GOVERNMENT OF US VS PURGANAN
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco, 12 Phil. 490 (1909), is illustrative. In this
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario
Batacan Crespo, G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, it was held
that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings.
It is “available only in criminal proceedings,” thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word “conviction”, the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules
of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended”
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.” (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in
the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. In cannot be taken to
mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature. (Gov’t. of Hongkong Special Administrative Region, G.R. No.
153675, April 19, 2007, Gutierrez, J).
Q — The SC in USA v. Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties giving
recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and
liberty, is a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan in order, such that,
the right to bail may be available in extradition proceedings? Explain.
ANS: Yes. First, the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his
liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in
administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, have likewise been
detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to
our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of
the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. The SC has admitted to bail persons
who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative
proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of
registration was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective
deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that “To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;”
and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used “is the machinery of criminal law.” thus, the provisions relating to bail was
applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prison and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration, 90
Phil. 256 (1951), it was ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal
charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of
deportation. The Court of Mejoff relied upon the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, there is no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no
reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is
not in issue. (Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, et al., supra.).
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this
jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.
Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Q — What is extradition? Explain.
ANS: Section 29a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) defines “extradition” as “the removal of an accused from the Philippines with
the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the
requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government.”
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power,
created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state. It is not a criminal proceeding. Even if the
potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature
criminal, for it is not a punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
follow extradition. It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations
between different nations. It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the
potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely
administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused
or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for
the purpose of trial or punishment.
Q — How is extradition characterized if it is not a criminal proceeding? Explain.
ANS: While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also
“the machinery of criminal law.” This is shown by Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069 (The
Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the “immediate arrest and temporary
detention of the accused” if such “will best serve the interest of justice.” Section 20
allows the requesting state “in case of urgency” to ask for the “provisional arrest of
the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;” and that release from
provisional arrest “shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused if a
request for extradition is received subsequently.”
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears
all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding
state following the proceedings. “Temporary detention” may be a necessary step in
the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable.
Q — What is the standard of proof when a prospective extraditee applies for
bail? Explain.
ANS: An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in
granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases.
While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in
administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which
is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his
Separation Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed, “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by “clear and
convincing evidence” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence
to show he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the
trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the
basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”
FACTS:
This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v.
Ralph C. Lantion. Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United
States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine
Government Notes Verbale and accompanied by duly authenticated documents
requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant
to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition
Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was
granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila. The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for
his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ. Initially,
the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition but was reversed in 2000. It
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC, the appropriate
Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject
of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following
charges in Indictment: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire
fraud; (4) false statements; and (5) illegal campaign. In order to prevent the flight of
Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before
it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," 10 which prayed that petitioner’s
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC granted. In that hearing,
petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court
allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant
should issue, he be allowed to post bail. Court granted (1M bail). Jimenez was
granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order.

HELD:
FIVE POSTULATES OF EXTRADITION
1. EXTRADITION IS A MAJOR INSTRUMENT FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF
CRIME.
First, extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing
crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state
to the other.
With the advent of easier and faster means of international travel, the
flight of affluent criminals from one country to another for the purpose of
committing crime and evading prosecution has become more frequent.
Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods of dealing with criminals and
crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look
upon extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in
the suppression of crime.”[30] It is the only regular system that has been devised to
return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in accordance
with municipal and international law.
xxx
Indeed, in this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel,
and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be
an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with other states in order to improve
our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2. THE REQUESTING STATE WILL ACCORD DUE PROCESS TO THE ACCUSED
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal system and judicial
process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s signature on an
extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the
other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited. That
signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to
the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that
will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would
have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. THE PROCEEDINGS ARE SUI GENERIS
Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition
proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional
rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by
itself -- they are not.
“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in
the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional
rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused
cannot be invoked by an extraditee
“There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a
criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding,
the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence
under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied,
a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited ‘upon showing of the existence of a prima facie
case.’ Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State
exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of
the nation’s foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite.”
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called
upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.
Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored
to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function
of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that
jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty,
and whether the person sought is extraditable.
4. COMPLIANCE SHALL BE IN GOOD FAITH.
Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries
the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity
with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such
failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with
our obligations under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused
to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in
the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when it has
done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the
accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under
obligation to make the surrender.” Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and
in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper.
5. THERE IS AN UNDERLYING RISK OF FLIGHT
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima
facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch:
nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons
sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings
would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent -- (1) leaving the requesting
state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2)
remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is
seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently
speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-
present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity
and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient
opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
DUE PROCESS
1. On the Basis of the Extradition Law
2. On the Basis of the Constitution
Is an extraditee entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest? It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition
Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused. This
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the
arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving
facts and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such
facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered
“immediate.” The law could not have intended the word as a mere superfluity but,
on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is
not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first impression -- a
prima facie finding -- sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accused.xxx Even Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of
complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to
notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
xxx
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges
merely further examine complainants and their witnesses. In the present case,
validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the
accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale
for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown
trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous.
