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Republic vs Naguiat

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:

Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land located in Panan,
Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having
acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their predecessors-in-interest who have
been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge,
said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any
interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.

Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the fact that she has not
established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable
and disposable property.

ISSUE:

Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public
domain?

HELD:

No, the said areas are still classified as forest land. The issue of whether or not respondent and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of
land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation
or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is
merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like.
2. Chavez v PEA and AMARI G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002.

7/7/2010

Facts: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084
creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas,"
and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in
the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting
and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and
Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand
eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register
of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and
7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands"
located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City.

PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28,
1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8, 1995,
then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.

The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee Report
No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the
government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2)
the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.

On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No.
365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate
Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, the
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force
upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in
the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the
terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the
1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that
on "constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
Issue: The issues raised by petitioner, PEA and AMARI are as follows:
1. Whether the reliefs prayed for are moot and academic because of subsequent events;
2. Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to observe the principle of governing the
heirarchy of courts;
3. Whether the petition should be dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies;
4. Whether petitioner has locus standi;
5. Whether the constitutional right to information includes information on on-going neogtiations
BEFORE a final agreement;
6. Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of
certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987 Constitution; and
7. Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the issue whether the amended JVA is grossly
disadvantageous to the government

Held: 1. We rule that the signing and of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction.

PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation if in the
meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's principal
basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of the Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution, which prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private
corporations. The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to
transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila
Bay to a single private corporation.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression being a wholly government owned
corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973
Constitution, covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired the lands from
private parties.

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition
because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of
the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's
seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the reclamation progresses, The
Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area to raise
financing for the reclamation project.

2. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the
public. The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case.
Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the
Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction
over the instant case.
3. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the
sale of its lands. The law obligated PEA make this public disclosure even without demand from
petitioner or from anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like
the Amended JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that
PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of this
legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is
a purely legal or constitutional question. The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of
AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA
to comply with its constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is
the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern. Second is the application of a
constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public
domain among Filipino Citizens.
The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable
lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a
constitutional duty to the nation.

Ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts
or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of 'paramount public
interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people.'

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights — to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources — matters
of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
people's right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section
28, Article II of the Constitution, thus: “Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest."

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission


understood that the right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the
consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the
exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract
is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may
be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli.
However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries
and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to records,
documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises
the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is
also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize
disruption to government operations, like rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection
and copying.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is
employed in some public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls,
fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private
individuals.

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service and
open only to those authorized to use the property.Property of public dominion referred not only to
property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to develop the
national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although employed
for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense
of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State." This provision, however,
was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must declare
the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could
lease or alienate the property to private parties.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature


Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service.
This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to
private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some future public service.

However, government reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as


disposable public agricultural lands, could only be leased and not sold to private parties because of
Act No. 2874.

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973
Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable lands of the public
domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the general law governing the
lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public
domain is still CA No. 141.

Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more alienable public lands.
An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual could
even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the
corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on
acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park
lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of
the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only
natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources,
such as the seas or bays, are "waters . . . owned by the State" forming part of the public domain, and
are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while
PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water whether
directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval of the President. On the other
hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not
make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial
lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain
to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less
patrimonial lands of PEA.

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from
Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by PEA." PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire,
administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned,
managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." 87 (Emphasis supplied) There is,
therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable
lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance
with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's
patrimonial lands.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code,
the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79
of PD No. 1445 mandates that:... "In the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold
at a private sale at such price as may be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and
approved by the Commission."

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the
additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another
350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750
hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not
a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the
alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government
units and entities like PEA.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141
does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial
lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to
government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or
patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become illusory if Congress can declare
lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a government agency
tasked to dispose of public lands.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private
lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This scheme can even be applied to alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can "acquire . . . any and all kinds of lands."

The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last
issue. Besides, the Court is not the trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of
factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

3. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. PEDRO O. ENCISO, RESPONDENT.

Facts: The facts, as culled from the records of the case, show that on April 24, 2000, the respondent,
alleging to be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential land located in Barangay South
Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales, filed a petition for land registration before the RTC of Iba, Zambales.

