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@ e petitioner invokes t e constitutionally protected rig t to life and liberty guaranteed

by t e due process clause, alleging t at no prima facie case as been establis ed to
warrant t e filing of an information for subversion against im. Petitioner asks t is Court
to pro ibit and prevent t e respondents from using t e iron arm of t e law to arass,
oppress, and persecute im, a member of t e democratic opposition in t e P ilippines. 

@ e background of t is case is a matter of public knowledge. 

A ras of bombings occurred in t e Metro Manila area in t e mont s of August,

September and October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a
P ilippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed imself and
injured is younger brot er, Romeo, as a result of t e explosion of a small bomb inside
is room at t e YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and
military aut orities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at t e birt day
party of former Congressman Raul Daza eld at t e latter's residence in a Los Angeles
suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and is wife were among t ose w ose likenesses
appeared in t e group pictures toget er wit ot er guests, including Lovely. 

As a result of t e serious injuries e suffered, Lovely was broug t by military and police
aut orities to t e AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) w ere e was placed in t e
custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under t e over-all direction of General
Fabian Ver, ead of t e National Intelligence and Security Aut ority (NISA). S ortly
afterwards, Mr. Lovely and is two brot ers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely were c arged
wit subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. 
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one
w ic resulted in t e deat of an American lady w o was s opping at Rustan's
Supermarket in Makati and ot ers w ic caused injuries to a number of persons. 

On September 20, 1980, t e President's anniversary television radio press conference

was broadcast. @ e younger brot er of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during t e
conference. In is interview, Romeo stated t at e ad driven is elder brot er, Victor,
to t e petitioner's ouse in Green ills on two occasions. @ e first time was on August
20, 1980. Romeo stated t at Victor did not bring any bag wit im on t at day w en e
went to t e petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag w en e left. @ e second time
was in t e afternoon of August 31, 1980 w en e broug t Victor only to t e gate of t e
petitioner's ouse. Romeo did not enter t e petitioner's residence. Neit er did e return
t at day to pick up is brot er. 

@ e next day, newspapers came out wit almost Identical eadlines stating in effect t at
petitioner ad been linked to t e various bombings in Metro Manila. 

Meanw ile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of t e ospital's intensive
care unit and transferred to t e office of Col. Madella w ere e was eld
incommunicado for some time. 

On t e nig t of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to ave exploded at t ree
big otels in Metro Manila, namely: P ilippine Plaza, Century Park S eraton and Manila
Peninsula. @ e bombs injured nine people. A meeting of t e General Military Council
was called for October 6, 1980. 

On October 19, 1980, minutes after t e President ad finis ed delivering is speec

before t e International Conference of t e American Society of @ravel Agents at t e
P ilippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Wit in t e next
twenty-four ours, arrest, searc , and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against
persons w o were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in t e series of bombings in
Metro Manila. One of t em was erein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered imself to be a
"state witness" and in is letter to t e President, e stated t at e will reveal everyt ing
e knows about t e bombings. 

On October 21, 1980, elements of t e military went to t e ospital room of t e petitioner

at t e Manila Medical Center w ere e was confined due to is recurrent and c ronic
ailment of bronc ial ast ma and placed im under arrest. @ e arresting officer s owed
t e petitioner t e ASSO form w ic owever did not specify t e c arge or c arges
against im. For some time, t e petitioner's lawyers were not permitted to visit im in is
ospital room until t is Court in t e case of `
 
 
 ., (G.R.
No. 55345, October 28, 1980) issued an order directing t at t e petitioner's rig t to be
visited by counsel be respected. 

On November 2, 1980, t e petitioner was transferred against is objections from is

ospital arrest to an isolation room wit out windows in an army prison camp at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati. @ e petitioner states t at e was not informed w y e was
transferred and detained, nor was e ever investigated or questioned by any military or
civil aut ority. 

Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, t e petitioner was released for umanitarian

reasons from military custody and placed "under ouse arrest in t e custody of Mrs.
Lydia Salonga" still wit out t e benefit of any investigation or c arges. 

On December 10, 1980, t e Judge Advocate General sent t e petitioner a "Notice of

Preliminary Investigation" in à


 . (w ic included
petitioner as a co-accused), stating t at "t e preliminary investigation of t e above-
entitled case as been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and t at
petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of t e c arge s eet and t e supporting
evidence wit in w ic to file is counter-evidence. @ e petitioner states t at up to t e
time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to t e contrary,
e as not received any copies of t e c arges against im nor any copies of t e so-
called supporting evidence. 

On February 9, 1981, t e records of t e case were turned over by t e Judge Advocate

General's Office to t e Ministry of Justice. 

On February 24, 1981, t e respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner,
among ot ers of aving violated Republic Act No. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and
Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of t e Revised Penal Code. @ e
inquest court set t e preliminary investigation for Marc 17, 1981. 

