ADB Technical Assistance Consultant's Report For PAK ARE

Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report
Project Number: 34339-02 (TA 4881)

April 2008
Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Renewable Energy

Policy Formulation and Capacity Development of the
Alternative Energy Development Board
Prepared by Hagler Bailly Pakistan and Mercados EMI, Spain
For Alternative Energy Development Board

Islamic Republic of Pakistan
This consultant’s report does not necessarily reflect the views of ADB or the Government concerned, and
ADB and the Government cannot be held liable for its contents. (For project preparatory technical
assistance: All the views expressed herein may not be incorporated into the proposed project’s design.
Hagler Bailly Pakistan
Associated with PA Consulting Group Technical, Management, and Economic Counsel
Ref: L9164PRP April 3, 2009
Mr Arif Alauddin
Chief Executive Officer
Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB)
3, Street 8, F 8/3
Islamabad 44000
Subject: ADB TA 4881-PAK: Final Project Reports
Dear Mr Alauddin,
It gives us great pleasure to submit the final reports for ‘ADB TA 4881-PAK: Renewable
Energy Policy Formulation and Capacity Building of AEDB’, for which Hagler Bailly
Pakistan and Mercados EMI, Spain were engaged by the Asian Development Bank under
Contract No. S/70-128 on June 27, 2007.
As you are aware, the draft final reports were submitted on December 20, 2008, and an
extended review period was designated for receiving comments and feedback, which
concluded on February 28, 2008. We hope the final reports—two copies of which are
enclosed herewith in printed form as well as on a CD, which also contains the RES-E pricing
model developed for the study—will meet your requirements.
I would also like to take this opportunity to thank you for the keen interest and support
extended by AEDB for the completion of this important assignment, and hope that it will
prove to be beneficial for the effective development of the renewable energy sector in
Pakistan.
Sincerely,
Dr Jamil Masud
Director/NTL
Hagler Bailly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.

39, Street 3, E7, Islamabad 44000, Pakistan
Tel: (92 51) 261 0200-07, Fax: (92 51) 261 0208-09
mail@haglerbailly.com.pk, www.haglerbailly.com.pk
Encl.:
1. Formulation of Pakistan’s Renewable Energy Policy for On-grid and Off-grid Areas
(R9FR1PRP, dated March 11, 2009)
2. AEDB’s Capacity Assessment and Institutional Needs
(R9CA1PRP, dated March 11, 2009)
3. Pakistan RES-E Model (ver. 1)
cc:
1. Dr Parvez Butt, Member (Energy), Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan,

Islamabad (1 printed copy, 1 CD)
2. Mr Sean O'Sullivan, Director, CWID, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Manila
(3 printed copies, 1 CD)
3. Mr Rune Stroem, Country Director, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Islamabad
(1 printed copy, 1 CD)
2
ADB TA 4881PAK:
Renewable Energy Policy Formulation and Capacity Development of AEDB
Final Report
Formulation of Pakistan’s
Renewable Energy Policy
for Ongrid and Offgrid Areas
and
Mercados EMI, Spain

Asian Development Bank
Manila

Final Report
Formulation of Pakistan’s
Renewable Energy Policy
for Ongrid and Offgrid Areas
Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................... iii
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
2 Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term On‐Grid RES‐E Policy ..................................... 4
2.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 4
2.2 Extension of RE Short‐term Policy ......................................................................... 5
2.3 Medium Term RES‐E Policy Highlights ................................................................... 5
2.3.1 Target Markets .......................................................................................... 5
2.3.2 Implementation Period ............................................................................. 6
2.3.3 Consistency Across Policies ....................................................................... 6
2.3.4 Tariff Incentives ......................................................................................... 6
2.3.4.1 Selected Approach .................................................................... 6
2.3.4.2 Structure of Tariffs .................................................................... 7
2.3.4.3 Indexation for Upfront Tariffs ................................................... 7
2.3.5 Type of Contracts ...................................................................................... 7
2.3.6 Allocation of Network Investment Costs ................................................... 7
2.3.7 Mandatory RE Power Purchasing .............................................................. 7
2.3.8 Direct Sales ................................................................................................ 7
2.3.9 Allocation of Carbon Credits...................................................................... 7
2.3.10 Land and Site Access .................................................................................. 8
2.3.11 Incentives Other Than Tariffs .................................................................... 8
2.3.12 Roles of Institutions ................................................................................... 8
2.3.13 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Consents ........................................... 8
2.3.14 Procedural Requirements .......................................................................... 8
3 Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term Off‐Grid RES‐E Policy .................................... 9
3.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 9
Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 i
Asian Development Bank Formulation of Pakistan’s Medium Term Renewable Energy Policy
TA 4881‐PAK: Final Report for On‐grid and Off‐grid Areas
3.2 Medium Term Off‐grid RE Policy Recommendations ............................................ 9
3.2.1 Target Markets .......................................................................................... 9
3.2.2 Implementation Period ........................................................................... 10
3.2.3 Rationale and Institutional Organization ................................................ 10
3.2.4 Targets and Incentives ............................................................................. 13
3.2.5 Project Funding ........................................................................................ 13
3.2.6 Pricing ...................................................................................................... 13
3.2.7 Incentives Other Than Tariffs .................................................................. 14
3.2.8 Roles of Institutions ................................................................................. 14
3.2.9 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents .......................................... 14
3.2.10 Performance Monitoring and Enforcement ............................................ 15
3.2.11 Allocation of Carbon Credits.................................................................... 15
Annex I: Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation in
Pakistan (2009‐2014) ................................................................................ 17
Annex II: AEDB Position Paper 1: Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term
On‐Grid RES‐E Policy ................................................................................. 57
Annex III: AEDB Position Paper 2: Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term
Off‐Grid RES‐E Policy ................................................................................ 67
Annex IV: Working Paper 1: Relevant International Experience in Incentives for
Renewable Energy: The Case of the EU‐25 and Selected Countries ........... 79
Annex V: Working Paper 2: Review of Pakistan’s Short‐term Policy for
Development of Renewable Energy ........................................................ 153
Annex VI: Working Paper 3: Pakistan’s Energy Sector: Market, Growth and
Supply Options ....................................................................................... 189
Annex VII: Working Paper 4: Study of Costs and Potential Penetration of
On‐grid RE under Different Policies ........................................................ 241
Annex VIII: Working Paper 5: Development of On‐grid RE in Pakistan:
Medium Term Policy Recommendations ................................................ 301
Annex IX: Working Paper 6: Medium‐term Off‐grid RES‐E Policy Assessment ......... 325

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 ii
Abbreviations and Acronyms
A Ampere
AC Alternating current
ACGR Average compound growth rate
ADB Asian Development Bank
AEDB Alternative Energy Development Board
Ah Ampere‐hour
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir
AKRSP Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
API American Petroleum Institute
APL Asia Pipelines Limited
ARL Attock Refinery Limited
bbl Barrel
Bcfd Billion cubic feet per day
BOI Board of Investment
BOO Build, own, and operate
BOO Build‐Own‐Operate
BP Basis point
BPL Basic poverty line
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China
BST Bulk supply tariff
Btu British thermal unit
C&F Carriage and freight
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
CapEx Capital Expenditures
CBO Community‐based organization
CCGT Combined cycle gas turbine
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CER Certified Emissions Reduction
cf Cubic feet
CFL Compact fluorescent lamp
CH4 Methane
CHASHNUPP Chashma Nuclear Power Plant
CHP Combined heat and power
cm2 Square centimeter
CNE Comisión Nacional de Energía
CNG Compressed natural gas

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 iii
CO2 Carbon dioxide
COD Commercial operations date
CP Contract price
CPI Consumer Price Index
CPPA Central Power Purchasing Agency
DC Direct current
DDGS Decentralized Distribution Generation Systems
DGG Directorate General, Gas
DGM Directorate General, Mineral
DGO Directorate General, Oil
DGPC Directorate General, Petroleum Concessions
DISCO Distribution company
DNA Designated national agency
DSM Demand‐side management
DVC Damodar Valley Corporation
E&P Exploration and production
E10 10% ethanol blended gasoline
EAC Electricity Authority of Cambodia
EAD Economic Affairs Division
ED Excise duty
EDB Engineering Development Board
EHV Extra high voltage
EIA Environmental impact assessment
ENERCON National Energy Conservation Centre
EPA Energy Purchase Agreement, or
Environmental Protection Agency
EPC Engineering, procurement, and construction
EPD Environmental Protection Department
EPE Energy Policy for Europe
ERTIC Programa de Electrificación Rural y Tecnologías de la Información y
Comunicación
EU European Union
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FBR Federal Board of Revenue
FEC Final energy consumption
FFV Flex‐fuel vehicle
FIT Feed‐in tariff
FO Furnace oil
FOB Freight on board

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 iv
FX Foreign exchange
FY Financial year
GDP Gross domestic product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GENCO Generation company
GES Growth environment score
GHG Greenhouse gas
GoP Government of Pakistan
GSA Gas Sales Agreement
GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH
GW Gigawatt
GWh Gigawatt‐hour
ha Hectare
HDIP Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan
HDR Hot dry rock
HEB Hydro Electric Board
HH Household
HOBC High octane blending compound
HSD High‐speed diesel
HSE Health, safety, and environment
HSFO high‐sulfur fuel oil
HV High voltage
I&P Irrigation and power
IA Implementation Agreement
ICT Islamabad Capital Territory, or
information and communication technology
IEE Initial Environmental Examination
IFEM Inland freight equalization margin
IFI International financial institution
IGCC Integrated gasification combined cycle
IIE Initial environmental examination
IPDS Irrigation & Power Department, Sindh
IPP Independent power producer
IREDA Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency
IRR Internal rate of return
ISCC Integrated Solar Combined Cycle
JP Jet propulsion
KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
kcal Thousand calories

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 v
KESC Karachi Electric Supply Corporation
kg Kilogram
kha Thousand hectares
km Kilometer
kT Thousand tonnes
kV Kilovolt
kVArh Kilovolt Ampere reactive‐hour
kW Kilowatt
kWe Kilowatt electrical
kWh Kilowatt‐hour
kWp Kilowatt peak
KWSB Karachi Water and Sewerage Board
lb Pound
LDO Light diesel oil
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate
LMM Locally manufactured machinery
LNG Liquefied natural gas
LoI Letter of Intent
LoS Letter of Support
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas
LRMC Long run marginal cost
m Meter
MC Marginal cost
MGCL Mari Gas Company Limited
MMscfd Million standard cubic feet per day
MMTPA Million tonnes per annum
MNES Ministry of Non‐Conventional Energy Sources
MoE Ministry of Environment
MoFR Ministry of Finance and Revenue
MOGAS Motor gasoline
MoPNR Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources
MoST Ministry of Science and Technology
MoWP Ministry of Water and Power
MPC Marginal private cost
MS Motor spirit
MSB Marginal social benefit

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 vi
MSC Marginal social cost, or
Medium‐Term Service Contracts
MSW Municipal solid waste
MT Metric tonne
MTDF Medium Term Development Framework
MTOE Million tonnes of oil equivalent
MW Megawatt
MWe Megawatt electrical
MWh Megawatt‐hour
NA Northern Areas, or
Not applicable/available
NAPWD Northern Areas Public Works Department
NARC National Agriculture Research Council
NEPRA National Electric Power Regulatory Authority
NGO Non‐governmental organization
NHA National Highway Authority
NOx Nitrous oxides
NPO National Productivity Organization
NREL US National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NRL National Refinery Limited
NTDC National Transmission and Dispatch Company
NTRC National Transport Research Centre
NWFP Northwest Frontier Province
O&M Operations and maintenance
OBA Output‐based aid
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OGDC Oil and Gas Development Corporation
OGEA Off‐grid Electrification Agency
OGEAC Off‐grid Electrification Account
OGRA Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority
OMC Oil marketing company
OpEx Operational expenditure
P&D Planning and Development
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
Pak EPA Pakistan Environment Protection Agency
PARC Pakistan Agriculture Research Council
PARCO PakArab Refinery Company
PASMA Pakistan Sugar Mills Association
PC Project Committee

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 vii
PCRET Pakistan Council for Renewable Energy Technologies
PCSIR Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
PCU Project Coordination Unit
PED Primary energy demand
PEPCO Pakistan Electric Power Company
PER Rural Electrification Program (Chile)
PHA Pakistan Housing Authority
PIAC Pakistan International Airlines Corporation
PIB Pakistan Investment Bonds
PIDC Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation
PLF Plant load factor
PMD Pakistan Meteorological Department
PNAC Pakistan National Accreditation Council
PNRA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
POE Panel of Experts
PPA Power Purchase Agreement
PPC Private Power Cell
PPDB Punjab Power Development Board
PPDCL Punjab Power Development Company Limited
PPEPCA Pakistan Petroleum Exploration and Production Companies Association
PPIB Private Power and Infrastructure Board
PPL Pakistan Petroleum Ltd.
PR Pakistan Railway
PRL Pakistan Refinery Limited
PROINFA Programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica
PSDP Public Sector Development Programme
PSO Pakistan State Oil Company
PSQA Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority
PTC Production tax credit
PV Photovoltaic
PWD Public Works Department
R&D Research and development
R&M Renovation and modernization
RE Renewable energy
REC Rural Electrification Companies
RED Renewable Energy Development
REDB Renewable Energy Distribution Backbone
REDSIP Renewable Energy Development Sector Investment Program

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 viii
REF Rural Electrification Fund
RES Renewable energy source
RES‐E Renewable energy sourced‐electricity
RET Renewable energy technology
RFP Request for proposals
RGGVY Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana
ROE Return‐on‐equity
RON Research octane number
RoR Run‐of‐river
RoW Right of Way
RPS Renewable portfolio standard
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
SC Self consumption
SCA Sindh Coal Authority
Scf Standard cubic feet
SEB State Electricity Board
SECP Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
SERC State Electricity Regulatory Commission
SHS Solar home system
SHYDO Sarhad Hydel Development Organization
SMEDA Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
SNGPL Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd.
SO2 Sulfur dioxide
SOx Oxides of sulfur
SRO Statutory regulatory ordinance
SS Small‐scale
SSGCL Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd.
SWERA Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment
T&D Transmission and distribution
TA Technical assistance
TCE Technical Control Entity
Tcf Trillion cubic feet
TPA Tonnes per annum
TRANSCO Transmission Company
TWh Terawatt‐hour
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
US United States

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 ix
VC Variable cost
VEI Village Electrification Infrastructure
W Watt
WACC Weighted average cost of capital
WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority
WHS Wind home system
WPI Wholesale Price Index
WTE Waste‐to‐energy
WTG Wind turbine generator
WTP Willingness‐to‐pay


R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 x

1 Introduction
Renewable energy development in Pakistan has been conceived under a phased,
evolutionary approach constituting a strategic policy implementation roadmap adopted
by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). The initial phase (i.e., the ‘short‐term‘) has
involved lenient policy measures and strong incentives in order to attract investment in
this relatively new business area, remove existing barriers to project implementation,
and ‘hand‐hold’ reasonable‐sized pioneering projects through to successful commercial
operation.1
The goal of this report, the final output under the Asian Development Bank (ADB) TA
4881‐PAK: Renewable Energy Policy Formulation and Capacity Development of AEDB, is
to help design a sound approach for the development of a medium‐term (i.e., five‐year)
RE policy for Pakistan that would succeed the current short‐term RE policy in 2009 and
help create a conducive environment for the growth of the domestic RE industry to at
least 2014, and upon which future policy directions could then be evolved.
In order to develop the new policy proposal, the TA consultants have completed the
following tasks:
• An assessment of key challenges, threats, and opportunities faced by RE and
related technologies in Pakistan. This assessment was carried out by analyzing
the potential of RE supply by comparison with alternative (conventional)
technologies.
• A review of the existing RE institutional framework in Pakistan, identifying the
current and future roles of all stakeholder institutions which could have an
important role or impact in RE promotion or regulation in the country.
• A critical review of past and present policies (especially the 2006 RE Policy),
strategies, and incentive mechanisms currently in place, and success in
promoting renewable energy development in Pakistan achieved thus far.
Where problems or bottlenecks were detected or envisaged in this regard,
possible solutions or actions to overcome these impediments were proposed.
• A medium term policy package of guidelines, regulations, and incentives for
grid‐connected2 RE power generation and sale from priority, feasible RE
technologies.
• Policy and action guidelines for the development and implementation of
dispersed RE use in standalone or isolated grid configurations, including
programmatic, sustainable rural RE energy supply schemes.

1
Under the GoP’s Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation, 2006, issued by the
Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB), hereinafter referred to as the 2006 RE Policy.
2
For the purposes of RE policy terminology, the term ‘grid’ is meant to imply either national or regional electricity
T&D networks operated by the NTDC/CPPA and/or DISCOs of 11 kV or higher voltage. Isolated, community‐based
local distribution networks are considered ‘off‐grid’.

R9FR1PRP ‐ FINAL REPORT: 11/03/09 1
• A set of comparative economic and pricing criteria for determining optimum RE
rates for grid‐connected applications, accounting for externalities and marginal
avoided costs of conventional alternatives.
• Determination of overall institutional arrangements at the federal, provincial,
and local levels required for the proper implementation of policy and regulatory
framework, with well‐defined capacity requirements, institutional roles, and
procedural arrangements that eliminate ambiguity, delays, and discretion faced
by investors and end‐users in routine RE application and operation.
This report is organized as follows:
• The main body of the report includes a short summary of the policy proposal
that was suggested by the consultants, discussed with stakeholders at a
national workshop, and presented in detail to the AEDB, which provided its
consent in the form of two position papers.
• Annex I comprises proposed text for a draft policy document, for consideration
and approval by the Government of Pakistan as its official medium‐term RE
policy statement.
• Annexes II and III contain the position papers issued by the AEDB, indicating its
consent to the proposed policy approach.
• Annex IV presents the consultants’ evaluation of the development (and
potential) of renewable energy resources in Europe and selected emerging
countries (China, India, and Brazil), focusing on current policy schemes for
promoting renewable energy sources, specifically for electricity generation. It
also contains an analysis of various incentive mechanisms and their impact on
the deployment of different RE technologies, with a special emphasis on widely
developed options, such as wind, hydro, biogas and biomass, which can operate
on a grid‐connected, commercial scale.
• Annex V presents the consultant’s evaluation of Pakistan’s current, short‐term
RE policy 2006 (applicable over 2007 to 2009) for the development of
renewable energy for on‐grid power generation, including a comprehensive
analysis of the incentive structure it creates and its performance regarding the
main RE sources it targets. The focus of the short‐term policy is on RE options
amenable to immediate commercial development, i.e., small hydro, wind, and
biomass‐based power generation. This phase is marked with beneficial risk‐
sharing and attractive tariffs for developers so as to enable a reasonable
generation capacity to be installed as ‘first‐of‐kind’ RE projects in the private
sector, that can then serve as successful business and technology‐assimilation
demonstrators.
• Annex VI presents an overview of Pakistan’s energy sector and its
organizational structure, prospects for its growth and anticipated constraints on
primary supplies, and possible future options and strategies that the country
may adopt in order to provide for the energy needs of a rapidly developing
economy. The purpose of this study is to provide estimates of anticipated

growth in the country’s energy demand, a comparative evaluation of different
conventional energy supply options available to it, and the circumstances under
which such needs can be met, especially in terms of electrical power.
• Annex VII presents an economic assessment of renewable energy deployment
options in Pakistan, in order to fine‐tune the tools required for the design of a
successful medium‐term RE policy for the country. More specifically, the
objective of this annex is two‐fold: firstly, to evaluate the cost structures of
renewable energy sourced‐electricity (RES‐E) in Pakistan, classifying different
renewable sources by the marginal cost of tapping them; secondly, to analyze
the social and private costs and the potential penetration of each type of RES‐E
under different policy environments. The model provided in this paper should
allow policy makers to move forward on a more sound analytical basis that
allows Pakistan to set feed‐in tariffs, based on avoided cost analysis, for on‐grid
RES‐E.
• Annex VIII presents the consultants’ draft proposal for the design of a medium
term policy for the development of on‐grid RES‐E in Pakistan. This proposal
takes into account the analyses presented in Annexes IV to VII, and has been
the basis for stakeholder discussions and development of the AEDB Position
Paper on medium term on‐grid RES‐E development.
• Annex IX presents the consultants’ assessment and proposal for the design of a
medium term policy framework for the development of off‐grid RES‐E in
Pakistan. This analysis takes into account some critical issues regarding off‐grid
renewable energy services, selected relevant international experience, and an
assessment of the overall costs implied in the ensuing policy recommendations.
This document presents general guidelines for formulating a detailed medium
term off‐grid RES‐E policy approach for Pakistan that has been the basis for
stakeholder discussions and development of the AEDB Position Paper on
medium term off‐grid RE development

2 Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term OnGrid RESE
Policy
2.1 Background
Our studies (see Annex VII) show that the economic penetration of on‐grid RE power in
Pakistan should be around 17 TWh per annum by 2020. This would be approximately 7%
of total grid‐based electrical power generation expected for that year. Almost 60% of
this future RE share would be comprised of hydel plants that are much cheaper than
conventional fossil fuel‐based generation. The fact that any capacity approaching this
share is not currently under development indicates that some strong barriers to RES‐E
investment may exist in the country, especially if we consider that the marginal cost of
RES‐E is about USD 75/MWh while the cost of generation based on FO is more than USD
125/MWh. There therefore appears to be a very strong economic signal favoring the
development of RE, and it can thus be concluded that some impediments are
responsible for the current lackluster state of RE deployment in the country.
A national on‐grid RES‐E policy should be based on a social assessment of costs and
benefits. The analysis of natural penetration based on private costs alone represents a
limited subset of such an analysis. Market failures appear hamper the development of
about 8 TWh per year of RE in 2020, and so an economic incentive mechanism needs to
be put in place (assuming that all other barriers will have been removed by then). Under
social cost assessment, hydel, biomass, biogas and wind energy plants are required to
generate, in order to replace CCGTs—as a matter of fact, all FO‐based generation would
need to be replaced, as well as around 15% of gas‐based generation, by 2020. If the
policy to achieve these results is properly defined and implemented, the social wealth
(total surplus) that may be created in Pakistan would be about USD 2.1 billion per year.
Several symptoms exist that indicate potential problems in achieving these RE
penetration goals unless policy elements are suitably adjusted (see Annex VI). One of
the critical issues is the existing dual mechanism offered by the regulator, NEPRA, for
setting tariffs for RES‐E projects in Pakistan. In terms of its formulation, the current tariff
system for unsolicited RE proposals is based on a ‘cost‐plus’ approach. The cost‐plus
computation requires a case‐by‐case determination of the applicable tariff for every
single producer. From the regulator’s point of view, the advantage of this methodology
is its ability to reduce infra‐marginal rents (i.e., producers’ surplus) down to zero and,
therefore, maximize the consumers’ surplus. Nevertheless, this approach presents
several major shortcomings, which can be summarized as follows:
• Investors, taking advantage of asymmetries in project‐related information

access, can ‘game’ against the mechanism to enhance their infra‐marginal
rents.
• It decreases the financial incentive to invest in RES‐E technologies, as
developers are explicitly deprived of most of the infra‐marginal rents (the
previous point notwithstanding).

• It increases in the administrative burden in processing projects and verifying
the cost structures in each case.
This approach has been adopted in Pakistan so far in order to help reduce the
developer’s risk, since it guarantees an ROE of at least 15%. While it is true that this
method reduces some of the risks to the developer, it is also true that it eliminates any
additional incentive to develop these types of projects and can make tariff negotiations
protracted and contentious—which appears exactly to have happened with respect to
the RE IPP experience in Pakistan so far.
Additionally, available international evidence shows that feed‐in (upfront) tariffs are
perhaps the most successful incentive mechanism for developing RE capacity.
International experience (see Annex IV) also shows that grid access, administrative
issues, and uncertainties with respect to the incentive mechanisms are as relevant as
tariffs as far as fostering RE capacity installation is concerned. Moreover, RE technology‐
wise feed‐in tariff would offer the most economical, ‘least‐cost’ power generation mix
for the country in the medium term and beyond, and would maximize the social surplus
created within society through the avoided costs of more expensive alternatives. Such
fixed, non‐negotiable tariffs would help circumvent the prolonged rate negotiations,
introduce an element of competition and urgency in project implementation, ensure
that all commercially feasible RE technologies are simultaneously developed, provide an
economically viable basis for the regulator to determine sustainable RE pricing, and help
prioritize available ‘least‐cost’ and ‘best‐site’ RE development on a fast track.
2.2 Extension of RE Shortterm Policy
This report recommends that the short‐term on‐grid 2006 RE Policy should be officially
extended to 2009 from its originally stipulated expiry date of June 31, 2008, as appears
de facto to be the case. This is required in order to allow projects that are presently at
an advanced processing stage to achieve financial closure under existing policy
stipulations, as well as to afford a reasonable timeframe for stakeholders to confer
about and familiarize themselves with the medium term policy approach proposed
herein.
2.3 Medium Term RESE Policy Highlights
2.3.1 Target Markets
The scope of this policy is grid‐connected power generation fueled by renewable
resources. ‘On‐grid RES‐E’ includes the following technologies, for individual installed
project capacity greater than 1 MW:
• Small hydro up to 50 MW
• PV and solar thermal energy for power generation
• Wind power generation
• Municipal solid WTE power
• Landfill methane recovery, and

• Bioenergy, resulting from anaerobic biogas digestors, pyrolytic biomass

gasification, co‐firing, cogeneration, etc.
2.3.2 Implementation Period
The medium term RES‐E policy should be applicable from 2009 to at least 2014, as we
recognize that incentives‐based policies require at a minimum five years of sustained
promotion in order to be successful; policy incentives must remain stable and assured
over a reasonably extended period in order for investor confidence to build up,
supportive institutional capacity to develop, and implementation bottlenecks to be
gradually and systematically removed.
2.3.3 Consistency Across Policies
An RES‐E project that achieves financial closure before the onset of the forthcoming
medium term policy phase should continue to be guaranteed all the incentives, terms,
and conditions defined in the presently applicable 2006 RE Policy over the tenure of its
respective PPA. This approach ensures the consistency and stability of an RE deployment
climate from the perspective of both investors and power purchasers, as well as other
relevant stakeholders.
2.3.4 Tariff Incentives
2.3.4.1 Selected Approach
Our proposal for determining bulk RE‐based power procurement tariffs is:
• Set upfront tariffs for each RES‐E technology based on the ‘avoided‐cost’ for
those technologies whose marginal cost is lower than the avoided social cost.
NEPRA will need to set technology‐wise feed‐in tariffs based on the
characteristics of the selected RES‐E technologies (‘supply curve analysis’),
bounded by the range obtained from the use of private and social avoided
costs. This means for small‐scale hydel, biomass, biogas, and wind, tariffs would
range between approximate USD 75‐100/MWh (see Annex VII).
• Set upfront tariffs for each technology based on the marginal cost of providing
the quota set by the GoP for those technologies whose marginal cost is higher
than avoided social cost. An upfront tariff is also proposed to foster the
deployment of any specific RE technology that promises additional benefits to
society; however, a good policy should prevent a reasonable, justifiable target
quota for them (defined in terms of installed MW) from being overshot.
• Discontinue the present system of negotiated RE power purchase tariffs.
• The competitive bidding alternative (i.e., tendering) must be kept as an option
for only those technologies whose marginal cost is higher than the avoided
social cost.

2.3.4.2 Structure of Tariffs
Upfront tariffs should be denominated in Pakistan Rupees/kWh. The upfront tariffs
should be based on a one‐part pricing approach (i.e., a single ‘energy charge’). Two‐part
tariffs (‘capacity payments’ plus ‘energy payments’) are difficult for most RES‐E
technologies, as most of them cannot guarantee capacity availability.
2.3.4.3 Indexation for Upfront Tariffs
Upfront tariffs must be adjusted based only on local currency variations. The indexation
of tariffs with the US dollar exchange rate should be automatic, carried out on a six‐
monthly basis. Another possibility presently is to use a reference currency basket
comprising of both US Dollars and Euros (e.g., in a 50:50 ratio).
2.3.5 Type of Contracts
RE IPP projects for sale of all power output to the grid system shall be implemented on
the basis of Build, Own and Operate (BOO) contracts valid for a period not less than
20 years.
2.3.6 Allocation of Network Investment Costs
The construction of transmission lines for evacuation of power from any RE IPP should
be the responsibility of the NTDC, KESC or a DISCO (depending on the location and
supply voltage of the project) if the length of the connection required from the project’s
outgoing bus bar to existing grid installations is shorter than 20 km, unless the IPP, of its
own choice, undertakes to install such infrastructure on a mutually agreed upon
transmission charge with the NTDC. The NTDC should bear all expenses associated with
power balancing on the grid to accommodate priority dispatch.
2.3.7 Mandatory RE Power Purchasing
As long as the CPPA exists and is carrying out its activities, all contracts for power
generation from RE should be signed by the CPPA—excepting ‘direct sales’. After the
CPPA eventually ceases its activities, neither distributors nor transmission companies
should have the right to reject, in part or in entirety, any contract signed previously
between the CPPA and an RE power generator. NEPRA should establish a future
methodology for compensating those DISCOs/TRANSCOs that are forced to accept
contracts at a stipulated RES‐E feed‐in tariff.
2.3.8 Direct Sales
RE power producers should be allowed to enter into direct (bilateral) sales contracts
with eligible end‐use customers. In this case, prices should not require approval by
NEPRA.
2.3.9 Allocation of Carbon Credits
RE investors should assume the entire risks and benefits of qualifying for and obtaining
CERs for their RES‐E projects. The current shared allocation of carbon credits under the
2006 RE Policy is unnecessarily complicated and was considered necessary under the
prevailing ‘cost‐plus’ tariff methodology. Additionally, the allocation of future CERs to

the RE developer would act as a stronger financial incentive, especially for those projects
where costs are closer to the fixed feed‐in tariffs and financial returns relatively lower.
2.3.10 Land and Site Access
The federal, provincial, and AJK governments shall facilitate investors in acquiring land
or RoW for project development, as well as in obtaining site access. However, the
primary responsibility for acquiring land and site access should rest with the project
sponsors.
2.3.11 Incentives Other Than Tariffs
We understand that current general incentives, including sovereign risk guarantee, the
financial regime, and the fiscal regime, as defined in the 2006 RE Policy, are adequate
and should be continued into the medium term policy regime as well.
2.3.12 Roles of Institutions
We do not recommend major changes in the roles that each key RE stakeholder
institution presently has defined for itself in Pakistan. However, some clarification of
AEDB and NEPRA roles may be to the benefit of the policy.
We strongly believe that the development of competent prefeasibility studies is critical
for the development of future RE projects in Pakistan. The cost and complexity of
undertaking such studies is currently a major barrier to serious investor interest in such
schemes, and therefore the AEDB and provincial governments must take a leading role
in identifying and developing such ‘bankable’ studies.
The proposal requires NEPRA to define feed‐in tariffs, as well as to approve the
application of them to specific RE projects, and to adjust grid and distribution codes in
order to facilitate project development and operation.
2.3.13 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Consents
We judge that the general existing institutional, legal, and regulatory consents required
prior to the approval and implementation of RE IPP projects need not be changed,
except for simplified permitting provisions for small‐scale plants (i.e., less than 5 MW
capacity).
2.3.14 Procedural Requirements
We believe that the processing schedule foreseen in the 2006 RE Policy is adequate.
However, it must be adjusted to the tariff regime that is instituted, and should be
reduced in overall duration to the extent reasonably possible.

3 Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term OffGrid RESE
Policy
3.1 Background
Historically, the predominant model for electrification in developing countries has been
grid extension and/or conventional energy‐powered mini‐grids developed by large,
state‐owned utilities. Recently, the spectrum of electrification models has widened,
including a long list of off‐grid solutions, such as WHSs and SHSs, amongst many others.
Annex B of Pakistan’s 2006 RE Policy provides only a brief set of guidelines for the
development of small off‐grid hydel projects, with some provisions applying to other RE
technologies as well. At present, there is no national policy for off‐grid electricity
investments. Additionally, the guidelines assign identical roles to the AEDB, provincial,
and AJK governments for RES‐E project implementation, and this overlapping can be
confusing and counterproductive.
Several off‐grid RE projects have recently been initiated in Pakistan—with varing
outcomes—and the AEDB has been actively participating in such efforts. Probably, the
most ambitious project has been the Khushaal Pakistan program (2001), which
envisaged 100% electricity coverage by the end of 2007, a target which was obvioulsy
not accomplished. Currently, the most active project is the Roshan Pakistan program.
The objective is to provide electrification services to 7,874 isolated villages. So far, 400
villages have been electrified through this program in Sindh and Balochistan provinces.
A critical issue in the current rural RE deployment strategy in Pakistan is the absence of a
clear demarcation of off‐grid areas and/or isolated/scattered populations. Such a
definition should define the geographical areas for which the grid extension would
remain uneconomical into the near future (say, next decade). This is an essential first
step in designing a rural electrification project, as it provides a means for understanding
key characteristics of the unelectrified villages to be targeted. It was estimated that in
2006, approximately 40,000 villages in the country lacked electricity services and about
8,000 out of them could only be electrified based on off‐grid solutions. Despite the lack
of proper data, it can be estimated that for electrifying 8,000 villages and scattered
populations, USD 800 million would be required (see Annex IX); in case some of the
villages planned to be electrified by grid extension (around 32,000) also require off‐grid
solutions, the financial cost would be even higher.
3.2 Medium Term Offgrid RE Policy Recommendations
3.2.1 Target Markets
The target population is that living in ‘off‐grid’ villages.3 These villages can be supplied
electricity, and eventually drinking water, based on RE generation. The AEDB shall be

3
For purposes of this policy, ‘off‐grid’ settlements are defined as those that are currently unelectrified, are not
included in any national or regional grid expansion plan for the next ten years, and are located more than 20 km
from existing power grid(s).

responsible for elaborating a database of all villages falling under this definition, in
collaboration with provincial and local governments and electricity utilities.
RE technologies included in this portfolio consist of, at a minimum:
• Micro‐ or mini‐hydel
• Hybrid systems, in which at least one RE source is employed
• Solar PV and thermal
• Micro‐ or mini‐wind systems
• Bioenergy resulting from anaerobic gas digestors, pyrolitic biomass gasification,
cogeneration, etc.
Grid expansion is outside the scope of this policy, as is any RE project that plans to
electrify a village with an installed generation capacity larger than 1 MW.
3.2.2 Implementation Period
The implementation period of this policy shall be 2009 to 2014.
3.2.3 Rationale and Institutional Organization
Off‐grid RES‐E based electrification can be developed either:
• Directly by provincial and/or local governments on a voluntary basis and/or
driven by social players without recourse to national subsidies, or
• Via national‐provincial coordination, in which provincial governments4
compete for federal government assistance to finance their off‐grid projects.
Under the first mechanism, provincial governments would be fully in charge of
developing the electrification projects within their respective territorial jurisdictions
using their own funds, or contributions and investments from the private sector, civil
society, and/or the target communities.
Under the second alternative, a coordinated national plan would to be set up to assign
competences to the different parties involved in its execution, in order to maximize their
operational potential and capabilities for achieving effective and efficient off‐grid
electrification. The main characteristics and tasks for stakeholders in this respect are
summarized in Exhibit 1.

4
For the remainder of the document, the term ‘provincial’ shall refer to all distinct administrative regions of the
country, including the Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, Northern Areas (NA),
Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).

Exhibit 1: Proposed Federally‐Assisted Off‐grid RES‐E Deployment Approach
State-owned Soft loans

banks
Ministry of
Water and OGREA budget
request
Power OGREA
Assessment
National off-grid
AEDB Off-grid
project Portfolio
Guidelines for
OGREA settlement
Villages and scattered Authorizations
Management
population
Provincial
Governments
(REAs) in Authorization
Awarded Tendering Performance
coordination Project Proposals issuance and
Projects Procedure monitoring
set tariffs
with local
governments
Priv. Investors
Developers NGOs
and Cooperatives Project Execution
operators Individuals
Others
IFIs and Financial and technical

donors assistance

The main features of the regulation proposed are as follows:
• The AEDB will act as the national off‐grid RES‐E program coordinator and will
decide the allocation of national funds to different off‐grid electrification
projects based on rules previously defined by the Government of Pakistan and
agreed upon by all provinces/units;
• The AEDB will create and update, with the assistance of the power utilities and
provincial governments, a complete assessment of the unelectrified villages and
scattered communities able to be supplied by RES‐E technologies which shall be
approved as the off‐grid electrification ‘target’ population for the medium term
(2010‐2014) by the Federal Cabinet;5
• Provincial governments—through their respective Off‐grid Electrification
Agency (OGEA)6—will be the key stakeholders for promoting off‐grid rural
electrification within their provincial borders. Based on the list of annual target
villages/populations developed by them in collaboration with the AEDB and
approved by the latter, each OGEA will prepare and submit to the AEDB a

5
Any village and/or scattered population not included in the approved list finalized by the AEDB will be excluded
from the off‐grid electrification program and not be eligible for the provisions of the present policy.
6
Or any related agency/department designated as such by the provincial government or regional administration for
the development of all off‐grid rural electrification projects in its territorial jurisdiction.

village‐specific electrification project in which, at least, the following aspects
shall be covered:
o Socioeconomic characteristics of target village/scattered population.
o Study on power demand potential and projected supply.
o Generation technology/ies to be deployed.
o Number of households to be connected.
o Implementation period.
o Total cost of the project, segregated between CapEx and OpEx.
o Detailed cash flow projections for the project.
o Social benefits due to project implementation.
o Quality‐of‐service characteristics.
• Projects should include, to the extent feasible, domestic equipment, water
installations, or any other facility that could expedite social development.
• Projects must strictly fulfill the AEDB’s guidelines for proper benchmarking, and
analysis. The AEDB will document simplified procedures for project approval,
including criteria for ranking the projects and the definition of the parameters
needed.
• Based on the above, the AEDB will create an annual project portfolio organized
according to a merit order based solely on a standardized social cost‐benefit
analysis of the projects.
• Once a project has been awarded by the AEDB, the relevant provincial
government will call for tenders for granting a 10‐year Authorization to develop
off‐grid electricity services following technology specifications stated in the
electrification project. If convenient (i.e., for proximate villages), several
projects may be combined for tendering under a single Authorization.
• The primary criterion for selecting the winning bid for each Authorization will
be ‘least subsidy’ demanded for capital investments for
electrification/installation.
• All types of stakeholders shall be eligible to participate in the tender process,
provided they meet a minimum set of technical qualifications to be defined by
provincial REAs with the guidance of the AEDB.
• The AEDB will define the standard Authorization template that the REAs will
apply to specific project tenders. The following contents shall be included:
o Schedule for electrification.
o Rights and obligations of the parties.
o Applicable tariffs or fees.
o Milestones for subsidy delivery.
o Quality‐of‐service regulation.
o Community capacity‐building.
o Conditions for termination of the Authorization.

3.2.4 Targets and Incentives
We recommend that about 50% (final target to be defined by the GoP) of all off‐grid
unelectrified villages currently identified should be electrified by end‐2014. The federal
government will provide subsidies for capital investments to the extent of 70% of the
total investment required for each RE project.
The AEDB will approve projects based on their respective social cost‐benefit analysis.
The standardized social cost‐benefit analysis should consider:
• The subsidy requirement (total, and as a share of total cost).
• The population involved.
• The economic development benefits accruing from the projects.
• The HSE (health, safety, and environment) performance aspects of the projects.
Remaining capital and O&M costs, including replacement costs, would be financed by:
• The respective REAs, employing provincial funds.
• The tariffs or fees for the off‐grid services defined by the provincial OGEA,,
taking into account the customers’ ability to pay.
• Community contributions, in the form of sweat equity (labor), land, and/or
cash.
• NGO and private contributions.
As subsidies are involved, they should be limited to the amounts needed for basic social
and human needs, including basic economic activities. Where additional quality and
quantity is desired, it must be paid for by the customer.
3.2.5 Project Funding
In order to provide funding to off‐grid projects, an Off‐grid Rural Electrification Account
(OGEAC) in the budget for the AEDB should be created. This account could be financed
by:
• Government budgetary allocations.
• Grants and loans by multilateral/bilateral financing and donor agencies.
• A levy on grid‐supplied retail electricity tariffs.
The OGEAC settlement is an attribute restricted solely to the AEDB. Once projects have
been awarded, tender procedures will direct the transfer to the respective REAs.
3.2.6 Pricing
The REAs will define the tariff/fee structure for each Authorization according to the
following criteria:
• Tariffs may be technology‐wise differentiated.

• In standalone systems, a one‐part tariff (Rs/customer) should be preferred.
• In community (mini‐ and micro‐grids) system, a one‐part tariff based on the
contracted capacity (Rs/kW‐contracted) should be preferred. In these systems,
each customer will have a power limiter installed in order to disconnect
him/her if the contracted capacity is exceeded.
• A metering device may be installed for customers paying for higher quantity or
quality of service.
• Tariffs may be only indexed to local inflation.
3.2.7 Incentives Other Than Tariffs
We believe that the current general financial and fiscal incentives, as defined in the 2006
RE Policy, are adequate and should be continued. Additional facilities and incentives
may be provided to encourage the local manufacture of RE technologies.
3.2.8 Roles of Institutions
The AEDB would play a key role in off‐grid electrification development as it is not only
the main coordinator of the process at the national level, but will also be in charge of
setting guidelines for project formulation, implementation, and financing. Additionally,
the AEDB will elaborate the list of off‐grid villages and scattered population to be
supplied by off‐grid RES‐E solutions updated on an annual basis.
We recommend a greater involvement of provincial and local institutions in RES‐E
deployment to off‐grid locations. Local stakeholders should also have an active role in
the process as a means to enhancing community acceptance and ensuring successful
deployment and operation.
The Ministry of Water and power will define the budget request for the OGEAC.
3.2.9 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents
Regulatory consents and processing requirements for off‐grid RES‐E services should be
simplified to the extent possible, so as to enable and expedite the development of
projects. No regulatory or operational consents by NEPRA and NTDC/DISCOs are
envisaged for such projects.
For off‐grid electrification, we suggest eliminating the LoI, LoS, and related guarantees
required for on‐grid RES‐E projects. The only consent necessary is the Project
Information Memorandum (PIM) for each project, which would include all technical and
economic features of the project.
Concerning environmental issues, the AEDB proposes that the federal and provincial
EPAs remove the requirement of an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) for off‐grid
RE projects of up to 1 MW capacity. However, a basic environmental compliance and
impact checklist should be developed by the EPAs and required to be completed for all
projects, primarily to ensure that water rights, flows, and community interests are not
unduly infringed upon. Additionally, the project developer should certify how proper

design, engineering, construction, and safety criteria will be addressed in the execution
of the project.
The most important consent that would be required is the Authorization issued by the
REAs on behalf of provincial governments.
3.2.10 Performance Monitoring and Enforcement
Project performance must be monitored, but in a light‐handed manner in order to avoid
huge regulation costs. The monitoring process will have two main parts:
• Investment plan monitoring: involves verification of the investment milestones
defined in the Authorization being reached, as a trigger for subsidy payments.
• Ongoing performance monitoring for the duration of the Authorization: This
involves monitoring that quality standards are met throughout its period of
validity. The regulator will establish standards for product quality, service
quality, and commercial quality. It should be noted that fewer standards that
can be effectively monitored are preferable to many standards that are poorly
monitored.
Performance monitoring and enforcement will be the responsibility of the provincial and
or local governments. The REAs should develop a program of awareness amongst their
customers and other community stakeholders to foster the direct monitoring of the
service provider.
3.2.11 Allocation of Carbon Credits
We consider logical and administratively simpler, for RE investors to assume the risks
and benefits of qualifying for and obtaining CERs, along with the potential revenues
associated with them. However, the AEDB would assist project developers applying for
CDM registration through programmatic or clustered, single‐umbrella application cover.
In such cases, CDM registration, validation, and verification costs and CER revenue
sharing arrangements shall be developed subsequently, as necessary.


