tried to
escape and shot Morley once again. Wells also shot Morley, then pursued Staples, whom he
ultimately killed outside of the car. Hamm and Wells took $1400.00 from the glove
compartment, fled the scene in the van driven by Reeser, and left the bodies of Morley and
Staples lying in the desert.
¶ 4 Hamm took his share of the money and visited his sister in California. At the hearing held
to consider his application to the Bar, he told the Committee that he “was compelled to come
back to Tucson,” despite knowing he probably would be caught. Police officers arrested
Hamm shortly after his return. While in custody, he told the police that Morley and Staples
were killed in a gun battle during the drug deal. Initially charged with two counts of first-
degree murder and two counts of armed robbery, Hamm pled guilty to one count of first-degree
murder and was sentenced to life in prison, with no possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
¶ 5 Once in prison, Hamm began taking steps toward rehabilitation and became a model
prisoner. After spending one year in maximum security, he applied for and received a job in a
computer training program that allowed him to be transferred to medium security. Once in
medium security, Hamm apparently took advantage of any and every educational opportunity
the prison system had to offer. He completed certificates in yoga and meditation and, on his
own, studied Jungian psychology. He helped fellow inmates learn to read and write and to
take responsibility for their actions. He obtained a bachelor's degree in applied sociology,
summa cum laude, from Northern Arizona University through a prison study program.
¶ 6 After Hamm completed six years in medium security, prison officials transferred him to
minimum security, where he worked on paint and construction crews. He received a
significant degree of freedom, which allowed him to live in a dormitory rather than in a cell and
occasionally to drive unaccompanied to nearby towns. He testified that he was the only
inmate permitted to head a work crew. Hamm reported to the Committee that he played an
instrumental role on various prison committees, particularly the committee that developed a
new grievance procedure within the Department of Corrections. In addition, he wrote grant
proposals for libraries, for handicapped prisoners, and for obtaining greater legal assistance for
prisoners.
¶ 7 While in prison, he met and married Donna Leone. She and Hamm founded Middle
Ground Prison Reform (Middle Ground), a prisoner and prisoner family advocacy organization
involved in lobbying for laws related to the criminal justice system and prisons. Middle
Ground also provides public education about those topics.
¶ 8 In 1989, the Governor, acting on the recommendation of the Arizona Board of Pardons and
Parole (the Board), commuted Hamm's sentence. When he had served nearly seventeen
years, in July 1992, the Board released Hamm on parole, conditioned upon no use of alcohol
or drugs, drug and alcohol testing, and fifteen hours of community service each month. In
December 2001, the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency  2granted Hamm's third application
for absolute discharge.
¶ 9 Between his release in August 1992 and his absolute discharge in December 2001, Hamm
performed thousands of hours of community service. He advocated for prisoners' rights in
various forums by writing position papers, appearing on radio programs, testifying in legislative
hearings, and speaking at churches, schools, and civic organizations. He also appeared in a
public service video encouraging children not to do drugs or join gangs. Hamm now works as
the Director of Advocacy Services at Middle Ground Prison Reform.
¶ 10 While on parole, Hamm graduated from the Arizona State University College of Law. In
July 1999, Hamm passed the Arizona bar examination and, in 2004, filed his Character and
Fitness Report with the Committee.
II.
¶ 11 The Rules of the Supreme Court of Arizona establish the process through which the
Committee and this Court evaluate applications for admission to the Bar, and prior case law
clarifies the burden an applicant must satisfy to establish good moral character. We begin
with a review of the rules.
A.
¶ 12 Rules 34 through 37 define the requirements for admission to the Bar. 3 The Committee
may recommend an applicant for admission only if that applicant, in addition to meeting other
requirements, satisfies the Committee that he or she is of good moral character. Rule 34(a).
The applicant bears the burden of establishing his or her good moral character. In re
Greenberg, 126 Ariz. 290, 292, 614 P.2d 832, 834 (1980) (citing In re Levine, 97 Ariz. 88, 397
P.2d 205 (1964)). In determining whether an applicant's prior conduct indicates a lack of
good moral character, the Committee must consider the following non-exhaustive list of
factors:
A. The applicant's age, experience and general level of sophistication at the time of the
conduct
B. The recency of the conduct
C. The reliability of the information concerning the conduct
D. The seriousness of the conduct
E. Consideration given by the applicant to relevant laws, rules and responsibilities at the
time of the conduct
F. The factors underlying the conduct
G. The cumulative effect of the conduct
H. The evidence of rehabilitation
I. The applicant's positive social contributions since the conduct
J. The applicant's candor in the admissions process
K. The materiality of any omissions or misrepresentations by the applicant.
Rule 36(a)3.
¶ 13 When prior conduct involves the commission of a violent crime, the Committee must, at a
minimum, hold an informal hearing. Rule 36(a)4.E. If three or more Committee members who
attended the hearing or who have read the entire record do not recommend admission of an
applicant, the Committee must hold a formal hearing to consider whether to recommend the
applicant for admission to the Bar. Id.
¶ 14 If the applicant fails to convince the Committee of his or her good moral character, the
Committee has a duty not to recommend that person to this Court. In re Klahr, 102 Ariz. 529,
531, 433 P.2d 977, 979 (1967);  Levine, 97 Ariz. at 91, 397 P.2d at 207 (“If the proof of good
moral character falls short of convincing the Committee on Examinations and Admissions, it is
its duty not to recommend admission.”);  In re Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 233, 319 P.2d 991, 993
(1957) (“In this it has no discretion;  if the members entertain any reservations whatsoever as
to the applicant's good moral character, it should not make a favorable recommendation to this
court.”). After the Committee submits its report, an aggrieved applicant may petition this
Court for review. Rule 36(g).
B.
¶ 15 This Court then independently determines whether the applicant possesses good moral
character and, based upon that determination, grants or denies the candidate's application.
Although we give serious consideration to the facts as found by and the recommendation of
the Committee, “[t]he ultimate decision in this difficult matter rests with the Supreme Court.” In
re Kiser, 107 Ariz. 326, 327, 487 P.2d 393, 394 (1971) (holding applicant possessed good
moral character);  see also Levine, 97 Ariz. at 92, 397 P.2d at 207 (holding the Court must,
“using our independent judgment, de novo determine whether the necessary qualifications
have been shown”). We do not limit our independent review to matters of law;  we have “the
ultimate responsibility for determination of fact and law.” In re Ronwin, 139 Ariz. 576, 579,
680 P.2d 107, 110 (1983);  see also In re Walker, 112 Ariz. 134, 137, 539 P.2d 891, 894
(1975) (making a finding regarding the credibility of testimony, although in agreement with the
Committee).
¶ 16 The ultimate question in cases such as this is whether the applicant has established
good moral character, a concept with which we have wrestled as we have attempted to define
its boundaries. Greenberg, 126 Ariz. at 292, 614 P.2d at 834. As Hamm asserts, the rules
and standards governing admission to the practice of law in Arizona include no per se
disqualifications. Instead, we consider each case on its own merits. Id. In Walker, we
described the principles on which we rely as follows:
‘Upright character’ * * * is something more than an absence of bad character. * * * It
means that he [an applicant for admission] must have conducted himself as a man of upright
character ordinarily would, should, or does. Such character expresses itself not in negatives
nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often in the will to do the unpleasant thing
if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Farmer, 191 N.C. 235,
131 S.E. 661, 663 (1926)).
¶ 17 We also agree with Hamm that, under the Rule applicable to Hamm's application, our
concern must be with the applicant's present moral character. In Greenberg, we explained
that “it is [the applicant's] moral character as of now with which we are concerned.” 126 Ariz.
at 292, 614 P.2d at 834;  see also Rule 36(a)3. Past misconduct, however, is not irrelevant.
Rather, this Court must determine what past bad acts reveal about an applicant's current
character.
III.
¶ 18 In compliance with Rule 36(a)4.E, the Committee conducted a formal hearing to consider
Hamm's application. The Committee heard testimony on May 20 and June 2, 2004. Hamm,
representing himself, and his wife presented extensive testimony. In addition, the Committee
heard from three licensed attorneys who had worked with Hamm and who recommended his
admission and also considered letters from those opposed to and in support of Hamm's
application. In detailed findings, the Committee specifically considered the various factors set
out in Rule 36(a) to determine Hamm's character and fitness to be admitted to the Bar. In its
report, the Committee stated that, in reaching its conclusions, it considered the following:
1) Hamm's unlawful conduct, which included the commission of two violent “execution style”
murders and his testimony as to the facts surrounding the murders.
2) Hamm's omissions on his Application and his testimony in explaining his failure to disclose
all required information.
3) Hamm's neglect of his financial responsibilities and/or violation of a longstanding child
support court order and his testimony as to his failure to comply with the court order.
4) Hamm's mental or emotional instability impairing his ability to perform the functions of an
attorney including his testimony as to any diagnosis and treatment.4
¶ 19 After reviewing all these factors, the Committee concluded that Hamm had not met his
burden of establishing that he possesses the requisite character and fitness for admission to
the Bar and accordingly recommended that his application be denied. We now consider the
Committee's findings, together with pertinent facts.
A.
¶ 20 The serious nature of Hamm's past criminal conduct is beyond dispute. Hamm
acknowledges that no more serious criminal conduct exists than committing first-degree
murder. Our society reserves its harshest punishment for those convicted of such conduct.
See Tucson Rapid Transit Co. v. Rubiaz, 21 Ariz. 221, 231, 187 P. 568, 572 (1920) (describing
murder as “the most serious crime known to the law”).
¶ 21 Hamm's past criminal conduct and the serious nature of that conduct affect the burden
he must meet to establish good moral character. He must first establish rehabilitation from
prior criminal conduct, a requirement that adds to his burden of showing current good moral
character. See In re Adams, 273 Ga. 333, 540 S.E.2d 609, 610 (2001) (“Where an applicant
for admission to the bar has a criminal record, his or her burden of establishing present good
moral character takes on the added weight of proving full and complete rehabilitation
subsequent to conviction․”);  In re Allan S., 282 Md. 683, 387 A.2d 271, 275 (1978) (“Although
a prior conviction is not conclusive of a lack of present good moral character, ․ it adds to his
burden of establishing present good character by requiring convincing proof of his full and
complete rehabilitation.”).
¶ 22 The added burden becomes greater as past unlawful conduct becomes more serious.
In In re Arrotta, we considered an application for reinstatement from an attorney who, eight
years earlier, pled guilty to mail fraud and bribery. 208 Ariz. 509, 96 P.3d 213 (2004). We
noted there that “the more serious the misconduct that led to disbarment, the more difficult is
the applicant's task in showing rehabilitation.” Id. at 512 ¶ 12, 96 P.3d at 216. An applicant
for initial admission to the Bar who is attempting to overcome the negative implications of a
serious felony on his current moral character likewise must overcome a greater burden for
more serious crimes. We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court, which recognized that
“in the case of extremely damning past misconduct, a showing of rehabilitation may be virtually
impossible to make.” In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (1983). Indeed, we are
aware of no instance in which a person convicted of first-degree murder has been admitted to
the practice of law.
¶ 23 To show rehabilitation, Hamm must show that he has accepted responsibility for his
criminal conduct. Hamm fully recognizes his need to make this showing. Indeed, he states
that his rehabilitation could not have proceeded absent such acceptance. We recognize the
Committee's concern that Hamm has not yet fully accepted responsibility for the two murders.
Hamm says he has done so, repeatedly and strongly, but some of his other statements
indicate to the contrary. The inconsistencies among his various statements related to
accepting responsibility are most evident when he discusses Staples' murder. Although he
told the Committee that he accepts responsibility for Staples' murder, in fact he consistently
assigns that responsibility to his accomplice. His testimony revealed almost no attention to
the commission or aftermath of Staples' murder. Hamm concedes that he has focused on his