On Marc 6, 1981, t e petitioner was allowed to leave t e country to attend a series of

c urc conferences and undergo compre ensive medical examinations of t e eart,
stomac , liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of is left eye to save is rig t
eye. Petitioner Salonga almost died as one of t e principal victims of t e dastardly
bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971. Since t en, e
as suffered serious disabilities. @ e petitioner was riddled wit s rapnel and pieces still
remain in various parts of is body. He as an AV fistula caused by a piece of s rapnel
lodged one millimeter from is aorta. @ e petitioner as limited use of is one remaining
and and arms, is completely blind and p ysical in t e left eye, and as scar like
formations in t e remaining rig t eye. He is totally deaf in t e rig t ear and partially deaf
in t e left ear. @ e petitioner's p ysical ailments led im to seek treatment abroad. 

On or around Marc 26, 1981, t e counsel for petitioner was furnis ed a copy of an
amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated Marc 12, 1981, c arging
t e petitioner, along wit 39 ot er accused wit t e violation of R.A. 1700, as amended
by P.D. 885, Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary
investigation were conducted. @ e prosecution presented as its witnesses Ambassador
Armando Fernandez, t e Consul General of t e P ilippines in Los Angeles, California,
Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA C ief, Investigation and Legal Panel of t e Presidential
Security Command and Victor Lovely imself. 
On October 15, 1981, t e counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss t e c arges
against petitioner for failure of t e prosecution to establis a prima facie case against
im. 

On December 2, 1981, t e respondent judge denied t e motion. On January 4, 1982,

e issued a resolution ordering t e filing of an information for violation of t e Revised
Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including erein petitioner. 

@ e resolutions of t e respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982

are now t e subject of t e petition. It is t e contention of t e petitioner t at no prima
facie case as been establis ed by t e prosecution to justify t e filing of an information
against im. He states t at to sanction is furt er prosecution despite t e lack of
evidence against im would be to admit t at no rule of law exists in t e P ilippines
today. 

After a painstaking review of t e records, t is Court finds t e evidence offered by t e

prosecution utterly insufficient to establis a prima facie case against t e petitioner. We
grant t e petition. 

However, before going into t e merits of t e case, we s all pass upon a procedural
issue raised by t e respondents. 

@ e respondents call for ad erence to t e consistent rule t at t e denial of a motion to

quas or to dismiss, being interlocutory in c aracter, cannot be questioned by certiorari;
t at since t e question of dismissal will again be considered by t e court w en it
decides t e case, t e movant as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in t e ordinary
course of law; and t at public interest dictates t at criminal prosecutions s ould not be
enjoined. 

@ e general rule is correctly stated. However, t e respondents fail to appreciate or take

into account certain exceptions w en a petition for certiorari is clearly warranted. @ e
case at bar is one suc exception. 

In t e case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) t e same contentions were advanced by
t e respondents to wit: 

xxx xxx xxx

... Respondents advert to t e rule t at w en a motion to quas filed by an accused in a

criminal case s all be denied, t e remedy of t e accused-movant is not to file a petition
for certiorari or mandamus or pro ibition, t e proper recourse being to go to trial, wit out
prejudice to is rig t to reiterate t e grounds invoked in is motion to quas if an adverse
judgment is rendered against im, in t e appeal t at e may take t erefrom in t e
manner aut orized by law. (Oà 101 P il. 599;  à 
13 SCRA 309.) 

On t is argument, we ruled: 
 @ ere is no disputing t e validity and wisdom of t e rule invoked by t e respondents.
However, it is also recognized t at, under certain situations, recourse to t e extraordinary
legal remedies of certiorari, pro ibition or mandamus to question t e denial of a motion to
quas is considered proper in t e interest of "more enlig tened and substantial justice",
as was so declared in †  G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969." 

Infinitely more important t an conventional ad erence to general rules of criminal

procedure is respect for t e citizen's rig t to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and
punis ment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. @ e integrity of a
democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in t e trial of around
forty persons w en on t e very face of t e record no evidence linking im to t e alleged
conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, imself a victim of t e still unresolved
and einous Plaza Miranda bombings, was arrested at t e Manila Medical Center w ile
ospitalized for bronc ial ast ma. W en arrested, e was not informed of t e nature of
t e c arges against im. Neit er was counsel allowed to talk to im until t is Court
intervened t roug t e issuance of an order directing t at is lawyers be permitted to
visit im (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only
after four mont s of detention was t e petitioner informed for t e first time of t e nature
of t e c arges against im. After t e preliminary investigation, t e petitioner moved to
dismiss t e complaint but t e same was denied. Subsequently, t e respondent judge
issued a resolution ordering t e filing of an information after finding t at a prima facie
case ad been establis ed against an of t e forty persons accused. 