Annex I: Policy for Development of Renewable Energy
for Power Generation in Pakistan
(20092014)



Policy for
Development of Renewable Energy
for Power Generation in Pakistan
20092014
DRAFT

Government of Pakistan
[Date]

Contents
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 25
2 Background ............................................................................................................ 25
3 Strategic Policy Objectives, Goals, and Development Strategy ............................... 26
3.1 Energy Security .................................................................................................... 26
3.2 Economic Benefits ............................................................................................... 26
3.3 Social Equity .......................................................................................................... 27
3.4 Environmental Protection ..................................................................................... 27
4 Medium Term On‐grid RES‐E Policy ........................................................................ 27
4.1 Scope of Policy ...................................................................................................... 27
4.2 Implementation Period ....................................................................................... 28
4.3 Consistency Across Policies ................................................................................. 28
4.4 Private Sector Participation ................................................................................. 28
4.5 Financial and Fiscal Incentives ............................................................................ 29
4.5.1 Fiscal Incentives ....................................................................................... 29
4.5.2 Financial Incentives ................................................................................. 29
4.6 General Incentives for RE‐Based Power Generators ........................................... 30
4.6.1 Guaranteed Market: Mandatory Purchase of Electricity ........................ 30
4.6.2 Grid Connection, Off‐take Voltage, and Interface .................................. 30
4.6.3 Wheeling .................................................................................................. 30
4.7 Specific Incentives for Grid‐Connected RE IPPs ................................................... 31
4.7.1 Carbon Credits ......................................................................................... 31
4.7.2 Security Package ...................................................................................... 31
4.7.3 Land and Site Access ................................................................................ 31
4.8 Facilities for Captive and Grid Spillover Projects ................................................. 32
4.8.1 Net Purchase and Sales ........................................................................... 32
4.8.2 Net Metering ........................................................................................... 32
4.8.3 Banking .................................................................................................... 33
4.8.4 Projects with Capacity Larger Than 10 MW ............................................ 33
4.9 Tariffs and Quotas for Grid‐Connected RE IPPs ................................................... 33
4.9.1 Categorization of Grid‐Connected RE IPPs Projects ................................ 33
4.9.2 Determination of Long Run Private Avoided Costs ................................. 34
4.9.2.1 Determination of the Conventional Supply Curve .................. 34
4.9.2.2 Determination of the RES‐E Supply Curve .............................. 35
4.9.2.3 Determination of Avoided Cost .............................................. 35
4.9.3 Determination of Long Run Social Avoided Cost..................................... 36
4.9.4 Quotas and Premiums for RES‐E Projects ............................................... 36

4.9.5 Calculation and Communication of Avoided Costs, Premiums, and
Quotas ..................................................................................................... 37
4.9.6 Determination of Technology‐wise Upfront Tariffs (Groups A and C) .... 37
4.9.6.1 Group A Projects ..................................................................... 37
4.9.6.2 Group C Projects ..................................................................... 37
4.9.6.3 Upfront Tariff Determination (Groups A & C) ........................ 38
4.9.6.4 IPP Tariff Determination (Groups A & C) ................................ 38
4.9.7 Determination of Individual Tariffs (Group B) ......................................... 38
4.9.7.1 Technical Parameters .............................................................. 38
4.9.7.2 Financial Parameters ............................................................... 38
4.9.7.3 Interest on Loans .................................................................... 39
4.9.7.4 Capital Cost ............................................................................. 40
4.9.7.5 O&M Cost ................................................................................ 40
4.9.7.6 Other Incentives ...................................................................... 40
4.10 Indexation for Upfront Tariffs .............................................................................. 40
4.10.1 Group A and C Projects ............................................................................ 40
4.10.2 Group B Projects ...................................................................................... 40
4.11 Wind and Hydrological Risks ............................................................................... 40
4.12 Special Requirements for Hydroelectric Projects ................................................ 40
4.13 Transparency and Visibility of Calculation of Tariff ............................................. 41
4.14 Compliance with GoP Policies ............................................................................. 41
4.15 Procedure for Establishing RE IPPs for Sale of All Power to the Grid .................. 41
4.15.1 Process for RE IPP Proposals ................................................................... 41
4.15.1.1 Submission of Proposals ......................................................... 42
4.15.1.2 Evaluation of Proposals and Issuance of Letter of Intent ....... 42
4.15.1.3 Feasibility Study ...................................................................... 42
4.15.1.4 Bank Guarantee and Validity Period of Letter of Intent ......... 43
4.15.1.5 Request for Licensing and Tariff Determination ..................... 43
4.15.1.6 Request for PSEC Certificate ................................................... 44
4.15.1.7 Performance Guarantee and Letter of Support ..................... 44
4.15.2 Process Subsequent to Issuance of LoS ................................................... 45
4.16 Security Package and Risk Cover ......................................................................... 45
4.17 Corporate, Fee, and Contractual Arrangements ................................................. 46
4.17.1 Fee Structure ........................................................................................... 46
4.17.2 Enterprise Structure and Licensing Requirements .................................. 47
4.17.3 Lock‐in Period .......................................................................................... 48
4.17.4 Type of Contracts .................................................................................... 48
4.17.5 Nature of Equipment ............................................................................... 48

5 Medium Term Off‐grid RES‐E Policy ........................................................................ 48
5.1 Scope of Policy ..................................................................................................... 48
5.2 Assessment of Target Populations ....................................................................... 49
5.3 Medium Term Electrification Targets................................................................... 49
5.4 Multiple Deployment Approach .......................................................................... 49
5.5 Coordination Amongst National and Provincial Authorities ............................... 50
5.5.1 Off‐grid Electrification Agencies .............................................................. 50
5.5.2 Project Selection ...................................................................................... 50
5.5.3 Social Cost‐Benefit Analysis ..................................................................... 51
5.5.4 Project Implementation .......................................................................... 51
5.6 Subsidies .............................................................................................................. 52
5.7 Off‐grid Electrification Account ........................................................................... 53
5.8 Fee Structure ....................................................................................................... 53
5.9 Financial and Fiscal Incentives ............................................................................ 54
5.10 Allocation of Carbon Credits ................................................................................ 54
5.11 Security Package and Risk Cover ......................................................................... 54
5.12 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Consents ..................................................... 54
5.13 Performance Monitoring and Enforcement ........................................................ 55


Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Example of Conventional Electricity Supply Curve ........................................................ 35
Exhibit 2: Example of RES‐E Supply Curve ...................................................................................... 35
Exhibit 3: Example of Avoided Cost Determination ....................................................................... 36
Exhibit 4: Processing Schedule for Grid‐Connected RE IPPs .......................................................... 41
Exhibit 5: Fee and Financial Charges for Grid‐Connected RE IPPs ................................................. 47


1 Introduction
With a large population of over 150 million and a rapidly developing economy,
Pakistan’s energy needs are potentially huge. The country, historically a net energy
importer, is confronting serious imminent energy shortages as its economy and
population grow while global fossil fuel prices remain highly volatile. Thus, Pakistan
needs to initiate a sustained, long‐term transition towards greater use of renewable
energy (RE)—an indigenous, clean, and abundant resource whose considerable potential
the country has yet to tap meaningfully.
The Government of Pakistan (GoP) intends to pursue this objective of harnessing power
from renewable resources with the full participation and collaboration of the private
sector. This document sets out policies and strategies to exploit such resources and
attract investments in electricity generation projects utilizing hydro (up to 50 MW
capacity), wind, solar, and biomass‐derived power (of all capacities). For hydroelectricity
(hydel) projects of capacity greater than 50 MW, the applicable policies are described in
the GoP’s Policy for Power Generation Projects, 2002. Additional policy guidelines shall
be issued in the future concerning other RE technologies, as well as for non‐power RE
applications, as the sector grows and technology advances take place.
2 Background
Recent studies show that the ‘natural’ penetration of on‐grid renewable energy power in
Pakistan, based on private cost analysis, could reach 17 TWh/year by 2020. This figure
represents around 7% of total grid‐based electrical power generation expected in that
year. Almost 60% of this projected RE share would be comprised of hydel plants that are
much cheaper than combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) running on fuel oil (FO), which in
turn defines the price of avoided generation on the national grid. Other renewable
energy sourced electricity (RES‐E) technologies that should be ‘naturally’ developed in
Pakistan include bagasse‐based combined heat and power (CHP) and other types of
biomass conversion.
The same studies have observed that the ‘optimal’ penetration of RE generation when
social costs are also taken into consideration should increase to around 25 TWh in 2020,
which is around 10.3% of total on‐grid power generation expected in that year. Market
failure (i.e., externalities not properly being internalized) would thus appear hamper the
development of about 8 TWh/year of RE generation, and so that an economic incentive
mechanism needs to be put in place to realize this potential, assuming that all other
barriers that block the development of natural penetration of RE have also been
removed (grid access, difficult to sign sales contracts, etc.) by then.
Under social cost assessment, not only hydel and biomass plants, but also biogas (from
farm slurries, sewage, landfills, etc.) and wind energy plants would be required to
replace CCGTs running on FO and natural gas—as a matter of fact, the studies show that
all FO‐based generation would need to be replaced, as well as around 15% of gas‐based
generation in 2020, because the marginal cost of RE for supplying this quota is around
USD 100/MWh. If the policy to achieve these results is properly defined and

implemented, the social wealth (total surplus) that may be created in Pakistan as a result
would be about USD 2,100 million per year.
Lessons learnt from the implementation of the short term 2006 RE Policy7 have
indicated potential problems in achieving the aforementioned RE penetration goals,
unless policy elements are promptly and suitably adjusted. This is especially important
considering that the marginal cost of some RES‐E technologies is in the order of USD
75/MWh, while the cost of generation based on FO has recently exceeded USD
125/MWh.
The 2009 Medium Term On‐grid RES‐E Policy contained in this document (see Section 4)
is based on a social assessment of cost and benefits. The analysis of natural penetration
based on private costs alone does not consider externalities, and therefore represents a
limited subset of such an analysis. Available international evidence shows that ‘feed‐in’
(upfront) tariffs are the best incentive mechanism for developing RE capacity, as can be
observed in the cases of Europe and some BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China)
countries. International experience also shows that an appropriate tariff mechanism is a
necessary but not a sufficient condition for developing RE energy; grid access,
administrative issues (contracts, licenses, permits, procedural requirements, etc.), and
stability of the incentive mechanism are equally relevant for fostering the accelerated
development of renewable energy.
Similarly, the 2009 Medium Term Off‐grid RES‐E Policy described in this document
(Section 5) will try to create a sustainable environment where federal and provincial
institutions, donors and NGOs can efficiently collaborate with the objective of rapid
electrification of remote villages and population settlements.
3 Strategic Policy Objectives, Goals, and Development
Strategy
The strategic objectives of the Government of Pakistan for developing renewable energy
resources are aimed at enhancing the following parameters:
3.1 Energy Security
Mainstreaming of renewable energy and greater use of indigenous resources can help
diversify Pakistan’s energy mix and reduce the country’s dependence on any single
source, particularly imported fossil fuels, thereby mitigating against supply disruptions
and price fluctuation risks. Additional costs and risks relating to fuel stocking,
transportation, and temporary substitute arrangements are also irrelevant for RE
systems, except for backup purposes.
3.2 Economic Benefits
When properly assessed for their externalities, renewable energy options can become
economically competitive with conventional supplies on a least‐cost basis. This is

7
Government of Pakistan, Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation, 2006, Alternative
Energy Development Board (AEDB), Ministry of Water and Power, Islamabad: December 2006.

particularly true for the more difficult, remote, and underdeveloped areas, where RE can
also have the greatest impact and the avoided costs of conventional energy supplies can
be significant. RE can thus supplement the pool of national energy supply options in
Pakistan, expediting economic empowerment, improving productivity, and enhancing
income‐generating opportunities—especially for currently marginalized segments of the
population. Decentralized RE systems can also help reduce energy distribution losses
and result in system‐wide and national efficiency gains (e.g., as measured by ‘energy
intensity’, or energy use per unit of GDP). A growing renewable energy industry can
afford new prospects for employment and business opportunities amongst local
manufacturers and service providers.
3.3 Social Equity
Pakistan’s present low per‐capita consumption of energy can be elevated through
greater RE use. Issues relating to social equity—such as equal rights and access for all
citizens to modern energy supplies, improved human development indicators, poverty
alleviation, and reduced burden on rural women for biomass fuel collection and use—
can also be addressed to a significant extent through widespread renewable energy
deployment. RE can thus facilitate social service delivery and help improve the well‐
being of the country’s poorest, which presently have little or no access to modern
energy services.
3.4 Environmental Protection
Local environmental and health impacts of unsustainable and inefficient traditional
biomass fuels and fossil fuel‐powered electricity generation can largely be circumvented
through clean, renewable energy alternatives. Similarly, displaced greenhouse gas
emissions carry significant global climate change benefits, towards which Pakistan has
pledged action under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
4 Medium Term Ongrid RESE Policy
4.1 Scope of Policy
The Medium Term On‐grid RES‐E Policy is aimed to provide electricity services utilizing
renewable technologies to consumers through connection to the power grid.8 This
includes RES‐E generators installed for sale of all or part of their power output to or via
the grid network.
For the purposes of this policy statement, renewable energy sourced electricity includes
the following technologies:

8

• Small hydro of 50 MW or less generation capacity9
• Solar photovoltaic (PV) and thermal energy for power generation
• Bagasse‐based generation
• Non‐bagasse biomass‐based generation
• Biogas‐based generation
• Generation based on landfill methane recovery
• Generation based on sewage gas recovery
• Municipal or industrial waste‐to‐energy generation.
Other RE technologies—such as biofuels, wave, tidal, geothermal energy, and fuel
cells—are also relevant to current and future renewable energy use in Pakistan.
However, these are not dealt with under this policy, although similar incentives could be
extended to them on a case‐by‐case basis.
4.2 Implementation Period
This medium-term RES‐E policy will apply for the period starting from [date to be
defined] and it will continue until at least [date to be defined] 2014, or a minimum of
five calendar years.
4.3 Consistency Across Policies
In order to ensure the consistency and stability of the RE deployment climate, both from
the perspective of investors and power purchasers, an RE project that achieves financial
closure before the onset of a subsequent policy phase (i.e., from [date to be defined]
onwards) will continue to be guaranteed all the incentives, terms, and conditions
defined in the 2009 Medium‐Term RE Policy over the tenure of its PPA/EPA.
4.4 Private Sector Participation
The private sector would be welcome to undertake projects falling in any of the
following categories:
• Independent power projects (IPPs) based on new plants (for sale of power to
the grid only)
• Captive and grid spillover power projects (i.e., self‐use and sale to utility)
• Captive power projects (i.e., for self or dedicated use).

9
Each country has its own definition of hydel plant sizes. For the purpose of this document, ‘small hydro’ is used to
collectively refer to hydel capacity of less than 50 MW, consisting of ‘micro’ hydels (units of less than 150 kW
installed capacity), ‘mini’ hydels (150 kW to 5 MW), and ‘small’ hydels (between 5 MW to 50 MW).

4.5 Financial and Fiscal Incentives
All renewable energy‐based power projects (private, public‐private, or public sector) will
continue enjoying the same fiscal and financial incentives prescribed in the 2006 RE
Policy. These are enumerated below.
4.5.1 Fiscal Incentives
• No customs duty or sale tax for machinery equipment and spares (including
construction machinery, equipment, and specialized vehicles imported on
temporary basis) meant for the initial installation or for balancing,
modernization, maintenance, replacement, or expansion after commissioning
of projects for power generation utilizing renewable energy resources, subject
to fulfillment of conditions under the relevant SRO.10
• Exemption from income tax, including turnover rate tax and withholding tax on
imports.
• Repatriation of equity along with dividends freely allowed, subject to rules and
regulations prescribed by the State Bank of Pakistan.
• Parties may raise local and foreign finance in accordance with regulations
applicable to industry in general. GoP approval may be required in accordance
with such regulations.
• Non‐Muslims and non‐residents shall be exempted from payment of Zakat on
dividends paid by the company.
4.5.2 Financial Incentives
• Permission for power generation companies to issue corporate registered

bonds.
• Permission to issue shares at discounted prices to enable venture capitalists to
be provided higher rates of return proportionate to the risk.
• Permission for foreign banks to underwrite the issue of shares and bonds by
private power companies (IPPs) to the extent allowed under the laws of
Pakistan.
• Non‐residents allowed purchase of securities issued by Pakistani companies
without State Bank of Pakistan’s permission, subject to prescribed rules and
regulations.

10
As per SRO (1)/2005 issued by the Ministry of Finance, Revenue and Economic Affairs on June 6, 2005, specifying
zero customs duty and sales tax on:
“Machinery, equipment and spares (including construction machinery, equipment and specialized
vehicles imported on temporary basis) meant for initial installation, balancing, modernization,
replacement or expansion of projects for power generation through nuclear and renewable energy
sources like solar, wind, micro‐hydel bio‐energy, ocean, waste‐to‐energy and hydrogen cell, etc.
“Spares and maintenance parts required for the above project after commissioning.”

• Independent rating agencies in Pakistan to facilitate informed decision‐making
by investors about the risk and profitability of project company’s bonds/TFCs.
4.6 General Incentives for REBased Power Generators
The provisions stated below shall be made available to all qualifying renewable energy‐
based power projects falling under any of the categories defined in Section 4.4 above.
4.6.1 Guaranteed Market: Mandatory Purchase of Electricity
It shall be mandatory for the CPPA or the power distribution utilities to purchase all
electricity offered to them by RE projects established in accordance with the provisions
given in Section 4.6.2. An EPA contract will be concluded between the project sponsor
and the CPPA or, eventually, between the project sponsor and the distribution company
in whose service territory the project may be located, except for those cases in which
the sponsor opts for a ‘direct sale’ to a bulk consumer. After the CPPA ceases to exist,
neither distributors nor transmission companies will have the right to reject, in part or in
entirety, any contract signed previously between the CPPA and an RE‐based power
generator. NEPRA will establish a suitable methodology for compensating those
DISCOs/TRANSCOs that are forced, under this 2009 Medium Term RE Policy, to accept
contracts with NEPRA‐mandated ‘feed‐in’ tariff.
RE power producers are allowed to enter into direct (bilateral) sales contracts with
eligible end‐use customers. In this case, electricity sale prices will not require prior
approval by NEPRA.
4.6.2 Grid Connection, Offtake Voltage, and Interface
Electricity shall be purchased from RE power producers at a voltage of:
• 220 kV at the outgoing bus bar of the power station if the power station is
located within 70 km of an existing 220 kV transmission line
• 132 kV if it is within 50 km of an existing 132 kV transmission line
• 11 kV if it is within 5 km of an existing 11 kV transmission line
• 400 V if it is within 1 km of a 400 V distribution feeder.
The minimum average power to be supplied in each case would be 1,250 kW/km,
250 kW/km, 100 kW/km, and 20 kW/km, respectively.
The producer may also undertake to lay a new transmission line for connection with the
main electricity grid. The power purchase tariff determination will be adjusted
accordingly for each of these options.
4.6.3 Wheeling
RE power producers shall also be allowed to enter into direct (bilateral) sales contracts
with end‐use customers. Under this arrangement, they would be allowed to sell all or a
part of the power generated by them directly to their customers, and the rest to the
utility for general distribution. For direct sales, they shall be required to pay ‘wheeling’

charges for the use of the transmission and/or distribution grid network employed to
transport power from the plant to the purchaser. In practical terms, the IPP shall inject
electricity into the grid system at one point (subject to the provisions in Section 4.6.2)
and would be entitled to receive the same amount at any other location upon payment
of a corresponding wheeling charge, to be determined by NEPRA. This wheeling charge
will reflect the cost of providing and maintaining the transmission interconnection,
including the energy losses suffered en route, calculated on a utility‐wide basis by
NEPRA.
4.7 Specific Incentives for GridConnected RE IPPs
Additionally, specific incentives are provided under this policy to renewable energy‐
based independent power producers (IPPs) selling all generated electricity (minus
auxiliary consumption) to the grid as described below.
4.7.1 Carbon Credits
All qualifying RE power projects eligible for financing under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) shall be encouraged to register for Certified Emission Reduction (CER)
credits with the CDM Executive Board, either collectively or individually. The
Government shall also strive, in collaboration with international development agencies
and to the extent possible, to facilitate project applications for such carbon credits in
order to reduce the associated initial transaction costs for project sponsors.
The annual carbon revenues eventually obtained shall be allocated to the project
sponsor, who shall be free to negotiate CER sales to third parties in any manner it
considers appropriate.
4.7.2 Security Package
The power purchaser shall enter into a specific Energy Purchase Agreement (EPA), based
on a standard model agreement, with the RE power producer. The Government of
Pakistan shall also enter into an Implementation Agreement (IA) which will guarantee
the payment obligation of the public sector power purchaser for power sales extending
over the term of the PPA. The EPAs will be much simpler than those currently
prescribed for for thermal or large hydro IPPs, and shall be based on the purchase of all
the energy generated at a per‐kWh rate.
4.7.3 Land and Site Access
The federal and provincial11 governments shall facilitate investors in acquiring land or
rights‐of‐way (RoWs) for project development, as well as providing site access on a case‐
to‐case basis by leasing, acquisition of RoW, and/or construction of road linkages.
However, the primary responsibility for acquiring land and site access will rest with the
project sponsors.

11
For the purposes of this policy document, the term ‘provincial’ shall hereinafter refer to all distinct administrative
regions of the country, including the Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, Northern
Areas (NA), Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Azad Jammu and
Kashmir (AJK).

4.8 Facilities for Captive and Grid Spillover Projects
For other categories of RE power generators (captive and grid spillover RE power
projects), wishing to sell surplus power to the utility grid, the following facilities shall be
made available:
4.8.1 Net Purchase and Sales
An RE power project, with a capacity larger than 1 MW and less than 10 MW, set up for
self (captive) or dedicated use, may supply surplus electricity to the power utility (grid
spillover), while at other times drawing electricity from the utility to supplement its own
production or local use, subject to the provisions in Section 4.6.2. In such cases, the net
electricity
• supplied by the power producer to the utility in a month (i.e., units supplied by
the producer minus units received by the producer, if greater than zero), shall
be paid for by the utility at a tariff equal to the average energy cost per kWh for
oil‐based power generation (as determined by NEPRA for GENCOs/IPPs over the
applicable quarter of the year) less 10% , or
• supplied by the utility to the power producer in a month, (i.e., units received by
the producer minus units supplied by the producer, if greater than zero), shall
be paid for by the producer at the applicable retail tariff (e.g., industrial or
commercial rates, depending upon the type of user connection).
Such net purchase and sales—or ‘net billing’—arrangements will involve measurement
of the electricity received and supplied to the utility by the power producer using two
separate sets of unidirectional meters.
4.8.2 Net Metering
An RE power project of capacity up to 1 MW set up for self (captive) or dedicated use
may also supply surplus electricity to the power utility while at other times drawing
electricity from the utility to supplement its own production for local use, subject to
provisions in Section 4.6.2. In such cases, the net electricity
• supplied by the power producer to the utility in a month, i.e., units supplied by
the producer minus units received by the producer, if greater than zero, or
• supplied by the utility to the power producer in a month, i.e., units received by
the producer minus units supplied by the producer, if greater than zero,
shall be paid for by the utility or the producer, respectively, at the applicable retail tariff
(e.g., industrial, commercial, or residential rates).
Such net metering arrangements may involve separate sets of unidirectional meters for
recording the electricity received and supplied to the utility by the power producer, or
special bidirectional meters capable of instantaneously recording net power transfers.
This facility would be particularly suitable for incentivizing dispersed small‐scale RE
generation, such as rooftop PV panels, helping optimize their utilization and payback
rates and obviating the need for expensive on‐site storage batteries.

4.8.3 Banking
For net billing purposes, a rolling account of energy units will be maintained on the
pattern of a bank account (i.e., debit or credit basis). Such banking accounts of net
energy units shall be maintained on a monthly basis and final balances will be reconciled
at the end of the year at the rates given in Section 4.8.1. Under this arrangement, a
producer may generate and supply power to the grid at one location and receive an
equivalent number of units for self use (say, at a factory) at a different or physically
distant location on the grid at a different time without paying any wheeling charges, but
subject to the distance limits for power input and off take as noted in Section 4.6.2. Any
additional (net) units consumed by the producer (beyond those supplied to the utility at
the plant location) in a given month shall be billed by the utility at the retail tariff
applicable to the type of electricity connection obtaining at the consumer’s premises.
Any excess (net) units supplied by the producer’s plant in a given month shall be
credited to the producer on a rolling monthly basis (i.e., deducted from the next month’s
consumption). Any accumulated energy unit credits accruing to the producer at the end
of the year shall be paid for by the utility at a tariff equal to the average energy cost per
kWh for oil‐based power generation (as determined by NEPRA for GENCOs/IPPs over the
preceding fiscal year) less 10%.
4.8.4 Projects with Capacity Larger Than 10 MW
For captive and grid spillover RE power generators with a capacity greater than 10 MW,
wishing to sell surplus power, the provisions included in Section 4.7 shall apply.
4.9 Tariffs and Quotas for GridConnected RE IPPs
4.9.1 Categorization of GridConnected RE IPPs Projects
For tariff determination purposes, RES‐E projects will be grouped in three different
categories:
Group A:
RE projects selling electricity to the utility (NTDC/CPPA or DISCOs) utilizing one of the
following technologies:
• Bagasse‐based generation
• Non‐bagasse biomass‐based generation
• Biogas‐based generation
• Generation based on landfill methane recovery
• Generation based on sewage gas recovery
• Small‐scale hydel, with capacity less than 50 MW
• On‐shore wind generation.

Group B:
RES‐E projects selling electricity to the utility (NTDC/CPPA or DISCOs) with special non‐
energy social and environmental benefits (i.e., waste‐to‐energy projects).
Group C:
RES‐E projects selling electricity to the utility (NTDC/CPPA or DISCOs) utilizing one of the
following technologies:
• Photovoltaics
• Solar thermal
• Other RES‐E technologies not included in Groups A or B.
Technology wise upfront (feed‐in) tariffs will be determined for each RE technology
included in Groups A, B or C. However, for Group B technologies, different tariffs specific
to each project (i.e., ‘case‐by‐case’ tariffs) may be determined, following the procedure
described below.
4.9.2 Determination of Long Run Private Avoided Costs
In order to determine long run private avoided costs of electricity supply to the national
grid, the following procedure will be applied:
4.9.2.1 Determination of the Conventional Supply Curve
The MoWP, through the Energy Wing of the Planning Commission, shall produce a Long
Run Least Cost Energy Plan (LREP), which will identify the most economic means to meet
Pakistan’s total energy demand—in particular electricity—using conventional
technologies. Conventional technologies include fossil fired and nuclear power plants,
and hydel larger than 50 MW of installed capacity. The LREP should cover a period of at
least 15 years.
Using the projects and technologies selected in the LREP for the later plan period, an
single‐part energy price, expressed in USD/kWh, shall be calculated for each of these
projects. An ordered list (from lowest to highest energy cost) will then be formed,
indicating for each project the expected energy produced, the cumulative energy
output, and the energy price. The cumulative energy vs. unit electricity cost will form
the conventional supply curve. Exhibit 1 shows an example of such a curve.

Exhibit 1: Example of Conventional Electricity Supply Curve
Energy Cumulated
Cost Conventional Supply Curve
Name produced Energy
[USD/MWh]
[TWh/year] [TWh/year] 120
Project 1 1.5 1.5 38.7
Project 2 2 3.5 38.8
100
Project 3 1.8 5.3 38.9
Project 4 3 8.3 40.1
Project 5 4 12.3 40.1
80
Cost [USD/MWh]
Project 6 2 14.3 40.1
Project 7 2.7 17 40.1
Project 8 3 20 40.1 60
40
Project 56 0.9 152.1 92.5 20

Project 57 0.7 152.8 92.8
Project 58 0.6 153.4 93
0
Project 59 0.8 154.2 94
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Project 60 1 155.2 96
Cumulated Energy [TWh/year]

4.9.2.2 Determination of the RES‐E Supply Curve
The MoWP, through the AEDB, will determine an RES‐E supply curve using a similar
approach to the one used for the conventional electricity supply curve. In deriving this
curve, the AEDB will use its best estimation of the potentially feasible RE projects in
Pakistan which could be developed over a reasonable time frame—i.e., 15 years—and
the cost of such development. If RE projects cannot be accurately identified individually
(due to the relatively large numbers and relatively small sizes involved), different cost
ranges, based on technology and location, may be used for the determination of the
RES‐E supply curve. Exhibit 2 shows an example of such curve.
Exhibit 2: Example of RES‐E Supply Curve
450
400
350
300
$/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
Supply Curve (Private Cost) Supply curve (Social Cost)
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
TWh/a

4.9.2.3 Determination of Avoided Cost
The long run private avoided cost is the price at which the value of the RE supply curve
(ordered monotonically from lowest to highest unit costs of energy output) equals the
value of the conventional electricity supply curve (ordered monotonically from lowest to
highest unit costs of energy output). Exhibit 3 shows, graphically, the determination of
this cost.

Exhibit 3: Example of Avoided Cost Determination
Determination of the Avoided Cost
200
180
160
140 RE Supply Curve

Cost [USD/MWh]
120 Avoided Cost

100
80
60 Conventional Supply Curve
40
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Cumulated Energy [TWh]

4.9.3 Determination of Long Run Social Avoided Cost
The methodology for determining long run social avoided costs is conceptually similar to
that described for long run private avoided costs in Section 4.9.2, the only difference
being that the cost of some selected externalities shall also be taken into account. The
MoWP will determine which externalities need to be included in the calculation, as well
as the methodologies applied to calculate them. At a minimum, the following
externalities shall be included:
• Global environmental costs (CO2‐equivalent GHG emissions)
• Air quality (e.g., NOx, SOx, and particulates), and
• Fuel dependency.
4.9.4 Quotas and Premiums for RESE Projects
There shall be no quotas and premiums for RES‐E projects falling in Groups A and B.
For RES‐E projects using technologies included in Group C, the MoWP may establish a
maximum quota (total MW of installed capacity nationally for a specified RE technology)
for such RE options that the GoP considers should be encouraged for long‐term strategic
or economic benefits that might accrue, with an associated price premium allowed
above the long run social avoided cost for such projects. The AEDB will conduct studies
in order to determine the minimum premium required in order to make these presently
uneconomical technologies commercially viable, and shall advise the MoWP accordingly.
Based on the premium required, the MoWP, in consultation with the Ministry of
Industries, Production and Special Incentives and the Ministry of Finance, shall
determine the national quota(s) to be established for each of the relevant technologies.
In order to monitor the total installed capacity in technologies for which a premium and
quota has been established, the AEDB shall maintain an up‐to‐date register of all Group
C projects reaching financial closure, under construction, or in operation in the country.

Once the quota has been exhausted, Group C projects may continue to be developed by
investors, but no premium shall be applicable to such subsequent projects.
4.9.5 Calculation and Communication of Avoided Costs, Premiums, and
Quotas
No later than six month of the publication of this 2009 Medium Term RE Policy, the
MoWP will calculate actual figures for:
• Long run private avoided costs for the national grid (in USD/kWh)
• Long run social avoided cost for the national grid (in USD/kWh)
• The list of technologies (included in Group C) which would be entitled to
receive a price premium, and the values of such premiums (i.e., price in
USD/kWh above the long run social avoided cost)
• The maximum national quota for each technology (in MW of installed capacity)
entitled to receive a premium.
These values will be communicated by the MoWP to the AEDB and NEPRA, and they
shall be used in the determination of upfront (feed‐in) tariffs, quotas, and premiums for
each RE technology defined in Section 4.1 in the manner described below.
4.9.6 Determination of Technologywise Upfront Tariffs (Groups A and C)
Within three (3) months after the MoWP communicates the values indicated in Section
4.9.5, the AEDB shall file class tariff petition(s) with NEPRA for each of the RE
technologies included in Groups A and C.
In order to determine the tariff to be requested for each technology, the AEDB shall
abide by the following procedure:
4.9.6.1 Group A Projects
For projects utilizing Group A technologies, the requested upfront tariff should not be
lower than the system‐wide long run private avoided cost (determined as indicated in
Section 4.9.2) and should not be higher than the long run social avoided cost
(determined as indicated in Section 4.9.3).
The tariff requested should take into consideration costs required for the adequate
development of each technology and results of calculations performed in the
determination of the RES‐E supply curve, as indicated in Section 4.9.2. The parameters
used in these calculation should be included in the tariff petition for NEPRA verification
and review.
4.9.6.2 Group C Projects
For projects utilizing Group C technologies, the requested upfront tariff shall be
calculated as the long run social avoided cost (determined as indicated in Section 4.9.3),
plus the premium determined by the MoWP for each technology. The AEDB shall submit
to NEPRA all supporting information required to assess the actual cost of development
of these technologies.

4.9.6.3 Upfront Tariff Determination (Groups A & C)
Within three (3) months of receiving the tariff petition submitted by the AEDB for each
RE technology under Groups A and C, NEPRA will determine the upfront tariffs (bulk
purchase prices to be used in the EPAs) for corresponding projects selling all electricity
produced to the utility (NTDC/CPPA or DISCOs). Based on the information submitted by
the AEDB, NEPRA may decide, within a specific technology, different upfront tariffs for
different ranges of installed capacity, if it considers this suitable.
4.9.6.4 IPP Tariff Determination (Groups A & C)
Sponsors of an RES‐E project falling into Groups A or C are required to apply to NEPRA
for determination of their project’s tariff. NEPRA shall, based on analysis of the project’s
qualification and characteristics, issue a determination consistent with the upfront tariff
corresponding to the relevant RE technology.
4.9.7 Determination of Individual Tariffs (Group B)
For projects utilizing Group B technologies, the AEDB shall file class tariff petition(s) with
NEPRA, utilizing the same procedure as indicated in Section 4.9.6.1. However, for
projects with special non‐energy socioeconomic and environmental benefits, a different
tariff may be requested. These kinds of projects will be considered as ‘Projects with
Special Environmental Characteristics’ (PSEC).
In order for a project to be considered a PSEC, its sponsor must obtain PSEC certification
for it from the MoWP according to the procedure described in Section 4.15.1.6.
Upon receipt of the PSEC certificate, the sponsor would be required to apply to NEPRA
for determination of the project’s bulk power purchase tariff within a period not
exceeding three (3) calendar months from the date of the certification. In the case of
Group B projects, the guidelines and parameters for determination of tariffs would be
those described below (Sections Error! Reference source not found. to 4.9.7.6).
4.9.7.1 Technical Parameters
The net energy available for sale shall be determined after taking into account electrical
efficiency, auxiliary loads, transformation efficiency, etc., and plant availability. Plant
availability factor should be determined judiciously, taking into account suitable
provisions for anticipated maintenance and forced outages.
Once a contract (EPA) has been entered into, the parameters adopted at the time of the
agreement shall not be changed for the duration of the contract.
4.9.7.2 Financial Parameters
The following parameters, principles, and assumptions shall be adopted for calculation
of the IPP tariff:
1. Debt:Equity Ratio
• For the purposes of determination of tariff, equity equal of at least 20% of the
total cost of the project would be the benchmark.

2. Internal Rate of Return/Return on Equity
• Tariff should be determined allowing reasonable internal rate of return (IRR) on
equity investment.
• IRR should be calculated over the life of the Implementation Agreement (IA),
starting from the date of construction start (i.e., start of payments to
contractors).
• IRR should be equal to long‐term interest rates based on auction of ten‐year
Pakistan Investment Bonds (PIBs) held during the previous six months, plus a
premium of x%, to be determined by NEPRA.
• For BOOT projects, the investor’s equity shall be allowed to be redeemed after
completion of debt servicing. The redemption in equity shall be in equal
instalments from the time debt servicing has been completed till the end of the
concession period. The effect of exchange rate variations shall be compensated
for in determining equity redemption. The projects shall be transferred to the
GoP at the end of concession period at a notional cost of Rs 1.
• For BOO projects, there will be no redemption of equity.
4.9.7.3 Interest on Loans
Tariff determination will be a two‐step procedure. Initially, an indicative tariff shall be
estimated, taking into account expected financial returns at the time of award of LoS so
as to enable an IPP to achieve financial close. At this stage, interest rate ceilings may
also be indicated with incentive provided for the IPP to arrange better terms of
financing. After financial closure, the tariff will be finally fixed such that the project’s
debt service cost component equals actual debt servicing plus the incentive. A ceiling for
rate of interest on local loans of 6‐month KIBOR12 plus 300 basis points for a ten‐year
loan plus two‐year grace period has been agreed upon in recent negotiations with IPPs.
For foreign loans, the ceiling rate may be taken as LIBOR13 plus a suitable spread for ten‐
year loans with two‐year grace period. IPPs shall be given an incentive to arrange better
terms of debt financing. If the IPP succeeds in arranging better terms by the time the
project achieves financial close, the overall impact of reduction in debt servicing shall be
shared, in the case of competitively determined tariffs for solicited projects and
negotiated tariffs for unsolicited projects, on a yearly basis in the following ratio:
Power Purchaser/Govt: IPP = 60:40
Wherever a floating interest rate regime is adopted, local loans may be indexed to
changes in relevant benchmark interest rates, such as KIBOR, etc. Likewise, foreign
loans may be indexed to changes in relevant benchmark interest rates, such as LIBOR,
etc., and variation in Pakistan Rupee to the US Dollar. Loans will be arranged by IPPs
without GoP guarantee.

12
Karachi Interbank Offered Rate.
13
London Interbank Offered Rate.

4.9.7.4 Capital Cost
Estimation of an IPP’s capital costs for this kind of projects is a challenging task. NEPRA
should determine them after thoroughly assessing market, vendor, and IPP provided
information.
4.9.7.5 O&M Cost
The operation and maintenance (O&M) cost comprises of fixed and variable
components. NEPRA should access information from the same sources as for the capital
costs to arrive at a judicious determination of O&M costs, both fixed and variable.
4.9.7.6 Other Incentives
All fiscal and financial incentives provided to RE IPPs by the GoP, as given in the policy
(see Section 4.5) shall be applicable.
4.10 Indexation for Upfront Tariffs
4.10.1 Group A and C Projects
Bulk power purchase tariffs for grid‐connected RE IPPs shall be denominated in Pakistan
Rupees per kilowatt‐hour (Rs/kWh). Upfront tariffs shall be adjusted automatically by
NEPRA on a quarterly basis, based only on local currency variations. IPPs will not have to
approach NEPRA for such tariff indexation.
The benchmark currency rate used as a reference will be the interbank rate for US
Dollars (US$) prevailing 30 days prior to the date the upfront tariffs are determined by
NEPRA.
4.10.2 Group B Projects
Indexation of tariffs for Projects with Special Environmental Characteristics (PSEC),
certified by MoWP under Section 4.15.1.6 shall be decided by NEPRA and included in the
initial tariff determination of such projects.
4.11 Wind and Hydrological Risks
Wind and/or hydrological risks shall be borne by the sponsors of wind and hydel
projects, respectively. No related risk cover will be considered in the tariff
determinations.
4.12 Special Requirements for Hydroelectric Projects
Each hydroelectric IPP will be required to form a company in accordance with Pakistan’s
laws and the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for the specific purpose of hydropower
generation.
A water use charge will be payable by the generation company to the provincial/regional
government for the use of water resources by the power project to generate electricity.
The water use charge will be fixed at Rs 0.15/kWh and shall be adjustable annually for
inflation using the wholesale price index (WPI) with effect from commercial operation
date (COD).

4.13 Transparency and Visibility of Calculation of Tariff
NEPRA shall provide complete soft and hard copies of its assumptions, inputs and
methodology used in the determination of RE IPP tariffs, along with the complete tariff
computation and model, to the IPPs as well as the public domain. This would enable
better understanding of tariff decisions by all concerned.
4.14 Compliance with GoP Policies
NEPRA shall comply with the policies and guidelines of the Government of Pakistan as
issued, modified, supplemented, and revised from time to time by the government.
4.15 Procedure for Establishing RE IPPs for Sale of All Power to
the Grid
RE‐based IPP projects shall be welcomed by the AEDB and designated
provincial/regional agencies14. A Letter of Intent (LoI) shall be issued to enable the
sponsors to carry out a feasibility study and obtain tariff determination and a generation
license from NEPRA. Thereafter, a Letter of Support (LoS) shall be issued to assist the
sponsors in achieving financial closure for the project. This process is described in detail
below:
4.15.1 Process for RE IPP Proposals
The schedule of activities leading to issuance of Letter of Intent (LoI) and/or Letter of
Support (LoS) is given in Exhibit 4 and explained in the following sections.
Exhibit 4: Processing Schedule for Grid‐Connected RE IPPs
Activity/Milestone Maximum Allowance (Days)

1. Submission of proposal on raw site by sponsors –
2. Review of proposal and qualification of sponsors by 30
AEDB/Counterpart Agency
3. Posting of Bank Guarantee by sponsors 15
4. Issuance of Letter of Intent (LoI) by AEDB/CA 7
5. Initial time allowed to carry out feasibility study and Based on schedule submitted
term of the LoI by IPP, subject to maximum of
18 months.
6. For projects in Group B, request for PSEC certification 90
7. Tariff petition and approval of tariff by NEPRA 90
8. Submission of Performance Guarantee by sponsors 15
upon approval of tariff by NEPRA
9. Issuance of LoS by AEDB/CA 7
Note: Indicated time allowance represents maximum processing period.

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A ‘one‐window’ counterpart agency (CA), functionally similar to the AEDB’s project processing entity, will be set up
by each of the provincial governments (i.e., Sindh, Balochistan, Punjab and NWFP) and regional administrations
(i.e., ICT, FATA, NA, AJK) for facilitating RE projects in the country. For projects located in any of the provinces or
AJK, proposals may be submitted to the relevant CA, or to the AEDB directly. For the Northern Areas, FATA, and
ICT, proposals should be submitted to the AEDB. In the remainder of this document, the term ‘AEDB/CA’ shall be
used as a short form to refer to this institutional arrangement.

