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Thayer Consultancy Background Briefing:

ABN # 65 648 097 123


South China Sea: China-Vietnam
Standoff the Silence is Deafening
Carlyle A. Thayer
July18, 2019

Q1. Regarding the standoff between China and Vietnam Coast Guards in the South
China Sea, some analysts have questioned why Vietnam has not responded directly or
not responded at all. Your Background Brief on this topic stated that ‘’there is
definitely something going on and Vietnam seems to have reacted strongly.’’
We request your assessment how Vietnam did react, and the reason why you think it
was a strong reaction?
ANSWER: The assessment “there is definitely something going on and Vietnam seems
to have reacted strongly” were the views of my client, who is usually well-informed.
These remarks refer to the confrontation between four Vietnam Coast Guard ships
and two China Coast Guard ships (one a 10,000-ton behemoth) and a seismic survey
vessel. Although the Vietnam Coast Guard ships are much lighter in weight, they are
reported to have stood their ground.
Subsequent unverified unofficial accounts in the Vietnamese language social media
report that there has been a series of ramming incidents between the opposing Coast
Guards and that the Vietnam Coast Guard was better prepared than in 2014.
Q2. In the event the reports of a standoff between Chinese and Vietnamese Coast
Guards are confirmed by the Vietnamese government and news media, do you think
there will be widespread anti-China protests similar in scale to the anti-China protests
that broke out last year when the National Assembly considered the draft Law on
Special Administrative and Economic Zones? Given the fact the Vietnam has widen its
crackdown on dissidents, many analysts will say that it’s unlikely that major protests
will occur. What is your assessment?
ANSWER: The crackdown on dissidents was aimed at a few individuals who expressed
their views on social media. The mass protests that erupted last year in relation to the
draft Law on Special Administrative and Economic Zones went viral after rumours
spread that Chinese commercial interests would be given ninety-nine-year leases in
areas sensitive to national security. In other words, the anti-Chian protests were
spontaneous, largely leaderless and more like a social movement.
While the new Law on Cyber Security will have a chilling effect on protests, the law
will be insufficient to prevent spontaneous mass public protests across Vietnam. I have
read one report by a blogger, who posted detailed reports of the so-called standoff,
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that his Facebook account was disrupted. The. Vietnamese government, however, will
not be able to block coverage of the standoff on social media if and when more details
become public.
Q3. What do you think President Xi Jinping meant to imply when he reiterated to
Nguyễn Thị Kim Ngân, Vietnam’s Chair of National Assembly, that the two countries
should ‘’safeguard maritime peace and stability with concrete actions’’? What are the
concrete actions referred to, and what concrete actions does he expect the
government of Vietnam to take?
ANSWER: China has always tried to get Vietnam to join with it in joint ventures as a
means of getting around Vietnam’s legal claims to sovereign jurisdiction over the
marine and seabed resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental
shelf. By “concrete actions” China also means that Vietnam should not make public
claims about its “indisputable sovereignty” to land features and waters in the East Sea
(South China Sea). In other words, Hanoi should acquiesce to China’s claims by
refraining from physical confrontations and making public Vietnam’s claims to
indisputable sovereignty.
Q4. What would you recommend that the Vietnamese government do with respect to
this standoff – officially as well as with respect to giving guiidance to the Vietnamese
media on how to report on this given the fact that this topicalready has been widely
discussed on social media?
ANSWER: Under UNCLOS, China cannot undertake hydrographic surveys in Vietnam’s
EEZ without prior permission.
First, the spokesperson of Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs should issue a.
detailed statement of what has actually taken place in the South China Sea since 3 July
when a Chinese survey ship commenced operations in Vietnam’s EEZ.
Second, Vietnam should also provide details of its response via diplomatic channels in
Hanoi and Beijing. Did Vietnam make a formal protest, if so, what were the legal and
political grounds for this protest?
Third, Vietnam should also provide details of what instructions were issued to the
Vietnam Coast Guard ships on station and what messages they exchanged with the
China Coast Guard. Vietnam should indicate what steps it advocates to resolve this
reported standoff peacefully; has China indicated a willingness to discuss this issue.
Fourth, Vietnam should call on regional states and other members of the international
community to support Vietnam in upholding its rights under UNCLOS.
Finally, Vietnam should remove any restrictions on its media and domestic press on
factually reporting these developments. The media should be free to contact domestic
and foreign experts for their views and opinions on this serious issue. Indeed, Vietnam
should invite the foreign media to embark on Vietnam Coast Guard ships in the area
to present a visual eye witness account of daily developments.
Vietnam should also reiterate that this is precisely the type of incident the ASEAN-
China South China Sea Code of Conduct is designed to prevent and/or resolve.
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Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea: China Vietnam Standoff the
Silence is Deafening,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, July 18, 2019. All
background briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.

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