1. Schneider vs Rusk
Mendoza-Martinez was aiming only to regulate,
FACTS
Appellant, who was born in Germany, came to this country with her
parents as a child and acquired derivative American citizenship. She lived
abroad since graduation from college, became married to a German
national, and, except for two visits back to this country, has lived in
Germany for the past eight years. The State Department denied her a
passport, certifying that she had lost her American citizenship under §
352(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, which provides
that a naturalized citizen, with exceptions not material here, loses
citizenship by continuous residence for three years in the country of origin.
She thereupon sued in the District Court for a declaratory judgment that
she is still an American citizen and has appealed from that court's adverse
decision.
The Solicitor General makes his case along the following lines.
Over a period of many years, this Government has been seriously
concerned by special problems engendered when naturalized citizens
return for a long period to the countries of their former nationalities. It is
upon this premise that the argument derives that Congress, through its
power over foreign relations, has the power to deprive such citizens of
their citizenship.
Other nations, it is said, frequently attempt to treat such persons as their
own citizens, thus embroiling the United States in conflicts when it
attempts to afford them protection. It is argued that expatriation is an
alternative to withdrawal of diplomatic protection. It is also argued that
Congress reasonably can protect against the tendency of three years'
residence in a naturalized citizen's former homeland to weaken his or her
allegiance to this country. The argument continues that it is not invidious
discrimination for Congress to treat such naturalized citizens differently
from the manner in which it treats native-born citizens, and that Congress
has the right to legislate with respect to the general class without regard to
each factual violation. It is finally argued that Congress here, unlike the
situation in Kennedy v.
and not to punish, and that what Congress did had been deemed
appropriate not only by this country, but by many others, and is in keeping
with traditional American concepts of citizenship.
ISSUE
WON Sec 352a of Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 is
unconstitutional for violating the right to due process.
HELD
The Opinion of the Court as delivered by Justice Douglas states
that, Sec. 352(a)(1) is discriminatory, and therefore violative of due process
under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, since no restriction
against the length of foreign residence applies to native-born citizens,
though some members of that majority believe that Congress lacks
constitutional power to effect involuntary divestiture of citizenship.,
reversed.
The Immigration and Nationality' Act of 1952 , provides:
"(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his
nationality by --"
"(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a
foreign state of which he was formerly a national or in which the place of
his birth is situated, except as provided in section 353 of this title, whether
such residence commenced before or after the effective date of this Act..."
We start from the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native born
and of the naturalized person are of the same dignity, and are coextensive.
The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the "natural
born" citizen is eligible to be President. Art. II, § 1.
While the rights of citizenship of the native born derive from Sec 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the rights of the naturalized citizen derive
from satisfying, free of fraud, the requirements set by Congress, the latter,
apart from the exception noted, "becomes a member of the society,
possessing all the rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the
constitution, on the footing of a native. The constitution does not
authorize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power of
the national Legislature is to prescribe a uniform rule of naturalization, and
the exercise of this power exhausts it so far as respects the individual."
Views of the Justices have varied when it comes to the problem of
expatriation.
There is one view that the power of Congress to take away citizenship for
activities of the citizen is nonexistent absent expatriation by the voluntary
renunciation of nationality and allegiance. That view has not yet
commanded a majority of the entire Court. Hence, we are faced with the
issue presented and decided in Perez v. Brownell, supra, i.e., whether the
present Act violates due process. That, in turn, comes to the question put
in the following words in Perez: "Is the means, withdrawal of citizenship,
reasonably calculated to effect the end that is within the power of
Congress to achieve, the avoidance of embarrassment in the conduct of
our foreign relations . . . ?" In that case, where an American citizen voted in
a foreign election, the answer was in the affirmative. In the present case,
the question is whether the same answer should be given merely because
the naturalized citizen lived in her former homeland continuously for three
years. We think not.
As stated by Judge Fahy, dissenting below, such legislation, touching as it
does on the "most precious right" of citizenship would have to be justified
under the foreign relations power "by some more urgent public necessity
than substituting administrative convenience for the individual right of
which the citizen is deprived."
"This Court has never held that Congress' power to expatriate may be used
unsparingly in every area in which it has general power to act. Our
previous decisions upholding involuntary denationalization all involved
conduct inconsistent with undiluted allegiance to this country."
This statute proceeds on the impermissible assumption that naturalized
citizens as a class are less reliable, and bear less allegiance to this country
than do the native born. This is an assumption that is impossible for us to
make. Moreover, while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection
clause, it does forbid discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process." Bolling v. Sharpe. A native-born citizen is free to
reside abroad indefinitely without suffering loss of citizenship. The
discrimination aimed at naturalized citizens drastically limits their rights to
live and work abroad in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a
second-class citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized
or native born, is no badge of lack of allegiance, and in no way evidences a
voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance. It may indeed be
compelled by family, business, or other legitimate reasons.