In t e lig t of t e failure to s ow prima facie t at t e petitioner was probably guilty of

conspiring to commit t e crime, t e initial disregard of petitioner's constitutional rig ts
toget er wit t e massive and damaging publicity made against im, justifies t e
favorable consideration of t is petition by t is Court. Wit former Senator Benigno
Aquino, Jr. now deceased, t ere are at least 38 ot er co-accused to be tried wit t e
petitioner. @ e prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt against eac
and every one of t e 39 accused, most of w om ave varying participations in t e
c arge for subversion. @ e prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and t e only source
of information wit regard to t e alleged link between t e petitioner and t e series of
terrorist bombings is now in t e United States. @ ere is reason to believe t e petitioner's
citation of international news dispatc es  t at t e prosecution may find it difficult if not
infeasible to bring im back to t e P ilippines to testify against t e petitioner. If Lovely
refused to testify before an American federal grand jury ow could e possibly be made
to testify w en t e c arges against t e respondent come up in t e course of t e trial
against t e 39 accused. Considering t e foregoing, we find it in t e interest of justice to
resolve at t is stage t e issue of w et er or not t e respondent judge gravely abused
is discretion in issuing t e questioned resolutions. 

@ e respondents contend t at t e prosecution will introduce additional evidence during

t e trial and if t e evidence, by t en, is not sufficient to prove t e petitioner's guilt, e
would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under t e circumstances of t is case, at w at cost
not only to t e petitioner but to t e basic fabric of our criminal justice system? 
@ e term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence w ic , if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain t e proposition it supports or to establis t e
facts, or to counter-balance t e presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. @ e
question raised before us now is: Were t e evidences against t e petitioner
uncontradicted and if t ey were unexplained or uncontradicted, would t ey, standing
alone, sufficiently overcome t e presumption of innocence and warrant is conviction? 

We do not t ink so. 

@ e records reveal t at in finding a case against t e petitioner, t e respondent judge

relied only on t e testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador
Armando Fernandez, w en called upon to testify on subversive organizations in t e
United States now ere mentioned t e petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of
t e Movement for Free P ilippines (MFP), or any of t e organizations mentioned in t e
complaint. Col. Diego, on t e ot er and, w en asked w at evidence e was able to
gat er against t e petitioner depended only on t e statement of Lovely "t at it was t e
residence of ex-Senator Salonga w ere t ey met toget er wit Renato @añada, one of
t e brains of t e bombing conspiracy ... and t e fact t at Sen. Salonga as been
meeting wit several subversive personnel based in t e U.S.A. was also revealed to me
by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on t e group pictures taken at former Congressman
Raul Daza's birt day party. In concluding t at a conspiracy exists to overt row by
violent means t e government of t e P ilippines in t e United States, is only bases
were "documentary as well as p ysical and sworn statements t at were referred to me
or taken by me personally," w ic of course negate personal knowledge on is part.
W en asked by t e court ow e would categorize petitioner in any of t e subversive
organizations, w et er petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, t e witness
replied: 

A. @o categorize former Senator Salonga if e were an organizer, e is an officer or e is

a member, your Honor, please, we ave to consider t e surrounding circumstances and
on is involvement: first, Senator Salonga wanted always to travel to t e United States at
least once a year or more often under t e pretext of to undergo some sort of operation
and participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp- 14-15) 

Suc testimony, being based on affidavits of ot er persons and purely earsay, can
ardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It s ould not ave been given
credence by t e court in t e first place. Hearsay evidence, w et er objected to or not, -
as no probative value as t e affiant could not ave been cross-examined on t e facts
stated t erein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112 SCRA
661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, imself, was personally examined by t e court, t ere
was no need for t e testimony of Col. Diego. @ us, t e inquest judge s ould ave
confined is investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, t e sole witness w ose testimony ad
apparently implicated petitioner in t e bombings w ic eventually led to t e filing of t e
information. 

Lovely's account of t e petitioner's involvement wit t e former's bombing mission is

found in is sworn statement made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on
October 17, 1980 at t e AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as a
prosecution or state witness but only as a
 
!
 for is two younger brot ers,
Romeo and Baltazar, w o were bot included in t e complaint but w o were later
dropped from t e information. Victor Lovely was examined by is counsel and cross-
examined by t e fiscal. In t e process, e Identified t e statement w ic e made
before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, t e prosecution made
a manifestation before t e court t at it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness. 

According to Lovely's statement, t e following events took place: 