role in Morley's murder rather than on his role in Staples' murder. The difference in
approach, he explains, resulted from one postcard written to him by Morley's grandmother and
his decision to use his connection to Morley to provide motivation to overcome difficulties.
We have no reason to doubt that Hamm's focus on Morley's murder aided him, using his
words, in “accomplishing things that people have been telling me I can't do and we're [Hamm
and Morley] still doing it today.” That fact, however, does nothing to assure us that Hamm
has taken responsibility for Staples' murder, as he must if he is to establish rehabilitation.
¶ 24 We also give serious consideration to the Committee's finding that Hamm was not
completely forthright in his testimony about the murders. 5 Hamm has insisted in his filings
with this Court that he did not intend to kill, but only to rob, his victims. The agreed facts,
however, lead directly to the inference that Hamm intended to kill. He conspired with his
accomplices to rob the victims;  he accepted the gun provided by Wells and took it with him in
the car with the victims;  he testified that, although he did not intend to kill the victims, he was
“afraid” they would be killed when he got in the car;  he shot Morley without ever attempting a
robbery and shot him a second time to make certain he was dead;  and he also shot Staples to
prevent his escape. The Committee observed Hamm testify and was able to judge the
credibility of his testimony in light of uncontested facts. We agree that the record shows that
Hamm, despite his current protestations to the contrary, intended to kill the victims. His
failure to confront the fact that these murders were intentional undermines his statements that
he fully accepts responsibility for his actions.
¶ 25 As did the Committee, we give substantial weight to Hamm's attempts at rehabilitation.
In Section I, supra, we described in some detail the activities Hamm has undertaken, both
while in and since his release from prison. We are impressed with the sincerity and fervor of
those who testified or submitted letters on Hamm's behalf. Were rehabilitation the only
showing Hamm must make to establish good moral character, we would weigh those factors
tending to show rehabilitation against those tending to show a lack thereof. Under the facts
of this case, however, we need not decide whether the facts of record establish rehabilitation.
¶ 26 When an applicant has committed first-degree murder, a crime that demonstrates an
extreme lack of good moral character, that applicant must make an extraordinary showing of
present good moral character to establish that he or she is qualified to be admitted to the
practice of law. Even assuming that Hamm has established rehabilitation, showing
rehabilitation from criminal conduct does not, in itself, establish good moral character.
Rehabilitation is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient of good moral character. An
applicant must establish his current good moral character, independent of and in addition to,
evidence of rehabilitation. We conclude that Hamm failed to make that showing.
B.
¶ 27 We share the Committee's deep concern about Hamm's longstanding failure to fulfill, or
even address, his child support obligation to his son, born in 1969, four years before Hamm
and his first wife separated. Not until he prepared his application for admission to the Bar in
2004 did Hamm make any effort to meet his responsibility to provide support for his son.
During the Committee hearing, Hamm advanced several explanations for his failure to do so.
Like the Committee, we find none of his explanations credible.
¶ 28 Although Hamm attempts to excuse his failure to pay child support by pointing out that he
never received a copy of a final divorce decree, Hamm scarcely can claim that he lacked
awareness of his obligation. A few months after he and his wife separated in 1973, Hamm
was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of failing to pay child support. On May 6, 1974,
James and Karen Hamm's divorce decree set Hamm's child support payments at $75.00 a
month. Hamm made no effort to learn the extent of his financial obligation to his son from
1974, when Hamm was twenty-six years old, until 2004, when he was fifty-five. During those
nearly thirty years, he gained sophistication and attended law school. He must have known,
and certainly should have known, that he had long avoided a basic parental obligation.6
¶ 29 Hamm also attempted to excuse his inattention to his obligation by explaining that he
learned, first from a private investigator hired by his wife in 1988, and later from his son, that
his former wife's new husband had adopted his son. His reliance on the private investigator's
1988 report to excuse his failure is surprising, given the fact that his son was only months from
the age of majority when Hamm learned of the report;  he provides no explanation for his lack
of concern prior to that date.
¶ 30 Hamm further explained that only when he applied for admission to the Bar in 2004 did he
discover that his son had not been adopted and then “calculated the child support payment
[due] over the years.” Hamm determined that he owed $10,000.00 and, even though the
statute of limitations barred an action to recover past amounts due, 7 contacted his son and set
up a repayment schedule.
¶ 31 “ Behavior of such long duration cannot be considered as a temporary aberration․”
Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138, 539 P.2d at 895;  see also Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lewis,
493 Pa. 519, 426 A.2d 1138 (1981) (holding that even when an attorney made belated
restitution for funds taken from clients, because “[s]uch actions cannot be said to be consistent
with high ethical standards of the profession, with a lawyer's fiduciary responsibility to his
client, with a character that is beyond reproach, or with truth, candor and honesty,” the attorney
could not continue to practice law). Hamm's failure to meet his parental obligation for nearly
thirty years makes it more difficult for him to make the required extraordinary showing that he
“has conducted himself as a man ordinarily would, should, or does.” Walker, 112 Ariz. at 138,
539 P.2d at 895.
¶ 32 We also agree with the Committee that Hamm did not display honesty and candor in
discussing his failure to pay child support with the Committee. Hamm testified both that his
son told him personally that he had been adopted and that his son “adamantly refused” to
accept interest payments on the unpaid child support.
¶ 33 Hamm's son testified, however, that he had never been adopted, that prior to his contact
with Hamm he had changed his name himself, and that he had not told Hamm he had been
adopted. Hamm's son also did not report adamantly refusing interest payments. In
response to a question from the Committee about interest payments, he said:
Discussions about interest? Seems like whenever we were talking about it, you know, he
said it was a large amount, and it seems like the subject of interest did come up. I can't
remember exactly, you know, what we said about it. But, you know, I didn't push the issue or
anything, say, well, you know, you're going to pay me interest for this or what, or is there any
interest. It wasn't really an issue or important to me.
¶ 34 We discern no reason that Hamm's son would have been other than forthright about these
matters, while Hamm had every reason to present himself in the best possible light. 8 Like the
Committee, we find the testimony of his son to be more credible.
C.
¶ 35 We further conclude that Hamm did not adequately explain his failure to disclose an
incident involving him and his current wife, Donna, when he submitted his application to the
Committee.
¶ 36 In 1996, Hamm and Donna engaged in a physical altercation outside a convenience store.
Donna “yelled the word ‘kidnap’ out of the window” of the vehicle Hamm was driving, causing
him to pull over and leave the vehicle. During their tussle, Donna tore Hamm's shirt. Both
called the police, who arrested neither Hamm nor Donna. The incident and what Donna
describes as her “embellishments” caused such great concern to the Hamms, particularly
because Hamm was on parole, that Donna submitted to a polygraph administered by a private
company to demonstrate that Hamm had not kidnapped her. The two also underwent marital
counseling.
¶ 37 Nonetheless, when filling out his Character and Fitness Report, Hamm failed to disclose
the incident to the Committee. Question 25 on the report asks specifically whether the
applicant, among other things, has been “questioned” concerning any felony or
misdemeanor.9 Hamm told the Committee that, in reading the application, he missed the
word “questioned” in the list of encounters with law enforcement that Question 25 directs an
applicant to report.
¶ 38 Hamm's explanation strains credulity. In Walker, this Court inferred that the son of an
Army officer would understand the requirement to register for the draft. 112 Ariz. at 138, 539
P.2d at 895. Likewise, we infer from Hamm's knowledge of the law and his efforts in 1996 to
document a defense for the domestic incident that he fully understood its importance and must
have known that the incident would be of interest to the Committee. His failure to include it in
his initial application further affects his ability to make the needed extraordinary showing of
good moral character.
D.
¶ 39 Hamm's actions during these proceedings also raise questions about his fitness to
practice law. The introduction to Hamm's petition before this Court begins:
The consequences of this case for Petitioner take it out of the ordinary realm of civil cases. If
the Committee's recommendation is followed, it will prevent him from earning a living through
practicing law. This deprivation has consequences of the greatest import for Petitioner, who
has invested years of study and a great deal of financial resources in preparing to be a lawyer․
This language repeats nearly verbatim the language of the United States Supreme Court in
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252, 77 S.Ct. 722, 1 L.Ed.2d 810 (1957), in which the Court
wrote:
While this is not a criminal case, its consequences for Konigsberg take it out of the ordinary
run of civil cases. The Committee's action prevents him from earning a living by practicing
law. This deprivation has grave consequences for a man who has spent years of study and a
great deal of money in preparing to be a lawyer.
Id. at 257-58, 77 S.Ct. 722. If an attorney submits work to a court that is not his own, his
actions may violate the rules of professional conduct. Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof'l
Ethics & Conduct v. Lane, 642 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 2002) (“[P]lagiarism constitute[s],
among other things, a misrepresentation to the court. An attorney may not engage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”);   see also Rule 42, ER 8.4(c)
(defining professional misconduct as including “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”). We are concerned about Hamm's decision to quote from
the Supreme Court's opinion without attribution and are equally troubled by his failure to
acknowledge his error. When the Committee's response pointed to Hamm's failure to
attribute this language to Konigsberg, he avoided the serious questions raised and refused to
confront or apologize for his improper actions, asserting instead:  “From Petitioner's
perspective, any eloquence that might be found in the Petition does not derive from any prior
case decided in any jurisdiction, but rather from the gradual development of his own potential
through study, reflection, and devotion to the duty created by his commission of murder.”
Hamm apparently either does not regard his actions as improper or simply refuses to take
responsibility. In either case, his actions here do not assist him in making the requisite
showing of good moral character.10
E.
¶ 40 When Hamm committed first-degree murder in 1974, he demonstrated his extreme lack
of good moral character. Although this Court has not adopted a per se rule excluding an
applicant whose past includes such serious criminal misconduct, we agree with those
jurisdictions that have held that an applicant with such a background must make an
extraordinary showing of rehabilitation and present good moral character to be admitted to the
practice of law. Perhaps such a showing is, in practical terms, a near impossibility. We need
not decide that question today, however, because Hamm's lack of candor before the
Committee and this Court, his failure to accept full responsibility for his serious criminal
misconduct, and his failure to accept or fulfill, on a timely basis, his parental obligation of
support for his son, all show that Hamm has not met the stringent standard that applies to an
applicant in his position who seeks to show his present good moral character.
IV.
¶ 41 Hamm asserts that he was denied due process of law because two members of the
Committee may have prejudged the merits of his application. Both members, however, left
the Committee proceedings when their potential bias came to light, and neither played any role
in the Committee's findings and recommendation.
¶ 42 Hamm, like all applicants for membership in the Bar, is entitled to receive due process
of law. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96
S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct.
1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). Also, “due process requires that a party be given a ‘fair trial in a
fair tribunal.’ ” United States v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 265, 280, 697 P.2d 658, 673 (1985)
(quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955)). Both the
Committee and this Court have provided Hamm ample opportunity to be heard through
hearings and written arguments. Moreover, this Court, and not the Committee, made the
ultimate decision on Hamm's application. Hamm received a full opportunity to be heard
before a fair tribunal.

