BPI Investment Corp. v. CA cigarettes. Convinced of the feasibility of the venture, Rosales readily agreed.

Under their agreement, Rosales would give the money needed to buy the cigarettes
 Credit transactions: Loan (Mutuum): A loan contract is not a consensual while Liwanag and Tabligan would act as her agents, with a corresponding 40%
contract but a real contract. It is perfected upon delivery of the object of the commission to her if the goods are sold; otherwise the money would be returned to
contract.
Rosales. Consequently, Rosales gave several cash advances to Liwanag and
 Obligations and contracts: Reciprocal Obligations: It is a basic principle in
reciprocal obligations that neither party incurs in delay, if the other does not Tabligan amounting to P633, 650.00.
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent
upon him. During the first two months, Liwanag and Tabligan made periodic visits to Rosales
to report on the progress of the transactions. The visits, however, suddenly stopped,
Facts: Frank Roa obtained a loan at 16.25% interest rate per annum from Ayala and all efforts by Rosales to obtain information regarding their business proved
Investment and Development Corporation. For security, Roa's house and lot were futile.
mortgaged. Later, Roa sold the house and lot to ALS and Antonio Litonjua, who
assumed Roa's debt to Ayala Investment. Ayala Investment, however, granted a new
loan to be applied to Roa's debt, secured by the same property at a different interest Alarmed by this development and believing that the amounts she advanced were
rate of 20% per annum. When ALS and Litonjua failed to pay, BPIIC, successor to being misappropriated, Rosales filed a case of estafa against Liwanag.
Ayala Investment, filed for foreclosure of mortgage.
The trial court found Liwanag guilty as charged and was ordered to reimburse
Issue: W/N a contract of loan is a consensual contract? complainant which the CA affirmed. Petitioner’s motion was denied hence, the
petition.
Held: A loan contract is not a consensual contract but a real contract. It is perfected
upon delivery of the object of the contract. Although a perfected consensual contract
Held: Estafa is a crime committed by a person who defrauds another causing him to
can give rise to an action for damages, it does not constitute a real contract which
suffer damages, by means of unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, or of false
requires delivery for perfection. A perfected real contract gives rise only to
pretences of fraudulent acts.
obligations on the part of the borrower.
From the foregoing, the elements of estafa are present, as follows: (1) that the
In the present case, the loan contract was only perfected on the date of the second
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or deceit; and (2) that damage or
release of the loan. A contract of loan involves a reciprocal obligation, wherein the
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
obligation or promise of each party is the consideration for that of the other. It is a
party, [3] and it is essential that there be a fiduciary relation between them either in
basic principle in reciprocal obligations that neither party incurs in delay, if the other
the form of a trust, commission or administration
does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is
The language of the receipt could not be any clearer. It indicates that the money
incumbent upon him. Only when a party has performed his part of the contract can
delivered to Liwanag was for a specific purpose, that is, for the purchase of
he demand that the other party also fulfils his own obligation and if the latter fails,
cigarettes, and in the event the cigarettes cannot be sold, the money must be returned
default sets in.
to Rosales.

Decision: The payment of amortization should accrue from the time BPIIC released
Thus, even assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and
the loan amount to ALS and Litonjua because it was only at that time (the delivery of
between the parties, we have ruled that when money or property have been received
the amount -- the object of the contract) that the loan contract was perfected.
by a partner for a specific purpose (such as that obtaining in the instant case) and he
later misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa.
Liwanag vs CA