36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you w ere to stay? 
A. Yes, at first e told me to c eck-in at Manila Hotel or t e Plaza Hotel w ere somebody would
come to contact me and give t e materials needed in t e execution of my mission. I t oug t t is
was not safe so I disagreed wit im. Mr. Psinakis c anged t e plan and instead told me to visit
t e residence of Ex-Sen. Jovito Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me t ere to
give t e materials I needed to accomplis my mission 
37. Q. Did you comply as instructed? 
A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at t e residence of Mr. Jo nny C ua,
usband of my business partner, t en I went to t e Hospital w ere I visited my mot er and
c ecked-in at Room 303 of t e YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila. 
38. Q. Did you visit t e residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by Psinakis? 
A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place t ree (3) times, t e first visit was August 20 or 21, and t e last
was 4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to t ese visits, I @ALKED to im on t e p one
about t ree or four times. On my first visit, I told im "I am expecting an attac e case from
somebody w ic will be delivered to your ouse," for w ic Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang
nagpunta dito at wala namang attac e case para sa iyo." However, if your attac e case arrives,
I'll just call you." I gave im my number. On my second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so
just come back on t e 31st of August at 4 P.M." On t at date, I was wit friends at Batulao Resort
and ad to urry back to be at Salonga's place for t e appointment. I arrived at Salonga's place at
exactly 4 P.M. 
39. Q. W at appened t en? 
A. I was us ered to t e sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined me in
t e sala. Sen. Salonga informed me t at somebody will be coming to give me t e attac e case
but did not tell me t e name. 
40. Q. Are t ere any subject matters you discuss w ile waiting for t at somebody to deliver your
materials? 
A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I ave met, I explained to im t e efforts of Raul Daza
in setting up t at meeting but I ave previous business commitments at Norfolk, Virginia. I told
im, owever, t at t roug t e efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to talk wit Ninoy Aquino in t e
airport telep one boot in San Francisco. He also asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and
t e latest opposition group activities but it seems e is well informed.
41. Q. How long did you wait until t at somebody arrived? 
A. About t irty (30) minutes. 
41. Q. W at appened w en t e man arrived? 
A. @ is man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato @añada Jovy Salonga was
t e one w o met im and as I observed parang nasa sariling ba ay si @añada nung dumating.
@ ey talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not ear w at t ey talked about. After
 t eir w ispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at t is time Atty. "Nits" @añada told me
"Nasa akin ang kailangan mo, nasa kotse." 
43. Q. Were t e materials given to you? 
A. W en Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in Atty. "Nits"
@añadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum w ere before I
alig ted, Atty. @añada anded me a "Puma" bag containing all t e materials I needed. 

xxx xxx xxx

45. Q. W at were t e contents of t e Puma bag? 

A. @en (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watc wit screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces electrical
blasting caps 4" lengt , ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 " lengt , nine (9) pieces
volts dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic packs of ig explosive
about 1 pound weig t eac . 

However, in is interview wit Mr. Ronnie Nat anielz w ic was aired on C annel 4 on
November 8, 1980 and w ic was also offered as evidence by t e accused, Lovely
gave a different story w ic negates t e above testimony insofar as t e petitioner's
participation was concerned: 

xxx xxx xxx

Q. W o were t e people t at you contacted in Manila and for w at purpose? 

A. Before I left for t e P ilippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to c eck in at t e Manila Hotel or t e
Plaza Hotel, and somebody would just deliver t e materials I would need. I disapproved of t is,
and I told im I would prefer a place t at is familiar to me or w o is close to me. Mr. Psinakis
suggested t e residence of Sen. Salonga. 
And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but e was out.
@ e next day I made a call again. I was able to contact im. I made an appointment t see im. I
went to Sen. Salonga's ouse t e following day. I asked Sen. Salonga if someone ad given im
an attac e case for me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I made t ree calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen.
Salonga told me "call me again on t e 31st of August. 


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During t e cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about t e so-called

destabilization plan w ic t e latter mentioned in is sworn statement: 
Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Ex ibit "G" about t e so-
called destabilization plan of Aquino. W en you attended t e birt day party of Raul Daza w erein
Jovito Salonga was also present, was t is destabilization plan as alleged by you already
formulated? 
WI@NESS: 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
COUR@ @O WI@NESS: 
Q. Mr. Witness, w o invited you to t e party? 
A. Raul Daza, your Honor. 
 Q. Were you told t at Mr. Salonga would be present in t e party. 
A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor. 
Q. Alrig t. You said initially it was social but t en it became political. Was t ere any political
action taken as a result of t e party? 
A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (@SN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84). 

Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely w et er in view of t e latter's awareness of t e

p ysical condition of petitioner, e really implicated petitioner in any of t e bombings
t at occurred in Metro Manila. @ e fiscal objected wit out stating any ground. In
sustaining t e objection, t e Court said: 

Sustained . . . @ e use of t e word 'implicate' mig t expand t e role of Mr. Salonga. In

ot er words, you are widening t e avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond t e participation
stated in t e testimony of t is witness about Mr. Salonga, at least, as far as t e evidence
is concerned, I supposed, is only being in t e ouse of Mr. Salonga w ic was used as
t e contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about t e bombings. Now t ese words
ad to be put in t e mout of t is witness. @ at would be unfair to Mr. Salonga. (@SN.
July 8, 1981, p. 67) 

Respondent judge furt er said: 

COUR@: 
As t e Court said earlier, t e parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to t e witness coming
to Manila already t en t e matter of . . . I ave gone over t e statement and t ere is no mention
of Salonga insofar as activities in t e United States is concerned. I don't know w y it concerns
t is cross-examination. 
A@@Y. YAP: 
Because according to im, it was in pursuance of t e plan t at e came to Manila. 
COUR@: 
According to im it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis w o asked im to come ere, but Salonga
was introduced only w en e (Lovely) came ere. Now, t e tendency of t e question is also to
connect Salonga to t e activities in t e United States. It seems to be t e t rust of t e questions. 
COUR@: 
In ot er words, t e point of t e Court as of t e time w en you asked im question, t e focus on
Salonga was only from t e time w en e met Salonga at Green ills. It was t e first time t at t e
name of Salonga came up. @ ere was no mention of Salonga in t e formulation of t e
destabilization plan as affirmed by im. But you are bringing t is up alt oug you are only cross-
examining for Salonga as if is (Lovely's) activities in t e United States affected Salonga. (@SN.
July 8, 1981, pp. 73-74). 