V.

¶ 43 Because James Hamm has failed to meet his burden of proving that he is of good moral
character, we deny his application for admission to the State Bar of Arizona.

FOOTNOTES

1. References in this opinion to “Rule _” are to the Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court.

2. The Board of Pardons and Paroles is now the Arizona Board of Executive Clemency.
1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 64.

3. Amendments to Rules 32 through 40 became effective December 1, 2005. Order

Amending Rules 32-40, 46, 62, 64 & 65, Rules of Supreme Ct., Ariz. Sup.Ct. No. R-04-0032
(June 9, 2005). In this opinion, we refer to the Rules effective when Hamm filed his
application for admission to the practice of law.

4. The Committee was divided as to the significance of complaints made concerning

Hamm's alleged unauthorized practice of law. This Court's decision does not rely upon those
allegations.

5. Hamm's lack of candor on this question also impacts our analysis of whether he met his
burden of showing present good moral character. See Section III, subsections B through E,
infra.

6. Hamm also cannot attribute his failure to pay child support to the absence of funds.
Even while in prison, Hamm earned “somewhere around a hundred dollars a month probably,”
but used no portion of those earnings to discharge his obligation.

7. When asked if he had taken steps to formalize his agreement with his son to pay back
child support, Hamm replied, “No. No. I simply acknowledged the debt regardless whether it is
a legal debt or not and whether it's an enforceable debt or not.” In its findings, the Committee
noted that Hamm “has since taken it upon himself to attempt to comply with his child support
obligations,” but expressed concern that he made no admission of a legal obligation to pay.
Whether an action to enforce Hamm's obligation to his son is in fact time-barred is unclear. In
Huff v. Huff, the Texas Supreme Court held that a ten-year statute of limitations under
Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5532, since repealed by Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 9(1), eff.
Sept. 1, 1985, applied to violations of child support orders. 648 S.W.2d 286, 287-88
(Tex.1983) (allowing a claim based on a 1973 divorce decree). Because Hamm's son turned
eighteen in 1987, the ten-year statute of limitations expired in 1997. In 2002, however, the
Texas Supreme Court held that an administrative writ, created by constitutional amendment in
1997, could be used to enforce a divorce decree issued in 1974, for which no order was
obtained, because the administrative writ is a “new and improved enforcement mechanism.”
In re A.D., 73 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex.2002). We need not resolve this question of Texas law,
but share the Committee's concern over Hamm's failure to formally investigate his legal
obligations to his son.

8. Rather than acknowledge any inconsistencies between his testimony and that of his son,
Hamm lashed out at the Committee's refusal to agree with Hamm's argument, which the
Committee could accept only if it accepted Hamm's testimony on this issue as credible.
Hamm accused the Committee of “totally ignor[ing] the content of [Hamm's Petition] to which it
supposedly was responding.”

9. Question 25 asks:Have you either as an adult or a juvenile, ever been served with a
criminal summons, questioned, arrested, taken into custody, indicted, charged with, tried for,
pleaded guilty to or been convicted of, or ever been the subject of an investigation concerning
the violation of, any felony or misdemeanor? (In answering this question, include all incidents,
no matter how trivial or minor the infraction or whether guilty or not, whether expunged or not,
whether you believe or were advised that you need not disclose any such instance.)