4.15.1.1 Submission of Proposals
Any sponsor wishing to undertake a renewable energy IPP project, either on ‘raw’ sites
or on sites for which the AEDB/CA has carried out pre‐feasibility studies, would be
required to submit a detailed proposal to the AEDB/CA which must be in compliance
with applicable policy guidelines and subject to the provisions in Section 4.6.2. The
sponsor would be required to submit a detailed information memorandum (PIM) to the
AEDB/CA, which must include, at a minimum, the following information:
• Project name and RET classification (i.e., wind, solar, small hydro, biomass,
hybrid, etc.)
• Statement of qualification of project sponsors, listing relevant corporate
experience, personnel, and financial capacity
• Project location (including geographical or GPS coordinates)
• Proposed net installed capacity (MW) and expected annual energy output
(MWh)
• Basic outline of plant and structures
• Estimated distance from the nearest 132 kV or 11 kV line or grid station
• Summary implementation plan, indicating specific project preparation
milestones, completion date, and expected COD
• Previous history of the project, if any
• Description of technology and main suppliers, and
• If applicable, relevant information required for PSEC certification.
4.15.1.2 Evaluation of Proposals and Issuance of Letter of Intent
Proposals for unsolicited projects on raw sites or on sites for which the AEDB/CA has
carried out pre‐feasibility studies will be examined by a Project Committee appointed by
the AEDB or CA. The time for reviewing the proposal should not exceed 30 working days
from the date of submittal. Proposals approved by the Committee shall be processed by
the AEDB/CA for issuance of a Letter of Intent (LoI) against a Bank Guarantee (see
Exhibit 5). This Bank Guarantee should be valid for a period not less than six (6) months
in excess of the validity of the LoI, following which the provisions of the agreements shall
be applicable. LoIs for proposed projects shall include relevant project milestones to
enable the AEDB/CA to monitor progress, and the sponsors shall commit to meeting the
milestones stipulated therein.
4.15.1.3 Feasibility Study
Sponsors shall enjoy exclusive rights for carrying out a feasibility study at a given site
during the period of the LoI, as long as they continue to meet the milestones specified in
the letter.
The feasibility study shall be reviewed by a ‘Panel of Experts’ (POE) appointed by the
AEDB/CA. If at any time during the feasibility study period, the POE determines that the

sponsors have failed to adhere to relevant milestones or to rectify such deviation, or are
not diligent, the AEDB/CA may serve a notice to the IPP to rectify the situation, failing
which it shall terminate the LoI and encash the Bank Guarantee. In such a case, the
sponsors will have no claim for compensation against the any government agency.
Feasibility studies undertaken by the public sector and donor agencies will be made
available to all interested private entrepreneurs by the AEDB/CAs against a nominal
administrative fee. The full cost of the feasibility study (up to a reasonable ceiling and as
reflected on the books of the concerned agency as being the actual cost of the feasibility
study), shall be indicated in the LoI and charged to the project sponsor at the time of
issuance of the Letter of Support (LoS), and shall be reimbursed to the agency which
originally conducted the study, except in the case where such study was conducted
under grant financing (e.g., donor funding, etc.). Wherever the GoP has obtained such a
feasibility prepared by the public or private sector, preference would be given to the
award of these projects through international competitive bidding (ICB).
For studies furnished to the private sector by the AEDB/CA or any public sector
organization, investors shall be responsible for verifying any or all aspects of the relevant
feasibility study, and would be encouraged to carry out additional or alternative project
appraisal of the site on their own for such purposes.
In case the feasibility has been completed by the public sector or private sponsor but the
unsolicited proposal does not materialize for any reason whatsoever, and the AEDB/CA
wishes to invite bids using the same feasibility study, then the cost of feasibility study
(up to a reasonable ceiling and as per proper audit) will be recovered from the successful
subsequent bidder, if any, and be reimbursed to the public sector entity or sponsor who
originally paid for, or conducted, the study.
4.15.1.4 Bank Guarantee and Validity Period of Letter of Intent
For issuance of the LoI, sponsors will be required to post a Bank Guarantee (see Exhibit
5) in favor of the AEDB/CA based on the project’s estimated installed capacity. This
guarantee shall be valid for a period extending six (6) calendar months beyond the
original validity of the LoI. The initial validity of the LoI shall be up to 18 calendar
months, depending on the size of the project and the schedule committed to by the IPP.
A one‐time extension to the LoI of up to a maximum period of 180 calendar days may be
granted by the relevant AEDB/CA if the Panel of Experts (POE) deems the sponsors’
progress on the feasibility study to be otherwise satisfactory and its completion
imminent. Submission of a Bank Guarantee valued at twice the original amount (i.e.,
US$ 1,000/MW) and valid for six (6) calendar months beyond the extended LoI period
shall be mandatory to qualify for an LoI extension.
If during the currency of the LoI, a sponsor wishes to withdraw from the project, the
extent to which the Bank Guarantee amount shall be encashed will be in proportion to
the time elapsed since the issuance of the LoI with respect to the total period of the LoI.
4.15.1.5 Request for Licensing and Tariff Determination
Upon completion, the feasibility study shall be reviewed by the POE, and if approved,
the AEDB will assist the project sponsors to apply to NEPRA for granting a generation

license and for the bulk power purchase tariff petition, which in any case should not be
higher than the upfront tariffs published by NEPRA for the corresponding RE technology.
NEPRA shall review the information submitted, verify compliance with the requirements
indicated in the upfront tariff determination for such technology and, in case of
approval, issue the license and tariff determination. This process should not exceed
three (3) months.
4.15.1.6 Request for PSEC Certificate
For projects using technologies included in Group B, a PSEC certificate may be
requested. This request should be made by the project sponsor to the MoWP before
petitioning NEPRA for licensing and tariff determination.
The request to the MoWP for PESC certification, shall include:
• The project’s feasibility study.
• A supporting letter issued by the AEDB stating that the project complies with
these special characteristics. Such a supporting letter will be issued by the POE
after reviewing the feasibility study provided by the sponsor, the additional
(non‐energy) socioeconomic and environmental characteristics of the project,
and the improvement the project could bring about for the welfare of the
population and local environment.
• An estimation of the tariffs required (expressed in Rs/kWh) in order to make
the project commercially viable, with all necessary supporting documentation.
In the estimation of this tariff, eventual project revenues, other than those
derived from power sales, shall be taken into account (e.g., carbon credits).
The MoWP, in consultation with the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Finance
and any other GoP institution it considers relevant, will analyze the documentation
submitted, and solicit additional information from the sponsors, if required.
In particular, the MoWP shall determine if the project’s positive externalities (benefit to
environment and/or population) exceed the negative impact that the requested tariff
would impose on electricity consumers and power sector financing.
In case such an analysis shows that a positive impact arises for the society as a whole,
the GoP, through the MoWP, may issue such PSEC Certificate, taking into consideration
that this issuance is facultative of the GoP and that there is no obligation to give any
reason for a rejection.
4.15.1.7 Performance Guarantee and Letter of Support
Subsequent to issue of generation license and determination of the bulk power purchase
tariff by NEPRA, the project sponsor shall be required to post a Performance Guarantee
based on project capacity in favor of the AEDB or relevant CA, valid initially for a period
of three (3) months in excess of the validity of the LoS. Upon submission of the
Performance Guarantee, a Letter of Support (LoS) shall be issued to the project sponsor
by the relevant AEDB/CA to enable the project to achieve financial close. Until financial

close is achieved, the LoS shall govern the project and supersede all other documents
and agreements.
If the LoS is issued by a provincial or regional CA, the AEDB shall be officially notified of
this. Similarly, if the LoS is issued by the AEDB, the relevant counterpart agency in
whose territory the project is to be located shall be notified. The AEDB shall maintain a
central registry of all approved RE IPPs in the country to ensure their proper
coordination and facilitation at the federal level.
4.15.2 Process Subsequent to Issuance of LoS
After the issuance of the LoS to an RE IPP project, its sponsor will be expected to carry
out the following activities:
• Sign the Implementation Agreement (IA), with the AEDB acting on behalf—and
with the permission—of the GoP, and the Energy Purchase Agreements (EPA)
with the power purchaser.
• Achieve financial close (as defined in the IA or EPA).
• Achieve construction start (as defined in the IA or EPA).
• Execute and commission the project according to major milestones established
in the LoS.
In case of default or departure from agreed milestones by project sponsors, the
AEDB/CA shall have the right to terminate the LoS and encash the sponsors’
Performance Guarantee upon issuance of due notice assigning reasons for such action
and after provision of sufficient opportunity for the rectification of such default.
However, in case the delay is caused by actions of the power purchaser or by the
government, the IPP shall not be penalized. Upon achievement of financial close, the
security agreements (IA and EPA) shall supersede the LoS and all other documents and
agreements. If the LoS expires, the IA and EPA and all other agreements with any
government entity shall also automatically terminate.
The investor, after receiving the LoS, will be required to submit to the relevant AEDB/CA,
on a format specified by the agency, a mutually acceptable implementation schedule
with specific milestones for progress monitoring. The AEDB/CA shall execute the
project’s Implementation Agreement (IA) on behalf of the Government of Pakistan,
whereas the Energy Purchase Agreement (EPA) shall be executed between the IPP and
the buyer upon GoP’s formal approval.
4.16 Security Package and Risk Cover
The security package for grid‐connected RE IPPs will comprise of the following:
• Implementation Agreement (IA), Energy Purchase Agreement (EPA), and Water
Use Agreement (WUA), as applicable.
• GoP guarantee on payment obligations of public sector entities. If some or all
of the utilities are restructured or privatized during the term of various
agreements, appropriate safeguards shall be built into the privatization

agreements so that the IPP contracts are wholly secured over their respective
contracted terms.
• Provide protection against specific ‘political’ risks.
• Provide protection against changes in the tax and duty regime.
• Ensure convertibility of Pakistani Rupees into US Dollars at the prevailing
exchange rate and the remitability of foreign exchange to cover necessary
payments related to the project, including debt servicing, payment of
dividends, and repatriation of equity.
• Suitable indexation of tariff components to cover the risk of exchange rate
variations.
4.17 Corporate, Fee, and Contractual Arrangements
4.17.1 Fee Structure
Fees are to be paid by sponsors of grid‐connected RE projects to the
AEDB/Provincial/AJK Agency as indicated in Exhibit 5 below. All fees are subject to
revision from time to time.

Exhibit 5: Fee and Financial Charges for Grid‐Connected RE IPPs
Activity Fee Remarks
a. Registration US$ 100 The AEDB/CA will provide

an information package
upon registration
b. Project facilitation and evaluation
expenses for projects registered
with the AEDB/CA:
≤ 5 MW
> 5 MW to 20 MW
US$ 1,000
> 20 MW to 50 MW
US$ 5,000
> 50 MW (i.e., wind, solar w/
AEDB) US$ 10,000
US$ 20,000
c. Bank Guarantee for issuance of US$ 500/MW nameplate capacity or bid bond-
Letter of Intent (LoI) by AEDB/CA specified
d. Reimbursement of public sector As determined Payable prior to issuance of
feasibility study cost, if applicable by AEDB/ LoS, based on actual
CA costs incurred, up to
maximum ceiling
Reimbursement of private sector As per cost
feasibility cost, if applicable ascertained by
AEDB from
relevant
accounts
e. Performance Guarantee for US$ 2,500/MW Payable upon approval of
issuance of Letter of Support (LoS) capacity power purchase tariff by
by AEDB/CA NEPRA
f. Legal fees Subject to a cap of US$ 100,000 for projects

above 50 MW, US$ 50,000 for projects in the
range of 6-50 MW, US$ 20,000 for projects in
the range of 1-5 MW, and no charge for
projects of capacity below 1 MW
Note: Upon financial close, the IPP will provide a Letter of Credit (LC) to the power purchaser as Performance Guarantee
as specified in the EPA (US$3/kW per month), subsequent to which the original Performance Guarantee furnished
at the time of issuance of the LoS shall be released.
4.17.2 Enterprise Structure and Licensing Requirements
Each IPP setting up a plant meant only for supplying power to the utility grid shall be
required to form a company in accordance with the laws of Pakistan under the
Companies Ordinance, 1984, for the specific purpose of power generation and for
obtaining a generation license from NEPRA. However, producers who wish to establish
plants whose power output is not exclusively for sale to the utility (e.g., captive or
dedicated plants with or without grid spillover provision) would be exempt from such a
requirement.

4.17.3 Lockin Period
The ‘Main Sponsor’ (defined as the individual or group holding at least 20% equity in the
IPP project), together with other initial project shareholders, must hold 51% of the
project equity for a period up to the project’s Commercial Operation Date (COD).
4.17.4 Type of Contracts
RE IPP projects for sale of all power to the grid may be implemented through either
‘Build, Own, and Operate’ (BOO) or ‘Build, Own, Operate, and Transfer’ (BOOT) contracts
between the parties concerned, valid for a period of not less than 20 years.
For the other type of projects, no such contracts shall be required. Instead, for captive,
dedicated, or grid spillover projects, or projects availing ‘net billing’, ‘wheeling’ or
‘banking’ facilities (see Sections 4.6.3, 4.8.1 & 4.8.3), separate contractual arrangements
will be required between the parties dealing with matters such as metering,
maintenance of interconnection, system protection, and billing of net sales and
purchase, wheeling, and banking charges/tariffs, etc.
4.17.5 Nature of Equipment
Projects which are meant for generating electricity for the sole purpose of supply to the
utility (NTDC or DISCOs) grid system, i.e., grid‐connected RE IPPs, will be required to use
new equipment. There shall be no such restriction on other producers.
5 Medium Term Offgrid RESE Policy
5.1 Scope of Policy
The Medium Term Off‐grid RES‐E Policy is aimed to provide electricity services to
populations living in villages, settlements, and scattered households not connected to
the power grid15 by employing renewable or hybrid technologies. The qualifying target
settlements are those not included in any national or regional grid expansion plans
spanning the next ten years and are located beyond 20 km of the existing power grid.
These villages/scattered dwellings can be supplied electricity based on renewable
sources of energy generation, either by stand‐alone or mini‐grid systems with an
installed generation capacity less than 5 MW. RES‐E technologies addressed under this
policy include:
• Hybrid systems, in which at least one renewable energy source is employed
besides conventional thermal generation

15

• Bio‐energy resulting from anaerobic gas digestors, pyrolitic biomass

gasification, co‐generation, etc.
5.2 Assessment of Target Populations
The AEDB shall consolidate and update, with the assistance of power utilities and
provincial/regional/local governments, a complete assessment of un‐electrified villages
and scattered communities falling under the scope of this policy. This list should include
at the very least: the name of the village/settlement and province/region, geospatial
coordinates, number of inhabitants, and number of households. This database should
be completed within six (6) months of this policy coming into effect.
5.3 Medium Term Electrification Targets
At least 25% of off‐grid un‐electrified villages identified by the AEDB in each province or
region should be supplied with RE‐sourced electricity by December 31, 2014.
5.4 Multiple Deployment Approach
Off‐grid electrification can be developed either:
• Directly by provincial/regional/local governments on a self‐financed, voluntary
basis and/or driven by social players without recourse to national subsidies, or
• Via national‐provincial coordination, in which provincial/regional governments
compete for federal government assistance to finance their respective off‐grid
projects.
Under the first mechanism, provincial/regional/local governments are fully entitled to
develop electrification projects within their own territorial jurisdictions. Each
province/region may develop a simplified regime for off‐grid project deployment,
following which bilateral agreements between the parties involved must be reached to
enforce project implementation. These agreements shall be arranged solely by the
relevant parties which would mutually decide on tariffs, quality of service, and other
contractual terms.
Under the second alternative, a coordinated plan amongst national and
provincial/regional authorities will be set up to assign competences to the different
parties involved in order to maximize their operational potential and capabilities for
achieving effective and efficient off‐grid rural electrification utilizing RES‐E.
The remainder of this policy statement will elaborate exclusively on the framework for
off‐grid RES‐E deployment utilizing federal funding.

5.5 Coordination Amongst National and Provincial Authorities
5.5.1 Offgrid Electrification Agencies
Provincial/regional governments—through their respective Off‐grid Electrification
Agency (OGEA)16 and in close cooperation with local governments—shall be the key
stakeholders for promoting off‐grid rural electrification within their territorial borders.
Each province shall create a OGEA, or assign the functions of the OGEA to an existing
institution, within six (6) months of this policy becoming effective. The functions of the
OGEA in relation to off‐grid electrification are:
• Assist the AEDB in consolidating and updating target village and scattered
population assessment for off‐grid RES‐E deployment.
• Prepare specific electrification projects for identified villages and scattered
populations.
• Provide a single‐window facility for project sponsors at the regional level.
• Help develop and implement qualifying projects, based on the guidelines
defined in this policy.
• Issue tenders, evaluate bids, and issue off‐grid project authorizations.
• Monitor the quality of service provided by authorization holders.
• Set the fees for off‐grid services.
• Manage and disburse allocated national subsidy to authorized service
providers.
• Wherever possible, ensure the assistance and participation of local
governments in RES‐E deployment.
5.5.2 Project Selection
The AEDB shall act as the national off‐grid RES‐E program coordinator and shall
determine the allocation of national funds to different off‐grid electrification projects
based on rules previously defined by the Government of Pakistan.
Each provincial/regional OGEA will prepare and submit to the AEDB a location‐specific
RE‐based electrification project derived from the approved list of villages and scattered
populations consolidated by the AEDB. Each project assessment shall cover, at a
minimum, the following aspects:
• Socioeconomic characteristic of target village/scattered population.
• Study on power demand potential and projected supply.
• Generation technology/ies to be deployed.

16
Or any related agency/department designated as such by the provincial government or regional administration for
the development of all off‐grid rural electrification projects in its territorial jurisdiction.

• Number of households to be connected.
• Proposed implementation period.
• Total cost of the project, segregated between capital and operational
expenditures.
• Detailed cash flow projections for the project.
• Social benefits due to project implementation.
• Quality‐of‐service characteristics.
The proposed off‐grid projects should not strictly focus on providing electricity services
only. It is highly desirable that projects should include, to the extent feasible, domestic
equipment, water installations, and or any other facility that could help to improve the
social and human development of the target village/scattered population.
Each project must strictly comply with the guidelines developed by the AEDB for proper
comparison, benchmarking, and analysis. It shall be the duty of the AEDB to document
simplified procedures for project approval, including criteria for ranking projects and
definition of the parameters needed to obtain comparable project proposals (e.g., the
cost of different generation technologies).
The AEDB shall collect all project proposals and shall create an annual project portfolio.
This portfolio will be organized according to a merit order based only on the social cost‐
benefit analysis of the project.
5.5.3 Social CostBenefit Analysis
The AEDB will approve projects according to a merit order based on a standardized
social cost‐benefit analysis. The social cost‐benefit analysis shall consider:
• The subsidy requirement (total and as a share of total cost), in terms of both
capital investment and for operating the service.
• The beneficiary population involved.
• The economic development benefits evaluated on the basis of contribution to
economic output and growth, including direct and indirect economic costs and
benefits. Among other analyses, this should include the expected improvement
in, for instance, water supply, sanitation, education, health, gender issues,
employment, incomes, and other sustainable and human development
indicators of the community, instead of just kWh supplied.
5.5.4 Project Implementation
Once a project has been awarded by the AEDB, the OGEAs—in cooperation with local
governments—shall invite public tenders for granting a 10‐year Authorization to develop
off‐grid electricity services following technology specifications stated in the relevant

electrification project. If convenient (i.e., for proximate projects), several concession
areas or population centers may be grouped under a common tender.
All types of stakeholders (cooperatives, NGOs, private individuals, and private
companies) shall be eligible to participate in the off‐grid tender process provided they
meet a minimum set of technical qualifications to be defined by the OGEAs with the
guidance of the AEDB.
The AEDB shall define the standard Authorization template that the OGEAs will apply to
specific project tenders. In the Authorization, at a minimum the following would be
included:
• Schedule for electrification.
• Rights and obligations of all parties involved.
• Applicable tariffs/fees.
• Milestones for subsidy delivery.
• Quality of service regulation, including standards adjusted for each technology
and fines for non‐compliance.
• Community capacity building (provision of technical training, productivity
enhancement, and other incentives to promote community involvement and
economic development of the area).
• Conditions for termination of the Authorization.
The primary criterion for selecting the winning bid will be least subsidy demanded for
capital investment.
The Authorization to develop the project shall be issued by the OGEA on behalf of
provincial/regional governments.
5.6 Subsidies
The federal government shall provide subsidies for capital investments to the extent of
70% of the total investment required for the project, as previously approved by the
AEDB.
The remaining capital and O&M costs, including replacement costs, may be financed by
any, or a combination, of the following:
• The respective OGEAs, employing provincial/regional government funds.
• The tariffs/fees for the off‐grid services defined by the OGEA, taking into
account the customers’ ability to pay and instituted in close cooperation with
local governments
• Community contribution to such schemes may be in the form of sweat equity
(labor), land, and/or cash.
• NGO or private contributions.

The provincial/regional governments shall ensure the sustainability of the projects by
providing adequate funds to the Authorization holder or to the local community, once
the Authorization is expired.
As subsidies are provided, they shall be limited to the amounts needed for basic social
and human needs, including basic economic activities. Some consumers may want to
pay more for higher levels of quality and/or quantity of electricity service, in which case
the extra quality or quantity must be paid for by the customer as per provisions in the
bilateral agreement with the service provider.
5.7 Offgrid Electrification Account
In order to provide funds to off‐grid projects, an Off‐grid Electrification Account (OGEAC)
in the budget for the AEDB shall be created. The OGEAC settlement shall be an attribute
restricted solely to the AEDB.
The OGEAC shall be financed by:
• Government budgetary allocations. The request for funds to the Ministry of
Finance will be made by the Ministry of Water and Power, as estimated by the
AEDB in accordance with the off‐grid electrification project targets, and
• Grants and loans that multilateral/bilateral financing and donor agencies may
provide.
Delivery of federal subsidies shall be output‐based and only related to capital
expenditures. The OGEAs, directly or the through local governments, will monitor the
fulfillment of the milestones defined in the Authorization in terms of investment, and
ask for subsidy delivery to the AEDB who will transfer the funds to the holder of the
Authorization. The AEDB may develop spot monitoring of the projects in order to cross‐
check the use of these national subsidies.
The government—through state‐owned banks—will provide financing facilities at
preferential rates, collateralized by the future stream of subsidy deliveries defined in the
Authorization.
5.8 Fee Structure
Determination of the level and structure of the off‐grid electricity service fees shall be
the sole responsibility of the provincial/regional governments, working in collaboration
with local governments. The OGEAs will define the fee structure for each Authorization
according to the following criteria:
• In stand‐alone systems, a one‐part tariff (Rs/customer) shall be preferred.
• In community (mini‐ and micro‐grids) system, one part‐tariff based on the
contracted capacity (Rs/kW‐contracted) shall be preferred. In these systems,
each customer will have an on‐site power limiter installed disconnect service if
the contracted capacity is exceeded.

• In such cases where the customer is willing to pay for a higher quality or more
energy than required for basic needs, a metering device may be installed.
5.9 Financial and Fiscal Incentives
All projects under the scope of this policy shall be eligible for all fiscal and financial
incentives described in Section 4.5. These facilities shall be equally applicable to private,
public‐private, non‐governmental and public sector renewable energy power projects.
5.10 Allocation of Carbon Credits
All qualifying off‐grid projects eligible for financing under the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) shall be encouraged to register for Certified Emissions Reduction
(CER) credits with the CDM Executive Board, either collectively or individually. Holders
of the Authorization shall assume all costs, risks, and benefits of qualifying for and
obtaining CERs, including the potential revenues associated with them. Authorization
holders would be free to arrange for independent funding, buy‐back, and CER trading
facilities with third parties on their own. The GoP shall facilitate this process to the
extent possible, excluding financing from public funds of CDM‐related project costs.
5.11 Security Package and Risk Cover
Due to the nature of the projects envisaged under the Off‐Grid RE Policy, no security
package or risk cover shall be required or provided.
5.12 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Consents
Regulatory consents and processing requirements for off‐grid services shall be simplified
to the extent possible, so as to expedite the development of such projects and enable
small communities and investors to participate fully in these schemes.
No regulatory or operational consents from NEPRA, the NTDC, or DISCOs shall be
required for such projects. The only necessary regulatory consent shall be in the form of
the Project Information Memorandum (PIM), containing all technical and economic
features of the project. The PIM shall be developed by the OGEAs and submitted to the
AEDB for review and acceptance. For projects not soliciting national funding support,
this consent shall also not be required.
There shall be no requirement from the federal and provincial Environmental Protection
Agencies (EPAs) for submission of an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) for off‐grid
projects of up to 1 MW. The EPAs shall define a simplified basic environmental
compliance and impact checklist that shall be completed by the OGEAs for all projects
and submitted to the EPAs prior to award of the project by the AEDB, primarily to ensure
that water rights, flows, and community interests are not unduly infringed upon.
Additionally, as a condition of the Authorization, the project sponsor shall be required to
certify how design, engineering, construction, and safety criteria will be addressed
during the course of its construction and operation.

5.13 Performance Monitoring and Enforcement
Project performance shall be monitored by provincial and or local governments. The
OGEAs will develop a program of awareness in their areas to enable direct monitoring of
the service provider by customers and other community stakeholders.
The monitoring process should have two main parts:
• Investment plan monitoring: This involves verification of the investment

milestones defined in the Authorization being reached as a trigger for the AEDB
to release subsidy payments. This monitoring shall be performed by the OGEAs.
involves monitoring that service quality standards defined in the Authorization.
Service quality includes targeted hours of service, number and duration of
interruptions, and safety of the system. Quality of service regulation shall be
defined by AEDB as part of the standard Authorization, considering the
principles of simplicity and enforceability. The monitoring shall be based on
customers’, or other community stakeholders’, claims.

Annex II: AEDB Position Paper 1:
Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term
OnGrid RESE Policy

AEDB Position Paper 1:
Proposal for Pakistan’s MediumTerm
OnGrid RESE Policy

1 Background
Recent studies developed under ADB TA 4881‐PAK show that the economic penetration
of on‐grid renewable energy (RE) power in Pakistan should be around 17 TWh in 2020.
This is around 7% of total grid‐based electrical power generation expected for that year.
The fact that any capacity approaching this share is not currently developed indicates
that some strong barriers may exist, especially if we consider that the marginal cost of
RE is around USD 75/MWh and the cost of generation based on FO is more than USD
125/MWh. This provides a very strong economic signal favoring the development of RE,
and it can therefore be concluded that some impediments—of administrative,
regulatory, or financial kind—are responsible for the current lackluster RE deployment in
the country. Almost 60% of this expected RE share would be comprised of hydel plants
that are much cheaper than combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) running on fuel oil (FO),
which in turn defines the price of avoided generation. The other two RE technologies
that should be ‘naturally’ developed in Pakistan are bagasse‐based combined heat and
power (CHP) and other types of biomass conversion. Definitely, small‐scale hydel is the
cheapest option for developing RE in Pakistan and should be encouraged as early as
possible.
A national on‐grid RE policy should be based on a social assessment of cost and benefits.
The analysis of natural penetration based on private costs alone does not consider
externalities, and therefore represents a limited subset of such an analysis. The same
studies have observed that the optimal penetration of RE generation when social costs
are also considered should be around 25 TWh in 2020, which is around 10.3% of total
on‐grid power generation expected for that year. Market failure (i.e., externalities not
properly being internalized) would thus hamper the development of about 8 TWh of
renewable energy, and so that an economic incentive mechanism needs to be put in
place, assuming that all other barriers that block the development of natural
penetration of RE have also been removed (grid access, difficult to sign sales contracts,
etc). Under social cost assessment, not only hydel and biomass plants, but also biogas
(from farm slurries, sewage, landfills, etc.) and wind energy plants are required to
generate, in order to replace CCGTs running on FO and natural gas—as a matter of fact,
the studies show that all FO‐based generation would need to be replaced, as well as
around 15 % of the gas‐based generation in 2020 because the marginal cost of RE for
supplying this quota is around USD 100/MWh. If the policy to achieve these results is
properly defined and implemented, the social wealth (total surplus) that may be created
in Pakistan is about USD 2,100 million per year.
Whereas a year and a half is certainly not a sufficient time period over which to make a
definitive diagnosis of the current short‐term RE policy—as several projects are still

maturing, and therefore additional time should be allowed to evaluate their further
progress towards actual implementation—nevertheless, several symptoms exist that
indicate potential problems in achieving the aforementioned RE penetration goals unless
policy elements are adjusted promptly. One of the critical issues is the existing dual
mechanism for setting tariffs for RE projects: a developer may apply for either the
upfront tariff defined by NEPRA and/or raise a tariff petition to be reviewed by the
regulator on a case‐by‐case basis. Obviously, having both possibilities at hand, virtually
all developers have chosen the second option, and in all proposed RE IPP projects have
asked for tariffs higher than the upfront one offered by the regulator. In terms of its
formulation, the current tariff system for unsolicited RE proposals is based on a ‘cost‐
plus’ approach. The cost‐plus computation requires a case‐by‐case determination of the
applicable tariff for every single producer. From a regulator’s point of view, the
advantage of this methodology is the ability to reduce infra‐marginal rents (i.e.,
producers’ surplus) down to zero and, therefore, maximize the consumers’ surplus.
Nevertheless, this approach presents several major shortcomings, which can be
summarized as follows:
• Investors, taking advantage of asymmetries in information access (as only the
developer has intimate knowledge of a particular project’s costs and
peculiarities), can ‘game’ against the mechanism to obtain higher infra‐marginal
rents.
• It decreases the financial incentive to invest in RES‐E technologies, as
developers are deprived of most of the infra‐marginal rents.
• It increases in the administrative burden in processing projects, and increases
the possibility of unavoidable systemic delays.
This approach has been adopted in Pakistan so far in order to help reduce the risk faced
by the developers who want to undertake such projects, since it guarantees a return‐on‐
equity (ROE) of at least 15 %. While it is true that this method reduces some of the risks
to the developer, it is also true that it eliminates any additional incentive to develop
these types of projects. For instance, the ROE assured is the same regardless the type of
power generation project under consideration (i.e., renewable or conventional). This
can lead to quite curious situations, such as that the upfront tariff allowed by NEPRA for
conventional generation using reciprocating engines burning diesel oil (USD
119.7/MWh) is 25% higher than the upfront tariff for generation using wind (USD
95/MWh), regardless of the benefits that the latter brings to the environment or in
terms of fuel independence.
Additionally, available international evidence shows that feed‐in (up‐front) tariffs are
the best incentive mechanism for developing RE capacity, as can be observed in the
cases of Europe and some BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. International
experience also shows that the tariff is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for
developing RE energy; grid access, administrative issues (contracts, licenses, permits,
multiple uncoordinated processing windows, etc.), and instability of the incentive
mechanism are as relevant as the tariff policy for fostering the penetration of renewable
energy. A series of detailed annexes (Annexes IV to IX) prepared under ADB TA 4881‐
PAK conclusively indicate that RE technology‐wise feed‐in tariffs—based on an optimal

balance between the marginal social supply curves of RE and conventional generation in
Pakistan (i.e., on the ‘avoided‐cost’ principle)—would offer the most economical, ‘least‐
cost’ power generation mix for the country in the medium term and beyond (i.e., to
2020) and would maximize the social surplus created in society while at the same time
allocating a reasonable share to private investors which would serve as a necessary and
strong incentive to ensure that the RE penetration targets stated earlier can be
achieved. Such fixed, non‐negotiable tariffs would help circumvent the protracted rate
negotiations that recently proposed RE IPPs have been embroiled in, introduce an
element of competition and urgency in project implementation, ensure that all
economically viable RE technologies are simultaneously developed, provide an
economically viable basis for the regulator to determine sustainable RE pricing, and help
prioritize available ‘least‐cost’ and ‘best‐site’ RE development on a fast track that can
significantly help kick off the RE power generation industry in Pakistan.
2 Extension of RE Shortterm Policy
The current short‐term on‐grid RE policy must be extended to June 30, 2009, i.e., by
one calendar year beyond the current expiration date of June 30, 2008. This is required
in order to allow projects that are presently at an advanced processing stage to achieve
financial closure under existing policy stipulations as envisaged by the investors, as well
as to afford a reasonable timeframe for stakeholders to confer about the mid‐term
policy. An official announcement to this effect should be made at the earliest to assure
investors of continuity in the policy environment and allow them to plan accordingly.
3 RE Medium Term Policy AtaGlance
3.1 Target Markets
The scope of this policy is on‐grid RE; ‘on‐grid’ RE means grid‐connected power
generation fueled by renewable resources (either to transmission or distribution
systems). For purposes of RE policy definition, ‘on‐grid RE’ includes the following
renewable energy technologies (RETs), for individual project installed capacity higher
than 1 MW:
• Small hydro of 50 MW or less capacity
• Solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal energy for power generation
• Municipal solid waste‐to‐energy (WTE) power
• Landfill methane recovery, and
• Bio‐energy resulting from:
o Anaerobic biogas digestors
o Pyrolytic biomass gasification, co‐firing, cogeneration, etc.

The medium‐term RE policy should be applied from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2014.17
Although in the current short‐term Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for
Power Generation, 2006, the medium‐term policy to be developed was envisaged to be
implemented for a four‐year period, AEDB recognizes that incentives‐based policies
require at least five years of sustained promotion in order to be successful and bear
results; policy incentives must remain stable and assured over a reasonably extended
period in order for investment confidence to build up, supportive institutional capacity
to develop, and implementation bottlenecks to be gradually and systematically
removed.
3.3 Consistency Across Policies
An RE project that achieves financial closure before the onset of the next policy phase
should continue to be guaranteed all the incentives, terms, and conditions defined in the
applicable short‐term RE policy over the tenure of its Power Purchase Agreement (PPA).
An important aspect regarding various successive policy periods is that of assuring
continuity for projects that have been implemented under a certain policy, even in the
case that the relevant policy or specific incentives change in the meantime. This
approach ensures the consistency and stability of an RE deployment climate from the
perspective of both investors and power purchasers, as well as other relevant
stakeholders.
3.4 Tariff Incentives
3.4.1 Selected Approach
AEDB’s proposal for determining the RE‐based power procurement tariffs for the
medium‐term policy regime is:
• To set up‐front tariffs for each technology based on the ‘avoided‐cost’
approach for those technologies whose marginal cost is lower than the
avoided social cost. For these technologies, NEPRA will need to set technology‐
wise feed‐in tariffs based on the characteristics of the RE technologies (‘supply
curve analysis’), bounded by the range obtained from the use of private and
social avoided costs. According the referential studies already developed (see
Annex VII), this means that for those technologies (small‐scale hydel, biomass,
biogas, and wind), up‐front tariffs would range approximately between USD
75/MWh and USD 100/MWh.
• To set up‐front tariffs for each technology based on the marginal cost of
providing the quota set by the Government of Pakistan for those technologies
whose marginal cost is higher than avoided social cost. An up‐front tariff is
also proposed to foster the deployment of any specific RE technology that
promises additional benefits to society (i.e., meets industrial policy objectives,

17
This assumes that the current short‐term on‐grid RE policy will be extended to June 30, 2009, as stated earlier, in
order to allow some wind IPPs presently nearing financial closure to do so by early 2008.

creates employment opportunities, provides economical disposal mechanism

for wastes, etc.) that are not explicitly included in the supply curve of that
technology because they are currently ‘expensive’ (PV, solar thermal, WTE);
however, a good policy should prevent a reasonable, justifiable target quota for
them (defined in terms of installed MW) from being overshot.
• Discontinue the present system of negotiated RE power purchase tariffs (i.e.,
case‐by‐case petitioning for project tariffs above the up‐front tariff).
• The competitive bidding alternative (i.e., tendering) must be kept as an option
for only those technologies whose marginal cost is higher than avoided social
cost.
3.4.2 Structure of Tariffs
Up‐front tariffs should be denominated in Pakistan Rupees/kWh. The up‐front tariffs
should be based on a one‐part pricing approach (i.e., a single energy charge). Two‐part
tariffs (capacity payments plus energy payments) are difficult for most RES‐E
technologies, as most of them cannot guarantee capacity availability—even in the case
of biomass‐based generation, which may be constrained by seasonal harvests. Despite
the fact that some types of hydel plants may be in a position of providing firm capacity
commitments to the system, for the sake of simplicity the use only an energy charge is
recommended.
3.4.3 Indexation for Upfront Tariffs
Up‐front tariffs must be adjusted based only on local currency variations. The
indexation of tariffs with the US dollar exchange rate should be automatic on a six‐
monthly basis. Another possibility presently under discussion is to use a reference a
currency basket comprising of both US Dollars and Euros (e.g., 50:50).
3.5 Type of Contract
The RE projects should be implemented on the basis of ‘Build, Own, and Operate’ (BOO).
3.6 Allocation of Network Investment Cost
The construction of transmission lines for evacuation of power from any RE IPP should
be the responsibility of the NTDC, KESC or a DISCO (depending on the location and
supply voltage of the project) if the length of the connection required from the project’s
outgoing bus bar to existing grid installations is shorter than 20 km, unless the IPP, of its
own choice, undertakes to install such infrastructure on a mutually agreed upon
transmission charge with the NTDC. The NTDC should bear all expenses associated with
power balancing on the grid to accommodate priority dispatch and variability on account
of the RE project, and ensure that these expenditures are made in a timely fashion.
3.7 Mandatory RE Power Purchasing
Until the CPPA ceases its activities as the central power purchase agency, all contracts
for power generation from RE concluded under the current RE policy should be signed
by the CPPA—excepting those bracketed as ‘direct sales’. After the CPPA ceases its

activities, neither distributors nor transmission companies should have the right to
reject, in part or in entirety, any contract signed previously between the CPPA and an RE
power generator. NEPRA should establish a future methodology for compensating those
DISCOs/TRANSCOs that are forced to accept contracts with a feed‐in tariff under the
medium‐term RE policy.
3.8 Direct Sales
with eligible end‐use customers. In that case, prices should not require approval by
NEPRA.
AEDB considers logical as well as administratively simpler for RE investors to assume the
risks and benefits of qualifying for and obtaining certified emissions reduction (CERs),
along with the potential revenues associated with them. The current allocation of
carbon credit revenues between RE investors (IPPs) and the power purchasers (state
entity) is unnecessarily complicated and was considered necessary under the prevailing
cost‐plus tariff determination methodology; however, with up‐front tariffs, such a
situation would no longer hold. Additionally, the allocation of future CER revenues
entirely to the RE developer would act as a much stronger additional financial incentive
and would be more consistent with CDM eligibility under its ‘financial barrier’
assessment criteria.
3.10 Land and Site Access
or right‐of‐way (RoW) for project development, as well as providing site access on a
case‐to‐case basis by leasing, acquisition of RoW, and/or construction of road linkages.
However, the primary responsibility for acquiring land and site access should rest with
the project sponsors.
3.11 Incentives Other Than Tariffs
AEBD believes that current general incentives, including the sovereign risk guarantee,
the financial regime, and the fiscal regime, as defined in the 2006 RE policy, are
adequate and should be continued into the medium term stage as well.
3.12 Roles of Institutions
In the medium‐term RE policy tenure, AEDB is not forecasting major changes in the
different roles that each stakeholder institution has in facilitating renewable energy
development and project implementation in Pakistan. However, AEDB considers that
some slight clarification of AEDB and NEPRA roles may be to the benefit of the policy, as
would some changes brought about by specific policy provisions (e.g., absence of need
for independent wind speed monitoring and verification).
AEDB has detected that pre‐feasibility studies are critical for the development of some
RE resources (mostly hydel and some biogas projects) and for relatively immature or

new technologies. The cost and complexity of undertaking such studies is a major
barrier for the private sector seeking to develop RE projects in Pakistan, and often
readily bankable projects are not synchronized with the availability of concessional IFI
financing (e.g., the ADB’s REDSIP multi‐tranche RE financing facility). AEDB and
provincial administrations must undertake the lead responsibility of developing these
pre‐feasibility studies, either through GoP and/or IFI financing (grants and/or soft loans).
In the case of NEPRA, this proposal requires NEPRA to define feed‐in tariffs according to
the conceptual approaches presented in this paper (and detailed in Annex VII), as well
as to approve the application of pre‐defined up‐front tariff to a specific RE project, and
to adjust grid and distribution codes in order not to block the development of RE IPPs.
This may require a review and adjustment of NEPRA rules, which is currently being
undertaken.
3.13 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Consents
AEDB judges that the existing institutional, legal, and regulatory consents required prior
to approval and implementation of RE IPP projects must not be changed for the
medium‐term RE policy, except for simplified permitting provisions for small‐scale plants
(i.e., less than 5 MW capacity).
3.14 Procedural Requirements
AEDB believes that the processing schedule foreseen in the 2006 RE Policy is largely
adequate. However, it must be adjusted to the tariff regime that is instituted under the
medium‐term RE policy, and should be reduced in overall duration to the extent
reasonably possible.

Annex III: AEDB Position Paper 2:
Proposal for Pakistan’s Medium Term
OffGrid RESE Policy

AEDB Position Paper 2:
Proposal for Pakistan’s MediumTerm
OffGrid RESE Policy
1 Background
grid extension and/or conventional energy‐powered mini‐grids developed by large,
state‐owned utilities. These extensions have usually been financed through cross‐
subsidies between consumers, or by loans or grants provided by the government.
Recently, the spectrum of electrification models has widened, including a long list of off‐
grid solutions such as wind and solar home systems (WHSs and SHSs) and isolated mini‐
hydel/wind/solar grids, amongst many others.
Conceptually, this fact has already been considered in devising the short‐term
renewable energy (RE) policy by the Government of Pakistan (GoP). However, Annexure
B of Pakistan’s short‐term 2006 RE Policy18 provides only a brief set of guidelines for the
development of small off‐grid hydel projects, with some provisions applying to other RE‐
sourced electricity (RES‐E) technologies as well. At present, there is no national policy for
off‐grid electricity investments—the lack of which creates confusion amongst
stakeholders which, in turn, greatly affects the development of rural electrification.19
Additionally, the guidelines stated in the 2006 RE Policy assign identical roles to the
AEDB, provincial, and AJK governments for RES‐E project implementation. This
overlapping can be counterproductive, as it can create duplication of tasks amongst
national and provincial institutions, possible conflicts of interest, and coordination issues
between the different agencies involved.
Several off‐grid RES‐E projects have recently been initiated in Pakistan, either by the
federal government or by provincial governments, with differing outcomes. The AEDB
has been actively participating in such efforts, particularly in the promotion of stand‐
alone SHSs (in Sindh and Balochistan) as well as micro‐ and mini‐hydel projects (in AJK,
Punjab and NWFP). Probably, the most ambitious project has been the Khushaal
Pakistan program launched in 2001, which envisaged 100% electricity coverage by the
end of 2007, a target which was definitely not accomplished. Currently, the most active
project, in terms of rural electrification, is the Roshan Pakistan program. The objective is
to provide electrification services to 7,874 isolated villages, aimed at improving the
standards of living in these communities by providing access to lightning, information
and communications technology, drinking water, and, as a consequence of displacing
fossil fuels for lighting, better health conditions. Currently, 400 villages have been
electrified or are under the process of electrification through this program.