This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.
That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal
action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective
of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one
-- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondent’s demonstrated
predisposition to flee.
RIGHT TO BAIL
EXTRADITION DIFFERENT FROM ORDINARY CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by the use of the word
“conviction,” the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested
and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will
not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” does
not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in
criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.” Hence, the
second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right
to bail in criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken
to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are
bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present
case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for
the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE “NO BAIL” RULE
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and
enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process
is broad enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the
right to due process extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person. It is
“dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its application.”
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold
that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of
the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity,
those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional
liberty in extradition cases therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it
is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant
bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes that extradition is basically
an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police
assistance amongst states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any
intrusion by the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by
caution, so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not
be unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the limits of its own
prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
Rene A.V. Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
G.R. No. 212426 & 212444; January 12, 2016
Ponente: C.J. Sereno
FACTS: The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is an executive
agreement that gives U.S. troops, planes and ships increased rotational presence in
Philippine military bases and allows the U.S. to build facilities to store fuel and
equipment there. It was signed against the backdrop of the Philippines' maritime
dispute with China over the West Philippine Sea.
The US embassy and DFA exchanged diplomatic notes confirming all necessary
requirements for the agreement to take force. The agreement was signed on April
2014. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the same on June 2014. It was not
submitted to Congress on the understanding that to do so was no longer
necessary.
Petitions for Certiorari were filed before the Supreme Court assailing the
constitutionality of the agreement. Herein petitioners now contend that it should
have been concurred by the senate as it is not an executive agreement. The Senate
issued Senate Resolution No. 105 expressing a strong sense that in order for EDCA
to be valid and binding, it must first be transmitted to the Senate for deliberation
and concurrence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EDCA between the Philippines and the U.S. is
constitutional.
RULING: YES. The EDCA is an executive agreement and does not need the Senate's
concurrence. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with existing laws
and treaties that it purports to implement.
Petitioners contend that the EDCA must be in the form of a treaty duly concurred
by Senate. They hinge their argument under the following Constitutional provisions:
 Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3rds of all the Members of the
Senate.”
 Section 25, Article XVIII: “ xxx Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops,
or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate xxx ”
The President, however, may enter into an executive agreement on foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the
presence of foreign military bases, troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
implement an existing law or treaty
In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading: Executive Agreements
are defined as international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying
out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-
thirds of the Senate. The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements
without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by
long usage.
The Visiting Forces Agreement – a treaty ratified by the Senate in 1999 – already
allowed the return of US troops. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and
framework of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA. The practice of resorting to
executive agreements in adjusting the details of a law or a treaty that already deals
with the presence of foreign military forces is not at all unusual in this jurisdiction.
In order to keep the peace in its archipelago and to sustain itself at the same time
against the destructive forces of nature, the Philippines will need friends. Who they
are, and what form the friendships will take, are for the President to decide. The
only restriction is what the Constitution itself expressly prohibits. EDCA is not
constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains consistent with
existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice v. Juan Antonio Muñoz
G.R. No. 207342
November 7, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner HKSAR posits that respondent Muñoz must be extradited for the crime of
accepting an advantage as an agent. On the basis of the ruling in B. v. The
Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the term agent
in Section 9 of the HKSAR’s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POB) also covered
public servants in another jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz could be extradited to and tried
by the HKSAR for the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent
Ruling:
The petition was denied. Respondent cannot be extradited to the jurisdiction of the
HKSAR.
The rule of specialty in international law states that a Requested State shall
surrender to a Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense
specified in their treaty of extradition.
Meanwhile, the dual criminality rule, as embodied in the extradition treaty between
the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), expressly
provides that the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to extradite the
respondent to the jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the Requesting State for the offense
of accepting an advantage as an agent. Such extradition treaty states that surrender
shall only be granted for an offense coming within descriptions of offenses in its
Article 2 insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of
detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the
laws of both parties.
Foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself/herself. Despite the admission that Philippine courts
lack expertise on the laws of HKSAR, qualified legal experts on the laws of HKSAR
were consulted in the hearing before the trial court and they shared the same
opinion that the offense defined in Section 9 of the POBO was a private sector
offense. In addition, petitioner did not present an official publication of the ruling or
at least a copy of it attested by the proper office having legal custody. Hence, the
ruling was not shown to be a public document under HKSAR.
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA et al, petitioners,
vs.
EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO
Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of
public officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and
resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned therewith.
They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and
to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines “to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products”
and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or impairs” the constitutional powers of
both Congress and the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty specifically the legislative
power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987 Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the
Congress of the Philippines.
Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the Philippine
sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the Philippine
Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it concurred with
the President’s ratification of the agreement.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on
the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily
agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of
nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation
of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State
Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations.” By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.
One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. “A treaty
engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation
on the parties x x x. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is
bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure
the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.”
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their
state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a
convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in
pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree
to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been
used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters
as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the
termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of
alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying
down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international
organizations. The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be
considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations
imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2)
limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, “Today,
no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over.
The age of interdependence is here.”
The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade
without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law
encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.