10. In addition to the matters discussed above, only four years have passed since James
Hamm was absolutely discharged. The fact that Hamm has been free of supervision for this
relatively short time weighs against his admission to the practice of law. Greenberg, 126 Ariz.
at 293, 614 P.2d at 835 (noting that “[r]ehabilitation is seldom accomplished in an
instantaneous fashion” and holding that Greenberg had “not convinced [the Court] that he as
yet evidences the requisite good moral character”) (emphasis added);  see also In re Dortch,
860 A.2d 346, 348 (D.C.2004) (finding it “would be erosive of public confidence in the legal
profession and the administration of justice were we to admit an applicant who is still on parole
for crimes as serious as those committed by Dortch”). Because Hamm otherwise failed to
establish good moral character, however, we reached our decision without considering this
factor.

McGREGOR, Chief Justice.

 Republic of the Philippines 3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but
SUPREME COURT undertime by 1 hour;
Manila
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
EN BANC
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs. Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned Municipal
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent. Courts with his daily time records, he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and February
18, 1963 he was present in his office although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel
BARREDO, J.: Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15, 1962 as well as on February 18, 1963.
Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in his Court on June 17,
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his daily time record that he was present with
Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows: an undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible explanation for this
irregularity.

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the

municipal court of this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga,
Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He makes it his means
of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but does not pay
anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good government. These facts
can be checked with records of those municipal courts.
2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he
would instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has
cases in the municipal court in this town involving himself and his men. He incite them telling
them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over the judges. Those
persons being ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao
is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed influences to urge persons to
commit crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the evidence, he
had made it appear that he was present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18,
1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a matter of fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram
attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well
as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318 entitled Restituto
Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that
he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as
amended, again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel in the
municipal courts of Sta. Rita, Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service
Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time
record in the CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would
fill his time record as present. He receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked
with time record he has submitted and if he has any application for leave. He may try to cure it
by submitting application for leave but this should not be allowed as he has already committed
crime.
4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable
information it is prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any
profession or business without permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure
has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed to practice as he is not an
attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we are
urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service to investigate him on this.
If warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we believe he
deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator
to be amply supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records
and the declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that
respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior
permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time
record of service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions
when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of
the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above
findings of fact of the Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as
they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in
the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel
in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he falsified his time
record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the
number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would
indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure
love of justice.

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable
District Judge, Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable
Judicial Superintendent, Department of Justice, Manila, the undersigned's reply to the
preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not
inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has also been noticed and noted on the right
hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite this
absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for
respect and courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law,
much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants'
cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty
and the absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also checked the miscarriage of
justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith a carbon-
original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the
defendants in Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible
Entry, in the Municipal Court of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as
Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it
warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find
no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to
practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position
as interpreter in the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to
reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
Castro, C.J., Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint
and answer to District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western
Samar, for investigation, report and recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa
submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:

Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is
said to be a resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta
appears to be a fictitious person

Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with his
complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the
case against him by calling Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of
Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar.

Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the
respondent appeared as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the
Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the
same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm on August 5, 1960 and
on September 17, 1970.

Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in
civil case No. 39 in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor
Payao, et al., for forcible entry on December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963
and on March 1, 1963.

Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel
for the defendant in civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto
Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.

From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the
following entries in his daily time record:

1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;

2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;

G.R. No. 89591-96 January 24, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court
of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the People's motion seeking reconsideration of our August
13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989
giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the
pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why
private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial
court's order specifically provided for private respondent's detention at the residence of Atty.
del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but
was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not
detained in the residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he
were a free man, including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30,
1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,1 the latter
accepted cases and continued practicing law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court
a motion seeking clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990, prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel
refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the
custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never
really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty. Javellana
considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith
be issued?"2

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the
trial court's custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent Javellana in the
provincial jail.1âwphi1.nêt

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent
motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved
the motion for clarification filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against
him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario the custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold
and detain" him in Atty. del Rosario's residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of
the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed judge, he ceased to be
the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be
deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelana's life no longer exist. Thus,
the trial court's order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must
be recalled, and he shall be detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana
is not allowed to practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a
detention prisoner. The trial court's order was clear that private respondent "is not to be
allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The prohibition to
practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as well, except
in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed
under the custody of the law.1âwphi1 He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. 3 He must be detained in jail during
the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to be released on
bail or on recognizance.4 Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more
than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose,
Antique, is ordered to continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch
and to avoid further delay.

WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are
ordered detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately,
and shall not be allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except, upon prior written
permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.

Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police
Office, San Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San
Jose, Antique.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 4749 January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed
against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr.,
himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the
matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the
proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all,
he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been using this for at least three years
already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996
and 1997: (originals available).
Annex A — "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1, 1995 in Civil Case
No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC. Annex B — "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated
November 13, 1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Parañaque, MM. Annex C
— "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File Required Comment and
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a
duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice
law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar
standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially
its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not
indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be
done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
(thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1. his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En
Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 (in SCRA). 2. his conviction for estafa per Decision dated
June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the
Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which
is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13,
1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what
appears to be respondent's signature above his name, address and the receipt number "IBP
Rizal 259060."1 Also attached was a copy of the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by
Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying
respondent's motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for
violation of Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification 3 dated March 18, 1997, by the then
president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that
respondent's "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or
remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from
receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his comment-memorandum4 dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged: 5
3. That with respect to the complainant's absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997
the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member
in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in
good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainant's basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were
as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February
14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed
and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court
Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to
the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge
was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony,
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself would surrender his right or
privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the
present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his
principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is
located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is
legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of
taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his
detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a limited practice, the subsequent payment
by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption. In fact, he never
exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to
show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with
such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges
and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender such fulfillment or payment, not for
allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive
purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for
him to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting and
approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found
respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for three months
and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the decision, but
this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-
B, §12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondent's suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondent's non-indication of the proper IBP O.R.
and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more
particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President
Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondent's last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has
invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4
of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as
an example.
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent
admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992
have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a
limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondent's Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his
standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years
and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without
having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by
complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at
least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter
membership and receipt number for the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims,
however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that
he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, §4 as a
senior citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues
as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed
sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as
a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased
members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership
in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by
paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A.
No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of individual income
taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the
exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the
public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 — A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
BAR.
CANON 10 — A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 — A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in
court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent's advanced age,
his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a more temperate application of the
law,8 we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this
decision be attached to Atty. Llamas' personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in
the land.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007 (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
RESOLUTION bar.
CORONA, J.: WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume
the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated
to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently
applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application
was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in
the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition
of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of
the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume
the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose
in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who
is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with
the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of
age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before
this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof
of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the
lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this
Court a certificate of the license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax; 12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics
of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited
to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and,
consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino
citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of
law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of

another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." 17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed
never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a
lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
 Republic of the Philippines Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar
SUPREME COURT to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
Manila
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to
EN BANC the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
B.M. No. 2112 July 24, 2012
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines for
IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the Bench
PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner, and Bar.

RESOLUTION SO ORDERED.
REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15, 2006, he re-
acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in
the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were
several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P. Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar
petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his practice
of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine Bar
in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for his
ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay
re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of
allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the
Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in
fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the
petitioner’s membership in the bar;ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law.
Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. 1 Thus, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as
stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. 2 R.A. No. 9225
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. 3

It can not be overstressed that:

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.1âwphi1 It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal
education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and
for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions
makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC
required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of the following
documents in relation to his petition:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of

Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his good moral
character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-

MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE.
After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has
met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-10236-48 January 31, 1958
THE PFOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for
appellant.
Luis F. Gabinete for appellee Eustacio de Luna.
Pedro B. Ayuda for appellee Estella R. Gordo.
Alejandro P. Capitulo for appellees Angelo T. Lopez and Alawadin I. Bandon.
Fransisco de la Fuente for appellee Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.
Bienvenido Peralta for appellee Abraham C. Calaguas.
Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y Estrellas, Jaime P. Marco, Roque J.
Briones, Balbino P. Fajardo and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. in their own behalf.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, granting a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled
cases, for lack of jurisdiction and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended
informations, filed in said cases, do not constitute the crime of contempt of court with which
said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco, Santos L. Parina, Estela R. Gordo,
Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez, Abraham C. Calaguas,
Roque J. Briones, Alawadin T. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and Emilio
P. Jardinico, Jr., are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the
22nd day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each
one Of these cases.
. . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way
authorized to take his oath as a lawyer and after haing been duly informed and notified that
certain portions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are
unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petitions of the
candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for
admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the Honorable, the
Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
contemptously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the
Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts
constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the
respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all
other inferior courts by then and there, without being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an
oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making manifestations to that effect before the
Honorable, the Supreme Court.
After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which reads:
Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an
officer appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court . . . (Emphasis our.).
and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that .
It is a well-established rule that the power to judge the contempt rest exclusively with the court
contemned and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly,
disobedience of the order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a court of
another state or by a federal court.
the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees herein
"was committed not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and
that, accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish"
the appellees herein.
This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provisions of the Rules of court is permissive
in nature. It is merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of
contempt against the same. It does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so
punish the guilty party is exclusive. Indeed, in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court
could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the jurisdiction may have been vested
by statute, the right to exercise said authority, for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court,
under Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is limited to the promulgation of "rules
concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," and does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the
Philippines. In fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains that
"Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts," thereby implying, necessarily, that such power is withheld from the Supreme
Court. Needless to say, the aforesaid view, quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law
only "unless otherwise provided by stattute" (17 C.J.S., 81), and such statute, providing
"otherwise", exists in the Philippines.
Moreover, the amended informantions specifically allege that the defendants herein did
"perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that the tend directly or
indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the
Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the
Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it differently the acts charged
werecommitted, according to said amended informations, in contempt of the Supreme Court,
as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same.
Again , section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provide that a
person guilty of any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in section 232 of said Act
and section 3 of said Rule 64, "may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned
not more than six months." Pursuant to section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948
(Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases "in
which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more
than two thousand pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the
cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same are within the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with
that of the Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of
contempt against the same.
It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent jurisdiction over cases of
contempt of court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferencial right of the
court against which the act of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party.
However, insofar as appellees herein are concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed
and promulgated a resolution of the following tenor:
The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following tenor:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez. Pedro B. Ayuda. Alawadin I. Bandon. Roque J. Briones.
Abraham C. Calaguas. Balbino P. Fajardo. Claro C. Gofredo. Estela R. Gordo. Generoso H.
Hubilla. Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr. Angelo T. Lopez. Eustacio de Luna. Jaime P. Marco. Santos L.
Parina. Florencio P. Sugarol, and Maria Velez y Estrellas. Attorneys.
xxx xxx xxx.
MANIFESTATION
COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the above-named attorneys and to
this Honorable Court, hereby respectfully makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of
office as Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary
Public in and for the City of Manila, with office at R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in
pursuance of the provisions of Republic Act No. 972;
There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of the oath of office as
Annexes 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F', 'G', 'H', 'I', 'K', 'L', 'M', 'N', 'O', 'P', and 'Q'.
Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Godofredo, and Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took
the bar examination in August, 1954. They also had taken their oath before this Honorable
Tribunal, January 20, 1955.
This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the
Philippines.
Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.
(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA
In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as president of the 1946-1952
BAR EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila.
It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gefredo, and Sugarol, have not
passed the examinations, it was resolved:
A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in
connection with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;
B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from
notice thereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of the
Court;
C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the
oath to the said persons in disregard of this Court's resolution denying them admission to the
Bar (except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he
should not be disbarred or suspended from the pratice of law;
D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to
all courts of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission,
and the Department of Justice;
E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective
cases. (pp. 36-37, rec., G.R. No. L-10245.)
It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we
preferred that the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of
First Instance of Manila. In fine, the latter had no jurisdiction over the cases at the bar.
The next question for determination is whetehr the acts charged in the amended informations
constitute contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said amended informations to the
effect that the defendant in each one of the instant cases.
. . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent
snd defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and
everyone of the petitioners and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations
that tend directly and indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. . .
the lower court had the following to say:
From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command, order or notification from
the judicial court or any non-judicial person, committee or body clothed by law with power to
punish for contempt has been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused. Moreover, there is
nothing shown in the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1954 dircting
the accused not to take their oath as lawyers. The mere fact of taking an oath by any person
as a lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer without having completed the
requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court for the admission to the practice by law. It is
necessary before his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar examinations and is
admitted by the Supreme Court to practice as attorney. Our statutes punishas criminal
contempt one 'assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without
authority.' (par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath of lawyers by herein
accused, in the humble opinion of this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However, if this
had taken one step further, as for example, after taking their oaths, they have held out
themselves as lawyers to the public, received cases for litigants, appeared before any court of
justice personally or by filing pleadings therewith, would be considered that they are really
engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not committed any of these acts as
enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have
they disobeyed or defied any command, order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable
Supreme Court. What they have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers before a
notary public who was not authorized by law to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can
only swear as such before the Supreme Court or any member thereof.
Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that no criminal
contempt has been committed by the herein accused before this Court and neither before the
highest Tribunal of this land.
The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is, however, incomplete. It did
not include the allegation to the effect that the defendant in each one of the cases ar bar took
his "oath as a lawyer before a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed in the
resolutionabove quoted,
well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to
take his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions
of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and
therefore void and without force and effect, and that all the petition of the candidates including
the accused who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952, inclusive for admission to the bar
were refused and denied by the resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18,
1954, . . .
In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they,
likewise, sought admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as
the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court
denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law
and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by the latter to engage
in such practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned petition of appellees herein,
implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to said oath, as well as a prohibition of or injunction
against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath before a notary
public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will practice in
all the courtr of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, in said
resolution, thus violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in part:

A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:

1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a

court, or injunction granted by a court or judge.

and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical.

This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. vs. Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which
involved two lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent
out a circular, signed "Ney and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the
general practice of law in all courts of the Islands and that Bosque would devote himself
especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish Law. Accused of contempt of
court, both were convicted as charged, although upon different grounds. As regards the
Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of
in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the
aforementioned circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in
such practice of law; and that "consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to
disobedience of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party." As regards Ney, he
was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by "an officer of the court."

Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations, appellees
herein expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of
this Court to pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not
they should be admitted to the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the
administration of justice and impair the respect due to the courts of justice in general, and the
Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts constituting an "improper conduct
tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice," in
violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.

. . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its
majesty, or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court. . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.).

The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of
contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public"
as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for assuming to be an attorney . . .
and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court
may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking
"'the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so
and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the appellees had for all intents and
purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law (U.S. vs. Ney and Mosque, supra).

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the records of these cases be
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is
so ordered.

Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines replace its counsel of record, the law firm Piczon, Beramo & Associates. Though not specified
SUPREME COURT in the notice, Attys. Montarde and Mesa entered their appearance as collaborating counsels.