18
Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB), Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation,
2006, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: December 2006.
19
Presently, as in the past, rural electrification in Pakistan is being pursued almost exclusively through state‐financed
grid extension and limited mini‐grid hydel and thermal (diesel) generation.

An important gap in the current GoP electrification strategy is the absence of a formal,
clear demarcation of off‐grid areas and/or isolated/scattered populations. Such a
definition should determine the geographical areas and future power markets for which
extension of the national grid would remain uneconomical into the foreseeable future.
This is an essential first step in designing any rural electrification project, as it provides a
means for fully understanding the key characteristics of the unelectrified
villages/settlements and for properly assessing the deployment of appropriate
generation technologies. Even though precise data are unavailable, it is estimated that in
2006, approximately 40,000 villages in Pakistan lacked electricity services and about
8,000 out of them could only be electrified based on off‐grid solutions. In some areas,
such as in Balochistan, the situation is critical, with as much as 90% of the villages not
having access to grid power and being widely dispersed, with an average province‐wide
population density as low as 22 inhabitants/km2. Despite the lack of proper data, it can
be estimated that for electrifying 8,000 villages and scattered populations, at least
USD 725 million would be required; in case some of the villages to be electrified by grid
extension (around 32,000) also require off‐grid solutions, the financial cost can become
even higher.
The two most critical issues with respect to the current practice of off‐grid electrification
are scale and sustainability. Until now, efforts, both federal and provincial, though
successful, have been on a very limited scale. The sheer number of isolated villages and
scattered settlements in Pakistan requiring off‐grid electricity provision, however,
mandates an organizational approach and systematic effort on a scale that has not been
attempted before in the country. Secondly, the sustainability of the (off‐grid)
electrification solutions utilized is also essential, both for ensuring proper operation of
the installations as well as in terms of continued financing of their capital and recurring
costs.
The proposed medium‐term off‐grid RES‐E policy intends to overcome these issues
through appropriate design provisions, as detailed in a background study prepared
under ADB TA 4881‐PAK (Annex IX).
2 Medium Term Offgrid RESE Policy Recommendations
2.1 Target Markets
The target population for off‐grid RES‐E deployment is that living in ‘off‐grid’20 villages
and remote, scattered households. These villages/scattered dwellings can be supplied
electricity, and eventually drinking water, based on renewable sources of energy
generation, either by standalone or mini‐grid systems. The AEDB, along with the
distribution utilities, shall be responsible for elaborating (and properly updating) a
database of all villages/settlements falling under the purview of this ‘target’ definition,
and this list should include at the very least: the name of the village/settlement and

20
For purposes of this policy, ‘off‐grid’ settlements are defined as those that are currently unelectrified, are not
included in any national or regional grid expansion plan for the next ten years, and are located more than 20 km
from existing power grid(s).

province,21 its geospatial coordinates, number of inhabitants, and number of
households.
RES‐E technologies included in this portfolio consist of, at a minimum:
• Bio‐energy resulting from anaerobic gas digestors, pyrolitic biomass
gasification, cogeneration, etc.
Any type of national and/or regional grid expansion is outside the scope of this policy, as
is any RES‐E project that plans to electrify a village with an installed generation capacity
larger than 1 MW.
The implementation period of this policy shall be 2009 to 2014.22
2.3 Rationale and Institutional Organization
Off‐grid electrification can be developed either:
• Via national‐provincial coordination in which provincial governments compete
for federal government assistance to finance their off‐grid projects.
Under the first mechanism, provincial governments are fully in charge of developing the
electrification projects within their respective territorial jurisdictions. Each province may
adopt its own simplified regime for off‐grid project deployment, following which
bilateral agreements between the parties involved are reached to enforce project
implementation. These agreements are arranged solely by the relevant parties which
decide on tariffs, quality of service, and other contractual terms.
Under the second alternative, a coordinated plan has to be set up to assign
competences to the different parties involved in order to maximize their operational
potential and capabilities for achieving effective and efficient off‐grid electrification. The
main characteristics and tasks for stakeholders in this respect are summarized in
Exhibit 1.

21
For brevity, the term ‘province’ or ‘province/unit’ is used in this document to refer to all mutually exclusive
administrative units below the national level, i.e., Punjab, Sindh, North West Frontier Province (NWFP),
Balochistan, Northern Areas (NA), Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT), as
well as Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK).
22
Exact calendar date to be determined.

The remainder of this paper deals specifically with the second option (i.e., federally‐
assisted off‐grid RES‐E deployment), as the first option (i.e., provincial and alternative or
self‐financed off‐grid electrification) lies under the purview of provincial/local
administrations.
Exhibit 1: Proposed Federally Assisted Off‐grid RES‐E Deployment Approach
State-owned Soft loans

banks
Ministry of
Water and OGREA budget
request
Power OGREA
Assessment
National off-grid
AEDB Off-grid
project Portfolio
Guidelines for
OGREA settlement
Villages and scattered Authorizations
Management
population
Provincial
Governments
(REAs) in Authorization
Awarded Tendering Performance
coordination Project Proposals issuance and
Projects Procedure monitoring
set tariffs
with local
governments
Priv. Investors
Developers NGOs
and Cooperatives Project Execution
operators Individuals
Others
IFIs and Financial and technical

donors assistance

The main features of the regulation proposed are as follows:
decide on the allocation of national funds to different off‐grid electrification
projects, based on rules previously defined by the Government of Pakistan and
agreed upon by all provinces/units;
• The AEDB will consolidate and update—with the assistance of the power
utilities, provincial governments, and unit administrations—a complete
assessment of unelectrified villages and scattered communities able to be
supplied by RES‐E technologies on an annual basis;
• Provincial/unit governments—through their respective Rural Electrification
Agencies (REAs), and in close coordination with local governments—will be the
key stakeholders in promoting off‐grid rural electrification within their
geographical territories. Based on the list of annual target villages/populations
developed by them in collaboration with the AEDB and approved by the latter,

each REA will prepare and submit to the AEDB a village‐specific electrification
project in which, at least, the following aspects shall be covered:
o Socioeconomic characteristics of target village/scattered population.
o Total cost of the project, segregated between capital and operational
expenditures.
• The proposed off‐grid projects should not strictly focus on providing electricity
services only. It is highly desirable that projects should include, to the extent
feasible, domestic equipment, water installations, and or any other facility that
could help to improve the social and human development of the target
village/scattered population.
• Each project must strictly comply with the guidelines proposed by the AEDB for
proper comparison, benchmarking, and analysis. It will be the duty of the AEDB
to document simplified procedures for project approval, including criteria for
ranking the projects and the definition of the parameters needed to obtain
comparable project proposals (e.g., the costs of different generation
technologies).
• The AEDB will collect all project proposals and will create an annual project
portfolio. This portfolio shall be organized according to a merit order based
solely on a standardized social cost‐benefit analysis of the projects.
government, in cooperation with local governments will call for tenders for
granting, at least, a 10‐year Authorization to develop off‐grid electricity services
following technology specifications stated in the electrification project. If
convenient (i.e., for proximate villages), several projects may be combined for
tendering under a single authorization.
• The primary criterion for selecting the winning bid for each Authorization will
be ‘least subsidy’ demanded for capital investments for
electrification/installation.
• All types of stakeholders (cooperatives, NGOs, private individuals, and private
companies) shall be eligible to participate in the tender process, provided they
meet a minimum set of technical qualifications to be defined by provincial REAs
with the guidance of the AEDB.

apply to specific project tenders. In the Authorization, at a minimum, the
following contents shall be included:
o Applicable tariffs or fees.
o Quality‐of‐service regulation, including standards adjusted for each
technology and fines for non‐compliance.
o Community capacity‐building (provision of technical training and other
incentives to promote the regional development of the area).
2.4 Targets and Incentives
At least 25% of all the currently off‐grid unelectrified villages identified by the AEDB
should be supplied with electricity by December 31, 2014. In order to achieve this target,
the federal government will provide subsidies for capital investments to the extent of
70% of the total investment required for each RES‐E project approved by the AEDB.
The AEDB will approve projects according to a merit order based on their respective
social cost‐benefit analysis. The standardized social cost‐benefit analysis should
consider:
• The subsidy requirement (total and as a share of total cost).
benefits. Included, in this respect, should be the expected improvement in, for
instance, water sanitation, education, health, gender issues, employment,
incomes, and other sustainable and human development indicators of the
community—instead of just kWh supplied.
The remaining capital and O&M costs, including replacement costs, would be financed
by:
• The tariffs or fees for the off‐grid services defined by the provincial REA, taking
into account the customers’ ability to pay.
• Community contributions to such schemes may be in the form of sweat equity
• NGO and private contributions.

As subsidies are provided, they should be limited to the amounts needed for basic social
pay more for higher levels of electricity service, such as more kWhs received and better
quality of service. In that case, the extra quality and quantity must be paid for by the
customer as per provisions in the bilateral agreement with the service provider.
2.5 Project Funding
(OGREA) in the budget for the AEDB should be created. This account could be financed
by:
Finance will be made by the Ministry of Water and Power as estimated by the
AEDB/REAs according to the needs imposed by the off‐grid electrification
project targets.
provide.
• A levy on retail grid‐supplied electricity tariffs.
The OGREA settlement is an attribute restricted solely to the AEDB. Delivery of subsidies
should be output‐based and only related to capital expenditures. The REAs directly or
the through the local government will monitor the fulfillment of the milestones defined
in the Authorization in terms of investment, and ask the AEDB for subsidy delivery in the
form of funds transferred directly to the holder of the Authorization. The AEDB may
develop spot monitoring of the projects in order to cross‐check the use of these national
subsidies.
Additionally, the government—through state‐owned banks—will provide financing
facilities at preferential rates, collateralized by the future stream of subsidy deliveries
defined in the Authorization.
2.6 Pricing
The level and structure of the service tariff will be the sole responsibility of the
provincial governments, to be developed in cooperation with local governments. The
REAs will define the tariff structure for each Authorization according to the following
criteria:
• In standalone systems, a one‐part tariff (Rs/customer) should be preferred.
each customer will have a power limiter installed in order to disconnect
him/her if the contracted capacity is exceeded.
• In those cases in which the customer is willing to pay for a higher quality or
more energy than required for basic needs, a metering device may be installed.

The AEDB believes that the current general financial and fiscal incentives, as defined in
the 2006 on‐grid RES‐E Policy, are adequate and should be continued into the medium
term as well and extended to off‐grid RES‐E investors. Additional facilities and incentives
may be provided to encourage the local manufacture of RES‐E technologies, with a view
to bringing their costs down and improving availability of spares and local service and
maintenance capabilities. It is not considered necessary to issue sovereign risk
guarantees for these types of projects, however.
The AEDB recommends a greater involvement of provincial and local institutions, as
international experience shows positive results in off‐grid rural electrification
deployment when regional and local governments actively participate in the decision‐
making and implementation process. According to this view, provincial and local
governments should be directly involved in the activity of providing electricity services to
inhabitants living in scattered/isolated regions. Local stakeholders should also have an
active role in the process as a means to enhancing community acceptance and ensuring
successful deployment and operation.
The AEDB shall play a key role in off‐grid electrification development as it is not only the
main coordinator of the process at the national level, but will also be in charge of setting
guidelines for project formulation, implementation, and financing.
The Ministry of Water and power will define the budget request for the OGREA. In
addition, the Ministry will provide all the necessary means to assure that the fund is
created and properly managed.
2.9 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents
projects and enable small communities and investors to participate fully in these
schemes. Due to the characteristics of the proposed arrangements, no regulatory or
operational consents by NEPRA and NTDC /DISCOs are envisaged for such projects.
The AEDB suggests eliminating the Letter of Intent (LoI), Letter of Support (LoS), and
related guarantees that are required for on‐grid RES‐E projects. The only consent that
should be necessary is the Project Information Memorandum (PIM) for each project,
which would include all technical and economic features of the project. This is the
information that the AEDB will utilize to develop the national portfolio of off‐grid RES‐E
projects. In case the project does not require national funding support, this consent will
also not be required.
Concerning environmental issues, The AEDB proposes that the federal and provincial
Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs) remove the requirement of an Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) for off‐grid RES‐E projects of up to 1 MW capacity.

However, a basic environmental compliance and impact checklist should be developed
by the EPAs and required to be completed by the provincial REAs for all projects,
primarily to ensure that water rights, flows, and community interests are not unduly
infringed upon. Additionally, as a condition of the Authorization, the project developer
should certify how proper design, engineering, construction, and safety criteria will be
addressed in the execution of the project.
huge regulation costs. The monitoring process has two main parts:

milestones defined in the Authorization being reached, as a trigger for the
AEDB to release subsidy payments.
involves monitoring that service quality standards defined in the Authorization
are met throughout its period of validity. The regulator will establish standards
for product quality, service quality, and commercial quality. Product quality
includes stability of voltage and stability of frequency relative to benchmark
reference levels. Service quality includes targeted hours of service, number and
duration of interruptions, and safety of the system. Commercial quality includes
connection, accuracy in meter readings (for customers whose service requires
meter reading), accuracy in billing, and response time to resolve customer
complaints. It should be noted that fewer standards that can be effectively
monitored are preferable to many standards that are poorly monitored.
Performance monitoring and enforcement will be the responsibility of the provincial and
or local governments. The REAs should develop a program of awareness amongst their
service provider. The monitoring should be based on customers’ (or other stakeholders’)
claims.
The AEDB considers logical, as well as administratively simpler, for RES‐E investors to
assume the risks and benefits of qualifying for and obtaining Certified Emissions
Reductions (CERs), along with the potential revenues associated with them. However,
the AEDB would assist project developers applying for CDM registration through
programmatic or clustered, single‐umbrella application cover. In such cases, CDM
registration, validation, and verification costs and CER revenue sharing arrangements
shall be developed subsequently, as necessary.

Annex IV: Working Paper 1:
Relevant International Experience in
Incentives for Renewable Energy:
The Case of the EU25 and Selected Countries

Working Paper No. 1
The Case of the EU25 and
Selected Countries
Contents
Exhibits ....................................................................................................................... 83
Abbreviations and Acronyms ...................................................................................... 85
1 Objective .......................................................................................................................... 89
2 Current Policy Schemes for Promoting RE at a Glance ....................................................... 89
2.1 Price‐based Instruments...................................................................................... 89
2.2 Quantity‐based Instruments ............................................................................... 90
3 Current EU‐25 Experience on RE Development .................................................................. 94
3.1 RES Policy in the EU‐25 ........................................................................................ 94
3.2 RE Penetration in Electricity Generation ............................................................. 96
3.3 The EU‐25 Experience in RE Promotion .............................................................. 99
3.4 RE Development: Country Achievements vis‐à‐vis Promotional Schemes ....... 102
3.4.1 On‐shore Wind ...................................................................................... 102
3.4.2 Solid Biomass ......................................................................................... 104
3.4.3 Biogas..................................................................................................... 105
3.4.4 Other RE technologies ........................................................................... 106
4 RE Policies in Selected non‐European Countries .............................................................. 110
4.1 India ................................................................................................................... 110
4.1.1 RE Penetration in Electricity Generation ............................................... 111
4.1.2 Incentives and Policies .......................................................................... 111
Incentives Other than Tariffs .................................................................. 112
Current Experience of RE Tariffs in Relevant States .............................. 118

4.1.3 The Case of Wind Energy ....................................................................... 122
Incentive Mechanisms ............................................................................ 123
4.2 China .................................................................................................................. 128
4.2.1 Background ............................................................................................ 128
4.2.2 Potential and Incentives ........................................................................ 130
Bioenergy ................................................................................................ 131
Hydel ....................................................................................................... 132
Wind ....................................................................................................... 132
Solar ........................................................................................................ 133
4.3 Brazil .................................................................................................................. 134
4.3.1 Background ............................................................................................ 134
4.3.2 Potential and Costs ................................................................................ 136
Biomass ................................................................................................... 136
Small‐Scale Hydel ................................................................................... 138
Wind ....................................................................................................... 139
Solar ........................................................................................................ 140
4.3.3 Incentive Mechanism: The PROINFA Program ...................................... 141
5 What Have We Learned from International Experience? ................................................. 143

Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Price vs. Quantity Incentives ............................................................................ 91
Exhibit 2: RE Incentives at a Glance ................................................................................. 94
Exhibit 3: Renewables Penetration Target in Europe......................................................... 95
Exhibit 4: RE Penetration in Electricity Generation............................................................ 96
Exhibit 5: Total Annual Electricity Generation in the EU‐25 ............................................... 97
Exhibit 6: Total Annual RE Electricity Generation in the EU‐25 ........................................... 97
Exhibit 7: Wind Electricity Generation in the EU‐25 .......................................................... 98
Exhibit 8: Solid Biomass Electricity Generation in the EU‐25 .............................................. 99
Exhibit 9: Biogas Electricity Generation in the EU‐25 ........................................................ 99
Exhibit 10: Main Instruments for RE Promotion in EU‐25 Countries .................................. 100
Exhibit 11: Feed‐in Tariff levels in the EU‐25 .................................................................... 101
Exhibit 12: Feed‐in Tariff Levels by Technology in the EU‐25 ............................................ 102
Exhibit 13: On‐shore Wind Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 103
Exhibit 14: Biomass Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 105
Exhibit 15: Biogas Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 106
Exhibit 16: Small‐scale Hydel Mid‐term Potential and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 107
Exhibit 17: Biowaste Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 107
Exhibit 18: Photovoltaic Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 108
Exhibit 19: Solar Thermal Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 108
Exhibit 20: Tidal and Wave Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 109
Exhibit 21: Geothermal Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25 .................................................................................................. 109
Exhibit 22: RE Installed Capacity and Potential in India (2007) ........................................... 111
Exhibit 23: Nationwide Biomass Assessment (Season: Kharif) ........................................... 114
Exhibit 24: Gujarat Tariff Order, January 2007 .................................................................. 119
Exhibit 25: Rajasthan Tariff Order, March 2007 ................................................................ 119

Exhibit 26: Andhra Pradesh Tariff Order, March 2004 ....................................................... 120
Exhibit 27: State Government Incentives for Wind Power Development in India ................ 124
Exhibit 28: Main Assumptions in Up‐front Tariff for Wind Energy in India .......................... 127
Exhibit 29: Generation Capacity in China by Technology ................................................... 129
Exhibit 30: RE Generation in China .................................................................................. 129
Exhibit 31: Generation Cost by Type of Technology in China ............................................. 130
Exhibit 32: RE Installed Capacity and Potential in Brazil .................................................... 134
Exhibit 33: Brazil’s Generation Potential Using Native (left) and Planted (right) Forests ...... 137
Exhibit 34: Brazil’s Generation Potential Using Rice Bran .................................................. 137
Exhibit 35: Medium‐term Potential of Small‐scale Hydel in Brazil ...................................... 138
Exhibit 36: Brazil’s Wind Energy Potential ........................................................................ 139
Exhibit 37: Wind Seasonality in Northeast Region for PROINFA Projects vs.
Sao Francisco River Volume ........................................................................... 140
Exhibit 38: Average Annual Solar Irradiation in Brazil ........................................................ 141
Exhibit 39: Results of Tender Procedures in Brazil ............................................................ 142

Box 1: Main Rural and Household RES Technologies in India ............................... 112
Box 2: Brazilian Experience with Ethanol .............................................................. 136

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China
2
cm Square centimeter
CO2 Carbon dioxide
ED Excise duty
EHV Extra high voltage
EPE Energy Policy for Europe
EU European Union
FEC Final energy consumption
FFV Flex‐fuel vehicle
GW Gigawatt
GWh Gigawatt‐hour
ha Hectares
HV High voltage
IREDA Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency
ISCC Integrated Solar Combined Cycle
kcal Thousand calories
kg Kilogram
kha Thousand hectares
km Kilometer
kT Thousand tonnes
kV Kilovolt
kVArh Kilovolt Ampere reactive‐hour
kW Kilowatt
kWe Kilowatt electrical
kWh Kilowatt‐hour
kWp Kilowatt peak

m Meter
MC Marginal cost
MNES Ministry of Non‐Conventional Energy Sources
MSW Municipal solid waste
MT Metric tonne
MW Megawatt
MWe Megawatt electrical
MWh Megawatt‐hour
NOx Nitrous oxides
PED Primary energy demand
PLF Plant load factor
PROINFA Programa de Incentivo às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica
PTC Production tax credit
PV Photovoltaic
R&M Renovation and modernization
RE Renewable energy
RPS Renewable portfolio standard
SC Self consumption
SEB State Electricity Board
SS Small‐scale
SWERA Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment
TWh Terawatt‐hour
UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
VC Variable cost

The Case of the EU25 and
Selected Countries
1 Objective
This Annex presents the consultants’ evaluation of the development (and potential) of
renewable energy resources in Europe and other selected countries, focusing on current
policy schemes for promoting renewable energy sources (RES)1 specifically for electricity
generation.
The scope of the present study is to analyze how different incentive mechanisms have
impacted on the deployment of different RE technologies, with special emphasis on
widely developed options such as wind, hydro, biogas and biomass, which can operate in
on‐grid conditions.
These analyses will be used as a useful reference to evaluate existing incentives offered
by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) for RE promotion in Pakistan,2 and to design a
sound approach for the development of a medium term RE policy for the country under
ADB TA 4881‐PAK.
2 Current Policy Schemes for Promoting RE at a Glance
Worldwide, policy instruments most frequently used to promote RE deployment include:
2.1 Pricebased Instruments
• Feed‐in tariffs. Electricity produced using renewable energy sources is sold to the
network operator (or another identified buyer) at an administratively‐set price
(typically higher than the wholesale electricity price). The strongest points of a
feed‐in tariff are:
o Its perceived simplicity for potential investors,

1
Following the definition adopted by the Government of Pakistan, in this document the term ‘renewable energy’ (or
RE) excludes large hydro but includes small hydro (i.e., below 50 MW capacity), traditional biomass (fuel wood,
agricultural and forestry wastes, animal dung, and other unprocessed biomass fuels), and ‘new’ renewables (solar,
wind, biomass gasification, tide, geothermal, and others). Additionally, municipal solid waste (MSW) is also
included, where relevant.
2
I.e., those contained in the GoP’s Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation, 2006, and
NEPRA decisions regarding approved RE IPP tariffs.

o Its effectiveness in stimulating RE, and
o Its positive impact on technology diversity, permitting strategic support for
technologies that are still far away from market maturity.
The weakest point of this approach is the implicit lower level of competition
amongst power producers if compared, for example, with green certificates or
tendering systems (see Section 2.2 below). Although accompanied by a risk of
over‐compensation, as will be shown later in this paper, the feed‐in tariff
mechanism has proven to be one of the most effective means of promoting a
rapid deployment of RE technologies for power generation.
• Price premiums. Electricity produced using renewable energy is entitled to receive
an additional price component, which is typically set administratively, in addition
to the electricity price that it can obtain in the market. The premium system has
historically been considered as a kind of feed‐in tariff. It has some of the
advantages of the latter—its perceived simplicity and effectiveness in stimulating
RE as well as its positive impact on technology diversity—and is better integrated
in the internal electricity market than a pure feed‐in tariff system. However,
investment risks with the premium system are higher than with the feed‐in
system, as final prices fluctuate with electricity prices in the market. In any case,
investment risks with the premium system are still lower than with green
certificates.
• Investment subsidies. A financial subsidy is granted to investors developing
electricity generation capacity intended to use renewable energy sources. These
mechanisms include capital grants, third‐party financing, consumers grants and
rebates, among many others alternatives.
• Fiscal incentives. Fiscal rebates are granted on investment in electricity generation
capacity intended to use renewable sources, or on the energy produced. These
mechanisms include tax credits, excise and property tax exceptions, and/or many
other similar alternatives.
• Fossil fuel taxes. Carbon taxes or taxes on other pollutants, such as SOx and NOx,
are imposed on the use of fossil fuels. This can indirectly benefit renewables in
terms of bringing their prices down in comparison to fossil fuels.
2.2 Quantitybased Instruments
• Green certificates. An obligation to produce or consume a specified minimum
proportion of electricity generated using renewable sources is imposed on
generators or consumers (more often on load‐serving entities on behalf of
consumers). The obligation may be fulfilled directly or by acquiring green
certificates from other agents which produced electricity using renewable energy
sources. The strongest points of this model are its compatibility with the internal
market and in promoting competition between different RE producers. However,
the setting of yearly quotas and the fixing of penalties is not a simple task and
influences considerably the outcome of the system. The existence of dominant
market players can complicate the development of a green certificates market, but

a well‐designed system can overcome this situation. The main drawback of green
certificates is that the complexity and risks associated with these support schemes
transfer a higher cost to the consumer, while they also usually have considerable
administrative overheads.
• Tendering procedures. The state or the regulatory authority places a series of
tenders for the supply of renewable electricity, which is then supplied on a
contract basis at the price resulting from the tender. The additional costs
generated by the purchase of renewable electricity are passed to end‐consumers
of electricity through a specific levy. One of this system’s drawbacks is that if
competition is too strong, the prices offered are sometimes very low and there is a
risk of projects not being implemented. On the other hand, it has the advantage of
fast deployment in order to kick‐start the market in a specific technology sector.
However, it is not well suited for a large and rapidly growing market due to its high
administrative costs, the risk of unrealistic bids, and the potential for creating
administrative barriers.
All of the instruments described above are inherently mandatory. However, there is
another class of incentives based on voluntary decisions by consumers. The best known
such system is green pricing, where customers are given the option to support an
increased level of utility company investment in renewable energy technologies through
payment of an additional amount on their electricity bills to cover the renewable
energy’s incremental cost. This system has shown a very low level of effectiveness even
in affluent countries.
The distinguishing feature of these two main sets of instruments is the way in which
they stimulate demand for RE: by setting a price for RE or by requiring a certain RE share
in total electricity consumption. While price‐based systems in some way or another set a
price per unit of RE and, thus, leave the amount of electricity supplied to be determined
by the market, quantity‐based systems put an obligation upon consumers/utilities to
consume/generate a certain amount of RE while having the price for this electricity set
by the market, as illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.
Exhibit 1: Price vs. Quantity Incentives

Exhibit 1 compares the general functioning of a feed‐in tariff (on the left‐hand side) with
the general functioning of a green certificates system (on the right‐hand side). In the
case of a renewable feed‐in tariff, the regulator sets the price, p*, and the market will

decide the associated quantity of RE, q, that results from the intersection of p* and the
supply curve of RE. Alternatively, in a green certificates system the regulator would set
the quantity q* and leave it to the market to sort out the price level at the intersection
of supply curve of RE and q*. While all the other price‐based instruments mentioned
above result in a shift of the marginal cost curve to the right, principally by lowering the
RE’s generation or installation costs, the second quantity‐based instrument—a tendering
or auction system—works like a green certificates scheme where the regulator sets a
quantitative target and leaves price‐setting to the competitive process.
Historically, feed‐in tariffs have been the main instrument used for promoting
renewable energy. As they are administratively set and usually constant over a
predefined period, they provide a high degree of certainty for developers on their
expected revenue stream. In some cases, feed‐in tariffs have been set at such high levels
that investors were able to recover the investment costs over a period of only a few
years. The main drawback of feed‐in tariffs is that the quantitative outcome, i.e., the
amount of electricity generated using renewables, depends on the way the economic
agents respond to the incentive provided by the tariff. If agents are more responsive
than estimated when setting the tariff level, then the amount of electricity generated
from renewables will be higher than the expected or required level. Conversely, if agents
are less responsive than expected, the RE target will not be met and the level of the
feed‐in tariff would have to be increased. Moreover, as the cost of generating
technologies varies over time, the RE tariffs may also need to be adjusted to provide the
same level of incentives. Therefore, in implementing a system based on a feed‐in tariff,
the administration faces a difficult trade‐off between aiming to achieve the target,
which may involve repeated adjustment of the tariff level, and the stability of the system
on which would depend investors’ confidence. Similar drawbacks affect fiscal incentives
and investment subsidies, with the additional disadvantage, in the latter case, that the
subsidy provides incentives for the development of generating capacity, but it does not
necessarily promote its efficient or full utilization to produce electricity.
While specific remedies have been introduced to address these problems—e.g., by
limiting the capacity which is entitled to benefit from the feed‐in tariff—in the last five
years green certificates schemes have been launched in a number of jurisdictions,
mainly in Europe. As mentioned before, green certificates schemes represent a mirror
approach to feed‐in tariffs. Where feed‐in tariffs set the level of the incentive and allow
market agents to determine the quantitative outcome, a green certificates scheme sets
the quantitative target, in the form of the obligation for market participants to produce
or procure a predefined share of electricity from renewable sources, while the costs of
achieving this objective are defined by the available technologies and market conditions.
Non‐compliance penalties may be used to ensure that these costs do not become
excessive and, if market conditions tighten, the quantitative target is implicitly relaxed.
Although in principle the outcomes that both instruments yield should be the same, they
differ in at least three aspects. Firstly, rent allocation differs depending on the
instrument: a feed‐in system may imply windfall profits to power generators that do not
occur with quantity‐based systems, where the decreases in marginal costs directly
benefit consumers. Secondly, with imperfect information about supply curves, one or

the other system might be preferred: if the supply curve is gently sloped, setting the
feed‐in tariff at the wrong level would result in the wrong RE quantity; while with a
steep cost curve, setting the quantity target wrong could entail excessive costs. Thirdly,
since the rent allocation differs amongst instruments, this might also have an impact on
the firms’ dynamic efficiency and R&D expenditure.
Another key issue is related to the setting of single or multiple levels of feed‐in tariff or
quotas. If designed properly, a feed‐in tariff will ensure that the cost‐efficiency (or equi‐
marginality) principle (see Annex VI for details) is met purely on the basis that a single
price p* is paid for all RE; paying a uniform price for RE will lead to a mix of different
renewable energy technologies depending on their respective marginal cost curves. The
story changes, however, if, for whatever reason, there is not a single uniform feed‐in
tariff for all RE, but instead a whole system of different tariffs paid for the various RE,
e.g., one feed‐in for electricity from wind, a different one for solar, and yet another one
for geothermal. Where a policy is designed in such a way, the principle of equi‐
marginality is violated, as a given quantity of renewable energy will no longer be
provided at least cost. Similarly, the positive impacts of a green certificates scheme on
cost‐efficiency would be undermined by establishing the so‐called 'technology bands'
where different quotas are set for individual renewable energy technologies. This
analysis does, of course, ignore the issue of dynamic efficiency as described in Annex VII.
The third primary support mechanism identified above is the tender or auction system,
in which the regulatory body calls for tenders to provide energy from renewables.
Usually, auctions are structured in such a way that a certain amount of additional RE
capacity is put out to tender with bids being selected on the basis of their proposed
generation costs. Successful bidders are then awarded a long‐term power purchase
agreement with feed‐in tariffs set at the marginal production cost of the most expensive
bidder who was still awarded a contract. As all participants in the tender will have to bid
at their respective long‐run marginal cost, such an auction will lead to a cost‐efficient
expansion of RE. However, this result will only occur across all renewable energy
technologies if the auction is conducted in a technology‐neutral manner. In the case of
different technology bands, the most likely outcome will once again be a non cost‐
efficient solution, as marginal costs will vary amongst different RE suppliers.
From the theoretical point of view, all these instruments are incentive‐based, i.e., they
rely on price signals to provide incentives for the development of electricity generation
using renewable energy; the practical applications of price‐based and quantity‐based
schemes are such that green certificate schemes tend to be technology neutral, while
most feed‐in schemes are the opposite. As a summary, Exhibit 2 provides the main pros
and cons of the different mechanisms discussed above.

Exhibit 2: RE Incentives at a Glance
Policy Instrument Advantages Disadvantages
Feed-in • Highly effective • Less compatibility with

tariffs internal markets
• Highly efficient due to the low
risk for investors • Need regular adjustment
• Permit strategic support for • May overcompensate investors
technology innovation
Price • Highly effective • Risk of over-compensation in

premiums the case of high electricity
• Efficient due to the medium
prices without appropriate
risk for investors
adjustment
• Good compatibility with
internal markets
• Permits strategic support for
technology innovation
Investment • Good complement for some • Inefficient as a main

subsidy technologies instrument
Fiscal • Good secondary instrument • Good results only in countries

measures with high taxation and for the
most competitive technologies
Fossil fuel • Reveal the social price of • When a market is set,

taxes conventional energy, allowing inframarginal windfall profit
energy portfolio optimization difficult to assess
Green • Good compatibility with • Less efficient due to higher

certificates internal markets risks and administrative costs;
better designs can overcome
• Competition between
this issue
generators
• Not very appropriate for
• Supports the lowest-cost
developing medium- to long-
technologies
term technologies
Tendering • Fast development, provided • Stop-and-go nature can cause

procedures political will instabilities
• Very good tool for starting • Development blocked if
policies competition too severe
3 Current EU25 Experience on RE Development
3.1 RES Policy in the EU25
The European Council, in its meeting on March 2007, approved an Action Plan—the
Energy Policy for Europe (EPE)3—which establishes a specific quantitative target for

3
Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, An Energy Policy for
Europe, January 10, 2007, [COM(2007) 1 final].

renewables penetration to be achieved by 2020. More specifically, this target requires a
20% penetration of renewables in primary energy demand (PED).4
Exhibit 3: Renewables Penetration Target in Europe
Renewables Penetration Target

(% of Primary Energy Demand)
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
2006 2010 2010 2020 2020

Actual Target Expected Target Target
(PED) (FEC)

More recently, a different definition of the renewables penetration target has been
proposed, in which the 20% target is defined with respect to final energy consumption
(FEC), rather than in primary energy supply terms.
The 2020 target for renewables penetration compares with a 2006 penetration level (in
terms of primary energy demand) of 7%, and a 12% target for 2010 set by the White
Paper on Renewable Sources of Energy, 1997.5 Current forecasts, however, suggest that
unless significantly more effort is deployed, this target will not be fully achieved, and
renewables will represent approximately 10% of primary energy production in 2010.6,7
The 2020 target, if expressed in terms of PED, would require a doubling of renewables
penetration between 2010 and 2020. However, if the 20% target for renewables
penetration were expressed in FEC terms, it would be significantly less demanding, as it
would be equivalent to a 14% target in primary energy demand terms, just a few
percentage points above the 2010 target.

4
An additional target is set for the use of biofuels in the transport sector, requiring a 10% penetration by 2020.
5
Communication from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Energy for the Future:
Renewable Sources of Energy. White Paper for a Community Strategy and Action Plan, 26 November 1997
[COM(97) 599 final].
6
An additional 2010 target related to electricity generation was also set, requiring renewables to account for at least
21% of total electricity production. Even in this case, current estimates predict that the target will not be met
(renewables penetration in electricity generation is expected to reach 19% in 2010, 2% short of the target).
7
The latest data on current and expected renewables penetration are provided in the Communication from the
European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Renewable Energy Road Map—Renewable
Energies in the 21st Century: Building a More Sustainable Future, January 10, 2007 [COM(2006) 0848 final].

3.2 RE Penetration in Electricity Generation
The penetration of renewables in Europe has been promoted through the setting of
community‐wide and national targets and standards. As part of this approach, the use of
renewables in electricity generation has also been promoted. A specific target was set by
the 1997 White Paper,8 which required the share of renewables in electricity generation
to reach 21% by 2010 (an increase of 8% in this share over 10 years). Current estimates
predict that by 2010, renewables will account for 19% of total electricity generation, 2%
short of the target.
Exhibit 4: RE Penetration in Electricity Generation
Share of Electricity Generation Using RES-E

90
80
70
60
% of PED
50
40
30

20
10
0
Netherlands
EU-25
Slovenia
Lithuania
Malta
Slovakia
Poland
Spain
UK
Italy
Latvia
Lux.
Belgium
Sweden
Portugal
Czech
Estonia
Finland
Greece
Ireland
Cyprus
Denmark
Germany
Hungary
France
Austria
2006 2010 Target

Differentiated targets were set for the different member States to reflect their specific
circumstances and their respective endowment of renewable potential. Exhibit 4
compares the 2010 target assigned to each member state to the actual penetration of
renewables in electricity generation for that country in 2006 (including hydel as a
renewable energy source).
As part of this promotion process, RE‐based power production in Europe has been
consistently developing over time, doubling its own generation (in MWh/year) every five
years, which means an approximately 20% average annual growth rate over the last
fifteen years. Exhibit 5 shows the evolution of electricity generation in the EU‐25 in
terms of generation technology; for the purposes of the present study, RE excludes
hydro as this technology is considered ‘almost’ conventional (even though it is
‘renewable’ with zero CO2 emissions), and usually is not included in promotional
schemes as the remaining hydel potential in most European countries is insignificant,
except re‐powering which can be an interesting option and is currently under analysis in

8
See Footnote 5.

several countries.
Exhibit 5: Total Annual Electricity Generation in the EU‐25
Total Electricity Generation (TWh)
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
TWh
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006

Year
RES-E Hydro Conventional Generation

A closer look at RE development through the last sixteen years in Europe shows a clear
picture on the evolutionary pattern followed by each of the main RE technologies.
As shown in Exhibit 6, wind becomes the leading RE technology from 2000 onwards with
a 43% share of total RE generation, followed by solid biomass which accounts for
approximately 26%, and biogas in third place with a 9% share in 2006.
Exhibit 6: Total Annual RE Electricity Generation in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation from RES-E (TWh)
200
180
Solar Thermal
160
Tide & Wave
140 Photovoltaics
120 Geothermal
Industrial Waste
TWh
100
Mun. Waste Ren.
80
Mun. Waste Non-Ren.
60
Biogas
40 Solid Biomass
20 Wind
0
1990 1995 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year


Even though these figures show an outstanding development of at least three types of
RE technologies, proper understanding of RE development in the EU‐25 requires a more
in‐depth analysis. Taking into account the three most developed RE technologies—wind,
biomass and biogas—and breaking down each technology into country shares, it is
possible to evaluate RET‐wise penetration, which will later permit a comparison with
individual promotional schemes by each country. Exhibit 7, Exhibit 8, and Exhibit 9 show
the country share for each RE technology in 2006; some findings can be easily surmised:
• Only three countries—Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom—(out of 25) have
a significant presence in each of these three technologies with a country share
larger than 5%.
• Germany and Spain together account for 65% of the total EU‐25 wind energy
generation in 2006.
• Finland holds one quarter of total EU‐25 biomass‐based generation, and Germany
generates nearly half of the region’s biogas power.
• France, despite its vast renewable resources, is most noticeably absent.
These differences in RE penetration can be attributed to at least two main causes: firstly,
an unequal distribution of the potentials for each RE technology; secondly, countries
with substantial RE potential may not have properly promoted these technologies.
Typical instruments employed for RE promotion are explained next, together with the
current experience in the EU‐25, in order to allow a proper assessment of results
achieved versus RE potential in each country.
Exhibit 7: Wind Electricity Generation in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Wind in 2006

(Country Shares)
22%
5% 7% Denmark
Germany
28% Spain
UK
37%
Rest

Exhibit 8: Solid Biomass Electricity Generation in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Solid Biomass in 2006

(Country Shares)
31%
24% Finland
Germany
Spain
7% Sweden
UK
14% 15%
Rest
9%

Exhibit 9: Biogas Electricity Generation in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation using Biogas in 2006

(Country Shares)
16%
20% Germany
Italy
Spain
10%
46% UK
8% Rest

3.3 The EU25 Experience in RE Promotion
The promotion of the use of renewable energy is not a recent phenomenon but has
been a main component of European energy and environmental policy for many years.
As already mentioned, while targets have been agreed at the EU level, the choice of
policy instruments for pursuing these targets has been left to each member state to
decide. This has led to the current situation where different member states implement
widely different approaches towards promoting renewables in electricity generation
within their territories.
Despite the introduction of green certificates schemes in Belgium, Denmark, Italy,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and of purchase obligations in Poland, feed‐in tariffs
still represent the most common ingredient in the EU‐25 renewables promotion policy,
as they are in use in 17 of the 25 member states. Exhibit 10 summarizes the main
instruments used in the different EU jurisdictions for promoting electricity from
renewable energy.

Exhibit 10: Main Instruments for RE Promotion in EU‐25 Countries
Green
Member Feed-in Price Investment Fiscal
Certificates/Purchase
State* Tariffs Premium Subsidies Incentives
Obligation
AT 3 3
BE 3 3 3
CY 3 3
CZ 3 3 3
DK 3 3
EE 3 3
FI 3
FR 3 3
DE 3 3
GR 3 3
HU 3
IE 3
IT 3
LV 3
LT 3
LU 3 3
MT 3
NL (3)
PL 3
PT 3 3 3
SK
SI 3
ES 3 3
SE 3 3
UK 3 3
(3) Since August 2006, new projects are not admitted to the per‐kWh subsidy as it became apparent that the Netherlands are on track to
achieve the 2010 renewables penetration target.
* AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, CY: Cyprus, CZ: Czech Republic, DK: Denmark, EE: Estonia, FI: Finland, FR: France, DE: Germany, HU: Hungary,
IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, LV: Latvia, LU: Luxembourg, MT: Malta, NL: Netherlands, PL: Poland, PT: Portugal, SK: Slovakia, SI: Slovenia, ES: Estonia,
SE: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom.

Exhibit 10 clearly shows that most jurisdictions use a combination of instruments to
promote the use of renewable energy in electricity generation: the policy’s effectiveness
has therefore to be assessed with respect to the total support provided. Nonetheless, it
is interesting to compare the level of feed‐in tariffs for different energy sources in the
different jurisdictions. Error! Not a valid bookmark self‐reference. shows the range of
feed‐in tariffs available to renewable energy‐based electricity generation. The same
range is also shown including Belgium and Luxembourg which appear to have the lowest
levels of feed‐in tariffs for most energy sources.
Exhibit 11: Feed‐in Tariff levels in the EU‐25

60
50
40
c€/kWh
31.2 32.0
30
20
10 8.7 8.8 9.7

8.0 7.7
6.2
Photo- Solar Tide & Wind

Biogas Biomass Biowaste Geothermal
voltaic Thermal Wave
Max. Average Min. Min. (incl. BE & LU)

Except for solar energy, average feed‐in tariffs in the EU are around € 60/MWh for
biowaste; between € 70/MWh and € 80/MWh for biomass/biogas, tidal/wave, and wind;
and € 100/MWh for geothermal. For solar energy, the average feed‐in tariff is around
€ 300/MWh level and may even be as high as € 600/MWh. Another relevant point to
mention is that in all the countries where feed‐in tariffs were set, this was done
technology‐wise, although a single feed‐in tariff would have been more efficient from
the economic point of view. Hungary and Greece are the exceptions, and additionally in
some countries, such as Germany and Ireland, the range across technologies is not wide,
as can be seen in Exhibit 12.

