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ABSTRACT:
This paper presents a performance-based design for a hypothetical case study of a 4-storey
shopping centre that contains malls, specialty shops, major stores, food-court, cinemas,
atrium and interconnecting floor voids.
The design strategy to achieve the fire safety objectives for the case study includes the
following key elements and measures:
• A sound fire safety management of the building to control fire start and occupant
evacuation.
• An effective sprinkler system to control the fire growth in the building.
• A reliable natural smoke venting system at the roof to allow smoke to vent from
shopping centre through the interconnecting floor voids. Mall is therefore designed as
a safe place.
• Use of normally used circulation paths, external open stairs and escalators for egress
purposes.
• Staged evacuation of the mall to minimise business disruption.
• Shutters to the entries of the majors and cinema complex designed to prevent smoke
spread.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed design against each of the fire safety
objectives, fire and evacuation modelling of the shopping centre were conducted. The
modelling and analysis results are presented.
In this paper, it is demonstrated that each of the design brief objectives including, occupant
safety, fire brigade safety, minimising fire and smoke spread; and minimising business
disruption is achieved.
1
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper presents a performance-based fire safety design of a hypothetical case study. The
design brief for one of three case studies formulated by the SFPE International Conference
organiser and is provided to representatives of various countries participating in the
conference so that they may each formulate a performance-based design.
This paper presents a design that represents the participation from Australia.
The performance-based fire safety analysis and design is to meet the following fire and life
safety goals:
1) Safeguard occupants from injury due to fire until they reach a safe place.
2) Safeguard fire fighters whilst performing rescue operations or attacking the fire.
3) Minimise smoke and fire spread inside the building.
4) Limit the impact on business continuity.
The initial shopping centre case study building section and floor plans as identified in the
project brief are shown in the following figures.
Atrium
Floor void L3
L2
L1
L0
2
LEGEND
L3
cinemas
2
specialty shop (< 2000 m )
food
court
mall space
floor void
kids office
play
L2
L1
entry/exit
entry/exit
L0
entry/exit
3
2 PERFORMANCE-BASED DESIGN IN AUSTRALIA
2.1 Background
Performance-based fire safety design for buildings was formally introduced exactly 20 years
ago in the Building Code of Australia 1996 (BCA 96).
BCA 96 was launched subsequent to a major research program by the Fire Code Reform
Centre (FCRC) which was established in 1994 as a joint initiative between the Australian
Government, industry and research organisations. Its mission was to develop a cost-effective,
engineered approach to fire safety design and reform the building code based on similar
principles. It contained 6 projects as follows:
• Project 1: Restructure the BCA Fire Provisions
• Project 2: Fire Performance Requirements for Lining Materials
• Project 3: Fire Resistance and Non-Combustibility Requirements
• Project 4: Alternative Fire Safety System Design Solutions for the BCA
• Project 5A: Fire Engineering Guidelines
• Project 5B: Fire Safety Design Code
• Project 6: Fire Safety in Low-Rise Shopping Centres
These 6 projects played a significant part in forming the BCA as it currently stands today.
Much of the performance-based design approach currently used in Australia is the outcome
of the FCRC Projects.
Document Relevance
BCA 2016 This is the latest building code in Australia which continues the performance
design approach introduced in BCA 96.
In this case study, the Objectives and Performance Requirements of the BCA,
together with the Design Brief objectives, will form part the basis of the
building design. The prescriptive design for the case study is also discussed.
FCRC 5A (IFEG) The International Fire Engineering Guideline (IFEG) 2005 is the main
guidance document for fire engineering design in Australia. It is a revision of
the original Fire Engineering Guideline developed in the FCRC Project 5A. In
this case study, the fire safety sub-systems outlined in IFEG are used as the
framework to develop the design strategy.
FCRC 6 FCRC Project 6 (FCRC Project 6) relates to fire safety design of shopping
centres specifically and is directly related to the case being studied.
In this case study, the research findings and recommendations of FCRC
Project 6 are used in the design of the shopping centre.
4
3 FIRE SAFETY OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN APPROACH
The objectives for design for fire safety set out in the BCA may be summarised in the figure
below.
A comparison of the Design Brief and BCA objectives are given below.
An overall comparison shows that the Design Brief Objectives are more demanding than the
BCA Objectives and would result in a more onerous design outcome.
In this paper, Design Brief Objectives are used as the basis for evaluation of the performance
of the case study. Given that there is no adjacent building located in the vicinity of the
shopping centre, BCA Objective 3 and 4 need not be considered. Hence, it can be regarded
that BCA Objectives are achieved when the Design Brief Objectives are satisfied.
5
3.2 Solution Approaches
The BCA sets out Performance Requirements that building solutions must comply with. The
compliance of Performance Requirements may be achieved by means of a Performance
Solution or a Deemed-to-Satisfy (DtS) Solution as shown in the figure below.
In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, the Performance Requirements of the BCA will not
be further discussed; rather, they are considered to be fully encompassed by the design
objectives. The proposed solution is considered acceptable if it is demonstrated to satisfy the
fire safety objectives discussed in the previous section.
Thus, the evaluation of the proposed design will be presented later in this paper against the
design objectives, as opposed to against the Performance Requirements, as those typically
carried out in the performance-based designs of buildings in Australia.
Nevertheless, some of the general BCA DtS requirements for the building are outlined
below. Specific aspects in relation to BCA Prescribed Solutions in relation to this case
study are also discussed.
The key requirements and BCA parameters pertaining to this case study are
summarised in the following table.
6
Fire Safety Systems Governing Building BCA DtS Requirements
Parameters
Fire Resistance Building Class = 6 (retail) Type of construction = A
and 9b (cinemas) Min FRL = 180/180/180 (class 6)
Rise in storeys = 4 Min FRL = 120/120/120 (class 9b)
L3
L2
L1
L0
FRL of 180/180/180 for Smoke exhaust required Various atrium provisions apply
retail use (class 6) mall and major store due to interconnection of 4 levels
Figure 5 General BCA DtS Requirements
7
4 AUSTRALIAN RESEARCH ON FIRE SAFETY OF SHOPPING CENTRES
For each centre visited, interviews were conducted with operational staff to understand their
approach to a variety of matters and to obtain a general overview of practices and
construction.
8
4.4 Fire Statistics
In ref [8], the statistical data on USA retail fires attended by the fire brigade were analysed.
These data, contained in the NFIRS database, includes 10 years (1983 to 1993 excluding
1986) of data and represents 77,996 retail fires. A further study was carried out on data
available from Australia. A comparison of the data indicates that similar trends are
demonstrated between the USA and Australian data.
The statistical data shows that fire in retail premises does not present a significant risk to life.
There were 86 deaths in 77,996 retail fires over 10 years in the USA.
As a result of these tests, 3 types of fire were identified according to their size:
C1—fires which are kept small without the presence of sprinklers.
C2—fires controlled by the presence of sprinklers.
C3—fires which are significantly more severe than C1 and C2.
The heat release rate obtained from an unsprinklered fire test (Test 4) for a specialty shop is
shown in the figure below.
60
50
Heat Release Rate (MW)
40
Specialty shop fire
30
Test 4
20
10
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Time (min)
Figure 7 Heat release rate obtained from an unsprinklered fire test
9
For the purpose of this case study, fire sizes are assumed as follows:
• C2 fire in retail enclosure (specialty shop or major store) = fast t2 fire plateaus at 2.0
MW
• C2 fire in mall area (atrium void) = fast t2 fire plateaus at 5 MW
• C3 fire is considered to be the unsprinklered fire in a specialty as shown in the figure
above (maximum heat release rate of 46.5 MW)
Since that time, further evaluation and testing have been conducted and the design principles
and procedures given in the above publications have been extended and published in [12].
The findings and recommendations from FCRC 6 and [12] are utilised in this paper to
formulate the performance-based solution for the case study. This is discussed in the next
section of this paper.
10
5 PROPOSED PERFORMANCE SOLUTION
For this case study, the IFEG sub-systems are used as the framework for developing the
design strategy to fulfil the Design Brief and BCA fire safety objectives for the building. This
is summarised in the following table.
11
5.2 Design Principles
Design principles were developed utilising the research findings of FCRC 6 and are
summarised in the table below.
SS-A • Specific management plans and procedures are to be put in place by the shopping
centre management to control the use and activities within the building.
• Sufficient fire extinguishers are to be provided for occupants to fight small fires within
the retail areas.
SS-B • In the event of a sprinkler controlled fire (C2) anywhere in the centre:
o all main egress paths in the centre are to remain tenable indefinitely.
o smoke spread is limited.
• In the event of sprinkler controlled fire (C2) in a major store or the cinema complex:
o the smoke produced is to be limited from spreading into the adjoining mall.
• In the event of an unsprinkler controlled fire (C3) in the centre:
o all main egress paths are to remain tenable for the expected duration of evacuation
using the paths.
SS-C • Spread of fire from the area or enclosure of fire origin is to be prevented.
• Collapse of multi-level building structure is to be prevented.
SS-D • Sufficient means of detection and warning the occupants are to be provided
throughout the building.
• The sprinkler system is to be reliable and commensurate with the hazard.
12
5.3 Design details
Design details and the corresponding rationale are given in Appendix A and some key details
are shown below.
Egress
LEGEND
Stairway
L3
cinemas
Doorway food
court
Escalator
kids office
play Entry to cinema
complex and all
major stores to have
shutter automatically
descend to 2 m to
Mall space on each prevent smoke
level is designed as spread and allow
L2
a safe place for occupants to move
evacuation into mall area
Use of open
external
stairways as
primary egress
routes
L1
Use of internal
escalators or open
stairways for
movement
between floors
13
Evacuation zoning
East atrium zone Cinema zone
Central atrium zone
14
5.4 Comparison of DtS Solution and Proposed Performance Solution
Fire Safety Systems BCA DtS Solution Proposed Performance Solution
Fire Resistance Type of construction = A Type of construction = A
Min FRL = 180/180/180 (class 6) Max FRL = 60/60/60 (throughout)
Min FRL = 120/120/120 (class 9b)
Egress Min fire isolated exit per floor = 2 Exits distributed evenly throughout
15
6 EVALUATION AGAINST OBJECTIVE 1 – OCCUPANT SAFETY
6.1 General
In order to evaluate the building with respect to occupant safety, the Proposed Design, as
outlined in the previous section, is modelled using computer programs to simulate the
occupant movement and conditions of the building, particularly the mall spaces, during
various fire scenarios in the building.
The results of the computer analyses are used to determine two time periods for various fire
scenarios, namely:
• Available Safe Egress Time (ASET)
• Required Safety Egress Time (RSET)
The above means that the occupants are able to move to a place of safety before the building
becomes untenable.
For the Proposed Design, the occupants in the centre are not expected to be exposed to the
fire environment for a significant period of time; and the main egress paths in the building
can be considered tenable under the following conditions [17], [18]:
It is noted that, at air temperatures below 100°C, the radiation will be less than 2.5 kW/m2.
Margin of safety of the design is the difference between the ASET and RSET, i.e.:
16
6.2 ASET Analyses
The conditions within the building are examined using the computer program FDS [13],
which is a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) model of fire-driven fluid flow and is
specifically developed for high-level fire engineering analyses. The software solves
numerically a form of the Navier-Stokes equations appropriate for low-speed, thermally-
driven flow with an emphasis on smoke and heat transport from fires.
The model includes four floor levels, the floor voids connecting the floor levels, the proposed
smoke vents and make-up air openings for the mall area.
In order to monitor the conditions within the building during the fire, measurement devices
are placed along the main egress paths at a height of 2 m above the floor on each level within
the models. These include devices to measure air temperatures, CO level, radiant heat and
visibility.
17
Table 2 Fire Scenarios Examined (sensitivity cases)
Fire Scenario Floor Level Fire location Fire Max HRR (MW)
FS04-a Level 0 4 (specialty shop) C2 5.0
FS04-b Level 0 4 (specialty shop) C3 46.5
FS05-a Level 0 5 (specialty shop) C2 5.0
FS05-b Level 0 5 (specialty shop) C3 46.5
2 1
5
L0
3
cinemas
food
court
L3
6
kids office
play
18
Each scenario was analysed for a duration of 1800 s, by which time all occupants would have
moved out of the building (see following section).