Apparently, t e respondent judge wanted to put t ings in proper perspective by limiting

t e petitioner's alleged "participation" in t e bombing mission only to t e fact t at
petitioner's ouse was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and @añada, w ic
was all t at Lovely really stated in is testimony. 
However, in t e questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, t e respondent judge
suddenly included t e "activities" of petitioner in t e United States as is basis for
denying t e motion to dismiss: 

On t e activities of Salonga in t e United States, t e witness, Lovely, in one of is

statements declared: '@o t e best of my recollection e mentioned of some kind of violent
struggle in t e P ilippines being most likely s ould reforms be not instituted by President
Marcos immediately. 

It is t erefore clear t at t e prosecution's evidence as establis ed facts and

circumstances sufficient for a finding t at excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent
Salonga. @ e Movement for Free P ilippines is undoubtedly a force born on foreign soil it
appears to rely on t e resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining
ascendancy in t e P ilippines wit t e use of force and for t at purpose it as linked itself
wit even communist organizations to ac ieve its end. It appears to rely on aliens for its
supporters and financiers. 

@ e jump from t e "contact point" t eory to t e conclusion of involvement in subversive

activities in t e United States is not only inexplicable but wit out foundation. 

@ e respondents admit t at no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner

Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. @ ere is no proof of is direct
participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, e is tagged as a leader of
subversive organizations for two reasons- 

(1) Because is ouse was used as a "contactpoint"; and 

(2) Because " e mentioned some kind of violent struggle in t e P ilippines being most
likely s ould reforms be not instituted by President Marcos immediately." 

@ e "contact point" t eory or w at t e petitioner calls t e guilt by visit or guilt by

association" t eory is too tenuous a basis to conclude t at Senator Salonga was a
leader or mastermind of t e bombing incidents. @o indict a person simply because some
plotters, masquerading as visitors, ave some ow met in is ouse or office would be to
establis a dangerous precedent. @ e rig t of citizens to be secure against abuse of
governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined. 

@ e testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies.

Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato @añada could not ave w ispered to one anot er
because t e petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not ave met Senator
Salonga at a Manglapus party in Was ington, D.C. in 1977 because t e petitioner left
for t e United States only on R  $-./. Senator Salonga denies aving known
Mr. Lovely in t e United States or in t e P ilippines. He states t at e as undred of
visitors from week to week in is residence but cannot recall any Victor Lovely. 

@ e presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birt day party in Los
Angeles w ere Senator Salonga was a guest is not proof of conspiracy. As stated by
t e petitioner, in is many years in t e turbulent world of politics, e as posed wit all
kinds of people in various groups and various places and could not possibly vouc for
t eir conduct. Commenting on t e matter, newspaper columnist @eodoro Valencia
stated t at Filipinos love to pose wit important visitors and t e picture proves not ing. 

It is likewise probable t at a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's

stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be visiting is ome or office. If a
rebel or subversive appens to pose wit t e petitioner for a group picture at a birt day
party abroad, or even visit im wit ot ers in is ome, t e petitioner does not t ereby
become a rebel or subversive, muc less a leader of a subversive group. More credible
and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonet eless, even if we discount
t e flaws in Lovely's testimony and dismiss t e refutations and arguments of t e
petitioner, t e prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establis a prima facie finding. 

@ e prosecution as not come up wit even a single iota of evidence w ic could

positively link t e petitioner to any proscribed activities of t e Movement for Free
P ilippines or any subversive organization mentioned in t e complaint. Lovely ad
already testified t at during t e party of former Congressman Raul Daza w ic was
alleged to ave been attended by a number of members of t e MFP, no political action
was taken but only political discussion. Furt ermore, t e alleged opinion of t e
petitioner about t e likeli ood of a violent struggle ere in t e P ilippines if reforms are
not instituted, assuming t at e really stated t e same, is not ing but a legitimate
exercise of freedom of t oug t and expression. No man deserves punis ment for is
t oug ts. ,

   And as t e late Justice Oliver W. Holmes
stated in t e case of 011! , 279 U.S. 644, " ... if t ere is any principle of
t e Constitution t at more imperatively calls for attac ment t an any ot er it is t e
principle of free t oug t not free t oug t for t ose w o agree wit us but freedom for t e
t oug t t at we ate." 