Exhibit 12: Feed‐in Tariff Levels by Technology in the EU‐25
60.0
50.0
Biogas
40.0 Biomass
c€/kWh
Biowaste
Geothermal
30.0 Photovoltaic
Solar Thermal
Tidal & Wave
20.0
Wind
Hydel SS
10.0
0.0
Czech Rep.
Spain
Austria
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Denmark
France
Greece
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Portugal

Appendix A describes in more detail the instruments employed for the promotion of
different types of renewable energy used to generate electricity in the different member
states of the EU‐25.
3.4 RE Development: Country Achievements visàvis Promotional Schemes
As already commented, the unequal country‐wise development of RE in the EU‐25 may
be attributed to two main drivers:
• Important differences in exploitable RE potential between country members, and
• Different RE promotional schemes followed by individual member states.
In this section, this issue will be addressed by analyzing whether the unequal
deployment of RE technology in the EU‐25 can be attributed to these drivers, or whether
there could be other issues that could also impinge upon renewables penetration.
3.4.1 Onshore Wind
In the case of on‐shore wind, Exhibit 13 presents information regarding wind
penetration in 2006 and its mid‐term potential9 as well as existing feed‐in tariffs10 in the
member states.

9
Mid‐term potential up to 2020 determined by the Optres model (EC‐DG Tren EIE Programme, February 2006).
10
Zero tariffs imply that the country is not applying feed‐in tariffs but some other promotional scheme.

Exhibit 13: On‐shore Wind Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using On-Shore Wind

6 12,0
5 10,0
4 8,
TWh/Annu
c€/kWh
m
3 6,
2 4,
1 2,
0 0,
Slovakia
Austria
Italy
Belgium
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Spain
Sweden
Hungary
Poland
Luxembourg
Greece
UK
Germany
Ireland
Finland
Portugal
Electricity generation in 2004 Increment during 2005-06
Potential up to 2020 Feed-in tariff

As it can be seen, the countries with largest on‐shore wind potential are: France,
Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and Italy, followed by several other countries
where the total potential is less than 10 TWh per year. The European experience
regarding on‐shore wind can be described as follows:
A. Experience of Member States with Feed‐in Tariffs
• France, where feed‐in tariffs are the highest amongst the EU‐25, surprisingly has
almost non‐existent wind deployment, with most of its current wind electricity
generation coming from recent development.
• Germany, Spain and Denmark11 present a large wind penetration with more than
50% of their mid‐term potential already covered by using smaller feed‐in tariffs
than France.
• Other important countries in terms of potential are: Austria, Belgium, Czech
Republic, and Greece; here, as in France, the existence of competitive feed‐in
tariffs does not seem to be a sufficient requirement for wind development to
occur.
The explanation for these heterogeneous outcomes varies from country to country: in
the case of France, administrative as well as grid barriers seem to be the main cause for
the lack of wind penetration. In other cases, such as Austria, Belgium and the Czech

11
Up to 2000, a high feed‐in tariff resulted in rapid development of wind technology in these countries. However, the
system was changed in 2001 to a small premium over the selling price, with much reduced effectiveness.

Republic, complex administrative mechanisms, regional systems, and unstable RE

policies may be hampering the development of on‐shore wind.
B. Experience of Member States with Other Promotion Schemes
• In the case of Italy, the United Kingdom and Sweden, green certificates schemes
were used for RE promotion with poor results in wind penetration, which may
reflect, as already mentioned, that wind is not the most cost‐effective technology,
and/or that the price volatility of green certificates may disincentivize investments
in this technology. The case of Italy is quite interesting. For many years, Italy had a
system of multiple feed‐in tariffs; the government however, decided to move to a
quota system because it considered this solution more efficient, setting a
reference price for the green certificates based on the average feed‐in tariff
(during 2006, the reference price was c€ 12.8/kWh), hoping that market‐driven
forces would set the actual price below this reference: however, prices are
currently quite similar to the reference level. It is not so clear if this is due to the
lack of competition or because of setting tight quotas.
• In Finland, an exemption from the energy tax scheme was applied. Unlike
electricity from fossil or nuclear sources, renewable electricity is exempted from
the Finnish energy tax paid by end‐users. In the case of wind energy, the available
support is not enough to plug the gap with conventional technologies.
• In Ireland, a tender system was initially implemented, but then changed to a feed‐
in tariff in 2005. The effectiveness of this tender system in allowing rapid
deployment of wind technology has proved to be very high.
3.4.2 Solid Biomass
At first glance, the penetration of solid biomass (see Exhibit 14), compared to its
potential in the EU‐25, seems to be—with some exceptions (e.g., Finland, Sweden and
Netherlands)—an unsuccessful story.
But biomass analysis should be conducted carefully because, unlike other RE
technologies—e.g., wind—solid biomass technologies are as diverse as different forms
of biomass used as input. In addition, biomass technologies suffer from several
economics‐related problems, which can be summarized as the non‐existence of a
‘biomass market’ that could provide the necessary price signals for technology
development; plus the fact that, like in any other conventional technology, generators
need to enter into long‐term agreements with biomass producers in order to obtain the
guarantee that they will have enough input for power generation at a given price.12
These reasons may explain why, despite the existence of high feed‐in tariffs, in many
countries—such as Germany and Spain—the deployment of this technology has been
relatively modest up to 2004, even though this trend seems to be curving up in the last
couple of years.

12
Other important issues include: biomass delivery processes and costs, sustainable harvesting, water resources, etc.

Exhibit 14: Biomass Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs in the EU‐25

Electricity Generation Using Biomass
80,00 16,0
70,00 14,0
60,00 12,0
c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
50,00 10,0
40,00 8,0
30,00 6,0
20,00 4,0
10,00 2,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Austria
Poland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Greece
Spain
Sweden
Hungary
Italy
Portugal
UK
Germany
Ireland
Finland

Two exceptions in biomass use in the EU‐25 are Finland and Sweden; in both cases,
promotional mechanisms provide incentives for cost effective development (tax
exemption in Finland and green certificates in Sweden), and the market seems to have
responded well to such signals.
As already mentioned, in the case of the Netherlands, feed‐in tariffs were applied, but as
the Dutch government realized in 2006 that its RE objectives for 2010 were going to be
achieved, it decided to suspend the system while considering future policy steps.
3.4.3 Biogas
For biogas, the situation in the EU‐25 has been similar to the biomass case, but on a
smaller scale. The evidence for this is presented in Exhibit 15. The development of
biogas technology is strongly dependent not only on national‐level promotional
schemes, but also on those at the provincial and municipal levels. This situation
introduces additional complexities to the analysis and is difficult to disentangle.
The two EU‐25 countries with largest biogas development currently are Germany and
the United Kingdom and in both countries landfill gas is the predominant technology
being supported by additional schemes at the municipal level. This situation may explain
the difference with corresponding development in Spain: in the latter case, the Spanish
government provided at the outset some low feed‐in tariffs which did not offer enough
incentives for a proper development of the technology. This situation has changed in

recent months, however, as the government has increased tariffs and expects larger
biogas deployment in the immediate future.
For the rest of the countries, lack of detailed information on local experience does not
allow an appraisal of the policies implemented.
Exhibit 15: Biogas Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Biogas
25,00 16,0
14,0
20,00
12,0
c€/kWh
10,0
TWh/Annum
15,00
8,0
10,00 6,0
4,0
5,00
2,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Spain
Austria
Italy
Poland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Sweden
Greece
UK
Hungary
Portugal
Germany
Ireland
Finland


3.4.4 Other RE technologies
For the rest of existing RE technologies, it is quite complicated to properly analyze actual
policy impacts due to several reasons which can be summarized as follows:
• Technology or industry too incipient (tidal, wave, photovoltaics, and solar thermal)
• No information regarding electricity generation (small‐scale hydel)
• Development of technology highly correlated with local promotional schemes
rather than at the national level (biowaste)
• Too small potential or very region‐specific (geothermal)
Nevertheless, available information and status of these RE technologies in the EU‐25 is
presented in Exhibit 16 to Exhibit 21.


Exhibit 16: Small‐scale Hydel Mid‐term Potential and Feed‐in Tariffs in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Potential Using Small-Scale Hydel

6,00 10,0
9,0
5,00
8,0
7,0

4,00
c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
6,0
3,00 5,0
4,0
2,00
3,0
2,0
1,00
1,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Spain
Austria
Italy
Poland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Sweden
Greece
UK
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Portugal
Finland

Exhibit 17: Biowaste Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Biowaste
14,00 10,0
9,0
12,00
8,0
10,00 7,0

c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
6,0
8,00
5,0
6,00
4,0
4,00 3,0
2,0
2,00
1,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Luxembourg
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Spain
Austria
Italy
Poland
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Greece
UK
Germany
Finland
Hungary
Ireland
Portugal



Exhibit 18: Photovoltaic Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Photovoltaics
7,00 60,0
6,00 50,0
5,00

40,0

c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
4,00
30,0
3,00
20,0
2,00
1,00 10,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Austria
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Spain
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Poland
Portugal
Sweden
UK
Germany
Ireland
Finland


Exhibit 19: Solar Thermal Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Solar Thermal

20,00 60,0
18,00
50,0
16,00

14,00

c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
40,0
12,00
10,00 30,0
8,00
20,0
6,00
4,00
10,0
2,00
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Spain
Austria
Italy
Poland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Sweden
Greece
UK
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Portugal
Finland



Exhibit 20: Tidal and Wave Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs
in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Tidal & Wave

70,00 12,0
60,00 10,0
50,00
8,0

c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
40,00
6,0
30,00
4,0
20,00
10,00 2,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Luxembourg
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Spain
Austria
Italy
Poland
Belgium
Netherlands
Sweden
Greece
UK
Germany
Finland
Hungary
Ireland
Portugal

Exhibit 21: Geothermal Penetration, Mid‐term Potential, and Feed‐in Tariffs in the EU‐25
Electricity Generation Using Geothermal
8,00 18,0
7,00 16,0
6,00 14,0
12,0
c€/kWh
TWh/Annum
5,00
10,0
4,00
8,0
3,00
6,0
2,00 4,0
1,00 2,0
0,00 0,0
Slovakia
Spain
Austria
Italy
Poland
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Czech Rep.
Denmark
France
Sweden
Greece
UK
Hungary
Portugal
Germany
Ireland
Finland



4 RE Policies in Selected nonEuropean Countries
4.1 India
The development of renewable energy technologies for power generation in India has
been aided by a variety of policies and support measures from the government. Major
policy initiatives were taken to encourage private/foreign direct investment to tap
energy from renewable energy sources. They include the provision of both fiscal and
financial incentives and the simplification of administrative procedures.
These promotional measures include:
• 100% accelerated depreciation for tax purposes in the first year of the installation
of RE projects/systems.
• No excise duty on manufacture for most of the finished products; low import
tariffs for RE capital equipment, materials and components.
• Soft loans to manufacturers and users for commercial and near‐commercial RE
technologies.
• Five‐year tax holiday for power generation projects.
• Feed‐in tariffs under alternate power purchase policy by the government for
power generated through RE systems and fed to the grid by the private sector.
• Facility for banking and wheeling of power.
• Facility for third‐party sale of renewable energy power.
• Financial incentives/subsidies for RE devices with high initial cost.
• Special thrust for renewable energy in the north‐eastern region of the country;
10% of Plan funds earmarked for north‐east towards enhanced and special
subsidies.
• Allotment of land on long‐term basis at token lease rent, and when the project
involves energy recovery from municipal waste, the supply of garbage free of cost
at project site by state governments.
The development of RE technologies in India depends on both national and state‐level
policies and regulations. At the national level, incentives for RE deployment arise in two
different ways: on the one hand, in the form of soft loans, subsidies and other national
tax benefits, and on the other hand, through a regulatory framework that provides a
bearing point for the states’ regulatory commissions, enabling them with proper
capacities for the promotion of RE technologies. Accordingly, at the state level, the
importance of State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) is extremely high as it is
a regulatory commission’s duty to study and establish the tariffs and other procedures
for RE deployment. After the Electricity Act 2003, SERCs were set up in most states of
the country. The Act has introduced Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), under which
each power utility has to source a certain percentage of its supply from renewable

generators; this percentage is defined at the state level. Therefore, SERCs have the
mandate of promoting renewables either through preferential tariffs, or a minimum
obligation on distribution companies to source a certain share of electricity from
renewable energy, or both. As a matter of fact, in many states both mechanisms live
together, although this situation may introduce some conflicts in the future.
4.1.1 RE Penetration in Electricity Generation
The importance of renewable energy’s increasing role in the overall energy scenario in
India was recognized in the early 1970s. During the past 30 years, significant efforts have
been made into the design, development, field demonstration, and large‐scale use of a
number of renewable energy products and systems. Today, India has one of the world’s
largest programs for the deployment of renewable energy products and systems.
India has a large potential for renewable energy in electricity, an estimated aggregate of
over 85,000 MW. However, only a fraction of the aggregate potential in RE, and
particularly solar energy, has been utilized so far (Exhibit 22).
Exhibit 22: RE Installed Capacity and Potential in India (2007)
RES-E Installed Capacity and Medium-Term Potential
60.000
50.000
40.000
MW
30.000
20.000
10.000
0
Biomass Wind Hydel SS Waste Solar
Actual Potential

4.1.2 Incentives and Policies
For each type of RE technology, two broad categories of incentives can be observed in
India: (1) fiscal and financial incentives, and (2) up‐front tariffs. The first type is quite
dependent on the RE technology involved, and therefore they are described separately
for each technology. A description of the up‐front tariff in some relevant states follows
after that. Wind‐based power generation is assessed separately due to its high
penetration.

Incentives Other than Tariffs
Bio Energy (Biomass and Biogas)
India generates a vast amount of biomass material which can be utilized for power
generation. The country annually produces fuel wood (200‐300 million tonnes), animal
waste (80‐100 million tonnes) and crop residues (100‐120 million tonnes) which are
consumed as the main biomass fuels. Some 19,500 MW (including 3,500 MW from
biomass cogeneration) can be generated from fuel wood and crop residues (400 million
tonnes per annum) and bagasse in the sugar industry. Programs are also being
developed for direct combustion and grid interactive gasification using woody biomass
or agricultural residues, such as crop straws, stalks, and husk.
The main sources of energy for rural communities, which constitutes the largest part of
the population, are biomass fuels such as firewood, agricultural residues, and cattle
dung. However, the energy from biomass resources has become unsustainable over the
years, mainly due to human population explosion and the low efficiency of traditional
stoves (chulhas) used for burning these fuels. These traditional chulhas lead to higher
smoke discharge which has adverse effects on health. Also, the age‐old practice of
burning cattle dung cakes in the kitchen deprives the soil of the much needed organic
manure, which in turn reduces agricultural productivity. India has been working towards
promotion and development of efficient technologies for biogas production, improved
chulhas, biomass gasification, and biomass briquetting.
Box 1: Main Rural and Household RES Technologies in India
Improved chulhas: A variety of biomass-based, efficient, smokeless chulhas

has been developed, which are estimated to have efficiencies of between 25-
30%. The fixed type chulhas have two or three pot-holes and the chimneys are
made of bricks/stones and clay, pottery liners, etc. Portable chulhas are made
of metal and metal-clad ceramics. In addition, a chulha for high-altitude use
has also been developed for cooking in colder Himalayan regions.
Biomass gasification: The biomass gasifier converts fuel wood and agricultural
residues into a ‘producer gas’, with a calorific value of 5,500kJ/Nm3, through a
thermo-chemical process. It can be used in burners and boilers and also in
dual-fuel engines, where it is first cleaned to remove particles of tar and then
cooled before use.
Biomass briquetting: Biomass briquettes, made through a manual process,
can be used as cooking fuel in homes, whereas those produced through
mechanical presses can be used in commercial boilers and furnaces.

Biogas: Although biogas has been mainly developed in India for off‐grid rural regions,
including in integrated rural energy systems, a brief presentation is given here in order
to obtain a full picture of the country’s RE program.
The biogas production process involves the mixing of wet cattle dung with an equal
quantity of water and then storage in the biogas digester plant where it is retained for
anaerobic decomposition in the absence of air. The gas produced, with an average

methane content of 55% to 75 %, is collected and piped for use in power generation or
other areas, such as household cooking, depending on the size of the producing plant.
Three basic designs of biogas plants have been developed in India—namely, the Fixed
Dome Deenbandhu Model, the Floating Gas Holder KVIC (Khadi and Village Industries
Commission) model and the Bag Type Digester—which are promoted under two
projects: one for community use and another for household use.
The main policies and incentives for biogas use in India are as follows:
• Special incentives are available for turn‐key entrepreneurs in rural areas to carry
out biogas installation and maintenance as commercial ventures.
• Commercial and cooperative banks provide loans for setting up biogas plants
under Agricultural Priority Area schemes.
• Turn‐key job fee, linked with a three‐year free maintenance warranty, provided to
entrepreneurs, as is support for service charges, training, and publicity.
• Central subsidy provided to users:
o Subsidies are available as an amount per plant and varies depending on the
region where the plant will be situated.
o Ranges between Rs 2,700‐11,700 (€ 50‐200).
• Dealership support at Fair Price Shops (FPS) and Public Distribution System (PDS)
outlets.
• Organizational and infrastructure support to implementing agencies.
• Publicity support.
• Technical back‐up units provide technical and training support for effective
implementation.
Biomass: At the national level, a biomass resource assessment program has been
implemented to help identify locations where the density of available biomass is
adequate for power projects.13
Promotion of biomass‐based power generation is being encouraged through enactment
of favorable policy regimes at the state as well as central levels. State policies include
buy‐back/wheeling/banking of generated electricity, as well as incentives in the form of
sales tax exemptions, participation in equity and grants, etc.

13
http://lab.cgpl.iisc.ernet.in/atlas.

Exhibit 23: Nationwide Biomass Assessment (Season: Kharif)
Crop Biomass Biomass Power

Area
State Production Generation Surplus Potential
(kha)
(kT/yr) (kT/yr) (kT/yr) (MWe)
Andhra Pradesh 1,479.9 1,887.7 4,271.6 734.3 92.0
Assam 666.3 1,792.6 3,046.5 554.8 63.7
Bihar 3,330.0 6,014.9 10,315.3 2,635.3 308.5
Chattisgarh 3,616.1 5,925.9 10,067.3 1,880.4 217.0
Goa 131.0 435.7 749.6 91.1 10.4
Gujarat 4,165.8 5,185.7 11,610.9 2,379.2 302.4
Haryana 1,515.2 3,107.7 5,473.6 3,672.2 439.0
Himachal Pradesh 361.6 772.3 1,832.9 821.2 106.2
Jammu & Kashmir 151.5 314.7 649.5 127.9 17.4
Jharkhand 127.6 259.1 325.8 81.6 9.9
Karnataka 4,020.6 7,888.3 14,837.3 3,306.0 418.5
Kerala 324.4 3,056.4 2,780.4 1,425.7 182.6
Madhya Pradesh 7,107.0 9,125.8 16,697.4 3,814.6 485.7
Maharashtra 7,812.3 10,100.7 18,387.3 4,077.9 514.9
Manipur 72.6 159.4 318.8 31.9 4.1
Nagaland 27.1 87.6 149.2 27.2 3.1
Orissa 1,815.5 1,822.6 3,338.2 870.5 109.1
Punjab 2,633.5 9,215.7 15,933.7 12,211.9 1,453.8
Rajasthan 5,661.2 75,196.8 173,610.5 26,194.5 3,362.3
Tamil Nadu 578.3 2,655.0 3,073.3 1,275.5 164.2
Uttar Pradesh 6,448.4 12,515.5 22,214.9 6,948.9 832.3
Uttaranchal 45.3 88.1 145.6 44.5 5.6
West Bengal 2,049.0 7,893.3 12,989.7 1,299.0 156.0
Total 54,140.0 165,501.5 332,819.1 74,505.9 9,258.9

The most important fiscal and financial incentives for biomass use in India are as follows:
• Interest subsidy up to 3% for commercial biomass power projects.14
• Capital subsidy of Rs 10 million/MW (€ 173.5/kW) for advanced biomass
gasification projects.15
• Up to 5% interest subsidy for biomass/bagasse cogeneration (commercial
projects).16
• Capital subsidy for cogeneration projects in joint venture model/IPP mode in
cooperative/public sector sugar mills; up to Rs 4.5 million/MW (€ 78.22/kW) with a
maximum of Rs 81 million (€ 1.4 million) per project.
• Capital subsidy for cogeneration projects in cooperative/public sector sugar mills
through JV companies to be set up by state governments or IPP‐mode projects; for
JV companies in only four states and four IPP projects (on first‐come‐first‐served
basis).
• Financial assistance under the National Biomass Resource Assessment Programme
(NBRAP) of up to Rs 0.15 million (€ 2,600) per study; financial assistance up to 90%
of the cost, or Rs 0.15 million (€ 2,600) per study, whichever is lower, will be
provided to state nodal agencies.
Waste to Energy
Urban, municipal, and industrial wastes have a high combined potential for energy
extraction in India of around 2,700 MW, comprising 1,700 MW of power from urban and
municipal wastes and about 1,000 MW from industrial waste. India has two programs
for energy recovery from urban and industrial wastes:
• The National Programme on Energy Recovery from Urban, Municipal and
Industrial Wastes.
• The UNDP‐GEF Project on Development of High Rate Biomethanation Processes.
The following projects are eligible:
• Projects based on any waste, or a mix of waste material of renewable nature
available from urban, municipal and industrial sectors, other than husk, bagasse,
straw, stalks, and fines of biomass origin.
• Projects based on a mix of other renewable wastes from urban and industrial
sectors, including husk and bagasse.
• Projects for production of biogas from distillery effluents are not eligible under this
program. However, projects for power generation from biogas being produced
from industrial waste, including distillery effluents shall be eligible.

14
Subject to net interest rate (after the subsidy) not being less than 11% and a maximum subsidy of Rs 20 million
(€ 347,000).
15
Maximum subsidy of Rs 80 million (€ 1.39 million).
16
Maximum subsidy of Rs 40 million (€ 0.695 million).

• Projects for generation of power from biogas, produced from urban and industrial
wastes through biogas engines, biogas turbines, dual fuel engines using diesel oil
up to a maximum of 5% as pilot fuel, and steam turbines with a minimum steam
pressure of 48 kg/cm2 shall be eligible.
• Projects based in conversion technologies, namely, biomethanation, pelletisation,
gasification, pyrolysis, incineration, sanitary landfilling, etc., or a combination of
thereof.
The state governments of Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh,
Maharashtra, Haryana, and Karnataka have announced policy measures pertaining to
allotment of land, supply of garbage and facilities for evacuation, sale and purchase of
power to encourage setting up of waste‐to‐energy (WTE) projects.
The most important fiscal and financial Incentives for WTE projects in India are as follow:
• Financial assistance as interest subsidy for reducing the rate of interest to 7.5%.17
• Financial support for the preparation of a detailed project report and techno‐
economic feasibility report: 50% of the cost up to Rs 0.2 million (€ 3,500).
• Financial assistance of up to 50% of capital cost of the project limited to Rs 30
million per MW (€ 521.27/kW) for innovative demonstration projects for power
generation from municipal solid waste and selected industrial waste.
• Financial assistance of up to 50% of the incremental cost for power generation
from biogas at sewage treatment plants.
• Incentive of Rs 1.5 million/MWe (€ 26/kWe) to municipal corporations/urban local
bodies for site clearance, facilitation, and coordination of actions.
• Incentive of Rs 0.5 million/MWe (€ 8.68/kWe) to State Nodal Agencies for their
coordinated actions and support.
Solar Photovoltaic
India receives about 300 clear sunny days per year with a daily average solar energy
incident over the country that varies from 4‐7 kWh/m2, depending upon the location. In
the last two decades, the unit cost of photovoltaic (PV) technology has decreased by
more than 10 times, increasing accessibility for dispersed rural applications. About
2.2 MW of on‐grid PV power plants have already been installed in the country.
The most important fiscal and financial Incentives for PV in India are as follows:
• MNES financial incentives for solar PV grid‐connected power projects:
o Detailed project report subsidy of Rs 0.1 million (€ 1 ,740).
o Investment subsidy of two‐thirds of the cost of the project, with a maximum of
Rs 20 million (€ 350,000) per 100 kW.

17
Maximum depends on project type, but ranges between Rs 5‐20 million/MWe (€ 86.7‐347.1/kW).

o O&M subsidy of 2.5% with a maximum of Rs 0.5 million (€ 8,700).
• IREDA financial package for solar photovoltaic power generation systems.
• MNES financial incentives for solar PV systems (power plants):
o For general areas: Rs 180,000/kWp (€ 3,125/kWp) of array capacity or 50% of
ex‐work cost of the project, whichever is smaller.
o For north‐eastern region, including Sikkim: Rs 350,000/kWp (€ 6,078/kWp) of
array capacity or 90% of ex‐work cost of the project, whichever is smaller.
Solar Thermal
All technologies employing solar heating come under this category, which also includes
non‐grid solar thermal technologies.
For electricity generation, India developed a 140 MW Integrated Solar Combined Cycle
(ISCC) power plant. The solar thermal component (35 MW) is based on parabolic trough
collector technology, while the combined cycle power plant (105 MW) operates during
non‐sunny hours, running on naphtha/natural gas.
Also, widely employed in India are non‐grid thermal technologies, solar water heating,
solar cookers, solar air heating, and solar thermal building design. These technologies
receive financial support in terms of interest subsidies.
SmallScale Hydel
The focus of the small‐scale hydel program in India is on promoting commercialization
and active private sector participation. An estimated potential of about 15,000 MW of SS
hydel (for projects up to 25 MW) exists in India.
India has so far set up more than 400 SS hydel projects of up to 25 MW capacity, totaling
2,013 MW. These projects are spread throughout the country in hilly regions, as well as
on canal drops. Most SS hydel projects are grid‐connected. However, there are some
projects which are decentralized and are managed by local community‐based
organizations (CBOs) or non‐governmental organizations (NGOs).
The 13 potential states which have announced their policies for private sector
participation in the SS hydel sector are Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab,
Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Orissa, West
Bengal, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan.
The facilities available in the states include wheeling, banking, attractive buy‐back rates,
and facility for third‐party sales, among others.
In order to accelerate development of SS hydel power in India, MNES is providing
incentives for:
• Detailed project report preparation from Rs 0.125 million per MW (€ 2.17/kW) up
to Rs 0.5 million (€ 8.7/kW), above 10 MW and up to 25 MW.

• Under special incentives for the north east region and Sikkim, a capital grant of
Rs 75 million per MW (€ 1,300/kW) is available for SS hydel projects in the region.
The maximum support per project is Rs 225 million (€ 4 million).
• Financial support for renovation, modernization, and capacity upgrading of old SS
hydel stations of up to Rs 26 million per MW (€ 452/kW), or 75% of the R&M cost,
whichever is lower.
• Financial support for development/upgrading of water mills of up to Rs 30,000
(€ 550) or 75% of project cost, in mechanical mode and Rs 100,000 (€ 1,740) or
75% of project cost in electrical/electrical‐plus‐mechanical mode.
• IREDA provides soft loans under MNES for setting up SS hydel projects of up to
25 MW capacity in the commercial sector.
Current Experience of RE Tariffs in Relevant States
As already presented, the development of RES in electricity (RES‐E) technologies in India
depends on both national and states policies and regulations. Exhibit 24 to Exhibit 26
present the current Indian experience in tariff determination in different states. As can
be seen, methodologies vary in some aspects, while they are concurrent in others.
One of the most important common approaches for tariff setting is that State Regulatory
Commissions seem to be applying up‐front tariffs based on a detailed cost assessment,
leaving producers the incentive to choose the best alternative in order to achieve the
project. The approach followed by some SERCs is very interesting because it solves some
important and controversial issues: for instance, input price‐setting for biomass. Fuel
price in biomass projects is a key issue as power plants can run with several biomass
fuels, including coal (non‐renewable), and also because biomass prices are very volatile;
if the price of biomass is higher than that of coal, then it is expected that producers will
switch coal for biomass as input, disregarding the objective of RE generation. In this
sense, the approach followed by some SERCs (Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat in the tables)
is to value biomass as the cost of the alternative fuel (coal) for which the market is
usually very liquid and prices can be easily determined.
Another important issue to comment on is SERCs experience in tariff‐setting for waste‐
to‐energy projects. For instance, Andhra Pradesh’s approach is to relate industrial waste
to another biomass project. This procedure has been adopted due to the lack of
supporting evidence for proper cost and tariff determination, and may be changed in the
future when information regarding costs and operation becomes available. Regarding
municipal waste, the procedure for tariff determination is different than that for other
RE technologies as the nature of the project is different. For this technology the
approach followed national guidelines instead of a cost‐based analysis.


Exhibit 24: Gujarat Tariff Order, January 2007
Cap-
1 Fuel 2 Depreciation Structure Discount
Tariff PLF Capital Cost O&M Fuel Cost SC ROE Tariff Rate
Consumption Rate (Debt Rate
Rate)
Single 80% Rs 40,000 2.5% of 25% of fossil Alternative fuel 8% Linear, 90% of 70:30 14% 10.6% Rs 3.0
Cogeneration
/kW capital cost fuel approach the initial value (10.25%) /kWh (US$
(US$ 1,012 with 5% consumption @ Rs 775/MT (US$ in 20 years; 0.076
/kW) escalation 2,250 kcal/kg 19.6/MT) with 5% 10.75% /kWh) fixed
Bagasse
(SHR 3,700 escalation working capital for 20 years

kcal/kWh)
Single 80% Rs 35,000 7% of capital 1.3 kg/kWh @ Alternative fuel 10% 10.75% for 70:30 14% 11.10% Rs 3.08
/kW cost with 5% 3,300 kcal/kg approach working capital (10.25%) /kWh
(US$ 886.5 escalation (SHR 4,290 Rs 1,000/MT (US$ (0.078
Biogas
/kW) kcal/kWh) 25.3/MT) with 5% /kWh) fixed

escalation for 20 years
1 2
Notes: Plant load factor, Self consumption.
Exhibit 25: Rajasthan Tariff Order, March 2007
Cap-
1 Fuel 2 Depreciation Structure Discount
Tariff PLF Capital Cost O&M Fuel Cost SC ROE Tariff Rate
Consumption Rate (Debt Rate
Rate)
Dis- 60% - Rs 47,000 4% of Mustard residue Direct fuel AC: SLM 90% of the 70:30 14% 10.6% AC: Rs 4.55/kWh
criminated 70% - /kW capital @ 3,400 approach 12% initial value in (10%) (US$ 0.1153
by tech: air- 75% (US$ 1,190 cost with kcal/kg Rs 1,050/ 20 years; /kWh)
cooled (AC) /kW) for WC 5% (AC SHR: 4,200 MT (US$ 26.6 WC: 12.25% for WC:
or water- escal- kcal/kWh; /MT) with 5% 10% working capital Rs 4.17/kWh
cooled (WC) ation WC SHR: 4,440 escalation (US$
Biomass
kcal/kWh) 0.1056/kWh)
fixed for 20
years
1 2

Exhibit 26: Andhra Pradesh Tariff Order, March 2004
Cap-
Fuel
1 Capital 2 Dep-reciation Structure Discount
Tariff PLF O&M Consumptio Fuel Cost SC ROE Tariff Rate
Cost Rate (Debt Rate
n
Rate)
Multi-part, 55% Rs 32,500/k 3% of 1.6 kg/kWh Alternative 9% Linear, 70% of 70:30 16% Not Tariff is divided into
depending on W capital cost @ 2,300 fuel approach the initial (10%) levelized Fixed Cost (depends
PLF (US$ 823 with 4% kcal/kg Rs 575/MT value @ on the year of
/kW) escal-ation (SHR 3,700 (US$ 14.6 7.84% per operation): from
kcal/kWh) /MT) with 5% annum; Rs 1.72/kWh (1st
escal-ation 12% for year) to Rs 0.9/kWh
Bagasse Co-generation
working capital (10th year) and

Variable Cost
(depends on calendar
year): from
Rs 1.02/kWh (2004-
05) to Rs 1.24/kWh
(2008-09)
If PLF>55%, then
VC+0.215
/kWh

Multi-part, 80% Rs 40,000 4% of 1.16 kg/kWh Alternative 9% Linear, 70% of 70:30 16% Not Tariff is divided into
depending on /kW capital cost @ 3,200 fuel approach the initial (12%) levelized Fixed Cost (depends
PLF (US$ with 4% kcal/kg Rs 1,000/MT value @ on the year of
1,012/kW) escalation (SHR 3,700 (US$ 25.3 7.84% per operation): from
kcal/kWh) /MT) with 5% annum; Rs 1.61/kWh (1st
escal-ation 12% for year) to Rs 0.87/kWh
working capital (10th year) and
Variable Cost
(depends on calendar
year): from
Rs 1.27/kWh (2004-
05) to Rs 1.54/kWh
(2008-09)
Biomass
If PLF>80%, then
VC+0.215
/kWh
Multi-part, 35% Rs 36,250 - - Water royalty 1% 6.7% per 70:30 16% Not Tariff depends on the
depending on /kW pass-through annum for the (12%) levelized year of operation:
Small Scale Hydel
PLF (US$ 918 therefore not first 10 years; from Rs 2.6/kWh in

/kW) included in 12% for the 1st year to
tariff estima- working capital Rs 1.88/kWh in the
tion 10th year.
If PLF>35%, then
Tariff+0.215
/kWh
This category requires special treatment considering the nature of project activities. The capital cost of the projects is in the range of Rs 60 million/MW. The
Commission is therefore of the opinion that the project of electricity generation from municipal waste should have a different tariff and therefore is inclined to
Municipal
continue the tariff for these projects on the guidelines of MNES without going into the cost details. The Commission likes to retain the base unit price of Rs 2.25
Waste
as on 01-04-2004 and the escalation index of 5% p.a. In other words, the base price as on 01-04-2004 will be Rs 3.37/kWh.
Industrial waste-to-energy projects are managed as biomass projects. Hence, the Commission treats industrial waste-based power projects on par with biomass
Industrial
projects and authorizes purchase of the energy at the rates permitted for sale of power from biomass power projects.
Waste
1 2

One last comment should be made on the type of tariffs adopted in the regions
under analysis (single, or multi‐part, or discriminated by some criteria). In this case,
the causes for introducing different tariffs for the same technology differ even in the
same state, such as Rajasthan, where biomass projects are divided between air‐
cooled and water‐cooled; and wind projects where two different tariffs are set for
two different regions of the state. Even though the choice of determining different
tariffs for different technologies or regions is strictly political, there is no clear reason
why this policy should be encouraged as it may create an unwanted distortion in
technology development (or in the agent’s behavior) as well as increase the
complexity of the system and tariff determination.
4.1.3 The Case of Wind Energy
For wind technology, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) undertook
an extensive study of the wind regime, establishing a countrywide network of wind
speed measurement stations. These have made it possible to assess the national
wind potential, and to identify suitable areas for harnessing wind power for
commercial use.
The total potential for wind power in India was first estimated by the Centre for
Wind Energy Technology at around 45,000 MW. This figure was also adopted by the
MNRE as the official estimate of the country’s wind power potential. However, since
1990, a massive exercise of wind monitoring and wind resource assessment has been
carried out by government agencies and the private sector has identified many more
resource areas.18
Over the past few years, the stability of the Indian market has encouraged larger
private and public sector investments. It has also stimulated a stronger domestic
manufacturing sector; some companies now source more than 80% of the
components for their turbines in India. This has resulted both in more cost effective
production and in creating additional local employment. Most recently, some Indian
manufacturers have started to export their products. About nine wind turbine
manufacturers are currently offering their products on the Indian market, the major
players being Suzlon, Enercon, Vestas Wind Technology India Pvt. Ltd, Vestas RRB,
and Pioneer Asia Wind Energy Group. It can be said that India is now emerging as a
manufacturing and knowledge hub for wind power development.
The geographical spread of Indian wind power has so far been concentrated in a few
regions, especially the southern state of Tamil Nadu, which accounts for more than
half of all installations. This is beginning to change, with other states, including
Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Karnataka, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh and
Andhra Pradesh starting to catch up.

18
Currently, the Indian Wind Turbine Manufacturers Association (IWTMA) estimates the potential to be of the
order of 65,000 MW.

Incentive Mechanisms
Regarding fiscal and financial incentives for wind power development in India, the
most important ones are:
• Direct taxes—80% depreciation in the first year of a project’s installation.
• Tax holiday for 10 years.
• No income tax to be paid on power sales to utilities.
• FDI investments are cleared very fast.
The MNRE has also issued guidelines to all state governments to create an attractive
environment for the export, purchase, wheeling and banking of electricity generated
by wind power projects.
On the other hand, most of the states have up‐front tariffs. Different states have
different tariffs for grid‐connected wind farms. Exhibit 27 presents a summary of the
incentives provided by state governments, and in Exhibit 28 a detailed description of
the cost assessment for the up‐front tariffs in relevant states is provided.
One result of these incentives and tariffs has been to encourage energy intensive
and profit‐making industries and businesses to invest in wind power. In addition, the
introduction of a Production Tax Credit (PTC) which would attract investment from
Non‐Resident Indians (NRIs), as well as foreign investment in the Indian market, is
currently being considered. An important attraction is that owning a wind turbine
assures a profitable power supply compared to the tariff of the high voltage sector.
Wind farms in India therefore often consist of clusters of individual self‐ generators,
and more than 97% of investment in the wind sector in India has come from the
private sector. Recently, wind farms have also come up as independent power
producers (IPPs).

Exhibit 27: State Government Incentives for Wind Power Development in India
Buy-back Rate by
Penalty on Infrastructure
Captive Sale to Electricity Third-Party Other
Wheeling Banking kVArh Development
Use Board/Utility Sale Incentives
Consumption Charges
(SEB)
Allowed At par with No info Rs 3.37/kWh Allowed Industry status 10 paise per Rs 1 million/MW
with time- conventional frozen for 5 years under kVArh up to
RPS: 5%
of-day Electricity 10% and
tariff Act 2003, 25 paise per
Andhra
subject to kVArh above
Pradesh
regulation 10%
framed by
respective
SERCs
Idem 4% of energy Not Rs 3.37/kWh Idem ED-exempted, 10 paise per No info

allowed without any demand cut kVArh up to
escalation for 20 30% of wind 10% and
Gujarat years farm installed 20 paise per
capacity KVArh above
10%
RPS: 5%
Idem 5% of energy + Allowed Rs 3.40/kWh Idem No electricity Rs 0.40 per No info

Rs 1.15/kWh as @2% of without any duty for 5 years kVArh
cross-subsidy for energy escalation for 10
Karnataka RPS: 5-10%
third-party sale input years of
commercial
operation
Idem 2% of energy Allowed Rs 4.08/kWh Idem Transmission No info No info

1.5% escalation line borne by
Haryana
Transco (10 km)
RPS: 3-10%

Idem 2% of energy + Not Year-wise rates Idem No electricity 27 paise No info

transmission allowed (Rs/kWh) from 1st duty for 5 years per kVArh
Madhya charges as per ERC to 20th year: 3.97,
RPS: 0.5%
Pradesh 3.80, 3.63, 3.40
and 3.30 (from 5th
to 20th year)
Idem 7% of energy + No info Rs 4/kWh Idem - - No info

West Bengal open-access
charges
Allowed 2% of energy as 12 months Rs 3.50/kWh First Allowed Power 25 paise Nil

with time- wheeling + 5% as year of under evacuation per kVArh
of-day T&D loss commissioning Electricity arrangement,
tariff (escalation of Act 2003, approach Road,
Maharashtra 15 paise per year subject to electricity duty,
for 13 years) regulation loan to
framed by cooperative
respective societies19
SERCs
RPS: 750 MW

19
Other incentives are: (a) For evacuation arrangement of wind energy projects, 50% amount will be given as a subsidy through the Green Energy Fund and 50% amount will be given as a
loan without interest to private developers; the loan will be repaid by MSEB/transmission licensees after commissioning and transferring the ownership of evacuation arrangement to
MSEB/transmission licensees in five equal yearly instalments; (b) 100% expenditure for construction of approach roads will be made through the Green Energy Fund; (c) No electricity duty
for five years for captive use; (d) 11% share capital will be provided to cooperative sector for setting up wind power projects as a grant through the Green Energy Fund.

Idem Below 132 kV, 50% Six months For Jaisalmer, Idem Exemption from 5 paise per Rs 0.2
of normal charges Jodhpur, and electricity duty year with million/MW
applicable to 33 kV Barmer districts: @50% for 7 escalation of
declared by Rs 3.60/kWh on 33 years 5% per year
commission + kV or 11kV system
surcharge + and Rs 3.71/kWh
Rajasthan losses20 on EHV system; for
other districts:
Rs 3.78/kWh on
33kV or 11 kV
system and
Rs 3.89/kWh on
EHV system
Idem 5% of energy 5% (12 Rs 2.90/kWh Idem - 25 paise per Rs 2.875

month kVArh if the million/MW
financial ratio of kVArh
year April drawn to KWh
Tamil Nadu to March) exported is up
to 10% and
50 paise per
KVArh for more
than 10%
Note: US$ 1 = Rs 40.

20
4.5% for supply to consumer directly on EHV system and 8.3% for supply using distribution licensee below 132 kV.

Exhibit 28: Main Assumptions in Up‐front Tariff for Wind Energy in India
Dep- Cap-
Discount
Tariff PLF1 Capital Cost O&M reciation Structure ROE Tariff Rate
Rate
Rate (Debt Rate)
Single 23% Rs 46,500/kW 1.5% of Linear 90% of 70:30 14% 11.38% Rs 3.37/kWh
Gujarat
(US$ 1,178/ capital cost the initial (10.25%) (US$ 0.085/kWh) fixed for 20
kW) with 5% value in 20 years
escalation years
Discrimi-nated 20% to Rs 0.442 lakh/kW 1.25% of Linear 90% of 70:30 (10%) 14% 10.6% For Jaisalmer, Jodhpur and
(depends on 21% (US$ 1,120/ capital cost the initial Barmer districts: Rs 3.60/kWh
districts) kW) with 5% value in 20 (US$ 0.0912/kWh) on 33 kV or
escalation years 11 kV system and Rs 3.71/kWh
Rajasthan
(US$ 0.094/kWh) on EHV

system; for other districts:
Rs 3.78/kWh (US$ 0.0957/kWh)
on 33 kV or 11 kV system and
Rs 3.89/kWh (US$ 0.0985/kWh)
on EHV system
Considering the uncertainties that surround existing wind developments in the area, if a strictly ‘cost plus’ approach were adopted, it would lead
to distortions and would result in higher tariff for the initial years, with the resultant extra burden on consumers.
Andhra Pradesh
The Indian Renewable Energy Association and other developers wanted continuance of the MNES policy. The Commission, therefore, is inclined to
continue the guidelines of MNES in a refined format without going into cost details and to rationalize the tariff by adopting the following
methodology:
Energy purchase rate: The Commission likes to retain the base unit price of Rs 2.25 as on 01-04-2004 and an escalation index of 5% p.a. In
other words, the base price as on 01-04-2004 will be Rs 3.37/kWh. As these projects have no variable expenses and negligible increase in
maintenance costs, the tariff will be frozen for a period of five years.
1 2

4.2 China
4.2.1 Background
In less than a generation, China has moved from being a self‐sufficient energy
consumer to becoming the world’s fastest‐growing energy consumer. During the last
decade, the country has steadily increased its share in the global energy market due
to the inability of domestic production to cope with escalating energy demand. The
rise in fossil fuel use has worsened already acute local pollution levels and driven up
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, increasing the pressure on the sustainability of
China’s development pattern.
Coal is the backbone of China’s energy system. It meets just over 60% of the
country’s primary energy needs, providing most of the fuel used by power stations
and much of the final energy used by industry, commercial businesses, and
households. In fact, coal’s importance in the overall fuel mix has been growing in
recent years, due to booming demand for electricity, which is almost 80% coal‐
based. Oil demand has been growing quickly also, with its share of primary demand
reaching 19% in 2005. Natural gas and the country’s many hydropower projects
constitute just 2% of total primary energy supply each. Nuclear power provides less
than 1% of primary energy.
Because of the continued use by so many rural households of fuel wood and crop
wastes for cooking and heating, biomass remains an important source of energy.
Still, its share of primary demand is only half what it was two decades ago. Other
renewables, while growing very rapidly, continue to represent a small overall share
of energy supplies.
Power generation currently accounts for just under 40% of total primary energy use
in China—a slightly higher share than that of the rest of the world. This reflects both
the relatively large share of electricity in final demand and the low thermal efficiency
of power stations, despite some improvement in recent years. Coal remains the
dominant fuel in China’s electricity mix with a share of 78% of total electricity
supplied in 2005. In 2006, nearly 90% of new power‐generation capacity was coal‐
fired, compared to 70% in 2000. The efficiency of coal‐fired generation has gradually
improved, with the construction of larger, more efficient units and the deployment
of supercritical and other clean coal technologies.
Over the period to 2020, China needs to add 782 GW to its generating capacity,
more than the total current installed capacity in the EU‐25. Diversification to other
energy sources—especially nuclear power and non‐hydro renewables—is a high
priority. But even if forecasts for nuclear (19,000 MW by 2020) and non‐hydro
renewables (over 32,000 MW by 2020) are achieved, they will still represent a small
fraction of total installed capacity forecasted for 2020 (1,300 GW, see Exhibit 29).
Basically, the forecasting implies some substitution (regarding the shares) of oil‐
based generation by wind generation and combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs).


