Analysis
November 9, 2010
Summary: Electoral failure,
which constitutes a major op-
portunity for parties to renew
their leaders in other democratic
systems, does not serve the
same function in Turkish politics.
Instead, leaders successfully
argue that they cannot leave the
party leadership vacant under
such difficult circumstances.
Over the years, in many democ-
racies, countervailing powers,
practices and understandings
developed to protect against the
retention of power by party lead-
ers. However, there continue to
be a number of factors that pro-
mote such oligarchic practices
in Turkey. These include the high
concentration of party power at
the center, parties’ dependence
on public funds, and centralized
decisions regarding election
candidates.
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Party Oligarchy: Why Turkish Political
Parties Fail to Change Their Leaders
by İlter Turan
On October 17, the Felicity Party of
Turkey elected Necmettin Erbakan as
its new president. This move may have
appeared unusual to many observers,
for Mr. Erbakan is 84 years old. In
Turkish politics, being party president
is a highly demanding job, and yet
television footage of him showed a frail
man who needed help to rise from his
seat and walk.
It is equally unusual that the party
had held its regular convention
only a couple of months earlier and
had re-elected a young academic,
Numan Kurtulmuş, as its president.
Dr. Kurtulmuş had refused, however,
to include Mr. Erbakan’s son, some
of his relatives, and members of his
inner circle of cronies in the list he
proposed for the party executive
committee, thereby arousing Mr.
Erbakan’s displeasure. Mr. Erbakan
mobilized his supporters to challenge
the results of the convention in court,
alleging procedural irregularities, and
succeeded in forcing an extraordinary
party convention. Before the conven-
tion was held, however, Mr. Kurtulmuş
resigned, taking away with him many
of the provincial party chiefs and
an important number of members.
Within two weeks, he had established
the People’s Voice Party. Who would
run for the now vacant presidency
of Felicity Party, on the other hand,
remained a mystery until the last
moment. Mr. Erbakan’s candidacy
was proposed only when the time for
electing a party chief came during the
convention. He was only three votes
short of being elected unanimously.
Mr. Erbakan has served as the leader
of the National Order Party (1970-
1971), the National Salvation Party
(1973-1981), the Welfare Party (1984-
1998), and the Felicity Party (2003-
2004). This string of parties shared
similar political and philosophical
leanings that included an expanded
role for religion in public life and
politics. All but the currently active
Felicity Party have been proscribed
by the Constitutional Court for using
religion for political purposes. Under
his leadership, these parties have had a
mixed record in elections, been part of
coalition governments and the opposi-
tion, and witnessed mass departures
from the party in order to establish
a highly successful new party that
achieved an electoral majority in the
first election it constested. Mr. Erbakan
headed these parties except when he
was legally unable to do so, as in the
case of the Felicity Party after 2004
when he was convicted of having spent
Welfare Party funds without being able
to account for them.
Analysis
The story of Necmettin Erbakan recounted above may be
more colorful than those of other party leaders but is by
no means unique. Turkish political parties traditionally
experience great difficulty in changing leaders. Electoral
failure, which constitutes a major opportunity for parties to
renew their leaders in other democratic systems, does not
serve the same function in Turkish politics. Instead, leaders
successfully argue that they cannot leave the party leader-
ship vacant under such difficult circumstances. When the
electoral outcome is found to be satisfactory, it is naturally
the leader’s achievement. As they move along in years, long
service to the party and experience are cited as justifica-
tions for keeping their jobs although their energies may be
dwindling visibly. Why is it so difficult for Turkish political
parties to change their leaders and what are the side effects
of their longevities?
Oligarchic Propensities
In the early 20th century, Swiss-German sociologist Roberto
Michels identified the proclivity of leaders, in particular
those of organizations with egalitarian beginnings such as
the German Social Democratic Party, to pursue a number
of policies intended to render their leadership indispensable
and unchallenged. Michels recognized that party leaders,
by getting elected to the top position, acquired power,
status, and material comforts that they were unwilling to
lose. Over the years, in many democracies, countervailing
powers, practices, and understandings developed to protect
against the retention of power by party leaders. However,
there continue to be a number of factors that promote such
oligarchic practices in Turkey.
