SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and
substituted by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada) respondents.

This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision[1] dated March 25, 1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions[2] dated March 24, 1995
and September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113, and nullified
the sale of the subject lot by the spouses Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion of the respondent
court's decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a new one is rendered:

1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V. Alejo in favor of Anita
Bonode Si.

2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to
Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R. Armada Jr., single.

3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and revive Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose, Crisostomo and Severo,
Jr.

4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share corresponding to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30) days from notice in writing
by Crisostomo Armada.

5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay the plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.

6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay the plaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses
and costs of suit. SO ORDERED."[3]

The factual background of the case is as follows:

The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada, Sr.
This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460. During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to their children and
the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued TCT No. 16007 in the names of the three sons, as follows : "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V.
Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor, 113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age,
Filipinos."[4] Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title "... by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979,
executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of
ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No.
17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian Florentino)."[5]

On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with
Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada, brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.

The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by making it appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a Filipino
citizen, residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City. By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had migrated and were
already citizens of the United States of America. It also stated that when petitioners registered the deed of absolute sale they inserted the phrase "... and that
the co-owners are not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them.", and that petitioners knew of the misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the
complaint alleged that the other owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written notice of the sale; and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private
respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title with damages, claiming they had a right of redemption.

Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of sale (Exhibits
1, 2, and 3)[6] conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33 square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale
particularly described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners contend that since the property was already three distinct parcels of
land, there was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr. had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the
spouses Si. Petitioners point out that it was only because the Armada brothers failed to submit the necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of
Deeds in Pasay City that separate titles were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued and registered in the names of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.

After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:

"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. With costs against the plaintiffs."[7]

Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994, the appellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In reversing the
decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents, the Court of Appeals found that:

"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the portion sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1, 2, & 3) to the Armada brothers do not
appear in the said title, neither does it indicate the particular area sold. Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the Register of Deeds issued TCT
No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the basis of the said deeds of Sale. In fact, TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, Jr.
in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33 sq. m. respectively.

Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si, stated that the
portion sold was the 'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of the Registry of
Deeds for Pasay City, which means that what was sold to defendants are still undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold remains a portion of the
whole.

Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on March 27, 1979, Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact and co-defendant, Cresenciana Alejo,
sold his undivided 113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), and presented for registration with the Register of
Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying plaintiffs of the sale (TSN, pp. 6-8, December 20, 1988). Instead, it appears that the phrase 'and that the co-owners are
not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to them', was inserted in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'B').

xxx

Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the undivided property is not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the Vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners."[8]

On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam received a copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November 21, 1994, for being filed out of time.

On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under Section 1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court.[9] Petitioners presented new
evidence, TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la Rosa, married to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that the
cancellation was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of Escolastica's sons. On March 24, 1995, respondent court denied the motion, reasoning that when
the motion was filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the decision had become final and executory. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said
resolution was denied.

Hence, the present petition, alleging that:

"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that a co-ownership still existed.

"2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of 25 March 1994 on purely technical
grounds.

"3. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the Motion for New Trial.

"4. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering petitioners to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and the costs
of the suit."[10]

In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether respondent court erred in denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or the Motion for New
Trial; (2) whether private respondents are co-owners who are legally entitled to redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code;[11] and (3) whether the
award of moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit is correct.

The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right of redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The trial court found that the disputed
land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds of absolute sale[12]technically described the portion sold to each son. The portions
belonging to the three sons were separately declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970.[13] Jose's
testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to Jose.
[14] More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT
134594[15] in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 134595[16] under the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 134596[17] owned by
Jose Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record.

However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's findings.[18]

In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals
from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion.[19] This we have
done in this case. It is our considered view now, that the trial court is correct when it found that:

"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which documents purports to have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay
City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons
was definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical description (sic). In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover,
every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These are
the unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely determined
and identifiable. The fact that the three portions are embraced in one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption among co-
owners exists."[20] (citation omitted)

". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is that they
were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22, 1979, a portion of said
letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Levereza."[21] (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each brother
was no longer available.[22]

Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,[23] there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is no co-
ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically
described.[24] This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:

"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor,
or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that
he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."

Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed of the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated February
22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza."[25] Co-owners with actual notice of
the sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable
them to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof
and/or afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary.[26]

Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein private respondent could redeem the lot bought by petitioners, the issue of whether
the appellate court erred in denying petitioners' motions for reconsideration and new trial need not be delved into. The same is true with respect to the
questioned award of damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot put a premium on the right
to litigate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995 and September 6,
1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs.BRUNO FEHR, respondent.

This case arose from a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by petitioner Elna Mercado-Fehr against respondent Bruno Fehr before the Regional Trial Court of Makati in March
1997.1

After due proceedings, the trial court declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of property.2 The dispositive portion of the Decision dated January 30, 1998 states:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the marriage between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on March 14, 1985 is hereby declared null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of property
between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the rights previously acquired by
creditors.1ªvvphi1.nét

Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is hereby awarded to petitioner, she being the innocent
spouse.

Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.

SO ORDERED.3

On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various motions4 filed by respondent after the case had been decided. The Order pertained
to the properties held by the parties, thus:

xxxxxxxxx

After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following properties to be excluded from the conjugal
properties, namely:
a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that the same is owned by petitioner’s parents, Herminio Mercado
and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and

b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis
by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx

Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be distributed in the following manner:

TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO:

a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m., covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14734; and

b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)

TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR:

a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and

b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)

Furthermore, Suite 204, LCG Condominium with an area of 113.54 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title NO. 14735 is hereby declared the
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY of respondent, BRUNO FRANZ FEHR. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 in the name of
respondent, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, being respondent’s exclusive property, acquired prior to his marriage.1awphi1.nét

Anent the monthly rentals prior to the issuance of this Order of the subject properties, namely the Ground Floor Front (Friday’s Club), Ground Floor Rear
Apartment and Upper Basement at LGC Condominium, all leased by Bar 4 Corporation, the same shall be shared by the parties in common, in proportion to
one-half each or share and share alike, after deducting all expenses for Income Taxes, Business Permits, Realty Taxes, Municipal License fees, clearances, etc.
Accordingly, petitioner is hereby directed to deliver to respondent the following: a) the balance of his share of the monthly rentals from February 1998 to May
1998; and b) his one-half share (1/2) of the monthly rentals of the aforesaid properties from June 1998 up to this date. Thereafter, the parties shall own and
enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties adjudicated to them as stated above.

The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and
medical expenses.5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children.
Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner
further claimed that it would not be in the best interests of the children if she would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share in the support
of the children. She instead proposed that the Upper Basement and the Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could
use the income from the lease of said premises for the support of the children.6

Resolving said motion, the trial court held in an Order dated October 5, 2000 that since the marriage between petitioner and respondent was declared void ab
intio, the rules on co-ownership should apply in the liquidation and partition of the properties they own in common pursuant to Article 147 of the Family Code.
The court, however, noted that the parties have already agreed in principle to divide the properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately
among them and their children as follows: 1/3 for petitioner, 1/3 for respondent and 1/3 for the children. It also affirmed its previous ruling that Suite 204 of
LCG Condominium was acquired prior to the couple’s cohabitation and therefore pertained solely to respondent.71ªvvphi1.nét

On November 28, 2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the October 5, 2000 Order of the trial court.8 Respondent filed an Opposition to the
Notice of Appeal.9 On January 12, 2001, petitioner withdrew the notice of appeal10 and instead filed on the following day a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, questioning the findings of the trial court in its Order dated October 5, 2000.11

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated October 26, 2001, dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The appellate court stated that petitioner
has not shown any reason to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari as the errors she raised were mere errors of judgment which were the proper subject
of an ordinary appeal, not a petition for certiorari.12

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision, which was also denied by the appellate court.13

Hence this petition. Petitioner raises the following arguments:

1) Petitioner correctly filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 in the Court of Appeals in view of the
fact that the questioned orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of or lack of jurisdiction.

2) The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the questioned orders were errors of judgment and not of jurisdiction.14

We shall first address the procedural issue, whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner.

Petitioner argues that the filing of a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals was proper because the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of its Order dated October 5, 2000, and there were no other speedy and adequate remedies available. She asserts that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion when it held that Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium was the exclusive property of respondent, although it was established that they
lived together as husband and wife beginning March 1983, before the execution of the Contract to Sell on July 26, 1983. Furthermore, the trial court’s ruling
dividing their properties into three, instead of two as provided under Article 147 of the Family Code, or four, as allegedly agreed by the parties during a
conference with the trial court judge on May 3, 2000, also constituted grave abuse of discretion.15

Respondent, on the other hand, contends that petitioner may no longer avail of any remedy, whether an appeal or a petition for certiorari, as she had lost all
the right to appeal from the time the Decision of January 30, 1998 became final and executory. He argues that the Order of the trial court dated October 5,
2000 is no longer assailable because it was merely issued to execute the final and executory Decision of January 30, 1998. He also submits that the division of
the properties into three and the distribution of 1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent, and their children was proper, in accordance with Articles 50,
51, 147 and 148 of the Family Code mandating the delivery of the presumptive legitime of the common children upon dissolution of the property regime.
Respondent further claims Suite 204 of LCG Condominium to be his exclusive property as it was acquired on July 26, 1983, prior to their marriage on March
14, 1985.16

A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain speedy, and adequate
remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As a general
rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an appeal is the proper remedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is involved. As long as a court acts
within its jurisdiction and does not gravely abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in certain exceptional cases, where the
rigid application of such rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be
relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to a party where the trial judge has
capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an ordinary appeal would simply be
inadequate to relieve a party from the injurious effects of the judgment complained of.17

The exception applies to the case at bar. We reject respondent’s submission that all the appellate remedies of petitioner have been foreclosed when the
Decision dated January 30, 1998 became final and executory. What is being questioned in this petition is not the January 30, 1998 Decision of the trial court
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity, but the Order of the trial court dated
October 5, 2000 dividing the common properties of petitioner and respondent into three—1/3 to petitioner, 1/3 to respondent and 1/3 to their children, and
affirming its previous ruling that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is the exclusive property of respondent. The issue on the validity of the marriage of petitioner
and respondent has long been settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the subject of review. There were, however, incidental matters that had to
be addressed regarding the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order
pertained to the division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, pursuant to the court’s directive in its main decision to
dissolve the conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally disposes of the issues concerning the partition of the common properties of petitioner
and respondent, and as such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However, considering the merits of the
case, the Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will result in miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their
common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. We have held
that where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.18

We now go to the substantive issues. The crux of the petition is the ownership of Suite 204 of LCG Condominium and how the properties acquired by
petitioner and respondent should be partitioned.

It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in
with respondent in the latter’s residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983.
The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as
evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also
signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name
of petitioner.19

In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioner’s submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under
Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides:

Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and
of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the
consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is
nonetheless void,20 as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation.

We held in Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City:21

This peculiar kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to
the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Article 37 and 38" of the Code.

Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition
of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household."

Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and
wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown
that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner
moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family
Code because of respondent’s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations.

The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were
already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent.

As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. There
is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties into three—1/3 share each to
the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division
of the properties—1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover, respondent’s argument that the
three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable marriages and
exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.22

In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and respondent and the property
regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of petitioner and respondent in accordance with this Court’s
ruling. SO ORDERED.

APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX
OCAMPO JR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO, ELISA
OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS OCAMPO JR. and
ERNESTO O. FORTUNO, petitioners, vs. FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO, NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO,
IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents.
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. In an action involving
property, petitioners should rely on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents’ claim.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 31, 2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 56941. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the awards for damages and attorney’s fees are hereby deleted, the judgment appealed from is, in all other
respects, AFFIRMED. Without costs."3

The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,4 rendered on October 30, 1996, which decreed thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, holds and declares that defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito, are the true and
lawful exclusive owners of the following properties, namely:

(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on
the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by a street, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more
or less, presently covered by TCT No. 13654 in the name of Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito and previously covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983)
in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and assessed at P17,240.00.

(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North and East by a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on
the West by Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of P6,240.00.

(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325,
and on the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4884 square meters, declared under TD No. 35122 and assessed at P6780.00 as described and referred
to in paragraph 9, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the original complaint and it is hereby ordered that:

1. The complaint and supplemental complaint are dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs to prove their cause/causes of action by preponderance of evidence
and on the added ground of prescription;

2. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay as their joint and several obligation, to defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo, Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito, the total
sum of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation and P50,000.00 for moral damages;

3. The plaintiffs jointly and severally pay the cost of this suit.

4. Upon the finality of this decision, the notice of lis pendens annotated at plaintiffs’ behest in the Certificates of Title covering the properties in question, of
defendants be cancelled; and the plaintiffs, their agents and representatives as well as successors-in-interest are ordered to respect the right of ownership of
said defendants thereto, and to vacate and restore the lawful possession of all portions of said properties to herein defendants, their agents, representatives
and successors-in-interest."5

The Facts
The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of facts as follows:

"Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar and syntax, the following summation of the relevant and material antecedents of the case by the court a
quo, is substantially correct --

‘This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by plaintiffs against the defendants.

‘The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children, namely: Fidela, Felix,
Andres, Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and Luis. Of the aforementioned children, the following are already dead, namely: Felix, who is
survived by his widow, Melita F. Ocampo and children Felix, Jr., Ramon and Miguel; Andres, who is survived by Juana Ocampo and children Jose, Andres,
Imelda, Violeta and Mercedita; Jose, who is survived by his children Antonia, Elias and Juan (Johnny); Rosario, who is survived by Ernesto O. Fortuno; Luis, who
is survived by his children Rose, Ricardo, Jonas, Maria Dolores, Rebecca, Fidela and Luis, Jr.; and Luisa, who is survived by Carlos Llorin and children Mecita,
Manuel, Carlos, Jr., Carmelita and Marilou L. Arellano.

‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired several parcels of land and, upon
their death, left the following properties, namely:

(a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on
the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by a Street, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more
or less, presently covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and assessed at P17,240.00;

(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North and East by a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on
the West by Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of P6,240.00; and

(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325,
and on the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4,884 square meters, declared under TD No. 35122 and assessed at P6,780.00.

‘that all the above named parcels of land are actually owned in common by the children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander Ocampo although
the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property
owned in common by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully
and unreasonably refuse to do so and moved by a common purpose, both of them mortgaged to the PNB the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint
to secure the payment of a P110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which were x x x exclusively to the benefit of said defendants only; that the same defendants
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs amounting to not less than P2,000.00 a
year; and, that because of their relationship, they undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but because of defendants Fidela Ocampo and
Felicidad Ocampo[‘s] utterly unreasonable and unjustified actuations, the same failed.

xxx xxx xxx

‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of the properties described in paragraph 9 of the complaint; ordering
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo, to release or otherwise cancel any and all encumbrances on TCT No. RT-4389(983) which they had caused
to be annotated thereon, particularly, the mortgage in favor of the PNB; requiring Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to refrain from further encumbering
said properties or otherwise subjecting the same to any lien and for that purpose, a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued against them to enjoin the
commission of such acts; ordering defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to submit an accounting of the fruits and other produce they had
received from said properties; further ordering Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to indemnify plaintiffs the sum of not less than P15,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and related expenses of litigation, plus the costs of the suit; and, further granting plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable
in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx

‘On 17 December 1987, counsel for plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental Complaint dated 2 December 1987 which was granted by the Court as
there was no opposition to it.

‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30 September 1987, TCT No. RT-
4389(983) in the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering the lot described as parcel (a) in paragraph 9 of the original complaint was cancelled and, in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant Vicente Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their favor on 13 January 1984; that at the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
was presented for registration and when TCT No. 1364, Registry of Camarines Sur, was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both the donor and donees
were notoriously aware that said parcel of land was among the lots subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867 of which the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the mother
of the donees, Felicidad Ll. Ocampo, are defendants, that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the donor Fidela Ll.
Ocampo was not the exclusive owner thereof; that the transfer of defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and Belen Ocampo-Barrito of the ownership over said property
now subject of this partition is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the
same are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein; that defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito
and Vicente Barrito have not acted in good faith, deliberately causing damage and injury to the plaintiffs by their avaricious desire to obtain sole ownership of
said properties through dubious and illegal means that the defendant spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito, through dubious means and undue
influence over Fidela Ll. Ocampo, a very old spinster whom they have lately taken into their custody, succeeded in having the latter execute this supposed
deed of donation inter vivos; that defendants have not acted with justice, honesty and good faith, causing injury to plaintiffs’ rights in a manner inconsistent
with morals and good customs, hence, are liable for moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; and that to set an example for the public good and to deter
others similarly minded from doing so, defendants should be assessed exemplary damages of not less than P50,000.00.

‘Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered (a) declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos allegedly executed by Fidela Ll. Ocampo in favor of Belen Ocampo-
Barrito and Vicente Barrito be declare[d] null and void, (b) ordering defendants Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito to reconvey so much of the property
subject thereof as pertain to the plaintiffs, (c) directing defendants, jointly and severally, to indemnify plaintiffs such amounts as this Honorable Court may
consider fair and reasonable by way of actual, moral and exemplary damages, inclusive of attorney’s fees and related expenses of litigation, and (d) granting
plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.

xxx xxx xxx

‘As Special Defenses, defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito allege that the original defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her predecessor-in-interest, since 1949 has been
the absolute owner in fee simple of the property by virtue of the issuance of the certificate of title in her name; that her predecessor-in-interest held the same
certificate of title to the same parcel of land (TCT No. RT-4389(983) free of all encumbrances and adverse claims and was in notorious, public, and actual
possession of the property in concept of absolute owner from 1949 until 13 January 1984, when said predecessor-in-interest validly conveyed the property by
donation inter vivos which she accepted in the same public instrument; that TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito on the strength of
the donation inter vivos executed in her favor by her predecessor-in-interest and has since 30 September 1987, been the absolute owner thereof; that since
1949 none of the plaintiffs ever questioned the absolute ownership and title of defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito’s predecessor-in-interest over the property
making the decree of registration incontrovertible; that it is fatal for plaintiffs’ cause of action to allege that defendants exerted ‘undue influence over Fidela
Ll. Ocampo’ for the latter to ‘execute the deed of donation’ while clearly admitting in both the original and supplemental complaints that defendants are
residents of Mindoro Occidental a far away place from Nabua, Camarines Sur, the place where the same predecessor-in-interest admittedly resides; and, that
Belen Ocampo-Barrito’s title cannot be collaterally attacked in these supposed partition proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

‘Defendants pray that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit and plaintiffs be ordered to pay defendants the sum of P200,000.00 for moral damages,
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as compensatory damages, to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00, and for other just and
equitable remedies.

xxx xxx xxx

‘As the Special and/or Affirmative Defenses, defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo alleges that she is the true and absolute owner of the real properties described in
paragraph 9 of the original complaint having acquired the same by lucrative title and has, since becoming owner thereof, been in actual possession thereof
excepting the portion of the lot described in paragraph 9 (a) of the complaint and covered by ‘Torrens’ title which was and is still being unlawfully occupied by
plaintiffs Quiens; that the properties have been declared for assessment in defendant’s name as exclusive owner thereof and since her acquisition of said
properties, has paid the taxes thereon; that defendant had exercised continuously all the legal incidents of ownership on said lands to the exclusion of and
adversely to the public, plaintiffs herein included; that the [D]eed of Donation Inter Vivos and the subsequent transfer of the property mentioned in paragraph
9 of the complaint to other defendants Belen Ocamp[o]-Barrito is valid conveyance which binds the said property; and, that assuming that plaintiffs have a
cause of action, the same is barred by laches.

xxx xxx xxx

‘Defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo prays that judgment be rendered dismissing the complaint and ordering plaintiffs to indemnify such sum as will be proved as
well as [s]uch amount as this Court may assess by way of moral and exemplary damages and costs, including necessary expenses for litigation, and for just
and equitable reliefs.’"6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

According to the appellate court, other than the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership7 executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was
offered to establish petitioners’ claim of co-ownership. The CA held that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and
documentary evidence that had been adduced by respondents to prove their defenses. Communal ownership of the property in question was supposedly not
proven, either, by the ancient photograph showing Spouses Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo with their ten children in front of the disputed property; or
by another picture showing the name "Oniang Ocampo -- 1-15-61" engraved on the said house or building.

The court a quo rejected the argument of petitioners that the title to the subject property had been placed in the name of Fidela, because their parents
followed the Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest son or daughter who was single. Petitioners explained that upon the death of the
eldest sibling, the properties would revert to the younger brothers and sisters. According to the CA, however, not a shred of evidence was adduced to prove
that such a Chinese custom existed or was observed in that place.

The CA also dismissed petitioners’ contention that common ownership was indicated by the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and
lived on the subject property. It ruled that fraternal affection could have been the motive that impelled respondents to allow their relatives to use it.

In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said that respondents were able to give clear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer
Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.

Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for damages and attorney’s fees, because the trial court had failed to cite the factual, the legal and the equitable
bases therefor.

Hence, this Petition.8

The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

"1. Where the evidence presented, oral and documentary, on the question of co-ownership, is overwhelming as it is unopposed, unrebutted and unimpeached,
has co-ownership been proved?

"2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long, public possession by co-owners, did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that there is no co-
ownership?

"3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak, puerile and inconsistent, did the courts commit a grave misapprehension of facts when they gave credence to
it?

"4. Where a deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid?

"5. Where a declaration against interest has not been opposed, assailed, rebutted or impeached, did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in holding
there is no such declaration?"9

At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed property?

The Court's Ruling: The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Ownership of the Subject Property

At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3) properties originally involved in the litigation brought before the RTC, petitioners’ appeal dealt only
with the first one, referred to in the Statement of Facts above -- a parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In
their CA appeal, petitioners declared that "the focus of this case is on the first [property] which is located at downtown Poblacion of Nabua and therefore a
valuable piece of property, 1,119 square meters in all."10 Because petitioners had not questioned the RTC Decision with regard to the other properties, then
the adjudication of these matters became final. Thus, only one property is left for resolution in the present proceedings.11

Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of a co-ownership.12 The settlement of the issue of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition.13 This action will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest in the subject property. Parties filing the action are in fact required by the Rules of Court14 to set forth in their complaint the nature and
the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a partition thereof until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely
resolved.15

Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.16 Petitioners’ chief evidence
of co-ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence
that were adduced by respondents, as will be expounded below.

Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the questioned property that eventually led to them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by
their parents -- Spouses Ocampo -- whose deaths passed it on to the children. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no proof of ownership of their
predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, the former rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by
Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and presented preponderant proof of her claim.

First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land,17 referring to the subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix
Ocampo as buyer. The document dated July 6, 1948, was signed in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before Juan B. Ballecer, a notary public.

The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by this document, which they never contested. According to them, the land in question was the conjugal
property of their parents; and that upon the latter’s deaths, the former inherited it in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal property of Spouses
Ocampo, then petitioners should have presented evidence to prove such ownership by their alleged predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to do so,
how then can they prove the transfer to them of ownership that has not been established in the first place? It is axiomatic that no one can transfer to another
a right greater than that which one has;18 thus, the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher than its source.19

Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his "exclusive ownership" of the property, "having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having]
been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in
[the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons."20

Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that
Fidela had entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.

As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4389 (983),21 which named the former as owner in fee
simple; and a Declaration of Real Property,22 evidencing payment of real property taxes, also by Fidela as owner.

To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also presented a Real Estate Mortgage23 executed by the former as absolute
owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen
correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.

The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.24 Co-
ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of one’s interest in
the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others.25 The effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be
allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership.26 In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgement of co-ownership.

Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos27 executed on January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows
the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.

A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from the donor to the donee.28 Petitioners stubbornly rely
on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution
of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of
Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:

"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed
with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidela’s interest since the alleged acknowledgement was written and
executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all her
properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against."29
Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be considered as a declaration against interest. A statement may be admissible as such a
declaration if it complies with the following requisites: 1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3) at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her interest; and 4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed
the declaration to be true.30

As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the declarant, since her right
over the property had already been extinguished by the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have acknowledged co-
ownership, as she had no more property against which she had an interest to declare.

Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1365431 as proof of her ownership of the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land
is the Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to defeat the face value of respondent’s TCT, which enjoys a legal presumption
of regularity of issuance.32 It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling of the subject property -- commencing in 1948 and eventually
leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 198433 -- it was only after 1984 that petitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof.

We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of title does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named therein.34 But given the circumstances of this case, the claim of co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again,
we stress, Belen clearly traced the source of her sole ownership of the property in question and thereby foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated
allegation of co-ownership thereof.

In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration35 indicating that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the
property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.

On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to prove their ownership. Having filed an action involving property, they
should have relied on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents’ claim.36

Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was sufficiently proved by their witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We
disagree. Their testimonies cannot prevail over the array of documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based simply on the testimonies
of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties, self-serving as they are.

As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster their claim of co-ownership, we affirm the CA’s disposition showing the flimsiness of their claim as
follows:

"The other piece of documentary evidence presented by appellants really proved nothing. The ancient photograph showing the spouses Chino Jose and Juana
Llander Ocampo together with their ten children, simply proved that there was such a picture taking of the spouses with their children. But the photograph
does not prove communal ownership by appellants over the disputed parcels of land; neither does it prove that the said properties were indeed owned by the
spouses Chino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and then later on transferred to and commonly owned by their children. By the same token, the picture exhibited by
appellant showing the name ‘Oniang Ocampo -- 1-15-61’ (or Apolonia Ocampo, one of the children of the spouses Chino Jose and Juana) engraved in the house
or building, does not prove communal ownership of the properties in question. At best, it is susceptible of various meanings, like: that of Oniang Ocampo was
born on 1-15-61, or that she got married on that date, or that she was celebrating a special event on the date mentioned, or that she even died on the date
mentioned. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti, that the said engraving proved ownership over the disputed building, some such fact can only work to
the prejudice of herein appellants. Why? Because it would mean that only Oniang (or Apolonia) was the owner of the building and that the building is not,
therefore, a communal property of the children of the late spouses Chino Jose and Juana. Adverting to this piece of evidence, the Trial Court postulated --

‘The engravings on the house ‘ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-61 cannot serve as evidence that the property is of common ownership. At most, this can only
establish the fact that said building was constructed for a certain ‘Oniang’ on 15 January 1961. If, indeed, the property is of common ownership, there could
not have been any difficulty to engrave thereon ‘HEIRS OF JOSE OCAMPO and JUANA LLANDER-OCAMPO -- 1-15-61’ instead of ‘ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-
61.’"37

Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put
up businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly found that since the litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could have been
a good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership among the parties
cannot be presumed.

Neither are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses Ocampo placed the subject property in the name of only one person in accordance with a Chinese
custom. As mentioned earlier, that custom consisted of placing properties of parents in the name of the eldest unmarried son or daughter, with the implicit
understanding that ownership thereof would later revert to the siblings.

In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that such custom existed and was practiced in that place,38 Belen presented evidence that clearly negated
any claim of ownership by the former’s predecessors-in-interest. Having shown that the property in question was originally owned by one Adolfo Ocampo --
not by Spouses Ocampo, from whom petitioners derive their right -- the claim of custom becomes immaterial.

The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not necessarily favor petitioners and prove that the property in question is indeed co-owned. If they felt
that her testimony would prove their cause, then they could have easily called her as an adverse or a hostile witness.39 But since respondents were confident
in the documents they presented in court, they did not see any need to call her as a witness.

Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for donating her properties, when she is still alive and needs money in her old age. They clearly overlook the
nature of a donation.

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of another who accepts it.40 Once perfected, a donation is
final; its revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any legal ground therefor.41 A donation may in fact comprehend the entire property of the
donor.42 At any rate, the law provides that donors should reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and that of all their
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by them.43

In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the subject property, petitioners are contradicting even themselves. On the one hand, they assert that she
would not have disposed of her property, since she would need it in her old age; on the other, they argue that it was not hers alone anyway. It should be clear
that the law protects donors by providing that, without any reservation of sufficient means for themselves, the donation shall be reduced upon the petition of
any person affected.44

To be sure, petitioners’ arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself. The law is clear that when its terms have been
reduced to writing, an agreement must be presumed to contain all the terms agreed upon; and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.45

Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the donation. Never was there any intimation that she had either been coerced or defrauded into entering
into it. As all the essential elements of a donation -- consent, subject matter and cause46 -- have been satisfied, we see no reason to entertain any doubt
about the Deed pertaining thereto.

The question of why the land was registered several years after the donation is purely speculative. What is important is that there was a duly proven Deed of
Donation, which formed the basis of Belen’s claim and led to the registration of the property in her name.
Petitioners also question Fidela’s filing of an unlawful detainer suit after the date of the Deed of Donation. Again, we remind petitioners that because this
action involves property, they should rely on the strength of their own title, not on the alleged weakness of the claim of respondents. At any rate, the burden
of proof of the claim of co-ownership rests on the former.

Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the review of factual findings of the courts below. It is a settled doctrine that in a civil case, final and
conclusive are the factual findings of the trial court, if supported by clear and convincing evidence on record. Usually, the Supreme Court does not review
those findings -- especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case.47 From the records of the present case, no cogent evidence appears that
would impel us to apply the above doctrine differently. The courts below have not overlooked essential facts that, if considered, may produce a different
outcome. The trial court correctly explained thus:

"This Court from the outset had the opportunity to see and hear the tell-tale [signs] of truthfulness or perjury – like the flush of face, or the tone of voice, or
the dart of eyes, or the fearful pause [--] and finds that credibility is with the defendants [herein respondents]. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence is
with defendants whose testimonial evidences are buttressed by their documentary evidences."48

Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards for damages and attorney’s fees for respondents’ failure to show any factual, legal or equitable bases
therefor.49

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

LILIA SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VICTORINO S. ALVARO as Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 120, Caloocan City, and VIRGINIA TERIA,
respondents.

This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001
as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59182.

Lilia Sanchez, petitioner, constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 with the
following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez married to Celia Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez married to Nicanor Montalban, Lilian Sanchez, widow, Nenita Sanchez, single,
Susana Sanchez married to Fernando Ramos, and Felipe Sanchez.[1] On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of
private respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed on 23 June 1995[2] by all six (6) co-owners in her
favor.[3] Petitioner claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting private
respondent Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City sometime in
September 1995, subsequently raffled to Br. 49 of that court.

On 12 February 1998, the MeTC-Br. 49 of Caloocan City ruled in favor of private respondent declaring that the sale was valid only to the extent of 5/6 of the
lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale having been established as a forgery.

Petitioner then elevated her appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, subsequently assigned to Br. 120, which ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda of appeal. Counsel for petitioner did not comply with this order, nor even inform her of the developments in her case. Petitioner not
having filed any pleading with the RTC of Caloocan City, the trial court affirmed the 27 July 1998 decision of the MeTC.

On 4 November 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution in favor of private respondent Virginia Teria, buyer of the property. On
4 November 1999 or a year later, a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

On 28 April 1999 private respondent started demolishing petitioner’s house without any special permit of demolition from the court.

Due to the demolition of her house which continued until 24 May 1999 petitioner was forced to inhabit the portion of the premises that used to serve as the
house’s toilet and laundry area.

On 29 October 1999 petitioner filed her Petition for Relief from Judgment with the RTC on the ground that she was not bound by the inaction of her counsel
who failed to submit petitioner’s appeal memorandum. However the RTC denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

On 14 June 2000 petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo.

On 23 May 2001 the appellate court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On 18 June 2001 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of
Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 8 January 2002.

The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the challenged case before it.

As a matter of policy, the original jurisdiction of this Court to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should generally be exercised relative to actions or
proceedings before the Court of Appeals or before constitutional or other tribunals or agencies the acts of which for some reason or other are not controllable
by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of the extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court, it is
either of these courts that the specific action for the procurement of the writ must be presented. However, this Court must be convinced thoroughly that two
(2) grounds exist before it gives due course to a certiorari petition under Rule 65: (a) The tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction; and (b) There is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Despite the procedural lapses present in this case, we are giving due course to this petition as there are matters that require immediate resolution on the
merits to effect substantial justice.

The Rules of Court should be liberally construed in order to promote their object of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or
proceeding.[4]
The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to aid the courts in the speedy, just and inexpensive determination of the cases before them.
Liberal construction of the rules and the pleadings is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice.[5] Litigations should, as much as possible, be
decided on their merits and not on mere technicalities.[6]

Verily, the negligence of petitioner’s counsel cannot be deemed as negligence of petitioner herself in the case at bar. A notice to a lawyer who appears to
have been unconscionably irresponsible cannot be considered as notice to his client.[7] Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, it appears from the
records that counsel was negligent in not adequately protecting his client’s interest, which necessarily calls for a liberal construction of the Rules.

The rationale for this approach is explained in Ginete v. Court of Appeals - [8]

This Court may suspend its own rules or exempt a particular case from its operation where the appellate court failed to obtain jurisdiction over the case owing
to appellant’s failure to perfect an appeal. Hence, with more reason would this Court suspend its own rules in cases where the appellate court has already
obtained jurisdiction over the appealed case. This prerogative to relax procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the
period to appeal has been invoked and granted in a considerable number of cases x x x x

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of
Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, as we are now constrained to do in the instant case x x x x

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free
from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial
justice.

Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination
and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of
special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.[9]

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case since the procedural infirmity was not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of petitioner.
Besides, substantial justice requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the present controversy that was brought about by the absence of any
partition agreement among the parties who were co-owners of the subject lot in question. Hence, giving due course to the instant petition shall put an end to
the dispute on the property held in common.

In People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation v. Tiongco[10] we held:

There should be no dispute regarding the doctrine that normally notice to counsel is notice to parties, and that such doctrine has beneficent effects upon the
prompt dispensation of justice. Its application to a given case, however, should be looked into and adopted, according to the surrounding circumstances;
otherwise, in the court’s desire to make a short-cut of the proceedings, it might foster, wittingly or unwittingly, dangerous collusions to the detriment of
justice. It would then be easy for one lawyer to sell one’s rights down the river, by just alleging that he just forgot every process of the court affecting his
clients, because he was so busy. Under this circumstance, one should not insist that a notice to such irresponsible lawyer is also a notice to his clients.

Thus, we now look into the merits of the petition.

This case overlooks a basic yet significant principle of civil law: co-ownership. Throughout the proceedings from the MeTC to the Court of Appeals, the notion
of co-ownership[11] was not sufficiently dealt with. We attempt to address this controversy in the interest of substantial justice. Certiorari should therefore
be granted to cure this grave abuse of discretion.