The results also show that the air temperatures, CO levels and radiant heat levels within the
building spaces generally stabilise and remain largely unchanged before the end of the
analysis period (refer to graphs in Appendix C). It is therefore expected that they would also
19
remain largely unchanged should the analysis continue for a longer period of time, or even
indefinitely. The following graphs provide a sample of the stabilized ASET results for FS05.
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
Given that the air temperatures, radiant heat levels and CO levels are well below the
tenability limits and their values remain unchanged with time, it can be concluded that the
building spaces would be tenable indefinitely with respect to these three quantities. Hence,
the ASETs for the floor levels may be summarised as shown in the following table.
20
Table 5 ASET for Proposed Design (in seconds)
Criterion L0 L1 L2 L3
Air temperature ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
CO level ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
Radiant heat level ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
It is noted that the results above are compiled from the relevant worst fire scenarios for each
floor level including the sensitivity fire scenarios.
6.3.2 Assumptions
The following general and conservative assumptions are made in the analysis:
• The shopping centre is fully occupied with the FCRC Project 6 recommended
population numbers rather than BCA assumed population, as shown in the following
figure.
21
Level 3 FCRC 6
BCA
Level 2
Level 1
Level 0
• All the occupants within the centre commence evacuation at the same time. This is
the worst case scenario as occupants from each level fill the stairs at the same time.
• The stairways and escalators are used for occupant movement between the floor
levels.
• The occupants within the enclosure at the perimeter of the building on the ground
level (Level 0) move directly to the outside using the doorways that lead to the
outside.
• The occupants on the upper levels also use the stairways at the perimeter to move
down the building.
The movement times for the occupants to move out of each floor level (into the stairway) or
out of the building are summarised in the figure below.
Total Building
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Level 0
The result shows that the occupants could move out of the entire shopping centre in 900 s.
22
The RSET value for each floor may be taken as the corresponding movement time in the
figure above plus pre-movement time. As recommended in FCRC 6, pre-movement time may
be ignored for occupants located in the vicinity of the location of fire.
Nevertheless, in order to determine if way finding is an issue visibility in the centre during
the fire is further examined.
The following table summarises the time when visibility drops below 10m. It should be
noted that these values are conservative estimates and are based on the first instance where
any gas phase device located in the egress paths drops below 10m. At these times 10m of
visibility is still maintained in areas away from the fire or voids.
The results show that in all the base cases examined, the occupants would have sufficient
time evacuate prior to visibility dropping below 10 m.
In the sensitivity scenarios, further analysis of the visibility slice files show that the visibility
levels elsewhere in the building away from the fire and voids are still maintained above 10 m,
occupants are provided with sufficient visibility to evacuate the building. Visibility slice files
indicating the extent of reduced visibility for FS04-b is shown in Figure 18.
23
t = 600s t = 900 s
L0
L1
L2
L3
Note 1 Note 1
Note 1: At 534 s egress modelling shows occupants already entered into escape corridors
The assessment shows that ASET is greater than RSET for the mall spaces with a significant
margin of safety. Sufficient visibility is also maintained in the base case design and
sensitivity design to allow occupants to evacuate the building.
It shows that the Proposed Design exhibits a high level of fire safety for the occupants and:
Objective 1 is achieved 9
24
7 EVALUATION AGAINST OBJECTIVE 2 – FIRE BRIGADE INTERVENTION
In the previous section, the evaluation focuses on the tenability conditions of the building
immediately after the fire starts until the occupants move to a place of safety. The conditions
over this period of time may be regarded as “early tenability” of the building. Analysis results
for this case study show that this period concerned is no more than 900 s.
The Fire Brigade, however, would arrive relatively later in the event of a fire. Their safety,
should they decide to enter the building, is therefore dependent on the tenability conditions of
the building at a later stage. This may be regarded as “later tenability”, which generally
occurs after the occupants have evacuated the building.
max max
1.5 m
120°C 3.0 kW/m 2
< 10 mins
W Poh 2010
AFAC appears to have set an exceedingly low radiant heat limit of 1.0 kW/m2 for a routine
fire fighting condition. The limit is lower than the heat flux received from sun bathing in the
tropics, which is estimated to be 1.1 kW/m2 [19].
25
7.2 Fire Brigade Intervention
In order to estimate the Fire Brigade Intervention, the AFAC Fire Brigade Intervention Model
(FBIM) Charts [16] are used to model their response to a fire in the building.
As fire fighters approach a fire (< 10m), temperatures and radiant heat levels will increase to
potentially hazardous or extreme conditions, however the trained fire fighters will position
themselves in a safe location to fight the fire and are able to move back out of the fire
affected area if required.
The centre is provided with a 60 minute FRL throughout as a means of redundancy. The fire
modelling shows that temperatures in the centre are well below the limiting temperatures of
structural steel and concrete. In addition, occupants in the building would have evacuated
and fire fighters can commence applying water to a fire within 60 minutes period.
Under these conditions, the fire brigade will be able to enter the building and fight the fire
inside the building using the hydrants inside the building. The fire brigade will be able to
conduct search and rescue in the building. Hence:
Objective 2 is achieved 9
26
8 EVALUATION AGAINST OBJECTIVE 3 – MINIMISE SMOKE AND FIRE
SPREAD
Barriers are also provided within the ceiling space to prevent fire spread within the ceiling
space.
With the above provisions in place, smoke spread into the majors and cinema complex would
be minimized as the smoke detectors provided in front the shutters would detect smoke and
initiate the descent of the shutters. The 2 m height still allows for occupants to pass through
the shutter and provides a baffle to minimize smoke spread into the store.
The specialty shops will be provided with a shop front wall and baffle above its doorway to
minimise the extent of smoke spread in.
The provision of a natural ventilation smoke management system in the mall space also vents
smoke out of the building minimizing the spread of smoke to the stores.
The extent of smoke spread from a fire in the centre is further discussed in the following
sections based on a fire occurring in the mall space, specialty shops and majors.
27
8.2.2 Limiting spread into mall area
As part of the performance design, smoke is prevented from spreading into mall area from the
major stores and cinema complex as follow:
- Each major store is equipped with automatic smoke exhaust and smoke separated
from the mall as discussed earlier.
- The cinema complex is equipped with automatic smoke venting and smoke separated
from the mall as discussed earlier.
The results of fire modelling (Fire Scenarios 3 and 6) show that, in the event of fire occurring
in a major store or cinema complex minimal smoke spread into the mall space occurs outside
of the major store or cinema.
L2 L3
Figure 20 FS03 Extent of smoke spread out of Level 0 major store fire
L0 L1
L2 L3
28
To provide a conservative ASET for each fire scenario, the fire modelling (Fire Scenarios 1,
2, 4 and 5) conducted assumed full height walls around all the stores to confine smoke within
the mall space only. This leads to a worst case design in terms of smoke spread throughout
the mall areas. Had the stores been open, smoke would spread into the stores and dilute
leading to less smoke spread within the mall space.
The results show that in the worst case fire scenarios where the fire is occurring at the lowest
floor level, smoke does not spread throughout all the mall spaces of the shopping centre. The
extent of smoke spread throughout the mall space is shown in the following figures. It can be
reasonably expected that if the smoke is located in the mall space where the shops open into,
smoke spread into these shops is also possible.
L2 L3
L0 L1
L2 L3
29
L0 L1
L2
L3
L0 L1
L2 L3
In the sensitivity scenarios, smoke spread is still limited. The following figures show the
extent of smoke spread in the shopping centre in the sensitivity scenarios.
30
L0 L1
L3
L2
L0 L1
L2
L3
31
L0 L1
L2 L3
L0 L1
L2 L3
For the purpose of this assessment the objective is to minimize smoke spread throughout the
centre.
The results show that smoke spread from a fire in the proposed design is minimized and:
Objective 3 is achieved 9
32
9 EVALUATION AGAINST OBJECTIVE 4 – LIMIT IMPACT ON BUSINESS
CONTINUITY
Based on the performance design of the centre, evacuation is to be directed by the wardens
and the centre may be evacuated as follows:
- Major stores – in the event of a fire occurring in a major store, the store of the fire
origin is to be evacuated immediately. The occupants in the major store may move to
the mall area, which is designed as a safety place. The adjoining mall and other parts
of the centre need not be evacuated unless smoke starts to spread into the mall area.
Floor area directly above the major store may also need to be evacuated as instructed
by the fire brigade when they attend and assess the fire.
- Cinema complex – in the event of a fire occurring in cinema, the cinema complex is
to be evacuated immediately. The occupants in the cinema complex may move to the
mall area, which is designed as a safety place. The adjoining mall and other parts of
the centre need not be evacuated unless smoke start to spread into the mall area.
- Mall area – the mall area is divided into 3 zones: East, Centre and West. When smoke
spreads into the mall, the zone concerned is to be evacuated. Other zones need not
evacuate unless smoke starts to spread to the zone.
The above strategy would help the centre management control the evacuation and also limit
the impact on business continuity of the areas not affected by the fire.
33
9.2.2 After the event of fire
After the event of fire, the fire safety systems including the sprinkler systems are to be
reinstated. When the centre is determined to be safe to be occupied, businesses in the area not
affected by the fire may continue.
Businesses affected by fire and/ or smoke will need to be repaired and cleaned prior to re-
occupying. The sprinklers and smoke management system provided in the proposed design
have been demonstrated to be highly effective in limiting fire spread and also limiting smoke
spread throughout the building. These provisions minimise the effects of fire on businesses
outside the area of fire origin.
With the strategy outlines impact on business continuity shopping centre is limited and:
Objective 4 is achieved 9
34
10 CONCLUSIONS
A performance-based design has been presented for the case study which incorporates 4
storey shopping centre interconnected by floor voids.
As part of the performance-based design, a fire engineering strategy has been developed to
encompass all the sub-systems as outlined in the International Fire Engineering Guideline and
to achieve the design objectives set out for the case study.
The key design features of the Proposed Design include the use of:
• A sound fire safety management of the building to control fire start and occupant
evacuation.
• An effective sprinkler system to control the fire growth in the building.
• A reliable natural smoke venting system at the roof to allow smoke to vent from
shopping centre through the interconnecting floor voids. Mall is therefore designed as
a safe place.
• Normally used circulation paths, external open stairs and escalators for egress
purposes.
• Staged evacuation of the mall to minimise business disruption.
• Shutters to the entries of the majors and cinema complex designed to prevent smoke
spread.
The evaluation shows that the Proposed Design achieves each and every fire safety objective
set out for the case study.
35
11 REFERENCES
36
[17] Poh, W., “Tenability Criteria for Design of Smoke Hazard Management Systems”,
Ecolibrium, AIRAH, August 2011.
[18] “Practice Note for Tenability Criteria in Building Fires”, Society of Fire Safety,
Engineers Australia, April 2014.
[19] Raj, P.K., “A Review of the Criteria for People Exposure to Radiant heat Flux from
Fires”, Journal of Hazardous Materials, 159, 2008, pp 61–71.
37
APPENDIX A
Design Strategy
• To minimise the number of fire starts.
• To extinguish any fire before it becomes threatening.
Design Principles
• Specific management plans and procedures are to be put in place by the shopping centre
management to control the use and activities within the building
• Sufficient fire extinguishers are to be provided for occupants to fight small fires within the retail
areas
Design Details Rationale
Management plans and procedures
Specific management plans and procedures If the initiation of fire within a building could be
are to be developed by shopping centre prevented, all the fire safety objectives would be
management using risk management achieved and there would be no need to invest in
principles as set out in AS/NZS ISO expensive fire-safety measures.
31000:2009.
The tasks outlined in Appendix B were developed to
The fire safety management tasks are to specifically target the major cause of fire starts in
include all types of activities including shopping centre. This is based on the finding of the
communications, maintenance, auditing and study of fire statistics in FCRC 6 [8] that, of all
training (see Appendix B). These tasks are reported fires in shops in the USA:
aimed at minimising the number of fire starts • 36% are due to heat from electrical
and extinguish the fire before it becomes equipment arcing or overloading
threatening. • 15% are due to fuel fired or powered objects
Sprinkler system
The centre is to be sprinkler protected Sprinkler protection is considered a key fire safety
throughout to control the growth of fire in the system of the performance solution. This is based on
building (details of the sprinkler system will the finding of the USA data as reported in FCRC 6
be further discussed later in the paper). [8] that sprinklers appear to reduce the death rate by
about a factor of three.