To begin with, the organizational structure of Turkish
political parties, reflecting the administrative traditions of
the country, is heavily centralized. The national organs of
political parties have the power to remove elected officials
of local branches and appoint whomever they prefer. This
is justified — as with the national administrative system,
where centrally appointed governors can remove elected
mayors from their positions — on the grounds of main-
taining unity, coherence, and control so that local-level
officials do not conduct disapproved activities for which the
national bodies may be held accountable. While this may
sound reasonable at first sight, it produces highly problem-
atic outcomes. Local party organizations are seen by the
voters as extensions of the center, not as effective grassroots
2
organizations through which citizens can bring significant
inputs into the political process. Few, therefore, aspire to
join political parties. Links between Turkish political parties
and society at large are, as a result, rather weak. Local
party activists tend to be limited to few individuals whose
function is to represent the central organs of the party at
the local level. Conversely, when the national leadership
senses a challenge taking shape in the periphery against its
dominant position, it moves to change the leadership of
local branches from which such a challenge emanates. The
national organs may even choose to free themselves from
the inconvenience of having active and assertive provincial
organizations by limiting the number of members they
accept. Turkey has seen at least one political party that
limited the number of members a subprovincial branch
could accept to 149 to escape the legal necessity of holding a
convention if the number reached 150.
The imbalance between national
organs and local organizations
has allowed the former to make
key decisions on candidates for
national and local office.
The national or central organs of political parties have also
been strengthened in recent decades by government grants
to major political parties. Based on the percentage of the
vote a party has received in the preceding national elections
and the number of deputies a party has in the parliament,
the government annually transfers public funds to political
parties. The amount is tripled in an election year. Ostensibly
serving to prevent the domination of political parties by
private interests, these grants render parties less dependent
on fundraising from supporters, free the national leadership
from relying on local party organizations for financial assis-
tance, and also make the latter dependent upon national
organs as a source of funds.
The imbalance between national organs and local organi-
zations has allowed the former to make key decisions on
candidates for national and local office. The laws contain
Analysis
provisions that allow for primary elections within parties to
determine candidates and what rank these candidates will
occupy in multi-member district tickets where winners are
determined on the basis of proportional representation. But
the weakness of local organizations and the desire of the
center to consolidate its superiority renders candidate desig-
nation almost exclusively the leader’s prerogative. Aspiring
candidates ingratiate themselves to the leader rather than
search for local support to be placed on the ticket. Many do
not have an independent power base but rely on the leader
for their electoral successes. In this way, a circle of politi-
cians forms around the leader whose prosperity depends
on their staying in favor with him. Needless to say, for these
individuals, the changing of a leader is a threat to their
power and prosperity. By way of example, in the RPP, which
changed its leader recently (Cf. On Turkey, June 14, 2010),
a battle between the new leader and his team and those in
positions of power under the old leadership is currently
gathering momentum.
Finally, it should be pointed out that the closing down of
parties by military governments and by the Constitutional
Court has also unintentionally strengthened the power
position of leaders by making them heroes in the eyes of
their supporters.
An Unchanged Party System
What are the consequences of the failure of parties to
change their leaders? First, it has made it difficult for
parties to adjust to changing social, economic, and political
conditions. Changing leaders, after all, is one of the most
effective ways for organizations to bring about change. But
the difficulties of pursuing such a path have been cited as
a major reason for the weakness of Turkey’s opposition
parties. Second, if a leader is forced to leave his position as a
result of legal struggles or personal faults, he leaves behind
a group of loyalists who crave for his return. Through them,
the departed leader can continue to wield power in the
party. If his replacement exceeds the role of a proxy, then he
is challenged by the loyalists. Finally, an inability to change
leaders promotes the fragmentation of parties since those
who advocate such a change of leadership inevitably leave to
establish a new one. The case of the Felicity Party illustrates
all of these points, but it would be a mistake to think that
the phenomenon is confined to one party. It permeates the
entire party system.
3
İlter Turan, Professor, Bilgi University
İlter Turan is currently a professor of political science at Istanbul’s Bilgi
University, where he also served as president between 1998-2001. His
previous employment included professorships at Koç University (1993-
1998) and Istanbul University (1964-1993), where he also served as the
chair of the International Relations Department (1987-1993), and the
director of the Center for the Study of the Balkans and the Middle East
(1985-1993). Dr. Turan is the past president of the Turkish Political
Science Association and has been a member of the Executive Commit-
tee and a vice president of the International Political Science Associa-
tion (2000-2006). He has served as the program chair of the 21st World
Congress of Political Science in Santiago, Chile, July 12-16, 2009. He is
board chair of the Health and Education Foundation and serves on the
board of several foundations and corporations. He is widely published
in English and Turkish on comparative politics, Turkish politics, and
foreign policy. His most recent writings have been on the domestic and
international politics of water, the Turkish parliament and its members,
and Turkish political parties. He is a frequent commentator on Turkish
politics on TV and newspapers.
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reaction.
Analysis