We ave adopted t e concept t at freedom of expression is a "preferred" rig t and,

t erefore, stands on a ig er level t an substantive economic or ot er liberties. @ e
primacy, t e ig estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of
our constitutional system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As
explained by Justice Cardozo in à2,

(302 U.S. 319) t is must be so

because t e lessons of istory, bot political and legal, illustrate t at freedom of t oug t
and speec is t e indispensable condition of nearly every ot er form of freedom.
Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. @ is Court is particularly
concerned w en allegations are made t at restraints ave been imposed upon mere
criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to t e
ascertainment of political trut . It cannot be t e basis of criminal indictments. 

@ e United States Supreme Court in R0


1(367 U.S. 290) distinguis ed
between t e   
of t e moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence and speec w ic would prepare a group for violent action
and steel it to suc action. In )0

1(394 U.S. 705), t e American court
distinguis ed between criminal t reats and constitutionally protected speec . 
It stated: 

We do not believe t at t e kind of political yperbole indulged in by petitioner fits wit in

t at statutory term. For we must interpret t e language Congress c ose against t e
background of a profound national commitment to t e principle t at debate on public
issues s ould be unin ibited, robust, and wide open and t at it may well include
ve ement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly s arp attacks on government and public
officials. New York @imes Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S. 254). @ e language of t e political
arena, like t e language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and inexact.
We agree wit petitioner t at is only offense was a kind of very crude offensive met od
of stating a political opposition to t e President. 

In t e case before us, t ere is no teac ing of t e moral propriety of a resort to violence,
muc less an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to organize t e use of force against t e
duly constituted aut orities. @ e alleged remark about t e likeli ood of violent struggle
unless reforms are instituted is not a t reat against t e government. Nor is it even t e
unin ibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly s arp attack w ic is protected by t e
guarantee of free speec . Parent etically, t e American case of  


 `
(395 U.S. 444) states t at t e constitutional guarantees of free speec and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of t e use of force or of law
violation except w ere suc advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce suc action. @ e words w ic petitioner
allegedly used according to t e best recollections of Mr. Lovely are lig t years away
from suc type of proscribed advocacy. 

Political discussion even among t ose opposed to t e present administration is wit in

t e protective clause of freedom of speec and expression. @ e same cannot be
construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of members ip in a subversive
organization. Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragrap 6, political
discussion will only constitute, prima facie evidence of members ip in a subversive
organization if suc discussion amounts to: 

(6) Conferring wit officers or ot er members of suc association or organization 


  
 
&
 
    . 

As stated earlier, t e prosecution as failed to produce evidence t at would establis

any link between petitioner and any subversive organization. Even if we lend credence
to Lovely's testimony t at a political discussion took place at Daza's birt day party, no
proof w atsoever was adduced t at suc discussion was in furt erance of any plan to
overt row t e government t roug illegal means. @ e alleged opinion t at violent
struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means s ows eit er advocacy of or
incitement to violence or furt erance of t e objectives of a subversive organization. 

Lovely also declared t at e ad not ing to do wit t e bombing on August 22, 1980,
w ic was t e only bombing incident t at occurred after is arrival in Manila on August
20, and before t e YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See @SN, pp. 63-63, July
8, 1981). He furt er testified t at: 
WI@NESS: 
 Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against t e government. My
bombing mission was directed against t e particular family (referring to t e Cabarrus family [@SN,

p. 11, July 9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].

Suc a statement w olly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment

w ic Lovely was supposed to ave been commissioned to perform upon t e orders of
is co- accused and w ic was t e very reason w y t ey answer c arged in t e first
place. @ e respondent judge also asked Lovely about t e possible relation between
Cabarrus and petitioner: 
COUR@: 
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, w y did you implicate
Jovito Salonga? 
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga. 

It s ould be noted t at after Lovely's testimony, t e prosecution manifested to t e court

t at it was adopting im as a prosecution witness. @ erefore, t e prosecution became
irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on t e witness stand, t at it was not is
intention "to do some kind of bombing against t e government" and t at e "did not try
to implicate Salonga", especially since Lovely is t e sole witness adopted by t e
prosecution w o could supposedly establis t e link between t e petitioner and t e
bombing incidents. 

@ e respondent court s ould ave taken t ese factors into consideration before
concluding t at a prima facie case exists against t e petitioner. Evidence must not only
proceed from t e mout of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself suc as t e
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under t e
circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In t e case at bar, t e prosecution
cannot even present a credible version of t e petitioner's role in t e bombings even if it
ignores t e subsequent disclaimers of Lovely and wit out relying on mere affidavits
including t ose made by Lovely during is detention. 