The respondent averred, inter alia, that he acquired title to the said lot by virtue of an extrajudicial
settlement of estate and quitclaim on March 15, 1999; the said property is not tenanted or occupied by
any person other than the respondent and his family who are in actual physical possession of the same;
and the respondent and his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, peaceful, open,
notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the land in the concept of an owner for not less
than 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the respondent failed to adduce any muniment of title and/or the tax
declaration with the application to prove bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or its open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax declaration adverted to in the application does not
appear to be genuine and the tax declarations indicate such possession to be of recent vintage; (d) the
claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by the
respondent considering that he failed to file an appropriate application for registration within the period
of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by P.D. No. 892; and (e) the subject land is a portion of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is not subject to private
appropriation.

Issue: WON respondent is entitled to the land

Ruling: NO

Ratio: Records reveal that subject land is a residential land owned by the Municipality of Masinloc,
Zambales. The Municipality of Masinloc, through Resolutions 71, 102 and 102-A-29 sold the subject land
to Honorato Edaño as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 31, 1969 executed by the
Municipal Mayor.

Article 423 of the Civil Code provides that:

"Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property."

Properties of political subdivision[s] which are patrimonial in character may be alienated. By analogy,
when a municipality's properties for public use are no longer intended for such use, the same become
patrimonial and may be the subject of a contract. Thus, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by and
between the Municipal Mayor of Masinloc and Honorato Edaño was a valid contract. Subject land was
likewise sold by Honorato Edaño to petitioner-appellee's father, Vicente Enciso, by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale. From then, subject land changed hand until it was acquired by petitioner-appellee when
his siblings executed an Extrajudicial Partition assigning said land to him. It was declared for taxation
purposes in his name under Tax Declaraton

Subject land was reclassified as residential. It was already segregated from the public domain and
assumed the character of private ownership. It was reclaimed by the Municipality of Masinloc and
eventually adjudicated to Honorato Edaño. The Municipality of Masinloc must have been in possession
of the subject land even before 1969 considering that it was originally surveyed way back in 1927-1928.
In the exercise of its proprietary right, the Municipality of Masinloc validly conveyed the subject land to
petitioner-appellee's predecessors-in-interest. Petitioner-appellee's possession and occupation of the
subject land is continuous, public, adverse and uninterrupted and in the concept an owner and no other
person claimed possession and ownership of the same. Article 1137 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribed (sic) through uninterrupted
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of titles or of good faith."

Parenthetically, petitioner-appellee's possession tacked with that of his predecessors-in-interest already


complied with the thirty (30)-year requirement of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
required under the law.

Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner-appellee sufficiently and satisfactorily proved his real and
absolute ownership in fee simple; that he has a registrable title over the subject land and that he
complied with the requirements under the law to warrant registration of title over the subject land.[22]

The petition is meritorious.

While it is the rule that findings of fact of appellate courts are conclusive upon this Court, among the
recognized exceptions is where the findings of fact are not supported by the record or are conspicuously
erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion.[23] This is the situation in this case.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.

Applicants for registration of title must therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
either since time immemorial, or since June 12, 1945. It is not disputed that the land sought to be
registered was originally part of the reclamation project undertaken by the Municipality of Masinloc,
Zambales. The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of the public domain may only be leased
and not sold to private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain which the government could not sell to private parties except if the
legislature passes a law authorizing such sale. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas
for public use or public service.[24] The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in
the Regalian doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the public domain belong to the
State.[25] On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also
known as the Public Land Act, compiling all the existing laws on lands of the public domain. This remains
to this day the existing and applicable general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of
the public domain. The State policy prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain to private individuals continued under the 1935 Constitution.

Indeed, there is nothing to support the respondent's claim that the property "was reclassified as
residential ... already segregated from the public domain and assumed the character of private
ownership." At the moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities classified the subject as
alienable and disposable. It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to
establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.[26]

According to the CA, "the Municipality of Masinloc must have been in possession of the subject land
even before 1969 considering that it was originally surveyed way back in 1927-1928." This is not the kind
of possession and occupation contemplated under the law. While the subject property was still in the
hands of the municipality, it was undeniably part of the public domain. The municipality cannot then be
considered a predecessor-in-interest of the applicant from whom the period of possession and
occupation required by law may be reckoned with. Any other interpretation would be dangerously
detrimental to our national patrimony.