FIRST DIVISION Likewise, the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the doctrine laid down in Sublay v. National
Labor Relations Commission,18 in dismissing the petition. In Sublay, it was held that a
G.R. No. 167886 October 25, 2005
substitution cannot be presumed from the mere filing of a notice of appearance of a new
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, lawyer and that the representation of the first counsel of record continuous until a formal notice
vs. to change counsel is filed with the court. 19 Thus, absent a formal notice of substitution, all
PAMINTUAN DEVELOPMENT CO., represented by MARIANO PAMINTUAN, lawyers who appeared before the court or filed pleadings in behalf of the client are considered
JR., Respondent. counsels of the latter. All acts performed by them are deemed to be with the client’s consent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 15, 2005 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, which dismissed Land Bank of the Philippines’
(LANDBANK’s) petition and sustained the August 2, 2004 Order 2 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which denied due course to the notice of appeal
and notice of entry of appearance filed by LANDBANK’s counsels.
The antecedent facts show that in DARAB Case No. 1204-0545-2003 for "Preliminary
Determination of Just Compensation," DARAB rendered a Decision3 dated April 27, 2004,
fixing the just compensation of respondent Pamintuan Development Company’s 274.9037
hectare lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4972 and located at San Vicente,
Makilala, Cotabato, at P58,237,301.68. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the just compensation of TCT No. T-4972 registered in
the name of Pamintuan Development Company (PAMDEVCO) containing an area of 274.9037
hectares located at San Vicente, Makilala, Cotabato is preliminary determined at FIFTY EIGHT
MILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED ONE AND
68/100 (P58,237,301.68) PESOS.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. The order denying the motion for
reconsideration was received by petitioner on June 11, 2004. At the proceedings before the
trial court, petitioner was represented by Piczon, Beramo & Associates.
On June 4, 2004, Attys. Engilberto F. Montarde and Felix F. Mesa, filed a Notice of Entry of
Appearance5 in behalf of petitioner. Within the period to appeal, or on June 15, 2004, said
counsels also filed a Notice of Appeal 6 via registered mail. The Certification7 attached to the
Notice of Appeal was signed by Loreto B. Corotan, Head of petitioner’s Agrarian Operations
Center.
Respondent filed an Opposition contending that the notice of appeal and notice of entry of
appearance should be denied due course because Attys. Montarde and Mesa failed to show
that their appearance was authorized by petitioner. Said new counsels, on the other hand,
asserted that they were duly authorized, attaching to their Comment the Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) executed by Gilda E. Pico, Executive Vice President of petitioner, authorizing
Loreto B. Corotan to represent,8 and designating9 Attys. Montarde and Mesa as counsels for
LANDBANK.
On August 2, 2004, DARAB issued an order holding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa are
without authority to represent petitioner because the latter failed to effect a valid substitution of
their former counsel of record. It added that the April 27, 2004 decision had become final and
executory because the notice of appeal filed by its purported new counsels is a mere scrap of
paper which did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal. Thus –
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant Notice of Entry of Appearance and the Notice
of Appeal are hereby not given DUE COURSE for LACK OF LEGAL BASIS. The decision
dated April 27, 2004 has become FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.10
The case of Ong Ching v. Ramolete,20 is on all fours with the instant controversy. The trial
court therein held that the period to appeal had already lapsed rendering the assailed decision
final and executory because petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, though presented within
the reglementary period, is without legal effect having been filed by a lawyer other than
petitioner’s counsel of record. It disregarded petitioner’s written authorization belatedly filed by
said new lawyer as the same was not appended to the motion for reconsideration previously
filed. In debunking the ruling of the trial court, we stressed that the new counsel who filed the
motion for reconsideration in behalf of the client is presumed to be authorized even if he filed
no formal notice of entry of appearance. Hence, said motion effectively tolled the running of the
period to appeal. As explained by the Court:
The present case, however, does not involve a substitution of attorneys, but merely the
employment by petitioner of an additional counsel. True it is, as claimed by respondents, that
the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Hermosisima gives no indication that he was
presenting his motion in collaboration with Atty. Vasquez; but neither would it indicate that by
his filing of the pleading in the case, Atty. Hermosisima was replacing Atty. Vasquez as
counsel for petitioner. In law it is assumed prima facie that every attorney who appears in court
does so with sufficient authority. The fact that a second attorney enters an appearance on
behalf of a litigant does not authorize a presumption that the authority of the first attorney has
been withdrawn. There is no question that a party may have two or more lawyers working in
collaboration as his counsel in a given litigation. Thus in the case at bar the certificate dated
May 16, 1972, executed by Atty. Vasquez, is to the effect that he, with the consent and
authority of petitioner (who signified his conformity in writing) was authorizing Atty.
Hermosisima to collaborate with him in the case due to his ill health. While the said certificate
was not attached to the motion for reconsideration on May 17, 1972, but was presented in
court rather belatedly on June 16, 1972 as an annex to petitioner’s "Rejoinder to Opposition to
Motion for Reconsideration," respondents have not shown that the recitals of fact contained
therein did not reflect the truth. At any rate, this case is different from U.S. v. Borromeo, Fojas,
et al. v. Navarro, Ramos v. Potenciano, Baquiran v. Court of Appeals. Here petitioner's
counsel, Atty. Vasquez, not only affirmed his continued connection with the case, but also
explained Atty. Hermosisima’s appearance as collaborating counsel. While it may be desirable
in the interest of an orderly conduct of judicial proceedings, that a counsel for a party should
file with the court his formal written appearance in the case, before filing a pleading therein, or
mention in said pleading that he is submitting the same in collaboration with the counsel of
record, the mere circumstance that such acts were not done does not warrant the conclusion
that the pleading filed by such counsel has no legal effect whatsoever.
It is evident therefore that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in denying due course to
the notice of appeal seasonably filed by Attys. Montarde and Mesa, the duly authorized
counsel of petitioner. In the same vein, the affirmance by the Court of Appeals of the assailed
order of the DARAB is a clear disregard of the oft repeated principle that courts should not
resort to a rigid application of the rules where the end result would frustrate the just, speedy
and inexpensive determination of the controversy. 21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the April 15, 2005 Decision of the Court of
Appeals dismissing the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 85843, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is DIRECTED to give due course to
petitioner’s Notice of Entry of Appearance and the Notice of Appeal.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration appending two memoranda 11 signed by Atty.
Danilo B. Beramo, petitioner’s Department Manager and Head, Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) Legal Services Department, confirming the authority of Atty.
Montarde to file a notice of appeal.

The DARAB, however, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, a petition
for certiorari was filed by petitioner with the Court of Appeals, but the latter dismissed the
petition. It sustained the DARAB’s finding that Attys. Montarde and Mesa were not clothed with
authority to file the notice of appeal.12

Petitioner filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

In a resolution dated June 6, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the execution of the April 27, 2004 decision of the DARAB.

We find that the DARAB gravely abused its discretion in holding that Attys. Montarde and
Mesa lacked the authority to file a notice of appeal in behalf of petitioner. Section 21, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized

to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to
authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either
party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and
may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court for
a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt
as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

The presumption in favor of the counsel’s authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong
one.13 A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact,
the absence of a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by
the counsel in his client’s name.14 However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of the
other party require a lawyer to adduce authorization from the client.

In the case at bar, the filing of a notice of entry of appearance by Attys. Montarde and Mesa,
gave rise to the presumption that they have the authority to file the notice of appeal in behalf of
petitioner. When their authority was challenged, they presented the SPA executed by Gilda E.
Pico, Executive Vice President of LANDBANK authorizing them to represent petitioner; and the
two memoranda of Atty. Danilo B. Beramo, Department Manager and Head, CARP Legal
Services Department, requesting Atty. Montarde to file a notice of appeal. These documents
are sufficient proof of their authority to represent petitioner’s cause. The doubt entertained by
the DARAB as to when the SPA and memoranda were executed is of no consequence in view
of petitioner’s vigorous assertion that it authorized said lawyers to file a notice of appeal.
Indeed, even an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be ratified by the client either
expressly15 or impliedly.16 Ratification retroacts to the date of the lawyer’s first appearance and
validates the action taken by him.17

The DARAB’s assertion that Attys. Montarde and Mesa cannot validly represent petitioner
because there was no proper substitution of counsels, lacks merit. Petitioner never intended to
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to
the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company.
He wrote:
. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your
Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan
de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and
interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on
the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that
Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I
categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to
resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial
contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which
was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he
said:
. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and
voided, the "manipulated contract" entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner
Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts
from me.
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April
15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on
the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on
account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head of
the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court,
to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the
scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage. and . . the refund of . . (his)
payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with
this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the
letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage -
PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest
ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had
been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed
from the senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the
Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a
mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the
District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the
Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
only "the Executive Clerk of Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but
also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order
that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of Villarosa &
Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it
was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings
and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in
communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied
any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free
Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew,
his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if
those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous"
with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he
prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal"
or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he
does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in
Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance
that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but she had since
avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the
property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is
situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims
that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the
key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless
allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan
(dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December
15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5,
1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation. 14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to .
. (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his)
will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest." 17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior
of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the
presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict
propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however
sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia
Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court,
Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government
workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he
accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and
word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation
from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine
Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to
the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in
his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given
to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the
title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. Nos. 979 and 986 December 10, 2002
RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,
MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he
was directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course
within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations."
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court
disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations
null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of
completion of the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999
Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit
to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the
1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School
(PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such
course since 1967.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion was
denied.
On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of
petitioner, filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its Resolution of 27
November 2001 "noted without action" the said petition and further resolved "that no further
pleadings will be entertained."
On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons
why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and
regularly attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo
Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22
July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law.
Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he x x x enrolled in
and passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a
"self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a
deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood."
Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his
signature on the space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A.
Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC). Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations,"
petitioner admitted that he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information
supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had
erroneously typed "Philippine Law School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the
school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course.
Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take the
bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as
Annex "D" of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review
course in UST.
To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his
payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c) car pass to
the UST campus; (d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST
that petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the review course; (e) separate
affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of petitioner that they saw him regularly
attending the review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the
attendance of petitioner in his review classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review
Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g) affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance
staff at the UST Law Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those
who would arrive early and request her to open the reading area and turn on the
airconditioning before classes started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk
at the UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July 1999
to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had completed the pre-bar review
course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999.
Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the
pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he
thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex "D"
of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but
also his completion of the pre-bar review course.
In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru
Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the 1995
Committee on Bar Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son
and stated that his son took the pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his son’s
Petition that he took it in PLS is a "self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that
if there was really a falsehood and forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which
would have been a fatal defect, why then was his son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar
examinations?
Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary hearing
on 30 October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from
petitioner who appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe.
On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
"Considering petitioner’s explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents in support
thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt.
The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In the said
case, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath.
In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave
Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8,
1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed his explanation that he had no actual
knowledge of his conviction.
In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyer’s Oath, the Court stated, thus:
‘It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer’s oath.
Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to
do some introspection.’
In his letter, petitioner’s father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his son’s request
for oath-taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong that his son may have
unwittingly committed.
It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar
Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may
be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any
crime.
As regards petitioner’s failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of completion
of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit another
certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only his
enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth.
Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the
Court declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only Purisima but also
Josenio Marquez Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their
failure to submit within sixty days from the last day of the examinations the certification of
completion of the pre-bar review course. However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20,
2000, acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April
13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both were allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required certification was
due to his honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where he took his review
course, had filed the required certification together with other required documents, was
accepted.
In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification within the
60-day period was due to her erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment and
attendance was arequired, was likewise accepted.
The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his f ailure to submit
within the 60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially
complied with the requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought that
the required certificate of compleltition of the pre-bar review course is the same as the
certificate of enrollment and attendance in the said course.
The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioner’s explanation should also be given credit just like
his three co-examinees.
Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas
Antonio M. Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal
Education which recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of fairness,
equal treatment and protection, considering that his co-accused in a criminal case have been
allowed to take the lawyer’s oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27,
2001, that there was no reason to accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the
dispensation of justice should be even-handed and consistent."
The recommendation is well taken.
The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-
bar review course in UST as he herein avows.
The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject
Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the
Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence
showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.
Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of the
pre-bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner
considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact
remains that there is such a certification issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This
finding is backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law,
that she was the one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999.
Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of
the subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by
petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not
in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking
and completion" of the pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render it difficult
to record the attendance religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months.
Considering petitioner’s explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very
least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and
kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioner’s father pleaded that
"the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be
enough penalty." It is time to move on.
At this juncture it may be well to note the Court’s growing concern over the apparent laxity of
law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed
that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able
to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar
review course is an additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who
failed the bar examinations for three (3) or more times.
For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be
done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is
intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its
Report and Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and
986 is granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar
Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar.
He is further allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176278 June 25, 2010