Fire extinguishers
Portable fire extinguishers to AS 2444 are to Fire extinguishers are proposed in lieu of fire hose
be provided in: reels. This is based on the study in FCRC 6 [8] that
• each specialty shop occupants are more likely to use fire extinguisher
• throughout each major store than fire hose reels.
• enclosures containing power distribution
equipment FCRC 6 [8] also shows that fires attended by the fire
• kitchens, dining rooms, food and brigade in the USA, 39% of fires are either self
beverage outlets extinguished (15%), or put out with make-shift aids
• hazardous goods or flammable liquids (7%) or portable extinguishers (17%).
stores
The extinguishers are to be installed at the
readily accessible locations in the retail areas
and staff are to be trained in the use of fire
extinguishers.
38
SS-B: Smoke Development and Spread and Control
Design Strategy
• To maintain egress paths tenable for occupants to move to place of safety
• To limit smoke spread to minimise business disruption.
Design Principles
• In the event of a sprinkler controlled fire (C2) anywhere in the centre:
o all main egress paths in the centre are to remain tenable indefinitely.
o smoke spread is limited.
• In the event of sprinkler controlled fire (C2) in a major store or the cinema complex:
o the smoke produced is to be limited from spreading into the adjoining mall.
• In the event of an unsprinkler controlled fire (C3) in the centre:
o all main egress paths are to remain tenable for the expected duration of evacuation using the
paths.
39
serve each major store.
A baffle is to be installed at their entrance to
the mall to limit smoke spread into the mall The major stores usually have their entrance
area. Alternatively an automatic shutter may connected to the mall area. The mall entrances serve
be installed to automatically descend to a 2 m as an egress path for the occupants. To prevent
height above the floor level to allow smoke spreading into the mall, baffles or automatic
occupants to evacuate into the mall. Shutters shutter are proposed to be installed at the mall
are to automatically descend to 2m above the entrance.
floor upon detection of fire in the centre.
Specialty shops
All specialty shops having a floor area less Specialty shops do not have their own smoke
than 2000 m2 connected to the mall areas are exhaust system. Hence specialty shops connected to
to be considered parts of the mall for smoke the mall are considered part of the mall with regards
management purposes. to smoke management.
Stairway Pressurisation
Stairway pressurisation is omitted. This is based on the design strategy of maintaining
the mall area tenable. Given that the stairways are
connected to the mall area, they will likewise be
tenable without pressurisation. Stairways around the
perimeter of the building are proposed to be external
and open to the outside.
40
SS:C - Fire Spread and Impact and Control
Design Strategy
• To maintain the stability of the building to ensure occupant and fire brigade safety
• To minimise the spread of fire to adjacent buildings
• To minimise the spread of fire within building to maintain business continuity
Design Principles
• The building is to be designed against spread of fire from the area or enclosure of fire origin.
• The building is to be designed against collapse of multi-level building structure.
Gaps around penetrating services should not The ceiling barriers are to act primarily as a
exceed 50mm at any location. radiation shield, it is not necessary to fire-stop gaps
around the perimeter of non-combustible services
penetrating the barrier.
41
SS:D - Fire Detection, Warning and Suppression
Design Strategy
• To minimise the time for detecting fire and alerting occupants in the building
• To minimise the time to suppressing or controlling fire in the building
Design Principles
• Sufficient means of detection and warning the occupants are to be provided throughout the
building.
• A reliable sprinkler system which is commensurate with the hazard is to be incorporated
throughout the centre.
Sprinkler system
The sprinkler system is to be designed in The sprinkler system is the key fire safety system
accordance with the requirements AS 2118. which is to be enhanced to ensure its reliability.
As part of the performance-based design
strategy, it is to be further enhanced as The sprinklers for each level of the building are to
follows: be separately valved to reduce the chance of two
• Fast response sprinklers with a maximum adjoining zones, being isolated at the one time.
RTI of 50m1/2s1/2 are used.
• The system is connected to two town The use of monitored valves will support sound
mains water supply, each capable of management as notification of isolation is required
satisfying the required system flow along with time of re-instatement. If the system is
demand. not re-instated within the prescribed time period, the
• A monitored isolation valve is installed fire brigade will arrive at the building to investigate
at each floor level to enable sprinkler the situation.
isolation of individual floor level.
• Each major store is served by a control Sprinklers associated with major stores are to be
valve, separate from those of the separately valved to those associated with the
specialty shops. specialty shops and mall. This is to reduce the
likelihood of the sprinklers within major stores
being frequently isolated when the specialty stores
are refurbished and vice versa.
42
S-E: Occupant Evacuation and Control
Design Strategy
• To provide means for safe egress of occupants put at risk by a fire.
Design Principles
• The centre is to be designed for a population density of at least 10m2/person.
• The mall area is to be designed as a safe place for the occupants to move away from the fire and
to provide the primary means of escape
• All major access paths in the mall are to be utilised as egress paths.
• All enclosures and areas within the centre are to be designed to avoid entrapment and have
sufficient egress paths to move to a safe place, open space, or roadway, prior to the achievement
of untenable conditions.
• An evacuation plan is to be developed and implemented by the building management.
• Evacuation of the centre is to be controlled by building management through a warden system.
43
Egress stairways are provided around the the building are designed for the occupants to move
perimeter for the occupants on the upper from the mall to the outside.
level to move down the centre and out of the
building.
Egress Sequence
In the event of fire detection in a major store Due to the interconnection of the floor levels within
or the cinema complex, the occupants in the each section, it is necessary to commence
store or cinema complex are to evacuate into evacuation of all affected floor levels/ areas at the
the mall. The mall need not be evacuated same time when fire is detected.
unless fire is detected in the mall.
44
SS-F: Fire Services Intervention
Design Strategy
• To provide sufficient notification and means of fire fighting for the fire brigade
• To safeguard fire fighting operation
Design Principles
• Sufficient means of notification of a fire is to be provided.
• Sufficient fire brigade access to the building and the relevant part of the building is to be
provided.
• Sufficient communication within the building is to be provided.
• Sufficient hydrants are to be provided and suitably located to facilitate brigade fire fighting.
Internal hydrants
Hydrants are to be provided in accordance Given the building is sprinkler protected, the fire
with AS 2419. brigade will be able to fight the fire within the
building.
45
APPENDIX B FIRE SAFETY MANAGEMENT
These objectives are necessary since shopping centre buildings are designed for limited fire
scenarios and the effectiveness of the designed fire-safety systems will always be less than
100%.
In order to safeguard the occupants from fire injuries, a sound fire-safety management plan
must be developed and implemented. Such a plan can only be successfully developed and
implemented if it receives full support from all management levels of the centre, in particular
the senior management. The organisation within a shopping centre likely to be given the
responsibility to develop and implement a plan is Centre Management or its designate; but for
major stores (including department stores) it is likely that the management plans for all stores
of a particular chain will have been developed by a centralised group but implemented
locally. It is nevertheless essential that management plans for major stores are consistent with
those of Centre Management.
Determine Determine
The plan shall be documented and likelihood consequences
Accept yes
risks
no
Treat risks
- Identify treatment options
- Evaluate treatment options
- Select treatment options
- Prepare treatment options
- Implement options
46
Fire-safety management tasks
Application of the above process to shopping centre situations has resulted in the
identification of many fire-safety management tasks. These are given in the summary table
below. These are tasks which are likely to be important but no attempt has been made to rank
them in order of priority. It will be noted that each of these tasks can be considered as
involving a particular type of action:
Types of Actions
Communication of
1 Î issues and procedures
2 Î Maintenance
3 Î Refurbishment
4 Î Auditing
5 Î Reinforcement
6 Î Training
47
Storage of goods in close proximity to electrical and mechanical equipment can lead to
overheating and fire initiation. These audits shall be documented and filed for easy recall.
Audits of "hot spots" in switchboards and equipment
Can be accomplished using thermal imaging cameras. These audits shall be documented and
filed for easy recall.
Rectification of hot spots
Incorporated as part of maintenance program. Rectification actions shall be documented.
Policing of penalties for non-compliance with procedures
This is where the contractor or tenant is warned or penalised for violations. Constant
education showing the ease with which a fire can start, and the potential consequences, is
required as part of staff and contractor training. A record shall be kept of non-compliances.
EARLY DETECTION
Establish and communicate who should be notified in the event of a member of staff observing a
fire start or smoke
This will most likely be centre management/security staff. Need to also establish how such
notification is to be made.
Establish and communicate who should investigate a potential incident should a smoke or other
detector be activated
Maintenance of automatic fire detection and alarm equipment
This is concerned with the operability of FIP's and associated automatic detection systems
such as smoke detectors.
Use of security cameras and security staff training
Most areas of major shopping centres are visually monitored to reduce theft. Security staff
need to be able to recognise a fire start and respond in the accordance with established
procedures.
General staff training
Similarly a wide range of staff should be trained to recognise a fire start and respond in the
accordance with established procedures.
EARLY SUPPRESSION
Establish and communicate whose responsibility it is to fight a fire with an extinguisher
The rule should generally be that the closest trained staff member to the detected fire should
seek to extinguish the fire with an extinguisher.
Maintenance of portable extinguishers
Establish and communicate policy with respect to storage of combustibles in relation to sprinkler
heads
The aim is to:
• limit the shielding due to stored combustibles and non-combustibles in order to
maximise sprinkler effectiveness
• explain the consequences of not complying
48
• establish and communicate penalties for non-compliance
Auditing of combustibles and non-combustibles in relation to sprinkler heads
Aim is to provide a mechanism to measure and reinforce compliance with above policy so
as to ensure that sprinklers are not overrun due to late activation or to water not being able
to get to fire.
Establish and communicate policy with respect to sprinkler isolation
The aim is to:
• minimise the time that sprinklers are isolated – encourage construction procedures that
only require short term isolation
• ensure that isolation procedures do not introduce permanent blockages into pipework
• ensure that sprinkler system is reinstated each day or at the completion of work
whichever is the lesser period of time
• ensure that sprinkler modifications are adequately recorded such that there is no
confusion about which sprinkler belongs to which zone
• enforce penalties for non-compliance
Policing of penalties for non-compliance with procedures
This is where the contractor or tenant is warned or penalised for violations. Constant
education showing the importance of sprinklers and the effects of high levels of shielding is
required as part of staff and contractor training.
EFFECTIVE EVACUATION
Development and communication of evacuation plan
Maintenance of smoke control systems, doors to stairways, exit signs and emergency lights
49
APPENDIX C FIRE MODELLING RESULTS
50
Fire Scenario FS01 – C2 fire on Level 0 below atrium void
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
51
Fire Scenario FS02 – C2 fire on Level 0 below atrium void
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 31
30
2.00
30
Radiation (kW/m2)
29
1.50
visibility (m)
29
1.00
28
28
0.50
27
0.00 27
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
52
Fire Scenario FS3 – C2 fire on Level 0 in major store
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
53
Fire Scenario FS04 – C2 fire on Level 0 in specialty shop
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
54
Fire Scenario FS4-a (sensitivity) – Increased C2 fire on Level 0 in specialty shop
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
55
Fire Scenario FS04-b (sensitivity) – C3 fire on Level 0 in specialty shop
60000
heat release rate (kW)
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
56
Fire Scenario FS05 – C2 fire on Level 0 in specialty shop
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
57
Fire Scenario FS05-a (sensitivity) – Increased C2 fire on Level 0 in specialty shop
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
58
Fire Scenario FS05-b (sensitivity) – C3 fire on Level 0 in specialty shop
60000
heat release rate (kW)
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0 300 600 900 1,200 1,500 1,800
time (s)
100 100
90
90
80
80
70
air temperature (°C)
70 60
CO (ppm)
60 50
40
50
30
40
20
30 10
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
2.50 35
30
2.00
25
Radiation (kW/m2)
1.50
visibility (m)
20
15
1.00
10
0.50
5
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
59
Fire Scenario FS06 – C2 fire on Level 3 in cinema
6000
heat release rate (kW)
5000
4000
3000
cinemas
food
court 2000
1000
kids
play
office 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s)
100 20
18
90
16
80
14
air temperature (°C)
70 12
CO (ppm)
60 10
8
50
6
40
4
30 2
20 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0max L1max L2max L3max
0.10 35
0.09
30
0.08
0.07 25
Radiation (kW/m2)
0.06
visibility (m)
20
0.05
15
0.04
0.03 10
0.02
5
0.01
0.00 0
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800
time (s) time (s)
L0max L1max L2max L3max L0min L1min L2min L3min
60
APPENDIX D FBIM ANALYSIS
General
The information supplied by the Fire Brigade Intervention Model (FBIM) developed by the
Australasian Fire Authorities Council [16] was used to determine quantitatively the time for
fire brigade intervention activities. These include the time for fire brigade units to respond to
a call and arrive at the site, conduct an initial assessment of the scene and setup water supply.