Exhibit 29: Generation Capacity in China by Technology

Hydropower projects are still the largest alternative to coal, and 300 GW capacity by
2020 is planned21, yet while the 22.5 GW Three Gorges Project has encouraged
further development, the barriers remain considerable – high costs for dams and
long‐distance transmission, opposition to resettlement and ecological impacts, and
complex interregional and transnational water rights issues.
In addition, the country is actively engaged in the development of other sources of
renewables to generate electricity, mainly wind power, biomass and solar
photovoltaic. Generation from these sources is expected to reach 103 TWh in 2020,
about 2% of total electricity (see Exhibit 30).
Exhibit 30: RE Generation in China
RES-E Expected Development (TWh)

120
100
80
TWh/Annum
60
40
20
0
1990 2005 2015 2020
Wind Biomass & Waste Geothermal Solar Tidal & Wave

21
China is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world, producing 397 TWh in 2005. Hydel power is
expected to rise to 802 TWh in 2020, but its share of total power output will fall from 16% to 13%.

The costs of power generation in the current Chinese context, without a price on CO2
emissions, are shown in Exhibit 31. As can be seen, coal is likely to be the most
competitive electricity supply source, followed by ‘advanced’ coal technologies and
nuclear power. Gas turns out to be the most expensive option, with costs ranging
from €c 3.4 to 5.5/kWh. Coal can provide electricity at costs as low as €c 1.9/kWh.
The construction cost of supercritical coal‐fired power plants is in the range of € 430‐
650/kW, cheaper than any other RE technology.
Exhibit 31: Generation Cost by Type of Technology in China
China's Technology-Wise Generating Costs

6,0
5,5
5,0
4,5
4,0
c€/kWh
3,5
3,0
2,5
2,0
1,5
1,0
CCGT Coal Coal Large Nuclear Wind
Advanced Standard Hydel

Source: Energy Outlook 2007 – China. EIA.
A final comment about the potential of off‐grid rural electrification is relevant.
Thanks to rising incomes and a rigorous policy of making modern energy services
available to the entire population, all but around 10 million households now have
some access to electricity in China; and LPG, biogas and natural gas are distributed in
a growing number of towns and cities. Improved stoves are also widely available
though, unfortunately not always used as intended: frequently, improved biomass
stoves that burn efficiently and vent smoke outside the house are left idle in favor of
small coal briquette stoves that have the advantage of convenience but are often un‐
vented, worsening indoor air quality.
Although rural electrification programs have been particularly successful, the level of
electricity supply to a large proportion of the rural population is modest. The
availability of clean‐burning gaseous fuels is also very limited in rural areas and they
are not affordable to many families. These issues are addressed in the 11th Five‐Year
Plan, which promotes the development of off‐grid renewables, biogas and solar
thermal technologies, among others, supported by technical outreach, grants and
credit facilities. For cooking and hot water, large integrated biogas programs have
been carried out through the rural energy centers of the Ministry of Agriculture.
Nevertheless, many millions of rural households in China will continue to rely on
traditional biomass to meet much of their energy needs.
4.2.2 Potential and Incentives
Renewable energy accounted for about 15% of China’s total primary energy
consumption in 2005. The main renewable energy source now is biomass, mainly

used for cooking and heating in rural households. In the electricity sector,
hydropower is the main renewable energy source, accounting for 16% of total
generation in 2005. Solar thermal heating is also well developed. The Chinese
government plans to significantly expand the use of renewable energy in the future,
for electricity and heat production and for making transport fuels.
In order to encourage the development of renewable energy, China has introduced
the Renewable Energy Law, which came into effect on 1 January 2006. The law
provides for the compulsory connection to the grid of power plants producing
electricity from renewables. It stipulates that all renewable sources are ‘must‐run’
and, consequently, they must be purchased. In addition, utilities must provide grid‐
connection services and related technical support.
The provisions of the law establish that the reference tariff of renewable energy
projects will be determined by the State Council on the principle of being beneficial
to the development and utilization of renewable energy and being economic and
reasonable, where timely adjustment will be made on the basis of the development
of each technology. When there are more than one interested parties in developing
a site, the tariff will be determined through tender; however, such a tariff cannot
exceed the level of the reference tariffs for similar renewable power generation
projects. The difference between the expense that power grid enterprises purchase
renewable power at and the expenses incurred in the purchase of average‐priced
power generated with conventional energy will be shared among all customers. Grid
connection expenses may be included into the grid enterprise’s power transmission
cost and retrieved from the tariff.
Secondary legislation has set specific incentives mechanism for different RE
technologies that are explained below.
Bioenergy
China’s biomass consumption, at 227 MTOE in 2005, is the largest in the world. It is
almost entirely traditional biomass. Only 3.3 MTOE were used in power generation in
2005. Main biomass resources in the country comprise agricultural wastes, scraps
from forestry and forest product industries, and municipal waste. Agricultural wastes
are widely distributed across the country. Among them, crop stalks suitable for
energy production represent a potential of about 105 MTOE yearly.
In the medium to long term, the forestry sector could provide a yearly potential of
210 MTOE. Wastes from the processing of agricultural products and manure from
livestock farms could, theoretically, also contribute another 80 billion cubic meters
of biogas per year. Municipal wastes could provide some 16 billion cubic meters of
landfill gas. The government’s target calls for 5,500 MW of biomass‐fired generating
capacity by 2010 and 30,000 MW by 2020.
In the mid‐term, it is expected that total biomass consumption will remain broadly
unchanged. However, the utilization pattern is expected to change considerably.
Traditional biomass consumption will most probably fall and, by contrast, demand

for electricity and heat from biomass, including industrial on‐site generation, is
projected to increase from 8 TWh in 2005 to nearly 100 TWh in 2020.
Secondary legislation implementing the Law on renewables sets a subsidy of
Yuan 0.25 /kWh (c€ 2.3/kWh) for biomass‐fired projects.
Hydel
Total hydel potential in China (including both large and small scale)—some 1,750
TWh—is the highest in the world. Resources are located mainly on the Yangtze,
Lancang, Hongshui and Wujiang rivers. Further hydro development will be
undertaken because of its economic advantages and advantages in reducing
emissions. Hydropower is projected to increase from 397 TWh in 2005 to 1,005 TWh
in 2030, but its share in total generation will fall from 16% to 12%. The government’s
300 GW target is met by 2030 in the Reference Scenario.
The huge Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River in Hubei province, when fully
completed in 2009, will have a total installed capacity of 22,500 MW22. Construction
has recently started on two other very large hydropower plants: the Xiluodu project,
located along the Jinsha River in south‐western China, which, when completed in
2015, will have a total capacity of 12,600 MW; and the Xiangjiaba project, in Sichuan
province, which is projected to be completed also in 2015, with a capacity of
6,000 MW.
Small‐scale hydropower plants are widely used. About one‐third of China’s counties
rely on small‐scale hydropower as their main power generation source, with a total
installed capacity of 50,000 MW.
For hydro plants, Regulation 701/2001 (on price regulation) applies. Under this
regulation, some kind of up‐front tariff for coal and hydel is set. These up‐front
tariffs vary between provinces, but as an average they are around US$ 0.04/kWh.
Wind
Installed wind power capacity in China was 1,300 MW in 2005 which doubled in
2006. By the end of that year, there were 91 wind farms in operation in 16 provinces,
equipped with 3,311 wind turbines. Besides large wind farms, over 200,000 stand‐
alone small‐scale wind turbines provide electricity to households in remote areas.
With its large land mass and long coastline, China has relatively abundant wind
resources. Estimates by the China Meteorology Research Institute, based on
measurements taken at ten meters above ground, indicate a potential of 253 GW for
onshore wind power. The institute estimates offshore wind resources to represent
an exploitable potential of about 750 GW.
Nevertheless, the government’s target for large‐scale wind turbines is quite
modest—5,000 MW in 2010 and 30,000 MW in 2020. Wind power development will

22
There are 14,700 MW currently in operation.

need to be accompanied by investment in grid expansion and transmission upgrades.
The capital costs of wind power projects in China are lower than those in North
America and Europe because of the lower cost for equipment, land and installation.
In China, companies undertaking wind power projects are not required to purchase
the five‐year warranty on equipment, which is standard practice in the European
Union and the United States. Thus, investors assume all the risk after two years of
operation, which banks will accept in China but not elsewhere. Developers may also
opt for equipment with lower‐quality steel in order to lower investment
requirements. Turbines are also relatively new and untested in China, thus
potentially yielding slightly more unpredictable output. The domestic manufacturing
industry—including joint ventures—accounted for 45% of the wind‐turbine market in
2006. At present, over twenty manufacturers are established in China. Competition
between foreign and local manufacturers and suppliers of wind turbines and related
components may put downward pressure on wind turbine prices or may force some
manufacturers to cut back on quality in order to remain in business. Domestic
turbine manufacturers are being supported by a governmental requirement that
more than half of the equipment in the first phase of a wind project must be made in
China with, in later phases, the domestic manufacturing share increasing to 70%.
This discrimination against foreign manufacturers and developers is compounded by
the prospects of low returns on investment, low tariffs in some cases, and a lack of
transparent, supportive pricing mechanisms such as feed‐in tariffs, and by a lack of
flexibility in implementing wind power projects (e.g., site selection and wind farm
size are determined by the government). On financing, Chinese domestic wind
power developers can borrow up to 80% of the project’s costs, while there is a 66%
limit on borrowing by foreign investors. This tends to lower the return‐on‐equity of
foreign investor‐owned projects. Furthermore, to qualify for clean development
mechanism (CDM) credits, projects are required to be at least 51% Chinese‐owned,
which forces international investors to hand over control of the project to a Chinese
partner. Currently, the rate of return to foreign investors on wind projects is around
2% to 4%, which explains their lack of enthusiasm. Domestic investors earn much
higher returns, of at least 8%, depending on the particulars of the project.
In the case of wind projects, the implementation of the Law does not have
preferential pricing policies. Instead, the standard price for wind power is
determined through competitive tendering. There is no minimum wind power price:
each wind project receives an individual on‐grid price which varies significantly: from
Yuan 0.382/kWh (c€ 3.64/kWh) to Yuan 0.79/kWh (c€ 7.5/kWh). There are two types
of tendering procedures, one through the central government and another through
the provincial/local government.
Solar
By the end of 2005, China’s installed capacity of photovoltaic systems was about
70 MW, of which approximately 50% was used to supply electricity in remote rural
areas without grid connection. Since 2000, China’s domestic PV industry has grown
rapidly, achieving annual PV module production capacity of approximately 300 MW

at the end of 2006. The future potential is very large, as most areas benefit from high
solar radiation. The national targets are 300 MW installed by 2010 and 1,800 MW by
2020. PV technology can be expected to make significant advances beyond 2020
along with cost reductions.
China is the world leader in solar thermal systems for heating and hot water supply.
About 75 million m2 of solar collectors are installed in China at present. This
technology is already cost‐effective. The success of the past is likely to continue. The
national target for 2010 is 150 million m2, increasing to 300 million m2 in 2020.
4.3 Brazil
4.3.1 Background
Brazil is Latin America’s largest energy consumer, accounting for over 40% of the
region’s consumption. Its energy mix is dominated by renewable energy sources and
oil. Its primary energy demand is projected to grow annually at 2.1%, from 200
MTOE in 2004 to 352 MTOE in 2030.
The country is expected to continue to rely on hydropower to meet most of its
power‐generation needs, building about 66 GW of new capacity until 2030. Dams are
likely to be located far from centers of demand, requiring large investments in
transmission lines to connect them to the national grid. Brazil has a large renewable
energy supply potential, with 260 GW of technical hydropower potential (some
12 GW are additional potential in small scale hydel) and 143 GW of technical wind‐
power potential (even though the expected penetration until 2030 is 5,000 MW23),
and a large potential in biomass, mainly driven by sugar‐cane bagasse (see Exhibit
32). Development of these vast resources, however, has been hindered by cyclical
economic disruptions and shortages of long‐term and low‐cost capital.
Exhibit 32: RE Installed Capacity and Potential in Brazil
Brazil's mid-term RES-E Potential
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
MW
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
Biomass Wind Hydel SS
Existing (2005) PROINFA (2006-08) Potential

23
Plano Nacional de Energía 2030, Ministerio de Minas y Energía, Brasil.

Similar to other developing economies, Brazil faces a number of energy and
environmental challenges. Natural gas demand has increased considerably over the
last few years, as the government kept gas prices low to encourage energy
diversification. A rapid expansion of gas imports fuelled this growth. In 2006, imports
from Bolivia accounted for 48% of gas consumption.24 Particularly in light of the
recent nationalization of the energy sector in Bolivia, Brazil is seeking to reduce this
concentrated gas import‐dependence by accelerating development of the Espirito
Santo and Santos basins and by importing LNG. Environmental concerns will,
however, need to be addressed. Much more investment will be needed to exploit
domestic gas resources and to expand the gas transportation and distribution
infrastructure. Hydropower accounted for over three‐quarters of Brazil’s electricity
generating capacity in 2005, and the government plans to authorize the building of
new large hydropower plants; but there are important environmental and financial
obstacles. The government is actively promoting the use of sugar‐cane residue
(bagasse) for cogeneration of heat and power and other non‐hydro renewables‐
based electricity generation.
Brazil’s energy mix has become more diversified over the past several decades. In
1980, biomass use accounted for 34% of total energy demand. Most of this was
traditionally used for cooking and heating in the residential sector. Total biomass use
declined to 27% in 2004. The use of biomass today is predominantly based on
modern energy technologies, such as the production of ethanol from sugar cane, the
cogeneration of electricity from sugar cane bagasse, the use of sawdust and black
liquor (a by‐product of the pulp and paper industries) and the production of charcoal
from eucalyptus plantations by steelmakers. Fuel wood use for cooking and heating
fell from 25 MTOE in 1971 to 11 MTOE in 2004, though there are indications that
high oil prices have recently reversed this trend. Poor households in the north and
northeast, the least developed part of the country, still rely predominately on fuel
wood to meet their cooking and heating needs.
Though it is beyond the scope of this work, it is important to mention the Brazilian
experience on ethanol which is considered the most successful of the world. Brazil is
the world’s second‐largest ethanol producer, after the United States, and the world’s
largest ethanol exporter. Ethanol is derived from sugar cane. Brazil’s national ethanol
program, ProAlcool, was launched in response to the oil crisis in the 1970s. From
1983 to 1988, 90% of the 800,000 new cars sold each year on average in Brazil were
running on ethanol. In 2003, car manufacturers, beginning with Volkswagen,
introduced ‘flex‐fuel’ vehicles (FFV), which are capable of running on any
combination of hydrous ethanol and a gasoline‐anhydrous ethanol blend. Such
vehicles allow consumers to choose any combination of the cheapest fuel while
protecting them from any fuel shortages. FFVs do not cost any more than
conventional vehicles. Today, the government estimates that FFVs account for more
than three‐quarters of new car sales in Brazil. Pure gasoline is no longer sold. Brazil’s
ethanol production was 15.9 billion liters in 2005, more than a third of global

24
According to official estimates.

production, of which 2.6 billion liters were exported. Brazil has a 50% share of the

global ethanol trade (see Box 2 for more details).
Box 2: Brazilian Experience with Ethanol
Most of the reduction in the cost of producing ethanol in recent years has come
from the agricultural phase of ethanol production. Around 60% to 70% of the
final cost of ethanol is the cost of the sugar cane. Agricultural yield and the
amount of sucrose in the plant have a strong impact on costs. Average
productivity in Brazil is around 65 tonnes per hectare (MT/ha), but it can be as
high as 100 to 110 T/ha in São Paulo State. Since the beginning of ProAlcool,
yields have improved by about 33% in São Paulo with the development of new
varieties and the improvement of agricultural practices. Many operations have
been mechanised over the past 25 years, but advances in harvesting are more
recent. In the past five years in the midwest, southeast and southern regions,
about 35% of the area planted with sugar cane has been harvested mechanically
and, of this, about 20% has been harvested without previously burning the field.
Up to 90% of the sugar cane is harvested mechanically in some regions. It is
estimated that the widespread application of mechanised harvesting would
achieve a significant further reduction in the per-tonne cost of sugar cane.
Throughout the evolution of ProAlcool, technological priorities have changed.
Initially, the focus was on increasing equipment productivity. The size of
Brazilian mills also increased. Some mills now have a crushing capacity of 6
million tonnes of sugar cane per year and capacity is expected to increase to 10
million tonnes by 2010. The focus was then shifted to improvements in
conversion efficiencies. Over the past 15 years, the primary focus has been on
better management of the processing units. In the future, attention is expected
to be given to reducing water needs. On average, five cubic metres of water are
used for each tonne of sugar cane processed, though values range from 0.7
m3/tonne to 20 m3/tonne. Average ethanol production yields have grown from
3,900 litres per hectare per year (l/ha/year) in the early 1980s to 5,600
l/ha/year in the late 1990s. In the most efficient units, yields are now as high as
8,000 to 10,000 l/ha/year.
To meet rising domestic and export demand for ethanol, the Brazilian
government plans to increase productive capacity and to build ports with storage
tanks and loading facilities. Brazil will also need to establish a clear regulatory
framework in order to increase production and to address the potential
environmental and social impacts of expanding ethanol production in the
country.

4.3.2 Potential and Costs
Biomass
Brazil has extensive and diverse biomass resources, which are exploited for energy in
many ways. The country is a highly efficient producer of large‐scale industrial
charcoal, with biomass‐to‐charcoal conversion efficiencies ranging from 30% to 35%,
particularly from plantations. Charcoal production has increasingly become a
professional activity, with most charcoal being produced from dedicated plantations.
In 2000, about 72% of charcoal was produced from eucalyptus plantations,
compared with 34% in 1990.

Almost all sugar‐cane distilleries in Brazil use bagasse‐fired steam turbine systems to
provide steam and electricity to meet on‐site factory needs. Most biomass
cogeneration is in São Paulo state, where 40 sugar mills sell some 1.3 GW of surplus
power to the grid. The public authorities are promoting bagasse‐based cogeneration
to reduce the country’s reliance on hydropower. Apart from bagasse, only a small
proportion of the large potentially recoverable residues from commercial crops and
forestry are used for energy purposes. Landfill gas is also underdeveloped. With the
exception of bagasse, there is a lack of consistent and reliable data on biomass
resources and their potential as an energy source. This is particularly the case with
regard to residues in the pulp and paper industry, which are produced in large
quantities.
Exhibit 33: Brazil’s Generation Potential Using Native (left) and Planted (right)
Forests
Exhibit 34: Brazil’s Generation Potential Using Rice Bran

The use of bagasse as an input for power generation is competitive with other
existing conventional technologies. The incremental mid‐term potential of power
generation using sugar cane bagasse accounts for up to 6,400 MW. Regarding the
wood and rice sectors, the identified mid‐term potential at the national level is not
very large, but potential at the regional level must be considered an important
option for biomass penetration, with an estimated incremental potential of
1,300 MW in both segments. Generation costs using rice bran or wood is very similar
and its value is close to R$ 117/MWh (€ 44.15/MWh). Amongst existing technologies
for power generation, biogas recovery from landfills is one of the most mitigating of
all solutions for GHG emission reduction. Biogas potential in Brazil ranges from

1,000 MW up to 3,000 MW; in addition, if we take into account recycling measures,
the potential increases by an additional 1,000 MW. The generation cost for landfill
gas is around R$ 191/MWh (€ 72.07/MWh).
Small‐Scale Hydel
Up to 2007 the installed capacity for this technology accounted for 1,673 MW
distributed amongst 280 facilities. The mid‐term potential identified for Brazil is
approximately 15,000 MW, spread over 3,000 plants each with an installed capacity
ranging from 1 MW up to 30 MW (see Exhibit 35).
Exhibit 35: Medium‐term Potential of Small‐scale Hydel in Brazil
Potential
State Plants
MW %
Acre 53 0.4% 4
Alagoas 17 0.1% 6
Amapá 37 0.2% 3
Amazonia 366 2.5% 22
Bahía 914 6.1% 87
Ceará 8 0.1% 5
Espíritu Santo 594 4.0% 84
Goiás 659 4.4% 49
Marañaos 275 1.9% 30
Mato Groso 1,445 9.7% 84
Mato Groso do Sul 741 5.0% 70
Minas Gerais 3,920 26.4% 367
Pará 484 3.3% 35
Paraíba 8 0.1% 3
Parana 1,587 10.7% 1,781
Pernanbuco 25 0.2% 5
Piauí 28 0.2% 2
Rio de Janeiro 487 3.3% 55
Rio Grande do Norte 2 0.0% 1
Rio Grande do Sul 839 5.6% 76
Rondonia 442 3.0% 38
Roraima 37 0.2% 2
Santa Catarina 635 4.3% 56
Sao Pablo 1,007 6.8% 102
Tocantins 253 1.7% 22
Total 14,865 100.0% 2,989

Several fiscal incentives have been developed at various governmental levels for
small‐scale hydel promotion. They can be summarized as follows:
• Public land use tax exemption.
• Some specific federal taxes can be used as tax‐credits in state and municipal
taxes.
• Federal R&D tax exemption.
• In addition to the fiscal promotion scheme, small‐scale hydel projects are
entitled to sell power to qualified customers (with consumption over 500 kW
each) on a bilateral basis. The generation cost for this technology is around
R$ 135/MWh (€ 50.94/MWh), depending on the project’s financial terms.
Wind
In Brazil, the existing potential for wind technology amounts to 143.5 GW even
though, as already mentioned, the government expects that less than 5% (some
5,000 MW) will be developed by 2030.
Exhibit 36: Brazil’s Wind Energy Potential

Generation costs involving wind technologies vary between R$ 203‐231/MWh

(€ 76.6‐87.5/MWh), calculated using a load factor that ranges between 0.42 and
0.32, respectively. These prices are higher than the average price for new energy in
Brazil which is approximately R$ 139/MWh (€ 52.45/MWh).
Meanwhile, with the development of a national industry for the production of wind
generators, production costs will tend to reduce and as the competence among
companies increases, prices will tend to reduce as well, making this energy source
more competitive.
As explained later, the PROINFA program forecasted a wind penetration of
1,423 MW by December 2008, whereas up to April 2007, wind generation in Brazil

accounted for 237 MW, of which 208 MW resulted from the PROINFA project.
According to Eletrobrás, on average, wind farms committed in the PROINFA project
should have a load factor of 30%, but in the northeast region the load factor has
increased to over 40% after the replacement of the project’s turbines for others
more suitable for the region.
Another important fact to point out is that most of the wind farms are located in the
northeast region. This will help the development of small‐scale hydel due to the
complementarities that exist between these technologies in the region: the most
important one is the inverse seasonality between prevailing wind speeds and
availability of water for hydel generation, as shown in Exhibit 37.
Exhibit 37: Wind Seasonality in Northeast Region for PROINFA Projects
vs. Sao Francisco River Volume
Solar
Solar energy in some rural areas is the only feasible solution (technically and
economically) to provide inhabitants with electricity; this is due to low local
consumption, the scatter of population in rural areas, distances to main transport
lines, difficulty in accessing the area, as well as due to environmental restrictions. In
urban areas it has additional efficiency advantages since it can be used not only to
generate energy but also to heat water. The latter would reduce the ‘electric shower
consumption problem’ peculiar to the country.25
According to the SWERA (Solar and Wind Energy Resource Assessment) project,
financed by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the most
appropriate areas to exploit solar energy in Brazil are the states of Bahia,
Pernambuco, and Piauí, along with the south, southeast and central regions, in this
order. The average insolation factor in these states equals 5 kWh/m2/day, as shown
in Exhibit 38.

25
Around 36 million people in Brazil use electric showers. This technology, as it is used today, at peak time
energy consumption (from 6 pm to 9 pm) uses up about 6 GW. In other words, electric shower consumption
corresponds to 10% of the total energy used in Brazil.

Exhibit 38: Average Annual Solar Irradiation in Brazil

However, the biggest obstacle for the dissemination of solar energy (both for heating
and electricity generation) is still the high initial costs and the lack of low‐interest
loan programs that could stimulate the sector. Only some government sponsored
programs have been developed in some regions, resulting in an installed capacity of
9 MW.
4.3.3 Incentive Mechanism: The PROINFA Program
The Brazilian Alternative Energy Sources Incentive Program (Programa de Incentivo
às Fontes Alternativas de Energia Elétrica, or PROINFA), launched in 2004, provides
incentives to stimulate the use of alternative sources of energy. PROINFA’s long‐term
goal is to increase the share of wind, biomass, and small and medium‐sized
hydroelectric facilities to 10% of electricity generation by 2020.
The Brazilian government has designated Eletrobrás (state‐owned company

operating the HV grid and large hydro plants) as the primary buyer of electricity
generated by PROINFA projects, entering into long‐term power purchase
agreements at a guaranteed price. The guaranteed price for wind is 90% of the
average supply tariff, 70% for small hydro and 50% for biomass. Several of the
Eletrobrás Group’s regional electricity companies are minority shareholders (up to
49%) in special purpose entities which own and operate PROINFA projects.
Brazil’s national development bank (BNDES) agreed to provide 70% of the financing
for the projects and the Brazilian Energy Fund, launched in December 2004, should
assist in funding the remaining 30%.

PROINFA is being implemented in two phases:
• In Phase 1, Eletrobrás had a target for 3,300 MW of renewable capacity by
2006. As of September 2006, 1,191 MW of small hydro, 1,423 MW of wind,
and 685 MW of biomass capacity had been accepted for PROINFA.26
• In Phase 2, Eletrobrás will be expected to lead the way to the fulfillment of
PROINFA’s 10% goal of electricity generation from renewables resources.
The main characteristics of the incentives provided are as follows:
• Price floors for RE power.
• Costs are distributed to consumers on pro‐rata basis.
• Tender procedure for energy acquisition.
• Minimum national participation: 60%.
• 20‐year contract with Eletrobrás.
• Up to 70% of contractual income guaranteed.
• Differences between contractual power and generated power are traded on
the spot market.
The results of the tender procedures until now are shown in Exhibit 39.
Exhibit 39: Results of Tender Procedures in Brazil
Technology Plants Capacity Energy Average Investment Investment

(MW) (GWh/Annum) Tariff (M€) (€/kW)
(€/MWh)
SS Hydel 63 1,191 6,541 46.4 1,358.50 1,140.64
Wind 54 1,423 3,719 79.8 2,086.80 1,466.47
Biomass 27 685 2,275 38.2 381.13 556.39
Total 144 3,299 12,536 3,826.43 -

26
See ‘Acompanhamentodas Centrais Geradoras do PROINFA ‐ Versão Agosto de 2006’ at
http://www.aneel.gov.br/37.htm.

5 What Have We Learned from International Experience?
In this Annex, we have provided a comprehensive description of most of the relevant
international experience regarding promotion of on‐grid RE generation. It is not
possible to extract specific and definitive conclusions, or even patterns, amongst all
the analyzed cases, since these vary widely in terms of both context and details
among different countries. However, some ‘lessons learnt’ can be discerned. Some
of these lessons are presented in the following paragraphs as answers to five basic
questions that should be kept in mind while designing policies and regulations for
developing RE in a given country or region.
Which have been the most successful RE stories and what are the common stylized
facts in those experiences?
We have seen that the experience of Germany, Denmark, Spain, and India regarding
wind generation is a successful one. Similarly, the case for biomass in some Nordic
countries and in Brazil (bagasse‐based) has performed well. Both biogases and
biowaste have shown good results in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and the UK.
For solar PV, the only example examined is Germany, but in some countries, such as
Spain, it is being developed at very high rates. Within the analyzed sample, the only
country that has developed geothermal energy is Italy, as in others countries
assessed the potential is negligible. In the three emerging countries studied, both
small‐scale and large‐scale hydel is being developed both because there is still
important potential and because it is cost‐effective. In EU, the remaining potential
for hydel is much less significant.
When analyzing what might be the common issues in these countries, we identified
at least two main facts:
• Either they developed a strong national industry on a particular RE technology,
and/or
• They have a huge potential in one RE resource and hence the cost for
developing the corresponding technology is very competitive, even when
external costs are not internalized in the cost‐benefit analysis.
The first case is obvious when analyzing the wind sector: all of the most successful
countries in developing wind generation have a huge local industry associated:
Germany (Enercon, Nordex, Repower), Spain (Gamesa, Acciona), Denmark (Vestas),
and India (Suzlon). The market share of these manufactures is around 80% (if we add
the remaining successful experience, USA (GE), the market share is 95%). Though a
less concentrated industry, the case for biogas in Germany can also be cited. This
raises two new questions: (1) Is it necessary to develop an associated industry to
foster the penetration of a new technology? and (2) Is it easy to develop a new
industry on renewable energy?
There is no evidence that not having an established local industrial and
manufacturing base in a specific RET is a binding constraint to foster the penetration

of renewable energy. However, there is some positive correlation between the
existence of these industries and the installed capacity in a country: 72% of the
world’s wind installed capacity is on the aforementioned five countries. Although we
do not consider this issue a pre‐condition in itself, it might have an influence in the
regulatory tools chosen to foster the penetration of renewables.
The usual, simple benchmark rule—“do the same as this or that successful
experience”—may be misguiding. Such benchmarking can be dangerous if is not
properly assessed. Background conditions must be carefully understood before
getting to final conclusions. In the case of Pakistan, the experience of Brazil and
some EU countries, that in smaller scale are also successful (i.e., Ireland), may be of
more interest. As will be explained later, it is worthwhile to note that in both these
experiences, tendering procedures were carried out in order to kick the market off.
Different is the case if the country decides to initiate the development of an
indigenous industry in some RE technology. The basic problem of this approach is
that, normally, the involved technologies require some kind of a ‘learning curve’
before becoming commercially viable. Most of the countries mentioned above
started research on wind energy at least ten years before the technology could be
commercially developed. For instance, in the Spanish case, the first experimental
developments of large‐scale wind turbines were carried out by ASINEL (Spanish
association of the electrical industry) in the beginning of the 80s. An intriguing
experiment is the Chinese case, where some important manufacturers are being
established (i.e., Goldwind); however, the quality of their products is still a matter of
concern.
Other successful stories can be found in those countries where the abundance of a
resource makes it very cheap, as is the case of bagasse and hydel in Brazil, other
biomass in the Nordic countries, geothermal in Italy, etc. In these countries, the
policy looks for the most cost‐efficient solution, but this solution is not developed
based only on market signals. The case of Brazil is very interesting. The power sector
in Brazil is based on 95 % hydel; probably medium‐size hydel is the cheapest option,
but this generates the problem of security of supply, i.e., in hydrologically extra‐dry
years or in some seasons during dry or average years. Therefore, some thermal
generation is considered a necessary complement, and for covering this need
bagasse‐based generation is probably the cheapest option available. Successful
country experiences have developed RE technologies that are cheapest and better
suited for the country in the first place.
It is important to mention that in all cases, even when the technology is cost‐
efficient (as in some cases of hydel, biogases or biomass), a policy for fostering
technology development is a must. Besides the necessary subsidy to offset the issue
that externalities are considered in private evaluation of conventional generation,
there are also financial, grid access, informational, and regulatory barriers that must
be assessed.

How do the three main incentive mechanisms score: quotas, feed‐in tariff and
tendering procedures?
Broadly speaking, evidence shows that feed‐in tariffs are the best incentive
mechanism for developing RE, although this evidence should be carefully managed.
Quota systems do not seem to be working properly. In our opinion, this is because of
two main issues:
• One is inherent to the system—it is more complex than the others as it needs a
secondary market to trade the green certificates, a penalty mechanism for
defaulters, etc.
• The second one, which can be easily overcome, is related to an inappropriate
regulatory design in several of the instances examined.
Tendering procedures worked quite well in many cases, at least to kick‐start the
market. The big issue regarding tendering systems is whether they should only be
employed to start the market, or as an ongoing system because, in the latter case,
they seem to be more complex than a feed‐in tariff system.
Is it better to have technology‐based incentives or single, common incentives?
• In the case of feed‐in tariffs and tendering procedures, the issue of single vs.
technology‐based pricing arises. International evidence shows that except for a
few (and not very successful) European countries, almost all countries have
adopted technology‐based incentive mechanisms. When this point of analysis
is reached, two issues should be assessed: technology‐based incentives are
needed to foster the development of expensive technologies that have around
three times higher cost, such as on‐grid solar PV and thermal. Regarding the
other cluster of technologies whose costs are relatively closer, the case for
technology‐based incentives is about simplicity vs. fairness.
• For all these technologies a simple feed‐in tariff or tendering procedure may
be much simpler than technology‐based ones, but some infra‐marginal rents
appropriated by the producers may arise in the case of the cheapest
technologies. The issue should be overcome by a cost assessment for each
technology in the specific country.
Is success only a matter of tariff?
Definitely not. Tariff is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for developing RE

energy. In our opinion, grid access, administrative issues (contracts, licenses,
permits, multiple uncoordinated windows, facilities, etc.) and instability of the
incentive mechanism are as relevant as the tariff itself for fostering the penetration
of renewable energy. We have seen cases such as France, where the potential for
many RETs is huge and the tariffs similar or higher than those in other countries
which have achieved great RE deployment success; however, grid access and
complex administrative mechanisms had blocked development in France until 2006.

It also important to mention that small projects probably need other types of
incentives, such as capital grants, interest rate reductions, etc., because, when these
projects are developed by either the community or very small firms, the financial
barriers can be huge. The Indian experience is quite interesting in this regard.
Are the incentive mechanisms different if designed for a developed country from
those for an emerging one?
This question implicitly comprises two other questions:
• Are the incentive mechanisms different across developed and emerging
countries? and
• Is the level of the tariff for RE different in the two cases?
There is not enough evidence to enable a categorically statement that incentive
mechanisms need to be different depending on the degree of the country’s
development. Both feed‐in and tendering procedures can be found in developed and
emerging countries. In our sample, we do not identify emerging countries with quota
systems, probably because they are quite complex to implement when there is not a
consolidated (power or financial) market actually operating.
Although it is foreseeable that the tariff for capital‐intensive technologies should be
higher in emerging countries because of the higher risk, we do not find a consistent
difference across tariffs in the countries analyzed. Probably, this is because our
sample only comprises BRIC27 countries which are perceived as less risky than other
emerging countries.

27
Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

Appendix A: RE Promotional Schemes in the EU25
Main Supporting Policies Key Factors Biogas Biomass Biowaste Geothermal
Feed-in tariffs plus Biogas: 10.3-16.5 € Electricity:
Investment subsidy (30% aprox) for cents/kWh <200 kW 13 € cents/kWh Electricity: 7 € cents/kWh
Austria 4-12.8 € cents/Kwh
solar thermal, biomass, geothermal, Sewage & landfill: 3-6 € >200 kW 10 € cents/kWh Heat: Investment subsidy
wind and hydro on project basis cents/kWh Heat: Investment subsidy
Green certificates system with 2 € cents/Kwh 2 € cents/Kwh
2 € cents/Kwh
Belgium minimum feed-in tariff plus tax 2 € cents/Kwh Wallonie: investment Heat: (Wallonie) investment
Wallonie: investment subsidy
compensation scheme. subsidy subsidy
Although the government intends to make
Landfill & Sewage:
Governmental grants of 30-40% plus Cyprus less dependent on imported Investment grant;
Cyprus Investment grant plus Investment Subsidy
feed-in tariffs energy, the infraestructure is set up for 6.3 € cents/kWh
6.3 € cents/kWh
fossil fuel generation.
PP: purchase price for the electricity

Minimum feed-in tariffs (Purchase supplied to the network.
8.3-11 € cents/kWwh (PP) 8.5-12.3 € cents/kWwh (PP) 16.4 € cents/kWwh (PP)
Czech Rep price or Green premiums). GP: green premium for the electricity
4.2-7 € cents/Kwh (GP) 4.4-8.2 € cents/Kwh (GP) 12.8 € cents/Kwh (GP)
Taxes reductions supplied to a trader or eligible customer.
Methods may not be combined.
4 € cents/Kwh (guaranteed for

Green certificates system plus feed-in
Denmark 4 € cents/Kwh 10 years) plus 1 € cents/Kwh 4 € cents/Kwh
tariff
guaranteed for RE certificate
Changes in the law opens the possibilities 1.8*Residential price for 7

Estonia Tax incentives plus feed-in tariffs
for producing wind energy profitably. years
Exemption from energy tax for Feed-in tariffs and green certificates are
Finland 4.2 € cents/kWh (aprox)
renewable energy being analysed.
Feed-in tariffs (<12 MW) and

Feed-in tariffs plus tender (>12 MW),
7,5-11 € cents/Kwh (15 7,5-11 € cents/Kwh 10-15 € cents/Kwh (15
France guaranteed for 15-20 years and rates Administrative and grid barrier exists. 7,5-11 € cents/Kwh (15 years)
years) (15 years) years)
adjusted by inflation.
Fiscal incentives
<150 kW 11.5 € cents/Kwh;

<5 MW 15 € cents/kWh
Sewage and landfill: 150 kW<p<500 kW 9.9 €
5 MW<p<10 MW 14 €
Feed-in tariffs. Limited grid capacity hampers the growth <500 kW 7.7 € cents/kWh;
cents/kWh
Germany Investments subsidies (except wind). of onshore wind. Technical problems on cents/Kwh; 500 kW<p<5 MW 8.9 €
10 MW<p<20 MW 8.95 €
Subsidised loans for wind investments. offshore wind. >500 kW to 5 MW 6.6 € cents/kWh
cents/kWh
cents/Kwh 1.5% decrease per year (20
>20 MW 7.16 € cents/kWh
years)
Administrative and grid barrier exists.

Islands: 7.8 € cents/Kwh Islands: 7.8 € cents/Kwh
Feed-in tariffs plus investments Greek government has established rules
Greece - Mainland: 7 € cents/Kwh Mainland: 7 € cents/Kwh
subsidies (30% aprox) for heat. for rational use of geothermal energy in
Investment subsidy (heat) Investment subsidy (heat)
line with the community's view.
No coordinated national action. Insufficient

Hungary Feed-in tariffs (on indefinite term) 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh
investment climate.

Hydro L-S SS Hydel Photovoltaics Solar Thermal Tidal & Wave Wind onshore Wind offshore
<20 kWpeak 60 € cents/kWh

Austria 3.15-6.25 € cents/Kwh Investment Subsidy 7.8 € cents/kWh
>20 kWpeak 47 € cents/kWh
15 € cents/Kwh
15 € cents/Kwh
Belgium 5 € cents/Kwh Wallonie: investment 2 € cents/Kwh 5 € cents/Kwh 9 € cents/Kwh
Flandes: subsidy scheme
subsidy
Investment grant; plus: Investment grant; plus:
5 years: 9.2 € cents/kWh 5 years: 9.2 € cents/kWh
Investment grant;
Cyprus Investment Subsidy 10 years: 4.8-9.2 € 10 years: 4.8-9.2 €
<5 kW 20.4 € cents/kWh
cents/kWh (according to cents/kWh (according to
annual wind speed) annual wind speed)
8.7-13.8 € cents/kWwh
49 € cents/kWwh (PP) 49 € cents/kWwh (PP) 8.9 € cents/kWwh (PP)
Czech Rep (PP)
46.4 € cents/Kwh (GP) 46.4 € cents/Kwh (GP) 7.1 € cents/Kwh (GP)
4.9-8.7 € cents/Kwh (GP)
Spot price plus Spot price plus

Denmark environmental premium (1.6 environmental premium (1.6
€ cents/kWh) € cents/kWh)
1.8*Residential price for 1.8*Residential price for 12

Estonia
7 years years
Finland 4.2 € cents/kWh (aprox) 6.9 € cents/kWh (aprox)
0-10 years: 8.2 € cents/kWh 0-10 years: 13 € cents/kWh

6,1-8.6 € cents/Kwh (20 30-45 € cents/Kwh (20 10-15 years: 2.8-8.2 € 10-20 years: 3-13 €
France
years) years) cents/kWh cents/kWh
(15 years) (20 years)
Premiums for
<500 kW 9.67 €
upgrades before 6.19 € cents/kWh plus a
cents/Kwh; 5.5 € cents/kWh plus 3.2 €
2012 or increasing 2.91 € cents/kWh (bonus for
Germany 500 kW<p<5 MW 6.65 € 45.7 € cents/Kwh 45.7 € cents/Kwh cents/kWh (bonus) and 2%
its capacity by 12 years) and 2% yearly
cents/Kwh yearly reduction in tariff.
15% reduction in tariff.
(30 years)
(15 years)
Islands: 7.8 €
Islands: 7.8 € cents/Kwh Islands: 7.8 € cents/Kwh cents/Kwh Islands: 7.8 € cents/Kwh Islands: 7.8 € cents/Kwh
Greece Investment Subsidy (heat)
Mainland: 7 € cents/Kwh Mainland: 7 € cents/Kwh Mainland: 7 € Mainland: 7 € cents/Kwh Mainland: 7 € cents/Kwh
cents/Kwh
Hungary 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh 6-6.8 € cents/Kwh



The Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff

(REFIT) program guarantees power
prices for all registered renewable
Ireland power generators. 7.2 € cents/kWh
Tariffs range from 5.7 € cents/kWh for
wind power to 7.2 € cents/kWh for
biomass.
Certificate system with mandatory Certificates are issued only for plants
demand (cap and trade). producing more than 50 MWh per year.
Italy Tradable green certificates - Tradable green certificates
Funds for specific technologies and/or Problems in obtaining authorisation at local
municipalities. level and high cost of grid connection.
Regulation fixes the total capacity for

instalation and specific volumes for
next year are annually published.
Purchase tariff for small hydro, waste Long-term loan on favourable conditions
Latvia
and biogas is set at the average for projects in private and public sectors.
electricity sales tariff, while tariffs for
wind power plants are approved case-
by-case.
Procedure for promotion of purchasing

There are feed-in tariffs since 2002 but
Lithuania of electricity generated from 6.9 € cents/kWh
with no guaranteed time.
renewable and waste energy sources.
<3 MW 2.5 € cents/kWh for 10

Limitations on eligibility and budget.
Feed-in tariffs plus investments <3 MW 2.5 € cents/kWh years.
Luxembourg Broad range of support measures which
subsidies up to 40%. for 10 years. Investment compensation
may be used cumulatively.
scheme.
Malta is formulating a strategy for

Reduced VAT on solar applications, renewable energy.
Malta
from 15% to 5%. Energy infraestructure up to now has been
oriented to subsidied oil products.
On 18 August 2006, the Dutch Minister of

Economic Affairs suspended MEP subsidy
The MEP is a kWh subsidy paid to
of new projects, given recent information
domestic producers of electricity from
Netherlands indicating hat the Dutch renewable
renewable sources and CHP who feed-
electricty objectives for 2010 will be
in to the national grid.
achieved.
A new MEP from 2008 is forseen.