@ e resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from t e same defect. In t is resolution,

Lovely's previous declarations about t e bombings as part of t e alleged destabilization
plan and t e people be ind t e same were accorded suc credibility by t e respondent
judge as if t ey ad already been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 

@ e purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure t e innocent against asty,

malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect im from an open and public
accusation of crime, from t e trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect t e state from useless and expensive trials. (@rocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241;
citing Has im v. Boncan, 71 P il. 216). @ e rig t to a preliminary investigation is a
statutory grant, and to wit old it would be to transgress constitutional due process.
(See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy t e due process
clause it is not enoug t at t e preliminary investigation is conducted in t e sense of
making sure t at a transgressor s all not escape wit impunity. A preliminary
investigation serves not only t e purposes of t e State. More important, it is a part of t e
guarantees of freedom and fair play w ic are birt rig ts of all w o live in our country. It
is, t erefore, imperative upon t e fiscal or t e judge as t e case may be, to relieve t e
accused from t e pain of going t roug a trial once it is ascertained t at t e evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or t at no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to t e guilt of t e accused. Alt oug t ere is no general formula or
fixed rule for t e determination of probable cause since t e same be decided in
t e lig t of t e conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a
large degree upon t e finding or opinion of t e judge conducting t e examination, suc
a finding s ould not disregard t e facts before t e judge nor run counter to t e clear
dictates of reasons (See La C emise Lacoste, S.A. v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). @ e
judge or fiscal, t erefore, s ould not go on wit t e prosecution in t e ope t at some
credible evidence mig t later turn up during trial for t is would be a flagrant violation of a
basic rig t w ic t e courts are created to up old. It bears repeating t at t e judiciary
lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rig ts. So it as
been before. It s ould continue to be so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal,
116 SCRA 93). 

@ e Court ad already deliberated on t is case, a consensus on t e Court's judgment

ad been arrived at, and a draft 

was circulating for concurrences and separate
opinions, if any, w en on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted
t e motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop t e subversion case against
t e petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of t e Minister of Justice, t e prosecution
restudied its evidence and decided to seek t e exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as
one of t e accused in t e information filed under t e questioned resolution. 

We were constrained by t is action of t e prosecution and t e respondent Judge to

wit draw t e draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to
place it once again in t e Court's crowded agenda for furt er deliberations. 

Insofar as t e absence of a prima facie case to warrant t e filing of subversion c arges

is concerned, t is decision as been rendered moot and academic by t e action of t e
prosecution. 

Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, owever, t at e is not

precluded from filing new c arges for t e same acts because t e petitioner as not
been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in t at sense, t e case is not
completely academic. 

Recent developments in t is case serve to focus attention on a not too well known
aspect of t e Supreme Court's functions. 

@ e setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State aut ority into
areas reserved by t e Bill of Rig ts for t e individual as constitutionally protected
sp eres w ere even t e awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not
t e totality of t e Court's functions. 
@ e Court also as t e duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It as t e symbolic function of educating benc
and bar on t e extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. 

In
, 
(41 SCRA 1), t e petitioner w o questioned a P1,195,200.00
bail bond as excessive and, t erefore, constitutionally void, escaped from t e provincial
jail w ile is petition was pending. @ e petition became moot because of is escape but
we nonet eless rendered a decision and stated: 

@ e fact t at t e case is moot and academic s ould not preclude t is @ribunal from
setting fort in language clear and unmistakable, t e obligation of fidelity on t e part of
lower court judges to t e unequivocal command of t e Constitution t at excessive bail
s all not be required. 

In 
O (65 SCRA 624) w et er or not t e Cultural Center of t e
P ilippines could validly be created t roug an executive order was mooted by
Presidential Decree No. 15, t e Center's new c arter pursuant to t e President's
legislative powers under martial law. Stan, t is Court discussed t e constitutional
mandate on t e preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity.
(Article XV, Section 9, Paragrap 2 of t e Constitution).

In t e abeas corpus case of 

 
, 59 SCRA 183), during t e pendency
of t e case, 26 petitioners were released from custody and one wit drew is petition.
@ e sole remaining petitioner was facing c arges of murder, subversion, and illegal
possession of firearms. @ e fact t at t e petition was moot and academic did not
prevent t is Court in t e exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of t e
most voluminous decisions ever printed in t e Reports.

In t is case, t e respondents agree wit our earlier finding t at t e prosecution

evidence miserably fails to establis a prima facie case against t e petitioner, eit er as
a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overt row t e government or as an officer or
leader of any subversive organization. @ ey ave taken t e initiative of dropping t e
c arges against t e petitioner. We reiterate t e rule, owever, t at t is Court will not
validate t e filing of an information based on t e kind of evidence against t e petitioner
found in t e records.

WHEREFORE, t e petition is DISMISSED for aving become moot and academic.

SO ORDERED.




,(
2O2 ,

 O
34  à


'

,
 


5


&2
 
6(6#%#%"

-2Ô concurring 

5,à

, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a
petition for t e writ of abeas corpus. Before t is Court could finally act on t e petition,
t e subject was released and for t at reason t e majority of t is Court resolved to
dismiss t e petition for aving become moot and academic. Justice @ee ankee and t e
undersigned disagreed wit t e majority; we expressed t e view t at despite t e
release of t e subject, t e petition s ould ave been resolved on t e merits because it
posed important legal questions. 