Fire Scenario
A fire occurs in the cinema complex located on Level 3 which is considered to be the worst
case scenario as it is the most remote location in the building. The cinema complex is
provided with sprinklers and smoke detection. Smoke detectors are assumed to activate 80 s
after ignition.
The figure and table below summarize the results of the FBIM for this scenario.
0 240 480 720 960 1200 1440 1680 1920 2160 2400 2640 2880 3120 3360 3600
Time (sec)
61
Task Name Activities Activity Task Elapsed
Time (s) TIme (s) Time (s)
Alarm activation • Activation of smoke detector (worst case 80
and verification detector activation time)
• Time delay for alarm verification 20 100 100
Transmit call to • Relay and dispatch information by phone or 30 30 130
fire station radio
Dispatch 2 • Time to travel to fire station, dress, 90
pumper appliance assemble, assimilate information and leave
and 8 fire fighters station.
(FF) to fire scene. • Time to reach fire scene (Fire Brigade 462 552 682
standard response time of 7.7 minutes)
FF 1-6 don BA • FF to dismount truck and don BA (90th 133
equipment & percentile)
obtain tools • Gather hydrant equipment 56
• Gather forced entry tools 25 214 896
FF 7-8 set up • Remove equipment for hydrant (90th 56
hydrant percentile)
connection • Prepare and flush hydrant (90th percentile) 59
• Remove, connect and charge hose (Hydrant 99
- Appliance) (90th percentile)
• Remove and connect hose (Appliance - 67 281 1177
Booster) (90th percentile)
FF 1-6 • Hindrance factor = 1.5
communicate with • FF approach entrance 25 m away (90th 42
fire warden percentile).
• Time to communicate with Fire Warden 90 153 1049
FF 1 (OIC) & 2 • FF 1 (OIC) & 2 to walk 200m to a stair on 333
assess Level 2 and the perimeter of the building.
Roof Level • FF 1 (OIC) & 2 to ascend stair to Level 2, 300
approximately 120 steps (90th percentile).
• FF 1 (OIC) & 2 to walk 200m into Level 2 333
to assess situation. FF1 (OIC) & 2 approach
stair to roof.
• FF1 (OIC) & 2 to ascend stair to roof, 200
approximately 80 steps (90th percentile).
• FF 1 (OIC) & 2 to walk 200m into Roof 333 1499 2548
level to assess situation.
FF 3-6 proceed • FF 5 & 6 to walk 200m to a stair on the 333
to Level 3 perimeter of the building.
• FF 5 & 6 to ascend stair to Level 3, 400
approximately 160 steps (90th percentile).
• Connect and charge hoses from hydrant 108 841 1890
FF 5 & 6 perform • Reconnaissance of Level 3 (500m per FF) 833 833 3381
reconnaissance of
Level 3
FF 3 & 4 attack • FF 3 & 4 to walk 100m in to Level 3 (90th 167
fire with hose percentile).
• FF 3 & 4 apply water to fire 167 2715
62
Application of the new “Italian Fire Safety Code” (D.M. 3 agosto 2015) to
Case Study 3 Mall
Vincenzo Puccia
National Fire Corps - Via S. Fidenzio, 3 - 35100 Padova (PD)
Luca Fiorentini
TECSA S.r.l. – Via Figino, 101 – 20016 Pero (MI)
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
In Italy last year (2015) a specific new fire safety code have been enforced by law. This new
act is a performance based approach that is aimed to overcome prescriptive rules. These rules
have proved to be not completely applicable to nowadays architectures, retrofitting of
existing buildings for new purposes, etc. The importance of the new code resides in the fact
that if the requirements are met no complex activities (like CFD assessments against
thresholds values) should be used to state the conformity and the conformity should be
achieved with a general strategy rather than the compliance to strict requirements in each area
of interest (fire rating of materials, emergency egress, etc.). The new Italian Fire code, at the
moment, doesn’t include in its field of application malls and activities with a prescriptive fire
prevention rule still in course of validity. On the other hand, the structure of the code is as
flexible to be applied, as the original goal, to all civil activities with an huge presence of
people, where the common fire scenario is a compartment fire and the safety of lives is
strongly related to the capability to outcome the fire and smoke spreading between the
compartments.
The aim of the new fire code compilers and developers is that the fire design community will
acquire the new fire design philosophy described by mean of this approach, that represent an
alternative to the fire prevention prescriptive corpus.
The “Fire Code” (D.M. 3 agosto 2015) is the result of the effort of the Italian National Fire
Brigade to update to the state of the art available the fire safety regulation, resulting of a great
number of single fire regulations, each related to a specific type of activity, as school, car
parking, hotel, office.
After a first step of evaluation, started in January 2014, a road map was traced with the aim to
build a new fire code with a strong performance based structure, but, on the other hand,
available to the largest group of professional profiles.
The first technical assessment was conducted between the most relevant fire standards
available, choosing the structure of BS9999 as a main reference, doing an effort to adapt it to
the our specific heritage and construction typology.
REPORT
1. The performance criteria selected to assess the fire safety goals and objectives.
The performance criteria for this study result from the full application of the fire safety code
to the geometry of the mall (case study n.3). The approach of this new fire code is based both
on a semi prescriptive approach and on a performance based risk assessment with the fire
safety and fire protection tools.
The fire safety code includes deemed to satisfy solution, based on largely verified design
criteria and allow, on the other hand, the application of alternative solution, to be
demonstrated by mean of fire models from the fire engineer.
The performance criteria generally intended in the fire code are considered as accomplished
if the activities are designed and managed to:
Minimize the fire and explosion causes
Guarantee for a determined time the structural stability
Limit the spread of the fire all over the activity
Limit the spread of the fire to neighbouring activities
Limit the effects of explosions
Guarantee the evacuation of the occupants, or allow to rescue them in other ways
Guarantee the safety for the rescue teams
Safeguard the heritage
Guarantee the business continuity for strategic structures
Prevent and limit the environmental damage in case of fire
In this first step of feasibility design, the first choice was to use the deemed to satisfy solution
included in the code, evaluating the use of fire models if the result of this first step would
result too conservative with regard to the safety measures.
The Fire safety code is divided in four main sections, the first (Generalities) introduces the
definitions and allow a characterization of occupants and possible fires, allowing the risk
class attribution, the second (fire design strategy) is a driven process to select the
performance level required to each component of the fire safety / fire protection design.
This section include Fire reaction, Fire resistance of Structures, Compartment maximum
allowable surface, evacuation of occupants strategy, Fire safety management, Fire Control &
Suppression, Fire Detection & Alarm, Smoke Control, Firefighting Operating, Safety of
technical & utility plants.
A third section is dedicated to technical fire regulation addendum for specific activities
(elevators, risk explosion areas etc.)
The fourth section (Methods) includes the full performance based fire design methods, with
reference to the most diffused international standards.
For the data in this case study nothing but the fire safety code tables were used. On the other
hand, the aim of the fire code is to allow to designers solution not easily practicable by mean
of the traditional prescriptive fire prevention regulation.
The new Italian Fire Code was applied to the case study, starting with deemed to satisfy
solution identified in the code, starting from the identification of risk profiles for the
occupants, as well as evaluating the maximum number of occupants, based on the data
included in the code.
The first step is the risk profile assessment for the occupant typology, based on the BS 9999
classification, included in the Fire Code as a core tool, before the development of his
structure, with a selective choice of international state of art standard. The BS 9999 logic
represented the backbone of the code, but various integrations for the specific Italian issues
on heritage, construction products and work activity was included.
The Occupants Risk Profile Is so related to three Risk Profiles, in a Fire Scenario:
Life Threat
Property/Heritage/Business Continuity Threat
Environment Threat
As above exposed, the Life Threat Risk Assessment was acknowledged from BS 9999
standard, following an approach based on occupants state of wakefulness, their familiarity
with places etc. coupled with the fire Heat Release Rate, related with the time it need to
reach 1MW.
The Fire Code logic flow start with the risk class attribution and assign with a matrix
approach a set of performance levels for the fire strategy design, for items from the allowed
fire reaction of materials to the fire resistance of the structures, the fire suppression the smoke
control the fire safety management etc.
On this basis, the characteristic of the occupants of the shop could generally assumed as B
and the fire growth rate can be assumed 2 or 3, depending on an overall evaluation of the heat
release rate of the fire load stored inside. In a conservative approach, the Class B3 will be
attributed to all occupants of the mall (obviously the employed have an awareness of the
place more close to A, but the largely prevalent characteristic of occupants is B type.
A more articulated approach could attribute, on compartment base, a risk class B2 or B3,
depending on heat release rate of the fire load stored inside.
It’s important to understand that the life risk attribution is based on a compartment level, so
for all the compartment L0,1,2 the reference will be B3.The same for the compartment L3.
The approach pursued here was to verify the case study with the maximum number of
occupants and a challenging fire scenario, a rapid fire growth curve, however the fire code
allows the store manager to do a specific evaluation on his activity as well as on the expected
number of occupants.
Next step is the Property Risk attribution, considering the table G-3.6 of the code. The goal
8. Limit the impact on business continuity could be afforded by selecting a Property Risk 3,
with the impact on design criteria, but normally this level of risk is limited to strategic
activities (Hospitals, civil protection headquarters)
The environmental risk could be considered mitigated by the application of all fire prevention
and protection measures derived from the code application, as the activity doesn’t include a
particular risk of loss of containment for environmental dangerous substances.
To assess the number of occupants, the data of Tab S.4-6 is the main reference.
In the reference section of the chapter 4 a number of state of art standards for the occupants
evacuation assessment is reported.
To evaluate the number of occupants in each area, the reference is the values in Tab S.4-6 of
the fire code, where the assessment of this value must be done.
For the levels 0,1 and 2, with shopping areas, the entire surface of the level was considered,
including the mall, with an overall coefficient of 0.2 occupants/square meter.
People/square
L 0-1-2 surf.(mq) Occ.
meter
Tab.1
For the Level 3 the maximum number of occupants is a design defined constraint, with 960
seats, for the food court, the office and the kidsplay, the reference of Tab S.4-6 of the Fire
Code allow an assessment for other areas.
People/square
Level 3 surf.(mq) Occ.
meter
Tab.2
As for the precedent data, the total number of occupants in the mall complex result in more
than ten thousand people.
3. Fire safety measures selected.
The design based on fire safety code is developed through the section S, fire strategy design,
in order to comply with the fire safety targets above illustrated.
The fire safety measures selected include:
3.1 Fire Reaction Requirements for upholstery and furnishing
3.2 Fire Resistance for Structures
3.3 Division into Compartments and compartments surface
3.4 Escape ways designed to fulfil the requirements of maximum length, position and
availability for the occupants of each level
3.5 Fire management system
3.6 Fire Control & Suppression
3.7 Smoke detection
3.8 Smoke control
3.9 Firefighting Operation
3.10 Safety of Technological & Utility network
The fire reaction is related to the goals 5. Safeguard occupants from injury due to fire and
smoke until they reach a safe place., 7. Minimize smoke and fire spread inside building
As per the table S.1-3 the performance required for fire reaction of materials will be III for
the egress routes and II for other spaces for activities.
For the level II the conform solution will be the material class GM3, and for level III,
respectively, the material class GM2.
The fire resistance is mainly involved with the goals 6. Safeguard fire fighters while
performing rescue operations or attacking the fire. And 8. Limit the impact on business
continuity
Level III
By mean of an evaluation of the table S.2-3 and fire load data (reference the buchanan for
statistical data)
The shop facades must be evaluated with reference to the general safety and the safety of the
rescue teams in case of fire.
The detail design must consider the above characteristic of construction products as well as
the overall installation to comply with the objective
6. Safeguard fire fighters while performing rescue operations or attacking the fire.
3.3 Compartments
Standard solutions
The height of the structure is 17.2 m, as result of 4 levels, each 4.3 m height.
The mall will consist of a multi level compartment with the levels 0, 1, 2 (shop area)
And various compartment at the level 3 for the cinema, the food court and the offices.