Even assuming that Honorato Edaño, the respondent's earliest predecessor-in-interest, possessed the
property as early as 1969, the respondent's claim must still fail, as he was unable to prove open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership. As the Court ruled in Republic v. Alconaba:[27]

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and,
the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the
word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual
possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.
The petitioners* charge His Honor, Judge Francisco Velez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57,
Makati, Metro Manila, with grave, abuse of discretion in issuing an order authorizing the private
respondent, through Domingo Palomares, to perform acts of ownership over a 2,574-hectare parcel
of land known as Hacienda de Maricaban spread out in various parts of Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay
City, and Parañaque. There is no controversy as to the facts.

On November 5, 1985, the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, as administrator of the heirs of
Delfin Casal, commenced suit with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati, Metro Manila for
declaratory relief, quieting of title, cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 192, and
cancellation of entries upon Original Certificate of Title No. 291.

Palomares had earlier come to this Court (February 27, 1985) on a similar petition, and in addition,
to direct the Register of Deeds to issue a duplicate owner's copy of Original Certificate of Title No.
291, embracing allegedly Hacienda de Maricaban, in lieu of the (alleged) lost one. On September 9,
1985, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. (G.R. No. 69834).

On December 19, 1985, the petitioners filed their answer.

On June 2, 1986, the private respondent filed a motion to admit amended complaint impleading the
Republic of the Philippines and the registers of deeds of Pasig, Makati, and Pasay City as parties-
respondents, and alleging, among other things, that: (1) on October 1, 1906, the Court of Land
Registration (James Ostrand, Presiding Judge) confirmed the title of Dolores Pascual Casal y Ochoa, a
native of Madrid, Spain, over the 2,574-hectare parcel above-mentioned; (2) on October 17, 1906,
the Register of Deeds of Rizal issued OCT No. 291 in her name; (3) upon her death, and successive
deaths of her heirs, the property devolved on Gerardo, Reynaldo, Lolita and Erlinda, all surnamed
Casal, great granchildren of Dolores; (4) no conveyances or dispositions of any kind have been
allegedly made upon the parcel; (5) TCT No. 192, which covers the same landholding; is allegedly
spurious and inexistent; (6) the State itself, by placing 27,213,255 square meters thereof under a
military reservation (Fort McKinley, now Fort Bonifacio), by Proclamation No. 423, and fifty hectares
thereof pursuant to Proclamation No. 192, had been guilty of landgrabbing; (7) any and all holders
of any and all TCTs emanating therefrom or from TCT No. 192, are null, void, and of no force and
effect; and (8) as a consequence thereof, the heirs of Dolores Casal suffered various damages and
attorney's fees.

On June 26, 1986, the petitioners filed an answer, stating, among other things, that: (1) the estate of
Dolores Casal (or Delfin Casal, her grandchild) is not a juridical person authorized by law to bring
suit; (2) the registers of deeds of Makati, Pasig, and Pasay City are not the real parties in interest,
but rather, the registered owners over which the court had not acquired jurisdiction; (3) the non-
joinder of the real parties in interest is fatal; (4) OCT No. 291 has long been cancelled; (5) Judge
Gregorio Pineda of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, Pasig, had earlier denied
prayers for the issuance of duplicate owner's copy of OCT No. 291 because the land embraced
therein had been validly delivered to the Government; (6) the Supreme Court itself had denied the
Casals' appeal;** (7) as a consequence, res judicata is a bar; (8) prescription has also set in; and (9)
the Casal's claims can not validly override the titles of innocent purchasers for value.

On August 29, 1986, the respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order, directing the
petitioners to cease and desist from performing the acts complained of.

In a subsequent memorandum, the petitioners alleged that Dolores Casal had conveyed the
property to the Government of the United States in 1906 and the Manila Railroad Company on
which Judge Ostrand, the Presiding Judge of the Court of Land Registration, later Justice of this
Court had stamped his imprimatur.

