Republic of the Philippines House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City,

SUPREME COURT California

Manila
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00)
SECOND DIVISION Furniture and furnishings $3,000

Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, Bank of America Checking Account $8,000

vs.
Bank of America Cash Deposit
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

DECISION Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00 4

PEREZ, J.:
The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein
secured a loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of the Court about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of
of Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 the same.
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001.
The factual antecedents are as follow: In December 2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing
David to sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in
September 2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December
Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit
1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America
with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003
(USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two
stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall
children, namely: Jerome T.
be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia
₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. Sampaloc property; and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the Philippines.5 David was able
Francisco, California. to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid
balance of ₱410,000.00.
During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in
the USA: Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce
with the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court
granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June
PHILIPPINES
2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085 Norma ₱1,693,125.00
Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property) On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. located at Laboy, ₱400,000.00
before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and
Dipaculao, Aurora David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the
power to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at Maria ₱490,000.00
Aurora, Aurora
to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that
all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the
3
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at Sabang ₱175,000.00 purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the
Baler, Aurora
payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, Aurora ₱750,000.00

USA In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was
entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA

1
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees
of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of
the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in
California, U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial separation
prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia
T. Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or
forfeiture of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf
of the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila
and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty.
Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties
were chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and
presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A.
Noveras only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining
in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana
pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of
the parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties
shall be cancelled and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom
said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in
the preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two
minor children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these
properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the
first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby
given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A.
Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them
annually by the petitioner within the first half of January of each year,
starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena,
respondent David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly
allowance in addition to their income from their presumptive legitimes,
while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The
monthly allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the
future as the needs of the children require and his financial capacity can
afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the
Sampaloc property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay
₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two
children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but the
share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler,
Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from
which shall only be made by them or by their representative duly authorized
with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made
withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision,
with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of
the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can
be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-
in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall
be shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover
their legal and personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the
parties are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law,
the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the
petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property
regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children,
instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property
regime as absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage
settlement before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the
Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national
2
law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions
of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community
properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial
court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with
preponderant evidence.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is
praying for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA.
Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine
properties to David, subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes.
The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation
made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the
equal division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with
respect to the common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered
both spouses to each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the
assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province,
in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in
the Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in
paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any,
shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of
January, starting 2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are
each ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children,
Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the
Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be
deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the
latter’s names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty
(30) days from receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding
passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the
same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The last paragraph shall read as follows:
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil
registry of Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal
Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds
for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized
the California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said
judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial
court. David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is
tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was
already granted all US properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own
properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from
the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the
properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines,
Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the
bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and
laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our
rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an
action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority
or tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must
beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of
the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.
3
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce
were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on
certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American
citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any
of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly
authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case
however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was
obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a
different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino
citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows
that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in
proceeding directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before
the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the
modification isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles
66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on
paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation
of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an
absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been
decreed by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article
101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final
judgment against the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the
decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to
necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the
Family Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be
for a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not
returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give
any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from
such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and
stayed at his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times
to visit him there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going
back to the USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them
worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the
petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with
the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the
saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the
Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property
was not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated
the petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while
actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been
living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up
his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been
cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified
that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for
Operation form.20Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June 2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year,
the petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be
granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99
ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
4
 (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under
Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute
community regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure
shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of
the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out
of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall
thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall
constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband
and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such
share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No.
(2),the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value
of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered
upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration
the best interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will
not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the
modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision
with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction
over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code
clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of
the spouses in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the
payment of their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained
in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the
Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the
same is presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not
entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only
the amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged
thereto. Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal
councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166
duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle
the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited
the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net
of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate
children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father
and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each
spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the
titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each
pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
5
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu),
which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they
were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the
filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only
eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the
Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to
their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in
the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in
Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his
new wife established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao,
Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son,
Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for
support from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which
petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality
of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him,
resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure
Order against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and,
subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent
Protection Order to which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution
thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an
alien, the dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating
respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code,
thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to
all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless
of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
6
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier
in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling
that since the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The
Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to
support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by
our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent
with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays
down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly
to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant
Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the
three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or
appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for
review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts
being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the
response thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given
set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor
child under Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question
of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights
and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for
future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to
the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the
present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice
should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s
obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence
of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is
not excused from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with
petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of
the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen,
since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other
words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the
Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and
duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
7
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they
belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce
Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not
obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws
on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v.
Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law
of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded
and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant
presented by respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support
to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s
allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by
respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that
such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in
light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, 47 to
wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were
properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign
law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and
established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not
be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded
in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
—
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing
of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its
application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of
Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such
obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great
injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled
thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable
under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
8
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting
the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the
determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct
further proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
xxxx
Associate Justice

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman
or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's
child/children.51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the
child is considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find

strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation
to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that:
"[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international
law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting,
that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe
in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10)
years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly,
the crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to
petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
9
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or
her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling
on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15,
2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to
remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife,
the petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.3
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to
the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the
OSG argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that
this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial
court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section
1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order
or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine
any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or
duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
(4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce
decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse,
as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to
remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue
10
raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries,
litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its
enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented
by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is
one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently
obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its
spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
11
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to SO ORDERED.
remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article
26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should
be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it
would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would
still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.