The compartment at the third level will be with REI capabilities, each single cinema will be
separated with REI structures from others.
Alternative solution
By mean of SEFC and method G.2.6, a single compartment for all levels could be verified
with regard to a number of design fire scenarios.
Separation
As any information is included about the boundary activities, the chapter separation will not
considered here.
This is a main issue on this benchmark application of the fire safety code, dealing with the
capabilities of the structure to ensure the safe escape and, in general, the safety for the
occupants of the activity.
The fire safety code allow to the store manager to define a different, and less challenging,
number of occupants with regard to the specific type of activity.
Here, for the aim of this paper, the default value of the code result in a total number of
occupants of 10895. A so high number of people require, for a simultaneous evacuation an
huge vertical escape system, as well an high number of escape doors.
Making reference to table S.4.1 and S.4.2 of the Fire Code, the performance level required is
I, so the design goal will be the exodus of the occupants to a safe place, as defined at section
G.
Particularly the aim of the design of the escape system will be to move the occupants in an
open space, out of the mall.
For mobile stairs or tapis roulants, they will be considered on the escape systems with a
smoke detection plant, with performance level IV, and they will be safe blocked under the
exodus, under responsibility of the safety management
For the cinema seats, look at the Illustration S.4.1 for the disposition of the places.
Fig. 1
The fire safety design philosophy, with compliance to the fire safety code approach, is to
include the three shops levels (Level 0, 1, 2) in a single multilevel compartments, and an
independent fire compartment for the third floor, also separating the cinema from the
restaurant. The office space will be also separated by fire resistant walls, with independent
escape routes.
Each component of the escape system is designed with reference to the most dangerous life
risk profile, with reference to the exodus, between the compartments.
So our reference on life risk attribution will be B3.
The design criteria for horizontal escape way is based on tables S.4-10 for maximum length
of 40 m with a maximum available single way pattern of 15 m.
Fig. 2
For the total width of escape routes the table S.4.11 allow a specific width of 6.20
mm/person, so a minimum total width of horizontal way out is simply evaluable.
L 0-1-2
Escape way horiz width 1200mm 1800mm 2400mm
number
level 0 17 12 9
level 1 14 10 7
level 2 11 8 6
Tab 3
Obviously the level 0 will have direct external door, with the requirement of absence of flow
interaction with the vertical flows from the levels 1 and 2.
Fig. 3
The doors from level 0 will be placed enough far away from the external stairs serving the
upper levels of the mall.
Level 3
Escape way horiz width 1200mm 1800mm 2400mm
number
shops 2 1 1
cinema 5 4 3
office 1 1 1
kidsplay 2 1 1
food court 8 5 4
Tab 4
For the vertical escape ways the design criteria is to totally separate the flows from the 3rd
level with restaurant, cinema, shop and office from the other two levels.
This approach is largely based on external stairs than on smoke proof internal stairs, with the
result to a number of external steel structures, but, in the other hand, the internal layout will
not modified as the shop surface will result completely available with the only exception of
crossing gaps.
Tab 5
VERTICAL MINIMUM WIDTH L3
Tab 6
Exodus of people with disabilities
Must be also considered the evacuation of people with disabilities as per S.4.9 paragraph,
including area of rescue assistance, with strong connection with safety & fire management
system.
Area of rescue assistance will be included in all levels, as the presence of people with
disabilities couldn’t be excluded nor in the shopping areas nor in the cinema or restaurant.
For the cinema dedicated places will be included in the detail design of each projection room.
The dimensions of the safe space must be enough to house all people with disability in the
area, for the level 1 and 2 the availability of more than one single safe place must be
considered, with reference to the medium distance from each level point.
Each safe place must include a safe bidirectional communication system with the emergency
management room and with the external lines, rescue tools (wheelchairs, stretchers, first aid
kit) and instructions for the safe behaviour waiting rescue teams.
Fig. 4
The areas of rescue assistance must be compliant with ISO 21524 standard, with information
and indication panels compliant with ISO 7010 or E024 or equivalent.
Fire Management System
This is a main issue on this benchmark application of the fire safety code, dealing with the
capabilities of management to cope with the safety management to maintain the fire risk
under the design conditions (fire loads control, escape ways availability, plants maintenance)
For 2. and 3. must be considered the effective availability of egress routes, a primary item in
shops and malls, as the sell surface and the disposition of products could hardly influence the
As the activity include a very large number of occupants, with crowd management as a
central issue on the safety management system in occurrence of a fire, a level III of Fire
Mangement System will be required.
An emergency room will be included in the design, with a dedicated area and staff.
Fire Control
5. Safeguard occupants from injury due to fire and smoke until they reach a safe place.
6. Safeguard fire fighters while performing rescue operations or attacking the fire.
7. Minimize smoke and fire spread inside building.
8. Limit the impact on business continuity
An automatic fire control system based on sprinkler technology will be installed in all areas,
with technical requirements of EN 12845 (or equivalent standard as NFPA 13).
The mall will be protected with an internal and external fire protection with fireplugs and fire
hoses full compliant with a state of art standard.
Smoke Detection
An automatic smoke detection system will be installed in all areas of the mall, including
technical areas and specific risk areas with level IV of performance as per S.7.2.
The smoke detection will be compliant with commonly accepted standards, and will be
integrated in the fire management system with EVAC
table s.7-5
Smoke control
5. Safeguard occupants from injury due to fire and smoke until they reach a safe place
7. Minimize smoke and fire spread inside building.
8. Limit the impact on business continuity
by mean of the design decision
4. Smoke control strategy for the mall.
5. Smoke control strategy in shops
A level III of performance smoke control system will be installed, with convective smoke
evacuation system on the third floor and mechanical evacuation systems on the mall on the
levels 0,1,2 by mean of channels, a full detail study on the compatibility with the sprinkler
system and with the mall geometry will be conducted. For the levels 0,1,2 the smoke duct
will be placed on the external walls, by mean of horizontal ducts operating a forced
convective smoke control from the mall gallery, and from the biggest shop areas.
Fire Rescue Operations
A level III of performance in Fire Rescue Operations, as defined in the table S.9.2 of the Fire
Code, will be required for the overall activity.
This requirement could affect the management of the fire operation in case of fire in the
structure, with regard to the safety for firefighters teams.
the level III is intended allow the availability of the external area of the mall for rescue teams,
All utility and service networks must be designed in compliance of standards accepted for the
authority having jurisdiction in the country of construction.
Particularly, the utility network must be installed to avoid explosion or fire risks, and must
comply to the requirements and specific of performance required (i.e. minimum time of
guaranteed service for power auxiliary generation).
4. How safe egress will be provided for building occupants under a variety of
reasonably foreseeable fire scenarios.
The approach to the egress design is based on a large availability of external stairs for Levels
1, 2 and 3, coupled with maximum length of egress horizontal ways. Some internal escape
ways are available, as a mobile stair system is included from levels 0,1,2, with elevators. The
level 3 is accessible by men of fire protected elevators or by external stairs, as it is a separate
compartment from L0,1,2.
The openings at the ceiling of the level 2 are sealed with pans fire resistant, with any pattern
available for the fire smoke.
The Fire code is based on a design philosophy very close to BS9999 with a single fire
ignition in a compartment of the activity.
On the other hand, the performance levels selected for automatic suppression system, fire
detection system and fire control system are designed to guarantee tenability parameters in
each compartment for enough time for a safe evacuation in a large variety of fire scenarios, as
a fire in a shop, or in the mall.
The safety management system manager is responsible to address a complete and correct
information to the occupants during the emergency, and a number of emergency operators
will be available on the occurrence of a fire.
As above mentioned, the Fire Safety Code doesn’t include the arson as a fire design scenario,
but a security service will be available as usual in the mall.
6. The fire scenarios evaluated, and how they were selected.
The fire safety code consider a design philosophy based on single compartment risk
assessment and a single fire on the activity. The arson will not considered-as a design
scenario.
The fundamental hypothesis of the Fire Safety Code are:
in ordinary conditions, a fire in an activity start from a single ignition point
The overall fire risk for the activity couldn’t reduced to zero
The fire safety measures, intended as fire prevention and fire protection included in the
Italian Fire safety Code are selected to minimize the fire risk both regard to probability of a
fire ignition and to consequence of a fire, in measure of an acceptable risk.
The fire code allow a full performance based approach, with the cap. Methods, but in this
case study an approach based on the guided design procedure, following all the items of the
code from the risk assessment to the design of all fire safety and fire protection measures.
7. A discussion of how the proposed fire safety measures address the performance
criteria.
The fire code is based on a matrix approach, assigning specific performance levels to each
specific fire safety measure
9. How safety for persons with disabilities groups with small children will be
provided.
The above paragraph on egress and evacuation design include the disabilities management.
One or more areas of rescue assistance, compliant at ISO 21542 or equivalent standard, will
be included at levels 1, 2 and 3.
The fire emergency system management, as part of fire safety management system, will
include specific procedures for the areas of rescue assistance.
10. Fire safety tools and design methods used in the analysis and designs (i.e., fire
models, calculation methods, statistics, fire test data, etc.), including why the tools
were selected.
This design method doesn’t use directly mathematical fire models, the matrix based approach
is based on largely accepted fire statistic and fire test data. A reference is available at the end
o f each chapter of the fire code, including:
S3 Compartments
References for Compartments
Eurocode 1, UNI EN 1991-1-2
UNI EN 12101-6
S5 Fire Management
UNI Inail “Linee Guida per un sistema di gestione di sicurezza e salute sui luoghi di
lavoro(SGSSL), 2011
BS OHSAS 18001 e Linee Guida BS OHSAS 18002 per la “valutazione della salute e
sicurezza sui luoghi di lavoro (Occupational health and Safety Assessment Series,
OHSAS)”
11. Which aspects of the analysis were modelled, and which were based on
engineering judgment.
Almost all the sections of the Fire Code applied for the design procedures are based on
engineering Judgement included in deemed to satisfy provision, as the quantitative methods
are used for alternative solutions.
The deemed to satisfy solution were derived both from international and national recognized
scientific literature, statistical data and engineering judgement, from the experience of years
of fire operations, in civil and industrial fires.
The specific chapter S.5.6 of the Fire Code include specific prescription for the safety
management of the activity, including fire load control, material control (i.e. upholstery,
furnishing). A safety management system, compliant with OHSAS or equivalent standards)
must be activated to take under control the fire risk in the activity as effect of maintenance
and modification of single areas.
All workers must be receive a complete instruction about the fire management system, and
the compliancy to the constraint to shopping areas and all activities.
Here, we considered a fast fire growth curve, conducting to a demanding performance
required to all component of the fire prevention and protection strategy .
The design procedure for the deemed to satisfy solutions in the code take in consideration an
uncertainly margin, and the performance levels for each issue include a safety coefficients.
The choice in this exercise was to apply nothing but the deemed to satisfy solutions, on the
other hand, however, the method section of the code include an evaluation and validation
procedure for numerical simulation of fires.
14. References for all engineering tools and methods, input data, fire tests, occupant
characteristics, statistics, etc.
The following drawings represent the application of the fire safety code to the structure. The
aim of this exercise is only to expose a first result, only using the solution included in the
code for the fire safety and fire protection issues, without a deepest evaluation, however
available in the tool.
The level 1 and 2 have some escape ways on the roof surface of the above levels, and the
level 3 is totally independent for its escape patterns.
The choice was to set a challenging number of occupants, with the higher value supposed in
the default value for the fire code, is however possible for the structure manager to do a
formal declaration with the maximum number of occupants admitted in the structure.
On the other hand, the safety management system must include an occupant number control
system at all gates.
The design choice is a two fire compartment structure, with the first including levels 0, 1 and
2 and the second the level 3.