On October 12, 1987, the respondent court issued an order in the tenor, as follows:

No other opposition having been registered, this Court hereby resolves to grant the plaintiffs' prayer
in the OMNIBUS MOTION in order to safeguard the integrity of the land embraced in OCT 291,
hereby authorizing for this purpose the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares:

1. To order such subdivision and/or individual survey or surveys within Parcel II, Parcel III and
Parcel IV under Survey Plan Psu-2031 by a licensed geodetic engineer or engineers at plaintiffs
expense in order to facilitate and simplify the efficient administration of the property described in
OCT 291; and

2. To sell, exchange lease or otherwise dispose (of) any area or areas or portion or portions
thereof, subject to the approval of the Intestate Estate Court, to cover expenses for the payment of
taxes to which the property is subject, as well as expenses of administration and for the protection
of the integrity of the said lands.

SO ORDERED.[1]

Eleven days later, or on October 23, 1987 to be precise, it issued another order, as follows:
4. ACTING REGISTRARS OF LAND TITLES v. RTC

Acting on the plaintiff's MOTION dated October 15, 1987 praying for the issuance of a Writ of Execution
implementing the Order of this Court dated October 12, 1987 before the expiration of the time to
appeal, and after inquiring from the plaintiff's counsel for their reason in seeking the same, the Court
hereby issues this clarificatory order affirming the power of the plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares to
execute and perform the acts authorized in the said Order of October 12, 1987 without the need of a
Writ of Execution, where no relief has been sought therefrom by any party, said Order being
implementable at the instance of the said plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares, anytime when the said Order
becomes final 15 days after the said plaintiff received copy of the same (see Section 39, Chapter IV, B.P.
Blg. 129). Plaintiff Domingo C. Palomares may therefore take whatever steps he considers appropriate
for the implementation of the said Order without need of further Orders or additional authority from
this Court.

SO ORDERED.[2]

The petitioners filed a notice of appeal; the respondent court, however, denied it,[3] "it being
directed against ... an interlocutory order ..."[4]

Hence, this recourse.

The petitioners interpose the following questions:

A. Whether or not respondent Court can validly decide before trial in favor of private respondent
the ownership and possession of the 25,743,514 square meters (of) land known as "Hacienda de
Maricaban", which is the main issue in this case;

B. Whether or not respondent Court can validly allow private respondent to exercise and perform
all acts of ownership and possession over the said land before trial;

C. Whether or not respondent Court has acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide this action;

D. Whether or not respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in not dismissing this action or allowing petitioners to appeal from the orders in
question.[5]

In their comment, the private respondent averred, among other things, that: (1) the respondent
court, contrary to the petitioners' claim, did not decide the case "before trial"; (2) OCT No. 291 had
not been validly cancelled and that the rubber stamp impression thereon, "CANCELLED" is a forgery;
(3) the act of Judge Pineda, in denying issuance of OCT No. 291, duplicate owner's copy can not be
considered res judicata because that case involved purportedly a mere petition for issuance of
duplicate owner's copy; (4) non-joinder of proper parties is not a jurisdictional defect; (5) the TCTs
issued thereafter are a nullity because OCT No. 291 had not been shown to have been duly
cancelled; (6) OCT No. 291 has become imprescriptible; and (7) the private respondent has a valid
right of dominion over the property.

In the meantime, the private respondent came to this Court on certiorari (G.R. No. 90176) alleging
that on December 15, 1987, in connection with Sp. Proc. No. Pq-2993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 118 Pasay City, entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Fortunato Santiago
and Mariano Pantanilla, Crisanta P. Santiago, et al., Petitioners," Judge Conrado Vasquez, Jr. issued
an order disposing of certain parcels which the private respondent claims as forming part and parcel
of Hacienda de Maricaban.

On June 20, 1988, the respondent judge in G.R. No. 81564 filed his own comment, asserting, among
other things, that: (1) what he had sought to bar, by virtue of injunction, was incursions and forcible
entries of trespassers and squatters; (2) the petitioners can not rightly claim that he had
prematurely adjudicated the case, because there was allegedly no decision to begin with; (3) that he
issued the writ of preliminary injunction in order only to maintain the status quo ante bellum, that is
to re-place the private respondent, which had been allegedly in prior possession, in possession; (4)
he did not allegedly authorize unbridled "acts of ownership" to be exercised on the property; (5) all
rights of dominion given thereon were subject to the approval of the intestate estate court; (6) he
denied the notice of appeal because the order dated October 12, 1987, was interlocutory in nature
from which no appeal lies; (7) as to jurisdiction, the various motions filed by petitioners, allegedly
accepting the court's jurisdiction, have clothed the court with jurisdiction, and that besides, the
jurisdictional question was never raised except now.