ALAN F. PAGUIA, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR. in his capacity as Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the
United Nations, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the President’s prerogative to nominate

ambassadors by legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress’
role in the appointment of ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments’ confirmation of
nominees.1 However, for lack of a case or controversy grounded on petitioner’s lack of
capacity to sue and mootness,2 we dismiss the petition without reaching the merits, deferring
for another day the resolution of the question raised, novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the
writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s nomination of respondent
former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative
to the United Nations (UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the
Philippine Foreign Service Act of 1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davide’s age at that
time of his nomination in March 2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner
grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) at 65. 3 Petitioner theorizes
that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees, career or non-career; thus,
respondent Davide’s entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the rest of the DFA
officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question
petitioner’s standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.4 Second, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public
respondents) argue that neither petitioner’s citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with
standing to question respondent Davide’s appointment because petitioner remains without
personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a suit which does not involve the taxing
power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds. Third, public respondents
question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a petition for quo
warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23’s mandated
retirement age applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career
appointees such as respondent Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioner’s lack of capacity to sue and
mootness.

First. Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this
suit. We have granted access to citizen’s suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise
issues of "transcendental" importance calling for urgent resolution. 5 Three factors are relevant
in our determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the
crucial issues raised – the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear
disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more
direct and specific interest to bring the suit.6 None of petitioner’s allegations comes close to
any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a
statutory provision on the retirement of government personnel occasioned by its seemingly
ambiguous crafting is the admission that a "clear disregard of constitutional or statutory
prohibition" is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with "more direct and
specific interest to bring the suit." Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the
mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than
petitioner’s generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.1avvphi1

The same conclusion holds true for petitioner’s invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers’
contributions to the state’s coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures
which are claimed to be unconstitutional or illegal.7 However, the salaries and benefits
respondent Davide received commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other
executive issuances, the funding for which was included in the appropriations for the DFA’s
total expenditures contained in the annual budgets Congress passed since respondent
Davide’s nomination. Having assumed office under color of authority (appointment),
respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw salary, 8 negating petitioner’s
claim of "illegal expenditure of scarce public funds." 9