 R




1,R6, G.R. No.
62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition for pro ibition to restrain t e respondents from
interrogating t e petitioners, members of t e print media, on various aspects of t eir
works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even t eir private lives. Again t e
majority of t is Court dismissed t e petition because t e assailed proceedings ad
come to an end t ereby rendering t e petition moot and academic. In dismissing t e
petition a s ort and mild note of concern was added. And again Justice @ee ankee and
t e undersigned disagreed wit t e majority. We expressed t e view t at t is Court
s ould rule squarely on t e matters raised in t e petition rat er t an dismiss it for
aving become moot and academic. 

I am glad t at t is Court as abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing

t em on t e ground t at t ey ave become moot and academic and stopped t ere. I am
glad it as reverted to 5, 
 
O and 


w ic are mentioned in t e ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. 

I agree wit t e 

of Justice Gutierrez t at because t e subversion c arges
against t e petitioner ad been dropped by t e trial court on January 18, 1985, t ere is
no longer any need to pro ibit t e respondents from prosecuting Criminal Case No. Q-
18606 insofar as e is concerned. 

I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying t at t e initial action of t is Court

was to grant t e petition, i.e. pro ibit t e prosecution of t e petitioner. @ is is manifest
from t e 

of Justice Gutierrez. I regret t at on t is matter t e Court as been
preempted by a "first strike" w ic as occurred once too often. 

Justice Gutierrez states t at, "@ e Court ad already deliberated on t is case, and a
consensus on t e Court's judgment ad been arrived at." Let me add t at t e
consensus ad taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and t e decision started to
circulate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, t e decision
was still circulating overtaken by events. @ e decision could ave ad a greater impact
ad it been promulgated prior to t e executive action. 



6(6#%#%"

-2Ô concurring 

5,à

, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a
petition for t e writ of abeas corpus. Before t is Court could finally act on t e petition,
t e subject was released and for t at reason t e majority of t is Court resolved to
dismiss t e petition for aving become moot and academic. Justice @ee ankee and t e
undersigned disagreed wit t e majority; we expressed t e view t at despite t e
release of t e subject, t e petition s ould ave been resolved on t e merits because it
posed important legal questions. 

 R




1,R6, G.R. No.
62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition for pro ibition to restrain t e respondents from
interrogating t e petitioners, members of t e print media, on various aspects of t eir
works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even t eir private lives. Again t e
majority of t is Court dismissed t e petition because t e assailed proceedings ad
come to an end t ereby rendering t e petition moot and academic. In dismissing t e
petition a s ort and mild note of concern was added. And again Justice @ee ankee and
t e undersigned disagreed wit t e majority. We expressed t e view t at t is Court
s ould rule squarely on t e matters raised in t e petition rat er t an dismiss it for
aving become moot and academic. 

I am glad t at t is Court as abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing

t em on t e ground t at t ey ave become moot and academic and stopped t ere. I am
glad it as reverted to 5, 
 
O and 


w ic are mentioned in t e ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. 

I agree wit t e 

of Justice Gutierrez t at because t e subversion c arges
against t e petitioner ad been dropped by t e trial court on January 18, 1985, t ere is
no longer any need to pro ibit t e respondents from prosecuting Criminal Case No. Q-
18606 insofar as e is concerned. 

I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying t at t e initial action of t is Court

was to grant t e petition, i.e. pro ibit t e prosecution of t e petitioner. @ is is manifest
from t e 

of Justice Gutierrez. I regret t at on t is matter t e Court as been
preempted by a "first strike" w ic as occurred once too often. 
Justice Gutierrez states t at, "@ e Court ad already deliberated on t is case, and a
consensus on t e Court's judgment ad been arrived at." Let me add t at t e
consensus ad taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and t e decision started to
circulate for signature on November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, t e decision
was still circulating overtaken by events. @ e decision could ave ad a greater impact
ad it been promulgated prior to t e executive action.

(%("
 In t e à
5&7 dated December 8, 1981, Lovely was quoted as aving said in t e United States t at
"I was not t e bomber, I was bombed." 
Lovely, w o was granted immunity in t e United States, reportedly would not testify before a San Francisco federal
grand jury and instead said, "Your Honor, I came back to tell w at appened in t e P ilippines. I was not t e bomber, I
was bombed." 
@ e 0

à 


dispatc from San Francisco, U.S., written by Spencer S erman, gives a fuller account,
t us:
Wit t e grand jury present in t e courtroom Lovely alleged it was P ilippine aut orities w o were responsible for is
injuries. It was t ey, not im, w o placed t e bomb in is otel room, e said. 
I came back to t e States to tell w at appened in t e P ilippines. I was not t e bomber. I was bombed. @ ere are so

many secrets t at will come out soon. I cannot (testify) even if I will be jailed for lifetime. I welcome t at."
 @ e à
R!, a San Francisco-based weekly, in its issue of December 23, 1981, contains t e same account,
wit t e following words: 
"Your Honor . . . I am not going to participate I was almost murdered. I cannot continue. My friends were murdered
before I came to t e United States . . . I came back to t e United States to tell w at appened in t e P ilippines. I was
not t e bomber, I was bombed. @ ere are many secrets t at will come out very soon I cannot. Even if I will be jailed for

lifetime. I welcome t at."