On July 7, 1988, the petitioners filed a reply traversing the respondent judge's allegations.

On August 26, 1988, the respondent judge filed a supplemental comment. He reiterated that the
writ of injunction was directed only on such spaces not occupied by the Government (Fort Bonifacio,
Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population
Commission, National Science and Development Board, and National Housing Authority).

Meanwhile, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan, for and on behalf purportedly of the "Heirs of Delfin Casal"
and the private respondent, Domingo Palomares, filed "Comment/Opposition in Intervention",
dated December 23, 1988 asking for the outright dismissal of the petition.

On December 14, 1989, the private respondent filed a manifestation, stating, among other things,
that assuming OCT No. 291 had been cancelled, there was still basis for the respondent judge to
prevent landgrabbers from entering into vacant portions of the estate embraced thereby.

The Court finds the issues, quintessentially, to be:

(1) Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?

(2) Did the respondent judge, in issuing the orders, dated October 12 and October 23, 1987,
commit a grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

I. Is OCT No. 291 still valid and subsisting?

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the hectarage embraced by TCT No. 192 (OCT No.
291) consists of Government property. Three things persuade the Court: (1) the decrees of
Proclamations Nos. 192 and 435; (2) the incontrovertible fact that OCT No. 291 has been duly
cancelled; and (3) the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 00293, affirming the
decision of Hon. Gregorio Pineda, Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXI, in
LRC (GLRO) Rec. No. 2484, Case No. R-1467 thereof, entitled "In Re: Issuance of Owner's Duplicate
of Certificate of Title No. 291," as well as our own Resolution in G.R. No. 69834, entitled "Domingo
Palomares, et al., v. Intermediate Appellate Court".
(a) Proclamation No. 192 ("RESERVING FOR THE VETERANS CENTER SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN
PARCEL OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF
LUZON") and Proclamation No. 423 ("RESERVING FOR MILITARY PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG, TAGUIG, AND PARAÑAQUE,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, AND PASAY CITY") have the character of official assertions of ownership,
and the presumption is that they have been issued by right of sovereignty and in the exercise of
the State's dominical authority. We take not only judicial notice thereof[6] but accept the same
as a valid asseveration of regalian right over property.

With respect to the premises occupied by the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, Nayong Pilipino, the Population Commission, National Science and Development Board, and
the National Housing Authority, we do not have the slightest doubt that they stand on Government
property by sheer presumption that, unless otherwise shown, what the Government occupies is
what the Government owns.

While there is no presumption that property is Government property until otherwise shown,
because the law recognizes private ownership, thus:

Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively.[7]

we find hard evidence on record that: (1) the property covered by OCT No. 291 had been conveyed
to the United States of America; (2) it had been later ceded to the Republic of the Philippines; and
(3) as a consequence, OCT No. 291 was cancelled upon final orders of Judge Ostrand.

Be that as it may, the private respondent in G.R. No 81564 is pressed hard to establish the fact that
portions of the property, especially the open spaces referred to in the lower court's writ of
injunction and the private respondent's manifestation of December 14, 1989, and which open
spaces it claims to be outside Maricaban are indeed outside Maricaban (or OCT 291). With respect,
however, to parts thereof on which Fort Bonifacio, Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ninoy Aquino
International Airport, Nayong Pilipino, Population Commission, National Science and Development
Board, and National Housing Authority sit, the hands of the private respondent are tied.

Claims that Judge Ostrand's decree was a counterfeit is not only self-serving, it finds no support
from the records. The presumption is "that official duty has been regularly performed,"[8] and the
burden is on the private respondent to prove irregular performance. The barren insistence that
Judge Ostrand's order was a forgery is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption. To begin with,
the act of forgery has been seasonably disputed by the petitioners. Secondly, the Acting Registrar of
Deeds of Pasig, who supposedly certified to the fake character of Judge Ostrand's order has himself
joined the other petitioners in opposing the reconveyance sought.