Sanchez Roman defines co-ownership as “the right of common dominion which two or more persons have in a spiritual part of a thing, not materially or
physically divided.[12] Manresa defines it as the “manifestation of the private right of ownership, which instead of being exercised by the owner in an
exclusive manner over the things subject to it, is exercised by two or more owners and the undivided thing or right to which it refers is one and the same.”[13]

The characteristics of co-ownership are: (a) plurality of subjects, who are the co-owners, (b) unity of or material indivision, which means that there is a single
object which is not materially divided, and which is the element which binds the subjects, and, (c) the recognition of ideal shares, which determines the rights
and obligations of the co-owners.[14]

In co-ownership, the relationship of such co-owner to the other co-owners is fiduciary in character and attribute. Whether established by law or by agreement
of the co-owners, the property or thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a trustee for the benefit of his co-
owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his co-owners.[15]

Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties.
Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.[16]

Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an
ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.[17]

Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He
may validly lease his undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.[18] But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or
determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
[19]

Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to
the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to
protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private
respondent Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2001 as well as its Resolution dated 8 January 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 59182 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. A survey of the questioned lot with TCT No. 289216 (formerly TCT No. 263624) by a duly licensed geodetic engineer
and the PARTITION of the aforesaid lot are ORDERED.

Let the records of this case be REMANDED to MeTC-Br. 49, Caloocan City to effect the aforementioned survey and partition, as well as segregate the 1/6
portion appertaining to petitioner Lilia Sanchez.

The Deed of Absolute Sale by the other co-owners to Virginia Teria shall be RESPECTED insofar as the other undivided 5/6 portion of the property is concerned.

SO ORDERED.
CARMEN FANGONIL - HERRERA, Petitioner, vs TOMAS FANGONIL, PURA FANGONIL TINO, MARINA FANGONIL, MARIANO FANGONIL, MILAGROS FANGONIL-LAYUG
and VICTORIA FANGONIL ESTOQUE, Respondents.

In this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner assails the (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30
January 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61990, and (b) the Resolution of the same Court dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
urges this Court to modify the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision dated 9 October 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 in Special Proceedings Case No. A-806 for Judicial Partition. The petition prays that the two parcels of land, one located in
Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union, more particularly described as:

A parcel of rice land which the middle portion (15,364 sq. m) has been included and situated in Barrio Lloren, Tubao, La Union, declared under Tax Dec.
Number 2889. Bounded on the North, by the property of Manuel Ordoña; on the East, by the property of Severino Padilla, Nicolas Caniero, and Heirs of V.
Selga; on the South, by the properties of Manuel Ordoña and Francisco Padilla; and on the West, by a river; containing an area of more than two hectares; x x
x.[2] and the other in San Nicholas East, Agoo, La Union, designated as:

A parcel of unirrigated rice land without permanent improvements, situated in Barrio San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union with an area of 10,777 sq. m. (1 Ha. 1,777
sq. m.) more or less, visible by signs of pilapiles around its perimeter, assessed at P400.00, declared for tax purposes in my name under Tax Declaration
Number 6373, and bounded-on the North, by Donato Eslao; on the East, by the Heirs of Flaviano Fangonil, and others; on the South, by Eulalio Fangonil; and
on the West, by the heirs of Remgio Boado; x x x.[3] be adjudged solely to petitioner to the exclusion of respondents. In addition, petitioner requests that
another parcel of land located in Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, be divided in accordance with the manner she proposes.

The following are the antecedent facts:

Petitioner and respondents[4] are children of the late Fabian Fangonil and Maria Lloren Fangonil[5] of Tubao, La Union. The Fangonil spouses had 7 children:
Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso, and Carmen. Fabian died on 1 June 1953, while Maria Lloren died on February 1976. The spouses died
intestate, leaving an estate consisting of 7 parcels of land herein specified:

Parcel 1 – a 1,800 square meter residential land located at Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, which is facing the Town Plaza;

Parcel 2 – a 922 square meter residential lot located at Barangay Sta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union;

Parcel 3 – a 54,759 square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 4 – an 84,737 square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 5 – a 5,821 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Francia Sur, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 6 – a 17,958 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union;

Parcel 7 – 9,127 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at San Nicolas East, Agoo, La Union.
 The only remaining heirs are the 7 children. Prior to an extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs in 1983, there was never any settlement of the
estate. The parties do not dispute that the succeeding transactions involving parcels 6 and 7 took place. Fabian Fangonil, with the consent of Maria Lloren
Fangonil, obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over a 15,364 square meter middle portion of the sixth parcel of land for P1 ,450.00, executed under a Deed
of Mortgage[6] in favor of Francisca Saguitan on 20 April 1949. A portion of the sixth parcel, with an area of 4,375 square meters, was sold with a right to
repurchase to a certain Constantino Oribello for P1,450.00 on 15 December 1953. The transaction was under an agreement designated as a Deed of Pacto de
Retro Sale[7] between Maria Lloren Fangonil, who was a widow by then, and Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel of land was sold,
with a right to repurchase, by Fabian Fangonil to Quirino Estacio under an agreement denominated as Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro[8] on 12 December
1949 for P2,600.00. The total amount received by the Fangonil spouses for the properties was P5,500.00.

The parcels above-mentioned were never repurchased or redeemed by the Fangonil spouses. Prior to foreclosure, the portion of the sixth parcel
covered by a Deed of Mortgage was released from the mortgage on 20 April 1956 upon petitioner’s payment of P1,950.00 to Francisca Suguitan. The portion
of the sixth parcel covered by the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale was repurchased on 16 October 1956 upon petitioner’s payment of P1,550.00 to Constantino
Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel subject of the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro was repurchased by petitioner on 13 November 1959 upon the
payment of P2,600.00 to Quirino Estacio. Petitioner paid the total amount of P6,100.00 for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7.

On 14 November 1983, the parties executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Partial Partition of the estate of the Fangonil spouses covering the seven
parcels of land. Although petitioner signed the extrajudicial settlement, she refused to accede to the proposed manner of partition of parcel 1. Thereafter, all
the heirs concerned, except petitioner, executed a joint affidavit dated 19 December 1994, stipulating on the partition of parcel 1. On 2 February 1995 or 11
years after the execution of the extrajudicial settlement, petitioner executed an affidavit[9] refuting the portions pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, on the ground
that her late brother Sinforoso Fangonil who was a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge then, committed misrepresentation and convinced her to sign the said
settlement.

On 1 March 1995, six of the seven children of the Fangonil spouses, excluding herein petitioner, filed with the RTC a petition for judicial partition of the
seven parcels of land, with prayer for appointment of Marina Fangonil as administratrix. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. A-806.
Petitioner intervened before the trial court to oppose the petition. She likewise prayed that she be appointed administratrix, claiming exclusive ownership over
parcels 6 and 7.

The parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings, considering there was no disagreement as to the manner of sharing Parcels
2, 3, 4, and 5 of the estate. In addition, on 16 September 1996, the respondent heirs deposited in court P7,453.00[10] as payment to petitioner and her
brother Tomas Fangonil as the only outstanding debtors of the estate as specified in the 14 November 1983 extrajudicial settlement. On 2 September 1998,
respondents, through counsel, submitted a Manifestation/Motion dated 31 August 1998, proposing a manner of computation for repayment to petitioner, the
pertinent portions of which read:

3. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar on November 13, 1959 is P3.90 to U.S. $1.00;

4. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar as of this date August 31, 1998 is P42.00 to U.S. $1.00;

5. So that the amount of indebtedness of P6,100.00 on November 13, 1959 has now the equivalent of P65,790.00 as of 31 August 1998;

5.1 The equivalent amount of P65,790.00 shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and every heir having a share in said
indebtedness in the amount of P9,398.57;[11]

On 7 October 1998, the RTC issued an Order generally approving the manifestation/motion except for the computation, modifying the amount to
P138,100.00 as the present equivalent of the amount of P6,100.00 previously paid by petitioner to redeem parcels 6 and 7. In its Decision[12] dated 9
October 1998, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein and declared parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of the spouses Fangonil to be partitioned and
ordered the partition of parcel 1 based on the manner proposed by respondents. It ordered the payment of the estate debt to petitioner and her brother in
the amount of P138,100.00, the money equivalent of the P6,100.00 paid by her at the time of redemption of parcels 6 and 7. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby adjudicates and partitions the inherited properties, including the controversial
parcels 6 and 7, in accordance with the following:

FIRST PARCEL

xxxx

This is divided into two (2) segments, the Eastern Portion and Western Portion.

The Eastern Portion shall belong to three (3) heirs, namely Tomas Fangonil, Sinforoso Fangonil represented by Victoria Estoque and Marina Fangonil. The
Western Portion shall belong to two (2) heirs, the Southwestern part belongs to Pura F. Tino and the Northwestern part belongs to Carmen Fangonil Herrera x
x x.

SECOND PARCEL x x x x

This parcel goes to Mariano Fangonil and Milagros Fangonil Layug.

THIRD PARCEL x x x x

A drawing of lots was conducted on April 25, 1997 with respect to parcel 3. Parcel 3 was divided into seven by Geodetic Engineer Gerardo Dacayanan.
The result was the following (see also, Order dated April 25, 1997, page 166, Record of the case):

Lot 1 (A) – Milagros F. Layug

Lot 2 (B) – Tomas Fangonil

Lot 3 (C) – Mariano Fangonil

Lot 4 (D) – Pura F. Tino

Lot 5 (E) – Sinforoso Fangonil

Lot 6 (F) – Carmen F. Herrera

Lot 7 (G) – Marina Fangonil

xxxx

FOURTH PARCEL x x x x

The same thing happened. There was a drawing of lots. The result was the following:

Lot 1 (A) – Marina Fangonil

Lot 2 (B) – Carmen F. Herrera

Lot 3 (C) – Tomas Fangonil

Lot 4 (D) – Sinforoso Fangonil

Lot 5 (E) – Milagros F. Layug

Lot 6 (F) – Pura F. Tino

Lot 7 (G) – Mariano Fangonil

xxxx

FIFTH PARCEL

xxxx

On May 2, 1997, the drawing of lots on Parcel 5 was conducted. The result was as follows:

Lot 1 – Pura F. Tino

Lot 2 – Marina Fangonil

Lot 3 – Milagros F. Layug

Lot 4 – Sinforoso Fangonil

Lot 5 – Carmen F. Herrera

Lot 6 – Mariano Fangonil

Lot 7 – Tomas Fangonil

SIXTH PARCEL

xxxx

On August 27, 1998, the drawing of lots was conducted with respect to the controversial parcels, the SIXTH PARCEL and the SEVENTH PARCEL. The
result on the sixth parcel was as follows:

Lot 1 – Pura F. Tino

Lot 2 – Sinforoso Fangonil

Lot 3 – Tomas Fangonil

Lot 4 – Marina Fangonil

Lot 5 – Carmen F. Herrera (boycotted the draw)

Lot 6 – Mariano Fangonil

Lot 7 – Milagros F. Layug

xxxx

SEVENTH PARCEL

xxxx

The draw was made on the same day, August 27, 1998. Just like in the drawing of lots for the Sixth Parcel, Carmen F. Herrera boycotted the draw.
Hence, the Court ruled that since there are seven rolled papers for the seven heirs to draw, the last undrawn rolled-paper containing the lot number shall be
for Carmen Herrera. The result for the draw for the SEVENTH PARCEL was as follows:

Lot 1 – Carmen Herrera

Lot 2 – Tomas Fangonil

Lot 3 – Milagros F. Layug

Lot 4 –Marina Fangonil

Lot 5 – Sinforoso Fangonil

Lot 6 – Mariano Fangonil

Lot 7 – Pura F. Tino

It should be noted that after the draws on August 27, 1998, Atty. Baltazar, counsel for [respondents], manifested that he will file a motion as regards
the accounting of the produce of the sixth and seventh parcels. However, what he filed was the Manifestation/Motion dated August 31, 1998.

The six heirs (excluding Carmen F. Herrera) shall reimburse the amount of P138 ,100.00, each one contributing the amount of P19,728.57, to Carmen
F. Herrera. Since the other six heirs did not insist on the accounting of the produce with respect to parcels 6 and 7, Carmen F. Herrera does not have to render
an accounting. As a matter of fact, this Court, in its Order dated October 7, 1998, considered the produce of the said two (2) parcels, which she appropriated
from the ‘50s to the present as interest on her money.[13]

Petitioner appealed the above RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging the unfair and prejudicial manner of partition of parcel 1 and claiming exclusive
ownership over parcels 6 and 7. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal in its Decision promulgated 30 January 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the October 9, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, in Special Proceeding Case No. A- 806, is
AFFIRMED in toto.”[14]

Under said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of the trial court, pronouncing that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would
support her claim that the distribution was not equal and prejudicial to her interest. It concurred with the trial court in concluding that, at the most, she is only
entitled to the reimbursement of the amount she spent for redemption of the questioned lots in an amount equivalent to what her money commanded then,
stating that petitioner is simply holding the said property in trust for the other co-heirs. At the same time, it upheld the trial court’s finding on the equivalent
of the money which petitioner paid to redeem and repurchase parcels 6 and 7, but the dispositive portion merely indicated the amount of P130,100.00.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 January 2004 Decision which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 15 July 2005.
Dissatisfied with the final resolution of the Court of Appeals on the matter, petitioner now comes before this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner insists she is the exclusive owner of parcels 6 and 7 and rejects the partition of parcel 1 as being unequal and
prejudicial, raising the following issues:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MANNER IN WHICH PARCEL 1 IS TO BE PARTITIONED BASED ON THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS’ POSITION WHICH IS CLEARLY UNEVEN AND UNFAIR TO THE PETITIONER WHOSE SHARE WILL THEN BE FOUND AT THE REAR PORTION
OF THE SAID LOT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PARCELS 6 AND 7 SHALL BE OWNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY
THE PETITIONER BEING THE ONLY ONE WHO REDEEMED AND REPURCHASED SAID PARCELS IN THE 1950’S EVEN WHILE THE PARENTS OF THE
PARTIES WERE STILL ALIVE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND
7 HAD LONG PRESCRIBED AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TO EXERCISE FULL
OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND
7 HAD LONG BEEN BARRED BY LACHES AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER [TO]
EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID
PARCELS.

V. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MONEY EQUIVALENT OF THE MONEY OF THE OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT WHICH SHE USED TO
REPURCHASE AND REDEEM PARCELS 6 AND 7 IN THE 1950’S WOULD ONLY BE P138,100.00 IN TODAY’S MONEY, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT
THE SAID PARCELS COULD BE REDEEMED BY THE ESTATE OF FABIAN AND MARIA LLOREN.[15]

Petitioner’s arguments are fallacious.

With respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the petition is a combination of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 and an independent civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. This is based on the observation that petitioner impleaded the
Court of Appeals as one of the respondents while at the same time raising issues of fact alone. Respondents posit that these are indicative of an “intention to
categorize the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of Court” and should be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously impleaded
the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we
held in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals,[16] the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule
45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be
but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.[17] The correct procedure is not to implead the Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in
several instances that where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, the Court of
Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.[18] The Court of Appeals is herein omitted
from the title of the case, as a liberal interpretation of the rules on technicality, in pursuit of the ends of justice and equity.[19]

We now discuss respondents’ contention that only factual issues have been brought to this Court.
 Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be set
forth.[20] Questions of fact may not be raised unless the case falls under any of the following exceptions[21]:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

In this particular instance, we are clearly faced with issues of fact. A question of fact is involved when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence
and relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.[22] We find that the
only questions to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in affirming the partition of parcel 1 in accordance with
the findings of the trial court; and (b) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in not finding that exclusive ownership of the properties in question
has been vested in petitioner.

In the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.[23] Factual matters are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court.[24] In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of
law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[25] factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive[26] on the parties
and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial court.[27] Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness, the findings of
fact of the lower court are conclusive. On this ground alone, the appeal warrants a dismissal.

Setting aside the procedural defects, the appeal must fail based on the merits. Upon perusal of the records of the case, it is evident to this Court that
no cogent reason exists to disturb the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner contends that the manner of partition of parcel 1 by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is unfair and prejudicial to her
interest. However, she was not able to adduce substantial evidence aliunde to support her allegations. Respondents stress that the Fangonil spouses
appropriated portions of Parcel 1 to Carmen, Pura, Tomas, Marina, and Sinforoso, by pointing out specific areas pertaining to each. Carmen, Tomas, and
Marina built their houses on parcel 1. Prior to the order of partition, an ocular inspection of parcel 1 was conducted by the RTC to determine which manner of
partition it would approve. During said ocular inspection, however, the RTC saw existing structures upon which the homes of Carmen, Tomas, Marina, and a
store of Carmen were situated. The arrangement was allegedly based on their oral agreement. This same arrangement allotting an equal area of 362 square
meters to each of the heirs was made the basis of the manner of partition proposed by respondents and later on approved by both the RTC and Court of
Appeals.

Anent the rights of the parties pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, petitioner insists that her act of paying for the repurchase and release from mortgage of
parcels 6 and 7 was on the understanding with her parents that she would thereafter be the owner thereof. She asserts that her exercise of acts of ownership
over parcels 6 and 7, to the exclusion of her parents and siblings, reveals she is the exclusive owner of these lots. She cites several circumstances in support
of her contention that respondents never considered parcels 6 and 7 part of the estate of their parents and are not co-owners thereof. First, petitioner
presented real estate tax receipts indicating that she had been the one paying for the realty taxes of the property. Secondly, petitioner asserts she has been
the only one hiring tenants for and benefiting from the produce of parcels 6 and 7. Lastly, the non-attempt of respondents to partition parcels 6 and 7 within
10 years from the death of the Fangonil spouses, as well as to reimburse her if indeed such was the agreement, demonstrates that they never considered the
said parcels part of the estate of their parents.
 After a thorough examination of the cases cited by petitioner and a painstaking review of the case records, this Court cannot give credence to
petitioner’s stance. The scales of justice overwhelmingly tilt in favor of respondents and against petitioner’s assertion that exclusive ownership of parcels 6
and 7 has vested in her. The fact that it was petitioner’s money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner thereof, in
the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such. This is more so if other evidence was adduced to show such is not the case. Neither will petitioner’s
exercise of acts of ownership over the properties bring us to that conclusion. It is evident that petitioner was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the
fruits of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-owners.[28] Moreover, although we recognize that real estate tax receipts indicating
payment of realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other
circumstances and evidence showing otherwise.[29] As a matter of fact, although the receipts indicate that the real estate tax payments for parcels 6 and 7
for the years following their repurchase and release were made by petitioner, the receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the
decedent Fabian Fangonil.

Petitioner and respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement dated 14 November 1983, wherein it was stipulated that the Fangonil spouses died
intestate, leaving 7 parcels of land in their names. Parcels 6 and 7 were included. It further stipulated that petitioner and her brother Tomas (now deceased)
are the only creditors of the estate, categorically stating petitioner is a creditor of the estate in the amount of P8,700.00. This amount represents what was
paid for by her for the repurchase and release from the mortgage lien of parcels 6 and 7 in the 1950s. Pertinent records of the case reveal that the amount
actually advanced for the repurchase was P6,100.00. The aforementioned extrajudicial settlement, which was later on submitted to the RTC for consideration
in the judicial partition, taken together with petitioner’s comment[30] in the same proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction
between petitioner and her parents was a mere loan. Under this extrajudicial settlement, respondents and petitioner included parcels 6 and 7 as part of the
estate of their deceased parents. It is particularly stated therein that petitioner and her brother Tomas are the only creditors of the estate. Although
petitioner’s comment allegedly maintained her claims on parcels 6 and 7, she categorically admitted therein that the amount totaling P8,700.00 referred to in
the extrajudicial settlement represents the personal money she used for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7.

Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and 7. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or
that no such admission was made.[31] We find that petitioner’s affidavit retracting her acquiescence to the stipulation on parcels 6 and 7 in the extrajudicial
settlement deserves scant consideration for being self-serving. Absent positive proof that the earlier statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable
mistake, retractions thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence.[32]

As to the issue of prescription, petitioner’s possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription
applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the
following elements[33] must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly,
petitioner cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or
co-owner. Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting
of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.[34] In this case, we find that
petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioner’s only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to
honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994. Alternatively, possession by a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other
co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them.[35] A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other.[36] Mere actual
possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property.
[37] Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.[38] An action to demand partition among co-
owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property.[39]
 On the matter of laches, we find no sufficient cause to apply the principle of laches, it being a principle grounded on equity. Laches is the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it.[40] Several circumstances must be present. First, there should exist conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy. Second, there is delay in asserting the complainant’s
right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit. Third, defendant
had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his claim. Fourth, the defendant will suffer injury or prejudice in
the event relief is accorded the complainant, or the suit is not held barred. Petitioner failed to prove the presence of all four established requisites of laches.
Moreover, there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of the court.[41] Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is
controlled by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice.[42]

Regarding the issue on the computation of the money to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for the amount she advanced to repurchase and
release parcels 6 and 7 from the mortgage debt, the Court of Appeals adopted the amount as computed by the RTC based on the present peso money
equivalent.[43] There is a discrepancy between the amount of indebtedness as quoted by the Court of Appeals from the RTC decision and the amount cited
by the Court of Appeals in the latter part of its decision. However, the amount stated in the paragraph before the dispositive portion was P130,100.00, without
any other indication that it intended to modify the amount determined by the RTC while the body of the Court of Appeals decision quoting the RTC decision
indicated the amount of indebtedness as P138,100.00. There was obviously a typographical error, with the body of the decision stating that the Court of
Appeals was affirming the RTC’s manner of computation totaling P138,100.00. Moreover, in the body and dispositive portion, the Court of Appeals upheld the
RTC’s decision in toto. Even then, the amount found by the RTC on the basis of the formula it used in the Order dated 7 October 1998 was erroneous.[44]

Still applying the present peso-dollar exchange rate, a slight modification in the computation is hereby ordered. The present peso equivalent of the
P6,100.00 indebtedness incurred on 13 November 1959 by the Fangonil spouses and payable to petitioner should be computed based on the following figures:

The currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar in the 1950s, which is P2.00:$1.00; Currency exchange rate of the Philippine
Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment. Therefore, the present peso money equivalent of the P6,100.00 should be derived
from the succeeding formula:

[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the
1950s)] multiplied by P6,100.00

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 and (b)
its Resolution dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 February 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the
amount to be reimbursed to petitioner. The present peso equivalent of the P6,100.00 indebtedness is hereby ordered reimbursed to petitioner which amount
shall be computed based on current peso-dollar exchange rates at the time of finality of judgment, applying the formula below: [(Current exchange rate of the
Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)] multiplied by P6,100.00 . The
equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and every heir having a share in the said indebtedness. No Costs. SO ORDERED.

SULPICIA JIMENEZ and TORIBIO MATIAS, Petitioners, vs. VICENTE FERNANDEZ alias HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ and TEODORA GRADO, Respondents.

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the following Decision 1 and Resolution 2 of the Honorable Court of Appeals: (1) Decision, dated March 1,
1977 in C.A.-G.R. No. 49178-R entitled "Sulpicia Jimenez, et al., v. Vicente Fernandez, et al." affirming in toto the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Third Judicial District in Civil Case No. 14802-I between the same parties and (2) Resolution dated June 3, 1977 denying plaintiffs-appellants'
motion for reconsideration.

As gathered from the records, the factual background of this case is as follows:
The land in question is the Eastern portion with an area of Four Hundred Thirty Six (436) square meters of that parcel of residential land situated in Barrio
Dulig (now Magsaysay), Municipality of Labrador, Pangasinan actually covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 (Exhibit A) issued in the name of
Sulpicia Jimenez.

The entire parcel of land with an area of 2,932 square meters, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez. Fermin Jimenez has two (2) sons named Fortunato and
Carlos Jimenez. This Fortunato Jimenez who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. After the death of Fermin Jimenez, the
entire parcel of land was registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso. As a
result of the registration case Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued on February 28, 1933, in the names of Carlos Jimenez and Sulpicia
Jimenez, in equal shares pro-indiviso.

Carlos Jimenez died on July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion of
the property consisting of 436 square meters.

On January 20, 1944, Melecia Jimenez sold said 436 square meter-portion of the property to Edilberto Cagampan and defendant Teodora Grado executed a
contract entitled "Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the former transferred said 436 square meter-portion to the latter, who has been in occupation
since.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On August 29, 1969, plaintiff Sulpicia Jimenez executed an affidavit adjudicating unto herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos Jimenez,
upon manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle. Consequently Transfer Certificate of Title No. 82275 was issued on October 1, 1969 in
petitioner's name alone over the entire 2,932 square meter property.

On April 1, 1970, Sulpicia Jimenez, joined by her husband, instituted the present action for the recovery of the eastern portion of the property consisting of
436 square meters occupied by defendant Teodora Grado and her son.

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and holding the defendant, Teodora Grado, the absolute owner of the land in question;
ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendant the amount of P500.00 as damages, as attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 20)

Petitioner appealed the above judgment to the respondent Court of Appeals and on March 1, 1977, respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming
the same in toto. Said decision was rendered by a special division of five (5) justices, with the Hon. Lourdes San Diego, dissenting.

Petitioners within the reglementary period granted by the Honorable Court of Appeals, filed therewith a motion for reconsideration. But said motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated June 3, 1977.

In their appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals from the aforequoted decision of the trial court, herein petitioner raised the following assignments of error
to wit:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I . THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IS NOT THE DAUGHTER OF CARLOS JIMENEZ.
II . THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALSO KNOWN AS MELECIA JIMENEZ, HAS NO RIGHT TO SELL THE LAND IN
QUESTION TO EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.

III . THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE
DEED OF SALE (EXH. "1") EXECUTED BY MELECIA CAYABYAB, ALIAS MELECIA JIMENEZ, IN HIS FAVOR.

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT TEODORA GRADO DID NOT BECOME THE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION BY VIRTUE OF THE DEED
OF EXCHANGE (EXH. "7") EXECUTED BY HER AND EDILBERTO CAGAMPAN.

V.T HE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OF APPELLANT SULPICIA JIMENEZ OVER THE LAND IN QUESTION CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY
THE ADVERSE OPEN AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO.

VI .THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE APPELLEE TEODORA GRADO IS THE ABSOLUTE OWNER OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE LIGHT OF
THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF LOURDES ARCUINO, ET AL., V. RUFINA APARIS AND CASIANO PURAY, G.R. NO. L-23424,
PROMULGATED JANUARY 31, 1968, WHICH CASE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

VII .THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AND ORDERING THE APPELLANTS TO PAY THE APPELLEES THE SUM OF P500.00 AS ATTORNEYS
FEES PLUS THE COSTS.

From the foregoing, this petition for review was filed.

We find merit in the petition.

From the start the respondent court erred in not declaring that Melecia Jimenez Cayabyab also known as Melecia Jimenez, is not the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez and therefore, had no right over the property in question. Respondents failed to present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was really
the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument that Melecia Cayabyab was the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there
can be no question that Melecia Cayabyab had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally transferred
to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property subject of this petition.

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code).
Moreover, Art. 2263 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Rights to the inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of 1889, by other
previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . . (Rollo, p. 17)

Thus, since Carlos Jimenez, owner of one-half pro-indiviso portion of that parcel of land then covered by Original Certificate of title No. 50933, died on July 9,
1936 (Exhibit "F") way before the effectivity of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional rights pertaining to his estate must be determined in
accordance with the Civil Code of 1889. Citing the case of Cid v. Burnaman (24 SCRA 434) wherein this Court categorically held that:

To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of 1889 (which was the law in force when Carlos Jimenez died and which should be the governing law in so far as
the right to inherit from his estate was concerned), a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child -
for illegitimate not natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807, 935)

Even assuming that Melecia Cayabyab was born out of the common-law-relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos Jimenez, she could not
even be considered an acknowledged natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry
Maria Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so far as the estate of
Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
Melecia Cayabyab in the absence of any voluntary conveyance to her by Carlos Jimenez or Sulpicia Jimenez of the litigated portion of the land could not even
legally transfer the parcel of land to Edilberto Cagampan who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same to herein private respondents.

Analyzing the case before Us in this manner, We can immediately discern another error in the decision of the respondent court, which is that the said court
sustained and made applicable to the case at bar the ruling in the case of Arcuino, et al., v. Aparis and Puray, No. L-23424, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 407,
wherein We held that:

. . . it is true that the lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the registered owners. They
merely claim to have acquired by succession, their alleged title or interest in lot No. 355. At any rate plaintiffs herein are guilty of laches.

The respondent court relying on the Arcuino case, concluded that respondents had acquired the property under litigation by prescription. We cannot agree
with such conclusion, because there is one very marked and important difference between the case at bar and that of the Arcuino case, and that is, that since
1933 petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez was a title holder, the property then being registered in her and her uncle Carlos Jimenez' name. In the Arcuino case, this
Supreme Court held. "(I)t is true that lands registered under the Torrens System may not be acquired by prescription but plaintiffs herein are not the
registered owners." (Rollo, p. 38) Even in the said cited case the principle of imprescriptibility of Torrens Titles was respected.

Melecia Cayabyab's possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be unavailing against the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez who was the holder pro-indiviso
with Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract of land which includes the portion now in question, from February 28, 1933, when the
Original Certificate of Title No. 50933 (Exhibit 8) was issued.

No possession by any person of any portion of the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the land
covered by the certificate of title. (Benin v. Tuason, L-26127, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531)

Sulpicia's title over her one-half undivided property remained good and continued to be good when she segregated it into a new title (T.C.T No. 82275, Exhibit
"A") in 1969. Sulpicia's ownership over her one-half of the land and which is the land in dispute was always covered by a Torrens title, and therefore, no
amount of possession thereof by the respondents, could ever defeat her proprietary rights thereon. It is apparent, that the right of plaintiff (now petitioner) to
institute this action to recover possession of the portion of the land in question based on the Torrens Title of Sulpicia Jimenez, T.C.T. No. 82275 (Exhibit "A") is
imprescriptible and not barred under the doctrine of laches. (J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Macalindong, L-15398, December 29, 1962, Francisco v. Cruz, et al., 43 O.G.
5105) Rollo, p. 39)

The respondent Court of Appeals declared the petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez guilty of laches and citing the ruling in the case of Heirs of Lacamen v. Heirs of
Laruan (65 SCRA 605), held that, since petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez executed her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication only in 1969, she lost the right to recover
possession of the parcel of land subject of the litigation.

In this instance, again We rule for the petitioner. There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court and since laches is an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. It would be rank injustice and
patently inequitous to deprive the lawful heirs of their rightful inheritance.

Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez is entitled to the relief prayed for, declaring her to be the sole and absolute owner of the land in question with right to its
possession and enjoyment. Since her uncle Carlos Jimenez died in 1936, his pro-indiviso share in the properties then owned in co-ownership with his niece
Sulpicia descended by intestacy to Sulpicia Jimenez alone because Carlos died without any issue or other heirs.

After all, the professed objective of Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act or the law which established the Torrens System of Land
Registration in the Philippines is that the stability of the landholding system in the Philippines depends on the confidence of the people in the titles covering
the properties. And to this end, this Court has invariably upheld the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title and in, among others, J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v.
Macalindong (6 SCRA 938), held that "the right of the appellee to file an action to recover possession based on its Torrens Title is imprescriptible and not
barred under the doctrine of laches.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution dated March 1, 1977 and June 3, 1977 in CA G.R. No. L-49178-R are SET
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-
Rivera, respondents.

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the 22 August 1994 Decision2 as well as the 27 June 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 39875. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court ("trial court") of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 8796-M. The
trial court’s Decision ordered petitioner Manuel T. De Guia ("DE GUIA") to turn over to private respondent Jose B. Abejo ("ABEJO") possession of the one half
(½) undivided portion of a fishpond and to pay actual damages and attorney’s fees.

The Antecedents

On 12 May 1986, ABEJO4 instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner
of the ½ undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond ("FISHPOND") situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan
Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPOND’s total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO further
averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJO’s damage and prejudice. ABEJO also
complained that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIA’s sublease
contract over the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay
damages.

DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues
concerning the validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has
prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to
him, ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJO’s
ownership of the ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA
sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.

The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief5 on 05 April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial
brief6 on 31 July 1990. DE GUIA’s pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO.
DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to Compromise,7 offering to settle ABEJO’s claim for P300,000 and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJO’s
choice.

Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4 December 1990. DE GUIA’s last witness completed her testimony on 22 November 1991. The
trial court summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA as follows:

Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land covering a fishpond with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one
half undivided portion owned by Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh. B), the
only heir of the original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July 30, 1974 the whole fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a "Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and
defendant. The contract provided that the period of lease shall be until November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and defendant failed to surrender the
fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27, 1983 were made for defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in question
(Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver possession and also to pay the rentals due. In anticipation, however, that defendant will vacate the fishpond,
plaintiff, on December 21, 1983 entered into a two year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for a consideration of P50,000.00
(Exh. G). This contract, despite its execution and even already notarized, had to be cancelled and the amount of P50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico
when the defendant did not heed the demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks
payment of P450,000.00 and P20,000.00 attorney’s fees.

On the other hand, defendant’s evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of one half of the undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs ownership of the
other half as void and fraudulent. As to the area pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he introduced improvements worth P500,000 and being in good
faith, he asked that he should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief, however, defendant raised the only issue which is the amount of damages
plaintiff is entitled to in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies of defendant’s witnesses particularly Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando
Peña was the amount of rental of fishponds in the same locality as the fishpond in question at a given time. However, the documentary evidence (Exhs. 1 and
2) in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence.8

The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant and hereby orders that:

1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided portion of the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits and fruits in equal
share with the defendant effective immediately until such time that partition of the property is effected;

2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by way of actual or compensatory damages;

3 Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

4. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.9

Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in ordering him to vacate and surrender possession of the ½ undivided portion
of the FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals found DE GUIA’s appeal without merit and affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Upon DE GUIA’s motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500.

Hence, the instant petition.

The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adopted in toto by the Court of Appeals are restated as follows:

1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond situated in Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by
Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo.

2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:

PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - ½ share; and LORENZA ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, ½ share, ---
3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters. ABEJO is seeking to recover possession of the ½ undivided portion of the
FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.

4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire FISHPOND by virtue of a document captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan ("Lease Contract") executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to 30 November
1979 for a consideration of P100,000.

5. The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza
Araniego Abejo’s ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND by intestate succession.

6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND to his son, ABEJO, on 22 November 1983.

7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to derive income from the property despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and several
demands to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.

8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE GUIA on 12 May 1986.

9. DE GUIA’s claim of ownership over the other ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND has not been finally adjudicated for or against him.

DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Contract of Lease with Preliminary Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano as proof of his ownership of the other undivided half portion of the FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA filed the complaint for himself and as
attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva Lejano ("Lejano Heirs")10 against Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros Villarico,
et al. ("Defendants"). The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case. No. 86-27-M. The
complaint alleged that DE GUIA acquired his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND from the Lejano Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs sought
to annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan, executed on 10 November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the
Defendants. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that Primitiva Lejano signed these documents under duress and without consideration.