Fig. 6
Fig. 7
Fig. 8
Fig. 9
Fig. 10
SFPE Shopping Centre Case Study
THE TEAM 4
1 INTRODUCTION 5
1.1 The Design Approach 5
1.2 Qualitative Design Review 6
1.3 RIBA Stage 2 design 7
1.3.1 RIBA Stage 2 description 7
1.3.2 Design decisions (SFPE Design brief section 3) 9
2 GOALS 10
2.1 Regulatory Requirements 10
2.2 Client Goals 10
4 FIRE STRATEGY 15
4.1 Outline Fire Strategy Assessment and Proposed Approach 15
9 MANANGMENT 71
9.1 Specific Management Requirements 71
10 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE 73
10.1 Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 73
10.2 Construction, Design and Management Regulations (CDM) 74
12 CONCLUSION 77
13 REFERENCES 79
British Standards Publications 79
SUMMARY
This report was written for the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) as part of the 11th
Conference, titled ‘Performance Based Codes and Fire Safety Design Methods’, which will
be held in Warsaw, Poland in May of 2016. The SFPE United Kingdom Chapter, who
includes Christine Pongratz, Darren Agnew, and Sandy Kilbourne, has developed a fire
safety strategy for the proposed SFPE Shopping Centre case study as a part of this SFPE
Performance Based Design conference.
The objective of this case study is to prepare a performance-based fire safety strategy report
for a shopping mall. The project brief, provided by SFPE, defines the goals of the “client”,
and the “constraints” provided by the buildings architectural plans proposed. It is therefore
the objective of this report, to outline an example a fire safety design solution from the design
perspective of the United Kingdom. This report has been written to address an international
fire engineering audience, mainly the SFPE case study participants, as a means to
communicate an example of the U.K. design practices.
The specific requests within the SFPE design brief have been addressed by means of
providing an example fire strategy. The fire strategy identifies a full set of goals and
constraints (some additional from the design brief, but typical in the U.K.), and describes a
fire safety design solution specifically to address (1) Means of warning and escape (2)
Internal fire spread (linings) (3) Internal fire spread (structure) (4) External fire spread, and
(5) Access and facilities for the fire service. The fire strategy has been written to the level of
detail typical for a RIBA stage 2 (concept design stage). However, additional background
(exceeding a typical stage 2 fire strategy), such as guidance document context and history,
and engineering methodology descriptions and solutions, has been provided within the report
for the purposes of the case study fire engineering audience. The shopping centre is assumed
to be located in the United Kingdom and the basis of the fire strategy design has been
considered to comply with relevant municipal statutory requirements (Part B of the Building
Regulations as an example in England).
A qualitative design review has been performed to develop a fire strategy which applies both
fire engineered solutions and relevant U.K. guidance for an optimal design solution at this
design early stage. Specifically, the smoke control design has been developed utilising a fire
engineered approach, to install a mechanical exhaust system within the shop and mall
circulation areas. Design items such as structural fire precautions, firefighting etc. follow the
guidance offered within BS 9999, BS 5588 (Part 7 and 10), and BS 7974.
THE TEAM
The United Kingdom Shopping Centre Case Study report has been written by the following
individuals:
The SFPE United Kingdom Chapter, has developed a fire safety strategy for a proposed
Shopping Centre case study. The objective of this case study is to prepare a performance-
based fire safety strategy report for a shopping mall, which includes retail shops,
supermarkets, food-court and restaurants, car parks, entertainment area etc. The fire strategy
approach has been developed on the basis of the drawing information received in the SFPE
design brief.
As a minimum, the proposed fire safety strategy meets the following fire and life safety goals
as described in the SFPE design brief:
Safeguard occupants from injury due to fire and smoke until they reach a safe place.
Safeguard fire fighters while performing rescue operations or attacking the fire.
Minimize smoke and fire spread inside building.
Limit the impact on business continuity
The full set of project goals, constraints, and assumptions, utilised to inform the design
solution, are identified in Sections 2 and 3 within the fire strategy report. Given the goals and
constraints identified, the design solution and its methodologies are subsequently described in
section 5 – 9, and outlined in a fire safety provision table in Section 4.
The fire safety solution is comprised of three components:
The Fire Strategy: This is a description of what occupant, building management, and
fire service behaviour and provisions are expected, for given fire scenarios. It includes a
description of the evacuation zoning and any interactions between evacuation zones.
Fire Protection Features and Systems: This is a description of the fire protection
features (passive and active fire protection systems) that are required to enable the fire
strategy.
Management Plan: This is a description of the staffing duties, training, and maintenance
requirements required to maintain the fire protection features and systems to ensure the
correct operational response in the event of a fire or alarm. Note: A detailed and co-
ordinated plan is not included within this report, but is required to be developed by the
building operator.
Figure 2: Fire engineering process (flow chart created from concepts in PD 7974)
The United Kingdom government produces prescriptive design solution guidance, (such as
BS 9999) for compliance with the municipal statutory building regulations (i.e. Building
Regulations 2010, Schedule 1, Part B in England).
Fire Safety Strategy has largely been developed based on contemporary U.K. based design
guidance to satisfy regulatory requirements (such as BS 9999). However, the scope of these
guidance document are often is limited to the ‘more common’ types of buildings. Therefore,
the fire safety strategy also includes for the adoption of more pefromance-based analytical
methods, specifically in support of the smoke control strategy developed for the mall area.
Fundamentally, the fire safety strategy design solution has been developed by adopting BS
9999, BS 5588 (Part 7 and 10), and BS 7974, where appropriate. The full list of guidance
utilised within this report is described in the references, in Section 13.
The objective of this case study is to prepare a performance-based fire safety strategy report
for a shopping mall. The fire safety solution must satisfy the client’s needs, either as the
building landlord, or as an individual tenant.
As such, the importance of integrated design throughout the building life is clear; this
integration therefore relates not only to design, but also construction, flexibility of use,
ongoing maintenance and operation. In order to meet all the needs of the client (SFPE), the
following fire strategy goals have been identified.
Goal Description
Flexibility for tenant fit-out The client would like the base build design to reduce limitations on the tenant
design fit out design, within the unit and in regards to the store front entrance
Flexibility for future shop The mall is mainly fit with various size shop units. The client would allow for
tenants to combine adjacent units if desired.
unit size change
Limit impact of tenant fit- It is anticipated that tenant will change within the life of the building. The
out construction phase on client would like the base build design solution to allow for minimum
other areas of the mall disruption to the rest of the shopping centre, during the tenant fit out /
construction phase of an individual unit.
Limit the impact on business The client would like to limit disruption caused by false alarms, which do not
continuity warrant a full building evacuation.
Limit smoke damage to the The client would like to limit smoke damage to the building.
building and its facilities
Realistic Managing regime The client will hire and train building management to follow procedures
regards to the life safety and fire strategy provisions. However, all
management obligations must be manageable with the number of staff
available.
The SFPE shopping mall contains a total of 4 stories, which house retail shops (ranging from
100m2 to 5000m2), a food-court with seating area, restaurants, a fitness club, and a cinema
with 5 theatres.
For the purposes of this Stage 2 concept design, the shop units as designated on the DWG
drawings produced by SFPE, will be treated as retail units.
The building height (to highest occupied floor in east atrium is 25m, and the building
extension footprint is approximately 26,920m2)
The SFPE shopping mall will consist of:
Level Building description
Level 0 Shop units (largest approximately 3,724m2)
Mall circulation space with kiosks
One “Kids Play” unit
Level 1 Shop units (largest approximately 2,417m2) and mall circulation space
with kiosks
Level 2 Shop units (largest approximately 5,222m2)
Level 3 Shop units (largest approximately 2,191m2)
Food Court (seating area and kitchen units)
Cinema Foyer and 5 cinemas (which seat approximately 960 people
total) + staff
4 FIRE STRATEGY
Service access point (indicative provision, and the Fire Service to agree
location shown in Figure 34), and is and co-ordinate for this provision
defined as a room which is either
solely dedicated as a control centre or
is combined with the building
management/security office.
Downstands Fixed smoke reservoir barrier The depth of the downstands directly
downstands, or smoke channelling informs the smoke exhaust rate
screens, are required within the mall required per smoke zone. Should the
areas to limit smoke spread beyond a proposed arrangement of such
defined area (i.e. smoke zone). The downstands require modification
design and location of such (either location or depth) beyond this
downstands is described further in stage, then this can affect the calculated
Section 6.6.2. performance of the smoke exhaust
system (i.e. exhaust rate and inlet air
provision).
Emergency voice Each refuge space contains a two way
communication communication device linking back to
system for refuge the fire control centre (in accordance
spaces with BS 5839-9).
Emergency lighting All emergency escape routes should
have adequate artificial lighting
provided in both public and back of
house areas. Lighting to escape stairs
should be on a separate circuit from
that supplying any other part of the
escape route. In addition, all escape
routes and communal areas should be
provided with emergency lighting in
compliance with BS 5266-1:2011.”
The system should be supplied with
backup power supply as it is
considered a life safety system.
Escape signage In accordance with BS 9999, every
escape route (other than those in
ordinary use) should be distinctively
and conspicuously marked by
emergency exit signs of adequate size
complying with the Health and Safety
(Safety signs and signals) Regulations
1996.
In general, signs containing symbols
or pictograms which conform to BS
ISO 3864-1:2011 satisfy these
regulations.”
Door control Power door mechanisms will be The automatic opening of the three
mechanisms provided to all final exit doors on final exit doors may present a security
Level 0 upon activation of a risk for the client, if the system were to
confirmed fire due to replacement air operate outside mall opening hours. If
required for the smoke control system. so, the solution for the make-up air of
The final exits will provide the inlet the smoke control system may be
air for the system, as described in reviewed at the next design stage.
Section 6.6.5.1. The power door
Fire Safety Provision Comments Risks & Opportunities
Multiple occupancy premises should be provided with a common detection and alarm system
appropriate to the individual risks. In areas with noisy environments or where people might
otherwise have difficulty in hearing the fire alarm, flashing warning beacons must be
considered (i.e. mall circulation, retail, and cinema).
Figure 5 Escape routes 45° or more apart Angle ABD should be at least 45°.
Alternative routes are available from C because CBA or CBD (whichever is less) should
angle ACB is 45° or more, and therefore CA or be no more than the maximum distance
CB (whichever is the less) should be no more of travel given for alternative routes,
than the maximum distance for travel given for and CB should be no more than the
alternative routes. maximum distance for travel where
Alternative routes are not available from D there are no alternative routes
because angle ADB is less than 45°. There is
also no alternative route from E.
a) Option 1 b) Option 2 (travel distance in dead-
end condition)
NOTE The use of dotted lines is to aid use of the diagrams and does not have any other
significance
Single escape routes and exits
A single escape route is acceptable in the following situations:
parts of a floor from which a storey exit can be reached within the travel distance limit for
travel in one direction, provided that, in the case of places of assembly and bars, no one
room in this situation has an occupant capacity of more than 60 people, or 30 people if the
occupants require assistance to escape;
levels with an occupant capacity of not more than 60 people, provided that the travel
distance limit for travel in one direction only is not exceeded.
In many cases there is no alternative at the beginning of the route. For example, there might
be only one exit from a room to a corridor, from which point escape is possible in two
directions. This is acceptable provided that the overall distance to the nearest storey exit is
within the limits for routes where there is an alternative, and the “one direction only” section
of the route does not exceed the limit for travel where there is no alternative.
5.3.5.1 Doors
The door width per person expected to use the door should generally not be less than the
value given for the appropriate risk profile and the total door width should be:
not less than the aggregate of the exit widths; and
not less than 800 mm regardless of risk profile.
However, if additional fire protection measures are provided the width may be reduced
subject to certain limitations.
NOTE An increased door width might be necessary on some access routes.
Where the minimum level of fire protection measures are provided the minimum width of doors
based upon the risk profile is:
Risk profile Minimum door width per person (mm)
A2 3.6
B2 4.1
B3 6
If a storey has two or more storey exits it has to be assumed that a fire might prevent the
occupants from using one of them. The remaining exit(s) need to be wide enough to allow all
the occupants to leave quickly. Therefore, when calculating the aggregate of the exit widths
the largest exit width should be discounted.
Generally, the total width of doors is calculated by multiplying the maximum number of
occupants by the minimum door width per person for the appropriate risk profile. This is
calculated as follows:
𝐶∗𝑑
𝑊=
𝑁−1
Where:
W = Door width
C = Occupancy Capacity
d = Minimum door width per person in mm
N = Minimum number of exits, when more than one is provided, or number of exits actually
provided if the minimum number is exceeded.
NOTE 1 This can result in very wide exits and additional exits may be provided to reduce the actual width
of the exits.
Where:
WT = Total Exit Width with minimum Fire Safety Measures in place;
C = Occupancy Capacity;
WTP = Total Exit Width when additional fire safety measures are in place;
WA= Average Exit Width with minimum Fire Safety Measures in place;
WAP = Average Exit Width when additional fire safety measures are in place.