2. Republic vs Cokeng 68 & 70
68
FACTS
The respondent only stated in his application for naturalization his
address in Sto. Cristo Manila however he manifested in several public
documents that he also resided in Quezon City and when asked about his
residence in Quezon City he asserted that it was an address not a
residence or it was set down in mistake or he purchased it for his parents
Respondent-appellee Francisco Cokeng seeks reconsideration of this
Court's decision in the above entitled case, ordering the revocation of his
certificate of naturalization. The bases of the decision were that in the
original application for naturalization, said respondent failed to state all his
former places of residence; and lack of good moral character and
irreproachable conduct, rendering the naturalization one that was illegally
obtained.
ISSUE
Whether or not the revocation of the respondents certificate of
naturalization is valid.
HELD
 With regard to the first ground Section 7 of the Naturalization Law
expressly requires the applicant to state his "present and past place of
residence", and the words used in the statute clearly show that the term
residence was not employed in the sense of legal domicile, precisely
because a person can only have one domicile. The good faith of the
applicant in omitting one or more of his "present and past places of
residence" in his application, becomes and is irrelevant for the purposes of
the law. Considering the purpose of the requirement, which is to enable
the public and the investigating agencies of the government to gather all
information available as to the conduct of an applicant, and thus
determine whether his behaviour at all times has been irreproachable as
required by law, and hence, whether the prospective admission to
citizenship should be objected to or not, it becomes obvious that by places
of residence, section 7 of the Naturalization Law refers to the places of
actual physical residence, whether temporary or permanent. The decision
in O Ku Phuan vs. Republic states that: "the fact that petitioner mentioned,
in his testimony, said former places of residence, does not and cannot -
contrary to the import of the order appealed from - cure the effect of the
failure to specify them in his aforementioned petition."Whether the
omission be in good or bad faith, the fact is that full inquiry as to the
irreproachability of applicant's behavior is thereby prevented, and the
law's intent for publication is frustrated thus its fatal to the application for
naturalization.
It is apparent from the preceding considerations that the act of
appellee Cokeng in not disclosing his residence in Quezon City, having
deprived the State of opportunity to fully inquire into the applicant's
conduct, rendered the decree of naturalization improvident and improper,
being contrary to the requirements and policy of the law. While the decree
had become final, the State is not thereby deprived of corrective action
through denaturalization proceedings for the cancellation of the
naturalization certificate. For under section 18 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, "a competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued
and its registration in the civil registry whenever it is shown that â said
naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally. . These
terms were reproduced from the American law that allowed cancellation
of naturalizations "fraudulently or illegally procured", and it has been the
consistent interpretation of the Federal and Supreme Courts of the United
States that the term "illegally procured" is not limited to irregularity, but
also denoted a determination by the Court contrary to law of the matter
submitted to it. The conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that the
respondent has not established adequate grounds for altering the
conclusions made in the main decision to the effect that his failure to
disclose all his places of residence justified the revocation of his
naturalization.
With regard to the second ground for revocation, to wit, that
respondent Cokeng had committed under declarations of his income, no
fraud can be deduced as there was no sowing that the respondent
maliciously and intentionally alleged the overpayment of taxes for the
years 1952,3 &4.
In view of these developments, we are left with no alternative but to
conclude that, despite the suspicious variations in the results of the
different examinations of respondent's tax cases, the second charge of
under declarations of his income has not been clearly established, and
therefore, his denaturalization cannot be predicated upon said charge.
It appearing, however, that Cokeng's naturalization was illegally obtained,
because the Court granting it improperly disregarded the applicant's
failure to disclose one of his places of residence, contrary to the
requirement of section 7 of the Naturalization Law, the denaturalization
decreed in the original decision of this Court must be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
Separate Opinions
Dizon, Angeles and Castro
....More specifically, we hold the view (1) that the residential building,
situated at no. 28, 12th Street, Broadway, Quezon City, and owned by
Cokeng, was not a "residence" within the meaning of the word as used in
the Naturalization Law; and (2) that measured by the injunction that in
a denaturalization proceeding the proof of fraudulent or illegal
procurement of the certificate of naturalization must be "clear,
unequivocal and convincing," the evidence in the present case does not
meet this stringent requirement the Government must prove that there
was attempt to defraud the government in omitting some of the
respondent's properties....
70
FACTS
Before this Court for resolution is respondent-appellee’s
supplementary second motion for reconsideration dated January 27, 1968.
1968 case read above.
In his motion respondent-appellee raises a constitutional question and
claims that to denaturalize him for violation of section 7 of the
Naturalization Law would be a denial of due process inasmuch as the
petition for that purpose filed in the Court of First Instance did not allege
such ground, but rather that he had no residence in the City of Manila at
all, his residence being in Quezon City, at the address aforementioned, at
the time of his application. In other words, his position is that since the
petition for denaturalization was based on non-compliance with section 8
of the Naturalization Law, according to which an application for
naturalization must be filed in the Court of First Instance of the place of
the applicant’s residence for at least one year proceeding the filing of such
application, and since the charge of non-compliance was not true, he
having been found to be really a resident of Manila, precisely at the
address stated by him, he should not be denaturalized on another ground
neither alleged nor the subject of evidence at the trial, namely, failure to
state any other places of residence, past and present, as required by
Section 7.
