Kah Yee Phang

Wordcount : 1982

How far do you agree with the interpretation that Thatcher’s electoral success was a result of

the weakness of the Labour party?

Interpretation A supports the argument that Thatcher’s electoral success was a result of the

division within and weakness of the Labour party while interpretations B and D argue that

her success was primarily a result of the Conservative Party’s successes.

Interpretation C, on the other hand, provides an alternative view that other reasons such as the

Falklands factor and the organisation of the electoral system contributed most towards

Thatcher’s electoral success.

Many historians, such as Jenkins in interpretation A, argue that the weakness of the Labour

Party was the main reason explaining Thatcher’s electoral success.

Due to the changing political and social structure, the working class who traditionally

supported Labour diminished in size by 3% and this translated to a 12% lead in the share of

votes for the Conservatives among the skilled working class.

Although Jenkins argued that this change did not mean that Labour’s downfall was

“inevitable”, it contributed to limiting Labour’s chances of electoral success. A result of this

was Labour becoming the “party of the underclass” which meant that Labour represented a

smaller proportion of the electorate. This, in turn, made the party and the electorate a “poor

fit” especially with the drastic policy changes under Michael Foot who replaced James

Callaghan as leader of the Labour Party in 1980. With the support of Tony Benn, who was

essentially an extremist left-wing politician, Foot introduced policies such as the disarmament

of Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent and re-nationalisation. These policies were deemed

unrealistic by most of the public and right-wing Labour politicians because these somewhat

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extremist policies did not complement ‘modernisation’ that the country was progressing

towards and which the electorate was in favour of. The adoption of these policies meant that

the increasingly left-wing Labour Party had lost its ‘political touch’, an aspect that Margaret

Thatcher relied on for popular support and electoral success. This argument is substantiated

especially if the 1987 election is considered because Labour’s reformed policies under the

leadership of Neil Kinnock helped to increase their share of votes from 27.6% to 30.8%.

Arguably, Foot’s adoption of the unpopular left-wing policies also resulted in the factional

infighting between the extremist left (Militant Tendency) and right-wing moderates that

Jenkins sees as being very important in explaining Thatcher’s electoral success. The

“spectacular disunity” arising from the conflict within Labour significantly undermined it as a

credible political party.

The eventual split and the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) by prominent

Labour moderates, nicknamed the ‘Gang-of-Four’, is crucial in explaining Labour’s defeat in

1983. This is because it diverted some of Labour’s supporters to support other political

parties such as the Alliance that gained an extra 11.6% whilst Labour lost 9.3% share of the

popular vote.

Ultimately, Jenkins supports the view that Thatcher’s electoral success was a result of the

weakness of the Labour party because the individual factors explored in his argument merely

contribute to Labour’s downfall as opposed to the Conservatives’ strengths.

However, Jenkins’ argument in interpretation A does not explain Thatcher’s overall electoral

success because more emphasis is put on the 1983 elections whilst the 1979 and 1987

elections play little or no part in his argument.

In regards to the 1983 election, the premise of Jenkins’ argument is flawed because the

arguments by Young (B) and Morgan (D) demonstrate that the importance of high

unemployment figures that went up to more than three million (A) did not thwart Thatcher’s
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chances for electoral success.

Young in interpretation B explains that the reduction in the importance of unemployment

figures was due to Thatcher’s economic policies. This is especially true because Thatcher

used economics to change the heart and soul1” of the electorate.

For example, the privatisation programme that was a “consummate exercise in vote-winning”

increased the number of shares owned by individuals from 3 million to 9 million. Similarly,

the sale of council houses enriched people of the working class. By actively promoting

policies that increased the earnings and income of the people, individualism replaced

consensus. As such, mass unemployment figures became less threatening and because they

did not affect most of the people personally.

Similarly, Morgan in interpretation D argued that mass unemployment “lost its old political

potency” because the introduction of economic policies which led to deindustrialisation

produced high unemployment levels in the North where there was little Conservative support.

These policies had little effect in the south and east of England where most of the

Conservative held constituencies where.

Clearly, both Young and Morgan in interpretations B and D, oppose Jenkins’ argument in

interpretation A. Rather than agreeing that the Conservatives’ political dominance in 1979,

1983 and 1987 was a result of Labour losing the elections, collectively, their argument

supports the view that Thatcher’s electoral success was a result of the strength of the

Conservatives.

Thatcher’s commitment to liberalise the ‘supply-side’ and reduce government intervention in

1
Marquand, David. ‘Britain Since 1918, The Strange Career of British Democracy’, Weidenfield & Nicolson,
2008, pp 283. Quoted in David Marquand, Britain Since 1918 p283 and Ian Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma pp
105
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economic affairs created optimism and popularity for the Conservatives during election

periods is demonstrated by Young in interpretation B. He explains that Conservatives’

economic successes such as the increased average weekly earnings of an individual to 14% in

real terms and the reduction of the basic tax rate from 33% to 30% by 1987 increased the

disposable income of individuals. This led people to feel better off under Thatcher and

despite going through recessions in 1981 and 1987, recovery was quick enough to dispel any

potential criticism or pessimistic views of the Conservatives. Therefore, the economic

success of the Conservatives made Thatcher more appealing as Prime Minister and this is

reflected in her electoral success because even some of the underclass who tended to vote for

Labour supported Conservatives instead.

Similarly, Morgan in interpretation D argues that the “promise of continued prosperity” in

economic terms brought Thatcher’s electoral success. However, Morgan’s argument focuses

on the Conservative’s success in the south and east of England because these regions are

more influential politically. Thatcher’s overall policies benefitted people of these areas most.