It is demonstrated that very wide exits are required when limited to the minimum number of
exits.
For the purposes of this case study the minimum fire safety requirements have been exceeded
and as a result the exit widths applicable to the malls have been taken to be the figure for
“Additional Fire Safety Measures”.
Figure 4: Examples Showing 5 Stairs on Level 3
As identified in Table 10, the level 3 requires a minimum total of 18.84m of exit width. The
proposed stair locations, and protected corridors identifies a total of 5 stairs required based on
the number of people expected, and minimum exit numbers required. Therefore, each stair
will be sized to 3.8m width (18.84m divided by 5 total stairs). This example applies to the
shopping centre mall area only, the cinema exit example is identified in Section 5.4.1.
NOTE: The Food court consists of a standing area immediately in front of the kiosk
where people wait to be served and a seating area with tables and chairs for
people to eat their food. These two areas have been included in the mall
capacity as they are open to the mall with no clear delineation between the
areas.
Note: The total width calculation uses a value of 6mm per person to calculate the exit width
and where additional fire safety measures are in place this value reduces to 5.3mm per
person.
The width of the escape stairs is dependent on the occupancy use of the area which it serves.
The minimum width of the upward and downward travel defined by BS 9999 is shown in
Figure 10. The required width of escape stairs which serve a simultaneous evacuation, as
described below, should be compared to values in Table 12, to confirm compliance.
Table 12: Occupancy Characteristic (Table from BS 9999)
As an example from the mall area of level 3, the total occupant load within the mall is
expected to be 5709 using the methodology described in Section 5.3.1. Therefore, using the
B2 risk profile minimum width as identified in Table 13, a total of 19.41m of stair width is
required to serve the level 3 mall (3.4mm/persons x 5709 persons = 19.41m). It is currently
proposed for level 3 to have a total of 5 escape stairs serving the mall area, as shown in
Figure 4, therefore, each stair will require an average of 3.88m in width.
As the minimum width per stair serving the level 3 mall is 3.88m, the 1100mm minimum
width for downward travel required by Table 12 has been considered, and is exceeded
appropriately.
Example Level 3 Cinema
The simultaneous evacuation strategy will apply to the entire building including the cinema.
Where shopping centre complexes contain office blocks, hotels, residential accommodation
or places of entertainment such as theatres and cinemas, dance halls, etc. each of these other
occupancies needs to have its own internal means of escape arrangements set out in
accordance with accepted principles.
Alternative exits from these other occupancies should not discharge onto a mall even where
they have an entry from a mall.
Means of escape from these other occupancies should be separate from protected stairways
serving the malls or units. Thus the cinema complex requires its own means of escape as
follows:
Cinema Complex
Occupancy Capacity (C) 1000 (960 + 40)
Including Staff
Risk Profile B2
No of exits/ Stairs *based on exit number provisions 3
from occupant load
Door Exit Width = 1000 persons *3.3 (mm/person) 3.3 m
/1000mm
*based on door exit width
provisions per person
Average Exit Width = 3.3/3 1.1 m
Stair Width = 1000 persons *3.4(mm/person) 3.4 m
/1000mm
*based on stair width provisions
per person
Average Stair Width = 3.4m/3 stair 1.13 m per stair
As the minimum width per stair serving the level 3 cinema is 1130m, the 1100mm minimum
width for downward travel required by Table 12 has been considered, and is exceeded
appropriately.
6.1 Linings
In order to limit the risk of fire and smoke spread, all wall and ceiling linings should meet the
recommendations of BS 9999 Table 35, as follows:
Class of Lining
Location
U.K. National Class European Class
Small rooms of area not more than 30m2 3 D-s3, d2
Other rooms 1 C-s3, d2
Other circulation spaces 0 B-s3, d2
Table 14: Lining classifications
The architect must ensure that the above lining classifications are met through their choice
and specification of materials.
A Class 0 finish must be used in the mall and escape routes and gives the slowest spread of
fire when tested in accordance with BS 476: Part 6 and 7. Typical examples include concrete,
ceramic tiles and plasterboard.
A Class 1 finish can be used in retail units and achieves a slightly lower performance
compared to a Class 0 finish.
A Class 3 finish may be used in small rooms. Typical examples include timber with a density
greater than 400kg/m², timber particle board or glass reinforced polyesters.
6.4 Compartmentation
The large retail unit on the second floor is in excess of 4000m2 and as such is required to be
provided with a compartment wall. However, this is subject to discussion with the tenant.
This should be developed at the next stage of the project in consultation with the tenant.
The guidance in BS 5588 Part 10 identifies the increased hazard to occupants means of
escape within a covered shopping mall, however, specific quantitative methods of
engineering practice is not included in the guidance. Also consulted for guidance, the
Scottish, “Non Domestic Technical Handbook (NDTH), Annex C for additional guidance for
enclosed shopping centres, identifies a minimum mall width to be 6m (measured from shop
to shop front), which consequently exempts fire resisting construction on the shop façade
facing the mall.
It is considered acceptable to design for no additional fire resistance along the shop façade
facing the mall, as the minimum width of the mall circulation area is no less than 6m between
all facing shop units. Furthermore, this is considered acceptable due to the installation of fast
response sprinklers within each shop unit and within the mall circulation area (limiting fire
growth and spread).
6.4.4 Cinema
The cinema is to be treated as a single 60 minute compartment to assist means of escape, and
separation of the mall void. It is also recommended that the Foyer is separated from the
adjoining accommodation by a 60 minute fire rated compartment wall.
6.4.6 Including protection of opening and fire stopping and cavity barriers
Where appropriate, suitable provisions should be made to prevent the unseen spread of fire
and smoke through cavities or concealed spaces by the use of cavity barriers. The provision
of any such barriers should meet the general recommendations of Section 34 of BS 9999.
Openings in any fire-separating element (e.g. compartment walls, cavity barriers, protected
corridor etc.) should be protected with appropriate fire stopping or sealing to ensure that the
fire resistance of the element is not compromised. The provision of any such protection
should meet the general recommendations of Section 35 in BS 9999.
The compartmentation walls which require 60 minutes fire resisting construction (insulation
and integrity), are shown in red in Figure 5 - Figure 8.
Figure 5: Level 0 indicative compartment walls (red lines demark 60 minutes fire compartment walls)
Figure 6: Level 1 indicative compartment walls (red lines demark 60 minutes fire compartment walls)
Figure 7: Level 2 indicative compartment walls (red lines demark 60 minutes fire compartment walls)
Figure 8: Level 3 indicative compartment walls (red lines demark 60 minutes fire compartment walls)
6.6 Smoke control strategy
In order to evaluate the appropriate smoke extract system within each space of the shopping
centre, an analysis was completed to evaluate the potential hazards within the area. Individual
scenarios are considered to review each type of space (i.e. shop, circulation area, cinema) to
determine the appropriate means of smoke control for life safety purposes, and smoke
clearance after a fire event. The detailed consideration of each design fire for smoke control
purposes is explained in section 6.6.6.
The shop units and mall circulation space will be divided into smoke control zones according
to area and length. The mechanical smoke extraction system in a specific zone will activate
upon a confirmed fire within that smoke zone. The perforated ceiling will allow for smoke to
travel within the ceiling void. The mechanical extract is designed to keep the smoke layer
formation just above the false ceiling height, as illustrated in Figure 9.
Each defined smoke control zone will require powered extraction according to the extraction
rates detailed in Section 6.6.3. A smoke barrier, or downstand, will be provided around the
perimeter of each smoke control zone. The design intent is to restrict smoke flow to adjacent
smoke control zones by extracting the smoke at a rate which will keep the smoke layer within
the ceiling void of the original smoke zone of fire origin.
Activation of extraction system zone
Each smoke extraction system in a specific zone will activate upon a confirmed fire within
that zone. Scenarios which lead to a confirmed fire are described in Table 7.
Addressable smoke detectors will be located at false ceiling level within each zone, designed
to BS 5839-Part 1, as described in Section 5.2. Additionally, the fire brigade and building
management may activate a specific smoke extraction zone via the fire control panel (located
in the Fire Control Centre, as described in Section 8.2).
Smoke strategy principles within the building:
Shop units greater than 1300m2 will be provided with their own mechanical smoke
extraction system within the false ceiling design.
Shop units which are less than 1300m2 will be provided with mechanical smoke
extraction within the false ceiling design, which will be shared with adjacent units (up to
a combined maximum area of 1300m2)
Mall circulation space with a floor slab directly above will be provided with mechanical
smoke extraction within the false ceiling design.
Atrium 1, 2, and 3 (as identified in Figure 13) will be provided with mechanical smoke
extraction within the false ceiling at roof level.
Dome 1 (as identified in Figure 13) will have a smoke clearance system, utilising the day-
to-day HVAC system to clear smoke if it accumulates at high levels (not for life safety
purposes).
The smaller dome voids on level 0 will have a smoke clearance system, utilising natural
ventilation if smoke accumulates at high levels (not for life safety purposes).
The kitchen area within the food court on level 3 will have local hood extraction at each
kitchen unit (in addition to a bespoke suppression system for each hob). No additional
smoke extraction will be provided.
The cinema will utilise the day-to-day HVAC system to clear smoke in the event of a fire
(the cinema does not require additional smoke extraction for life safety purposes).
The details regarding the smoke strategy / zoning principles are detailed within Section 6.6.3.
An illustration in section view of the false ceiling design in shown in Figure 10.
The shop units, which exceed 1300m2, will have their own separate smoke zone. If the
specific retail shop exceeds 1300m2, the unit will require two zones, etc. No smoke zone
should exceed 1300m2.
Each shop unit, which is less than 1300 m2, will also have a smoke extraction system.
However, the ceiling void above the shop unit will be shared with the adjacent shop units.
Therefore, the smoke reservoir to exhaust smoke will be shared between shop units. The
shared smoke zone system will be designed so no smoke zone exceeds 1300m2. An example
of the smoke zoning for shop units is shown in Figure 11. As described in Section 6.4.2, the
walls between retail units are to be provided with 60 minutes fire resistance.
The smoke extraction rate per zone for the retail units is 12.1m3/s. This is based for a
potential fire size of 2.5MW fire. The design fire size was established by means of sprinkler
consideration and guidance from BRE 368. The design fire discussion is presented in Section
6.6.6.1. The extraction rate is based on an axisymmetric plume (i.e. the fire is located below
the smoke zone and bellows directly into the false ceiling / smoke reservoir).
It is a primary client goal to allow for a flexible design, in which shop units can change tenant
in the future. The shop locations as drawn currently may change, as tenants wish to combine
units and alter shop fronts. Given the extraction rate is based on an analysis from an
axisymmetric plume, the rate is less than would be required for a balcony spill plume. A spill
plume analysis would require additional consideration to elements of the store architecture.
The benefit of the smoke extraction within each shop unit is this presents no limitations on
the width of the store entrance door. There is also potential for shop units to combine, or
change storefront design. As this is a key goal of the clients, this solution offers the best
solution for flexibility for future changes.
It is of the building owner’s responsibility that the base build design of the false ceiling
reservoir (downstand) arrangement, which is shared between units, remains intact. Any
changes to this design will comprise the design intent of the smoke control strategy and will
need to be redesigned by a competent fire engineer.
6.6.3.2 Mall circulation space
The mall circulation space, which includes only areas that have a direct floor slab 5.5 m
above (not to include any void areas), will have the same extraction system as specified for
the shop units. The design fire is also specified as 2.5MW, see Section 6.6.6.2 for details. The
mall zoning strategy is identified per level in Figure 18 - Figure 21 . The extraction rate per
smoke zone within the mall circulation space is also 12.1m3/s.
A section view example of the mall circulation space is identified as design fire 2 in Section
6.6.6.2.
6.6.3.3.2 Atrium 3
The 4m x 4m voids on levels 1 and 2 which span across the south circulation area of the mall
will be treated as one atrium. Similar to Atrium’s 1 and 2, the space will have mechanical
smoke extraction around the perimeter of the roof (also assuming the roof is mainly skylight).
Given the smaller size of the voids, the fuel load is assumed to be items such as kiosks. For
the purposes of this stage C design, the fire size for this atrium is assumed to be 2.5MW. The
details regarding the design fire chosen for this space is explained Section 6.6.6.4.