(b) The decision in AC-G.R. No. 00293, dismissing the private respondent's petition for the issuance
of a new owner's copy of OCT No. 291, a dismissal affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 69834, also
militates against the return of the property to the heirs of Delfin Casal. The Appellate Court's
judgment, a judgment sustained by this Court, operates as, at the very least, the law of the case
between the parties, that OCT No. 291 has been cancelled and the land covered has been
conveyed and ceded to the National Government. The fact that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 dealt
with a petition for issuance of lost owner's duplicate copy is no argument because be that as it
may, the private respondent can not rightfully say that the heirs of Delfin Casal still have title to
the land. If it can not secure a new owner's copy, it can mean that they have lost title thereto.
(c) The principle of res judicata is also a bar to the instant proceedings. It should be noted that in
G.R. No. 69834, Mr. Domingo Palomares prayed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered it is most respectfully prayed to the most Honorable Supreme
Court, that in the name of law, justice and fair play, to prevent and frustrate "land-grabbing" by the
government, decision be rendered:

FIRST, That a thorough review of the aforementioned resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court
be made;

SECOND, That after due consideration, the resolution subject of review be set aside based on the
aforestated assignment of error;

THIRD, That the Order of the Lower Court dated Jan. 19, 1977 be affirmed as the lawful and valid
order;

FOURTH, To erase all doubts by declaring OCT No. 291 as continuously and existing validly against
the whole world;

FIFTH, Clearing OCT No. 291 of all adverse claims, since the herein petitioners are the true and
legally declared heirs; and

SIXTH, Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasig Rizal to issue the Owner's Duplicate Copy of OCT No.
291.

Petitioner-Appellant further prays for other just and equitable reliefs.***

When we therefore denied that petition, we, in effect, held that reconstitution (of lost duplicate
owner's copy) was not possible because the mother title (OCT No. 291) had been duly cancelled.
And when we therefore declared OCT No. 291 to have been cancelled, we perished all doubts as to
the invalidity of Mr. Palomares' pretenses of title to Maricaban. Our judgment was conclusive not
only as to Mr. Palomares, but also as to the existing status of the property. As we have held:

The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is barred by the final judgment rendered in
the previous case of Tuason & Co. vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal. The reason is plain: if the herein appellants really had a preferential right to a conveyance of
the land from J.M. Tuason & Co., or if the certi-ficate of (Torrens) title held by Tuason & Co. were
truly void and ineffective, then these facts should have been pleaded by these appellants in the
previous case (Q-4275), since such facts, if true, constituted a defense to the claim of Tuason & Co.
for recovery of possession. If appellants failed to plead such defenses in that previous case, they are
barred from litigating the same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a well established rule that as
between the same parties and on the same subject and cause of action, a final judgment is
conclusive not only on matters directly adjudicated, but also as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto.[9]
II

Did the respondent judge, in issuing the order, dated October 12, 1987, commit a grave abuse of
discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction?

The Court has no doubt that Judge Velez is here guilty of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari. As above-stated, what he gave away, by virtue of
reconveyance, was property that inalienably belongs to the Government or its successors. Worse,
he gave away property without notice to the actual possessors, that is, the present registered
owner. It is beyond debate, as we have indicated, that the land had been, since the cancellation of
OCT No. 291, parcelled out to a succession of buyers and owners. In the absence of notice, it
acquired no jurisdiction to decree redelivery or reconveyance. It is well-established that owners of
property over which reconveyance is asserted are indispensable parties, without whom no relief is
available and without whom the court can render no valid judgment.[10]

Furthermore, the present holders of the land in question are innocent purchasers for value, or
presumed to be so in the absence of contrary evidence, against whom reconveyance does not
lie.[11]

The respondent judge can not conceal his faults behind arguments that he did not intend to convey the
premises, but rather, to secure, allegedly, vacant portions thereof from interlopers. First, this is not
stated in his order. Second, that order is clear and unequivocal that Domingo Palomares has the right
"(t)o sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of any area or areas or portion or portions thereof
..."[12] Third and last, the security of the property is the lookout of the claimants, and not the court's. In
case the premises the respondent judge's injunctive writ have been directed belong to others, let them
air their plaints.