The trial court rendered judgment11 on 28 February 1992 against DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs as follows:

WHEREFORE the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly Manuel De Guia, their successor-in-interest, not entitled upon the facts and the law to the
relief prayed for in the amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs against said plaintiff. Instead, as prayed for by defendants, judgment is
hereby rendered:

1. – Declaring the "Kasulatan ng Sanglaan" (Exhs. "A" & "1") dated November 10, 1979, and the "Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan" (Exhs. "C" &"3")
also dated November 10, 1979, as valid for all legal intents and purposes;

2. – Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage; and

3. – Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

SO ORDERED.12

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court of Appeals found the claim of force and
intimidation in the execution of the documents as highly improbable since Primitiva Lejano’s son, Renato Davis, witnessed the signing of the documents and
found nothing irregular at the time. The appellate court also held that assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs with immediate
foreclosure, Defendants were merely exercising their legitimate right of foreclosing the mortgaged property for non-payment of the loan. In addition, Primitiva
Lejano’s lawyer and notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abaño, testified that the parties appeared before him to affirm the contents of the documents. He also
stated that he was present when Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano Davis and her son Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event the Court of Appeals’ Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the
FISHPOND.

The Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJO’s ½ undivided share in the
FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIA’s sublease contract expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired his father’s share in 1983. However, the trial court
pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the judicial or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to
ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending partition, it is only just
that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJO’s share in the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he raised as sole
issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the reasonable amount but under certain conditions which
ABEJO found unacceptable.

In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered the Lease Contract between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C. Villarico which
provided for a yearly rent of P25,000 for ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The trial court declared that the total amount of rent due is P212,500,
computed from November 1983 when ABEJO became a co-owner of the FISHPOND up to 199113 or a period of eight and one half years. The trial court further
ordered DE GUIA to pay an additional P50,000 which represents the amount ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the Lease Contract
between them due to DE GUIA’s refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.

Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits from
the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall govern
the rights of the parties.

The Court of Appeals’ Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals debunked DE GUIA’s claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the
proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIA’s failure to respect ABEJO’s right over his ½ undivided share in the
FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of possession. The trial court’s decision effectively enforces ABEJO’s right over the property which DE GUIA violated
by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just
like accounting when necessary.

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIA’s claim that the award of compensatory damages of P242,000, computed based on the rent stipulated in the
Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly exorbitant. The Court of Appeals clarified that the amount the trial court awarded was
P262,500 and not P242,000 as erroneously alleged by DE GUIA. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO and
Ruperto C. Villarico carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE GUIA’s witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Peña. The Court of
Appeals also upheld the award of attorney’s fees since the parties could have avoided litigation had DE GUIA heeded the justifiable demands of ABEJO.

On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500. The Court of Appeals explained that the
trial court correctly computed the total amount of rent due at P212,500. The trial court erred, however, in adding the sum of P50,000 representing the rent for
1983 and 1984 which ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified that the sum of P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the rent of
P25,000 by 8½ years. The 8½ year period already included the two months rent received from and then subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.

The Issues

DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:

I.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION DENYING PETITIONER’S PLEA FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;

II.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO TURN OVER THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF
THE FISHPOND WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP;

III.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE AWARD OF ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE SAME;

IV.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S FAVOR.14

In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for recovery of possession and turn-over of the ½ undivided portion of a common property is
proper before partition; and (2) whether there is sufficient basis for the award of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of Possession

DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO
should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since the court cannot implement any decision in the latter case without first a
partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery of possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the action is part of an undivided, co-owned
property. The procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession, makes enforcement difficult if not impossible since there is still no
partition of the subject property.

Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons." A co-owner of
an undivided parcel of land is an "owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion
which is truly abstract."15 On the other hand, there is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.16

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment." This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership
(accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions are
brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession. However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to
possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion de reivindicacion,
which seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court.171awphi1.nét

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of the property.18 In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The
plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material
or determinate part of the property.19

In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and Herminio De La Cruz,20 we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover
a material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because
until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal portion.

As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be
excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate
part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the delivery of one-half (½) of the building in favor of private respondent.

Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJO’s claim of ownership over
the ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJO’s ½ undivided share by offering to settle the case for P300 ,000 and to
vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the entire
FISHPOND.1a\^/phi1.net Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of bringing an action for recovery of possession and the recovery of
compensatory damages.

Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have
the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of
dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a ½ portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains
indeterminate or unidentified.21 As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.

Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and not subject to laches.22 Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated
the co-ownership under certain conditions.23 Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.

To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-
owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-
owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for
partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such
recognition, ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.

DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when they ordered the recovery of rent when the exact identity of the portion in question had
not yet been clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to pay damages in the form of rent is premature before partition.

We disagree.

The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use
to the prejudice of the co-ownership.24 Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent
possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the other
co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner
who dwells in the house.

The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the
consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property.25
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent.26 Moreover, where
part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the
accessions of the property and should share in its net profits.27

The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After DE GUIA’s lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJO’s right to receive rent,
which would have accrued to his ½ share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to others.28 Since ABEJO acquired his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22
November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession and use of ABEJO’s portion beginning from that date. The compensatory
damages of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased property,29
considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to ABEJO’s ½ undivided share in the
FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new
rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years.

ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November 1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per
annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 220930 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from
finality of this decision until full payment.31

Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory Damages

DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant. He assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence the Lease Contract between ABEJO
and Ruperto C. Villarico that served as basis for the yearly rent of P25,000 for ABEJO’s share in the FISHPOND.

DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to the testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo ("Camargo") and Marta
Fernando Peña ("Peña") that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for much lesser considerations.

This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below.32 More so in the instant case, where the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court.33

It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Camargo and Peña because DE GUIA failed to present documentary evidence to support their
testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of Camargo and Peña unconvincing. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the
testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before
them.34

We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts’ evaluation of the witnesses’ testimonies. We likewise find reasonable the P25,000 yearly
compensation for ABEJO’s ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being a question of fact, it is for the trial and appellate courts to decide and this Court
will not disturb their findings unless clearly baseless or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this case.

Fourth Issue: Attorney’s Fees

The trial court did not err in imposing attorney’s fees of P20,000. Attorney’s fees can be awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code
specifically:

xxx

(2) Where the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
xxx

DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle
the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to
protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with
respect to that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory damages of P212,500 and attorney’s fees of P20,000, and MODIFIED as
follows:

1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the entire FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is
recognized without prejudice to the outcome of CA–G.R. CV No. 38031 pending before the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property;

2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of the entire FISHPOND prior to partition;

3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing rent from 27 November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27
November 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until full payment;

4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of P25,000 from June 1992 until finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the
same period, and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment;

5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental of
P25,000 for the latter’s ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of
possible changed circumstances.

SO ORDERED.

BERNARDO MENDOZA I, BERNARDO MENDOZA II, GUADALUPE M. MANGALE, JULIANA M. SAMONTE, PACITA M. SAMONTE, RICARDO MENDOZA, FRANCISCO
MENDOZA, PATRICIA MENDOZA, OLYMPIA M. DIZON, ROMEO MENDOZA, REYNALDO MENDOZA, REMEDIOS M. BERNABE and TRINIDAD MANUEL MENDOZA,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RENATO SAMONTE and LUCIA DELA CRUZ SAMONTE, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 23, 1976, in C.A G.R. No. 56049-R entitled "Bernardo
Mendoza I, et al. v. Renato Samonte, et al.," which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan; and its resolution dated September 15,
1976, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are, as follows:

On February 18, 1969, petitioners Bernardo Mendoza I, Bernardo Mendoza II, Guadalupe M. Mangale, Juliana M. Samonte, Pacita M. Samonte, Ricardo
Mendoza, Francisco Mendoza, Patricia Mendoza, Olympia M. Dizon, Romeo Mendoza, Reynaldo Mendoza, Remedios M. Bernabe and Trinidad Manuel Mendoza
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an action for reconveyance of real property against private respondents spouses Renato Samonte and
Lucia de la Cruz Samonte. On October 27, 1970, petitioners filed a First Amended Complaint wherein they alleged that in the event that the sale of the real
property by petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza to private respondents is declared valid, they are nonetheless entitled to legal redemption.

During the pre-trial on June 28, 1971, the parties, through their respective counsel, submitted the following partial stipulation of facts (pp. 48-51, Record on
Appeal):

xxx xxx xxx

1. Plaintiffs are the legal heirs of the late Arcadio Mendoza of Barrio Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan; plaintiff Trinidad Manuel being the surviving spouse of
said Arcadio Mendoza and the rest of the plaintiffs being the legitimate children of spouses Arcadio Mendoza (deceased) and Trinidad Manuel;

2. Arcadio Mendoza and Trinidad Manuel were married on April 22, 1923, in the Catholic Church, Parish of Bulacan, Bulacan;

3. Areadio Mendoza died in the Barrio of Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, on November 4, 1944;

4. The late Arcadio Mendoza left properties, real and personal, among which is the property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 12192 of the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan, situated at Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan, consisting of nine (9) parcels of land, with an aggregate area of 33,398 square
meters; . . .;

5. The property in question is Lot 3-A, which is a portion of Lot 3, which Lot 3-A is more particularly described as follows:

(A parcel of land (Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd17370, being a portion of Lot 3, described on plan Psu-51078, LRC (GLRO) Record No. 32994),
situated in the Barrio of Taliptip, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by (Lot 8, Psu-51078, Road Widening)
Bulacan-Obando Provincial Road (15-00 m. wide); on the SE., points 2 to 3 by property of Faustino Samonte; on the SW., points 3 to 4 by property of Faustino
Samonte; and on the NW., points 4 to 1 by Lot 3-B of the Subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being S, 30 deg. 52'E., 3794.82 m. from
BLLM 1, Mp. of Bulacan,

thence S. 49 deg. 38'E., 46.93 m. to point 2;

thence S. 42 deg. 21 'W 49.94 m. to point 3;

thence N. 43 deg. 47'W., 47.33 m. to point 4;

thence N. 42 deg. 46'E., 45.14 m. to the point

of beginning containing an area of TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY EIGHT (2,238) SQUARE METERS, more or less. All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points 1 and 4 by PS. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm., and the rest of Old PLS. Stone Mons.
20x20x60 cm., bearings true; declination O deg. 48'E date of the original survey, April 27, 1926 and that of the subdivision survey, July 21, 1961.

6. Arcadio Mendoza acquired ownership over the above-mentioned nine (9) parcels of land, including Lot 3, through donation from the late Jose Samonte,
which mode of acquisition was recognized and adjudicated by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated September 23, 1964, in the case entitled "Victor
Samonte, et al. v. Maria Samonte, et al."; GR No. 22891-R; . . .;

7. In the case decided by the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. No. 22891-R the plaintiffs were:
VICTOR SAMONTE, AGATONA SAMONTE, ARTEMIO VILLANUEVA, CELESTINO VILLANUEVA, RAMON VILLANUEVA, MERCEDES VILLANUEVA, SANTOS VILLANUEVA,
MAXIMO VILLANUEVA, ALIPIO VILLANUEVA, SIXTO DE LOS REYES, JOSE DE LOS REYES, LIGAYA DE LOS REYES, ELINO VILLANUEVA, CRISANTA VILLANUEVA,
PEDRO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS VILLANUEVA, ARSENIO VILLANUEVA, BALTAZAR VILLANUEVA, OTILLA VILLANUEVA, ENRIQUE VILLANUEVA, JOSE VILLANUEVA,
ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, MARTA MENDOZA, MARIA MENDOZA, FELIPA VILLENA, ADELA ANDAYA, and MATIAS VILLANUEVA. (sic)

while the defendants were:

FAUSTINO SAMONTE, MARIA SAMONTE, BERNARDO MENDOZA, GUADALUPE M. VDA. DE MANGALI, JULIANA MENDOZA, RAUL SAMONTE, BERNARDO MENDOZA
II, RICARDO MENDOZA, FRANCISCO MENDOZA, PACITA MENDOZA, CAYETANO SAMONTE and TRINIDAD MANUEL, in her own right and as guardian-ad-litem for
the minors, OLIMPIA, PATRICIA, REYNALDO, REMEDIOS and ROMEO all surnamed MENDOZA;

8. The aforementioned Lot 3 was subsequently subdivided into two (2) lots, namely: Lot 3-A with an area of 2238 square meters and Lot 3-B with an area
of 2115 square meters, as shown in the Subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-17370, dated September 7, 1961, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land
Registration, Antonio Noblejas;

9. One June 26,1962, plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza sold to defendants, Renato Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte, Lot 3-A . . .;

10. The said "Dokumento ng Bilihan:" is written in Tagalog, signed by plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, as vendor, witnessed by plaintiffs Juliana
Mendoza and Pacita Mendoza Samonte, and notarized by Atty. Pedro Magsalin;

11. In said "Dokumento ng Bilihan," plaintiff Trinidad Manuel Mendoza declared the following:

Na sa aming kasunduan ng aking mga anak at ako, ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking kalahati sa nasabing Lot 3, na may kaunting lamang, at ang Lot 3-B
ay siyang nauukol sa aking mga anak na tunay nilang pag-aari. (See first paragraph, page 3, Dokumento ng Bilihan, (Annex "C");

Na sa aking pakikpagkasundo (sic) sa aking mga anak at sa kanilang kapasiyahan at kapahintulutan ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking ipinagbili sa
magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz, alang-alang sa aming pangako na ipagbili sa nasabing magasawa ang kalahati ng naturang Lot 3, na
ang halaga ay matagal ng tinanggap namin sa mga nakabiling magasawa. (see second paragraph, page 3, Dokumento ng Bilihan, supra);

Na alang-alang (sic) sa halagang TATLONG LIBO AT LIMANG DAANG PISO (P3,500.00), Salaping Pilipino (sic), na aking ng (sic) tinanggap na may mga
dalawang taon na sa magasawang (sic) RENATO SAMONTE at LUCIA DE LA CRUZ, mga Pilipino (sic), may sapat na gulang at naninirahan sa Taliptip, Bulacan,
Bulacan, ay aking ipinagbibili, isinasalin at inililipat sa nasabing magasawang Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz, sa kanilang mga anak at tagapagmana ang
Lot 3-A ng Lote 3, na binabanggit sa itaas nito, pati ng pagkamayari at possesion (sic) ng nasabing Lote 3-A, na walang pinanagutan (sic) kahit ano hanggang
sa petsang ito, at aking ipagtatangol sa ano mang habol sa Lote 3-A ang mga bumiling magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia de la Cruz sa sarili kong
pananagot. (See last paragraph, page 2, Dokumento ng Bilihan, supra).

12. All the improvements in said Lot 3-A were placed therein by defendant spouses Renato Samonte and Lucia de la Cruz Samonte.

WHEREFORE, parties herein respectfully pray that the foregoing partial stipulation of facts be admitted, and that the above-entitled case be set for hearing for
purposes of receiving evidence insofar as the contorverted (sic) facts are concerned.

Malolos, Bulacan, June 18, 1971.

(SGD.) ERNESTO M. TOMANENG

Counsel for the plaintiffs

Suite 507 Marvel Bldg. I

258 Juan Luna, Manila

(SGD.) FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.

Counsel for the defendants

54 Dona (sic) Juana Rodriguez, St.

Quezon City

On October 15, 1973, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against petitioners, based on the following grounds (pp. 51-53, Record on Appeal):

There are several issues raised by the plaintiffs in their pre-trial brief as well as memorandum and foremost among them is the question regarding the validity
of the sale. According to the plaintiffs, the sale of the disputed property in favor of the defendants was null and void because as a mere co-owner of an
undivided estate, Trinidad Mendoza had no right to divided (sic) the estate into parts and then convey a part thereof by metes and bounds to a third person.
Such was the case, according to the plaintiffs, since there had never been any partition, judicial or extrajudicial, of the estate among the heirs of the late
Arcadio Mendoza.

It is apparent that the resolution of this issue will depend on whether or not the heirs of Arcadio Mendoza had already partitioned his estate and in pursuance
thereto, adjudicated the lot in question to the plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza.

After examining the "Dokumento ng Bilihan," evidencing the sale of the lot in question to the defendants, the Court is convinced that there was such an
agreement to partition the properties, including the one involved in this case, left by the deceased Arcadio Mendoza. From paragraphs 4 and 5 of said
document, . . . it can readily be seen that the partition had been accomplished by the heirs of Arcadio Mendoza. . . . Said paragraphs, which read as follows,
clearly stated that it was the agreement among the surviving children and wife of Arcadio Mendoza that Lot 3-A, which was the other half of Lot 3, was to be
the share of plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza while Lot 3-B would belong to the children:

Na sa aming kasunduan ng aking mga anak at ako, ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking kalahati sa nasabing Lot 3, na may kaunting lamang, at ang Lot 3-B
ay siyang nauukol sa aking mga anak na tunay nilang pagaari (sic).

Na sa aking pakikipagkasundo sa aking mga anak at sa kanilang kapasiyahan at kapahintulutan ang nasabing Lot 3-A ay siyang aking ipinagbili sa
magasawang (sic) Renato Samonte at Lucia dela Cruz, alang-alang sa aming pangako na ipagbili sa nasabing magasawa (sic) ang kalahati ng naturang Lot 3,
na ang halaga ay matagal ng (sic) tinanggap (sic) namin sa mga nakabiling magasawa (sic).

Indeed, it must habe (sic) been because of this agreement to partition the estate, that Lot 3, from which the land in question came, was subdivided on
September 7, 1961 by a surveyor as stated in the second paragraph of said deed of sale.

Na upang mahati humigit kumulang sa dalawang bahagi ang nasabing Lote No. 3, ang isa ay para sa mga anak ng namatay na aking asawang Arcadio
Mendoza, at ang pangalawa ay para sa akin na tunay kong pagaari (sic), ay ipinagawa namin ang ang (sic) plano de subdivision (LRC) PSD-17370 petsa Sept.
7, 1961, aprobado ni G. Antonio H. Noblejas, Comisionado ng Land Registration, at ang kinalabasan ay ang mga sumusunod:

Lote 3-AArea 2238 sq. m.:

xxx xxx xxx

It bears emphasis that according to the fourth paragraph of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" quoted above, the sale made by plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza of Lot 3-A
to the defendants had the prior consent and approval of her children, the other plaintiffs herein.

In the opinion of the Court, the paragraphs cited above constitute clear admissions on the part of plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza, who executed said deed of sale,
and on the part of plaintiffs Pacita Samonte and Juliana Samonte, who signed the same as witnesses, regarding the existence of the partition agreement
adjudicating to plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza the land in question before it was sold to the defendants.

Of course, plaintiffs Trinidad Manuel, Pacita Samonte and Juliana Samonte, who all took the stand, vehemently denied having read and understood the
contents of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" which they admittedly signed. According to plaintiff Trinidad Manuel, she affixed her thumbmark on the document
when her sister Lourdes Manuel, the mother of defendant Renato Samonte, asked her to do so and promised to take care of the "interests" of her children. On
her part, Pacita Samonte claimed that although she was able to read the title of the document, she did not read the contents thereof, however, since she
signed the same only upon the assurance of her aunt that her mother Trinidad Mendoza, had already given her conformity. Juliana Samonte also denied
having read the document but alleged that her failure to do so was due to her illness then.

But in the opinion of the Court, all these deals cannot prevail over the presumption that the said plaintiffs understood the contents of the deed of sale whtn
(sic) they signed the same. For following the ordinary course of human nature, one does not affix his signature on a legal document if he does not understand
the same. Besides, it appears that the "document (sic) ng Bilihan" was written in a dialect spoken by and known to the said plaintiffs who while on the stand
all testified in the Tagalog dialect.

Moreover, according to plaintiff Romeo Mendoza, the son of plaintiff Trinidad Mendoza, the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" was prepared by their lawyer, Atty. Pedro
Magsalin who according to the defendant Renato Samonte read the same to the plaintiffs Trinidad Mendoza, Juliana and Pacita Samonte before the latter
affixed their respective signatures, a fact which is not improbable.

Indeed, there is another circumstance showing why the denials of plaintiffs Trinidad Mendoza, Juliana and Pacita Samonte cannot be given much credit. These
three plaintiffs testified that they did not know the contents of the deed of sale not only at the time they signed it but also after they had executed the same.
Yet, the undeniable fact remains that after the execution of said deed of sale in 1962, the defendants started building their house on the lot in question in
barrio Taliptip, Bulacan, Bulacan. The failure of said plaintiffs and of the other plaintiffs to stop or even question the defendants regarding the construction of
their house on the lot in question, which was being built openly in the vicinity where they all resided, can only mean that the plaintiffs knew that the
defendants had a right to build on the disputed property.

Considering the finding of the Court that Lot 3-A, the property in question, was the subject of a partition agreement and was adjudicated to plaintiff Trinidad
Mendoza, it follows that said property was no longer held in co-ownership by the plaintiffs at the time that it was sold to the defendants. Such being the case,
the provisions of Article 1620 of the Civil Code, allowing a co-owner to exercise the right of redemption, cannot be applied.

To summarize, the trial court took into account the following in dismissing petitioners' complaint: (1) the pertinent provisions of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" to
prove that Lot 3 has been subdivided and that Lot 3-A has been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza; (2) the presumption that petitioners
Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, Pacita Samonte and Juliana Mendoza understood the contents of the document when they signed it; (3) estoppel on the part of
petitioners; and (4) non-applicability of Article 1620 of the Civil Code.

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court (p. 40, Rollo). The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 70, Rollo)
Hence, the present petition.

The issues are whether or not: (1) the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is valid; and (2) petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption.

According to petitioners, on June 26, 1962, when the alleged "Dokumento ng Bilihan" was executed by Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, Lot 3-A was still under
litigation for it was only on September 23, 1964, that C.A.-G.R. No. 22891-R was decided by the respondent court. This being the case, petitioners have not
executed any agreement of partition, judicial or extrajudicial. As held by the respondent court in C.A.-G.R. No. 22891-R, Lot 3-A (and other lots) was donated
by Jose Samonte to Arcadio Mendoza for which reason, petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza is not entitled to one-half (1/2) of Lot 3 but only to the share of one
(1) legitimate child or 1/13 rights and interests, citing Article 996 of the Civil Code. 1 The "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is null and void insofar as it affects the rights
and interests of the other petitioners because petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza can only sell her 1/13 rights and interests over Lot 3-A and not more than
that. Corollarily, the remaining petitioners can still exercise the right of legal redemption, conformably with Article 1620 of the Civil Code. 2

Disputing these allegations of petitioners, private respondents contend that petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza declared under oath in the "Dokumento ng
Bilihan" that Lot 3-A was given to her by virtue of an agreement of partition between her and her children. She declared further that the land in question was
sold by her to private respondents with the knowledge and consent of her children. The amount paid therefor was known to her and her children. The
document was written in Tagalog, the dialect in Bulacan. It was signed by petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza, as vendor, witnessed by petitioners Pacita
Samonte and Juliana Mendoza and prepared and notarized by Atty. Pedro Magsalin, the family lawyer of petitioners. Having participated in, consented to
and/or benefited from the sale, petitioners are estopped from impugning the validity and enforcesbility thereof.

Likewise, We affirm.

In resolving the first issue, We have to settle two (2) sub-issues: (1) has Lot 3 been partitioned; and (2) if so, has the subject lot been adjudicated to petitioner
Trinidad Manuel Mendoza? In this case, the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession. Where there are two or more heirs, the whole
estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs (Article 1078 of the Civil Code). Petitioners' co-ownership over Lot 3 was
extinguished when it was subdivided into Lot 3-A and Lot 3-B, which portions were concretely determined and technically described (see de la Cruz v. Cruz,
G.R. No. L-27759, April 17, 1970, 32 SCRA 307). Against the impetuous denial of petitioners that Lot 3 has been partitioned (pp. 19, 96, 121, Rollo) is Exhibit A
which is the Subdivision Plan of Lot 3, (LRC) PSD-17370, dated September 7, 1961, duly approved by the Commissioner of Land Registration. It is also Our
finding that Lot 3-A has been adjudicated to petitioner Trinidad Manuel Mendoza. We take into account the pertinent provisions of the "Dokumento ng Bilihan"
and estoppel on the part of petitioners (pp. 6-8, supra). Therefore, the "Dokumento ng Bilihan" is a valid document.

We resolve the second issue based on the previous discussion that the co-ownership has been extinguished. Article 1620 of the Civil Code applies only if the
co-ownership still exists. If the property has been partitioned or an identified share has been sold, there is no longer any right of legal redemption (see
Umengan v. Butucan, et al., 117 Phil. 325; Caro v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-46001, March 25, 1982, 113 SCRA 10).

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated June 23, 1976 and the resolution dated September 15, 1976 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
EMILIO PUNSALAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. C. BOOT LIAT, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

AVANCEÑA, J.:

On or about the 13th of July, 1920, a Moro by the name of Tamsi saw from the Cawit-Cawit shores in the Province of Zamboanga, a big bulky object in the
distance which attracted his attention. Thereupon, together with another Moro named Bayrula, he went in a small boat to investigation and found it to be a
large fish. They then returned to shore, where they met other Moros and requested their help to catch the fish. They went in three small boats, there being
then in one, seven in the other, and five in the third, twenty-two men, in all, twenty-one of whom are plaintiffs herein, and the remaining one named Ahamad
is defendant. After having arrived at the place where the fish was, which was found to be a whale, they proceeded to pull it toward the shore up to the mouth
of the river, where they quartered it, having found in its abdomen a great quantity of ambergris, which was placed in three sacks, two of which were full and
the other half full, and taken to the house of Maharaja Butu, where they left it to the care of Ahamad. Then the contents of the two full sacks were placed in
three trunks. All of these twenty-two persons made an agreement that they were to be the sole owners of this ambergris and that none of them could sell it
without the consent of the rest. As to the half sack of amber they agreed that some of them should take it to Zamboanga to sell for the purpose of
ascertaining the market price of the ambergris, in order that they might dispose of the rest accordingly. Some of them, with Tamsi in charge, went to
Zamboanga to sell the half sack of amber where they did dispose of it to a Chinaman, Cheong Tong, for the sum of P2,700, which amount was distributed
among all the parties in interest. Then they offered to sell for the sum of P12,000 to the Chinamen, Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat, the rest of the amber
contained in the two sacks which had been left in the house of Maharaja Butu, for safekeeping, and a document (Exhibit A) to this effect was executed by Lim
Chiat and Cheong Tong, on the one hand, and Tamsi, Imam Lumuyod, and Imam Asakil, on the other. Thereupon they went to Cawit-Cawit on board the
launch Ching-kang to get the amber so sold.

It appears that there were other people in Zamboanga who knew of the existence of this ambergris in the house of Maharaja Butu. While the above related
events were taking place, Mr. Henry E. Teck, who was one of those having knowledge of the existence of this amber in Cawit-Cawit and of the fact that the
launch Ching-kang had left for Cawit-Cawit, proposed to the master of the revenue cutter Mindoro to go to Cawit-Cawit to seize some supposedly contraband
opium. After transmitting this information to the Collector of Customs, he, the master of the Mindoro, immediately proceeded to Cawit-Cawit. There were on
board the vessel Mr. Teck, some Chinamen, among whom were C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, and Go Tong, and some Moros who, according to Mr. Teck, were to
assist in the arrest of the smugglers. Upon the arrival of the Mindoro at Cawit-Cawit, the master, accompanied by Mr. Teck and some Moros, went to the house
of Maharaja Butu. As is to be presumed, this information about the supposed contraband opium was but a trick to have the Mindoro at their disposal. The
master proceeded to search the house, stating that he had information to the effect that there was contraband opium and as a result of the search, he found
three large trunks containing a black substance which had a bad odor. He then asked the owner of the house to whom those three trunks belonged, and the
latter pointed to Ahamad who was present and who stated that the contents came from the abdomen of a large fish. The master, however, said that it was
opium and told Ahamad that he would take the three trunks on board the ship. Then Ahamad and other Moros asked permission of the master to accompany
him on the voyage to Zamboanga, to which the master consented. When already on board and during the voyage the master became convinced that the
contents of the three trunks were not opium.

During the voyage, Mr. Teck offered to purchase the amber contained in the three trunks, but Ahamad refused to sell it for the reason that he was not the sole
owner thereof, but owned it in common with other persons who were in Zamboanga. However Mr. Teck, aided by his companions who wielded some influence
in Zamboanga, insisted that Ahamad should sell them the amber, telling him not to be afraid of his companions, as he would answer for whatever might
happen. With this promise of protection, Ahamad decided to sell the amber for P7,500 and received P2,500 as part payment on account of this price, a bill of
sale having been signed by Ahamad, Maharaja Butu and three Moros more. The balance of this price was paid later.
When Cheong Tong, Lim Chiat, and the Moros who had gone to Cawit-Cawit on board the launch Ching-kang arrived at the house of Maharaja Butu, they found
that the amber they had purchased from Tamsi and his companions was no longer there.

The plaintiffs are twenty-one of the twenty-two Moros who had caught the whale, and Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong, who had purchased from Tamsi and his
companions the amber contained in the three trunks deposited in the house of Maharaja Butu for safekeeping. They claim the 80-½ kilos of ambergris
contained in three trunks, or its value in the amount o P60,000, and damages in the sum of P20,000. This action is brought against C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, Go
Tong, Henry E. Teck, and the Moro, Ahamad, the first four being the persons who purchased this same amber from the one last named while on board the
revenue cutter Mindoro.

It appears from the foregoing that the amber in question was the undivided common property of the plaintiffs (with the exception of Lim Chiat and Cheong
Tong) and the defendant Ahamad. This common ownership was acquired by occupancy (arts. 609 and 610 of the Civil Code), so that neither Tamsi, Imam
Lumuyod, or Imam Asakil had any right to sell it, as they did, to Lim Chiat and Cheong Tong, nor had the Moro Ahamad any right to sell this same amber, as
he did, to C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, Go Tong, and Henry E. Teck. There was an agreement between the coowners not to sell this amber without the consent of
all. Both sales having been made without the consent of all the owners, the same have no effect, except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them
(art. 399, Civil Code).

Although the original complaint filed in this case was entitled as one for replevin, in reality, from its allegations, the action herein brought is the ordinary one
for the recovery of the title to, and possession of, this amber. It is no bar to the bringing of this action that the defendant Ahamad is one of the coowners. The
action for recovery which each coowner has, derived from the right of ownership inherent in the coownership, may be exercised not only against strangers but
against the coowners themselves, when the latter perform, with respect to the thing held in common, acts for their exclusive benefit, or of exclusive
ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in violation of, the right of the community. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain of June 22, 1892.) In this case
the selling of the amber by the defendant Ahamad as his exclusive property and his attitude in representing himself to be the sole owner thereof place him in
the same position as the stranger who violates any right of the community. He is not sued in this case as a coowner, for the cause of action is predicated upon
the fact that he has acted not as a coowner, but as an exclusive owner of the amber sold by him.

As to the sale made by Ahamad, it is urged that the purchaser acted in good faith. It is contended that the latter did not know that the amber belonged to
some others besides Ahamad. But the evidence shows otherwise. Henry E. Teck himself admitted that on the occasion of the sale of the amber he really had
promised Ahamad to protect him, and although he said that the promise made by him had reference to the contingency of the amber proving to be opium, as
the master of the revenue cutter Mindoro believed, this is incredible, because he could not make Ahamad such a promise, nor could such a promise, if made,
have any influence on the mind of Ahamad, inasmuch as the latter knew that the amber was not opium. If, as Henry E. Teck admits, he made Ahamad this
promise of protection, it should have been only on account of Ahamad's refusal to sell the amber due to the fact that he was not the sole owner thereof.

With regard to the action of the trial court in not admitting Exhibits 1 and 2 offered by the defendants, we believed that it was no error. These documents are
affidavits signed by Paslangan, and the best evidence of their contents was the testimony of Paslangan himself whom the plaintiffs had the right to cross-
examine. Moreover, they are substantially the same as the statements made by Paslangan at the trial when testifying as witness for the defendants, and for
this reason the ruling of the trial court excluding these documents would not, at all events, affect the merits of the case.

In the complaint it is alleged that the value of the amber is P60,000. Upon the evidence adduced on this point, and taking into account that the defendant,
Henry E. Teck, himself, testifying as witness, has stated that this amber was worth P1,200 per kilo, we accept this estimated value set forth in the complaint.

The decision of the court below contains the following order for judgment:

Wherefore, it is the judgment and order of the court that the defendants C. Boon Liat, Henry E. Teck, Ahamad Ong Chua, and Go Tong deliver to the plaintiffs,
Emilio Punsalan, Bayrula, Daring Gumuntol, Mohamad, Insael, Dunkaland, Tahil, Dambul, Dagan, Sabay, Sahibul, Pingay, Mujahad, Amilol, Baraula, Saraban,
Lim Chiat, and Cheong Tong twenty-twenty-first (20/21) of the amber in question, or, in default thereof, to pay them its value of twelve thousand pesos
(P12,000), less one-twenty-first of said amount.
Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the only modification that the value of the amber which is the subject-matter of this action shall be
P60,000, without special finding as to the costs of this instance. So ordered.

RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, EMETERIA ASEJO, TEODORICA ASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO and SANTIAGO
ASEJO, respondents.

In issue herein are property and property rights, a familiar subject of controversy and a wellspring of enormous conflict that has led not only to protracted
legal entanglements but to even more bitter consequences, like strained relationships and even the forfeiture of lives. It is a question that likewise reflects a
tragic commentary on prevailing social and cultural values and institutions, where, as one observer notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self-
fulfillment and where property is held as sacred as life itself. "It is in the defense of his property," says this modern thinker, that one "will mobilize his deepest
protective devices, and anybody that threatens his possessions will arouse his most passionate enmity." 1

The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the wisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing the social order is shouldered by the political leadership-
and the people themselves.

The parties have come to this Court for relief and accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief pursuant to the decree of law.

The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision 2 appealed from:

xxx xxx xxx

... [T]he land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of Albay located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m. originally belonged to one Felisa
Alzul as her own private property; she married twice in her lifetime; the first, with one Bernabe Adille, with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant
Rustico Adille; in her second marriage with one Procopio Asejo, her children were herein plaintiffs, — now, sometime in 1939, said Felisa sold the property in
pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of repurchase being 3 years, but she died in 1942 without being able to redeem and after her death, but during
the period of redemption, herein defendant repurchased, by himself alone, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-judicial partition representing himself
to be the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name alone also, so that OCT. No. 21137 in the
name of his mother was transferred to his name, that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise had failed, his half-brothers and sisters,
herein plaintiffs, filed present case for partition with accounting on the position that he was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed,-and this is
the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs, Emeteria Asejo was occupying a portion, defendant counterclaimed for her to vacate that, —

Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained defendant in his position that he was and became absolute owner, he was not a trustee, and
therefore, dismissed case and also condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because of this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial
court erred in:
I. ... declaring the defendant absolute owner of the property;

II. ... not ordering the partition of the property; and

III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the portion of the property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellant's brief.

which can be reduced to simple question of whether or not on the basis of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should be maintained. 3

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent Court of appeals reversed the trial Court, 4 and ruled for the plaintiffs-appellants, the private respondents herein. The petitioner now appeals,
by way of certiorari, from the Court's decision.

We required the private respondents to file a comment and thereafter, having given due course to the petition, directed the parties to file their briefs. Only the
petitioner, however, filed a brief, and the private respondents having failed to file one, we declared the case submitted for decision.

The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption
within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro the
right to demand redemption of the entire property.

There is no merit in this petition.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with aspect to his share alone. 5 While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in
its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-
ownership.