The atrium smoke extraction is designed for an axisymmetric plume, which is for a fire
located directly below the 4m x 4m void. The extraction rate is designed to keep the smoke
layer 4.0m above level 3 (the highest walking surface). The exhaust rate required for an
axisymmetric plume to generate a smoke layer to remain above 15.0m from the base of the
fire is 69.5 m3/s.
If a fire within this atrium on ground level is below the level 1 floor slab, the smoke will be
extracted through the local mall circulation space extraction system. Although the space is
treated as a large atrium, the floor slabs on level 1 and 2 may be considered obstructions for
possible smoke extraction at roof level. A fire within that void may generate a plume width
exceeding 4m, and smoke could spread to level 1 or 2.
A basic engineered analysis is applied to approximate the potential smoke plume width at
level 1 and 2, for an axisymmetric plume at level 0. Chapter 51, Control by Mechanical
Exhaust or Natural venting in the 5th Edition of the SFPE Handbook, approximates a plume
diameter to be 25-50% of the distance above the top of the fuel package.
Using the most onerous approximation for plume with diameter of 50% above the base of the
fire, a fire at ground level may have a plume width of 5.5m when it reaches level 2 (11m
above ground). Therefore, it is expected for smoke to spill to level 2. As there is a local
smoke extraction system at level 2, the excess smoke may be detected and the smoke control
extract system at level 2 may clear this smoke. With two smoke control systems runnign at
the same time, it must be ensured that there is sufficient inlet air being achieved as part of the
design calculation.
A section view to illustrate the basic smoke control principle within Atrium 3, is shown in
Figure 15.
6.6.3.7 Cinema
The cinema does not require a dedicated smoke extraction for life safety purposes. As
described in Section 5.1.2 the evacuation of the cinema is separate from the mall/food court
area, provided with its own egress stairs sized for simultaneous evacuation.
If smoke were to accumulate in a cinema, the mechanical ventilation system installed could
be designed to be used to remove smoke.
Figure 29: Christmas tree heat release rate versus time (image from BRE design fire guidance)
The worst case scenario, identified as Tree 3, shows a total output just above 5MW in just 50
seconds from ignition. Given this data, a 5MW fire is used for Christmas tree design fires.
Although the tree burns very quickly, and may not produce steady-state like conditions (as it
is only at its peak for above 20 seconds), additional decorations or adjacent fuel load such as
chairs may contribute to the total ignition source. The 5MW design fire is therefore
considered an appropriate fire size to determine the smoke extraction rates at this stage. There
is a potential in subsequent design stages to re-evaluate potential fuel load within Atrium 2 in
order to reduce the extraction rate required in the large space.
Mechanical extraction calculations
The mechanical extraction is sized to accommodate a 5MW fire on the ground floor, which is
located directly under the large void which extends to roof level. Therefore, an axisymmetric
plume is considered within the atrium.
Similar input parameters as described in design fire 1 have been applied, as detailed in Table
19.
The atrium is a total of 25m tall, and the available reservoir depth is 6m. The calculations are
therefore considered to keep a 19.0m clear layer height.
Table 19: Input values to calculate the mechanical exhaust rate required – Design fire 3
Similar to design fire 2, it is assumed that kiosks will line the centre of the Section A-A
(south) mall area. Given there are 4m x 4m voids above the mall circulation area, it is
assumed large Christmas trees will not be located within these smaller voids, and will be
placed in Atrium 1 or 2. Therefore, the kiosk fire size as described in 6.6.6.2 is assumed
within this space.
Mechanical extraction calculations
Atrium 3 is considered an open space due to the 4m x 4m voids located along Section A-A.
The mechanical extraction is sized to accommodate a 2.5MW fire on the ground floor, which
is located directly under a 4m x 4m void. Therefore, an axisymmetric plume is considered
within the atrium.
It is assumed if a kiosk is located underneath the level 1 floor slab, the local mechanical
extract will exhaust the smoke as designed.
Similar input parameters as described in design fires 1-3 have been applied, as detailed in
Table 20.
The atrium is a total of 19.5m tall, and the available reservoir depth is 4.5m. The calculations
are therefore considered to keep a 15.0m clear layer height.
Table 20: Input values to calculate the mechanical exhaust rate required – Design fire 4
It is advised that q is equal to 10 kW/m2 which represents the radiation required to ignite
clothing, paper, etc. Following this methodology a provisional separation distance can be
calculated as below:
Assuming a worst case fire scenario of 5MW (BRE 368 unsprinklered fire), over an area of
10m2, a separation distance from the centre of a fire to an adjacent retail unit or kiosk is
calculated as approximately 4m.
It should be noted that BS 9999 requires the escape provisions to be considered should the
retail islands reduce the exit widths through the concourse. As such the methodology for
calculating the separation distance, and the impact on means of escape should these kiosks be
installed, will be assessed during the next stage of the design (when the dimensions, and fuel
loads of the kiosks can be fully understood).
The separation distance of the fuel load package (kiosks) configuration and fit out will
require understanding from the building management team, this responsibility is identified in
Section 9.
Under the guidance of BS 9999, it is necessary to construct the external walls such that the
amount of unprotected area on the side of the building overlooking the elevation is restricted,
such that the potential for fire spread by radiant heat transfer is limited.
In order to evaluate the external fire spread requirements, the relevant boundaries to existing
or potential buildings (or property) is considered. It has been assumed that the shopping
centre is located at a distance sufficiently removed from these relevant boundaries and the
risk of fire spreading to or from the shopping mall is negligible.
A shopping centre with a floor level more than 7.5m above fire fighter access level and more
than 900m2 in area should be provided with a minimum of two firefighting shafts. The shafts
should be located such that the maximum hose distance to the most remote point of each floor
level is no more than 60m from the dry rising main in either stair, when measured on a route
suitable for laying hose.
Ventilation
Each firefighting shaft should be provided with ventilation to both the stair and the
firefighting lobby.
Ventilation to the stair can be achieved by the provision of a 1.5m2 openable ventilator
located over the head of the stair. Alternatively, a 1.0m2 ventilator can be provided at every
storey level.
Ventilation of the firefighting lobby may be provided by one of the following methods:
A 1.5m2 openable ventilator direct to outside at every storey above/below entry level.
A mechanical ventilation system consisting of a smoke shaft approximately 0.5m2 in area.
A 1.5m2 automatically opening vent which discharges into a natural smoke shaft
measuring 3m2 in plan area.
All access routes for fire service vehicles should satisfy the following specification (it should
be noted that this can vary from Service to Service, and is subject to consultation with the
Statutory Authority):-
Access should be provided for a Fire Service pump appliance to within 18m of the dry rising
main inlet within the firefighting shaft and those in each of the stairs serving the cinema. The
guidance in BS 9999 recommends that if any portion of the route is a ‘dead-end‘, turning
facilities will be required (e.g. turning circle, hammerhead, or other point at which vehicle
can turn) so that Fire Service vehicles do not have to reverse more than 20m.
Fire Hydrants
If any building is constructed more than 100m from an existing hydrant in BS 9999
recommends that additional hydrants should be provided within 90m of an entry point to the
building or a dry rising main inlet and not more than 90m apart.
The provision of fire hydrants is subject to confirmation regarding the location of existing
statutory street hydrants around the site, and following conducting a water main water flow
and pressure test to confirm the water flow characteristics in vicinity to the building.
A fire control centre should be provided in in large/complex buildings, to enable the Fire
Service to assist the premises management control an incident immediately on arrival.
The fire control centre should be adjacent to a Fire Service access point, or other location
agreed with the Fire Service, and it should be readily accessible, preferably directly from the
open air. If this is not practicable, the route to the fire control centre should be protected. An
indicative location for the fire control centre is shown in Figure 34.
The fire control centre should be provided with a 3 hours non-maintained system of
emergency lighting supplied from a source independent of the normal lighting, to enable the
control centre to operate satisfactorily in the absence of the normal lighting supply.
It should be noted that some form of communication should be provided to the fire control
centre, and all fire safety systems should be available to the Fire Service.
9 MANANGMENT
10 REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
As an example to England specifically, it has been assumed the development will be subject
to the requirements of the Building Regulations 2010 and, therefore, it will be necessary for it
to meet the requirements of Schedule 1 of the Regulations relating Part B1-B5, as listed in
Section 2.1. Guidance on how these functional requirements can be achieved in buildings is
provided in a number of guidance documents, such as Approved Document B - Fire Safety
(the ‘AD-B’). However, AD-B is not the only method of achieving compliance and this
document permits the use of Fire Engineering as an alternative tool for achieving compliance.
On this basis, it has been proposed to design the building using the guidance given in BS
9999: Code of Practice for fire safety in the design, management and use of buildings.
The fire design solution as explained in Section 4 - 9 outline the key fire safety design
solutions for the SFPE shopping centre at RIBA design stage 2. It is understood, that at this
early concept design stage, the current architectural drawings are still to be resolved, and
changes to the design are anticipated. As such the proposed design solution must be reviewed
in the next design by a competent fire engineer to determine the solution validity given
alternations to the proposed SFPE shopping centre design.
As a part of the concept stage design, the proposed design must be reviewed determine if the
design solution does meet the goals and constraints driven by all stakeholders involved. The
principle fire safety features, as described in Table 7 identify potential risks and opportunities
at this design stage given the proposed design solution. The following items may be further
discussed with stakeholders during the next design stage.
12 CONCLUSION
This document outlines the key fire safety considerations for the SFPE shopping centre. The
U.K. SFPE chapter team, has applied qualitative design review, by considering the design
goals and constraints (both typical to the UK and in line with the SFPE design brief) to
determine an optimal design solution for a concept stage design. The fire safety solution is
comprised of the fire strategy, the fire safety features and system, and a fire safety
management plan. The fire safety provision are outlined in Section 4, and the detailed
consideration of the fire features, system, and management are described in Section 5 – 9
within the report.
The key aims of the fire strategy which include, (1) safeguarding occupants from injury due
to fire and smoke during egress, (2) safeguarding fire fighting during fire and rescue
operations, (3) minimizing the smoke and fire spread inside the building, and (4) limiting the
impact on business continuity, have all been considered methodically to deliver the optimal
design for the client, tenants, and the buildings future inhabitants.
Key design features which address these goals include:
Means of escape provisions which consider a total evacuation (simultaneous evacuation)
strategy from both the mall and cinema. Each area within the building has been
considered for adequate travel distances, and horizontal, and vertical escape access
widths.
The simultaneous evacuation strategy is activated on a double-knock detection system
which allows for full evacuation only upon a confirmed fire. This will minimise the event
of a false alarm, to limit the impact on business continuity.
A sprinkler system will be installed throughout the building to limit fire and smoke spread
to the room of origin, for the purpose of life safety, property protection, and business
continuity.
The mall circulation space and atria are designed with mechanical exhaust, to limit smoke
spread and safeguard occupants during egress by designing the system to allow for a clear
height above the highest walking surface (smoke reservoir within false ceiling void).
All shop units are designed with mechanical smoke extraction. As it is a key goal for the
client to allow for flexibility within the shop tenant fit out units, the smoke control
strategy has been developed to provide flexibility for each unit within the base build
design. This smoke control design will allow for future tenant shop change of size (i.e.
small units combine to large units), and change of shop front design (i.e. no restrictions
on door width). This design will also reduce impact on business continuity by limiting the
need for additional construction of exhaust systems in future. By designing smoke
extraction within each shop unit, smoke spread throughout the mall is reduced.
A number of risks and opportunities have been identified in Section 12, which will be
developed in subsequent design stages both with the design team and with the approving
authorities. The client must review and provide any feedback on the proposed strategy prior
to the commencement of the subsequent design stage. Further any other fire requirements
from external stakeholders, such as insurers or tenants, must be provided as soon as possible
to enable these to be incorporated into the fire strategy.
Further it is recommended that discussions with the approving authorities are initiated early
in the subsequent design phase, so the proposal can gain agreement ‘in principle’ at an early
stage of the design.
All tenants are responsible for developing a fire safety management plan for their respective
tenancies and for ensuring that these are co-ordinated. To this end, specific management
requirements which must be accounted for in order to enable the efficiency of the fire safety
solution have been highlighted in Section 9 and must be incorporated into the landlord and
tenant fire safety management plans, as produced by others.
Overall it is considered that the life safety standards required for compliance with the
municipal Building Regulations can be achieved within the building in subsequent design
stages through the fire strategy solution outlined in this report.
13 REFERENCES