For example, deregulation which removed market restrictions in the financial services sector

and the encouragement of small and medium enterprises by means of New Business

Schemes, created jobs in these areas. In fact, these policies that also promoted free market

monetarism contributed to the emergence of a ‘new’ working class in the “expanding towns

of southern England and East Anglia”. Consequently, the Conservatives won 40% of the total

working-class vote and came ahead of Labour that only had 28% in the South.

On the other hand, Thatcher was less popular in the North and West of England because the

economic policies she had introduced had inflicted adverse social and economic impact on

these regions. Therefore, the Conservatives’ strength in the south and east of England is

indisputable and thus Morgan’s argument is valid because, ultimately, Thatcher’s electoral

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support came from these regions. In this sense, therefore, Morgan’s argument in

interpretation D undermines Jenkins’ argument in interpretation A because it shows that the

Conservatives, similar to Labour, did not represent the majority of the people and not all of

their policies were adequate for the majority of the people. This means that the

Conservatives had a level playing field against other political parties and therefore Labour’s

weaknesses cannot be the most important factor that resulted in Thatcher’s electoral success

because, ultimately, the Conservative Party needed public support to get into power.

Although predominantly a solid argument suggesting that Thatcher’s electoral victories were

due to the Conservatives’ economic success, Young (B) failed to identify that their economic

success was centralised in the south and east of England. On the other hand, Morgan (D) did

not exactly recognise that Thatcher’s economic success created support for the Party in these

areas either. However, these arguments should not be dismissed because both interpretations

B and D corroborate to show that the Conservatives’ economic successes in the south and

east of England are instrumental in strengthening Conservative support.

An alternative view is demonstrated in interpretation C. Rather than agreeing that it was

Labour’s weaknesses or the strength of the Conservative that resulted in Thatcher’s electoral

success, Evans argues that other factors such as the Falklands Factor and the electoral system

had most impact towards Thatcher’s success although the weakness of Labour and the

strength of the Conservative Party contributed.

According to Evans, the weaknesses of the Labour Party contributed to Thatcher’s electoral

success but only in the sense that it made the electoral system favourable for the

Conservatives.

This is because the “appalling disarray” within Labour and its eventual split caused “deep
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unpopularity” and made the anti-Conservative vote so fractured that it made the electoral

system favourable for Thatcher. This view is supported by the fact that the Conservatives

won two landslides with 144 and 147 seats in 1983 and 1987 despite only having a 42.4%

and a 42.2% share of the popular vote.

After all, Labour’s weaknesses are less significant in regards to Thatcher’s electoral success

if Britain used proportional representation instead. This is because the Conservative vote

never exceeded 43% (C) and Labour was the biggest political party after the Conservatives

during Thatcher’s regime.

In reality, the strength of the Conservatives is important because Thatcher wouldn’t have won

without obtaining popular support even under ‘First Past the Post’.

Evans explained that Thatcher’s success in 1983 was also due to the victory in Falklands

because it helped to revive the popularity of the Conservatives that seemed to have faltered

during her first three years in power.

This “Falklands Factor” Evans referred to was Thatcher embodying a national leader whose

military prowess humbled political opponents such as Foot and Kinnock who represented

Labour. Their inept response and pacifism made Labour, as a political party, look apathetic

and unpatriotic during a national crisis. Perhaps they should not be blamed because they were

caught in a quagmire supporting servicemen and women fighting whilst opposing the war.

Then again, this led to the lost of public confidence for Labour which is signified by the

dramatic loss of 3 million votes in 1983 because the public interpreted this as the weakness of

the Labour Party, which runs parallel to Jenkins’ argument in interpretation A. Even so,

Evans does not regard the Falklands Factor most important towards improving the

Conservatives’ popularity for the1983 elections and Thatcher’s overall electoral success

because the Conservatives’ popularity was still going to improve with economic recovery that

was already “under way”.

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Margaret Thatcher’s electoral success is undeniable because she held the position of Prime

Minister for 11 consecutive years. The weakness of the Labour party is important in the sense

that it made Thatcher, instead of James Callaghan, Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock, more

appealing as Prime Minister. However, judging from the interpretations provided, the

weakness of Labour (A) cannot be considered as the most important factor towards

Thatcher’s electoral success because it was consistently undermined by other competing

factors that contributed to the strength of the Conservative Party.

Collectively, interpretations B, C and D suggest that the most important factor towards

Thatcher’s electoral success was the Conservatives’ economic policies. Although Thatcher’s

Keynesian policies weren’t as popular during1979-1981, it was only because most people

were accustomed to Monetarist policies and feared change. After all, Thatcher got into power

in 1979 largely because she provided remedies that promised to cure the British Disease such

as continuous strike action like the 1978-9 ‘Winter of Discontent’ and the consequent poor

economic performance the country faced since after the Second World War.

On the basis that the conjoint arguments in interpretations B, C and D presents a

more persuasive case that the strength of the Conservative Party resulted in

Thatcher’s electoral success, it can be concluded that the Thatcher’s electoral

success had little to do with the weakness in the Labour Party.

Bibliography

Marquand, David. ‘Britain Since 1918, The Strange Career of British Democracy’, Weidenfield & Nicolson,
2008, pp 283.
Quoted in David Marquand, Britain Since 1918 pp283 and Ian Gilmour, Dancing with Dogma pp 105

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