Ireland 5.7 € cents/kWh
Tradable green certificates.

Tradable green Feed-in tariffs ranging from Tradable green
Italy Tax deductions (heat) Tradable green certificates Tradable green certificates
certificates 36 € cents/kWh and 49 € certificates
cents/kWh
Latvia
Lithuania 6.9 € cents/kWh 6.9 € cents/kWh
<50 MW for 20 years

25 € cents/kWh <3 MW 2.5 € cents/kWh for
<3 MW 2.5 € cents/kWh (municipality) Investment compensation 10 years.
Luxembourg
for 10 years. 45-55 € cents/kWh (other) scheme (heat). Investment compesation
Investment compensation scheme.
scheme.
Malta
Netherlands



No clear enforcement mechanism.
There are environmental funds on all levels
Poland Green Power Purchase Obligation
of the administration supporting the
developments of RES
Feed-in tariffs (formula)

Portugal Investments subsidies
Tax incentives
There is no specific support for wind

Current low energy prices.
and solar energy.
Slovakia The government only recognises potential
Biomass is supported in remote rural
for biomass in remote rural areas
areas.
Administrative problems for acquiring
permissions.
<1 MW 6.98 € cents/kWh
Slovenia Feed-in tariffs. Regulation establishes a contractual 6.11 € cents/kWh
framework between network operator and
generator including a 10 year contract.
<500 MW 13.07 (T) - <2 MW 15.89 (T) - 11.53 (P) €

<50 MW
The producer may choose between: 9.77 (P) € c/kWh c/kWh
Transparent support scheme and high feed- 6.89 € cents/kWh (T)
Spain Preferential tariff (T); or >500 MW 9.68 (T) - 5.78 >2 MW 14.65 (T) - 10.09 (P) €
in tariffs deliver high investment certainity. 3.84 € cents/kWh (P)
Premium price (P) (cap and floor) (P) € c/kWh c/kWh
(20 years)
(15 year) (15 year)
The certificate system will form an

incentive to invest in the most cost-
Electricity certificates
Sweden effective options. Green certificates Green certificates
Investment grants for wind
Volatility in prices cause uncertainity on
investors.
Obligatory targets with tradable green Grid connection issues could disadvantage
certificate system. RES support programs.
United Kingdom Climate change levy (0.63 € cent/kWh Obligatory demand is set to 2027 ensuring Green certificates Green certificates
aprox.) long-term demand.
Grant schemes RES-E economically viable.
Sources: EC "The share of renewable energy in the EU" and IEA "Global renewable energy"


Poland

7.6 € cents/kWh for the first
>5 kW 31.7 € cents/kWh
33 GWh injected in the grid
Portugal for the first 21 GWh injected
or 15 years whatever comes
in the grid or 15 years
first
whatever comes first.
Slovakia
<1 MW 6.11 € cents/kWh <36 kW 27.85 €

<1 MW 6.33 € cents/kWh
Slovenia 1 MW<p<10 MW 5.89 € cents/kWh
cents/kWh >36 kW 6.11 € cents/kWh
Preferential tariff only:

Premium cap & floor only: <50 MW
<10 MW 8.52-6.52 € 6.89 € cents/kWh
Premium floor 100 kW<p<10 MW 41.75 € 26.94 € c/kWh (T) 7.32 € c/kWh (T) Premium cap & floor only:
cents/kWh (T)
Spain only: 6.12 € cents/kWh 34.4-25.4 € c/kWh (P) 8.49-7.13 € c/kWh (P) 16.4-8.43 € c/kWh
10 MW<p<50 MW 8-6.12 3.84 € cents/kWh
cents/kWh 10 MW<p<50 MW 22.97 € (25 year) (25 year) (25 year)
€ cents/kWh (P)
cents/kWh
(25 years) (20 years)
(25 years)
Sweden Green certificates Green certificates Green certificates Green certificates
Investment compensation
United Kingdom Green certificates Green certificates Green certificates Green certificates Green certificates
scheme (heat).

Annex V: Working Paper 2:
Review of Pakistan’s Shortterm Policy for

Working Paper No. 2
Contents
Exhibits ..................................................................................................................... 156
Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................................... 157
1 Objective .............................................................................................................. 159
2 Current Short‐term Policy ..................................................................................... 160
2.1 Short‐term Policy Targets .................................................................................. 160
2.2 Regulatory Tools for RE Development .............................................................. 160
2.2.1 Existing Procurement Approaches ........................................................ 160
2.2.2 Security Package .................................................................................... 161
2.2.3 Permits and Consents ............................................................................ 161
2.3 Incentive Mechanisms ....................................................................................... 162
2.3.1 General Incentives ................................................................................. 162
2.3.2 Specific Incentives by RE Technology .................................................... 164
3 Performance of the Short‐term RE Policy.............................................................. 171
3.1 Overall Performance.......................................................................................... 171
3.2 Stakeholders Views ........................................................................................... 173
3.2.1 Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) ................................... 173
3.2.2 National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) ........................ 174
3.2.3 Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB) ..................................... 175
3.2.4 Developers (Private Investors) .............................................................. 176
3.2.5 Developers (State‐owned Investors) ..................................................... 177
3.2.6 Other Institutions Involved in RE Development .................................... 178
4 Consultants’ Views on Current Short‐term RE Policy ............................................ 179

Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Approved Wind IPP Tariffs .......................................................................... 167
Exhibit 2: Reference Small‐Scale Hydel Projects (ADB REDSIP Tranche I) .................. 171

BP Basis point
CPI Consumer Price Index
DISCO Distribution Company
E10 10% ethanol blended gasoline
EIA Environmental impact assessment
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPC Engineering, procurement, and construction
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FX Foreign exchange
GSA Gas Supply Agreement
GWh Gigawatt‐hour
HEB Hydro Electric Board
IIE Initial environmental examination
IPDS Irrigation & Power Department, Sindh
kW Kilowatt
kWh Kilowatt‐hour
LIBOR London Interbank Offered Rate
LOI Letter of Intent
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt‐hour

NA Northern Areas
NA Not applicable/available
OpEx Operational expenditure
PIB Pakistan Investment Bonds
POE Panel of experts
PPC Private Power Cell
PPDB Punjab Power Development Board
PPDCL Punjab Power Development Company Limited
RE Renewable energy
REDSIP Renewable Energy Development Sector Investment Program
RFP Request for proposals
ROE Return‐on‐equity
ROW Right‐of‐way
WPI Wholesale Price Index
WTG Wind turbine generator

1 Objective
This Annex presents the consultant’s evaluation of Pakistan’s current short‐term policy1
(January 2006 to June 2008) for the development of renewable energy for on‐grid power
generation, including a comprehensive analysis of the incentive structure it creates and
its performance regarding the main RE sources it targets.
As was stated in the Project Inception Report (R7IR1PRP, October 11, 2007), renewable
energy development in Pakistan has been conceived under a phased, evolutionary
approach constituting a strategic policy implementation roadmap adopted by the
Government of Pakistan (GoP). The initial phase (i.e., the ‘short‐term ‘) involves, in
principle, lenient policy measures and strong incentives in order to attract investment in
this relatively new business area, remove existing barriers to project implementation,
and ‘hand‐hold’ reasonable‐sized pioneering projects through to successful commercial
operation.
The focus of this phase is on RE options amenable to immediate commercial
development, i.e., small hydro, wind, and biomass‐based power generation. This phase
is marked with beneficial risk‐sharing and attractive tariffs for developers so as to enable
a reasonable generation capacity to be installed as ‘first‐of‐kind’ RE projects in the
private sector, that can then serve as successful business and technology‐assimilation
demonstrators. This first phase also requires actions towards rural, off‐grid, and
standalone RE deployment, including the geographical demarcation of off‐grid regions
and the design of legal and regulatory framework for off‐grid and distributed generation.
However, off‐grid and non‐power RE application will be addressed in the latter half of
this project.
Based on best international experience (see Annex IV), a comprehensive cost
assessment of RE and conventional sources (see Annexes VI and VII), and this diagnosis,
a more comprehensive ‘medium term’ (i.e., to 2012) policy framework for on‐grid RE will
be prepared for the systematic implementation of feasible RE technologies and scaling
up of associated capacity deployment in Pakistan.

1
Approved by the Federal Cabinet and stated in the GoP’s Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power
Generation, 2006, Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB), Ministry of Water and Power, Islamabad,
December 2006.

2 Current Shortterm Policy
2.1 Shortterm Policy Targets
During the initial policy tenure (ending on June 30, 2008), a limited portfolio of
independent power producer (IPP) projects and technologies would be approved for
development by the GoP, including wind, biomass, municipal solid waste‐to‐energy
(WTE), and small hydropower plants.2
In the case of wind IPPs, a cap of 50 MW of installed capacity (net rated output) per
wind farm was initially set. Additionally, a cumulative wind power generation ceiling of
300 MW during this phase on a first‐come‐first‐served basis was considered, but
subsequently dropped. The case of hydro and WTE plants that are allowed to be sized on
available resource characteristics and most economical capacity basis. However, only
IPPs of net installed capacity less than 50 MW will be processed by the Alternative
Energy Development Board (AEDB) under the GoP’s RE policy, while projects of capacity
greater than 50 MW are dealt with by the Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB)
under the GoP’s conventional power policy.3 Regarding biomass generation (basically
bagasse‐based), the GoP allows, in the immediate term, the installation of up to a
cumulative cogeneration capacity of 700 MW (power) at the country’s sugar mills.
2.2 Regulatory Tools for RE Development
2.2.1 Existing Procurement Approaches
The current policy basically comprises three different approaches for the procurement
of RE:
• Competitive Bidding (or Solicited RE IPP Proposals): Competitive bidding for a
RE‐based IPP project to be connected—partially or fully—to the national
electricity grid of an installed, net rated capacity up to 50 MW is allowed. The
procedure is managed by AEDB on behalf of GoP.
• Negotiation (or Unsolicited RE IPP Proposals): Proposals for renewable energy
IPP projects on ‘raw’ sites (those which could be developed for power generation
but for which feasibility studies do not exist) may also be submitted to the AEDB.
Any sponsor wishing to undertake this kind of project must submit a detailed
proposal to the AEDB; on completion, the feasibility study will be reviewed by
the Panel of Experts (POE) appointed by AEDB, and if approved, the project’s
sponsors are allowed to negotiate, within a period not exceeding three months, a
tariff with the energy purchaser and to obtain a generation license from NEPRA.
The power tariff is, however, subject to final determination by NEPRA. Power
purchase tariffs will be negotiated with qualifying projects under a transparent
formulation methodology, guaranteeing a minimum return on equity (ROE) to

2
The GoP defines ‘small hydro’ as run‐of‐river hydroelectric generators of less than 50 MW installed capacity.
3
Policy for Power Generation Projects, 2002, Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB), Ministry of Water and
Power, Islamabad, October 2002.

the sponsor(s). In case negotiations on tariff between the power purchaser and
sponsors of the feasibility study are not successful, the project may be processed
as a Solicited Proposal, except that the sponsors who have conducted the
feasibility study are allowed to participate with some advantages.4
• Up‐front tariff‐setting: This alternative is only available for wind IPPs. A detailed
description is provided later in this report.
2.2.2 Security Package
The risk‐sharing among the different stakeholders regarding RE power projects
connected to the national grid is arranged in a list of agreements. Fortunately, most of
these agreements are standardized, to the extent possible, in order to eliminate the
need for protracted negotiations. The key agreements are:
• Power Purchase Agreement (PPA): between the RE investor/operator and the
Purchaser. Power purchase tariffs and agreements (PPAs) will be negotiated for
each project for a minimum of 20 years and final approval provided by NEPRA.
• Implementation Agreement (IA): The Government of Pakistan will guarantee,
through an IA, bulk power purchase by the National Transmission and Dispatch
Company (NTDC) or relevant distribution company (DISCO) as specified in the
PPA for the entire duration of the agreement, regardless of power market
restructuring and privatization, and will also undertake to provide the
infrastructure for evacuating power from the RE IPP’s bus bar.
• Gas Supply Agreement (GSA): In case of cogeneration projects, which use gas as
an alternative fuel to bagasse (beyond the cane‐crushing season).
2.2.3 Permits and Consents
Several permits and consents are required from different government agencies before
construction of a grid‐connected power project can begin in Pakistan. AEDB acts as a
‘single window’ facility helping investors obtain them in a timely fashion. Additional
requirements may be imposed by financing institutions according to their own safeguard
requirements.
The most important GoP permits/consents required include:
National Electric Power Regulatory Agency (NEPRA):
• Generation License to construct, own or operate a RE power generation facility
• Approval of PPA/tariff for generation
• Second‐tier supply authorization (in case the project enters into a power sale
arrangement with a bulk supplier)

4
They do not need to submit a bid bond and, if approved by the AEDB, will be given a chance to undertake the
project at the lowest tariff offered during the bidding process.

• Transmission and/or distribution licenses (in case the project involves lines or
small distribution systems).
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
• Initial Environmental Examination (IIE)
• Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA).5
2.3 Incentive Mechanisms
The current policy comprises of both general incentives available to any technology and
specific mechanisms for some RE types.
2.3.1 General Incentives
The most relevant general incentives defined in the policy are:
Regarding Sovereign and Political Risks: The GoP commits:
• To guarantee the contractual obligations of its entities, including WAPDA, the
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) and provincial/AJK governments, even
though some or all of the utilities may by restructured or privatized during the
term of various agreements.
• To provide protection against specific ‘political’ risks.
• To provide protection against changes in the tax and duty regime.
• To ensure convertibility of Pakistani Rupees into US Dollars at the prevailing
exchange rate and the remittability of foreign exchange to cover necessary
payments related to the project, including debt servicing and payment of
dividends.
Regarding Land and Site Access: The federal, provincial, and AJK governments facilitate
investors in acquiring land or right‐of‐way (ROW) for project development, as well as
providing site access on a case‐by‐case basis by leasing, acquisition of ROW, and/or
construction of road linkages. However, the primary responsibility for acquiring land and
site access rests with the project sponsors.
Regarding Financial Regime: The following financial incentives are currently available to
grid‐connected RE power projects:
• Permission for power generation companies to issue corporate registered bonds
and to issue shares at discounted prices.
• Permission for foreign banks to underwrite the issue of shares and bonds by the
private RE power companies.

5
If mandated by the EPA after review of IIE.

• Non‐residents allowed purchasing securities issued by Pakistani companies

without the central bank’s (i.e., State Bank of Pakistan) permission.
• Availability of independent credit rating agencies to enable investors to properly
evaluate risk and profitability of project company’s bonds and share certificates.
Regarding Fiscal Regime: The following fiscal incentives are available to grid‐connected
RE power producers:
• No customs duty or sales tax on the import of RE plant and equipment.
• No levy of sales tax on RE plant, machinery, and equipment.
• Exemption from income tax, including turnover rate tax and withholding tax on
imports.
• Permission for project company to repatriate equity, along with dividends,
subject to prescribed rules and regulations.
applicable to industry in general.
• Non‐Muslims and non‐residents shall be exempted from payment of Zakat
(Islamic tithe) on dividends paid by the company.
Regarding Grid Investment Costs: the NTDC incurs the full cost of transmission
interconnection and grid strengthening expenses required to evacuate electricity from
qualifying RE IPPs, bear any of the expenses associated with power balancing to
accommodate priority dispatch and variability, and ensure that these expenditures are
made in a timely fashion.
Regarding Direct Sales: RE power producers are allowed to enter into direct (bilateral)
sales contracts with end‐use customers. For direct sales, they must pay ‘wheeling’
charges for the use of the transmission and/or distribution grid network used to
transport the power from the plant to the purchaser. This wheeling charge will reflect
the cost of providing and maintaining the transmission interconnection, including the
energy losses suffered en route, calculated on a utility‐wide basis by NEPRA.
Regarding Additional Rents from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Under the
Kyoto Protocol: The GoP will facilitate project application for carbon credits to the
extent possible. These credits are allocated based on a credit‐sharing mechanism among
customers (reduction in the negotiated tariff) and the sponsors. The annual carbon
revenues are divided as follows: (a) an up‐front deduction is made for the administrative
costs of the joint CER management mechanism; (b) an amount not exceeding that
required to bring the IPP’s return on equity (ROE) to the level allowed by NEPRA shall be
payable to the power purchaser; and (c) the remaining revenues shall be divided in
equal proportion between the IPP (as a ‘green credit’ for enhancing the financial returns
accruing to the project’s investors) and the power purchaser (as ‘green tariff’ support for
lowering the per unit price of clean RE power.

2.3.2 Specific Incentives by RE Technology
Bagassebased Cogeneration Projects
Co‐firing and cogeneration using bagasse has been in practice in the country’s sugar
mills for captive energy needs, and in the last year they have been authorized to sell
their excess electricity to the grid. Excepting this last issue, there are no specific
incentives for this kind of technology; all cogeneration projects are allowed the same
incentives and facilities as applicable to all other IPPs under the Policy for Power
Generation Projects, 2002; basically, those listed under ‘General Incentives’ heading.
These kinds of projects can be classified as ‘Captive and Grid Spillover Projects’;
therefore, they are allowed to sell surplus power to the utility grid. These projects are
allowed to be billed under a ‘Net Purchase and Sales’ provision in the RE policy, including
net metering and some conditions for banking. As a matter of facts, these incentives are
also available for any other RE, where applicable, such as the case of small hydros.
At present, there is a potential of around 3,000 MW of bagasse‐based combined heat
and power (CHP), much of which could be sold to the grid each year. The power
generated by the sugar industry at some 83 mills in the country is purchased by NTDC or
the relevant DISCO, whichever the case may be, at competitive rates negotiated and
agreed between the two parties and approved by NEPRA. The net electricity supplied by
the power producer to the utility in a month (i.e., units supplied by the producer minus
units received by the producer, if greater than zero), is to be paid by the utility at a tariff
equal to the average energy cost per kWh for oil‐based power generation (as
determined by NEPRA for GENCOs/IPPs over the applicable quarter of the year) less
10%. The energy supplied by the utility to the power producer in a month, (i.e., units
received by the producer minus units supplied by the producer, if greater than zero), is
to be paid by the producer at the applicable retail tariff (e.g., industrial or commercial
rates, depending upon the type of user connection). Such net billing agreements require
net metering arrangements that involve either separate sets of unidirectional meters for
recording the electricity received and supplied to the utility by the power producer, or
special bidirectional meters capable of instantaneously recording net power transfers.
Additionally, for net billing purposes, a rolling account of energy units is to be
maintained on the pattern of a bank account. Such banking accounts of net energy units
shall be maintained on a monthly basis and final balances will be reconciled at the end of
the year at the rates defined in the previous paragraph. Under this arrangement, a
producer may generate and supply power to the grid at one location and receive an
equivalent number of units for self use at a different or physically distant location on the
grid at a different time without paying any wheeling charges, but subject to some
distance limits for power input and off take.
Power cogeneration projects are treated as part of the sugar industry, but as separate
entities for taxation purposes.

The consultants were informed that there is presently only one project in the pipeline
for this type of energy sale, actually under processing by PPIB because its size (i.e., 120
MW). The project is designed to run 4 to 5 months on bagasse and the rest of the time
on coal—or eventually gas, if it is available. There is no up‐front tariff offered by NEPRA
for bagasse‐based projects. A tariff petition by the Pakistan Sugar Mills Association
(PASMA) has been presented to NEPRA in January 2008, which is currently being
reviewed.
Wind IPPs
Risk Hedgingbased Incentives
Power dispatch and wind speed risk are completely allocated to the off‐taker in the case
of wind IPPs. It is mandatory for the off‐taker to purchase all electricity available at the
wind IPP’s outgoing bus bar and dispatch it to the system. Similarly, wind speed risk6 is
absorbed by the power purchaser.
A ‘Benchmark Wind Speed’ based on monthly ‘Mean of Means’7 of wind speed is
determined from the available wind data for a given wind farm site. Annual/monthly
energy production calculated for the farm corresponding to the benchmark wind speed
stands for the plant’s ‘Benchmark Energy Production’, and the corresponding plant
capacity is called its ‘Benchmark Capacity’. In practice the actual energy production and
capacity may vary from these benchmark levels due to: (1) variation of wind speeds from
the benchmark value (a factor beyond the control of the wind power generator), and (2)
availability of the plant for electricity generation (within the control of the wind power
generator). The principle adopted is that the wind IPP should be made immune to
factors which are beyond its control, but fully responsible for factors within its control.
In the policy, a wind risk allocation matrix representing this principle is provided: for
wind speeds lower than the benchmark, the IPP is compensated; for wind speeds higher
than the benchmark, a benefit sharing rule is applied. In both cases, however, the IPP is
assumed be available for dispatch. To enable monitoring of wind speeds independently
for the determination of actual wind speed variations during the IPP’s operation,
monitoring masts are to be set up near the wind farm by agencies selected and
authorized by the AEDB.
One of the contentious issues with this arrangement is that on‐ground wind speed
measurements are carried out by the Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) at
about 40‐plus sites in the south of the country using 30m masts. However, these
measurements are not certified to industry standards and can at best be used for
reference purposes only. Site‐specific wind monitoring has been independently
conducted by several project developers to corroborate the PMD database as well as aid

6
Important to note that the policy’s ‘wind risk cover’ only provides for variations in wind speed, not other
parameters (e.g., wind direction, density, etc.) that can also affect a wind farm’s energy production.
7
Monthly ‘Mean of Means’ is the average of mean monthly wind velocities for a given month over a number of years
for which reliable data are available. At a minimum, this will be based on at least three years’ data from the PMD
wind monitoring mast nearest to the project location. Data collected at a certain height are extrapolated by
standard formulae to the turbine height of the proposed wind farm.

in micrositing turbines. However, this introduces additional upfront costs, delays, and
uncertainties in estimating project feasibility and negotiating tariffs, which can
jeopardize project financing and development.
Economic Considerations
The AEDB has been primarily concentrating on facilitating wind IPPs in the so‐called
‘wind corridor’, extending from Keti Bandar to the east of Karachi on the southern coast
to several hundred kilometers inland to Gharo towards the north‐east in Sindh province,
where wind speeds are high but which is also in proximity to the national power grid.
Projects in these areas therefore have to compete with established efficient
conventional generators (e.g., combined cycle gas turbines), which makes any
preferential tariff treatment and additional grid interconnection costs questionable from
the power purchasing utility’s perspective. It also detracts from possible more
economically feasible wind sites being properly investigated elsewhere, such as along
the coastline or inland Balochistan, where the net avoided costs as well as social benefits
of wind‐based electricity generation could be an order of magnitude higher, even with
somewhat elevated project development costs. Thus, the AEDB’s strategy of
concentrating on wind power exclusively within the competitive mainstream national
power sector versus more insulated peripheral regional power markets merits
reconsideration.
Tariff Incentives
As stated before, under the current short‐term RE policy, the tariff for sale of electricity
from a wind IPP can be arrived through three alternative mechanisms:
• Competitive bidding (solicited proposals)
• Negotiations (unsolicited proposals)
• Up‐front8 tariff‐setting.
Regarding the bidding process, it may be structured along either of the following two
options:
• Bidders may be required to submit their competitive proposals for the tariff
• A benchmark tariff may be offered up‐front, and bidders invited to quote a
discount on the benchmark price.
However, until now, the competitive bidding approach on power tariffs has not been
utilized by the GoP for RE IPPs. However, the other two alternatives have been
employed (negotiated and up‐front tariffs). For instance, in the Guidelines for
Determination of Tariff for Wind Power Generation issued by the government, general
conditions and references on the key parameters employed in tariff computation have
been defined . Consequently, on the one hand, NEPRA has established an up‐front tariff

8
In GoP parlance, the terms ‘up‐front tariff’ and ‘indicative tariff’ are used interchangeably.

in US$ 95/MWh; on the other, there have been several tariff petitions by sponsors
proposing payments ranging from US$ 100 to 115/MWh, some of these petitions have
been assessed and approved by NEPRA with only slight rate modification. Until now
there have been four formal wind IPP tariff petitions filed with the regulator, and three
of them have received final approval by NEPRA.
Exhibit 1 summarizes the parameters employed by NEPRA in its computation of the up‐
front wind power tariff as well as tariffs petitioned for by these four wind IPPs.
Exhibit 1: Approved Wind IPP Tariffs
Upfront Tariff WinPower Green Power Beacon Energy Zorlu Enerji
Date of Petition Jan. 2007 Feb. 2007 May 2006 Oct. 2006 Apr. 2007
50.6 MW 49.5 MW 48.6 MW

5 MW
Installed Capacity Up to 50 MW (22 x 2.3 MW (33 x 1.5 MW (27 x 1.8 MW
(Enercon WTGs)
Nordex N90 WTGs) GE/Skoda WTGs) Vestas V90 WTGs)
Net Load Factor 31.5% 31.8% 31.5% 40.4% NA
Generation
133.4 141.0 133.4 172.1 NA
(GWh/Year)
Gharo-Keti Bandar Khuti Kun, Mirpur
Location Gharo Creek area NA NA
Corridor Sakro, Thatta
Contract Type BOO BOO BOO BOO NA
Operational Life
20 20 20 20 NA
(Years)
Capital Structure
80:20 80:20 80:20 75:25 NA
(Debt:Equity)
Equipment
Investment NA 1,379 NA 1,545 NA
(US$/kW Installed)
Total EPC
Investment NA 1,952 1,523 2,358 NA
(US$/kW Installed)
Total Investment
Approx.
Cost 2,195 1,750 2,641 NA
1,900
(US$/kW Installed)
OpEx (O&M,
Approx.
Insurance, etc.) 98.8 44.0 58.8 NA
45
(US$/kW Installed)
10y + 1y (Grace)
10y LIBOR + 300 10y + 1y (Grace) 10y + 2y (Grace)
Debt LIBOR + 250-300 NA
BPs LIBOR + 350 BPs LIBOR + 500 BPs
BPs
Real ROE Net of
15% 15% 15% 15% NA
Withholding Tax
Carbon Credit
NA 50:50 100:0 50:50 NA
Sharing Ratio
Petitioned Levelized
NA 109.2 100.2 115.9 104.6
Tariff (US$/MWh)
NEPRA-Approved
Levelized Tariff 95 107.8 NA Pending NA
(US$/MWh)
Reference FX
NA 1.34 1.20 1.28 NA
(US$/€)
Reference FX
61.0 61.0 59.7 60.0 NA
(Pak Rs./US$)
Reference LIBOR 5.4% 5.4% 5.0% 5.4% NA

It is important to mention that the regulator has decided to allow an incentive of
US$ 10/MWh, in addition to the negotiated levelized tariff, to those IPP sponsors who
can achieve COD within 24 months of tariff determination, or June 30, 2009, whichever
occurs earlier.
Other incentives are related to the allowance for suitable (complete) indexation.
Generally speaking, negotiated tariff are allowed to be adjusted by changes in financing
terms (i.e., LIBOR), inflation (i.e., US CPI & US WPI), and foreign exchange risks (i.e., Pak.
Rs./US$ and/or €/US$ rates), both during the construction period and post‐COD.
Additionally, If the IPP succeeds in arranging improved financing terms by the time the
project achieves financial close, the overall impact of the reduced debt servicing
requirement shall be shared in the following ratio 60:40 (power purchaser:IPP).
However, for projects opting for the up‐front tariff, no such sharing will be required and
the project sponsor shall be entitled to retain the full benefit of any concessional
financing obtained below the prescribed interest ceiling.
Small Hydro IPPs
As mentioned earlier, the focus of this paper is restricted to small‐scale hydel, defined as
hydropower stations of capacity equal to or below 50 MW. There are two different set
of complementary polices currently in place for these kinds of projects: the short term
national‐level RE policy, which replicates provisions on offer to wind‐based IPPs to small
hydros, and provincial policies.9
National Level
Risk Hedgingbased Incentives
In relation to one of the main risks typically faced by a hydel project, i.e., hydrological
risk, the national policy is basically a direct translation of the rules providing for wind risk
cover to wind power projects. Hydrological risk is defined as the risk of variability of
water flows in the channel on which the plant is sited, and therefore of the effective
energy output of the hydro IPP. Under the current RE policy, this risk is absorbed by the
power purchaser. Similar to the case of wind IPPs, an assessment of this ‘Mean
Flow/Month’, based on monthly average water flow, is determined from available
hydrological data. This entails determining mean water flows from the data collected at
certain specified points upstream of the plant location. Energy production corresponding
to the mean flow rate is termed ‘Mean Flow Energy Production’. In practice the actual
energy production and capacity may vary from the mean flow levels due to: (1) variation
of water flow from the mean flow/month (a factor beyond the control of hydroelectric
power generator), and (2) availability of the plant for electricity generation (within the
control of hydroelectric power generator). The principle adopted is once again that the
hydroelectric generator will be made immune to factors which are beyond its control,

9
The provinces are independently empowered to set policies and to process and implement power projects based
on both conventional and renewable technologies up to a capacity limit of 50 MW.

but fully responsible for factors within its control. In the same way as for wind risk, a
matrix for the allocation of hydrological risk is defined in the national policy based on
exactly the same rationale.
To enable monitoring of water flow independently, monitoring sensors are to be set up
by the relevant agency (i.e., AEDB, provincial, or AJK/NA entity) with properly calibrated,
automated sensors and dataloggers. The monitoring sensors are to be sited at the
nearest location upstream of the plant site where the total water flow to pass through
the proposed plant’s turbines is available.
Additionally, a ‘water use charge’ is payable by the hydro IPP to the
provincial/AJK/Northern Areas administration for the use of water resources by the
project to generate electricity. The water use charge is currently fixed at Rs 0.15/kWh
and is adjustable annually for inflation
Tariff Incentives
As described for wind IPPs earlier, the tariff for sale of electricity from a hydel IPP can
also be arrived at through three alternatives methods:
• Competitive bidding (solicited proposals)
• Negotiations (unsolicited proposals)
• Up‐front tariff‐setting.
Provincial Level
The provinces/AJK10 co‐administer investments for power projects and act as the main
drivers and facilitators in this regard. There are six provincial institutions currently
engaged in the small hydel power sector in different regions of the country:
• Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO): In 1986, the Government of
NWFP established SHYDO for carrying out hydropower prospecting and
development, and to act as a utility company for isolated rural communities in
the mountainous areas of the province. With the assistance of WAPDA and GTZ,
SHYDO has prepared a master plan for the development of NWFP’s hydropower
potential. SHYDO has identified a hydroelectric potential of more than 6,000 MW
based on such small schemes, and has completed feasibility studies of several
projects ranging in capacity from 8 MW to 125 MW.
• Punjab Power Development Board (PPDB): PPDB was created in Punjab’s
Irrigation Department in 1995 for the promotion of hydropower generation
through the development of hydel power stations on canal sites in Punjab. At

10
The Northern Areas (NA) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) do not fall under the purview of
provincial/AJK governments but are administered directly by the federal government. Provincial‐level policies are
thus applicable only to the respective provinces of the Punjab, Sindh, Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), and
Balochistan. Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) represents an autonomous region also empowered to enact its own
state‐level policy and regulatory framework for projects up to 50 MW.

different canals, about 324 potential sites of medium‐ and low‐head were
identified, with a total estimated potential capacity of 5,895 MW.
In 2007, the PPDB was transformed into the newly‐created Punjab Power
Development Company Limited (PPDCL), registered as an autonomous
corporate body with its own board of directors, to develop and execute actual
hydro projects through government, multilateral, and public‐private partnership.
• Irrigation & Power Department, Sindh (IPDS): IPDS is responsible for hydel
development and identification of different hydropower sites on canals and
barrages in the Sindh province.
• AJK Hydro Electric Board (AJK HEB) and AJK Private Power Cell (AJK PPC): the
Government of AJK established the AJK HEB in 1989 to implement public sector
hydropower projects. Additionally, with the intention of providing a one‐window
facility and to encourage investment by private developers, the AJK Private
Power Cell was set up in 1995.
• Northern Areas Public Works Department (NAPWD): NAPWD was established
with the responsibility for the generation and distribution of electricity in the
mountainous and remote Northern Areas which is currently not connected to the
national power grid. NAPWD has constructed various mini hydel power stations
in the region and has built 11 KV lines for the transmission of electric power to
local towns and communities.
As a consequence of the work of these institutions, more than 2,000 MW of small‐
scale11 hydro projects have been identified (i.e., feasibility and/or pre‐feasibility studies
carried out). Additionally, these institutions have released guidelines for hydel projects
in their respective jurisdictions; in 2005, both SHYDO and PPDB issued their own policies
in this regard. The policies are quite similar and are based on negotiated tariffs, but
without sufficient details provided for unambiguously determining tariffs for hydel
projects. They seem to be derived from the same logic used for thermal or wind
projects. However, for storage‐type hydel plants, a more sophisticated pricing
methodology is required. Nevertheless, the projects that are in the pipeline for
development are mostly of the run‐of‐river type, so that this deficiency is not an
important issue for now.
Though private participation is encouraged, most of the small hydro projects in Pakistan
have so far been developed by provincial public institutions.12 Recently, The ADB has
allocated a first tranche of US$ 110.4 million loan for development by the public sector
of eight small hydro plants in the NWFP and Punjab regions. The levelized tariff of these
projects and their main characteristics are provided in Exhibit 2 below.

11
And approximately 30,000 MW of medium to large hydels.
12
With the exception of some community‐owned microhydels developed by NGOs (e.g., AKRSP in the Northern
Areas).

Exhibit 2: Reference Small‐Scale Hydel Projects (ADB REDSIP Tranche I)
Province | Punjab | NWFP |

Total/
Deg Daral Average
Location Marala Chianwali Pakpattan Okara Machai Ranolia
Outfall Khwar
Installed Capacity
7.2 5.4 5.0 3.2 4.0 2.63 36.6 11.5 75.5
(MW)
Total Investment
2,260 2,185 2,037 2,281 2,700 1,807 2,700 2,700 2,529.5
(US$/kW)
Plant Factor 77.0% 68.0% 66.5% 80.9% 78.8% 59.4% 62.7% 60.2% 66.3%
FIRR 8.6% 8.1% 7.1% 9.1% 6.7% 8.4% 9.0% 11.8%
Levelized Tariff
38.8 40.2 43.2 37.3 44.8 40.3 37.4 21.4 36.5
(US$/MWh)
Reference FX
60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
(Pak. Rs/US$)
Other RE Sources
There are no specific policies currently in place for other RE sources, such as solar
thermal, photovoltaic, biogas, waste‐to‐energy, etc.; only isolated demonstration or
pilot‐scale projects outside a consolidated framework have been developed or are under
implementation.
• USTDA has recently issued an RFP for conducting a municipal solid waste‐to‐
energy feasibility assessment for Karachi. Previously, the World Bank undertook
a similar assessment for Lahore, but later shelved its plans to fund such a plant.
• Currently, the New Zealand government is funding a pilot cattle dung gasification
facility in Landhi, Karachi, which could eventually be scaled up to fire 35 MW gas
turbine.
• The GoP recently introduced E10 gasoline sales on a very limited, experimental
scale, with plans to increase volumes utilizing ethanol produced by the sugar
industry which is currently being almost entirely exported.
3 Performance of the Shortterm RE Policy
3.1 Overall Performance
Despite the fact that one and a half year is a very short time to evaluate the adequacy of
a policy,13 the results achieved so far cannot be qualified as satisfactory. In particular:
• No new RE power projects have yet materialized under this policy up to now and
no projects are currently under construction, although some wind and small
hydro IPPs are in advanced stages of negotiations.

13
RE projects typically require a relatively long time to mature and reach the final stage of financial closure before
starting construction.

• No investor has so far accepted the up‐front wind power tariff proposed by
NEPRA under this policy, opting instead to petition for individually negotiated
tariffs.
• No tender has been launched to develop RES projects (‘solicited proposals‘) and
none is expected to be launched imminently.
• In implicit recognition of the failure of wind IPPs to materialize, the GoP is now
seriously considering undertaking wind farm development in the public sector.
• Many of the facilities offered by the policy to RE developers, such as carbon
financing, net power sales and purchase, banking, and grid interconnection rules,
have yet to be operationalized.
• Institutional capacity at both the federal and provincial levels for processing and
promoting RE investments in line with policy guidelines remains underdeveloped.
On the other hand, during recent months there have been advances in some areas (or
projects) which, eventually, can permit the current situation to improve somewhat in
the near future. Among them are:
• About 70 LOIs for the development of pre‐feasibility studies of wind projects
have been signed by the AEDB. It is possible that some of these projects may be
implemented in the future, although no time constraint or element of
competition exists for project sponsors to do so.
• Three wind power projects have petitioned for tariff determination to NEPRA
and obtained its final decision. At least one of them is progressing towards
financial closing.
• Zorlu Enerji, Turkey, has expressed its intention to construct a 50 MW wind farm
in the Gharo‐Keti Bandar corridor and have applied for tariff to NEPRA (decision
still pending). AEDB indicated this project has good chances to materialize as the
sponsor has ready access to wind turbines.
• The ADB has a pledged a US$ 500 million public sector loan facility for RE projects
in Pakistan, and allocated a first tranche of about US$ 130 million for eight small
hydro schemes in the Punjab and NWFP. A more comprehensive policy and tariff
regime for the projects to operate under is expected to be in place before start
of construction. Discussions for the allocation of the second tranche are currently
underway, consisting mostly of hydro schemes in the Northern Areas.
• Some sporadic, initial efforts are also underway for policy and tariff review for
mini/micro hydro and biomass conversion projects, and these are expected to be
co‐opted into the medium‐term policy development framework.
In order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of current short‐term RE policy regime
in Pakistan, the reasons of its relatively limited success thus far are further analyzed
below.

3.2 Stakeholders Views
As was stated in the Inception Report, the medium‐term RE policy development process
is expected to rely on extensive consultations with key stakeholders, including, among
others, various relevant government agencies and regulatory bodies, utilities, power
producers, private industry, community and non‐governmental organizations, financial
institutions, and donor agencies. During the project mission conducted at the beginning
of November, the Consultants have met with representatives from these agencies as
well as key members of the Project Consultative Group (PCG) and potential private
investors.
3.2.1 Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB)
Meetings were held with several staff members from AEDB, mainly in the areas of power
generation from wind and biomass conversion. AEDB confirmed that the only current RE
projects are small off‐grid hydro power plants constructed on river tributaries and canals
in northern Pakistan. Unfortunately, no new RE projects have yet materialized under this
policy since it was announced in December 2006, although some wind IPPs are in
relatively advanced stages of negotiations as mentioned earlier. Some initial effort is
also underway for policy and tariff review for hydro and biomass projects, but it is
expected that most of these deliberations will feed into the medium‐term policy
development work. As far as grid‐connected RE power generation is concerned,
therefore, the AEDB has been largely focused on wind IPP development since its
inception in 2003, a strategy that may require balancing and broadening in the context
of the medium term, particularly given the difficulties faced so far in this area as well as
the economic potential of other RES that also merit serious attention.
Regarding wind generation, AEDB summarized the problems encountered in the cases of
the most advanced and protracted IPP negotiations (WinPower and Green Power); these
problems mirror the views of the developers as well (see below). Two other developers
that were also prominent in these discussions were Beacon Energy and Zorlu Enerji. The
case of BE, despite belonging to the group of first movers, currently is at the lowest rank
in the pipeline and will probably be discontinued. On the other hand, ZE, a Turkish
investor with no local partner, has recently decided to install 5 MW of initial capacity
and, although it has no generation license and approved tariff, the probability of its
successful commissioning of this farm, later to be expanded to 50 MW, is high as the
sponsor has access to the wind turbine generators (WTGs) and has even shipped some
to Pakistan.
Both the AEDB and investors consider that the negotiation of a tariff in the context of a
continuously increasing price of WTGs in the international market (along with long
delivery schedules due to high global demand) is the mayor obstacle for realizing short‐
term policy objectives in relation to wind generation. The AEBD supports the investors’
view that Euro indexation of the tariff should be allowed, because it is the main driver
for cost increases on account of most wind turbine equipment being of European
manufacture. That means that until now, reference prices for WTGs have been European

ones, which make sense, especially as other large non‐European turbine manufacturers,
such as India’s Suzlon, are not active in Pakistan.
As for bagasse‐based power cogeneration, the AEDB states that short‐term potential is
about 500 MW and the main challenge is to switch from low pressure to high pressure
boiler technology and to increase bagasse availability beyond the current 4 to 5 months.
Unfortunately, complementation with other sources of biomass, such as rice husks, is
not easy due to logistical constraints and because, in some cases, there is no surplus left
over from alternative uses (such as in paper and particle board manufacture). Therefore,
coal or gas are required as fuel for the rest of the year in order to make bagasse projects
profitable, but indigenous gas and coal are becoming scarce and their availability cannot
be assured.
Unfortunately, no accurate data about the exploitable potential for biomass and biogas
use in Pakistan exists. It is assumed that potential for sewage gas is large—mostly in the
food industry—but this must be confirmed by more detailed studies. Other relevant
sources include municipal solid waste‐to‐energy, though only 30% of garbage is
currently collected by urban municipalities (free service, no tipping charges apply) or by
some private collectors. Basically, all garbage is accumulated in open dumps, which is a
major environmental concern. The AEBD has stated that it is initiating some studies to
evaluate these potentials more accurately.
Despite some specific regulation for bagasse‐based cogeneration, regulation for the
other biomass/biogas generation sources is practically inexistent. The AEDB has
requested the consultants to widen the scope of biomass and biogas in the medium‐
term policy, taking care not to encourage an undesired effect on food prices due to crop
substitution and diversion.
3.2.2 National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA)
Meetings were held with the Acting Chairman, Director Tariffs, and Technical Adviser,
NEPRA. According to the NEPRA Act, 1997,14 this regulatory institution is the only one
entitled to set tariffs for any kind of grid‐connected power generation, either
conventional or renewable. The tariffs approved for renewable energy projects
(especially wind projects) have been determined following the guidelines indicated in
the Policy for Development of Renewable Energy, 2006 and using project‐specific data
provided by individual petitioners.
An up‐front tariff has been approved for IPPs using wind energy, based on data provided
by the developers and international benchmarking. However, up to now, no projects
have been proposed based on this up‐front tariff (US$ 95/MWh). NEPRA considers it
unsuitable to determine an up‐front tariff for hydel projects, since these projects have
large site‐specific differences, and therefore their costs differ significantly; however, GTZ

14
Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, Government of Pakistan,
Islamabad.

has proposed introducing feed‐in tariffs for small hydros of less than 5 MW capacity on
which NEPRA has yet to rule.
It was remarked by the regulator that there were several problems faced by it while
determining tariffs for wind projects, mainly related with the absence of firm prices for
the turbines and/or EPC contractors. NEPRA considers that tariffs for future projects
should be determined based on actual EPC contract information and not on budgetary
(or estimated) data.
Regarding bagasse‐based cogeneration, it was stated that the sugar industry is also
trying to get an up‐front tariff determination from NEPRA. Until such time that this tariff
is determined, cogeneration projects can enter into bilateral agreements with
distribution companies at a price not higher than the reference price approved by
NEPRA for that distributor.
NEPRA considers that, due to the electricity shortages expected in 2008 (estimated to
be 10‐12% of total energy demand), the most important challenge is to increase
generation capacity at affordable costs (cheapest possible generation) and to ensure
that this capacity will be available during peak demand. Wind power does not
necessarily match either of these two conditions.
Other comments included:
• Although NEPRA was involved in the development of the 2006 RE policy, several
of its views were not accepted.
• For wind energy, it considers that feed‐in (or up‐front) tariffs, with all the risks
allocated to the developer, is a more adequate mechanism than the existing one
(where some of these risks are allocated to the purchaser).
• Tendering some renewable energy projects (either wind or hydel) could be an
interesting mechanism to reveal actual prices for this kind of projects as well as
to foster their implementation.
• The RE policy should be transformed into a Law to provide necessary legal
protection to the investors. A policy by itself, which may change from time to
time, does not provide the same level of protection.
3.2.3 Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB)
Despite it being a very qualified agency for developing power generation, our interest in
the PPIB was limited because only large renewable projects fall within the agency’s
scope, basically large hydel and cogeneration (over 50 MW).15 However, as the PPIB has
compiled what is arguably the most complete hydel potential assessment for Pakistan,
the consultants focused discussions on this subject.