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s
suspension from the practice of law bars him from performing "any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience."10 Certainly, preparing a petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal
protection grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot.
Respondent Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44388 January 30, 1985
VICTORIANO BULACAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTINO TORCINO and FELIPA TORCINO, defendants-appellants.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue before us is whether or not a complaint for forcible entry and detainer should be
dismissed by a municipal court on the ground that the plaintiff knowingly asked a non-member
of the bar to sign and file it for him.
A complaint for forcible entry and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction was filed with
the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte by Victoriano Bulacan against Faustino Torcino and
Felipa Torcino. The complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr., "Friend counsel for the
Plaintiff" but was verified by the plaintiff-appellee himself. The verification reads:
I, VICTORIANO BULACAN, of legal age, Filipino, married and a resident of Baybay, Leyte
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law thereby depose and say:
That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled case; that I have caused the above complaint to be
prepared by Nicolas P. Nuñes, Jr. and that I have voluntarily asked, sought and requested his
aid to file, claim, prosecute, and defend in court my civil case against the defendants Faustino
Torcino et al or others in connection with this case at the Municipal Court of Baybay, Leyte;
that I have read and known the contents thereon and the allegations therein are true and
correct to my own knowledge.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 4th day of August, 1972 at
Baybay, Leyte.
s/VICTORIANO BULACAN
t/VICTORIANO BULACAN
Plaintiff
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 4th day of August, 1972 at Baybay, Leyte by
Victoriano Bulacan with his Res. Cert. No. A-930280 dated Aug. 4, 1972 issued at Baybay,
Leyte.
s/NICOLAS P. NUÑES, JR
t/NICOLAS P. NUÑES, JR.
Notary Public
Until December 31st, 1972
Doc. No. 344
Page No. 56
Book No. VII
Series of 1972
When the defendants-appellants filed their answer, they did not question the fact that the
complaint was signed by Nicolas Nuñes, Jr.
On February 10, 1973, the municipal court issued the following order:
The contending parties are given one week time to submit the proposed compromise
agreement in connection with his case.
Failure to do so will constrain this court to render judgment on the basis of the ocular
inspection conducted sometime on December, 1972.
Due to the failure of the parties to settle their case amicably, the court rendered a decision
ordering the Torcinos to demolish and remove the portion of their house which was illegally
constructed on the land of the plaintiff The municipal court stated that there is no doubt that
Victoriano Bulacan is the owner and has been in possession of Lot No. 5998 and that the lot of
the defendants-appellants is on the eastern portion of said lot. The court found that the
Torcinos constructed a residential house which unfortunately encroached on the lot of the
plaintiff.
The Torcinos appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance of Leyte.
On September 18, 1973, the appellants Torcinos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or by an admitted attorney, and
therefore must be considered as sham and false.
Four days later, another motion to dismiss the complaint was filed with the additional
discussion that the fact that the complaint is verified, does not in itself cure the defect obtaining
in the complaint.
On September 24, 1973, appellee Bulacan opposed the motion and alleged that the motion to
dismiss was not filed on time and the defenses therein were not pleaded in the answer in the
municipal court and therefore, are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on
appeal in the Court of First Instance. The opposition also stated that the complaint
substantially conforms to the Rule.
On September 24, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Leyte denied the motion to dismiss. A
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
On December 7, 1973, when the case was called for continuance, the parties presented to the
court a stipulation of facts which states and which we quote verbatim:
COME NOW, the plaintiff and the defendants duly assisted by their respective counsel and
unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submits the following stipulation of facts, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff and the defendants hereby agree to relocate the defendants' land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-8133 which is hereto attached.
2. That should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the present construction
particularly the wallings is beyond the lot of the said defendants as defined and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8133 then the defendants win remove any portion of the
wallings that maybe inside the land of the plaintiff and vacate from the premises encroached.
However, should the findings of the Geodetic Engineer be that the walling constructed by the
defendants does not encroach even an inch on the land of the plaintiff then the plaintiff hereby
agrees to the dismissal of the present case.
3. That should the Geodetic Engineer finds out that the defendants has encroach the land of
the plaintiff the defendants will be the one who will pay for the services of the Goedetic
Engineer and should the findings be that no encroachment were made by the defendants, then
the plaintiff should shoulder the expenses of the relocation survey.
4. That parties hereby agree that Geodetic Engineer Jaime Kudera be appointed by the
Honorable Court to conduct and execute the relocation survey.
5. That plaintiff and defendants hereby agree to waive the claims and counterclaims for
damages.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court renders judgment on
the basis of the above stipulation of facts.
The stipulation of facts was signed by plaintiff Victoriano Bulacan, his new counsel Atty. Diego
A. Cala defendants Faustino and Felipa Torcino, and their counsel Gerardo A. Pabello
The court issued an order directing surveyor Jaime Kudera to conduct the relocation work on
the basis of the stipulation.
On December 17, 1983, Kudera submitted his report and on the basis of his findings, the Court
of First Instance of Leyte affirmed the decision of the municipal court.
The defendants appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and assigned two errors:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED BY THE
DEFENDANTS APPELLANTS AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS AND IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT ON THE
DECISION APPEALED FROM.
The Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 7, 1976 certified the appeal to us on the
ground that no testimonial or oral evidence was presented by the parties and, therefore, no
factual matters are in issue in the appeal.
We affirm the decision of the lower court.
The Torcinos allege that the complaint is irregular as it was signed not by the plaintiff but by
one who was not a member of the bar and who designated himself merely as "Friend counsel
for the Plaintiff." The appellants argue that the municipal court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case. They invoke Section 5, Rule 7 which states:
SEC. 5. Signature and address.—Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall
be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not
signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken out as sham
and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
willful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action.
Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the facts of this case, however, the applicable provision is Section 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules are clear. In municipal courts, the litigant may be assisted by a friend, agent, or an
attorney. However, in cases before the regional trial court, the litigant must be aided by a duly
authorized member of the bar. The rule invoked by the Torcinos applies only to cases filed with
the regional trial court and not to cases before a municipal court.
In the case of Cantimbuhan v. Cruz, Jr. (126 SCRA 190) we decided a similar issue and
allowed the appearance of two senior law students as friends of the complainant-petitioner
Cantimbuhan to prosecute the case before the sala of Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the
Municipal Court of Parañaque.
Similarly, in the case of Laput v. Bernabe (55 Phil. 621) a law student was allowed to represent
the accused in a case pending before the City Court of Manila.
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like shares to the ignorant or the unwary.
In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear for party litigants in places where duly
authorized members of the bar are not available. (U.S. v. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively
simple litigation before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable
person to appear in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection of the
parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts
and higher courts is more stringent.
In the case before us, the complaint was verified by the party litigant himself. In the verification,
the plaintiff specifically stated that he had caused Mr. Nuñes to conduct the litigation and to
sign the complaint in Ms behalf, indicating his awareness that Nuñes in not a registered
lawyer. There is, therefore, added justification for the pleading to be admitted rather than
dismissed. As the lower court has cited:
So it has been held that, where a pleading is not signed by the attorney as required, but is
verified by the party, substantial rights have not been affected and the defect may be
disregarded as against a motion to strike. (71 C.J.S. 954- 955)
Rules of pleading, practise, and procedure must be liberally construed so as to protect the
rights and interests of the ties. As we stated in Paulino v. Court of Appeals (80 SCRA 257):
xxx xxx xxx
... pleadings, as well as remedial laws, should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may
have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of
substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided. ...
The Torcinos try to impugn the results of the relocation survey. We agree with the appellee
that the appellants are now estopped on this issue because they themselves prayed in the
stipulation of facts that the findings of the geodetic engineer would be bases for the decision of
the court of first instance. We see no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion, in the
lower courts' findings that the house of the Torcinos encroached on the lot of Victoriano
Bulacan.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on
pure questions of law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated
May 3, 2002 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil
Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705;1 and
the RTC’s Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of
Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his
father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling
of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before
the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that
his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of
Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student
practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule)
should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the
case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking
to reverse the February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice
Rule, does not have the effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to
interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private
respondent and the public respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC,
in a Resolution dated May 3, 2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the
ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that
can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil indemnity, and that therefore, the
intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The
petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no
civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly
provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior courts, as an agent or friend of
a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the
petitioner filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC
seeking the reversal of the March 4, 2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar
Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal
Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioner’s Second Motion
for Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC
had already denied the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns
the following errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for
the writ of injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity
of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE]
THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS
YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY
PATENTLY REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT,
CANTIMBUHAN AND BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING
FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTC’S).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of
the issues reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. 5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law
student practice and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court
in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court
as an agent or friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in
behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an
attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed
his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized
law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court,
tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law
school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc
clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently
changed to "In the court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the Court of a municipality a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the
MeTC on September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court, the term "Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In
the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is
expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law student, not as an
agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a
quo must have been confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in
his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying
permission to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A
is not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is
allowed, irrespective of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter
No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend
of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability
may flow from the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private
prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In
denying the issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no
claim for civil liability by the private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case
do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and that therefore, petitioner’s appearance as private
prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as
espionage, violation of neutrality, flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular
representation.9 The basic rule applies in the instant case, such that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall
be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of
the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave
Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may
rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of
the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459 October 14, 2003
IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant,
vs.
Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign
from their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own
behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff
subjects the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto
H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo.
In the Complaint, the judge was charged with "gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave
misconduct" for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure" in Civil
Case No. 252.2
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo -- presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for
preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages 3 covered by the Rule
on Summary Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala,
Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated
respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order4 dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil case
to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge
scheduled the hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation5 on
September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of ten days to file an
answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to September 28,
2001.6Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition 7 to complainant’s prayer for preliminary
injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance after the defendants’
lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on behalf of and as counsel for her
co-plaintiff.8 Respondent gave the defendants ten days9 to file a motion to disqualify
complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her opposition
thereto.
In his Order10 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants’ Motion 11 to
disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions12 praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil
case. In an Order13 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainant’s Motions
because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He
likewise denied the defendants’ Motion for extension of time to file an answer. 14 Complainant
did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment15 on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition for
his inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of
administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing
cases. In the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves.
It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was
then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him,
considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every
motion presented before him.16 Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence
necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction. 17 Moreover, she
supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the validity of his
Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the case.18
Respondent likewise refutes complainant’s assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own
behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without
basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to
pay for the services of counsel.19 He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this
Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she
appeared in court.20
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in
the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal
action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided
within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction
and the principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had
already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.1a\^/phi1.net
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of ₱1,000
with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.21
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another round
of investigation, the subject of which was complainant’s appearance in court as counsel for
herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to
government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they
are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so
only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that "[e]ngaging in any private business,
vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which
amounts to malfeasance in office."22
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of ₱1,000 for
appearing as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar
infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that
she be directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in
court to litigate her case.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to
conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. 23 These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as promptly
as possible.24 Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary
Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary
actions.25 Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided.26 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. Both are "time procedures" designed to bring immediate
relief.27
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled
to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior
to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain
from doing a particular act or acts.28 It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 29Since this remedy is
granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that
the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case of forcible
entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30
days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
"Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
"A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within
five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
his possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof."
(Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word "shall" to evince
its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was
a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would
have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If
that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of
the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary
injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary
injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy adjudication
of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from further damage during the
pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and
judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts. 30 To a large extent, the
public’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt
disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof. 31 Judges are thus enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges
judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the required
periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. 32 To avoid sanction, they should ask this
Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he
cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided
within the prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and
pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary
Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for
forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges
should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala. 33 They should not be at
the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latter’s convenience that should
be the primordial consideration, but the administration of justice. 34 1awphi1.nét
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases
within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in
the performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting
Judge Doronila:35
"We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the clogging
of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-
out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the
disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties."36
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial court
is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently
put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:37
"x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more
than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is
carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no
greater empirical data that influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before
the courts."38
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions
against erring judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of ₱10,000 is appropriate pursuant to
current jurisprudence39 and Rule 140.40
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of
₱1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of
the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for
herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of
malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she
appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the
practice of law. We clarify. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law.
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar."
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress -- from its commencement to its termination.41 When they, however, act as their own
attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to
practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. 42 Individuals have long
been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they
are not considered to be in the practice of law. 43 "One does not practice law by acting for
himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself." 44

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession
or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as
counsel by rendering legal advise to others. 45Private practice has been defined by this Court
as follows:

"x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and
other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x." 46 (Citations
omitted)

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence,
she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to "the members
of such a vocation."47In turn, vocation is defined as "a person’s regular calling or business;
one’s occupation or profession."48

The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court.
The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her
being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in
propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot
make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion of the Court’s ruling
in Cayetano v. Monsod49 regarding the extent of the practice of law.

However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-
plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.

The raison d’etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a
person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending
the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that
complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give
complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-
plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be impairing the efficiency of public service
once she appears for the latter without permission from this Court.

We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the people’s faith and confidence in the
judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that
she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we
should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with the
dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility. 50 Given these circumstances,
the penalty of reprimand51 is sufficient.

This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls
short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to
preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing
discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the people’s faith in our justice system.
But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee
from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes, 52 and that serves only to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.53

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross

inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in
the amount of ₱10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby
REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and
is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.1awphi1.nét

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September
SUPREME COURT 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V.
Manila Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and
respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners
EN BANC Malana and Lucila as friends of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983 order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners, SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñ

vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of
the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of
petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases
Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San
Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979,
denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that
appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a
scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar
to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends of the
litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be
put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal
complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical
injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979,
petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-
petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979,
sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and
Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979,
respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that
the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside
as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on
November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all
persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines
vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979
as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly
authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in

court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend
or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts,
he can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15,
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the
private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of
petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court
provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has
waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal
action, and subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by
attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the
direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of
the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in
the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent
appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law
student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal
Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not
allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in
conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this condition.
What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other
hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest
to the court that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the
case under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear
as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with
more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under the supervision and
control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner
Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his
right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in
said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the
success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.