However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted
by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s
wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such
foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry
as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient
to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the

Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to
declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as
an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American,
that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

12
 consecutive weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing,
counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts
Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic
of the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear
on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title
and/or caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the
proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
EN BANC judgment.

April 24, 2018 As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted.
The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:
G.R. No. 221029

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after
die proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the
RESOLUTION Japanese Court x x x;

peralta, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks
to reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC.
PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter
are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of
San Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese
husband's marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear
anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer
her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by
aid entry of marriage;

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro 6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of
Manila. entry of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant
to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by
virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
SO ORDERED.3

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said
The facts are undisputed.
entry of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
MANALO.4
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for
her employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a
judgment of divorce Japanese court.
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The
2. Affidavit of Publication;
petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three

13
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka,
Japan of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of
Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that
the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that,
based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos
the right to file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they
are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the
Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens
of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos'
family rights and duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family
Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for
divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the
latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably
with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law
should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court,
the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as
similar to this case was Van Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a
foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage,
are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the
marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the
bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence,
our courts cannot grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code,
the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved
even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both
aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the
former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17,
1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil
Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her
to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine
the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount
to trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the
spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or
her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or
she had obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim
was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New
Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter
have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and
perhaps have already married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
14
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v.
Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law
and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving
parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as
coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino
citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce
proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of
enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the
cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would
not appear anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no
longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides
to be remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage,"
and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on
the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint
custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his
Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised
sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction,
on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the
"nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider,
arguing that the divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied.
In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the
Agreement, which is void, this Court said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the
Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law,
but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the
Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not
bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree
obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that
the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x
x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was
filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared
with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground
that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband
averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In
dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the
foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any
State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of
15
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that
the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his
capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We
referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
property relation, it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed,
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible
there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation
if the ends of justice are to be served.31
of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status
spouse can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our
is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce
rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is,
without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also
was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore,
between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground bound to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can
file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
We beg to differ.
between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the
same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the
decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations
arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record
of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the
property regime of the marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a
spouse's right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed
for divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the
RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of
the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words
in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the
words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such
words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
if a statute there should be departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse,
still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from
the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with
the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League
of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of
a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent
or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the
law control its letter.
16
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign classification.
divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who
under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign
is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is
unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend
at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against
should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to
Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the
their alien spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by
foreigner.55
operation on the latter's national law.

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found
initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon
under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the
the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws,
mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide
both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien
for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must
land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of
be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes
Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the
enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are
superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
constitutional.43
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate
against the other.
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and
that its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in
classification may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a
classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special
Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based
protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must
on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce
discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a
based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law
stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. 46 If a legislative
at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law
classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is
not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in
required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government
accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47
dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply
in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is
protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what
constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount
encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate
interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the
practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against
promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare.51 It essentially
their alien spouses.
involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual
rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies
with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith
violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e.,
the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is
innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that
acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
17
the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been
obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on
the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a
fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine
love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in
nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages.
And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry
an alien national. In one case, it was said:
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to
regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise
serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart,
to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal
requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded
by law, may validly support a marriage.63
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin
C. Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this
point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered.
I refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a
prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so
that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention
was primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily
discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal
opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
prohibiting a divorce law?
MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.
FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66
Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11,
1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on
the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No.
2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority
conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine
Executive Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which
repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as
intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing
of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse against the other to such
an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government
was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again
prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the
New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or
abroad, is no longer recognized.70
Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the
Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet
17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the
House of representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act
Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or
the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on
Population
And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds
for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:
a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against
the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner
to change religious or political affiliation;
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of a petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment
of more than six (6) years, even if pardoned;
e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of
respondent;
f. Homosexuality of the respondent;
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
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 h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another
person other than one's spouse during the marriage, except
when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born
to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears
a child after being a victim of rape;
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a
common child or a child of a petitioner; and
j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable
cause for more than one (1) year.
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years,
either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on
said judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as
follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage
annulled was eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-
one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental
authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the
age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;
b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after
coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such
party afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting
the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or
undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased,
such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband
and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the
marriage with the other and such incapacity continues or
appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible
infection found to be serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time
the petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition
from one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce
with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react
adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to
our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an
institution and their nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can
do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither
cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor
can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state
religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State
and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even
if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is considered
a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total
isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from
strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to
actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others,
the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the
State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is
not amiss to point that the women and children are almost always the helpless victims
of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation
passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna
Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as
amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional
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mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human
rights, and ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the
coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the
existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or
she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the
stigma of being branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse
consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive
interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of
marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor
of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying State
protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the
improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from
all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is
recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more
often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate
reality for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self
fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical
to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the
truth that some of them are rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is
considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In
reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between
the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so
we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import
would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature,
it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by
granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by
the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of
divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act
of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules
of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus,
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We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the
divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is
rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence
of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the
divorce court impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground
of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have
the burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws. Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial
notice must be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject
should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese
law validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon
her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that
Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV.
No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
divorce.

SO ORDERED

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