Facts: Petitioner Liwanag and a certain Thelma Tabligan went to the house of
complainant Rosales and asked her to join them in the business of buying and selling
Neither can the transaction be considered a loan, since in a contract of loan once the
money is received by the debtor, ownership over the same is transferred. Being the
owner, the borrower can dispose of it for whatever purpose he may deem proper.
In the instant petition, however, it is evident that Liwanag could not dispose of the
money as she pleased because it was only delivered to her for a single purpose,
namely, for the purchase of cigarettes, and if this was not possible then to return the
money to Rosales. Since in this case there was no transfer of ownership of the
money delivered, Liwanag is liable for conversion under Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.
Equitable vs NG
Facts: In the late 1990s, PCPCI sought to convert 280 hectares of its Polo estate in
Tanjay into a special economic zone under the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA). On 1998, PEZA issued a resolution favorably recommending the
conversion of the Polo estate into an ecozone subject to certain terms and conditions
including the submission of "all government clearances, endorsements and
documents required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement RA 7916."
The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its agricultural lands
into mixed residential, commercial and industrial lands with the municipal
government of Tanjay. After conducting the prescribed hearing, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Tanjay adopted a resolution granting PCPCI's application.
When Tanjay became a city, its Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted a resolution
approving Tanjay's Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance where
PCPCI's real properties, including the Polo estate, were reclassified as mixed
residential, commercial and industrial lands.
Sometime in 2003, petitioner DAR notified PCPCI that 394.9020 hectares of the
Polo estate had been placed under the CARP and would be acquired by the
government.
Thereafter, DAR’s Leonidas requested the Registrar of Deeds of Negros Oriental to
cancel PCPCI's certificate of title and to issue a new one in the name of the Republic
of the Philippines. He likewise asked Region VII Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Arrieta to determine the just compensation due to PCPCI.
On 2004, a new certificate of title was issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. The next day, that title was cancelled and another was issued in the
name of petitioners.
Meanwhile, on March 11, 2004, Arrieta approved the land valuation of the Land
Bank of the Philippines for the Polo estate. PCPCI moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.
On July 16, 2004, Leonidas informed PCPCI that a relocation survey of the Polo
estate would be conducted. PCPCI moved for the suspension of the survey but it was
denied.
Aggrieved, PCPCI filed a petition for certiorari in the CA asserting that the DAR
acted with grave abuse of discretion in placing the Polo estate under the CARP. It
argued that the Polo estate should not be subjected to the CARP because Resolution
No. 16 had already designated it as mixed residential, commercial and industrial
land. Moreover, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified to receive land under the
CARP.
In its February 16, 2005 decision, the CA found that the Polo estate was no longer
agricultural land when the DAR placed it under the CARP in view of Resolution No.
16. Furthermore, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified beneficiaries as they
were not tenants of PCPCI.
The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate under Resolution No. 16
as mixed residential, commercial and industrial land did not place it beyond the
reach of the CARP. Petitioners-beneficiaries, on the other hand, insist that they were
qualified beneficiaries. While they were neither farmers nor regular farmworkers of
PCPCI, they were either seasonal or other farmworkers.
Held: NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He determines whether a tract of land is covered
by or exempt from CARP. Likewise, questions regarding the eligibility of CARP
beneficiaries must be addressed to him. The DAR Secretary decides to whom lands
placed under the CARP shall be distributed.
Before PCPCI filed its petition for certiorari in the CA, it did not file a protest or
opposition questioning the propriety of subjecting the Polo estate to the CARP.
Neither did it assail the eligibility of petitioners-beneficiaries before the DAR
Secretary. There were available administrative remedies under the DARAB Rules
but PCPCI did not avail of them.
Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants of the
landowners. Thus, the DAR cannot be deemed to have committed grave abuse of
discretion simply because its chosen beneficiaries were not tenants of PCPCI.
TCTs and Certificate of Land Ownership Award are valid.

NON-CONVERSION TO MIXED RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL AND

INDUSTRIAL LAND

The approval of the DAR for the conversion of agricultural land into an industrial
estate is a condition precedent for its conversion into an ecozone. A proposed
ecozone cannot be considered for Presidential Proclamation unless the landowner
first submits to PEZA a land use conversion clearance certificate from the DAR.
This PCPCI failed to do.

This condition proves that the favorable recommendation of PEZA did not ipso facto
change the nature of the Polo estate. The property remained as agricultural land and,
for this reason, was still subject to the CARP.

In fact, Resolution No. 16 did not exempt PCPCI's agricultural lands from the
CARP. Section 20 of the LGC provides that a city or municipality can reclassify land
only through the enactment of an ordinance. In this instance, reclassification was
undertaken by mere resolution; thus, it was invalid.

QUALIFICATION OF CARP BENEFICIARIES

A basic qualification of a beneficiary is his willingness, aptitude and ability to

cultivate and make the land as productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system
of monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so that any beneficiary
guilty of negligence or misuse of the land or any support extended to him shall
forfeit his right to continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic
reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council.

This provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries of the CARP. Determining
whether or not one is eligible to receive land involves the administrative
implementation of the program. For this reason, only the DAR Secretary can identify
and select CARP beneficiaries. Thus, courts cannot substitute their judgment unless
there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.