Necessary expenses may be incurred by one co-owner, subject to his right to collect reimbursement from the remaining co-owners. 6 There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:

ART. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in common
and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his
share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on
the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. 7 But the provision does
not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Neither does the fact that the petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the existing co-ownership. While his half-
brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the
property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is
one.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the property on behalf of the private respondents. The Civil Code states:

ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes.

We agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that fraud attended the registration of the property. The petitioner's pretension that he was the sole heir to
the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear effort on his part to defraud his brothers
and sisters and to exercise sole dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision therefore applies.

It is the view of the respondent Court that the petitioner, in taking over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted
himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the
private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second alternative the petitioner having asserted
claims of exclusive ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co-heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assume the mere management
of the property abandoned by his co-heirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself affirms, the result
would be the same whether it is one or the other. The petitioner would remain liable to the Private respondents, his co-heirs.

This Court is not unaware of the well-established principle that prescription bars any demand on property (owned in common) held by another (co-owner)
following the required number of years. In that event, the party in possession acquires title to the property and the state of co-ownership is ended . 8 In the
case at bar, the property was registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name, while the claim of the private respondents was presented in 1974. Has
prescription then, set in?

We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership).
The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made
known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the property for the period required by law. 9

The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the
contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to
have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is occupying a portion of the land up to
the present, yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is
occupying only as a counterclaim, and only after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, 10 but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish
a shield for fraud. 11 It is therefore no argument to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one,
notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private respondents' claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a
constructive trust prescribes in ten years, 12 reckoned from the date of the registration of the property, 13 we, as we said, are not prepared to count the
period from such a date in this case. We note the petitioner's sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is "the only heir and child of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was
able to secure title in his name also." 14 Accordingly, we hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the
petitioner's act of defraudation. 15 According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they "came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of the
litigation." 16 Hence, prescription is not a bar.
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed
waived, 17 and here, the petitioner never raised that defense. 18 There are recognized exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why they
apply.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED,

VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and void
the orders of 23 and 26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22 October 1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Pasay City, Branch 30, and directing the trial court to set the case for pre-trial conference.

Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven (7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On
28 October 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful
neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written
memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen assuming
the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father.

Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the
meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in
Cebu.

After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed on 12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot
so that the they could divide the proceeds between them.

In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent.
Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died.

In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale
would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.

Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the lawyers of both parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-trial
order, with private respondent executing a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at the pre-trial and enter into any amicable settlement in his
behalf. 1

On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion to cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying his
wife to Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.

On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue as
scheduled.

When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in
whose favor he executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant
as in default and ordered reception of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.

On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court
denied the motion and plaintiff presented his evidence.

On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares
on the basis of their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued
enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to delay partition. The trial court also
upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the former's share, the trial
court held that this property should be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.

The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff P1,200.00 as rentals 2 from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus
interest from the time the action was filed.

On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22 October 1979 the trial court denied the motion.

Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders and decision of the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970
denying defendants motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order of 26 April 1979 declaring him in default and authorizing
plaintiff to present his evidence ex-parte; (e) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October 1979 denying his omnibus motion for
new trial.

On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April 1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default., The
appellate court found the explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and devoid of a manifest intention to delay the
disposition of the case. It also ruled that the trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed by counsel for defendant who should not have
been declared as in default for the absence of his counsel.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was
dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.

The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing
petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment against respondent.

We find merit in the petition.

As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is mandatory. 3 A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference
may be non-suited or considered as in default. 4 In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial,
court has authority to declare respondent in default. 5

Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which
should take into account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of
the case of movant. 6

In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's
explanation that he had to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her to a wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979
where she was one of the principal sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-trial, and the Court of Appeals did
not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain the trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement for lack of merit.
Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social function. It is time
indeed we emphasize that there should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it
is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases.

Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend
the pre-trial on the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in order not to be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared
for him, the order of the trial court declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex parte was proper. 7

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court
holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot
in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the
proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the time their father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it can be
sold to third persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders its disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part of
petitioner, he claims that he should be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.

In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that it could be sold to third persons and the proceeds divided between
them equally, and for respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as monthly rental, conformably with their stipulated
sharing reflected in their written agreement.

We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we
here declare to commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time
partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the
property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who
among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, 8 this Court upheld the order of the
trial court directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.

However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property
owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. 9
Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he
shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-
owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the

same. 10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he
has been preventing the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate
the property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest;
from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner.

When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-
ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in
the house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this extent and from
then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the
trial court in Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED, with the modification that respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the
premises in question within ninety (90) days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of P1,200.00 with interest at the legal
rate from the time he received the decision of the trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the premises.

The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This
decision is final and executory.

SO ORDERED.

SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR. OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH XXX, PASAY CITY and
AGUILAR-BERNARES REALTY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-52524 April 27, 1981

SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JOSE C. CAMPOS, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH
XXX, PASAY CITY, and LIM SIU LENG, respondents.

These two cases which involve similar facts and raise Identical questions of law were ordered consolidated by resolution of this Court dated March 17, 1980. 1

The petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, in both cases, is a condominium corporation within the meaning of Republic Act No. 4726 in relation to
a duly registered Amended Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions of the Sunset View Condominium Project located at 2230 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City
of which said petitioner is the Management Body holding title to all the common and limited common areas. 2

G.R. NO. 52361

The private respondent, Aguilar-Bernares Realty, a sole proprietorship with business name registered with the Bureau of Commerce, owned and operated by
the spouses Emmanuel G. Aguilar and Zenaida B. Aguilar, is the assignee of a unit, "Solana", in the Sunset View Condominium Project with La Perla
Commercial, Incorporated, as assignor. 3 The La Perla Commercial, Incorporated bought the "Solana" unit on installment from the Tower Builders, Inc. 4 The
petitioner, Sunset View Condominium Corporation, filed for the collection of assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty, private
respondent herein, a complaint dated June 22, 1979 docketed as Civil Case No. 7303-P of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City, Branch XXX. The private
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that the court has no jurisdiction
over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. The petitioner filed its
opposition thereto. The motion to dismiss was granted on December 11, 1979 by the respondent Judge who opined that the private respondent is, pursuant to
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, a "holder of a separate interest" and consequently, a shareholder of the plaintiff condominium corporation; and that "the
case should be properly filed with the Securities & Exchange Commission which has exclusive original jurisdiction on controversies arising between
shareholders of the corporation." the motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, the petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge, filed the instant petition for certiorari praying that the said orders be set aside.

G.R. NO. 52524

The petitioner filed its amended complaint dated July 16, 1979 docketed as Civil Case No. 14127 of Branch I of the City Court of Pasay City for the collection of
overdue accounts on assessments and insurance premiums and the interest thereon amounting to P6,168 06 as of March 31, 1979 against the private
respondent Lim Siu Leng 5 to whom was assigned on July 11, 1977 a unit called "Alegria" of the Sunset. View Condominium Project by Alfonso Uy 6 who had
entered into a "Contract to Buy and Sell" with Tower Builders, Inc. over the said unit on installment basis. 7

The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the amount sought to be collected is an assessment. The
correctness and validity of which is certain to involve a dispute between her and the petitioner corporation; that she has automatically become, as a
purchaser of the condominium unit, a stockholder of the petitioner pursuant to Section 2 of the Condominium Act, Republic Act No. 4726; that the dispute is
intra-corporate and is consequently under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission as provided in Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A. 8

The petitioner filed its opposition thereto, alleging that the private respondent who had not fully paid for the unit was not the owner thereof, consequently was
not the holder of a separate interest which would make her a stockholder, and that hence the case was not an intra-corporate dispute. 9

After the private respondent had filed her answer to the opposition to the motion to dismiss 10 of the petitioner, the trial court issued an order dated August
13, 1979 denying the motion to dismiss. 11 The private respondent's motion for reconsideration thereof was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
September 19, 1979. 12
The private respondent then appealed pursuant to Section 10 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court to the Court of First Instance, where the appeal was docketed as
Civil Case No. 7530P. The petitioner filed its "Motion to Dismiss Appeal" on the ground that the order of the trial court appealed from is interlocutory. 13

The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied and the parties were ordered to submit their respective memorandum on the issue raised before the trial court
and on the disputed order of the trial judge. 14 After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda on the matter, the respondent Judge issued an
order dated December 14, 1979 in which he directed that "the appeal is hereby dismissed and d the judgment of the lower court is reversed. The case is
dismissed and the parties are directed to ventilate their controversy with the Securities & Exchange Commission. 15 The petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied in an order dated January 14, 1980. 16 Hence this petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent Judge.

Issues Common to Both Cases

It is admitted that the private respondents in both cases have not yet fully paid the purchase price of their units. The Identical issues raised in both petitions
are the following:

1. Is a purchaser of a condominium unit in the condominium project managed by the petitioner, who has not yet fully paid the purchase price thereof,
automaticaly a ,stockholder of the petitioner Condominium Corporation

2. Is it the regular court or the Securities & Exchange Commission that has jurisdiction over cases for collection of assessments assessed by the
Condominium Corporation on condominium units the full purchase price of which has not been paid?

The private respondents in both cases argue that every purchaser of a condominium unit, regardless of whether or not he has fully paid the purchase price, is
a "holder of a separate interest" mentioned in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as "The Condominium Act" and is automatically a
shareholder of the condominium corporation.

The contention has no merit. Section 5 of the Condominium Act expressly provides that the shareholding in the Condominium Corporation will be conveyed
only in a proper case. Said Section 5 provides:

Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interests in the
common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or shareholding in the condominium corporation ...

It is clear then that not every purchaser of a condominium unit is a shareholder of the condominium corporation. The Condominium Act leaves to the Master
Deed the determination of when the shareholding will be transferred to the purchaser of a unit. Thus, Section 4 of said Act provides:

The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or to be divided into condominium only if there shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of the
province or city in which the property lies and duly annotated in the corresponding certificate of title of the land ... an enabling or master deed which shall
contain, among others, the following:

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Astatement of the exact nature of the interest acquired or to be acquired by the purchaser in the separate units and in the common areas of the
condominium project ...

The Amended Master Deeds in these cases, which were duly registered in the Register of Deeds, and which contain, by mandate of Section 4, a statement of
the exact nature of the interest acquired by a purchaser of a unit, provide in Section 6 of Part 1:

(d) Each Unit owner shall, as an essential condition to such ownership, acquire stockholding in the Condominium Corporation herein below provided ... 17
The Amended Master Deeds likewise provide in Section 7 (b), thus.

(b) All unit owners shall of necessity become stockholders of the Condominium Corporation. TOWER shall acquire all the shares of stock of SUNSET VIEW
and shall allocate the said shares to the units in proportion to the appurtenant interest in the COMMON AREAS and LIMITED COMMON AREAS as provided in
Section 6 (b) above. Said shares allocated are mere appurtenances of each unit, and therefore, the same cannot be transferred, conveyed, encumbered or
otherwise disposed of separately from the Unit ... 18

It is clear from the above-quoted provisions of the Master Deeds that the shareholding in the Condominium Corporation is inseparable from the unit to which it
is only an appurtenant and that only the owner of a unit is a shareholder in the Condominium Corporation.

Subparagraph (a) of Part 1, Section 6, of the Master Deeds determines when and under what conditions ownership of a unit is acquired by a purchaser thus:

(a) The purchaser of a unit shall acquire title or ownership of such Unit, subject to the terms and conditions of the instrument conveying the unit to such
purchaser and to the terms and conditions of any subsequent conveyance under which the purchaser takes title to the Unit, and subject further to this
MASTER DEED ... 19

The instrument conveying the unit "Solana" in G.R. NO. 52361 is the "Contract to Buy and Sell" dated September 13, 1977, Annex "D", while that conveying
the unit "Alegria" in G.R. NO. 52524 is the "Contract to Buy and Sell" dated May 12, 1976, Annex "C". In both deeds of conveyance, it is provided:

4. Upon full payment by the BUYER of the total purchase price and full compliance by the BUYER of an its obligations herein, the SELLER will convey unto
the BUYER, as soon as practicable after completion of the construction, full and absolute title in and to the subject unit, to the shares of stock pertaining
thereto and to an rights and interests in connection therewith ... 20

The share of stock appurtenant to the unit win be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which
time he will also become the owner of the unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the Condominium
Corporation. Inasmuch as owners is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid
the full purchase price thereof is not The owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation.

That only the owner of a unit is a stockholder of the Condominium Corporation is inferred from Section 10 of the Condominium Act which reads:

SEC. 10. ... Membership in a condominium corporation, regardless of whether it is a stock or non-stock corporation, shall not be transferable separately
from the condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance When a member or stockholder ceases is to own a unit in the project in which the condominium
corporation owns or holds the common areas, he shall automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of the condominium corporation.

Pursuant to the above statutory provision, ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to being a shareholder in the condominium corporation. It follows
that a purchaser of a unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully paid the full purchase price, is not a shareholder By necessary implication, the
"separate interest" in a condominium, which entitles the holder to become automatically a share holder in the condominium corporation, as provided in
Section 2 of the Condominium Act, can be no other than ownership of a unit. This is so because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is the owner of a unit
and when he ceases to be the owner, he also ceases automatically to be a shareholder.

The private respondents, therefore, who have not fully paid the purchase price of their units and are consequently not owners of their units are not members
or shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation,

Inasmuch as the private respondents are not shareholders of the petitioner condominium corporation, the instant case for collection cannot be a "controversy
arising out of intracorporate or partnership relations between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively" which controversies are under the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities & Exchange Commission, pursuant to Section 5 (b) of P.D. No. 902- A. The subject matters of the instant cases
according to the allegations of the complaints are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts: that of G.R. NO. 52361, which is for the collection of P8 ,335.38
with interest plus attorney's fees equivalent to the principal or a total of more than P10,000.00 is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance; and that
of G.R. NO. 52524, which is for the collection of P6,168-06 is within the jurisdiction of the City Court.

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to resolve the issue raised in G.R. NO. 52524 of whether an order of the City Court denying a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction can be appealed to the Court of First Instance.

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders of the respondent Judge dated December 11, 1979 and January 4, 1980 in Civil Case No. 7303-P, subject matter of the
Petition in G.R. No. 52361, are set aside and said Judge is ordered to try the case on the merits. The orders dated December 14, 1979 and January 14, 1980 in
Civil Case No. 7530-P, subject matter of the petition in G.R. No. 52524 are set aside and the case is ordered remanded to the court a quo, City Court of Pasay
City, for trial on the merits, with costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
LONGINOS JAVIER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SEGUNDO JAVIER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

This case relates to the ownership of the lot, and of the house standing thereon, No. 521 Calle Real, Malate, Manila. The court below found that the land
belonged to the plaintiff as administrator of the estate of his father, Manuel Javier, and that the defendant Isabel Hernandez and Manuel Ramon Javier, her
son, are the owners of the house standing on the lot. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the possession of the property, but giving the
defendants a reasonable opportunity to remove the house.

The evidence sustains the findings of fact to the effect that the land belongs to the estate represented by the plaintiff. There was evidence to show that
the land was, in 1860, in the possession of Manuel Javier, the father of the defendant Segundo Javier, and that since that time it has been occupied by his
children and that no one of these children ever made any claim to the ownership thereof, and no one them ever occupied the property as owner.

Manuel Ramon Javier, testifying as a witness, made no claim to the ownership of the land, and testified simply that the result of his investigations into
the question of ownership showed that there was a great confusion in regard thereto.

The appellants claim that this action can not be maintained by the administrator of the estate of Manuel Javier, but that it should be maintained by all
the heirs of the deceased. The right of judicial administrator to recover the possession of real property belonging to the estate of the deceased was recognized
in the case of Alfonso vs. Natividad 1 (4 Off. Gaz., 461; secs. 702, 703, and 704 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

The appellants claim in their brief that they were possessors in good faith, and by reason thereof and of the provisions of article 451 of the Civil Code
they can not be compelled to pay rent. It is to be observed, however, that the appellants do not come within the definition of a possessor in good faith found
in article 433 of the Civil Code cited in their brief. As said by the appellants themselves in that brief, the two defendants, Segundo Javier and his wife, Isabel
Hernandez, always believed that the land did not belong to them but belonged to the estate of Manuel Javier. It is to be observed, moreover, that the
judgment of the court does not allow any recovery at all for the use or occupation of the house, and the recovery of rent for the use of the land is limited to
the time elapsed since April 24, 1904, when a demand was made upon the defendants for the possession of the property.

It is also claimed by the appellants that, in accordance with article 453 of the Civil Code, they are entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses of
constructing the house. These expenses are only allowed in accordance with the article cited by the appellants to a possession in good faith, and the
appellants were not such possessors. lawphil.net

It is claimed finally by the appellants that the case should be decided by an application of the principles of law meant that community of property
existed because the house was owned by the appellants and the land by the plaintiff, the contention can not be maintained, for such a condition of affairs
does not create a community of property within the meaning of that term as it is used in title 3, book 2 of the Civil Code. If, on the other hand, it is itself
belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and that two of the defendants were such heirs, it can be said that the decision of the court below was fully as
favorable to the appellants as it could be.

Article 397 of the Civil Code relates to improvements made upon the common property by one of the coowners. The burden of proof was on the
appellants to show that the house was built with the consent of their cotenants. Even if a tacit consent was shown this would not require such cotenants to
pay for the house. (8 Manresa, Commentaries on Civil Code, p. 396.)
 The judgment of the court below allowed the appellants to remove the house within a reasonable time. Whether this judgment was erroneous as far as
the appellee is concerned, we need not inquire, because he has not appealed from the judgment.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellants.

After the expiration of twenty days from the date hereof let judgment be entered in accordance herewith and ten days thereafter let the case remanded
to the court below for proper action. So ordered.

RAMON MERCADO, BASILIA MERCADO joined by her husband, FRANCISCO RONQUILLO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. PIO D. LIWANAG, defendant-appellee.

The present appeal, taken by the plaintiff from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City), is before us on a certification by the Court of
Appeals, the questions involved being purely legal. The case was submitted to the trial court upon the following stipulation of facts:

1. That the complaint filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant seeks to annul a Deed of Sale on the ground of fraud and on the provisions of Article 493 of
the Civil Code.

2. That on July 14, 1956, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the plaintiff Ramon Mercado and the defendant Pio D. Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale, photostat
copy of which is attached hereto marked as Annex "A" and forming an integral hereof, covering a divided half and described in meter and bounds, or an area
of 2,196 square meters at P7.00 per square meter or for a total amount of P15,372.00, of a parcel of land situated at Kangkong, Quezon City, covered Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 20805 of the Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal, now Quezon City:

3. That the said T.C.T. No. 20805 containing an area of 4,392 square meters, is issued in the name of the plaintiffs Ramon Mercado and Basilia Mercado as co-
owners PRO-INDIVISO, and the sale was without the knowledge and consent of plaintiff Basilia Mercado;

4. That out of the total area of 4,392 square meters, an area consisting of 391 square meters was expropriated by the National Power Corporation sometime
in December 1953 at a price of P10.00 per square meter, Civil Case No. Q-829 (Eminent Domain) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
entitled "National Power Corporation, plaintiff, versus Brigido Almodoban, et als., defendants," but this fact of expropriation came to the knowledge of the
defendant Pio D. Liwanag upon the registration of the Deed of Sale Annex "A". .

5. That pursuant to the Deed of Sale Annex "A" T.C.T. No. 32757 was issued in the name of Pio Liwanag and Basilia photostat copy of which is hereto attached
and marked as Annex "B".

6. That defendant submits the receipt signed by plaintiff Ramon Mercado dated July 14, 1956 photostat copy of which is attached hereto and marked as Annex
"C" and promissory note of the same date for P10,000.00, photostat copy of which is attached hereto and marked is Annex "D" which are both self-
explanatory, but plaintiff Ramon Mercado disclaims payment and receipt of such check and promissory note, the check being uncashed and is still in the
possession of Atty. Eugenio de Garcia;

7. That plaintiffs and defendant respectfully submit for resolution of this Honorable Court the issue of whether or not the Deed of Sale Annex "A" court be
annulled based in the foregoing facts in relation to Article 493 of the Civil Code, setting aside all other issues in the pleadings.

Upon the issue thus presented the trial court held that under Article 493 of the Civil Code the sale in question was valid and so dismissed the complaint,
without costs. This ruling is now assailed as erroneous.
Article 493 provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Appellants except to the application of this provision in this case for the reason that in the deed of sale sought to be annulled the vendor disposed of a divided
and determinate half of the land under co-ownership. The argument, as far as it goes, seems to be tenable. What a co-owner may dispose of under Article 493
is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no
right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part by metes and bounds. Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Gonzales, et al. vs. Itchon, et al., 47 O.G.
6290; Manresa, Vol. 3, 7th ed. p. 630.

The pertinent recitals in the disputed deed of sale read:

I hereby sell, transfer and convey absolutely and irrevocably unto said Pio D. Liwanag, his heirs, successors, and assigns my rights, title and interest on my
chosen portion of the above described property which consist of one-half of aforesaid ownership bounded on the West by Pacifico Gahudo, on the North by
Hacienda de Piedad and on the South by Circumferential Road, consisting of 50 meters more or less frontal length along Circumferential Road, and with a total
area of 2,196 square meters as indicated in Co-owners Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20805.

Nevertheless, upon registration of the sale and cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 20805 in the names of the previous co-owners, the new transfer
certificate that was issued (No. 32757) did not reproduce the description in the instrument but carried the names of appellee Pio D. Liwanag and Basilia
Mercado as "co-owners pro-indiviso." There is no suggestion by any of the parties that this new certificate of title is invalid, irregular or inaccurate. There is no
prayer that it be canceled. As far as Basilia Mercado is concerned she retains in all their integrity her rights as co-owner which she had before the sale, and
consequently, she has no cause to complain. Much less has Ramon Mercado, for it was he who was responsible for whatever indicia there may be in the deed
of sale that a determinate portion of the property was being sold, as shown by the second paragraph thereof, quoted without contradiction in appellee's brief
as follows:

That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was originally in my name, but was split into two equal parts by virtue of my desire to donate to my sister-in-law
Juana Gregorio an equal half thereof with the understanding that I as donor would have the absolute power to choose from the property owned in common
that part which I would like to segregate for myself or my heir and assigns.

And of course appellee himself not only does not challenge the new certificate of title, wherein he appears as co-owner of an undivided one-half share, but
precisely relies upon it for his defense in this action.

The title is the final and conclusive repository of the rights of the new co-owners. The question of whether or not the deed of sale should be annulled must be
considered in conjunction with the title issued pursuant thereto. Since, according to this title, what appellee acquired by virtue of the sale is only an undivided
half-share of the property, which under the law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to dispose of, the trial court committed no error in
dismissing the action. The end-result of the transaction is in accordance with Article 493 of the Civil Code.

The other point raised by appellants refers to the statement in the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from that "the stipulation with regards to the
deed of sale based on the ground of fraud is insufficient for all purposes and besides, no proof showing the allegation of such fraud exists in the accord." It is
contended that the trial court erred in making such statement, the same being contrary to the stipulation in which the parties expressly eliminated the issue
of fraud. From the entire context of the decision, however, it can be gathered that the case was not decided on the basis of the said issue. In any event, even
if the court did err in considering the question of fraud in spite of the stipulation, the error is not a prejudicial one. As far as the dismissal of the actions
concerned, it makes no difference whether fraud has not been proven or fraud has been abandoned as an issue by express agreement.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellants in this instance.

HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners, vs. HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO,
NAPOLEON ACEBEDO, RIZALINO ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA PING, respondents.

The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus
Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar.

The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated
value of about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:

a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City;

b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City;

c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel Acebedo, and the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and

d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate.

The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and the others are the private respondents.

Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years, respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October
4, 1989. The said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in
Quezon City, and form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time, they already had a buyer. It was
further stated in said Motion that respondents-heirs have already received their proportionate share of the six (6) million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa
Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the
Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator hereafter):
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion;

2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate; and

3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.

To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to Approval of Sale", to wit:

1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without the
knowledge of the herein administrator, without the approval of this Honorable Court and of some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;

2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even render the
proponents of the sale liable for punishment for contempt of this Honorable Court;

3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the Estate to generate
funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and with the approval of this Honorable Court if warranted, to give the heirs some advances chargeable against
theirs (sic) respective shares, and, for the purpose to authorize the herein Administrator, and the other heirs to help the Administrator personally or through a
broker, to look for a buyer for the highest obtainable price, subject always to the approval of this Honorable Court. 1

On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the
properties at a price higher than P12,000,000.00.

The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners have not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the
Court, on February 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.

Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February
26, 1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly
petitioner-administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he confronted the notary public of the questioned document, the latter
revoked his notarial act on the same.

On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the
Deed of Absolute Sale.

The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, petitioner Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting
them several periods within which to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.

Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner-administrator filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10,
1990, maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided
among the heirs.

On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease some of the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed
an Opposition on the following grounds : that the motion is not proper because of the pending motion to approve the sale of the same properties; that said
conditional sale was initiated by petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest money; that the approval of the sale
would mean Yu Hwa Ping's assumption of payment of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts and thus, the intestate administrator may be
terminated.

On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which, stated, among others, to wit: 2
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying that the new administrator be directed to sell the properties covered by TCT
Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is hereby denied; and

c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some properties of the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to the approval of
the Court.

On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties to a conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held,
but still the parties were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was continued, wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be
allowed to sell their shares of the properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price already agreed upon, while herein petitioners negotiate for a higher price with Yu
Hwa Ping.

Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the Deed of Conditional Sale.

On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive portion of which states, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted, reconsidered and set aside, and another one is hereby issued as follows:

1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed by the heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their respective shares in
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;

2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same price as the
sale executed by the herein heirs-movants;

3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining balance of the purchase price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS from
notice hereof;

4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of court, resulting from his failure to submit the owner's copy of TCT Nos.
155569, and 120145 is hereby denied. 3

Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for the properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount
of P6,500,000.00.

Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21) days thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the
Court reinstate its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their Opposition. 4

Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were
denied by the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.

On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, hoping for the last time that they would be able to convince the Court
that its Order dated March 29, 1991 in effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its jurisdiction.

On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial Reconsideration for "lack of merit".

On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order dated March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners
filed this Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order
approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining
portion of said properties?

We answer in the positive

In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, 5 this Court made a pronouncement that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of
properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this matter should be threshed out in a
separate action.

The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a
decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court.
Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.

We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale
precisely was made conditional, the condition being that the same should first be approved by the probate court.

Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent's estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of the heirs to dispose of their ideal
share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the heirs. 7

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under
administration. This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. 8

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under administration, is based on the Civil Code provision 9 stating that the
possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such
heirs.

The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right. 11 Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the

co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 12 In other words, the law
does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. 13

As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et
al., 14 it was said that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way
of such administration. The Court then relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force as Article 533 and Article
493, respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes
the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the co-owners of the estate which remains undivided'."
Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private
respondents' right to alienate the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit.

PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.

SO ORDERED.

DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, Respondents.

The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as
may effectively bar their present action.

The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein
private respondent, Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case, with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6
share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in 1931
and had not been heard from since then [Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 39].
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado.
On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same
date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3,
1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino
Afable, Sr.

In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It
appears that said land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in the
name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino
Afable, Sr. in 1983.

In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended
that the petitioners were guilty of laches.He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to
him of the land.

After trial, the lower court rendered a decision:

1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land described in paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6)
respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon;

2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners, having 1/6 share each, of the property described in paragraph III of the complaint, to
wit:

a. Sabina Bailon

b. Bernabe Bailon

c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino

d. Delia Bailon-Casilao;

3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order to terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer
selected by the parties to delineate the specific part of each of the co-owners.

4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs respective shares as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;

5. Ordering the defendant to pay the following:

a. P5,000.00 as damages;

b. P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and;

c. to pay the costs.

[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37-38].

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it held that prescription does not he against plaintiffs-appellees
because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription,
nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz v. Gamponia [100 Phil. 277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the
petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the equitable doctrine of laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect of a
sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved
co-owners is required.

The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.Thus:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign
or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis
supplied.]

As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common.[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to
their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became
a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment
thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].

From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
the property.

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person
who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession
of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]

Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a
sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action. for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of
possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common property
claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].

As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.

In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of prescription is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, '(n)o
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.' [Emphasis supplied.] In Budiong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 241, this Court has interpreted said provision
of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that '(n )o title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will not
lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed parcel of land.

It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who are not the registered co-owners but merely represented their deceased mother, the
late Nenita Bailon, prescription lies.Respondents bolster their argument by citing a decision of this Court in Pasion v. Pasion [G.R.No. L-15757, May 31, 1961, 2
SCRA 486, 489] holding that "the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title can only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered" and that 'one
who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim the same.'

Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies only against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers.
The rational is clear:

If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step
into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code, Article 777; Old Civil Code, Article 657), the title or right undergoing no change by its
transmission mortis causa [Atus, et al., v. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764].

The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha [G. R. No. 67284, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 427, 429], which was promulgated subsequent to the
Pasion case reiterated the Atus doctrine. Thus:

Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. [Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257].

Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.

Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations complainant's rights,
the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in
the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go China Gun, et al. v. Co Cho et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].

While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing.

The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required
that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an
opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time. Thus:

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048,
August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].

The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
be enforced or asserted," [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35]. [Emphasis supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any
opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner co-owners had
entrusted the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest among them [TSN, July 27, 1983, p. 14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a
son of Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on cross-examination that his mother was only the administrator of the
land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away [TSN, October 5, 1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in 1942 after
she got married, it was only in 1983 that she returned. Sabina on the other hand, is said to be living in Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for China in 1931
has not been heard from since then. Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private respondent derived his title, made the disputed sales covering the
entire property, the herein petitioners were unaware thereof.

In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions entered
into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao returned to Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately, she and her co-
petitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. The appellate court thus erred in holding that 'the petitioners did nothing to show interest in the
land." For the administration of the parcel of land was entrusted to the oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof precisely because the other co-
owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of Sorsogon where the land is situated. Her co-owners also allowed her to appropriate the entire
produce for herself because it was not even enough for her daily consumption [TSN, October 5, 1983, pp. 17-18]. And since petitioner was the one receiving
the produce, it is but natural that she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if knowledge of the sale by Rosalia was conveyed to
the petitioners only later, they cannot be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her. In view of the
lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute
the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted against the petitioners.

The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would assert the
right on which they base the suit. On the contrary, private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-
owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to self was granted to the two sellers by the
other co-owners.

Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered," the truth was that Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the
name of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was already in his possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his testimony
before the court a quo:

COURT:

Q: From whom did you get the certificate of Title?

A: When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.

Q: It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?

A: Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5, 1984, p. 12) When cross-examined, he stated:

Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was given to you in the year 1974, was it not?

A: 1975.

Q: In 1975, you already discovered that the title was in the name of several persons, is it not?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you discovered that it is in the name of several persons, you filed a case in court for authority to cancel the title to be transferred in your name,
is it not? chanrobles virtual law library

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that was denied by the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon because there was ordinary one signatory to the deed of sale instead of six, was it not?

A: Not one but two signatories.

[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Rollo, p. 35]

Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the lot subject of the sale was registered should have prompted a searching
inquiry by Afable considering the well- known rule in this jurisdiction that:

... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such inquiry.
[Gonzales v. IAC and Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January 29, 1988).

Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who
were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree
of ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to
him by such sale must be borne by him.

Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein petitioner Delia Bailon-Casilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously to cure
the flaw [TSN, July 27, 1983, p.6]. Later, he even filed a petition in the Court of First Instance to register the title in his name which was denied as aforesaid.

It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who
invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
Spouses ALEXANDER CRUZ and ADELAIDA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. ELEUTERIO LEIS, RAYMUNDO LEIS, ANASTACIO L. LAGDANO, LORETA L. CAYONDA and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Private respondents, the heirs of spouses Adriano Leis and Gertrudes Isidro, 1 filed an action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig seeking the
nullification of the contracts of sale over a lot executed by Gertrudes Isidro in favor of petitioner Alexander Cruz, as well as the title subsequently issued in the
name of the latter. Private respondents claimed that the contracts were vitiated by fraud as Gertrudes was illiterate and already 80 years old at the time of
the execution of the contracts; that the price for the land was insufficient as it was sold only for P39,083.00 when the fair market value of the lot should be
P1,000.00 per square meter, instead of P390.00, more or less; and that the property subject of the sale was conjugal and, consequently, its sale without the
knowledge and consent of private respondents was in derogation of their rights as heirs.

The facts that gave rise to the complaint:

Adriano and Gertrudes were married on 19 April 1923. On 27 April 1955, Gertrudes acquired from the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(DANR) a parcel of land with an area of one hundred (100) square meters, situated at Bo. Sto. Niño, Marikina, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 42245. The Deed of Sale described Gertrudes as a widow. On 2 March 1956, TCT No. 43100 was issued in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro," who was
also referred to therein as a "widow."

On 2 December 1973, Adriano died. It does not appear that he executed a will before his death.On 5 February 1985, Gertrudes obtained a loan from
petitioners, the spouses Alexander and Adelaida Cruz, in the amount of P15,000.00 at 5% interest, payable on or before 5 February 1986. The loan was
secured by a mortgage over the property covered by TCT No. 43100. Gertrudes, however, failed to pay the loan on the due date.

Unable to pay her outstanding obligation after the debt became due and payable, on 11 March 1986, Gertrudes executed two contracts in favor of petitioner
Alexander Cruz. The first is denominated as "Kasunduan" which the parties concede is a pacto de retro sale, granting Gertrudes one year within which to
repurchase the property. The second is a "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan," a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the same property for the price of P39 ,083.00,
the same amount stipulated in the "Kasunduan."

For failure of Gertrudes to repurchase the property, ownership thereof was consolidated in the name of Alexander Cruz in whose name TCT No. 130584 was
issued on 21 April 1987, canceling TCT No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro.

On 9 June 1987, Gertrudes Isidro died. Thereafter, her heirs, herein private respondents, received demands to vacate the premises from petitioners, the new
owners of the property. Private respondents responded by filing a complaint as mentioned at the outset.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondents. The RTC held that the land was conjugal property since the
evidence presented by private respondents disclosed that the same was acquired during the marriage of the spouses and that Adriano contributed money for
the purchase of the property. Thus, the court concluded, Gertrudes could only sell to petitioner spouses her one-half share in the property.

The trial court also ruled that no fraud attended the execution of the contracts. Nevertheless, the "Kasunduan," providing for a sale con pacto de retro, had
superseded the "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" the deed of absolute sale. The trial court did not consider the pacto de retro sale an equitable mortgage,
despite the allegedly insufficient price. Nonetheless, the trial court found for private respondents. It rationalized that petitioners failed to comply with the
provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial order for the consolidation of the ownership in the vendee a retro to be recorded in the Registry
of Property.