The Court is also agreed that the challenged order was issued with no benefit of trial or hearing.
The private respondent can not validly rely on AC-G.R. No. 00293 as the "trial or hearing" to justify
the issuance of its said order, in the first place, because it is a different proceeding. But above all,
the private respondent itself says that AC-G.R. CV No. 00293 can not be made a basis for denying
reconveyance because "the ... petition was merely for the issuance of a new owner's duplicate
copy..."[13] Accordingly, it can not invoke that case and yet, repudiate its effects. It is the height of
contradiction.

It was also grave error for the lower court to deny the Solicitor General's notice of appeal. The
Government had all the right to appeal because: (1) the order of October 12, 1987 was in the
nature of a final judgment, as "final judgment" is known in law (however it is captioned), that is to
say, one that "finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in the
trial court;"[14] (2) it did not merely maintain the status quo, but allowed Mr. Domingo Palomares
to transact on the property by near-right of dominion over it.

Judge Velez had therefore no reason, indeed, excuse, to deny the Government's notice of appeal.
What is plain is the fact that Judge Velez was hell-bent, so to speak, in blocking the Government's
efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it.
What has obviously been lost on the parties, Judge Velez in particular, is the established principle
that injunction does not lie "to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place
it into that of another."[15] In this wise it has also been held:

It is a well established doctrine in this jurisdiction that an injunction is not the proper remedy for the
recovery of possession of real estate and the improvements thereon, as well as for the ejectments
therefrom of the actual occupants who claim to have title to or material interest therein. The use of
said remedy in such cases has invariably been considered unjustified, in open violation of the legal
presumption that the bona fide possessor of a certain piece of land and improvements thereon,
holds the same under claim of ownership and with a just title, and as an advanced concession of the
remedy to which the claimant might be entitled. (Citations omitted)[16]

xxx xxx x x.x

Injunction, moreover, is an extraordinary remedy. It lies only in certain cases, to wit:

Sec. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction.-- A preliminary injunction may be granted at
any time after the commencement of the action and before judgment when it is established:

(a) That the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission or conti-nuance of some act complained of during the litigation or the
non-performance thereof would probably work injustice to the plaintiff; or

(c) That the defendant is doing, threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the subject of the action, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.[17]

xxx xxx xxx

The conspicuous and unusual zeal with which Judge Francisco Velez now defends his acts[18] has
not escaped us. His honor should have borne in mind that in proceedings under Rule 65 of the
Rules, such as the present cases, the judge is included only as a nominal party. Unless otherwise
ordained by this Court, he is not called upon to answer or comment on the petition, but rather, the
private respondent. It is indeed distressing to note that it is the very judge who has taken the
cudgels for the latter in defending its interests, when he, the judge, should have remained a neutral
magistrate. Res ipsa loquitor.[19] He must get his just deserts.

III The Court thus closes the long-drawn tale of Hacienda de Maricaban. In this connection, let trial
judges be cautioned on the indiscriminate disposition of our dwindling natural resources to private
persons. Accordingly, we grant G.R. No. 81564 and dismiss G.R. No. 90176, and so also, end what
has come down as nearly a century of uncertainty, doubt, and conflict Maricaban has left in its trail.
The Court has finally spoken. Let the matter rest.

WHEREFORE:
1. The petition in G.R. No. 81564 is GRANTED:

(a) The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by our Resolution, dated April 13, 1988, enjoining the
respondent judge from enforcing his: (i) order of October 12, 1987 and (ii) the follow-up order of
October 23, 1987, is made permanent; and

(b) Original Certificate of Title No. 291 is declared duly CANCELLED;

2. The petition in G.R. No. 90176 is DISMISSED; and

3. Judge Francisco Velez is ordered to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt
with for giving away, by virtue of reconveyance, property that inalienably belongs to the
Government, without notice to the registered owner, and without benefit of trial or hearing; for
blocking Government efforts to defend what rightfully belongs to it; and for filing his comment of
June 17, 1988 and supplemental comment of August 26, 1988 without express leave of court.

Costs against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

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