Required to comment on the point thus raised by respondent-appellee, the
Solicitor General expressed his concurrence from the standpoint of the due
process clause of the Constitution, and submitted respondent-appellee’s
supplementary second motion for reconsideration to the sound discretion
of this Court.
ISSUE
WON 1968 case decision denied Cokeng's right to due process.
HELD
The Court based its decision in the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General to find derogatory results against Cokeng that
would prove his unfitness to be granted naturalization and the
investigation produced negative results in favor of Cokeng.
In view of the foregoing report of the Solicitor General it has
become unnecessary to remand this case to the court of origin for
the purpose contemplated in the resolution of this Court of
November 15, 1968, namely, for the Solicitor General to file the
corresponding amended petition for naturalization against
respondent-appellee in the event the investigation regarding his
conduct and behavior in Quezon City, before and after the grant
of citizenship to him on December 29, 1958, should yield
derogatory information which would render him unfit for
citizenship. The reason behind the requirement in Section 7 of the
Naturalization Law concerning the inclusion of an applicant’s
present and former places of residence in his petition for
naturalization has been satisfied in this particular case, and
consequently the filing of an amended petition for
denaturalization expressly alleging failure to comply with such
requirement would serve no practical purpose, nor may the
Solicitor General be expected to file such petition after the
investigation conducted by him had yielded negative results.
WHEREFORE, respondent-appellee’s supplementary second
motion for reconsideration is granted; the decision of this Court of
July 20, 1966, and the resolution of July 20, 1968 insofar as it
denies respondent-appellee’s first motion for reconsideration,
and the resolution of June 25, 1968, denying his second motion
for reconsideration, are set aside; and the judgment of the Court
a quo denying appellant’s petition for cancellation of respondent
 appellee’s certificate of naturalization is affirmed, without Unfortunately, the lower court decision came out in 1965, a full two years
pronouncement as to costs. earlier. The Republic thus emerged victorious in its suit to declare null and
3. Chan Teck Lao vs Republic DC + full case digest void the original judgment in favor of petitioner in view of Tan Ten Koc v.
No retroactive effect is to be given to a judicial pronouncement that would Republic, which the year before held for the first time that an applicant
impose on a party proceeded against in a denaturalization proceeding a must present positive evidence the newspaper where his petition was
requirement not in existence at a time that his application was heard and published was indeed of general circulation in the province where the
favorably acted on. proceeding was had. With the principle of non-retroactivity now firmly
Facts: adhered to, there is no more justification for what the lower court did. The
Chan Teck Lao filed an application for naturalization but the same was status of petitioner as a national of this country for well-nigh thirteen years
denied. In 1950, upon appeal, the SC reversed the decision. In 1962, the
ought to have remained undisturbed. What is more, a 1970 resolution of
Office of the Solicitor General then caused the cancellation of the
certificate of naturalization because there was no showing or proof that this Court penned by the present Chief Justice in Republic v.
the Nueva Era was a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Co Keng, warning against undue receptivity to claims by the State in
Tarlac, where the petitioner then resided. This is because a subsequent denaturalization proceedings, further strengthens the position of
ruling in a petition for cancellation of naturalization case was made by the petitioner-appellant in seeking a reversal. Such an approach can likewise
Court which states that there is a necessity to show that the newspaper be discerned in our resolution, with Justice Antonio as ponente, in Burca v.
where the publication is made is indeed a newspaper of general
Republic. We therefore cannot affirm.
circulation.
Issue: The Court makes it manifest that no retroactive effect is to be given to a
Whether the Office of the Solicitor General is correct in canceling the
judicial pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded against in
naturalization of Chan Teck Lao on the ground that he failed to follow the
publication requirement. a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence at a time
Ruling: that his application was heard and favorably acted on. There would be
NO. The 1967 leading case of Gan Tsitung v. Republic with former Chief manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had subsequently
Justice Concepcion as spokesman for the Court, indicates clearly the merit become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship.
of this appeal by petitioner Chan Teck Lao from a lower court decision
promulgated in 1965 ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
naturalization that dates back to 1952 as a result of 1950 decision of this
Tribunal sustaining his plea to become a Filipino. Gan Tsitung, in language
plain and unequivocal makes manifest that no retroactive effect is to be
given a judicial pronouncement that would impose on a party proceeded
against in a denaturalization proceeding a requirement not in existence at
a time that his application was heard and favorably acted on. There would
be manifest unfairness in setting aside a decision that had subsequently
become final and did lead to the grant of the coveted boon citizenship.