The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring Exhibit G — "Kasunduan ng Tuwirang Bilihan" Null and Void and declar[ing] that the title issued pursuant thereto is likewise Null and Void;

2. Declaring the property in litigation as conjugal property;

3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Marikina Branch to reinstate the title of Gertrudes Isidro;

4. Ordering the plaintiff[s] [sic] to comply with the provision[s] of Article 1607 in relation to Article 1616 of the Civil Code;

5. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] P15,000.00 nominal damages for the violation of plaintiffs' rights;

6. Ordering the defendant[s] to pay plaintiff[s] the sum of P8,000.00 as and for attorney's fees;

7. Dismissing defendant[s'] counterclaim; and

8. Ordering defendant[s] to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals in vain. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, holding that since the property was
acquired during the marriage of Gertrudes to Adriano, the same was presumed to be conjugal property under Article 160 of the Civil Code. The appellate
court, like the trial court, also noted that petitioner did not comply with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals. First, they contend that the subject property is not conjugal
but is owned exclusively by Gertrudes, who was described in the Deed of Sale between Gertrudes and the DANR as well as in TCT No. 43100 as a widow.
Second, assuming the land was conjugal property, petitioners argue that the same became Gertrudes' exclusively when, in 1979, she mortgaged the property
to the Daily Savings Bank and Loan Association. The bank later foreclosed on the mortgage in 1981 but Gertrudes redeemed the same in 1983.

The paraphernal or conjugal nature of the property is not determinative of the ownership of the disputed property. If the property was paraphernal as
contended by petitioners, Gertrudes Isidro would have the absolute right to dispose of the same, and absolute title and ownership was vested in petitioners
upon the failure of Gertrudes to redeem the property. On the other hand, if the property was conjugal as private respondents maintain, upon the death of
Adriano Leis, the conjugal partnership was terminate, 3 entitling Gertrudes to one-half of the property. 4 Adriano's rights to the other half, in turn, were
transmitted upon his death to his heirs, 5 which includes his widow Gertrudes, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. 6
Thus, as a result of the death of Adriano, a regime of co-ownership arose between Gertrudes and the other heirs in relation to the property.

Incidentally, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that Gertrudes' redemption of the property from the Daily Savings Bank vested in ownership over the
same to the exclusion of her co-owners. We dismissed the same argument by one of the petitioners in Paulmitan vs. Court of Appeals, 7 where one of the
petitioners therein claimed ownership of the entire property subject of the case by virtue of her redemption thereof after the same was forfeited in favor of the
provincial government for non-payment of taxes. We held however, that the redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to
the entire land subject of the co-ownership." We expounded, quoting our pronouncement in Adille vs. Court of Appeals: 8

The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

Essentially, it is the petitioner's contention that the property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in its redemption
within the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the present Code, giving the vendee a retro
the right to demand redemption of the entire property.
There is no merit in this petition.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by a co-owner with respect to his share alone (CIVL CODE, art. 1612; CIVIL CODE (1889), art. 1514.). While the
records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other
words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense.
Under the Civil Code:

Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned in
common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be
equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on
the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the
provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

It is conceded that, as a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common. Article 493 of the Civil Code
provides:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow." Where a parcel
of land, forming past of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the
face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the
deceased spouse. The rationale for this rule is that "a person dealing with registered land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition
of the property. He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face of the register or the certificate of title. To require
him to do more is to defeat one of the primary objects of the Torrens system." 9

As gleaned from the foregoing discussion, despite the Court of Appeals' finding and conclusion that Gertrudes as well as private respondents failed to
repurchase the property within the period stipulated and has lost all their rights to it, it still ruled against petitioners by affirming the Regional Trial Court's
decision on the premise that there was no compliance with Article 1607 of the Civil Code requiring a judicial hearing before registration of the property in the
name of petitioners. This provision states:

Art. 1607. In case of real property, the consolidation of ownership in the vendee by virtue of the failure of the vendor to comply with the provisions of article
1616 shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property without a judicial order, after the vendor has been duly heard.

The aforequoted article is intended to minimize the evils which the pacto de retro sale has caused in the hands of usurers. A judicial order is necessary in
order to determine the true nature of the transaction and to prevent the interposition of buyers in good faith while the determination is being made. 10

It bears stressing that notwithstanding Article 1607, the recording in the Registry of Property of the consolidation of ownership of the vendee is not a condition
sine qua non to the transfer of ownership. Petitioners are the owners of the subject property since neither Gertrudes nor her co-owners redeemed the same
within the one-year period stipulated in the "Kasunduan." The essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately
vested in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a
retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold. As title is already
vested in the vendee a retro, his failure to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or ownership for the method
prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the consolidated title. 11

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED in that the petitioners are deemed owners of the property by reason of the failure of the
vendor, Gertrudes Isidro, to repurchase the same within the period stipulated. However, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 130584, in the name of Alexander M.
Cruz, which was issued without judicial order, is hereby ordered CANCELLED, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 43100 in the name of Gertrudes Isidro is
ordered REINSTATED, without prejudice to compliance by petitioners with the provisions of Article 1607 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR., respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15
in Civil Case No. V-5369, ordering the dismissal of the action for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance filed by petitioners.

Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual antecedents are undisputed:

Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pontevedra, Capiz under Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. As appearing therein, the lot, which consisted of a total area of 27,179 square meters was
divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as follows:

Salome Bornales 4/16

Consorcia Bornales 4/16

Alfredo Bornales 2/16

Maria Bornales 2/16

Jose Bornales 1/16

Quirico Bornales 1/16

Rosalia Bornales 1/16

Julita Bornales 1/16

On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Salome and two other
co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described as having more or less the following measurements:

63-1/2 meters from point “9” to “10”, 35 meters from point “10” to point “11”, 30 meters from point “11” to a certain point parallel to a line drawn from
points “9” to "10”; and then from this “Certain Point” to point “9” and as shown in the accompanying sketch, and made an integral part of this deed, to
SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her heirs and assigns.[1]
Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described above and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband,
Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was evidenced by a Deed of
Mortgage[2] dated May 1, 1947.

On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado,
Sr.

On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from
Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage[3] in favor of Soledad’s heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and
Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del
Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.

Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the
shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots,
each covered by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an area of 11,732 square meters which was registered on
February 24, 1977 under TCT No. 14566.

In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for “repartition, resurvey and reconveyance” against the heirs of the now
deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in
TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the
property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.

On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalado’s widow, Josefina Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina and Rosemarie
were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.

During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale[4] executed between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of Mortgage[5]
and Deed of Discharge[6] signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed of Absolute Sale[7] showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the property from the
Distajos was likewise given in evidence.

Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have waived his
opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.

On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162,
she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial court also reasoned
that petitioners could not have a better right to the property even if they were in physical possession of the same and declared the property for taxation
purposes, because mere possession cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the land.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, with no pronouncement as to costs.[8]

Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:

I.THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A CONCRETE OR DEFINITE PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT
ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;

II.IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.[9]
In resolving petitioners’ appeal, we must answer the following questions: Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in
common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying petitioners’ right and title over the disputed area? Under the facts and circumstances duly
established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled to ‘repartition, resurvey and reconveyance’ of the property in question?

On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject land which originally
formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that Salome
purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much
is evident under Article 493[10] of the Civil Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et.al.[11] which
we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:

…The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. “Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest.” (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)[12]

Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its
entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale
executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said
lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has
the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment[13] Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her
aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-
owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact
sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains
by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In
other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo
could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were
equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that “no one can give
what he does not have,”[14] Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than
his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not
those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.[15]

In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey.
Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to substitute
petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in
Regalado’s name in 1977.

Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had already been effectively segregated from the ‘mother lot’ even before title was
issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took possession of the property in 1951 until
Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566. Additionally, the intervening years between the date of petitioners’ purchase of the property and 1987
when petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter,
question petitioners’ right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals,[16] we had occasion to hold that where the
transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a
period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior est condition possidentis). Such undisturbed
possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-owned property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably,
petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49 years up to the present.

The lower court’s reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced,
considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. Failure
and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud.
Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person .[17] In this case, we are convinced
that Regalado knew of the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly registered the same in his name alone
because he was aware of petitioners’ possession of the subject portion as well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.

That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162 was under claim of ownership by petitioners and the latter’s predecessor is beyond
question. Records show that the particular area subject of this case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May 1, 1947
or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor of the latter. Regalado never questioned the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for
the P400.00 debt and he must have at least known that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted the lot
as security for the mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of Lot 162 as security for the mortgage obligation, Regalado had in
fact recognized Soledad’s ownership of this definite portion of Lot 162. Regalado could not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed portion is being
claimed by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners, since Regalado even executed a Release of Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire
property was supposedly sold to him. It would certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to accept property as security, purchase the mortgaged property and,
thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage was still subsisting.

Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed
between Regalado and petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. As petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from making this assertion under the
equitable principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other and his privies any right
or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of any material fact asserted in it.[18] A perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage would
readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself absolute owner of the piece of land now being litigated. This declaration of fact was accepted
by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs cannot now be permitted to deny it.

Although Regalado’s certificate of title became indefeasible after the lapse of one year from the date of the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in
its issuance created an implied trust in favor of petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the former. An
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or
implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the said action is imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of title .[19]
Having established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal owners of the litigated portion included in TCT No. 14566, it is only proper that
reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners. The alleged incontrovertibility of Regalado’s title cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents because certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be
used as a shield for the commission of fraud.[20]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties are
directed to cause a SURVEY for exact determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED
and the Register of Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with said survey, upon finality of this decision.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES AURELIO AND ESPERANZA BALITE; Namely, ANTONIO T. BALITE, FLOR T. BALITE-ZAMAR, VISITACION T. BALITE-DIFUNTORUM,
PEDRO T. BALITE, PABLO T. BALITE, GASPAR T. BALITE, CRISTETA T. BALITE and AURELIO T. BALITE JR., All Represented by GASPAR T. BALITE, petitioners,
vs.RODRIGO N. LIM, respondent.

A deed of sale that allegedly states a price lower than the true consideration is nonetheless binding between the parties and their successors in interest.
Furthermore, a deed of sale in which the parties clearly intended to transfer ownership of the property cannot be presumed to be an equitable mortgage
under Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Finally, an agreement that purports to sell in metes and bounds a specific portion of an unpartitioned co-owned property
is not void; it shall effectively transfer the seller’s ideal share in the co-ownership.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 11, 2002 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
65395. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court a quo subject of the appeal is hereby SET ASIDE AND REVERSED and another Decision is
hereby rendered as follows:

1. The "Deed of Absolute Sale" (Exhibit "A") is valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Esperanza Balite over the property covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. 10824 is concerned;
2. The Register of Deeds is hereby ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6683 and to issue another over the entirety of the property covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 10824, upon the payment of the capital gains tax due, as provided for by law, (based on the purchase price of the property in
the amount of P1,000,000.00), with the following as co-owners, over the property described therein:

a) Each of the [petitioners] over an undivided portion of 975 square meters;

b) The [respondent], with an undivided portion of 9,751 square meters.

3. The [respondent] is hereby ordered to pay to the [petitioners] the amount of P120,000.00, within a period of five (5) months from the finality of the Decision
of this Court;

4. In the event that the [respondent] refuses or fails to remit the said amount to the [petitioner] within the period therefor, the rights and obligations of the
parties shall be governed by Republic 6552 (Maceda Law)."3

The Facts

The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

"The spouses Aurelio x x x and Esperanza Balite were the owners of a parcel of land, located [at] Poblacion (Barangay Molave), Catarman, Northern Samar,
with an area of seventeen thousand five hundred fifty-one (17,551) square meters, [and] covered by Original Certificate of Title [OCT] No. 10824. When
Aurelio died intestate [in 1985, his wife], Esperanza Balite, and their children, x x x [petitioners] Antonio Balite, Flor Balite-Zamar, Visitacion Balite-Difuntorum,
Pedro Balite, Pablo Balite, Gaspar Balite, Cristeta (Tita) Balite and Aurelio Balite, Jr., inherited the [subject] property and became co-owners thereof, with
Esperanza x x x inheriting an undivided [share] of [9,751] square meters.

"In the meantime, Esperanza x x x [became] ill and was in dire need of money for her hospital expenses x x x. She, through her daughter, Cristeta, offered to
sell to Rodrigo Lim, [her] undivided share x x x for the price of P1,000,000.00. x x x Esperanza x x x and Rodrigo x x x agreed that, under the "Deed of
Absolute Sale", to be executed by Esperanza x x x over the property, it will be made to appear that the purchase price of the property would be P150 ,000.00,
although the actual price agreed upon by them for the property was P1,000,000.00.

"On April 16, 1996, Esperanza x x x executed a "Deed of Absolute Sale" in favor of Rodrigo N. Lim over a portion of the property, covered by [OCT] No. 10824,
with an area of 10,000 square meters, for the price of P150,000.00 x x x.

[They] also executed, on the same day, a "Joint Affidavit" under which they declared that the real price of the property was P1,000,000.00, payable to
Esperanza x x x, by installments, as follows:

1. P30,000.00 – upon signing today of the document of sale.

2. P170,000.00 – payable upon completion of the actual relocation survey of the land sold by a Geodetic Engineer.

3. P200,000.00 – payable on or before May 15, 1996.

4. P200,000.00 – payable on or before July 15, 1996.

5. P200,000.00 – payable on or before September 15, 1996.

6. P200,000.00 – payable on or before December 15, 1996.

"Only Esperanza and two of her children, namely, Antonio x x x and Cristeta x x x, knew about the said transaction. x x x Geodetic Engineer Bonifacio G. Tasic
conducted a subdivision survey of the property and prepared a "Sketch Plan" showing a portion of the property, identified as Lot 243 with an area of 10,000
square meters, under the name Rodrigo N. Lim.

"The "Sketch Plan" was signed by Rodrigo x x x and Esperanza. Thereafter, Rodrigo x x x took actual possession of the property and introduced improvements
thereon. He remitted to Esperanza x x x and Cristeta x x x sums of money in partial payments of the x x x property for which he signed "Receipts".

"Gaspar, Visitacion, Flor, Pedro and Aurelio, Jr. x x x learned of the sale, and on August 21, 1996, they wrote a letter to the Register of Deeds [RD] of Northern
Samar, [saying] that they [were] not x x x informed of the sale of a portion of the said property by their mother x x x nor did they give their consent thereto,
and requested the [RD] to:

"x x x hold in abeyance any processal or approval of any application for registration of title of ownership in the name of the buyer of said lot, which has not yet
been partitioned judicially or extrajudicially, until the issue of the legality/validity of the above sale has been cleared."

"On August 24, 1996, Antonio x x x received from Rodrigo x x x, the amount of P30,000.00 in partial payment of [the] property and signed a "Receipt" for the
said amount, declaring therein that "the remaining balance of P350,000.00 shall personally and directly be released to my mother, Esperanza Balite, only."
However, Rodrigo x x x drew and issued RCBC Check No. 309171, dated August 26, 1996, [payable] to the order of Antonio Balite in the amount of P30,000.00
in partial payment of the property.

"On October 1, 1996, Esperanza x x x executed a "Special Power of Attorney" appointing her son, Antonio, to collect and receive, from Rodrigo, the balance of
the purchase price of the x x x property and to sign the appropriate documents therefor.

"On October 23, 1996, Esperanza signed a letter addressed to Rodrigo informing the latter that her children did not agree to the sale of the property to him
and that she was withdrawing all her commitments until the validity of the sale is finally resolved:

xxx xxx xxx

"On October 31, 1996, Esperanza died intestate and was survived by her aforenamed children.

"[Meanwhile], Rodrigo caused to be published, in the Samar Reporter, on November 14, 21 and 28, 1996, the aforesaid "Deed of Absolute Sale". Earlier, on
November 21, 1996, Antonio received the amount of P10,000.00 from Rodrigo for the payment of the estate tax due from the estate of Esperanza.

"Also, the capital gains tax, in the amount of P14,506.25, based on the purchase price of P150,000.00 appearing on the "Deed of Absolute Sale", was paid to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue which issued a "Certification" of said payments, on March 5, 1997, authorizing the registration of the "Deed of Absolute Sale" x
x x. However, the [RD] refused to issue a title over the property to and under the name of Rodrigo unless and until the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 10824
was presented to [it]. Rodrigo filed a "Petition for Mandamus" against the RD with the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar (Rodrigo Lim versus Fernando
Abella, Special Civil Case No. 48). x x x. On June 13, 1997, the court issued an Order to the RD to cancel OCT No. 10824 and to issue a certificate of title over
Lot 243 under the name of Rodrigo.

"On June 27, 1997, [petitioners] filed a complaint against Rodrigo with the Regional Trial Court of Northern Samar, entitled and docketed as "Heirs of the
Spouses Aurelio Balite, et al. versus Rodrigo Lim, Civil Case No. 920, for "Annulment of Sale, Quieting of Title, Injunction and Damages x x x, [the origin of the
instant case.]

xxx xxx xxx

"The [petitioners] had a "Notice of Lis Pendens", dated June 23, 1997, annotated, on June 27, 1997, at the dorsal portion of OCT No. 10824.
"In the meantime, the RD cancelled, on July 10, 1997, OCT No. 10824 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title [TCT] No. 6683 to and under the name of Rodrigo
over Lot 243. The "Notice of Lis Pendens" x x x was carried over in TCT No. 6683.

"Subsequently, Rodrigo secured a loan from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and executed a "Real Estate
Mortgage" over the [subject] property as security therefor.

"On motion of the [petitioners], they were granted x x x leave to file an "Amended Complaint" impleading the bank as [additional] party-defendant. On
November 26, 1997, [petitioners] filed their "Amended Complaint".

The [respondent] opposed the "Amended Complaint" x x x contending that it was improper for [petitioners] to join, in their complaint, an ordinary civil action
for the nullification of the "Real Estate Mortgage" executed by the respondent in favor of the Bank as the action of the petitioners before the court was a
special civil action.

"On March 30, 1998, the court issued an Order rejecting the "Amended Complaint" of the petitioners on the grounds that: (a) the Bank cannot be impleaded
as party-defendant under Rule 63, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the "Amended Complaint" constituted a collateral attack on TCT No.
6683. The [petitioners] did not file any motion for the reconsideration of the order of the court."4

The trial court dismissed the Complaint and ordered the cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of TCT No. 6683. It held that, pursuant to Article
493 of the Civil Code, a co-owner has the right to sell his/her undivided share. The sale made by a co-owner is not invalidated by the absence of the consent of
the other co-owners. Hence, the sale by Esperanza of the 10,000-square-meter portion of the property was valid; the excess from her undivided share should
be taken from the undivided shares of Cristeta and Antonio, who expressly agreed to and benefited from the sale.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the sale was valid and binding insofar as Esperanza Balite’s undivided share of the property was concerned. It affirmed the trial court’s ruling
that the lack of consent of the co-owners did not nullify the sale. The buyer, respondent herein, became a co-owner of the property to the extent of the pro
indiviso share of the vendor, subject to the portion that may be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-ownership. The appellate court disagreed with
the averment of petitioners that the registration of the sale and the issuance of TCT No. 6683 was ineffective and that they became the owners of the share of
Esperanza upon the latter’s death.

The CA likewise rejected petitioners’ claim that the sale was void allegedly because the actual purchase price of the property was not stated in the Deed of
Absolute Sale. It found that the true and correct consideration for the sale was P1,000,000 as declared by Esperanza and respondent in their Joint Affidavit.
Applying Article 13535 of the Civil Code, it held that the falsity of the price or consideration stated in the Deed did not render it void. The CA pointed out,
however, that the State retained the right to recover the capital gains tax based on the true price of P1,000,000.

The appellate court rejected petitioners’ contention that, because of the allegedly unconscionably low and inadequate consideration involved, the transaction
covered by the Deed was an equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code. Observing that the argument had never been raised in the court a quo,
it ruled that petitioners were proscribed from making this claim, for the first time, on appeal.

The CA further held that the remaining liability of respondent was P120,000. It relied on the Receipt dated August 24, 1996, which stated that his outstanding
balance for the consideration was P350,000. It deducted therefrom the amounts of P30,000 received by Antonio on August 27, 1996; and P200,000, which was
the amount of the check dated September 15, 1996, issued by respondent payable to Esperanza.

Finally, the appellate court noted that the mortgage over the property had been executed after the filing of the Complaint. What petitioners should have filed
was a supplemental complaint instead of an amended complaint. Contrary to respondent’s argument, it also held that the bank was not an indispensable
party to the case; but was merely a proper party. Thus, there is no necessity to implead it as party-defendant, although the court a quo had the option to do
so. And even if it were not impleaded, the appellate court ruled that the bank would still have been bound by the outcome of the case, as the latter was a
mortgagee pendente lite over real estate that was covered by a certificate of title with an annotated lis pendens.

Hence, this Petition.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners present the following issues:

"A."Whether or not the [CA] seriously erred in not deciding that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 16, 1996 is null and void on the grounds that it is
falsified; it has an unlawful cause; and it is contrary to law and/or public policy.

"B."Whether or not the [CA] gravely erred in not finding that the amount paid by [respondent] is only three hundred twenty thousand (P320,000.00) pesos and
that respondent’s claim that he has paid one million pesos except P44,000.00 as balance, is fraudulent and false.

"C."Whether or not the [CA] seriously erred in not deciding that at the time the Deed of Sale was registered x x x on May 30, 1997, said Deed of Sale can no
longer bind the property covered by OCT No. 10824 because said land had already become the property of all the petitioners upon the death of their mother
on October 31, 1996 and therefore such registration is functus of[f]icio involving a null and void document.

"D."Whether or not the [CA] seriously erred in not ruling that petitioners’ amended complaint dated November 27, 1997 was proper and admissible and
deemed admitted to conform to evidence presented.

"E."Whether or not the [CA] seriously erred in not declaring that TCT No. T-6683 in the name of Respondent Rodrigo N. Lim is null and void and all dealings
involving the same are likewise null and void and/or subject to the decision of the case at bar in view of the notice of lis pendens annotated therein.

"F."Even assuming but without admitting that the Deed of Sale is enforceable, the respondent court seriously erred in not deciding that the consideration is
unconscionably low and inadequate and therefore the transaction between the executing parties constitutes an equitable mortgage.

"G."The [CA] greatly erred in not rendering judgment awarding damages and attorney’s fee[s] in favor of petitioners among others."7

In sum, the issues raised by petitioners center on the following: 1) whether the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid, and 2) whether there is still any sum for which
respondent is liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:

Validity of the Sale

Petitioners contend that the Deed of Absolute Sale is null and void, because the undervalued consideration indicated therein was intended for an unlawful
purpose -- to avoid the payment of higher capital gains taxes on the transaction. According to them, the appellate court’s reliance on Article 1353 of the Civil
Code was erroneous. They further contend that the Joint Affidavit is not proof of a true and lawful cause, but an integral part of a scheme to evade paying
lawful taxes and registration fees to the government.

We have before us an example of a simulated contract. Article 1345 of the Civil Code provides that the simulation of a contract may either be absolute or
relative. In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but without any substance, because the parties have no intention to be bound by it. An absolutely
simulated contract is void, and the parties may recover from each other what they may have given under the "contract."8 On the other hand, if the parties
state a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, such a contract is relatively simulated. Here, the parties’ real agreement binds them.9

In the present case, the parties intended to be bound by the Contract, even if it did not reflect the actual purchase price of the property. That the parties
intended the agreement to produce legal effect is revealed by the letter of Esperanza Balite to respondent dated October 23, 199610 and petitioners’
admission that there was a partial payment of P320,000 made on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale. There was an intention to transfer the ownership of
over 10,000 square meters of the property . Clear from the letter is the fact that the objections of her children prompted Esperanza to unilaterally withdraw
from the transaction.

Since the Deed of Absolute Sale was merely relatively simulated, it remains valid and enforceable. All the essential requisites prescribed by law for the validity
and perfection of contracts are present. However, the parties shall be bound by their real agreement for a consideration of P1,000,000 as reflected in their
Joint Affidavit.11

The juridical nature of the Contract remained the same. What was concealed was merely the actual price. Where the essential requisites are present and the
simulation refers only to the content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable12 between the parties and their
successors in interest.

Petitioners cannot be permitted to unmake the Contract voluntarily entered into by their predecessor, even if the stated consideration was included therein for
an unlawful purpose. "The binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so."13 However, as properly held by the
appellate court, the government has the right to collect the proper taxes based on the correct purchase price.

Being onerous, the Contract had for its cause or consideration the price of P1,000,000. Both this consideration as well as the subject matter of the contract --
Esperanza’s share in the property covered by OCT No. 10824 -- are lawful. The motives of the contracting parties for lowering the price of the sale -- in the
present case, the reduction of capital gains tax liability -- should not be confused with the consideration.14 Although illegal, the motives neither determine nor
take the place of the consideration. 15

Deed of Sale not an Equitable Mortgage

Petitioner further posits that even assuming that the deed of sale is valid it should only be deemed an equitable mortgage pursuant to Articles 1602 and 1604
of the Civil Code, because the price was clearly inadequate. They add that the presence of only one of the circumstances enumerated under Article 1602
would be sufficient to consider the Contract an equitable mortgage. We disagree.

For Articles 1602 and 1604 to apply, two requisites must concur: one, the parties entered into a contract denominated as a contract of sale; and, two, their
intention was to secure an existing debt by way of mortgage.16

Indeed, the existence of any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602, not a concurrence or an overwhelming number thereof, suffices to give rise to
the presumption that a contract purporting to be an absolute sale is actually an equitable mortgage.17 In the present case, however, the Contract does not
merely purport to be an absolute sale. The records and the documentary evidence introduced by the parties indubitably show that the Contract is, indeed, one
of absolute sale. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the parties agreed upon a mortgage of the subject property.

Furthermore, the voluntary, written and unconditional acceptance of contractual commitments negates the theory of equitable mortgage. There is nothing
doubtful about the terms of, or the circumstances surrounding, the Deed of Sale that would call for the application of Article 1602. The Joint Affidavit
indisputably confirmed that the transaction between the parties was a sale.

When the words of a contract are clear and readily understandable, there is no room for construction. Contracts are to be interpreted according to their literal
meaning and should not be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment.18 The contract is the law between the parties.

Notably, petitioners never raised as an issue before the trial court the fact that the document did not express the true intent and agreement of the contracting
parties. They raised mere suppositions on the inadequacy of the price, in support of their argument that the Contract should be considered as an equitable
mortgage.

We find no basis to conclude that the purchase price of the property was grossly inadequate. Petitioners did not present any witness to testify as to the
market values of real estate in the subject’s locale. They made their claim on the basis alone of the P2,000,000 loan that respondent had been able to obtain
from the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation. This move did not sufficiently show the alleged inadequacy of the purchase price. A mortgage is a mere
security for a loan. There was no showing that the property was the only security relied upon by the bank; or that the borrowers had no credit worthiness,
other than the property offered as collateral.

Co-Ownership

The appellate court was correct in affirming the validity of the sale of the property insofar as the pro indiviso share of Esperanza Balite was concerned.

Article 493 of the Civil Code19 gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of such interest. The co-owner,
however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is represented by an
aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. Nonetheless, the mere fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render
the sale void.20 The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the
partition upon the termination of the co-ownership.

Hence, the transaction between Esperanza Balite and respondent could be legally recognized only in respect to the former’s pro indiviso share in the co-
ownership. As a matter of fact, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the parties expressly referred to the 10,000-square-meter portion of the land sold
to respondent as the share of Esperanza in the conjugal property. Her clear intention was to sell merely her ideal or undivided share in it. No valid objection
can be made against that intent. Clearly then, the sale can be given effect to the extent of 9,751 square meters, her ideal share in the property as found by
both the trial and the appellate courts.

Transfer of Property

During her lifetime, Esperanza had already sold to respondent her share in the subject parcel; hence her heirs could no longer inherit it. The property she had
transferred or conveyed no longer formed part of her estate to which her heirs may lay claim at the time of her death. The transfer took effect on April 16,
1996 (the date the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed), and not on May 30, 1997, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered. Thus, petitioners’ claim
that the property became theirs upon the death of their mother is untenable.
Second Issue:

Respondent’s Liability

Petitioners insist that the appellate court erred in holding that respondent’s outstanding liability on the Deed of Sale was P120,000, when the Receipts on
record show payments in the total amount of P320,000 only. They argue that the August 24, 1996 Receipt, on which the appellate court based its conclusion,
was unreliable.

To begin with, this Court is not a trier of facts. 21 It is not its function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine
that only errors of law,22 and not of facts, are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals23 has held that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. These
findings may be reviewed24 only under exceptional circumstances such as, among others, when the inference is manifestly mistaken ;25 the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts;26 findings of the trial court contradict those of the CA;27 or the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.28

Although the factual findings of the two lower courts were not identical, we hold that in the present case, the findings of the CA are in accord with the
documents on record. The trial court admitted in evidence the August 24, 1996 Receipt signed by Antonio Balite. Interestingly, he was never presented in the
lower court to dispute the veracity of the contents of that Receipt, particularly the second paragraph that had categorically stated the outstanding balance of
respondent as of August 24, 1996, to be P350,000. Furthermore, the evidence shows that subsequent payments of P30,000 and P200,000 were made by the
latter. Thus, we affirm the CA’s Decision holding that the remaining unpaid balance of the price was P120,000.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC., petitioner,vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ, CRISANTA DE CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE CASTRO,
EFRINA DE CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO and ARTEMIO DE CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.

This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court Appeals dated August 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution
dated March 15, 1996, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-
in-interest, Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of
land designated as Lot No. 3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or
less. They further claim that in 1979, without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to petitioner. The sale was made
possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole heir to the property. It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by Mariano affected
only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court, after hearing the
motion, dismissed the complaint in an Order dated August 18, 1984. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated October 4, 1994,
reconsidered the dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order
dated January 5, 1995.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try
and take cognizance of the case as the causes of actions have been decided with finality by the Supreme Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion and authority in taking cognizance of the case.

After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals, finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, dismissed the
petition in a Decision dated August 14, 1995. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a Resolution dated March 15, 1996.
Hence this petition.

Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the granting of the writ of certiorari in the present case:

FIRST GROUND

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP. PROC. NO. 118-M). THE "CAUSES
OF ACTION" HEREIN HAVE BEEN FINALLY DECIDED BY THE HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BR. 31) MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND SUSTAINED IN A
FINAL DECISION BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT.

SECOND GROUND

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
(BR. 79) DATED OCTOBER 4, 1994, AND THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 5, 1995, WHEN SAID RTC (BR. 79) INSISTED IN TRYING THIS CASE AGAINST TCMC WHEN
IT HAS RULED ALREADY IN A FINAL ORDER THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A "REAL PARTY" IN INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 170, ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO, ET. AL. vs. TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, ET . AL., WHICH CASE INVOLVED THE SAME RELIEF, SAME
SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SAME PARTIES.

THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND AUTHORITY WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE EXISTENCE
OF RES JUDICATA IN THIS CASE.

The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether or not the Regional Trial Court and/or the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case, and if so,
whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner invokes Rule 65 of the Rules of Court as its mode in obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision and
Resolution. Before we dwell on the merits of this petition, it is worth noting, that for a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must be shown that the
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not mere errors of judgment, for certiorari is not a
remedy for errors of judgment, which are correctible by appeal. 1 By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough — it must be grave. 2

In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the public respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it
took cognizance of the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. 3 Jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. 4 Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily mean that the lower court meant to reverse the
decision of the Supreme Court in the land registration case mentioned by the petitioner.

Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence the court's
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. 5 This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the
ends of justice would be frustrated by making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the defendant in all cases.

Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged errors committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of
judgment which are revisable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action of certiorari. 6 Based on the foregoing, even assuming for the sake of
argument that the appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court, which earlier denied petitioner's motion to dismiss, such actuation on the
part of the appellate court cannot be considered as grave abuse of discretion, hence not correctible by certiorari, because certiorari is not available to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.

In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. It was petitioner who elevated the instant controversy to the
Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief
therefrom. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that court's jurisdiction in the same case. 7 To do otherwise would
amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.

On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. 8 Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller's share pro indiviso,
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the
co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the
sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it continued
to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it. 9 Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the
seller and its delivery to the buyer.1âwphi1.nêt

In the light of the foregoing, petitioner's defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code,
"no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as
his share is concerned." In Budlong vs. Bondoc, 10 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It
cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED

RESTITUTO CENIZA and JESUS CENIZA, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAGNO DABON, VICENTA DABON, TERESITA DABON, EUGENIA DABON,
and TOMAS DABON, respondents.

This is a petition for review of the order dated October 29, 1976, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 48546 entitled, "Restituto Ceniza, et al. vs. Magno
Dabon, et al.," dismissing the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance of their shares in co-ownership property and reversing the decision of the trial court in
their favor.

On June 14, 1967, the petitioners filed against private respondents, an action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for recovery of their title to Lots Nos. 627-B
and 627-C (being portions of Lot No. 627 with an area of approximately 5,306 square meters) situated in Casuntingan, Mandaue, Cebu (now Mandaue City),
which originally formed part of "Hacienda de Mandaue" of the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. The Property is covered by reconstituted Original Certificate
of Title No. RO-10996 issued on February 8, 1939 (formerly Decree No. 694438 issued on February 27, 1934) in the name of "Vicente Dabon married to
Marcela [or Marcelina] Ceniza." (pp. 7 and 19, Record on Appeal).

Petitioners are the descendants of Manuel Ceniza while the private respondents are the descendants of his sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza was childless but
she had an adopted daughter named Flaviana Ceniza, who begot a daughter named Marced Ceniza and who in turn had a daughter named Marcelina (or
Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente Dabon. Private respondents are the children of this marriage and they are the great-great-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.

On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an only son, Pablo, who had two sons, Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a certain
Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children and the great-grandchildren of Manuel Ceniza.

The records disclose that when Hacienda de Mandaue was subdivided for resale to the occupants in 1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon, who were residing
in the hacienda, jointly purchased Lot 627 on installment basis and they agreed, for convenience, to have the land registered in the name of Dabon. Since
then, Jose Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs have possessed their respective portions of the land, declared the same for taxation, paid real estate taxes
on their respective shares, and made their respective installment payments to the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu.

After Dabon died in 1954, his seven (7) children, named Magno, Jacinta, Tomas, Flaviana, Soledad, Teresita and Eugenia, succeeded to his possession of a
portion of the land.

On November 4, 1961, a private land surveyor, Espiritu Bunagan, on the request of Jacinta Dabon and Restituto Ceniza who jointly defrayed the cost, divided
Lot 627 into three parts, namely:

(1) Lot No. 627-A with 3,538 square meters for Marcela Ceniza;
(2) Lot No. 627-B with 884 square meters for Restituto Ceniza; and

(3) Lot No. 627-C with 834 square meters for Nemesia Ceniza-Albina, who later bequeathed her share to her brother, Jesus Ceniza. (p. 19, Record on
Appeal).

The present controversy arose because the private respondents refused to convey Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C to the petitioners. They claimed that their
predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon, was the sole and exclusive owner of Lot 627, by purchase from the Seminario de San Carlos de Cebu. In their answer
to the petitioners' complaint for reconveyance in June 1967, they alleged that the petitioners' right of action had already prescribed.

Petitioners replied that Vicente Dabon held the land in trust for them, as co-owners, hence, their action for reconveyance was imprescriptible.

On August 31, 1970, the trial court rendered judgment for the petitioners. Finding that there existed a co-ownership among the parties, it ordered the private
respondents to execute deeds of conveyance of Lots Nos. 627-B and 627-C in favor of the plaintiffs, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza, respectively (p. 35, Record on
Appeal).

On appeal by the defendants (now private respondents) the Court of Appeals on October 29, 1976, reversed that decision of the trial court. It ruled that the
petitioners' right of action had prescribed after the lapse of 20 years from the date of registration of the land on February 8, 1939 in Vicente Dabon's name (p.
32, Rollo).

The petitioners have appealed to this Court by a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The legal issue presented by the petition is whether the registration of the title of the land in the name of one of the co-owner, constituted a repudiation of the
co-ownership for purposes of acquisitive prescription.

We find merit in the petition for review.

The trial court correctly ruled that since a trust relation and co-ownership were proven to exist between the predecessors- in-interest of both petitioners and
private respondents, prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's heirs except from the time that they repudiated the co-ownership and made the repudiation
known to the other co-owners, Restituto and Jesus Ceniza (Cortes vs. Oliva, 33 Phil. 480).

Paragraph 5 of Article 494 of the Civil Code provides-

No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

The registration of Lot No. 627 in the name of Vicente Dabon created a trust in favor of his co-owner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs. Article 1452 of the Civil
Code states:

If two or more persons agree to purchase property and common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is
created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each.

This Court has ruled in numerous cases involving fiduciary relations that, as a general rule, the trustee's possession is not adverse and therefore cannot ripen
into a title by prescription. Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:

a) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to the ouster of the cestui que trust;
b) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust; and

c) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.

The above elements are not present here for the petitioners/ co-owners have not been ousted from the land. They continue to possess their respective shares
of Lot 627 and they have been paying the realty taxes thereon. Restituto's house stands on his portion of the Land. Assuming that the private respondents'
rejection of the subdivision plan for the partition of the land was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the petitioners
instituted the present action for reconveyance. These circumstances were overlooked by the Court of Appeals.

In Custodio v. Casiano 9 SCRA 841, we ruled that:

Where title to land was issued in the name of a co-heir merely with the understanding that he would act as a trustee of his sisters, and there is no evidence
that this trust relation had ever been repudiated by said trustee, it is held that a reaction of co-ownership existed between such trustee and his sisters and the
right of the successors-in-interest of said sisters to bring the present action for recovery of their shares therein against the successors-in-interest of said
trustee cannot barred by prescription, despite the, lapse of 25 years from the date of registration of the land in the trustee's name. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Escobar v. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86, we affirmed the duty of the courts to shield fiduciary relations "against every manner of chicanery or detestable design
cloaked by legal technicalities" and to guard against misuse of the Torrens system "to foment betrayal in the performance of a trust."

In this case, since the statutory period of limitation within which to file an action for reconveyance, after the defendants had repudiated the co-ownership in
1961, had not yet run its course when the petitioners filed said action in 1967, the action was not barred by prescription. WHEREFORE. the decision of the
Court of appeals is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the decision dated August 31, 1970 of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, in Civil
Case No. R-10030 is reinstated. Costs against the private respondents.SO ORDERED.

MARIA BICARME assisted by her husband JOSE BALUBAR, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CRISTINA BICARME, respondents.

This petition seeks to set aside the appealed decision of the lower court 1 as affirmed by the appellate court on August 28, 1979, directing the amicable
partition of two parcels of land between Cristina Bicarme (private respondent) and her aunt Maria Bicarme (petitioner), as well as the Resolution, dated
October 5, 1979, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The affirmed decision of the lower court, rendered on December 22, 1975, disposes as follows:

(a) That Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and entitled in equal shares over the parcel of land in litigation
and described under paragraph 3 of the complaint;

(b) That the alleged deeds of Sale executed by Maria Bicarme covering and affecting the two parcels of land in suit are declared null and void in so far
(sic) as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff Cristina Bicarme;

(c) Maria Bicarme is ordered to account and/or pay the value corresponding to the one-half (½) undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of
the land and to commence from the filing of this complaint; that is seventy five bundles of palay valued at P375.00 with legal interest fully paid;

(d) That the parties are hereby ordered within (15) days from receipt of this decision to amicably agree upon a written partition and to submit the same
for approval, parties shall appoint a Commissioner to effect and carry out effectively the partition of the 2 parcels of land in equal parts between the plaintiff
and the defendant;

(e) Defendant and her hirelings and representatives are forever ordered to refrain from molesting the Commissioner in the discharge of his duty to
partition said two (2) parcels of land in suit;
(f) And, Defendant to pay Attorney's fee and cost of this suit.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 40-41, Record on Appeal)

Petitioner-defendant Maria Bicarme appealed.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision; hence, this petition.

The main issue in this case dwells on ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land.

As established by the trial court, Sps. Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of two parcels of land described as follows:

1. Cornland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Hill, on the East-Brono Barbers, on the South-Casimiro Palos, and on the West-Clemente
Baldozan, of about 8,721 sq. m., assessed at P400.00 under Tax Dee. No. 7764;

2. Riceland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Macario Bolos, East- Roberto Bicarme, South-Juliana Baldozan, and West-Telesporo, about
1,539 sq. m., assessed at P 60.00, under Tax Dec. No. 7765;

.... (P. 10, Record on Appeal)

The spouses died intestate and were survived by three children-Victorina Bicarme, Sebastian Bicarme and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian Bicarme died when he
was a little boy and without any issue. Later, Victorina Bicarme died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme.

Cristina claims that upon the death of her grandparents, Sps. Juan and Florencia, her mother Victorina and her aunt, Maria, became co-owners or co-heirs of
the litigated parcels of land. Upon the death of her mother, Victorina, Cristina became co-heirs with Maria, having inherited the share and interest of her
mother corresponding to one-half of the two parcels of land.

Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria, refused to share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed parcels of land. Maria, however,
maintains that "she acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose
and since then until the present, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse possession and enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner
thereof Maria further claims that Cristina, her niece, never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land; and, finally, that Cristina
Bicarme was presumed already dead" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).

In ruling Maria and Cristina to be co-heirs, the trial court relied on a provision separately stated in three deeds of sale executed by Maria as follows:

That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme;" (See
Exhibits '4', '5', '6', and '7' or Exhibits 'A-1,' 'B-1,' 'C-1', and 'D-1'; (p. 37, Record on Appeal, emphasis supplied)

The trial court stated that the provision was in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir.

We agree. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's lights thereto as a co-heir/co-owner. As the trial court
theorized:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) That Victorina Bicarme and Maria Bicarme never partitioned even orally the two parcels of lands which were then owned in common by them;
(7) . That even after the death of Victorina Bicarme, the land in suit remained undivided and were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme because
her niece Cristina Bicarme went to Manila and now married and presently residing at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City.

(8) That without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age, her aunt Maria Bicarme executed on April 27, 1973 a Deed of
absolute Sale (Exhibit 'A') in favor of Marina Pizarro who acquired portion No. 3 of the cornland; on the same date she also executed another Deed of Sale
(Exhibit 'B') in favor of Saturnino Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 2 of the cornland; and, in June 16, 1965 again Maria Bicarme executed a third Deed of Sale
(Exhibit 'C') in favor of Casimira Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 1 of the cornland;

(9) That these three (3) separated (sic) Deeds of Sale all executed by Maria Bicarme over the cornland have a respective total area of 740 square meters,
more or less, for portion No. 3; 1,836 square meters, more or less for portion No. 2; and 1,265 square meters, more or less for portion No. 1, or a total area of
3,481 square meters more or less;

(10) That in these three separate Deeds of Sale, Maria Bicarme expressly provided the aforesaid trust provision. (pp. 36-37, Record on Appeal, emphasis
ours)

Despite admission during the hearing on the Identity of the land in question (see p. 21, Record on Appeal), Maria's counsel, on appeal, re-emphasized her
original claim that the two parcels of land in her possession were acquired from the Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. However, the private document
relative to the purchase, was not produced at the trial, allegedly because "they were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese
Occupation." In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence was submitted. For all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property. The
Identity of the cornland as inherited property can no longer be disputed, in view of Maria's admission in the deeds of sale she had executed, containing the
trust provisions.

Having established Cristina's co-ownership rights, Maria nonetheless insists that Cristina's rights are barred by prescription under Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190
(Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil Code) then the applicable law, where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only
ten years (Diaz v. Garricho, 103 Phil. 261, 266). In the present case, Cristina, it is alleged, asserted her claims 34 years after her right of action accrued, as
follows:

... After Cristina left barrio Palao at the age of eleven (11), she never returned until she was twenty two (22) years old and married (pp. 32-34, tsn., Nov. 4,
1974). Upon her return her grandmother Florencia Bidaya was already dead (p. 33, Id). At that time, Cristina claimed her hereditary share in the lands in
question but her demands were ignored and repudiated by her aunt Maria, Cristina admitted that ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already of
age, her aunt Maria refused to recognize her rights to said lands (pp. 41-42, Id.). From that moment when Maria ignored and repudiated Cristina's hereditary
rights, Cristina's right of action already accrued and the period of prescription began to run.

The instant action was filed only in 1974 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), or some 34 years after it accrued. If she had any rights at all, Cristina slept on her rights.
The present action is unquestionably barred by prescription. (pp. 27-28, Appellants' Brief)

Against Maria's claims of acquisitive prescription, the lower court ruled that Maria was as trustee with respect to Cristina's share. As such, prescription, as a
mode of acquiring title, could not apply:

A co-owner is a trustee for the other co-owner. No one of the co-owners may acquire exclusive ownership of the common property thru prescription for
possession by one trustee alone is not deemed adverse to the rest (Castrillo vs. Court of Appeals, 10 SCRA 549; Custodio vs. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841 and,
Pascual vs. Meneses, 20 SCRA 219). (p. 6, Rollo)
While We agree with the trial court that Maria and Cristina are co-heirs, and that with respect to them prescription, as a mode of acquisition, cannot apply, We
hasten to elaborate on certain aspects, which need clarification.

It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any
time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of
acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire the property by prescription.

An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner,
asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibility of an
action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it
by prescription. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership. (A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Ann., Vol. II, pp. 192-193; Bargayo v.
Comumot, 40 Phil. 856, at p. 870). In this sense, the trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-
owner/trustee.

Having clarified this issue, the main question to be resolved is whether or not Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions
required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor.

One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole world. In order that a possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust, or the other co-owner the following must concur:

... (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. (A. Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Phils., Ann., Vol. 11, p. 193)

In the present case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations
in her name, there is no written evidence that these were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not
constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her
rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her refusal
to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes. Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in this
case:

Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co- owners. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or
profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an
ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. (Mangyan v. Ilan, 28 O.G. 62; Laguna v. Levantino, 40 O.G. (14th Suppl.) 136, cited in A. Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Ann., Vol. II, pp. 193- 194)

Additionally, it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession
of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on
imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition wig therefore prosper.

Finally, We eliminate the award on attorney's fees in the absence of any specific allegation thereon in her complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the
eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code. Even if We were to concede exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's
fees under Art. 2208, par. 11, this provision "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion without a
premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture." (Mirasol v. De la Cruz, G.R. L-32552, July 31, 1978; 84 SCRA 337.) Likewise, "the matter
of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's
fees are being awarded" (ibid). In the present case, the matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive portion of the decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
the award on attorney's fees is eliminated. Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION BACUS,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, namely: FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS,
HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.

The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and by the trial court are as follows:

During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino
Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After
his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by
Galileo Delima.

On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit,
TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.

Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.

On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial
Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and
Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.

On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate presently
covered by transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;

1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)

2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);

3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and

4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D. Arias, Helen Niadas and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed
Delima (one-fourth).

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof
another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.

After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to turn a over to the other heirs their respective shares
of the fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest).

Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered to petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed to immediately turn
over possession of the shares here awarded to the respective heirs.

Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit. The counterclaim is dismissed. SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision
and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and
waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the
realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).

Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have
already been waived.
2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)

The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which
shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed
property. Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned. Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid.
This term may be extended by a new agreement. A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years. Neither shall
there be any partition when it is prohibited by law. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-
heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes
care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee
(Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at
any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-
heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA
55).

However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein,
the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa
Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has
adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.

It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting
to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and
conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).

We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title
in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the
latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance
of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August
31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).

Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit
executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the
exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years
of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the
whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence,
when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription.
Whatever claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?

The Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals 1 Decision promulgated December 1, 1994 2 and
Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995 3 in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed petitioner's action for
partition and damages.

On August 10, 1975, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint 4 for partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes, both surnamed
Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. 5 On October 25, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not substituted as a party. 6

On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision 7 in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled: 8

Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property left by
his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified that he had been receiving [his] share
from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This
court therefore cannot rule on that.

In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that his parents
were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed: 9

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision. In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES the [petitioner's] complaint and the counterclaim
thereto. Without costs.

Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: 10

The Court DENIES defendants-appellants' motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial matters
raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.

Hence, this petition. 11

The Facts

The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows: 12

On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four (4) parcels of land,
described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio Trinidad, who was the original owner of the
parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three (3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff
demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the
defendants refused.

In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants contended that Inocentes
was single when he died in 1941 , before plaintiff's birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with them, and claimed that the parcels of land
described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940 and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of
the land. Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died in 1940,
survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.

Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.

Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from the defendants that
the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3) individual shares of his late father, but
defendants refused.

In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial court's decision: 13

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also she was [a member
of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because they are neighbors and she
knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad Molato; both were already dead,
Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At
the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiff's parents['] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times
a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because
Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of
Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels
subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.

When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining owners. That she
knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said Patricio died before the [war] and
after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was never partitioned or divided among the 3
children of Patricio.

A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man with a hat
holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the wife of the plaintiff,
Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the same Arturio, Felix and
Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.

Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In said
picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when . . . the picture [was] taken,
counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone to the house of his parents.
Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the name of Inocentes
Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being July 21, 1943 was also marked. The
signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.
On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her house but
she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented as Exhibit A and B,
witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in the picture as she knows all of
them.

At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this case.

Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of Arturio
Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of land. That she
knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a protestant pastor by
the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she also owns a parcel of land [and] she
used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season. That she knows that during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them,
Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes
Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely:
Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels of land up to the present. The witness testified that upon the death of
Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small, about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was
growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when
Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his father's share but Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.

Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle, they being
the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That both his father,
Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his mother about 25 years
ago.

As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as Exhibit C. That
his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 hut he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.

When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiff's mother died when he
was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the house of the
defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with them. So he and his
wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him to live with them, he
presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's daughter, his uncle and his wife. In
short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiff's
son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the defendants. That a few years after having lived with
them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the land to get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to
handle his case. He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is an upland.

Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is P2.00 each.
The boundaries are: East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at Tigayon.

Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. Adjoining
owners are: East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio, West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.

Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father of the
plaintiff.
Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio Briones;
West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.

Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.

Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.

Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio Trinidad
married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.

Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name of Patricio
Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.

Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of Anastacia Briones
and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 16378 in the name of Patricio
Trinidad.

On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts, palay and
corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New Washington, Aklan, by a
certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff answered he does not know because he
was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944 because it was wartime. That after the death of his
father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his
mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants, namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have
no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioner's] highest educational attainment is Grade 3.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified having known the
defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the name of Anastacia Briones and his father
are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness,
Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of
Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his aunt, "Nanay Taya", referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes
Trinidad, as well as Inocentes Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia
Trinidad, and with his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he
answered, "That I do not know", neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can recall if during the
lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered
that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had gone back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo,
as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew
anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: "I do not know about that."

On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he stated to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the hereditary property of
their father was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of this case before the court, witness answered
that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad, Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes
in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was
already dead before the war. When asked on cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that
he was buried in their own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family
picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as Lourdes Trinidad, and
the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he
does not know him.

Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and jobless. She testified that
Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That before the death of her brother, Inocentes
Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in 1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his
brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married
anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he also did [not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness
answered she knew her because Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad,
had lived with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, "Yes," but she denied that Arturio
Trinidad had lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his grandmother by the name of
Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if there had been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with
her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad went to visit her in her house, witness also said, "He did not."

Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad, had 3 children,
namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the only remaining daughter of the
spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother, Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the
same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she
has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will
carry his coffin as it was wartime and the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true
that Inocentes Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not answer
the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the child of Arturio Trinidad, she
answered; "Yes." and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her, she was only requested to hold this child to be
brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she
answered; "Maybe there was." When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is herself in the picture carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that
she was requested to bring the child to the church and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latter's child was taken
during the time when she and Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-
2 as her brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she does not
know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right of the child held by her
brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that she cannot identify because she had a poor
eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture for the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if
she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that
she does not know.

Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her neighbor in Tigayon. In the
same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad because they were her cousins. She testified that a
few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lola's house whose names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes
Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according
to her, about 1 1/2 months after his arrival from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato
had never been married to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was horn in 1928,
therefore, she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out. When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the year 1943 when
the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their private lot because Kalibo was then
occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified that . . . she knew both
the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from them. When asked if it is true that according
to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15 days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year
because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her house.
According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he
married on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano
Lajaylajay, a protestant pastor.

On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That she knew both
Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a Protestant minister and she was one of
the sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.

When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents but instead a certification
dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that
records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were destroyed during the Japanese time.

Respondent Court's Ruling

In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled: 14

We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. But the action
to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.

Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final judgment, in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.

Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died single in 1941. One
witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942,
solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n. Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant
evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes' acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son, who was born on July 21, 1943.

The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497). Admittedly, the defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in
the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants
possessed the land for more than ten (10) years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: 15

1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.

2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, brother of
private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on July 4, 1989,
after the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.

4. Whether or not petitioner's status as a legitimate child can be attached collaterally by the private respondents.

5. Whether or not of private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive prescription.

Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:

1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents' marriage and of his filiation?

2. Was petitioner's status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?

3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Court's Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricio's real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner or co-heir of
the decedent's estate. 16 His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and subsisting marriage
between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully discharged by petitioner and, thus, the
reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral Attack on Filiation

At the outset, we stress that an appellate court's assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because the Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply here. So, we had to
meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case. 17

Petitioner's first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence of their
marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.

This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias 18 ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony,
the couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the baptismal certificates of children born during such
union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. 19

In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification 20 from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and marriages were
either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioner's case. Although the marriage
contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioner's failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place, as other forms of
relevant evidence may take its place. 21

In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial of Felicidad
and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as husband and wife after the
marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers' association, used to visit Inocentes
and Felicidad's house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. 22 On July 21, 1943, Gerardo dropped by Inocentes' house when Felicidad
gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioner's baptismal party held at the same house. 23 Her testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation
respecting marriage. 24 It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage. 25 Petitioner also presented his baptismal certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the child's
father and mother. 26

On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:

Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document or a final
judgment.

Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.

Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. 27

Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification 28 that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned when the old
town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956. To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal certificate and
Gerardo's testimony.

The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late Felix Trinidad
(Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioner's first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying
petitioner's first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted. Although they do not directly prove petitioner's filiation to
Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes' legitimate son ante litem motam.

Lourdes' denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioner's daughter, she
demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. 29 When shown Exhibit A, she recognized her late
brother — but not petitioner, his wife and the couple's children — slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an alleged eye defect. 30

Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of "the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and special laws" to
show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals: 31

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence of proof in his favor that the defendant is her
father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been
entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]

Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity, 32 her testimony does not constitute
family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioner's legitimacy.

Be that as it may, the totality of petitioner's positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents' self-serving negations. In sum, private
respondents' thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents' witness, Pedro Briones, testified that Inocentes died in
1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which was then occupied by the
Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months, and his answers on direct
examination were noncommittal and evasive: 33

Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?

A: Not married.

Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?

A: I was staying with them.

Q: When you said "them", to whom are you referring to [sic]?

A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?

A: For only three months.

Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?

A: [T]hat I do not know.

Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?

A: No, sir.

Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?

A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.

Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?

A: Every Sunday.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?

A: I do not know him.

Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of Inocentes
Trinidad?

A: I do not know about that.

Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified, that when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes from Manila to
Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in March 1941, one and a
half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that Felicidad was ever married to
Inocentes. 34

Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not convinced that
Inocentes dies in March 1941. 35 The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; 36 thus, it stands to reason that Aklan was not occupied until
then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery In Kalibo, because of the Japanese soldiers who were roaming
around the area. 37

Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes' surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents — a presumptive proof of his status as
Inocentes' legitimate child. 38

Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. 39 Compared to the detailed (even if
awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Court's holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to Inocentes is unconvincing. In
determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the witnesses' manner
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. 40 Applying this rule, the trial court significantly and convincingly
held that the weight of evidence was in petitioner's favor. It declared:

. . . [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew . . . before plaintiff [had] gotten married and
had a family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The fact that plaintiff had so lived with the
defendants . . . is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of
getting his father's share. . . . His demand for the partition of the share of his father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their
nephew. . . . In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants
themselves, which status was only broken when plaintiff demanded for the partition . . . as he was already having a family of his own. . . . .

However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her nephew is offset by the
preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This witness was already 77 years old at the time
she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has
nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case
for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75 years old, has no husband nor children. 41

Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. 42 Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation and of his
parents' marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioner's cause.

Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the property without
recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession — in the concept of owners — of the parcels of land in issue since
Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-ownership, the act of
one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. 43 Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private respondents
his share of the produce of the land in dispute. Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond question. There is no
evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioner's father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles of these pieces of land were
still in their father's name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not shared with petitioner the produce of the
land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held: 44

. . . Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit
prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs.
Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by
laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership
and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the property involved (Rogue vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).

Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's claim over the land in dispute was time-barred.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court's decision dated July 4, 1989 is
REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
PHILIP C. SANTOS and HEIRS OF ELISEO M. SANTOS, petitioners, vs. LADISLAO M. SANTOS represented herein by his Attorney-In-Fact NOE M. SANTOS,
respondents.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the January 8, 1999 Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 48576 which reversed the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court[4] of San Mateo, Rizal (Branch 76) and which declared Ladislao M. Santos and Eliseo M. Santos as entitled to ½ pro
indiviso shares in the property of Isidra M. Santos. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

“IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal is granted. The Decision appealed from is REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Appellant and against the Appellees as follows:

1. Tax Declaration Nos. 04-0566 and 04-0016, Exhibits “8” and “9”, under the name of Appellee Philip Santos and the “Deed of Sale of Unregistered
Residential Land” (Exhibit “15’) are hereby declared inefficacious insofar as the undivided one-half portion of the Appellant in the Isidra property is concerned;

2. The Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos are hereby declared each entitled to ½ pro indiviso shares in the Isidra property;

3. The Court a quo is hereby ordered to effect the partition of the subject lot conformably with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil procedure.

Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.”

The following facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:

On May 13, 1993, Ladislao Santos, a resident in the United States of America, the Appellant in the present recourse, through his Attorney-in-fact, Noe Santos,
filed a complaint, with the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, against his brother, Eliseo Santos and the latter’s son, Philip Santos, the Appellees in the present
recourse, for “Judicial Partition”.

The Appellant averred, inter alia, in his complaint, that, when his and Eliseo Santos’ sister, Isidra Santos, died intestate on April 1, 1967, without any issue,
they inherited her parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration 1115, issued by the Provincial Assessor of Rizal located along General Luna Street, Gitnangbayan,
San Mateo, Rizal; that, sometime, in February 1, 1993, the Appellant discovered that Tax Declaration No. 1115 had been cancelled by Tax Declaration No.
7892, under the name of his nephew, Appellee Philip Santos, and that, on December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed a “Deed of Absolute Sale of
Unregistered Residential Land” on the basis of which Tax Declaration No. 04-0016 was issued to the Appellee Philip Santos. The Appellant prayed the Court
that judgment be rendered in his favor as follows:

“WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that after due hearing judgment be rendered as follows:

(1) Ordering the division of the intestate estate of the late Isidra Santos between petitioner and respondent Eliseo M. Santos;

(2) Declaring Tax Declaration No. 04-0015 in the name of Virgilio Santos as null and void;

(3) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated December 11, 1980, executed by Virgilio Santos in favor of Philip Santos as null and void;

(4) Declaring Tax Declaration No. 04-00161 (sic) in the name of Philip Santos as null and void;
Petitioner prays for other relief which this Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.” (at page 3, Records)

In their Answer to the complaint, the Appellees admitted that, upon the demise of Isidra Santos, the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos inherited the
said property and the latter’s share in Lot 1522 of the San Mateo Cadastre, which they and their sister, Isidra Santos, inherited from their father, Bonifacio
Santos who died before the outbreak of the Second World War but insisted that the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos had agreed, in 1969, after the
death of Isidra Santos, on April 1, 1967, to partition Lot 1522, under which a portion of Lot 1522, with an area of 3,387 square meters, was adjudicated to the
Appellant, and a portion of the same lot, with an area of 3,000 square meters, was conveyed to the Appellee Eliseo Santos and the parcel of land left by Isidra
Santos was conveyed by Appellee Eliseo Santos to Virgilio Santos, who, from infancy had been under the care of Isidra Santos, to approximately equalize the
share of the Appellee Eliseo Santos in the estate of Bonifacio Santos. The Appellees further averred that Appellees had acquired the Isidra property by
acquisitive prescription.

Neither Appellant Ladislao Santos nor Appellee Eliseo Santos testified in the Court a quo. Although the Appellee Eliseo Santos was present during the
proceeding, he did not testify anymore because of senility being then about 88 years old. Virginia Santos, the widow of Virgilio Santos, testified, in the Court a
quo, and declared, that she and Virgilio Santos married, on February 12, 1967, and resided in the house of Isidra Santos until the sale, by Virgilio Santos, of
the Isidra property to his brother, the Appellee Philip Santos and in exchange with the property of the latter located at Kambal Street, Gitnangbayan, San
Mateo, Rizal, where the couple and, after Virgilio Santos’ death, on April 5, 1984, had been residing. Virginia Santos likewise declared that Appellant Ladislao
Santos and the Appellee Eliseo Santos had an agreement, notarized by Atty. Sixto Natividad, that Virgilio Santos and Virginia Santos became the new owners
of the Isidra property. The copy of the Agreement given Virgilio Santos was xeroxed and the xerox copy was given to Appellee Philip Santos while Virgilio
Santos’ copy was filed with the Provincial Assessor’s Office on the basis of which, Tax Declaration No. 7892 was issued under his name. The Appellee Philip
Santos, on the other hand, declared that the Appellant Ladislao Santos and the Appellee Eliseo Santos and their respective Spouses executed a “Combined
Deed of Partition”, in 1969, covering the Lot 1522 and the Isidra Property, wherein it was covenanted that the Isidra Property was deeded to Appellee Eliseo
Santos. The Appellee Philip Santos further declared that he was then about 20 years old, and saw the said “Combined Deed of Partition” in the possession of
Appellee Eliseo Santos.

After due proceedings, the Court a quo promulgated a Decision dismissing Appellant’s complaint on the ground that the Appellant failed to adduce proof of his
entitlement to the relief prayed for by him and on the ground of acquisitive prescription.

The present recourse stemmed from the following factual backdrop - when Bonifacio Santos died intestate, he was survived by his two (2) sons, namely
Ladislao Santos, the Appellant in the present recourse, and Appellee Eliseo Santos, one of the Appellees in the present recourse and their sister, Isidra Santos.
The latter was the owner of a parcel of land, hereinafter referred to, for brevity’s sake, as the Isidra property, located in General Luna Street, Gitnangbayan,
San Mateo, Rizal, with an area of 391 square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 655, located in front of but oblique to and about fifty (50)
meters away from the property, with an area of 6,340 square meters, covered by Tax Declaration No. 383 of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, (Exhibit “L-3”).
She had a house constructed on her lot where she had been residing ever since.

In the meantime, on November 10, 1964, a cadastral survey of lands in San Mateo, Rizal, was undertaken. The property, with an area of 6,340 square meters
was identified as Lot 1522, Cadastre No. 375-D. Tax Declaration No. 655, covering the Isidra Property was later cancelled by Tax Declaration 1115 under her
name, effective 1966 (Exhibit “4”).

On May 29, 1967, the Appellant and his wife, Leonila Mateo executed a “Deed of Absolute Conveyance with Right of Way” over the southwestern portion of
Lot 1522, with an area of 3,000 square meters, in favor of his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos for the price of P500.00, with a provision for a right of way.

On April 1, 1967, Isidra Santos died intestate and was survived by her two (2) brothers, the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos.

On September 9, 1969, the Provincial Assessor issued Tax Declaration No. 7892, over the Isidra property, under the name of Virgilio Santos and Virginia
Santos, thereby canceling Tax Declaration No. 1115 under the name of Isidra Santos (Exhibit “5”). In 1972, Tax Declaration No. 7892 was cancelled by Tax
Declaration No. 5043, still under the names of Virgilio Santos and Virginia Santos, effective 1974 (Exhibit “4”) and by Tax Declaration No. 04-0015, effective
1980 (Exhibit “7”).

On December 16, 1980, Virgilio Santos executed a “Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Residential Land” in favor of his brother, the Appellee Philip Santos,
over the Isidra Property at the time covered by Tax Declaration No. 04-0015, for the price of P24,460.00 (Exhibit “H”). On the basis of said deed, Tax
Declaration No. 04-0015 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 04-0566, under the name of Appellee Philip Santos, effective 1981 (Exhibit “E”). The Spouses
Virgilio Santos vacated the said property and resided at Kambal Street, Gitnangbayan I, San Mateo, Rizal formerly owned by Philip Santos . The latter, in turn,
had the house on the lot demolished and had his shop installed in the Isidra Property. Since then, Philip Santos had been paying the realty taxes therefor. On
April 5, 1984, Virgilio Santos died intestate and was survived by his wife, Virginia Santos. In the meantime, the Appellant and Appellee Philip Santos left the
Philippines and resided in the United States of America.

Despite the “Deed of Absolute Conveyance With Right of Way” executed by the Appellant in favor of Appellee Eliseo Santos, the children of the Appellant and
their uncle, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, signed an Application, on September 26, 1984 and filed the same with the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (at San Mateo)
for the registration of “their title” over Lots 1522 and 2433 of Cadastre 375-D. The Applicants alleged, inter alia in said application, that Noe Santos, et al.,
(children of Ladislao Santos), were occupying a portion of Lot 1522, with an area of 3,430 square meters, while Appellee Eliseo Santos was occupying a
portion of the same lot, with an area of 3,000 square meters, more or less, as a site of cockpit building (Exhibit “5”). On July 16, 1986, the Regional Trial Court
promulgated a Decision granting the application, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares herein applicants the absolute owners of that parcels of land identified as Lot 1522 and Lot 2433, both of Plan AP-
04-001205 marked as Exhibit “D” and in consequence thereof, it is hereby Ordered that the said parcels of land be registered in the names of the applicants,
to wit:

1. Noe Santos, married to Felicidad Santos; Asuncion S. Ramos, married to Virgilio Ramos; LADISLAO SANTOS, JR., married to Regina Linco; NELIA S.
MACALALAD, married to Jacinto Macalalad; OFELIA SANTOS, single; RECTO SANTOS, single, all of legal ages, Filipino citizens and all are residents of Gen. Luna
St., San Mateo, Rizal, an undivided portion of 3,387 square meters of that parcel of land identified as Lot 1522 of Plan AP-04-001205, marked as Exhibit “D”
and undivided rights, interest and participation of that parcel of land identified as Lot 2433 of the above-mentioned Plan with an area of 43 square meters, all
in equal shares (pro-indiviso);

2. ELISEO SANTOS, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Virginia Santos and resident of Gen. Luna St., San Mateo, Rizal, an undivided portion of 3,000
square meters of that parcel of land identified as Lot 1522 of Plan AP-04-001205.

Once this Decision becomes final, let an Order of the issuance of a Decree of Registration issue” (Exhibits “26-E” and “26-F”)

On the basis of the Decision of the Court, Noe Santos, et al., and Appellee Eliseo Santos, were issued an Original Certificate of Title No. ON-1146, on November
18, 1986 over Lot 1522 (Exhibit M”).

Noe Santos, for and in behalf of his siblings and Appellee Eliseo Santos had a subdivision plan prepared, subdividing Lot 1522 into two (2) subdivision lots,
namely, Lot 1522-A, with an area of 3,000 square meters (Exhibit “15-A”) and Lot 1522-B, with an area of 3,387 square meters (Exhibit “15-B”).

In June, 1987, Noe Santos and his siblings and their uncle, Appellee Eliseo Santos, executed a “Partition Agreement” adjudicating Lot 1522-A, with an area of
3,000 square meters unto Appellee Eliseo Santos, and Lot 1522-B, with an area of 3,387 square meters, unto Noe Santos, et al., (Exhibit “13”). On the basis of
said deed, Original Certificate of Title No. ON-1146 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 148892 was issued to Appellee Eliseo Santos over Lot
1522-A (Exhibit “11”).
On March 17, 1993, Appellant Ladislao Santos, through counsel, sent a letter to the Appellee Philip Santos alleging that the Appellant had discovered that the
Isidra property inherited by Appellant and Appellee Eliseo, had been declared, for taxation purposes, under the name of Appellee Philip Santos, on the basis of
a ”Deed of Sale” executed by Virgilio Santos and suggesting a conference regarding the matter (Exhibit “J”). The Appellee Philip Santos wrote to the counsel
of the Appellant, declaring, inter alia, that the Isidra property, with the portion and Lot 1522-A, with an area of 3,000 square meters, formed part of the share
of Appellee Eliseo Santos in the estate of his father, Bonifacio Santos; that Appellee Eliseo Santos transferred the Isidra property to his son, Virgilio Santos,
who, in turn, sold the said property to Appellee Philip Santos, for the amount of P24,600.00, as part of the consideration of the conveyance, by Appellee Philip
Santos, of his property located in Kambal Street, Gitnangbayan, San Mateo, Rizal, where Virgilio Santos’ widow and family had been residing (Exhibit “24”)
and the redemption, by Appellee Philip Santos, of the Mortgage of the property by Virgilio Santos from the Rural Bank of San Mateo.”[5]

On May 13, 1993, herein respondent Ladislao Santos filed an action for the judicial partition of the Isidra property. After due proceedings, the trial court
promulgated a decision dismissing Ladislao’s complaint on the ground that the latter failed to adduce proof of his entitlement to the relief prayed for by him
and on the ground of acquisitive prescription. Specifically, the trial court cited the following reasons: (1) the subject property was registered/declared for
taxation purposes only in the name of Isidra Santos; (2) the fact of co-ownership thereof by reason of inheritance was not reflected in the tax declaration; (3)
there was no proof presented that the cancellation of the tax declaration in Isidra’s name and the issuance of another in Virgilio’s name had been effected
through fraud and misrepresentation; (4) there is no proof that a fake document was presented to the provincial assessor for the cancellation of the tax
declaration and the issuance of another in lieu thereof as all assessment records were destroyed by the fire which gutted the office of the provincial assessor;
and (5) from the time of Isidra’s death in 1967 up to May 13, 1993 when this case was filed, acquisitive prescription may have already set in.

In due course, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated, rendered its assailed Decision granting the appeal, reversing the trial court’s decision and declaring that
Ladislao Santos and Eliseo Santos are each entitled to ½ pro indiviso shares in the Isidra property.

Hence, this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following issues:

“I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY AND REGULARITY OF THE TRANSFER OF ISIDRA PROPERTY TO VIRGILIO
SANTOS AND LATER TO PETITIONER PHILIP C. SANTOS.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION PRO INDIVISO OF ISIDRA PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
DESPITE AND INSPITE OF THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF ALLEGED FRAUD AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE CANCELLATION OF THE TAX DECLARATION IN
ISIDRA’S NAME ANT ITS SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER TO VIRGILIO SANTOS’ NAME.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THAT ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION HAS ALREADY SET IN AS TO BAR THE INSTANT ACTION
FOR PARTITION.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO FILE THIS INSTANT ACTION FOR PARTITION HAS ALREADY
PRESCRIBED.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT LACHES HAS ALREADY SET IN AS TO BAR RESPONDENT IN ASSERTING HIS CLAIM
UNDER THE PETITION.

VI. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER PHILIP SANTOS AS BUYER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUE.”[6]

The material aspects of the issues are closely intertwined; hence, they are consolidated into two main issues specifically dealing with the following subjects:
(1) the validity of the transfers of the property originally belonging to Isidra M. Santos (the Isidra property) from Eliseo Santos to Virgilio Santos and then to
Philip Santos; and (2) whether the action for partition is already barred by ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years and estoppel by laches.

The petition is not meritorious.

The controversy involves a 391 square meter parcel of land situated in San Mateo, Rizal, owned by Isidra Santos, a spinster who died intestate and without
issue in 1967. She was survived by her two brothers, Ladislao and Eliseo. Sometime in 1993, Ladislao through his attorney-in-fact Noe M. Santos filed an
action for judicial partition of the Isidra property against his brother Eliseo and the latter’s son Philip. While admitting that Ladislao and Eliseo inherited the
subject Isidra property, Eliseo and Philip submitted that “Eliseo Santos and wife and Ladsilao and wife signed a document wherein Eliseo acquired the subject
lot from the combined partition of the estate of their father Bonifacio Santos and their sister Isidra Santos. Bonifacio’s estate was composed of 6,387 square
meters while that of Isidra Santos is the subject property with an area of 391 square meters. Out of this combined parcels of land, respondent got 3,387
square meters while Eliseo got 3,000 square meters and the subject Isidra property with an area of 391 square meters. Eliseo, in turn, donated the subject
Isidra property to his son, Virgilio Santos.”

Considering that petitioners Eliseo and Philip disputed the status of Ladislao as co-owner on the ground that the brothers entered into a Combined Deed of
Partition wherein the entire Isidra property was conveyed to Eliseo, It was then incumbent upon them to present the best evidence obtainable to prove the
same. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the claim of a subsisting co-ownership by Ladislao over the Isidra property has not been effectively refuted by
Eliseo and Philip, and that Eliseo and his successors-in-interest (Virgilio and Philip) did not acquire exclusive title over the entire Isidra property.

Petitioners insist that they have effectively refuted the co-ownership between Ladislao and Eliseo based on a “lawful document” proven as follows in the court
a quo: (1) the annotation at the back of Tax Declaration No. 1115 which states: “cancelled by Tax No. 7892, dated September 9, 1969, Virgilio and Virginia
Cruz-Santos”; (2) Rodolfo Bautista, municipal assessor of San Mateo, Rizal testified on the existence of the “document” authorizing the cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 1115 in favor of the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 7892 in Virgilio’s name; (3) Virginia Santos (wife of Virgilio), Philip and a certain Dr. Linco
testified on the existence of said “document”. In relation to the foregoing, petitioners argue that the Isidra property was acquired through a valid document
inscribed in the tax declaration;[7] that the existence and nature of this document was proved by testimonial evidence; and that respondent was not able to
show that the document registered with the provincial assessor’s office was not the combined partition or deed of transfer by brothers Ladislao and Eliseo.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that only the original document is the best evidence of the fact as to whether the brothers Ladislao and Eliseo Santos
executed a Combined Deed of Partition wherein the entire property of Isidra Santos was conveyed to Eliseo. In the absence of such document, petitioners’
arguments regarding said partition must fail. The testimonies of Virginia Santos and Philip Santos on the existence of and the contents of the aforesaid
documents are, at most, secondary evidence, which are inadmissible considering that the petitioners as the offerors failed to prove any of the exceptions
provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court[8] and to establish the conditions for their admissibility.[9] We quote with favor the findings of the Court
of Appeals, thus:

“Even if we assumed, for the nonce, that indeed, Lot 1522 was inherited by the Appellant and his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, however, we are not
convinced that the Appellant and his wife deeded to the Appellee Eliseo Santos and the latter to Virgilio Santos the Isidra Property under a “Deed of Transfer”
as testified to by Virginia Santos or under a “Combined Deed of Partition” as testified to by Appellee Philip Santos. The Appellees never adduced in evidence
any copy of the said deed executed by the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos and their respective spouses. Since the subject of inquiry was the subject
of said deed, it was incumbent on the Appellees to adduce in evidence the original of the deed or a copy of the original of the deed conformably with Section
3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence. The Appellees failed to do so. The Court a quo allowed the Appellees to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the said deed, but it was inappropriate for the Court a quo to do so over the objections of the Appellant. This is so because, before the Appellees
are allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of the deed, the Appellees had to prove, with the requisite quantum of
evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of the deed. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran
declared:

“Where there are two or more originals, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. For example, a lease was executed in duplicate, one being retained by the lessor and the other by the lessee. Either copy was, therefore, an
original, and could have been introduced as evidence of the contract without the production of the other. One of these originals could not be found. The non-
production of the other was not accounted for it was held that “under these circumstances, the rule is that no secondary evidence of the contents of either is
admissible until it is shown that originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.” (Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, Volume V, 1970 ed. at pages 90-91, supra, underscoring supplied)

Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the
following:

“(a) the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (c) unavailability of the original is
not due to bad faith on the part of the offeror.” (Francisco, Rules of Court, Part I, Volume VII, 1997 ed. at page 154).”

When she testified in the Court a quo, Virginia Santos declared that there were three (3) copies of the deed signed by the parties thereof. One copy of the
deed was given to Virgilio Santos, one copy was retained by the Appellee Eliseo Santos, and one copy was retained by Atty. Sixto Natividad, the Notary Public.
Virgilio Santos had his copy xeroxed and gave the xerox copy to Appellee Philip Santos. Virgilio Sanots’ copy was later filed with the Provincial Assessor’s
Office. x x x.

x x x x x x x x x.

When he testified in the Court a quo, the Appellee Philip Santos admitted that he saw a copy of the deed in the possession of his father, the Appellee Eliseo
Santos:

x x x x x x x x x.

While the Appellees adduced evidence that the copy filed with the Provincial Assessor’s Office was burned when the Office of the Provincial Assessor was
burned on April 7, 1977, however, the Appellees failed to adduce proof that the copy in the possession of Atty. Sixto Natividad was lost or destroyed. It bears
stressing that a Notary Public is mandated, under the Notarial Law, to retain two (2) copies of every deed involving real estate as part of his notarial record, a
copy of which he is to submit to the Notarial Section of the Regional Trial Court.

The Appellees could very well have procured, by subpoenae ad testificandum and duces tecum, the attendance of Atty. Sixto Natividad before the Court a quo
and bring with him his copy of the deed. After all, there is no evidence on record that he was already dead or was unavailable at the time of the trial in the
Court a quo. The Appellees did not. Moreover, the Appellees failed to prove the loss or destruction of the copy on file with the Notarial Section of the Regional
Trial Court or of the copy in the possession of the Appellee Eliseo Santos. Assuming, for the nonce, that the Appellees mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove the loss or destruction of all the copies of the original of the deed, however, Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence provides that,
before testimonial evidence may be adduced to prove the contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated to prove the loss or non-availability of
any copy of the original or of some authentic document reciting the contents thereof: x x x.”

x x x x x x x x x.

In the present recourse, Virginia Santos admitted that a xerox copy of the deed was given to the Appellee Philip Santos. However, when she testified in the
Court a quo, she admitted not having inquired from the Appellee Philip Santos if he still had the xerox copy of all deeds that Virgilio gave him. x x x.[10]

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioners’ evidence consisting of the tax declarations in Virgilio’s name and then in Philip’s name are not
conclusive and indisputable evidence to show that the lot in question was conveyed to Virgilio Santos, Philip’s predecessor-in-interest. A mere tax declaration
does not vest ownership of the property upon the declarant. Neither do tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation purposes constitute adequate
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty.[11]

As for the much-vaunted testimony of the municipal assessor of San Mateo, Rizal, the Court of Appeals had this to say:
“The Appellees presented Rodolfo Bautista, the representative of the Rizal Provincial Assessor, to prove that Tax Declaration No. 7892, under the name of
Virgilio Santos and Virginia Santos, cancelled Tax Declaration No. 1115, under the name of Isidra Santos, on the basis of the “Combined Deed of Partition”
purportedly executed by the Appellant and his wife, in tandem with the Appellee Eliseo Santos and his wife, which was, however, burned when the Provincial
Assessor’s Office was gutted by fire on April 7, 1977. However, Rodolfo Bautista himself unabashedly admitted, when he testified in the Court a quo that he
had no knowledge of the nature of the deed that was used for the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 1115 under the name of Isidra Santos or the previous
document burned or gutted by the fire.

“Atty. Ferry:

Q: When you testified last March 14, 1994, Mr. Bautista, you declared that you assumed your position in the Office of the Municipal Assessor only on January
6, 1982. Before that, you were not connected with the Municipal Assessor?

A: I am not yet connected, sir.

Q: So for the first time you learned, in your official capacity, the alleged lost of all records in the Office of the Provincial Assessor bearing dates 1977 down was
only recently?

A: No, sir.

Q: When?

A: When I took over in 1982, sir.

Q: But the fact is, you will agree with me in so far as the present controversy is concerned, you have no way of determining the particular document
presented to the Office of the Provincial Assessor which was made the basis in effecting the transfer of tax declaration in the name of Isidra Santos in favor of
Virgilio Santos marked in evidence as Exh. 4. You have no way of determining or identifying the particular document used or presented to the Office of the
Provincial Assessor which was made the basis for the cancellation of tax declaration in the name of Isidra Santos and that paved the issuance of the tax
declaration in the name of Virgilio Santos marked in evidence by the defendants as Exh. 5. You will not be able to know that simply on the basis of this
document? You are in no position to tell or determine what particular document was presented in the Office of the Provincial Assessor which paved the way to
the cancellation of Exh. 4 which is tax declaration no. 1115 in the name of Isidra Santos and the issuance of another one in the name of Virgilio Santos marked
in evidence as Exh. 5?

A: I do not know, sir (t.s.n. Bautista, at pages 9-10, April 18, 1994, underscoring supplied)

The Appellees can find no solstice[12] on the face of Tax Declaration No. 1115, Exhibit “4”, which contains the following entry:

“Cancelled by:

Tax Declaration No. 7892

Dated: Sept. 9, 1969

Virgilio & Virginia Cruz Santos”

(Exhibit “4-B”)
This is so because the entry does not contain any clue of the nature of the deed, if it was a deed at all, used for the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 1155,
the parties who executed the said deed or the beneficiary of said deed. Indeed, the Court admitted, in its Decision, that there was no way of identifying the
document used as basis for the issuance of a new tax declaration under the name of Virgilio Santos (t.s.n. Bautista, supra). Virgilio Santos could very well have
executed a “Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement of Estate and of Self-Adjudication of Real Property” covering the Isidra Property and filed the same with the
Provincial Assessor on the basis of which he was issued Tax Declaration No. 7892 over the property. But then, such a deed did not prejudice the share of the
Appellant in the Isidra Property. It is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself a property he was not the owner of. Hence, We find and so declare
that the Isidra Property remained the property of the Appellant and the Appellee Eliseo Santos as their inheritance from Isidra Santos. As our Supreme Court
declared in an avuncular case:

“Despite admission during the hearing on the identify of the land in question (see p. 21, Record on Appeal), Maria’s counsel, on appeal, re-emphasized her
original claim that the two parcels of land in her possession were acquired from the Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. However, the private document
relative to the purchase, was not produced at the trial, allegedly because they were placed in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese
Occupation. In 1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence was submitted for all intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property (Maria
Bicarme, et al., versus Court of Appeals, et al., 186 SCRA 294, at pages 298-299).”

In the light of our findings and disquisitions, Virgilio Santos did not acquire title over the Isidra Property. Hence, Virgilio Santos could not have lawfully sold the
said property to his brother, the Appellee Philip Santos. As the Latin aphorism goes: “NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET.”[13]

All told, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Virginia Santos, Philip Santos and Rodolfo Bautista, on the existence of said document, specifically, the
Combined Deed of Partition, cannot be considered in favor of the petitioners, the same being, at most, secondary evidence.

Anent the second issue, petitioners insist that acquisitive prescription has already set in; and that estoppel lies to bar the instant action for partition.
According to petitioners, Virgilio Santos was already in possession of the subject property since after the death of Isidra Santos on April 1, 1967. Thereafter,
Philip Santos took possession of the subject property on December 16, 1980 upon its sale on said date. They reason out that more than 13 years had lapsed
from April 1, 1967 to December 16, 1980; and that more than 12 years had lapsed from the time Philip Santos took possession of the property on December
16, 1980 up to the time Ladislao Santos filed the action for partition on May 13, 1993. Petitioners conclude that the instant action is already barred by
ordinary acquisitive prescription of ten years. Further, it is argued that the possession of Virgilio Santos could be tacked with the possession of Philip Santos
bringing to a total of 26 years the time that elapsed before the filing of the case in 1993. They add that these 26 years of inaction call for the application of
the principle of estoppel by laches.

Considering that there was no proof that Ladislao Santos executed any “Combined Deed of Partition” in tandem with the Eliseo Santos, we rule that a co-
ownership still subsists between the brothers over the Isidra property. This being the case, we apply Article 494 of the Civil Code which states that,
“prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or his co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.” In Adile vs. Court of Appeals,[14] it was held:

“x x x. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the
other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the period required by law.”

There is no showing that Eliseo Santos had complied with these requisites. We are not convinced that Eliseo had repudiated the co-ownership, and even if he
did, there is no showing that the same had been clearly made known to Ladislao. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
“Under Article 1119 of the New Civil Code, acts of possessory character executed in virtue of license or tolerance of the owners shall not be available for the
purposes of possession.

Indeed, Filipino family ties being close and well-knit as they are, and considering that Virgilio Santos was the ward of Isidra Santos ever since when Virgilio
Santos was still an infant, it was but natural that the Appellant did not interpose any objection to the continued stay of Virgilio Santos and his family on the
property and even acquiesce thereto. Appellant must have assumed too, that his brother, the Appellee Eliseo Santos, allowed his son to occupy the property
and use the same for the time being. Hence, such possession by Virgilio Santos and Philip Santos of the property does not constitute a repudiation of the co-
ownership by the Appellee Eliseo Santos and of his privies for that matter. As our Supreme Court succinctly observed:

“x x x [A]nd it is probable that said conduct was simply tolerated by the plaintiffs on account of his being their uncle, and they never thought that by said
conduct the defendant was attempting to oust them forever from the inheritance, nor that the defendant would have so intended in any way, dealing as we do
here with the acquisition of a thing by prescription, the evidence must be so clear and conclusive as to establish said prescription without any shadow of
doubt. This does not happen in the instant case, for the defendant did not even try to prove that he has expressly or impliedly refused plaintiff’s right over an
aliquot part of the inheritance. (at page 875, supra)”[15]

Penultimately, the action for partition is not barred by laches. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner
may demand at any time the partition of the common property.[16]

As a final note, it must be stated that since Ladislao has successfully hurdled the issue of co-ownership of the property sought to be partitioned, there is the
secondary issue of how the property is to be divided between the two brothers.[17] This Court cannot proceed forthwith with the actual partitioning of the
property involved, hence, we reiterate the order of the Court of Appeals for the trial court to effect the partition of the subject property in conformity with Rule
69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.
CONSOLACION Q. AUSTRIA, Petitioner, vs CONSTANCIA Q. LICHAUCO, CONSUELO Q. JALANDONI, JOSE ALBERTO L. QUINTOS, RICARDO M. QUINTOS, JR.,AILEEN
M. QUINTOS and TYRONE M. QUINTOS, Respondents.

Petitioner Consolacion Q. Austria assails the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 68591 dated June 21, 2005 and its Resolution[2] dated
October 7, 2005, which respectively affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, dated February 14, 2000 and its order[4]
dated August 7, 2000, and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos, and defendant-appellant Consolacion
Austria are siblings of full blood. Jose Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone, all surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of the defendant-appellant.

The above-named persons are co-owners of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of six hundred sixty one (661) square meters located in Palanan,
Makati City. The aforesaid parcels of land have permanent improvements thereon which straddle both lots, namely, a residential bungalow and two (2) units,
two-storey apartments, the titles of which are registered jointly in the names of the parties as co-owners thereof.

The plaintiffs-appellees allege that sometime in the early part of 1996, they informed defendant-appellant of their desire to have the subject properties
partitioned based on the percentage of each co-owner’s respective share.

A realtor was even engaged to prepare the schemes by which the subject properties could be physically partitioned among the co-owners. However, the
defendant-appellant Austria refused to accede to any of the schemes presented by the realtor for the physical apportionment of the subject properties
between the co-owners thereof.

Because of the refusal of the defendant-appellant Austria to partition the property, and the inability of the co-owners to mutually agree on an arrangement
acceptable to all of them, on July 1, 1997, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1485, against the defendant-appellant Austria and two other defendants namely Benedicto Quintos and Antonio Quintos (as
unwilling co-plaintiffs) for partition of the subject property.

Within the period for filing an answer, the defendant-appellant Austria filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.

In its order dated November 10, 1997, the lower court denied the omnibus motion to dismiss of the defendant-appellant Austria, and directed the defendants
to file their answer within the remaining period provided by the Rules.

Within the prescriptive period, the defendant-appellant Austria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 10, 1997 order, which the lower court
denied in an order dated February 2, 1998.

Not satisfied, the defendant-appellant Austria filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court which was docketed as CA-GR SP No. 46907, seeking to annul the orders of November 10, 1997 and February 2, 1998.

In a Resolution dated July 9, 1998, the Court of Appeals required the plaintiffs-appellees to comment, and temporarily restrained the respondent judge, his
agents, representatives, and other persons acting in his behalf from proceeding with Civil Case No. 97-1485 in order that the petition may not become moot
and academic.

On November 9, 1998, the defendant-appellant Austria received a copy of the Decision dated October 30, 1998 dismissing her petition for certiorari and
prohibition. The defendant-appellant Austria moved for the reconsideration thereof.
 Subsequently, on July 19, 2001, defendant-appellant Austria received a copy of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated July 9, 2001, denying her motion
for reconsideration of the decision denying her petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Undaunted, the defendant-appellant Austria then filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

In a resolution dated October 15, 2001, the Supreme Court denied the said petition for review for non-compliance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to pay on time docket and other fees and deposit costs in violation of Sec. 3, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(c), Rule 56.

Still not satisfied, on November 9, 2001, the defendant-appellant Austria filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated October 15, 2001 denying
her petition for review.

In its resolution dated January 24, 2002, the Supreme Court denied with finality the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

During the pendency of the defendant-appellant’s petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court, the plaintiffs-appellees filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 142 where the main case is pending, a motion dated April 6, 1998 praying that a declaration of default be issued against all
defendants and for plaintiffs to be allowed to present evidence ex-parte.

In an order dated July 13, 1998, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City held in abeyance the proceedings before it while awaiting the
resolution of the motion for reconsideration pending before the Court of Appeals.

Notwithstanding the order holding in abeyance the proceedings in the lower court, plaintiffs-appellees filed a Manifestation and Motion dated September 14,
1998 praying for the resolution of their Motion dated April 6, 1998. In its order dated September 25, 1998, the lower court deemed the incident submitted for
resolution.

While the motion for reconsideration filed by the appellant is still pending before the Court of Appeals, the lower court in its order dated July 6, 1999 declared
the defendants in default, set the reception of ex-parte evidence, and commissioned the Branch Clerk of Court to receive the ex-parte evidence and to submit
her corresponding report thereon as soon as the same is concluded.

On On August 4, 1999, the defendant-appellant Austria filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 6, 1999 with an urgent prayer to cancel
plaintiff’s ex parte presentation of evidence on August 9, 1999, which was however denied by the lower court, for lack of merit, in an order dated January 14,
2000.

The plaintiffs-appellees then presented their evidence ex-parte on January 28, 2000.

The assailed decision was subsequently rendered by the lower court on February 14, 2000, finding in favor of the plaintiffs-appellees.

A motion for new trial was thereafter filed by the defendant-appellant Austria, which was, in an order dated August 7, 2000, denied for lack of merit.[5]

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which dismissed her petition and affirmed the trial court’s decision but deleted the order that petitioner
pay reasonable rental for her use of a portion of the disputed properties. The appellate court denied reconsideration.

In assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner avers that her motion for new trial and appeal of the judgment by default are valid remedies under
the Rules of Court. She insists that the appellate court erred in not reversing the declaration of default despite the fact that she questioned the default order
in the petition for review which she seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner also contends that it was error for the trial court to allow the sale of
the entire property in dispute.
 Respondents filed a Comment[6] dated March 30, 2006, arguing that petitioner was correctly declared in default because of her obstinate refusal to file an
answer to the complaint despite being ordered to do so by the trial court. They also allege that they cannot be compelled to remain in co-ownership only
because of petitioner’s unjustified refusal to consent to a partition.

A Reply to Comment[7] dated July 25, 2006 was filed by petitioner who insisted that she was denied the right to fully ventilate her case.

Only two issues are raised in this petition. The first issue pertains to petitioner’s insistence that the judgment by default rendered by the trial court, which
was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is a denial of her day in court. The second issue concerns the validity of the trial court’s decision
alternatively ordering the partition of the subject property or authorizing its sale.

A defendant declared in default has the following remedies: (a) a motion to set aside the order of default under Sec. 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court;
(b) a motion for new trial under Sec. 1(a), Rule 37 if the default was discovered after judgment but while appeal is still available; (c) a petition for relief under
Rule 38 if judgment has become final and executory; and (d) an appeal from the judgment under Sec. 1, Rule 41 even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been resorted to.[8]

In this case, petitioner did not move to set aside the order of default rendered by the trial court but filed a motion for new trial after a decision had
already been rendered in the case. The motion for new trial, however, was denied by the trial court for lack of merit. She then appealed to the Court of
Appeals, assailing both the denial of her motion for new trial and the adverse decision of the trial court.

Evidently, petitioner utilized the appropriate remedies available to her. The fact, however, that she availed of the proper remedies does not by itself result in
a judgment in her favor or the reversal of the assailed order and decision of the trial court. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, petitioner was declared
in default because of her adamant refusal to file an answer despite being required to do so.

The factual circumstances in the cases of Heirs of Akut v. Court of Appeals[9] and Ampeloquio v. Court of Appeals,[10] cited by petitioner in pleading
liberality, are markedly different from this case. In Heirs of Akut, petitioners were not able to file an answer within the reglementary period because they failed
to obtain the services of counsel on time and two of the petitioners were then sick. In Ampeloquio, the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to
dismiss was mistakenly served upon one of its counsels on record and not upon the lawyer in charge of the case. Consequently, the answer was not filed on
time. In both cases, there was no indication that the failure to answer was intended to delay the case.

In contrast, the facts of this case suggest an intention on the part of petitioner to delay the proceedings. The complaint was first filed in 1997 but is only now
being finally laid to rest because of several procedural stumbling blocks, including the elevation of the case to this Court on the issue of the propriety of the
trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion to dismiss, hurled by petitioner one after the other.

Parenthetically, the appellate court initially issued a temporary restraining order as an incident to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner questioning the
trial court’s order denying her motion to dismiss but the restraining order was lifted after its 60-day validity .[11] The expiration of the temporary restraining
order resulted in the running of the prescribed period to file an answer and the continuation of the proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner’s obstinate
refusal to file an answer to the complaint despite these circumstances clearly justifies the declaration of default by the trial court and its affirmation by the
Court of Appeals.

This case has crept, ever so slowly, up the ladder of judicial process. While we are not dissuading parties from availing of the judicial remedies outlined in the
Rules of Court, they should be cautioned to be judicious in availing of these remedies. After all, rules of procedure are intended to be, not tools of delay, but of
prompt and just disposition of every party’s cause. Having fully availed of, even exploited, these remedies, petitioner cannot feign denial of her day in court.
She has been given every opportunity to fully ventilate her side.
 Now, we turn to the second issue raised by petitioner, i.e., the validity of the trial court’s decision alternatively directing the partition of the subject properties
or authorizing their sale to a third party.

There are two stages in every action for partition. The first phase is the determination of whether a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, i.e.,
not otherwise legally proscribed, and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end either: (a) with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited; or (b) with a
determination that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises, and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon.[12]

The second phase commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be
done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the
accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question.[13]

The proceedings in this case have only reached the first phase. It must be mentioned as an aside that even if the order decreeing partition leaves something
more to be done by the trial court for the complete disposition of the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners, the proceedings for the determination of
just compensation by the appointed commissioners, the submission of their reports and hearing thereon, and the approval of the partition, it is considered a
final order and may be appealed by the party aggrieved thereby.[14]

There is no question that a co-ownership exists between petitioner and respondents. To this extent, the trial court was correct in decreeing partition in line
with the Civil Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.[15]

However, the trial court went astray when it also authorized the sale of the subject properties to a third party and the division of the proceeds thereof. What
makes this portion of the decision all the more objectionable is the fact that the trial court conditioned the sale upon the price and terms acceptable to
plaintiffs (respondents herein) only, and adjudicated the proceeds of the sale again only to plaintiffs. The pertinent portion of the trial court’s disposition
states:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff:

1) Directing the partition (physical division) of the subject properties and all improvements thereon among the co-owners in accordance with their
respective shares; or

2) Authorizing the sale, conveyance or transfer of the above-described properties to a third-party at such price and under such terms acceptable to
plaintiffs and thereafter, dividing the proceeds of said sale among them in accordance with their proportionate interests.[16] [Emphasis supplied.]

It is true that petitioner did not assign this error on appeal resulting in the appellate court’s failure to rule on the matter. Nonetheless, we cannot simply brush
this issue aside considering that its resolution is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case.[17] The rectification of the trial court’s decision is
accordingly in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 21, 2005 is REVERSED in so far as it affirms the portion of the
decision dated February 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142, which authorizes the sale, conveyance or transfer of the properties
subject of this case and the division of the proceeds of said sale to respondents herein. The Decision dated June 21, 2005 and Resolution dated October 7,
2005 are AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

MARINA Z. REYES, AUGUSTO M. ZABALLERO and SOCORRO Z. FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE ALFREDO B. CONCEPCION, Presiding Judge, CFI of
Cavite, Tagaytay, Br. IV, SOCORRO MARQUEZ VDA. DE ZABALLERO, EUGENIA Z. LUNA, LEONARDO M. ZABALLERO, and ELENA FRONDA ZABALLERO,
respondents.

On March 13, 1980, petitioners filed with the CFI a complaint for injunction and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-572, seeking to enjoin private
respondents Socorro Marquez Vda. De Zaballero, Eugenia Z. Luna and Leonardo M. Zaballero from selling to a third party their pro-indiviso shares as co-
owners in eight parcels of registered land (covered by TCT Nos. A-1316 to A-1322) located in the province of Cavite, with an aggregate area of about 96
hectares. Petitioner claimed that under Article 1620 of the new Civil Code, they, as co-owners, had a preferential right to purchase these shares from private
respondents for a reasonable price.

On March 17, 1980, respondent trial judge denied the ex parte application for a writ of preliminary injunction, on the ground that petitioners' registered notice
of lis pendens was ample protection of their rights.

On April 24, 1980, private respondents received the summons and copies of the complaint. Private respondents then filed their answer with counterclaim,
praying for the partition of the subject properties. Private respondent Elena Fronda Zaballero filed a motion for intervention dated April 29, 1980, adopting
therein her co-respondents answer with counterclaim.

At the pre-trial hearing, the parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That the plaintiffs, the defendants and the intervenor are the pro-indiviso co-owners of the properties cited and described in the complaint;

2. That six and nine tenth (6-9/10) hectares of the land covered by TCT No. T-1319; approximately twelve (12) hectares of that covered by TCT No. T-
1320; and the entire parcel of covered by TCT No. T-1321, are subject of expropriation proceedings instituted by the National Housing Authority (NHA) now
pending before this Court in Civil Case Nos. TG-392, TG-396 and TG-417;
3. That based on the evidence presented by the herein parties in the aforecited expropriation cases, the current valuation of the land and the
improvements thereon is at P95,132.00 per hectare;

4. That on 16 April 1980, the plaintiffs received a written notice from the defendants and the intervenor that the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND
AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION had offered to buy the latter's share in the properties listed in the complaint subject to the following terms:

1. The selling price shall be net at TWELVE & 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter, or a total price of NINE MILLION (P9,000,000.00) PESOS for a total
area of SEVENTY TWO (72) HECTARES ONLY;

2. A downpayment equivalent to THIRTY (30%) PERCENT of the selling price, or a minimum downpayment of TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,700,000.00) PESOS;

3. The balance of the purchase price to be payable within THREE (3) YEARS from the date of downpayment in THREE (3) EQUAL, ANNUAL PAYMENTS with
interest at the legal rate prevailing at the time of payment;

4. The balance shall be covered by a BANK GUARANTEE of payments and shall not be governed by Art. 1250 of the Civil Code.

(Cf. Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer)

5. That in said letters (Annexes 1, 2 and 3, Answer), the plaintiffs were requested:

a) To exercise their pre-emptive right to purchase defendants' and intervenor's shares under the above-quoted terms; or

b) To agree to a physical partition of the properties; or

c) To sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and the intervenor, to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION
at the price and under the terms aforequoted.

6. That the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION is ready, willing and able to purchase not only the aliquot shares of the
defendants and the intervenor, but also that of the plaintiffs, in and to all the properties subject of this case, for and in consideration of the net amount of
TWELVE and 50/100 (P12.50) PESOS per square meter and under the afore-quoted terms;

xxx xxx xxx

[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 1-2, Rollo, pp. 43-44.]

The parties laid down their respective positions, as follows:

PLAINTIFFS

1. That the subject properties are incapable of physical partition;

2. That the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive;

3. That they are willing to exercise their pre-emptive right for an amount of not more that P95,132.00 per hectare, which is the fair and reasonable value
of said properties;
4. That the statutory period for exercising their pre-emptive right was suspended upon the filing of the complaint;

DEFENDANTS AND INTERVENOR

1. That the reasonable price of the subject properties is P12.50 per square meter;

2. That plaintiffs' right of legal pre-emption had lapsed upon their failure to exercise the same within the period prescribed in Art. 1623 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines;

3. That, assuming the soundness of plaintiffs' claim that the price of P12.50 per square meter is grossly excessive, it would be to the best interest of the
plaintiffs to sell their shares to the VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION, whose sincerity, capacity and good faith is beyond
question, as the same was admitted by the parties herein;

4. That the subject properties consisting approximately 95 hectares may be physically partitioned without difficulty in the manner suggested by them to
plaintiffs, and as graphically represented in the subdivision plan, which will be furnished in due course to plaintiffs' counsel.

[Annex "C" of the Petition, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 44-45.]

Based on the foregoing, respondent trial judge rendered a pre-trial order dated July 9, 1980 granting petitioners a period of ten days from receipt of the
subdivision plan to be prepared by a competent geodetic engineer within which to express their approval or disapproval of the said plan, or to submit within
the same period, if they so desire, an alternative subdivision plan.

On July 16, 1980, counsel for private respondents sent to the counsel for petitioners a letter enclosed with a subdivision plan. On August 4, 1980, petitioners
filed their comment to the pre-trial order, contending that the question of reasonable value of the subject properties remains a contentious issue of fact
ascertainable only after a full trial. Petitioners likewise insisted on their pre- emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership after
due determination of the reasonable price thereof.

Thereafter, counsel for private respondents sent the counsel for petitioners another subdivision plan prepared by a geodetic engineer. Still, no definite
communication was sent by petitioners signifying their approval or disapproval to the subdivision plans.

In order to settle once and for all the controversy between the parties, private respondents filed a motion dated December 16, 1980 requesting that
petitioners be required to formally specify which of the two options under Article 498 of the New Civil Code they wished to avail of: that petitioners' shares in
the subject properties be sold to private respondents, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter; or that the subject properties be sold to a third party, VOLCANO
LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. (claimed to have been erroneously referred to in the pre-trial as VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS
CORPORATION) and its proceeds thereof distributed among the parties.

Finding merit in the private respondents' request, and for the purpose of determining the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code, respondent trial
judge issued an order dated February 4, 1981 which directed the parties to signify whether or not they agree to the scheme of allotting the subject properties
to one of the co-owners, at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, or whether or not they know of a third party who is able and willing to buy the subject
properties at terms and conditions more favorable than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC. The order contained a series of questions
addressed to all the parties, who were thereupon required to submit their answers thereto.

Private respondents filed a "Constancia" expressing that they were willing to allot their shares in the subject properties to Socorro Marquez Vda. de Zaballero,
at the rate of P12.50 per square meter, and that they did not know of any other party who was willing and able to purchase the subject properties under more
favorable conditions than that offered by VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC.
However, instead of submitting their answers to the queries posed by respondent trial judge, petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to the true identity
of the third party allegedly willing to purchase the subject properties.

On February 26, 1981, respondent trial judge rejected petitioners' motion on the ground that it was irrelevant.

Thereupon, on February 27, 1981, petitioners filed a pleading captioned "Compliance and Motion", (1) reiterating the relevance of ascertaining the true
identity of the third party buyer, VOLCANO SECURITIES TRADERS AND AGRI-BUSINESS CORPORATION or VOLCANO LAKEVIEW RESORTS, INC., (2) expressing
their view that there is actually no bona fide and financially able third party willing to purchase the subject properties at the rate of P12.50 per square meter,
and, (3) once again insisting on their pre-emptive right to purchase the shares of private respondents in the co-ownership at a "reasonable price", which is
less than that computed excessively by the latter at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Petitioners therein prayed that further proceedings be conducted in
order to settle the factual issue regarding the reasonable value of the subject properties.

On March 16, 1981, respondent trial judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion. The judge ruled that petitioners did not possess a pre-emptive right to
purchase private respondents' shares in the co-ownership. Thus, finding that the subject properties were essentially indivisible, respondent trial judge ordered
the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to Article 498 of the New Civil Code. A notice of sale was issued setting the date of public
bidding for the subject properties on April 13, 1981.

Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration from the above order. Respondent trial judge reset the hearing on petitioners' motion for reconsideration to
April 6, 1981, and moved the scheduled public sale to April 14, 1981.

Without awaiting resolution of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the present petition for certiorari, alleging that the respondent trial judge
acted without jurisdiction, or in grave abuse of its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing his order dated March 16, 1981 which denied
petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares and which, peremptorily ordered the public sale of the subject
properties. On April 8, 1981, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of the subject properties at public auction.

With the comment and reply, the Court considered the issues joined and the case submitted for decision.

The Court finds no merit in the present petition.

The attack on the validity of respondent trial judge's order dated March 16, 1981 is ultimately premised on petitioners' claim that they had a pre-emptive right
to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of their co-owners, private respondents herein, at a "reasonable price". It is this same claim which forms the basis of their
complaint for injunction and damages filed against private respondents in the court a quo.

This claim is patently without basis. In this jurisdiction, the legal provisions on co-ownership do not grant to any of the owners of a property held in common a
pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners' reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is misplaced. Article 1620
provides:

A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of
the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the
thing owned in common [Emphasis supplied].

Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right of "legal
redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem is invoked only after the shares of the other co-owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the co-ownership [See
Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31 (1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and damages against private
respondents, no sale of the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had yet been made. Thus, Article 1620 of the New Civil Code finds no application to the
case at bar.

There is likewise no merit to petitioners' contention that private respondents had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of petitioners to purchase their shares
at a "reasonable price". Although it appears that private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer was made at a fixed
rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-trial Order dated July 9, 1980, Annex "C" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that private respondents
had agreed, without qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners. Hence, petitioners cannot insist on a right to purchase the shares at a price lower than the
selling price of private respondents.

Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin private respondents from alienating their pro-indiviso shares to a third party. The rights of a co-owner of a
property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the New Civil Code, thus:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign
or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation of the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

The law does not prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. The law merely provides that the
alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the portion of the property which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership [See Mercado v.
Liwanag, G.R. No. L-14429, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 472; PNB v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207; Go Ong v. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75884, September 24, 1987, 154 SCRA 270,] and, as earlier discussed, that the remaining co-owners have the right to
redeem, within a specified period, the shares which may have been sold to the third party. [Articles 1620 and 1623 of the New Civil Code.]

Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion when he denied petitioners' claim of a pre-
emptive right to purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares.

Moreover, there is no legal infirmity tainting respondent trial judge's order for the holding of a public sale of the subject properties pursuant to the provisions
of Article 498 of the New Civil Code. After a careful examination of the proceedings before respondent trial judge, the Court finds that respondent trial judge's
order was issued in accordance with the laws pertaining to the legal or juridical dissolution of co-ownerships.

It must be noted that private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim prayed for, inter alia, the partition of the subject properties in the event that the
petitioners refused to purchase their pro-indiviso shares at the rate of P12.50 per square meter. Unlike petitioners' claim of a pre-emptive right to purchase
the other co-owners' pro-indiviso shares, private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties is recognized by law, specifically Article
494 of the New Civil Code which lays down the general rule that no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Article 494 reads as follows:

No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.Neither shall there be partition
when it is prohibited by law.No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.

None of the legal exceptions under Article 494 applies to the case at bar. Private respondents' counterclaim for the partition of the subject properties was
therefore entirely proper. However, during the pre-trial proceedings, petitioners adopted the position that the subject properties were incapable of physical
partition. Initially, private respondents disputed this position. But after petitioners inexplicably refused to abide by the pretrial order issued by respondent trial
judge, and stubbornly insisted on exercising an alleged pre-emptive right to purchase private respondents' shares at a "reasonable price", private respondents
relented and adopted petitioner's position that the partition of the subject properties was not economically feasible, and, consequently, invoked the provisions
of Article 498 of the New Civil Code [Private respondents' "Motion To Allot Properties To Defendants Or To Sell the Same Pursuant To Article 498 Of The Civil
Code", Annex "D" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 46-49].

Inasmuch as the parties were in agreement as regards the fact that the subject properties should not be partitioned, and private respondents continued to
manifest their desire to terminate the co-ownership arrangement between petitioners and themselves, respondent trial judge acted within his jurisdiction
when he issued his order dated February 4, 1981 requiring the parties to answer certain questions for the purpose of determining whether or not the legal
conditions for the applicability of Article 498 of the New Civil Code were present in the case.

Art. 498 provides that:

Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be alloted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds distributed.

The sale of the property held in common referred to in the above article is resorted to when (1) the right to partition the property among the co-owners is
invoked by any of them but because of the nature of the property, it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision [See Article 495 of the New Civil Code] would
prejudice the interests of the co-owners (See Section 5 of Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court) and (2) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among
them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon reimbursement of the shares of the other co-owners.

Petitioners herein did not have justifiable grounds to ignore the queries posed by respondent trial judge and to insist that hearings be conducted in order to
ascertain the reasonable price at which they could purchase private respondents' pro-indiviso shares [Petitioners' "Compliance and Motion" dated February
27, 1981, Annex "H" of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 57-60].

Since at this point in the case it became reasonably evident to respondent trial judge that the parties could not agree on who among them would be allotted
the subject properties, the Court finds that respondent trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the holding of a public sale for the
subject properties (with the opening bid pegged at P12.50 per square meter), and the distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co-owners, as provided
under Article 498 of the New Civil Code.

Contrary to petitioners' contention, there was no need for further hearings in the case because it is apparent from the various allegations and admissions of
the parties made during the pre-trial proceedings, and in their respective pleadings, that the legal requisites for the application of Article 498 of the New Civil
Code were present in the case. No factual issues remained to be litigated upon.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED. SO ORDERED.

ESPERANZA FABIAN, BENITA FABIAN and DAMASO PAPA Y FABIAN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. SILBINA FABIAN, FELICIANO LANDRITO, TEODORA FABIAN and
FRANCISCO DEL MONTE, defendants-appellees.

Before us is the appeal taken by Esperanza Fabian, Benita I Fabian and Damaso Papa y Fabian from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
which dismissed their complaint for reconveyance, in civil case 295-R, filed against the defendants spouses Silbina Fabian and Feliciano Landrito and Teodora
Fabian and Francisco del Monte, upon the ground that the latter had acquired a valid and complete title to the land in question by acquisitive prescription.
 This case traces its origin way back to January 1, 1909 when Pablo Fabian bought from the Philippine Government lot 164 of the Friar Lands Estate in
Muntinlupa, Rizal, of an area 1 hectare, 42 ares and 80 centares, for the sum of P112 payable in installments. By virtue of this purchase, he was issued sale
certificate 547. He died on August 2, 1928, survived by four children, namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II, 1 and Silbina.

On October 5, 1928 Silbina Fabian and Teodora Fabian, niece of the deceased, executed an affidavit, reciting, among other things,

Que el finado Pablo Fabian, no dejo ningun otro heredero sino los declarantes, con derecho a heredar el lote No. 164 de la hacienda Muntinlupa, relicto
por dicho finado Pablo Fabian y para la aprobacion de traspaso a nosotros el referido lote No. 164, prestamos esta declaracion para todos los efectos que
pueden covenir a la Oficina de Terenos a defender por nuestro mayor derecho de heredar dicho lote contra las reclamaciones juntas de quien las presentare.

On the strength of this affidavit, sale certificate 547 was assigned to them. On November 14, 1928 the acting Director of Lands, on behalf of the
Government, sold lot 164, under deed 17272, to Silbina Fabian, married to Feliciano Landrito, and to Teodora Fabian, married to Francisco del Monte, for the
sum of P120. The vendees spouses forthwith in 1929 took physical possession thereof, cultivated it, and appropriated the produce therefrom (and concededly
have up to the present been appropriating the fruits from the land exclusively for themselves). In that same year, they declared the lot in their names for
taxation purposes under tax declaration 3374. This tax declaration was later cancelled, and in lieu thereof two tax declarations (2418 and 2419) were issued
in favor of Teodora Fabian and Silbina Fabian, respectively. Since 1929 up to the present, they have been paying the real estate taxes thereon. In 1937 the
Register of Deeds of Rizal issued TCT 33203 over lot 164 in their names. And on May 4, 1945, they subdivided the lot into two equal parts; TCT 33203 was
then cancelled and TCT 38095 was issued over lot 164-A in the name of Silbina Fabian, married to Feliciano Landrito, and 38096 was issued over lot 164-B in
the name of Teodora Fabian, married to Francisco del Monte.

On July 18, 1960 the plaintiffs filed the present action for reconveyance against the defendants spouses, averring that Silbina and Teodora, through
fraud perpetrated in their affidavit aforesaid, made it appear that "el finado Pablo Fabian no dejo ningun otro heredero sino los declarantes con derecho a
heredar el lote No. 164 de la hacienda de Muntinlupa", which is a false narration of facts because Silbina knew that she is not the only daughter and heir of
the deceased Pablo Fabian, and Teodora likewise knew all along that, as a mere niece of the deceased, she was precluded from inheriting from him in the
presence of his four surviving daughters; that by virtue of this affidavit, the said defendants succeeded in having sale certificate 547 assigned to them and
thereafter in having lot 164 covered by said certificate transferred in their names; and that by virtue also of these assignment and transfer, the defendants
succeeded fraudulently in having lot 164 registered in their names under TCT 33203. They further allege that the land has not been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value. A reconveyance thereof is prayed for, aside from P3,000 attorney's fees and costs.

In their answer of August 31, 1960, 2 the defendants spouses claim that Pablo Fabian was not the owner of lot 164 at the time of his death on August 2,
1928 because he had not paid in full the amortizations on the lot; that they are the absolute owners thereof, having purchased it from the Government for the
sum of P120, and from that year having exercised all the attributes of ownership thereof up to the present; and that the present action for reconveyance has
already prescribed. The dismissal of the complaint is prayed for.

On the basis of a partial stipulation of facts together with annexes, the lower court rendered judgment on June 28, 1962, declaring that the defendants
spouses had acquired a valid and complete title to the property by acquisitive prescription, and accordingly dismissed the complaint, with costs against the
plaintiffs. The latter's motion for reconsideration was thereafter denied.

Hence, the present recourse.

The three resulting issues of law tendered for resolution in this appeal, by the formulation of the parties are: (1) Was Pablo Fabian the owner of lot 164
at the time of his death, in the face of the fact, admitted by the defendants-appellees, that he had not then paid the entire purchase price thereof? (2) May
laches constitute a bar to an action to enforce a constructive trust? (3) Has title to the land vested in the appellees through the mode of acquisitive
prescription?
 1. Lot 164 was a part of the Friar Lands Estate of Muntinlupa, Rizal; its sale to Pablo Fabian was therefore governed by Act 1120, otherwise known as
the Friar Lands Act. While under section 15 of the said Act, title to the land sold is reserved to the Government until the purchaser makes full payment of all
the required installments and the interest thereon, this legal reservation refers.

to the bare, naked title. The equitable and beneficial title really went to the purchaser the moment he paid the first installment and was given a
certificate of sale. The reservation of the title in favor of the Government is made merely to protect the interest of the Government so as to preclude or
prevent the purchaser from encumbering or disposing of the lot purchased before the payment in full of the purchase price. Outside of this protection the
Government retains no right as an owner. For instance, after issuance of the sales certificate and pending payment in full of the purchase price, the
Government may not sell the lot to another. It may not even encumber it. It may not occupy the land to use or cultivate; neither may it lease it or even
participate or share in its fruits. In other words, the Government does not and cannot exercise the rights and prerogatives of owner. And when said purchaser
finally pays the final installment on the purchase price and is given a deed of conveyance and a certificate of title, the title at least in equity, retroacts to the
time he first occupied the land, paid the first installment and was issued the corresponding certificate of sale. In other words, pending the completion of the
payment of the purchase price, the purchaser is entitled to all the benefits and advantages which may accrue to the land as well as suffer the losses that may
befall it. 3

That Pablo Fabian had paid five annual installments to the Government, and in fact been issued sale certificate 547 in his name, are conceded. He was
therefore the owner of lot 164 at the time of his death. He left four daughters, namely, Esperanza, Benita I, Benita II and Silbina to whom all his rights and
interest over lot 164 passed upon his demise.

In case a holder of a certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall
descend and deed shall issue to the person who under the laws of the Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before the death of the
holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the certificate. 4

The assignment and sale of the lot to the defendants. Silbina and Teodora were therefore null and void as to that portion sold to Teodora, and as well as
to that portion which lawfully devolved in favor of the appellants. To the extent of the participation of the appellants, application must be made of the
principle that if property is acquired through fraud, the person obtaining it is considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom
the property comes (Gayondato vs. Insular Treasurer, 49 Phil. 244).

2. In Diaz, et al. vs. Gorricho, et al., 103 Phil. 264-265 (1958), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared in no uncertain terms that
laches may bar an action brought to enforce a constructive trust such as the one in the case at bar. Illuminating are the following excerpts from the decision
penned by Mr. Justice Reyes:

Article 1456 of the new Civil Code, while not retroactive in character, merely expresses a rule already recognized by our courts prior to the Code's
promulgation (see Gayondato vs. Insular Treasurer, 49 Phil. 244). Appellants are, however, in error in believing that like express trust, such constructive trusts
may not be barred by lapse of time. The American law on trusts has always maintained a distinction between express trusts created by the intention of the
parties, and the implied or constructive trusts that are exclusively created by law, the latter not being trusts in their technical sense (Gayondato vs. Insular
Treasurer, supra). The express trusts disable the trustee from acquiring for his own benefit the property committed to his management or custody, at least
while he does not openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation known to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this reason, the old Code of Civil
Procedure (Act 190) declared that the rules on adverse possession does not apply to "continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated) trusts.

But in constructive trusts, . . . the rule is that laches constitutes a bar to actions to enforce the trust, and repudiation is not required, unless there is a
concealment of the facts giving rise to the trust (54 Am. Jur., secs. 580, 581; 65 C.J., secs. 956, 957; Amer. Law Institute, Restatement of Trusts, section 219;
on Restitution, section 179; Stianson vs. Stianson 6 ALR 287; Claridad vs. Benares, 97 Phil. 973.
 The assignment of sale certificate 547 was effected on October 5, 1928; and the actual transfer of lot 164 was made on the following November 14. It
was only on July 8, 1960, 32 big years later, that the appellants for the first time came forward with their claim to the land. The record does not reveal, and it
is not seriously asserted, that the appellees concealed the facts giving rise to the trust. Upon the contrary, paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts of the
parties states with striking clarity "that defendants herein have been in possession of the land in question since 1928 up to the present publicly and
continuously under claim of ownership; they have cultivated it, harvested and appropriated the fruits for themselves." (emphasis supplied.)

3. Six years later, in Gerona, et al. vs. De Guzman, et al., L-19060, May 29, 1964, the factual setting attending which is substantially similar to that
obtaining in the case at bar, this Court, in an excellently-phrased decision penned by Chief Justice, then Associate Justice, Roberto Concepcion, unequivocally
reaffirmed the rule, overruling previous decisions to the contrary, that "an action for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trust,
resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations," and further that "the action therefor may be filed within four years from the discovery of the
fraud," the discovery in that case being deemed to have taken place when new certificates of title were issued exclusively in the names of the respondents
therein. The following is what Justice Concepcion, speaking for the Court, said:

[A]lthough, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the
property in question under an adverse title (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the
moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos v. Ramos, 45 Phil., 362; Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil., 857; Castro v. Echarri,
20 Phil., 23).

When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de
Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and
consequently, set up a title adverse to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that the
same is tainted with fraud.

Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v. Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959;
Marabiles v. Quito, L-10408, October 18, 1956 and Sevilla v. De los Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action
for reconveyance of real property based upon a constructive or implied trusts, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of limitations (Candelaria vs.
Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28, 1962).

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud in the execution thereof, the
action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place, in the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title in the
name of the respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement constitutes constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v.
Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v.
Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964). (Emphasis supplied.)

Upon the undisputed facts in the case at bar, not only had laches set in when the appellants instituted their action for, reconveyance in 1960, but as
well their right to enforce the constructive trust had already prescribed. 5

It logically follows from the above disquisition that acquisitive prescription has likewise operated to vest absolute title in the appellees, pursuant to the
provisions of section 41 of Act 190 that

Ten years actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land, uninterruptedly continued for
ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, 6shall vest in every actual
occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title. . . . (Emphasis ours.)
 The stringent mandate of said section 41 that "the possession by the claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must have been
actual, open, public, continuous under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants," was adjudged by the lower court as
having been fulfilled in the case at hand. And we agree. Although paragraph 13 of the stipulation of facts hereinbefore adverted to does not explicitly employ
the word "adverse" to characterize the possession of the defendants from 1928 up to the filing of the complaint in 1960, the words, "defendants have been in
possession of the land since 1928 up to the present [1960] publicly and continuously under claim of ownership; they have cultivated it, harvested and
appropriated the fruits for themselves," clearly delineate, and can have no other logical meaning than, the adverse character of the possession exercised by
the appellees over the land. If the import of the abovequoted portion of the stipulation of facts is at all doubted, such doubt is dispelled completely by
additional cumulative facts in the record which are uncontroverted. Thus, the appellees declared the lot for taxation purposes in their names, and the
resulting tax declaration was later concelled and two tax declarations were issued in favor of Silbina Fabian and Teodora Fabian, respectively. They have been
paying the real estate taxes thereon from 1929 to the present. And in 1945 they subdivided the lot into two equal parts, and two transfer certificates of title
were issued separately in their names.

Upon the foregoing disquisition, we hold not only that the appellants' action to enforce the constructive trust created in their favor has prescribed, but
as well that a valid, full and complete title has vested in the appellees by acquisitive prescription.1äwphï1.ñët

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
CELESTINO BALUS, Petitioner, vs. SATURNINO BALUS and LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD, Respondents.

Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 31, 2005 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58041 which set aside the February 7, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4 in Civil Case No. 3263.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Herein petitioner and respondents are the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on September 6, 1978, while Rufo died on July
6, 1984.

On January 3, 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns, as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte (Bank).
The said property was originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-439(788) and more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land with all the improvements thereon, containing an area of 3.0740 hectares, more or less, situated in the Barrio of Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan
City, and bounded as follows: Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 5122, Csd-292; along line 2-12, by Dodiongan River; along line 12-13 by Lot 4649,
Csd-292; and along line 12-1, by Lot 4661, Csd-292. x x x 2

Rufo failed to pay his loan. As a result, the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction
held for that purpose. On November 20, 1981, a Certificate of Sale3 was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The property was not redeemed within
the period allowed by law. More than two years after the auction, or on January 25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale4 in the Bank's favor.
Thereafter, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank.

On October 10, 1989, herein petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate5 adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third
portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted
knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.

Three years after the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, herein respondents bought the subject property from the Bank. On October 12, 1992, a Deed
of Sale of Registered Land6 was executed by the Bank in favor of respondents. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-39,484(a.f.)7 was issued
in the name of respondents. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject lot.

On June 27, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint8 for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner, contending that they had already informed
petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them.
Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.

On February 7, 1997, the RTC rendered a Decision9 disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the plaintiffs to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the defendant, the one-third share of the property in
question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition, as follows:

A one-third portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-39,484 (a.f.), formerly Original Certificate of Title No. P-788, now in the name of Saturnino Balus and
Leonarda B. Vda. de Calunod, situated at Lagundang, Bunawan, Iligan City, bounded on the North by Lot 5122; East by shares of Saturnino Balus and
Leonarda Balus-Calunod; South by Lot 4649, Dodiongan River; West by Lot 4661, consisting of 10,246 square meters, including improvements thereon.
and dismissing all other claims of the parties.

The amount of P6,733.33 consigned by the defendant with the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered delivered to the plaintiffs, as purchase price of the one-third
portion of the land in question.

Plaintiffs are ordered to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.10

The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot from the Bank.

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, herein respondents filed an appeal with the CA.

On May 31, 2005, the CA promulgated the presently assailed Decision, reversing and setting aside the Decision of the RTC and ordering petitioner to
immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents. The CA ruled that when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership
was extinguished.

Hence, the instant petition raising a sole issue, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT CO-OWNERSHIP AMONG THE PETITIONER AND THE RESPONDENTS OVER THE PROPERTY PERSISTED/CONTINUED TO EXIST (EVEN AFTER
THE TRANSFER OF TITLE TO THE BANK) BY VIRTUE OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT PRIOR TO THE REPURCHASE THEREOF BY THE RESPONDENTS; THUS,
WARRANTING THE PETITIONER'S ACT OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT BY REIMBURSING THE RESPONDENTS OF HIS (PETITIONER'S) JUST SHARE OF THE
REPURCHASE PRICE.11

The main issue raised by petitioner is whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted even after the lot was purchased by
the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the Bank.

Petitioner insists that despite respondents' full knowledge of the fact that the title over the disputed property was already in the name of the Bank, they still
proceeded to execute the subject Extrajudicial Settlement, having in mind the intention of purchasing back the property together with petitioner and of
continuing their co-ownership thereof.

Petitioner posits that the subject Extrajudicial Settlement is, in and by itself, a contract between him and respondents, because it contains a provision whereby
the parties agreed to continue their co-ownership of the subject property by "redeeming" or "repurchasing" the same from the Bank. This agreement,
petitioner contends, is the law between the parties and, as such, binds the respondents. As a result, petitioner asserts that respondents' act of buying the
disputed property from the Bank without notifying him inures to his benefit as to give him the right to claim his rightful portion of the property, comprising 1/3
thereof, by reimbursing respondents the equivalent 1/3 of the sum they paid to the Bank.

The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioner and respondents are arguing on the wrong premise that, at the time of the execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement, the subject property formed
part of the estate of their deceased father to which they may lay claim as his heirs.

At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that the subject property was exclusively owned by petitioner and
respondents' father, Rufo, at the time that it was mortgaged in 1979. This was stipulated by the parties during the hearing conducted by the trial court on
October 28, 1996.12 Evidence shows that a Definite Deed of Sale13 was issued in favor of the Bank on January 25, 1984, after the period of redemption
expired. There is neither any dispute that a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Hence, there is no question that the
Bank acquired exclusive ownership of the contested lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.14 In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.15 In
the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land
no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their
father.

Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became co-owners of the subject lot. Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right
of petitioner as co-owner of the contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the disputed lot did not pass into the hands of
petitioner and respondents as compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds a necessity for a complete determination of the issues raised in the instant case to look into petitioner's
argument that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an independent contract which gives him the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot
bought by respondents.1avvphi1

It is true that under Article 1315 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, contracts are perfected by mere consent; and from that moment, the parties are bound
not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
good faith, usage and law.

Article 1306 of the same Code also provides that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.

In the present case, however, there is nothing in the subject Extrajudicial Settlement to indicate any express stipulation for petitioner and respondents to
continue with their supposed co-ownership of the contested lot.

On the contrary, a plain reading of the provisions of the Extrajudicial Settlement would not, in any way, support petitioner's contention that it was his and his
sibling's intention to buy the subject property from the Bank and continue what they believed to be co-ownership thereof. It is a cardinal rule in the
interpretation of contracts that the intention of the parties shall be accorded primordial consideration.16 It is the duty of the courts to place a practical and
realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and the purpose which it is intended to serve.17 Such intention
is determined from the express terms of their agreement, as well as their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.18 Absurd and illogical interpretations
should also be avoided.19

For petitioner to claim that the Extrajudicial Settlement is an agreement between him and his siblings to continue what they thought was their ownership of
the subject property, even after the same had been bought by the Bank, is stretching the interpretation of the said Extrajudicial Settlement too far.

In the first place, as earlier discussed, there is no co-ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the estate
of their deceased father.

Moreover, petitioner's asseveration of his and respondents' intention of continuing with their supposed co-ownership is negated by no less than his assertions
in the present petition that on several occasions he had the chance to purchase the subject property back, but he refused to do so. In fact, he claims that after
the Bank acquired the disputed lot, it offered to re-sell the same to him but he ignored such offer. How then can petitioner now claim that it was also his
intention to purchase the subject property from the Bank, when he admitted that he refused the Bank's offer to re-sell the subject property to him?

In addition, it appears from the recitals in the Extrajudicial Settlement that, at the time of the execution thereof, the parties were not yet aware that the
subject property was already exclusively owned by the Bank. Nonetheless, the lack of knowledge on the part of petitioner and respondents that the mortgage
was already foreclosed and title to the property was already transferred to the Bank does not give them the right or the authority to unilaterally declare
themselves as co-owners of the disputed property; otherwise, the disposition of the case would be made to depend on the belief and conviction of the party-
litigants and not on the evidence adduced and the law and jurisprudence applicable thereto.

Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the
provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by
assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them a sole estate in a specific
property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other.20 In other words, the purpose of partition is to put
an end to co-ownership,21 an objective which negates petitioner's claims in the present case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated May 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CV No. 58041, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO., petitioner, vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL, respondent.

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen
Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-
101473/T-510 covering the purchased lot was canceled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 1562831 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name
of Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual.

In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23533. After trial,
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94 in Quezon City rendered, on July 31, 1995, a Decision ,2 declaring the marriage of Nicholson and Florencia null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the
ex-spouses’ conjugal partnership of gains. Subsequent events saw the couple going their separate ways without liquidating their conjugal partnership.

On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including
one involving the lot covered by TCT No. 156283. Among the documents Florencia submitted to procure the loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a photocopy
of the marriage-nullifying RTC decision, and a document denominated as "Waiver" that Nicholson purportedly executed on April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in
favor of Florencia, covered the conjugal properties of the ex-spouses listed therein, but did not incidentally include the lot in question.

Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, on November 29, 1999, initiated foreclosure
proceedings under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Office of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently, Metrobank caused the publication of the
notice of sale on three issues of Remate.3 At the auction sale on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the highest bidder.

Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage
of the disputed property, docketed as Civil Case No. 00-789 and eventually raffled to Branch 65 of the court. In it, Nicholson alleged that the property, which is
still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent.

Metrobank, in its Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim,4 alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia’s name, was paraphernal. Metrobank
also asserted having approved the mortgage in good faith.

Florencia did not file an answer within the reglementary period and, hence, was subsequently declared in default.
The RTC Declared the REM Invalid

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered, on September 24, 2001, judgment finding for Nicholson. The fallo reads:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment declaring the real estate mortgage on the property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the Registry of
Deeds for the City of Makati as well as all proceedings thereon null and void.

The Court further orders defendants [Metrobank and Florencia] jointly and severally to pay plaintiff [Nicholson]:

1. PhP100,000.00 by way of moral damages;

2. PhP75,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and

3. The costs.

SO ORDERED.

Even as it declared the invalidity of the mortgage, the trial court found the said lot to be conjugal, the same having been acquired during the existence of the
marriage of Nicholson and Florencia. In so ruling, the RTC invoked Art. 116 of the Family Code, providing that "all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved." To the trial court, Metrobank had not overcome the presumptive conjugal nature of the lot. And being conjugal, the RTC concluded that
the disputed property may not be validly encumbered by Florencia without Nicholson’s consent.

The RTC also found the deed of waiver Florencia submitted to Metrobank to be fatally defective. For let alone the fact that Nicholson denied executing the
same and that the signature of the notarizing officer was a forgery, the waiver document was allegedly executed on April 9, 1995 or a little over three months
before the issuance of the RTC decision declaring the nullity of marriage between Nicholson and Florencia.

The trial court also declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith on account of negligence, stating the observation that certain data appeared in the
supporting contract documents, which, if properly scrutinized, would have put the bank on guard against approving the mortgage. Among the data referred to
was the date of execution of the deed of waiver.

The RTC dismissed Metrobank’s counterclaim and cross-claim against the ex-spouses.

Metrobank’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Undeterred, Metrobank appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
74874.

The CA Affirmed with Modification the RTC’s Decision

On January 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision affirmatory of that of the RTC, except for the award therein of moral damages and attorney’s fees which the
CA ordered deleted. The dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION with respect to the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees which is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
Like the RTC earlier held, the CA ruled that Metrobank failed to overthrow the presumption established in Art. 116 of the Family Code. And also decreed as
going against Metrobank was Florencia’s failure to comply with the prescriptions of the succeeding Art. 124 of the Code on the disposition of conjugal
partnership property. Art. 124 states:

Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy x x x.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume
sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer
on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

As to the deletion of the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees, the CA, in gist, held that Metrobank did not enter into the mortgage contract out of ill-
will or for some fraudulent purpose, moral obliquity, or like dishonest considerations as to justify damages.

Metrobank moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA.

Thus, Metrobank filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, raising the following issues for consideration:

a. Whether or not the [CA] erred in declaring subject property as conjugal by applying Article 116 of the Family Code.

b. Whether or not the [CA] erred in not holding that the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga
ipso facto dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses.

c. Whether or not the [CA] erred in ruling that the petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value.7

Our Ruling

A modification of the CA’s Decision is in order.

The Disputed Property is Conjugal

It is Metrobank’s threshold posture that Art. 160 of the Civil Code providing that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," applies. To Metrobank, Art. 116 of the Family Code could not be of
governing application inasmuch as Nicholson and Florencia contracted marriage before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Citing
Manongsong v. Estimo,8 Metrobank asserts that the presumption of conjugal ownership under Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Metrobank adds, however, that for the presumption of conjugal ownership to operate, evidence must be adduced
to prove that not only was the property acquired during the marriage but that conjugal funds were used for the acquisition, a burden Nicholson allegedly failed
to discharge.

To bolster its thesis on the paraphernal nature of the disputed property, Metrobank cites Francisco v. Court of Appeals9 and Jocson v. Court of Appeals,10
among other cases, where this Court held that a property registered in the name of a certain person with a description of being married is no proof that the
property was acquired during the spouses’ marriage.
On the other hand, Nicholson, banking on De Leon v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation11 and Wong v. IAC,12 contends that Metrobank failed to overcome
the legal presumption that the disputed property is conjugal. He asserts that Metrobank’s arguments on the matter of presumption are misleading as only one
postulate needs to be shown for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to arise, that is, the fact of acquisition during marriage. Nicholson dismisses,
as inapplicable, Francisco and Jocson, noting that they are relevant only when there is no indication as to the exact date of acquisition of the property alleged
to be conjugal.

As a final point, Nicholson invites attention to the fact that Metrobank had virtually recognized the conjugal nature of the property in at least three instances.
The first was when the bank lumped him with Florencia in Civil Case No. 00-789 as co-mortgagors and when they were referred to as "spouses" in the petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. Then came the published notice of foreclosure sale where Nicholson was again designated as co-mortgagor. And
third, in its demand-letter13 to vacate the disputed lot, Metrobank addressed Nicholson and Florencia as "spouses," albeit the finality of the decree of nullity
of marriage between them had long set in.

We find for Nicholson.

First, while Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property
was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a
showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Contrary to Metrobank’s submission, the Court did not, in Manongsong,14 add
the matter of the use of conjugal funds as an essential requirement for the presumption of conjugal ownership to arise. Nicholson is correct in pointing out
that only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. Indeed, if proof on the use of conjugal is
still required as a necessary condition before the presumption can arise, then the legal presumption set forth in the law would veritably be a superfluity. As we
stressed in Castro v. Miat:

Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear.15 (Emphasis supplied.)

Second, Francisco and Jocson do not reinforce Metrobank’s theory. Metrobank would thrust on the Court, invoking the two cases, the argument that the
registration of the property in the name of "Florencia Nevalga, married to Nelson Pascual" operates to describe only the marital status of the title holder, but
not as proof that the property was acquired during the existence of the marriage.

Metrobank is wrong. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the
presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The correct lesson of Francisco and Jocson is that proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition
sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the
spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.16

The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of Nicholson’s arguments regarding Metrobank having implicitly acknowledged, thus being in virtual estoppel to
question, the conjugal ownership of the disputed lot, the bank having named the former in the foreclosure proceedings below as either the spouse of Florencia
or her co-mortgagor. It is felt, however, that there is no compelling reason to delve into the matter of estoppel, the same having been raised only for the first
time in this petition. Besides, however Nicholson was designated below does not really change, one way or another, the classification of the lot in question.

Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership

Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the CA’s holding, Art. 129 of the Family Code is inapplicable. Art. 129 in part reads:
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:

xxxx

(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as
provided in this Code.

Apropos the aforequoted provision, Metrobank asserts that the waiver executed by Nicholson, effected as it were before the dissolution of the conjugal
property regime, vested on Florencia full ownership of all the properties acquired during the marriage.

Nicholson counters that the mere declaration of nullity of marriage, without more, does not automatically result in a regime of complete separation when it is
shown that there was no liquidation of the conjugal assets.

We again find for Nicholson.

While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the
properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership. This
conclusion holds true whether we apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of the conjugal partnership’s assets and liabilities which is generally
prospective in application, or Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to 185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains. For, the
relevant provisions of both Codes first require the liquidation of the conjugal properties before a regime of separation of property reigns.

In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that pending its liquidation following its dissolution, the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into an
implied ordinary co-ownership among the surviving spouse and the other heirs of the deceased.17

In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil Code shall govern the property relationship between the former spouses, where:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when
the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the
disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having
consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

The conclusion would have, however, been different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the courts a quo,
the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal partnership of gains
on July 31, 1995 bore his forged signature, not to mention that of the notarizing officer. A spurious deed of waiver does not transfer any right at all, albeit it
may become the root of a valid title in the hands of an innocent buyer for value.

Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank’s right, as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2 undivided
portion thereof heretofore pertaining in ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a portion of the lot in
question, Metrobank may ask for the partition of the lot and its property rights "shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to [the bank] in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership."18 This disposition is in line with the well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so––quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.19

In view of our resolution on the validity of the auction of the lot in favor of Metrobank, there is hardly a need to discuss at length whether or not Metrobank
was a mortgagee in good faith. Suffice it to state for the nonce that where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the general rule that a purchaser or
mortgagee of the land need not look beyond the four corners of the title is inapplicable.20 Unlike private individuals, it behooves banks to exercise greater
care and due diligence before entering into a mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of the property offered as security and the
validity of the mortgagor’s title must be standard and indispensable part of the bank’s operation.21 A bank that failed to observe due diligence cannot be
accorded the status of a bona fide mortgagee,22 as here.

But as found by the CA, however, Metrobank’s failure to comply with the due diligence requirement was not the result of a dishonest purpose, some moral
obliquity or breach of a known duty for some interest or ill-will that partakes of fraud that would justify damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the CA dated January 28, 2004, upholding with modification the Decision of the RTC,
Branch 65 in Makati City, in Civil Case No. 00-789, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the REM over the lot covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry
of Deeds of Makati City is hereby declared valid only insofar as the pro indiviso share of Florencia thereon is concerned.

As modified, the Decision of the RTC shall read:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and all proceedings
thereon are NULL and VOID with respect to the undivided 1/2 portion of the disputed property owned by Nicholson, but VALID with respect to the other
undivided 1/2 portion belonging to Florencia.

The claims of Nicholson for moral damages and attorney’s fees are DENIED for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.