15
In a recent amendment, AEDB has been authorized to process all wind IPPs, including those of capacity greater than
50 MW.

The PPIB stated that the GoP aims to develop hydel projects, mostly medium size that
are easier to develop. A PPIB report16 estimates the total small‐scale hydel potential in
the country at about 2,000 MW, and up to 30,000 MW for medium‐ to large‐scale hydro.
The average investment cost that the PPIB employ in its analysis is around
US$ 1,250/KW‐installed.
The PPIB has mentioned the importance of conducting feasibility studies for developing
hydel, mostly large ones, as it represent a major barrier for private investors.17 The PPIB
is initiating work on this aspect, setting criteria to prioritize sites to be developed: the
first priority is to be given to sites that are 1) are near the load centers, 2) are easy to
access and build upon, 3) allow 50 MW to 500 MW of capacity to be installed, and 4) are
preferably run‐of‐river projects.
3.2.4 Developers (Private Investors)
The consultants maintained meetings and conversations with two potential wind power
IPP developers (Green Power and WinPower) and a hydel IPP developer (Laraib Energy).
In both the wind IPP cases, the project developers identified NEPRA tariff decision‐
making as the key obstacle for the successful commitment of their projects. They were
of the opinion that NEPRA is not fully cognizant of the peculiar characteristics and
dynamics of the renewable energy resource, technology, and costs, and consequently
several problems arise during tariff negotiations. They also consider that the regulation
related with CERs is relatively new, and in order to trade in them it allocates tasks to
governmental institutions, introducing additional risks to the investors.
The allowed IRR (15%) is considered relatively low if compared with other technologies
that they perceive to be less risky. The indicated a willingness to accept such returns if
several other risks, in addition to the average wind speed risk, were also provided for
(i.e., wind direction, variability, etc.)
They consider that having a simple feed‐in tariff for wind power, if adequately
calculated, would be more convenient and allow them to better manage all associated
risks.
Other problems mentioned were:
• The time required by NEPRA to take decisions about tariffs (six months) is too
long, and creates problems for the investors (difficulties to close firm contracts
with the EPCs)

16
Pakistan Hydel Power Potential, Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad
(Undated).
17
Similarly, the need for having bankable feasibility studies readily available for small hydro investment consideration
was also highlighted under the Asian Development Bank’s US$ 500 million Pakistan Renewable Energy
Development Sustainable Investment Program (REDSIP), the lack of which is seriously constraining annual tranche
allocation and disbursement.

• The standardized documents included in the security package (in particular, the
PPA and the IA) were only finalized very recently, and will require further review
by international legal specialists before being deemed acceptable by developers.
• The grid code is not fully adapted to wind power plants, since it was developed
based on conventional technologies (thermal and hydel), and needs to be
suitably modified.
• Currently, to close an agreement with a WTG supplier is becoming increasingly
difficult due to a surge in worldwide demand as well as perceived risks by
manufacturers in entering new markets such as Pakistan. Most reputable
manufacturers only assure deliveries for 2010/2011. To obtain wind turbines in
the short term (e.g., less than six months) is practically impossible.
Both developers stated that the help provided by AEDB to them was very valuable, but
that the agency itself was also on the learning curve.
Regarding hydel, Laraib Energy Limited is developing the New Bong Escape hydro
project, the first medium‐size hydel IPP. This is an 84 MW project, with 25% of financing
provided by the ADB under its private sector lending program. This project is based on
the earlier 1995 power policy focusing on hydel projects, and its processing started
before 2002. Recently, it has reached financial closure and obtained necessary
regulatory licenses to proceed with construction, which is scheduled to start shortly.
Important comments provided by this developer were:
• It considers 1995 power policy much better than the 2002 one. The new one
covers only 60% of hydraulic risk, compared to the full cover provided by the
previous one.
• As this was the first private hydel project, no formal implementation documents
previously existed. Therefore, it took a significant amount of time to prepare
them.
• As AJK (where the project is located) is an autonomous region, the guarantees
were need to be provided by the state government. However, the Government
of AJK was not able to provide adequate guarantees and neither was the NTDC in
a position to enter into power purchase agreement, since the plant is outside of
its territorial jurisdiction. The problem remains unresolved to this moment.
• The tariffs approved by NEPRA for this project is US$ 58.9/MWh.
3.2.5 Developers (Stateowned Investors)
The newly‐formed Punjab Power Development Company Limited (PPDCL) has the
authority to approve and develop hydel projects of up to 50 MW capacity. A Project
Management unit has recently been established to process such projects, as a
prerequisite for the ADB’s REDSIP program, and a total of 140 MW has been identified

for future development at different canal‐based sites;18 there are several more projects
in the pipeline for which the PPD is planning to conduct feasibility studies. It seems that
some local investors (industrial groups) are interested in taking up such projects; as
matter of fact, many of them have been registered for this purpose. The main features
of these projects are:
• Project selection criteria are similar to that of the PPIB,
• The power off‐taker is WAPDA (DISCO), and
• Site locations are easy to access and construct upon.
According to the PPDCL’s experience, the average investment costs for these projects
are on the order of US$ 2,200/KW and typical time for construction ranges from four
years for small hydel to six years for medium‐ to large‐scale ones, with lack of financing
being the single most important impediment to project implementation. Fortunately,
the ADB is willing to fund PPDCL in at least some of these projects.
The PPD has made a list of recommendations for the development of hydel projects at
the provincial level:
• Provincial authorities should provide single‐window facilities, in close
cooperation with the AEDB (similar to the PPIB) because federal administration
can be problematic for small, dispersed projects
• An up‐front (feed‐in) tariff should be proposed
• The tariff should be:
o Different for low‐ and high‐head hydel projects
o Based on two‐part (energy and capacity) tariff approach
• Fees and procedures must be simplified for very small projects (e.g., less than 5
MW)
• Standardization of hydel turbines and related equipment to foster local O&M
suppliers should be encouraged
• Easy financing for small projects is an essential requirement and must be
provided
• Off‐grid local distribution networks (‘mini‐grids’) need to be encouraged.
3.2.6 Other Institutions Involved in RE Development
The German technical assistance agency, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit

GmbH (GTZ), has been associated, very actively, in small hydro development in Pakistan
since 1983. It has been extensively involved with WAPDA in undertaking a hydropower

18
With five projects totaling 24.8 MW being implemented in the Punjab under the first tranche of the ADB’s REDSIP
facility. An additional three projects of 50.73 MW capacity are also being financed under this tranche in the NWFP.
See Exhibit 2 for details.

inventory and related data collection. Several pre‐feasibility studies were also developed
under this initiative.
Currently its efforts are concentrated in the electrification of rural areas using renewable
energy, in close cooperation with AEDB. GTZ’s Hydropower Promotion Programme (HPP)
has the goal of developing hydropower cost effectively, while mitigating any negative
social and environmental aspects. Most of the projects included in this program consist
of off‐grid schemes.
GTZ is also heavily engaged in the development of solar projects (also mainly in the rural
areas), promoting the use of solar water heaters (geysers) in the residential sector, and
in energy conservation projects.
4 Consultants’ Views on Current Shortterm RE Policy
Having summarized the opinions of different stakeholders on the short term RE policy,
as well as providing a brief assessment of the actual results obtained so far through the
implementation of this policy, it is possible to respond to a range of questions that need
to be addressed before a medium‐term renewable energy policy for the country is
defined. The consultants will take these issues into account in the subsequent policy
recommendations to be made to the Government of Pakistan for the medium‐term on‐
grid RE power policy.
Is the limited success of the short term policy a matter of ‘insufficient implementation
time’ (in the sense that projects typically require a longer maturity period), or are there
important structural barriers which have prevented the objective of rapid RE
deployment to be achieved?
As has been previously mentioned, one and a half years is not adequate time on which
to base a definitive diagnosis of a policy’s efficacy upon. Several projects are currently at
their ‘maturity’ stage, and therefore additional time should be allowed before evaluating
their ultimate fate. However, several symptoms exist that indicate there currently are
several concerns that merit attention, and that these issues can at least partially explain
why the development of RES in Pakistan is not progressing as was expected:
• Regardless of the relatively large number of LOIs that have been signed with
private developers to conduct feasibility studies of wind projects, only four or
five have reached a state where they can be considered serious commercial
projects; one of them has practically abandoned the idea of constructing the
plant, two others, although formally progressing, are experiencing significant
difficulties and only one (Zorlu Enerji) has a real possibility of being implemented
in the near future. Interestingly, this is the only international wind IPP in the
market, the rest of the proposed projects being locally sponsored. It appears that
the excessive number of LOIs signed by potential investors with the AEDB relates
more to a strategy of ‘locking interesting sites’—seeking the possibility of a more
interesting situation in the future—rather than actually working on developing
these projects. The lack of adequate, certified wind data measurements

(requiring additional on‐site monitoring) alone is not a viable explanation for
delays in project initiation by the sponsors, since in other parts of the world
(when adequate promotional incentives are in place) projects are often
committed with even less reliable data.
• New hydel IPP projects are practically non‐existent, and the few which are
developing are either being developed by state owned institutions or are now
reaching maturity based on the earlier 1995 policy. Despite the huge hydel
potential in Pakistan, only very few bankable feasibility studies exist. Without
these studies, the development of privately sponsored projects is even harder.
• Projects using renewable sources other than wind or hydel (i.e., solid biomass,
waste‐to‐energy) have not yet reached a pre‐feasibility stage of commercial
assessment.
Taking all these issues into account, it seems that the requirement of ‘more time’ is not
the primary reason for the limited development of RES so far, and that some changes
need to be incorporated in the promotional policy in order to reach the desired
deployment targets.
What are the most important problems as perceived by RE developers?
The two most important problems reported by potential RE IPP developers in Pakistan
are: tariffs levels and the time required to obtain NEPRA decisions regarding such tariffs.
As previously mentioned, two systems exists for determining RE tariffs in Pakistan: The
upfront tariff (defined by NEPRA only for wind projects so far) and/or raising a tariff
petition on a case‐by‐case basis. Not surprisingly, having both possibilities available, all
of the developers have opted for the second one, and in all cases have asked for tariffs
higher than the upfront rate offered. To determine these tariffs, NEPRA asks for
disclosing all the technical and economic documentation related with the project, and it
determines a project‐specific tariff using a cost‐plus approach.19 The time required by
NEPRA to announce a final tariff determination is of about six months from the filing of a
petition by the sponsor. The developer has the option of submitting another tariff
petition, in case the project’s costs escalate in the interim from what was originally
proposed. This system has presented several of issues, among them:
• Variation in project costs. Due to the present high world demand for wind
turbines, the market for such equipment is faced with a shortage of production
capacity. As a result, prices are increasing and the manufacturers are only
providing estimated quotations for any request that is not firmly committed.
Therefore, when the developer files a tariff petition, it has to use these estimated
quotations, either from the manufacturers itself or from the EPC constructors. As
the tariff decision requires about six months to process, the market conditions
obtaining at the time the tariff is finally announced may be different from when

19
The problems associated with the ‘cost‐plus’ approach will be discussed later.

the application was first filed, and a new tariff petition may need to be
submitted, starting the process all over again. This could lead to a perpetual
cycle. As this situation has occurred a couple of times, NEPRA is currently
requesting firm EPC quotations before it proceeds with reviewing tariff
applications. However, to obtain quotations with more than a one‐year validity is
extremely difficult for developers to achieve at present.20
• Possibility of gaming. When, as is currently the case in Pakistan, two options
exists for developing an unsolicited project (upfront or negotiated tariffs) the
normal behavior of a developer will be to try obtain a negotiated tariff, higher
than the up‐front one, as mentioned previously. Even having obtained a tariff
decision that can make the project financially feasible, the natural incentive to
file new petitions can persist, especially if another developer obtained a higher
tariff in the interim. It is not difficult to conceive that a developer will not start
construction until it is reasonably satisfied that the tariff it obtained is the
‘highest one’ it could obtain. As information asymmetry will always be there
(regardless of the information disclosed by the developer, who is the only one
privy to actual project costs and performance criteria), the possibility of projects
to be deliberately delayed foreseeing the possibility of iteratively higher tariff
approvals will always remain.21
Subsequently, based on the discussion above, it is clear that in the medium‐term RE
policy the possibility of filing tariff petitions different from the upfront ones (regardless
of the methodology used to define these upfront tariffs) needs to be discontinued.
Are the guidelines indicated in the short‐term policy adequate for promoting rapid
deployment of RES projects?
The short‐term RE policy (valid to end‐June, 2008) included a detailed set of guidelines
for determining the tariffs for wind projects.22 These guidelines, basically based on a
‘cost‐plus’ approach, reduce NEPRA’s capability of selecting a different methodology
while determining individual projects’ tariffs. In any case, this approach is consistent
with the methodologies used by NEPRA to define tariffs for other power generation
projects in the country, where, in practically all cases, a cost‐plus approach has been
used.

20
In addition of the six months required by NEPRA, additional time is required to obtain all other necessary consents
and to reach financial closure.
21
Note that although this assertion may seem to imply that the petitions filed by the RE IPP developers with NEPRA
are invariably not accurate, realistic, or contain inaccurate or misleading information, this is not the intention of the
consultants. Their purpose is rather to point out a systematic flaw in the tariff setting mechanism: that the incentive
for obtaining successively higher tariffs for a project exists in all the cases where the tariff can be somehow
‘negotiated’ based on developer‐supplied cost information, rather than being ‘capped’ at some level based on the
regulator’s own cost information.
22
It also includes guidelines for small hydro, waste‐to‐energy and bagasse‐based cogeneration, but in much lesser
detail. In the case of small hydels, the guidelines may be expanded further at a later stage (i.e., to include feed‐in
tariffs for mini‐ and microhydels).

This particular approach has been adopted for RE IPPs in order to reduce the risk faced
by the developer in undertaking such kind of pioneering projects, since it guarantees a
return‐on‐equity (ROE) equal to the long‐term interest rates on ten‐year Pakistan
Investment Bonds (PIB) plus a premium. While it is true that this methodology reduces
some of the financial risks assumed by the developer, it is also apparent that this
arrangement eliminates any further incentive to develop these types of projects.23 The
ROE used (15%) has been the same Regardless of the type of project under
consideration (i.e., using renewable or conventional energy sources). This leads to quite
a curious situation, for example:
• The upfront tariffs allowed by NEPRA for conventional generation using
reciprocating engines burning diesel oil (US$ 119.7/MWh) is 25% higher than the
upfront tariffs for power generation using wind (US$ 95/MWh), Regardless of the
benefits the latter brings to the environment or in terms of fuel independence.
• The tariffs approved for the latest small‐scale hydel developments were about
US$ 38/MWh. This value is only 30% of the tariffs allowed to reciprocating
engines or 60% of the tariffs approved for gas‐fired conventional generation.
As a result, there is no special incentive for a developer to commit to RES projects rather
than to develop less riskier conventional ones, which does not make economic sense.
The risks of RES projects (particularly wind) can be considered higher, at least because
there are no projects of this kind in operation at present in Pakistan. Therefore, the
reluctance of the serious investors to undertake these types of projects is naturally
higher.
It can be argued that the ‘cost‐plus’ approach, if compared with others, transfers to the
consumers most of the social surplus (see Annex VII), benefiting them but at the same
time decreasing it in absolute terms. Therefore, applying this methodology to all
generation technologies without any other type of discrimination leads to undesired
results where more expensive and pollutant technologies develop and the resulting
average ratepayer price of electricity could be even higher than in the case in which RES
are used.
As a result, it is concluded that tariff determination based in the ‘cost‐plus’ approach is
not suitable for promoting a rapid deployment of RES technologies. An up‐front tariff
based on the ‘avoid cost’ approach, as computed and explained in Annex VII, would
seem to be a more appropriate option.

23
In fact, the guidelines indicated in the policy are not a ‘pure’ cost‐plus approach, since they allow at least two
additional provisions whereby the developer can obtain potentially even higher returns: 1) the capital cost figures
used are not the actual ones, but estimated by NEPRA using market data, and 2) the ‘interest on loans’ assumed in
calculating tariffs is a benchmark; in case the developer manages to arrange better financing terms, the additional
benefits shall be shared amongst the developer and the purchaser (in a 60:40 ratio, respectively). However, due to
the reasons mentioned earlier, NEPRA has so far used the actual capital and debt servicing costs provided by the
developer in arriving at its tariff determinations.

Is the wind speed (or water flow) risk mitigation mechanism developed in Pakistan
actually perceived by investors as an important benefit? Should this be maintained in
the future?
The AEDB has designed a mechanism to ‘guarantee’ the income of a developer in case
the average wind speed (or average water flow, in the case of hydel) in a month at a
particular location is lower than a benchmark obtained from a set of measurements
performed in the past at the site over a reasonable period of time24 by the AEDB or
other independent body. This approach was developed, according to information
received from the AEDB, to mitigate the initial reluctance of the developers who might
feel uncomfortable investing in projects whose profitability depends on data that were
not collected by them. To the knowledge of the consultants, this approach has never
been used in other countries.
While this mechanism can be considered appropriate for an initial period for its stated
benefits, until such time that the industry gains confidence on the technology and its
commercial viability, it is not considered convenient to be maintained indefinitely into
the future. There are a number of reasons to eliminate it in the medium‐term RE policy:
• Variability of wind is inherent to wind power generation: To determine this
variability, as well as to design the hedging mechanism to take it into account, is
essentially a matter for the developer. It should not be the purchaser who
assumes it, particularly given the already low plant factors typical of wind farms
compared to firmer, conventional power availability. This has been the practice
in all other parts of the world.
• Reduced incentives for adequate design: The actual energy production from a
wind farm, at a particular location, will depend on the wind speed but also,
amongst other factors, on the design of the wind farm (i.e., micrositing issues).
The layout of the wind farm is entirely under the developer decision. It is the
developer, therefore, who should take on the benefits or problems inherent with
the project’s design. Also, the conversion of wind speed to energy depends on
several parameters: the type of turbines selected, the location of the towers,
their height, etc. These parameters and their impact will be determined ex‐post
(that is when the turbine selection and farm design have been finalized).
Therefore, any eventual gain obtained due to the design will be automatically
eliminated (transferred to the consumers) and the incentives for an adequate (or
optimum) design are thus strongly reduced.
• Complexity of mechanism: The assumption of wind speed risk by the purchaser
requires constant on‐site wind measurements, the development of wind tables
that can vary over time, and several assumptions regarding turbine efficiency and
availability, before the monthly payments due to the power producer can be
determined. It increases the administrative overheads relevant to
operationalizing the tariff mechanism considerably, and could lead to disputes

24
Benchmark wind speed measurements are usually based on three‐year rolling averages, while that for water flows
are typically derived from a more extensive hydrological time‐series database.

with the developer regarding the accuracy, quality, or adequacy of such
independent wind power measurements.
• Could lead to endless negotiations: Once one of the risks has been eliminated (in
fact, transferred to the consumers), the developers may ask for others to be
removed as well (e.g., wind direction, variability of the wind within a month,
etc.).25 This, in turn, may delay the execution of some projects further while
developers wait for such claims to be taken into account.
Therefore, it is considered that in the medium‐term RE policy, these risk mitigation
mechanisms will be eliminated altogether, and all resource variability (including wind
speed or water flows) be transferred to the developer, who would be in a better
position to manage it. In any case, if it is considered that RES projects that utilize
unpredictable resources (e.g., solar, wind, or hydel) are more risky than others, this
higher risk should be recognized in the IRR allowed and not transferred to the purchaser
(and, ultimately, to the customers).
Are there other problems encountered by RE developers that not directly related to
tariff issues?
According with the conversations held with representative developers, most other
problems reportedly faced by them were of much lesser importance than those related
to power purchase tariffs. Some problems existed in the KESC area, since KESC refused
to sign the PPA for a renewable energy project. It was eventually resolved, permitting
the project to proceed, with the contract agreement signed with the NTDC, despite the
project being connected to KESC lines
It should be noted, however, that this does not imply that other than tariffs, all other
issues potentially affecting RE projects can be termed insignificant; rather, such
additional problems have not come to light so far perhaps because most projects
currently under development have not yet progressed far along the implementation
track. In particular, two issues would seem to require urgent attention:
• Connection to the grid: It needs to be assured that the NTDC (or the DISCO) will
always conduct the grid extension required to connect RES projects in a timely
manner and at its own cost, and that it will be adequately compensated for the
additional costs incurred by the GoP. Otherwise, grid connection may become a
serious bottleneck in the future even if projects successfully reach the
construction stage.
• Transparent pass‐through for distributors. In several cases, the power purchaser
for an RE generation project may be a distribution utility, especially in the case of
small‐sized plants. If the price of the RES energy approved by NEPRA is higher
than the average cost of energy purchased by the distributor from the grid
(which will probably often be the case), and the distributor is not adequately
compensated for this higher cost, there will be reluctance for the distributor to

25
For example, see Section 2.3.1.

accept this energy (expressed, for example, by the utility creating ‘artificial
technical problems’ in order to escape any penalties for failing to assure power
off‐take). Therefore, transparent compensation for these extra costs needs to be
explicitly provided for. Two options exist for this purpose:
o Include these extra costs into the distribution revenue requirements allowed
by the distributors (e.g., through ‘system benefit charges’26). In this case, this
should be clearly stated in the tariff structures developed by NEPRA.
o Sell all the renewable energy produced to the Central Power Purchasing
Authority (CPPA), regardless of the voltage at the connection point. In this
case, the cost of procuring this energy can be incorporated by the CPPA in the
average energy price transferred to all distributors, regardless of the location
of the renewable project.
The advantages and disadvantages of both alternatives will be discussed in a separate
document outlining the medium‐term policy recommendations.
Are current administrative procedures (required consents, petitions, processing

schedules, etc.) a barrier to more rapid deployment of RES projects?
Potential developers have indicated problems with some of the administrative
procedures that have delayed the execution of their RE IPP projects. Most of these
problems are related to the documentation required to be included in the security
package (IA, PPA, etc.). They also stated that these issues seem to have been resolved
now, and that they consider the current contents of the proposed agreements adequate
and acceptable. These types of problems are typical for first‐of‐kind projects and were to
be expected.
However, it is worth mentioning that such elaborate administrative procedures (the
majority required to be handled in Islamabad) can be an important (and costly) burden
for small‐sized projects, especially those serving remote locations or small
communities.27 This issue was clearly stated by the Punjab Irrigation & Power officials,
who recommended a single‐window facility at the provincial level to deal with such
projects. The consultants agree with these comments, and recommend that the
medium‐term policy create different (and simpler) procedures for these kinds of
projects.
Are the institutional roles for promoting RES in Pakistan adequately assigned?
Three different institutions in Pakistan are involved with RES project development at
present:

26
These refer to competitively‐neutral, non‐by passable ratepayer charges allowed to utilities to enable them to
recover the cost of mandated renewable energy purchase, energy efficiency, environmental protection, and/or
low‐income assistance programs that the competitive market is unlikely to provide on its own.
27
For example, off‐grid hydel projects of a few megawatts capacity.

• AEDB: Responsible for promoting RES projects and to act as a ‘single window’
through which developers can obtain the required consents, permits and
agreements needed to realize the project.
• PPIB: Responsible for dealing with bagasse‐based cogeneration projects or hydel
generation projects larger than 50 MW of installed capacity.
• NEPRA: Responsible for sanctioning tariffs for grid‐connected RES projects.
Although, in principle, this separation of responsibilities can be considered rational, it
may hide some problems which, eventually, may create a barrier to the rapid
deployment of RES projects:
• It is recognized that, at least in the short term, some renewable energy
technologies will require tariffs higher than those applicable to conventional
sources.28 In this situation, NEPRA is confronted by a quite ‘logical’ conflict of
interest.29 On the one hand, it has to protect the interest of consumers, and
therefore set the tariffs as low as practicable, while simultaneously assuring the
financial health of the suppliers. On the other, it has to follow the policy
guidelines of the government, seeking to promote renewable energy sources,
even if the direct costs of doing so are higher than those for available
conventional alternatives.
The way to ‘resolve’ this conflict is to establish clear guidelines that the
regulatory authority (NEPRA) shall follow in determining these tariffs. That is, for
example, the case in the current short‐term policy for wind projects. However,
these guidelines do not exist for other renewable energy technologies.
Even in the case of wind power (where the guidelines are clearly stated), some
degree of discretionary interpretation always exists. That is the case, for
example, in respect of the capital cost component of the tariffs. The guidelines
state that this cost “…shall be determined after thorough market research and by
accessing information provided by the wind IPP”. In most of the cases, it is
practically impossible to determine if a cost provided by an IPP is consistent or
not with market conditions.30
It should be noted that this ‘conflict’ is not a characteristic unique to Pakistan,
but exists in practically all other countries, and this is one of the reasons several

28
Taking into account that some of the environmental impacts of conventional energy production are not reflected in
the corresponding approved tariffs. See Annex VII for a more detailed analysis of these issues.
29
Article 7 (Powers and Functions of the Authority) of the NEPRA Act XL states: “… In performing its functions under
this Act, the Authority shall, as far as practicable, protect the interests of consumers and companies providing
electric power services in accordance with guidelines… laid down by the Federal Government.” (underlined
emphasis by the consultants).
30
For example, in the final tariff determination for WinPower Pvt. Ltd., Mr Abdul Rahim Khan of NEPRA issued an
additional note stating that: “The project cost per kW for wind power projects… has reached a level where it
surpasses the threshold of project cost per kW for hydroelectric (run‐of‐river) projects, which are equally desirable
renewable energy projects… Therefore, priority of induction of various technologies needs to be reviewed.” This is
a typical case where the regulatory authority sees a conflict between protecting the consumer and following the
government’s policy guidelines.

nations have decided to exclude regulatory institutions in the determination of
the incentives (feed‐in or quotas) for renewable energy technologies, and instead
maintain them within the ‘policy‐making’ institutions (i.e., the Ministry of Energy
or similar departments).
As the powers of the regulatory authority to determine generation tariffs is granted by
the NEPRA Act XL of 1997 (Article 7), and no changes are proposed by the consultants in
this regard, it is very important that the medium‐term policy clearly states the guidelines
for determining the tariffs (or premiums) to be applied to renewable energy projects.31

31
As mentioned before, it is advisable that these guidelines be based on methodologies other than a ‘cost‐plus’
approach.

Annex VI: Working Paper 3:
Pakistan’s Energy Sector: Market, Growth
and Supply Options

Working Paper No. 3
Pakistan’s Energy Sector:
Market, Growth, and Supply Options
Contents
Exhibits ..................................................................................................................... 193
1 Objective .............................................................................................................. 199
2 Overview .............................................................................................................. 199
3 The Pakistan Energy Market ................................................................................. 202
3.1 Supply and Resource Availability ....................................................................... 202
3.1.1 Natural Gas ............................................................................................ 202
3.1.2 Oil ........................................................................................................... 203
3.1.3 Coal ........................................................................................................ 204
3.1.4 Electricity ............................................................................................... 205
Power Generation .................................................................................. 205
Transmission and Distribution ............................................................... 205
3.1.5 Alternative and Renewable Energy ....................................................... 206
3.2 Consumption and Sector‐wise Demand ............................................................ 207
3.2.1 Industrial Sector .................................................................................... 208
3.2.2 Residential Sector .................................................................................. 208
3.2.3 Commercial Sector ................................................................................ 209
3.2.4 Transportation Sector ............................................................................ 209
3.2.5 Agriculture Sector .................................................................................. 210
3.3 Resource Potential and Infrastructure .............................................................. 210
3.4 Sector Organization ........................................................................................... 213
3.4.1 Government Agencies ........................................................................... 213
3.4.2 Utilities and Energy Providers ............................................................... 215
Power ..................................................................................................... 215
Oil and Gas ............................................................................................. 215

Coal ......................................................................................................... 216
Nuclear ................................................................................................... 216
Renewables ............................................................................................ 216
3.4.3 Regulators .............................................................................................. 218
3.5 Policy Framework .............................................................................................. 219
3.6 Comparative Costs ............................................................................................. 220
3.6.1 Production Costs.................................................................................... 220
Crude Oil ................................................................................................. 220
Natural Gas ............................................................................................. 220
Liquefied Petroleum Gas ........................................................................ 221
Petroleum Products ............................................................................... 223
Coal ......................................................................................................... 224
Electricity ................................................................................................ 224
3.6.2 Energy Pricing ........................................................................................ 226
Electricity ................................................................................................ 227
Natural Gas ............................................................................................. 228
Liquefied Petroleum Gas ........................................................................ 229
Petroleum Products ............................................................................... 229
Alternative Energy .................................................................................. 230
4 Projected Supply and Demand ............................................................................. 231
4.1 Fueling Economic Growth ................................................................................. 231
4.2 Energy Supply and Demand Scenarios .............................................................. 233
4.2.1 Projected Energy Demand ..................................................................... 233
4.2.2 Projected Energy Supply and Deficit ..................................................... 235
The Base Case ......................................................................................... 236
Low Gas Case .......................................................................................... 236
Low Hydel Case ...................................................................................... 236
Low Gas, Low Hydel Case ....................................................................... 236
4.3 Projected Energy Balances ................................................................................ 237
5 Economic Implications .......................................................................................... 239
5.1 Scenario Impacts on Costs and Financing Needs .............................................. 239
5.2 Optimum Role of Renewable Energy ................................................................ 239

Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Pakistan Primary Energy Supplies, 2006‐07 ............................................... 201
Exhibit 2: Pakistan Energy Consumption, 2006‐07 ..................................................... 201
Exhibit 3: Coal Reserves, FY2007 ................................................................................ 204
Exhibit 4: Installed Power Generation Capacity, FY2007 ........................................... 206
Exhibit 5: Indigenous Energy Resource Potential, FY2007 ......................................... 212
Exhibit 6: GoP Agencies Relevant to Energy Production, Management
and End Use ................................................................................................ 214
Exhibit 7: Energy Utilities and Suppliers ..................................................................... 217
Exhibit 8: Relevant Regulatory Agencies .................................................................... 218
Exhibit 9: Policy Framework Relevant to Energy Production and Use ....................... 219
Exhibit 10: Gas Price Discounting Mechanism.............................................................. 221
Exhibit 11: Wellhead Gas Prices (as of June 30, 2007) ................................................. 222
Exhibit 12: Price Calculation of Petroleum Products Not Published by Platts ............. 223
Exhibit 13: Ex‐Refinery Prices of Petroleum Products (as of June 30, 2007) ............... 224
Exhibit 14: Cost of Power Generation at Crude Oil Price of US$ 60/bbl
and Coal Price of US$ 60/Tonne ................................................................. 225
Exhibit 15: Cost of Power Generation at Crude Oil price of US$ 90/bbl
and Coal Price of US$ 75/Tonne ................................................................. 226
Exhibit 16: Average Consumer Electricity Tariffs .......................................................... 227
Exhibit 17: Average Consumer Gas Tariffs .................................................................... 228
Exhibit 18: Consumer Prices of Petroleum Products as of June 30, 2007 .................... 229
Exhibit 19: Energy Use Per Capita for Selected Asian Countries, 2003 ........................ 231
Exhibit 20: Electricity Consumption Per Capita in Asia, 1980 & 2002 .......................... 232
Exhibit 21: Access to Electricity in Selected Asian Countries, 2000 ............................. 233
Exhibit 23: Energy Demand Forecasts at Various Economic Growth Rates ................. 235
Exhibit 24: Projected Energy Supply and Deficits ......................................................... 237
Exhibit 25: Projected Supply for Imported Energy Resources (Base Case) .................. 237
Exhibit 26: Projected Supply for Imported Energy Resources Under the
Low Gas Supply Scenario ............................................................................ 238
Low Hydel Supply Scenario ......................................................................... 238
Low Gas, Low Hydel Supply Scenario ......................................................... 238

ACGR Average compound growth rate
API American Petroleum Institute
APL Asia Pipelines Limited
ARL Attock Refinery Limited
bbl Barrels
Bcfd Billion cubic feet per day
BPL Bosicor Pakistan Limited
Btu British thermal unit
C&F Carriage and freight
CAA Civil Aviation Authority
cf Cubic feet
CHASHNUPP Chashma Nuclear Power Plant
CNG Compressed natural gas
CP Contract price
DGG Directorate General, Gas
DGM Directorate General, Mineral
DGO Directorate General, Oil
DGPC Directorate General, Petroleum Concessions
DISCO Distribution company
DNA Designated national agency
DSM Demand‐side management
E&P Exploration and production
EAD Economic Affairs Division
EDB Engineering Development Board
ENERCON National Energy Conservation Centre
EPD Environmental Protection Department
FO Furnace oil

FOB Freight on board
FY Financial year
GES Growth environment score
GSA Gas sales agreement
GWh Gigawatt‐hour
HDIP Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan
HOBC High octane blending compound
HSD High‐speed diesel
HSFO high‐sulfur fuel oil
I&P Irrigation and power
IFEM Inland freight equalization margin
JP Jet propulsion
KANUPP Karachi Nuclear Power Plant
kV Kilovolt
kW Kilowatt
kWh Kilowatt‐hour
lb Pound
LDO Light diesel oil
MGCL Mari Gas Company Limited
MMscfd Million standard cubic feet per day
MMTPA Million tonnes per annum
MoE Ministry of Environment
MoFR Ministry of Finance and Revenue
MOGAS Motor gasoline
MoPNR Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources
MoST Ministry of Science and Technology
MS Motor spirit

MT Metric tonnes
MW Megawatt
NARC National Agriculture Research Council
NHA National Highway Authority
NPO National Productivity Organization
NRL National Refinery Limited
NTRC National Transport Research Centre
OGDC Oil and Gas Development Corporation
OGRA Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority
OMC Oil marketing company
P&D Planning and Development
PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
PARC Pakistan Agriculture Research Council
PARCO PakArab Refinery Company
PCSIR Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
PEPCO Pakistan Electric Power Company
PHA Pakistan Housing Authority
PIAC Pakistan International Airlines Corporation
PIDC Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation
PNAC Pakistan National Accreditation Council
PNRA Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority
PPEPCA Pakistan Petroleum Exploration and Production Companies Association
PPL Pakistan Petroleum Ltd.
PR Pakistan Railway

PRL Pakistan Refinery Limited
PSO Pakistan State Oil Company
PSQA Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority
PV Photovoltaic
PWD Public Works Department
RE Renewable energy
RON Research octane number
RoR Run‐of‐river
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SBP State Bank of Pakistan
SCA Sindh Coal Authority
Scf Standard cubic feet
SECP Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan
SMEDA Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority
SNGPL Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd.
SRO Statutory regulatory ordinance
SSGCL Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd.
Tcf Trillion cubic feet
TPA Tonnes per annum
TWh Terawatt‐hour

Pakistan’s Energy Sector:
Market, Growth, and Supply Options
1 Objective
This Annex presents an overview of Pakistan’s energy sector and its organizational
structure, prospects for its growth and anticipated constraints on primary supplies, and
possible future options and strategies that the country may adopt in order to provide for
the energy needs of a rapidly developing economy.
The purpose of this study is to provide estimates of anticipated growth in the country’s
energy demand, a comparative evaluation of different energy supply options available to
it, and the circumstances under which such needs can be met, especially in terms of
electrical power. This would help determine the role that renewable energy (RE) based
generation can play in the national context, to the extent that availability and relative
costs allow.
In this respect, this analysis should also provide a useful base for evaluating the
economic merits of renewable energy sources (RES) relative to conventional supply
options in the energy mix,1 at both the national and local levels, and help prioritize
targets and policies aimed at the development of appropriate RE technologies in the
medium term, as required under ADB TA 4881‐PAK.
2 Overview
Pakistan requires increasingly large energy inputs to support the economic development
needs of a large population which, at over 160 million, makes it the world’s sixth largest
nation. Furthermore, Pakistan’s population is projected to grow at an annual rate of just
under 2%, reaching 190.7 million by 2015.2 Simultaneously, the country’s pace of
economic development is accelerating, with annual GDP growth having averaged 7%
over the last five years and the size of the national economy and per capita incomes
doubling in less than a decade. The significant strengthening of macroeconomic
fundamentals and resilience of growth trends—even in the face of serious and
unexpected challenges, such as record oil import prices and the severe earthquake of

1
While this study focuses on the prospects and costs of conventional energy supplies in Pakistan, the economics of
available RES options are discussed in detail in Annex VII.
2
World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, Population Database, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
Population Division, United Nations, New York: 2007 (data for medium variant projections).

2002—underpin current projections of robust national economic growth over the
medium term and beyond.3
These trends translate into rapidly escalating energy demand: primary energy supply in
Pakistan has been increasing at 6% per annum over the last five years (see Exhibit 1 and
Exhibit 2, respectively, for energy supply and use statistics).4 Over the same period,
electricity consumption in the country has risen at an average annual rate of 6.8%,
natural gas by 10.4%, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by 17.6%, and coal by 22.8%. Only
oil consumption has leveled off temporarily due to large‐scale fuel switching in the
power and cement industry, displaced by natural gas and coal, respectively—and
transportation, due to increased use of compressed natural gas (CNG) in vehicles.
Nevertheless, oil imports in 2004‐05 increased by 4.7% over the preceding year (at a
44.5% higher cost due to international crude price escalation), and the import bill stood
at over US$ 7.4 billion in 2006‐2007 compared to US$ 2.7 billion in 2003‐2004.
Electricity use, in particular, is growing robustly across all sectors—industry, agriculture,
domestic, and commercial—recording a 10.2% overall jump in 2005‐06 with generation
increase lagging behind at 9.3% during the same period. The country thus faced serious
peak electricity supply shortfalls, in the range of 1,500‐2,000 MW, during the summer of
2007, necessitating significant ‘load shedding’ or forced outages that adversely affected
economic activity and social services, and are expected to worsen in 2008 and beyond
before significant new generation capacity can be brought online. Despite a steady
improvement in recent years, system‐wide grid transmission and distribution losses still
remain high at 24.8% of dispatched power.
Projecting forward, Pakistan’s Medium Term Development Framework 2005‐2010
(MTDF) sets out a challenging program in order to achieve 8% average annual national
GDP growth. The associated increase in energy consumption is forecast at 12% per
annum, more than double the rate witnessed between 2000 and 2006. This will
increasingly strain Pakistan’s primary energy supply sources. Rising oil consumption and
flat domestic production will once again trigger rapidly increasing oil imports, while
steadily depleting domestic natural gas reserves—in the absence of substantial new
discoveries—will see the country importing gas for the first time in its history, both
through pipelines as well as in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments.
Electricity consumption, slated to grow on average at 8% per annum to 2015 (although
recent experience suggests even higher demand growth), will similarly require large
power generation capacity additions. Electricity imports from Iran have been in effect
for several years now for the Balochistan coastal grid, and larger power imports from
Central Asian states to the national grid, although logistically challenging, are under
active GoP consideration. Higher energy demand and imports will also require massive
investments in associated port terminals, storage facilities, refining capacity, pipeline
and transmission networks, and surface fuel transport infrastructure. There is increasing

3
According to a recent assessment, Pakistan is expected to maintain a GDP growth rate of 6.8% per annum in dollar
terms over the next 45 years. With this rate of increase, national per capita income is projected to reach US$ 7,753
by 2050 from US$ 737 in 2005. This growth could accelerate further if the country’s Growth Environment Score
(GES) improves in the interim (Global Economics Paper No. 134, Goldman Sachs, New York: December 2005).
4
Average compound growth rate (ACGR) between 2001‐02 to 2006‐07 (Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2007,
Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2008).

realization of the need to expedite exploitation of all indigenously available energy
resources, especially the significant Thar coal deposits as well as renewable sources
(small hydro, wind, solar, and biomass), while simultaneously undertaking large
hydroelectric projects on the country’s main rivers. However, success in efforts to
enhance Pakistan’s energy supplies is subject to a host of technical, financial,
institutional, and political considerations being addressed in a timely manner, to energy
market reforms and privatization of state‐controlled institutions proceeding smoothly,
as well as to the efficiency with which available supplies are harnessed and used.
Exhibit 1: Pakistan Primary Energy Supplies, 2006‐07
Total Energy Availability, 2006-07 Total Primary Energy Supply, 2006-07
62.498 MTOE 60.388 MTOE
Hydroelectricity Nuclear
7.627 0.546
12.6% 0.9%
Imports Coal Oil
19.835 4.427 18.121
32% 7.3% 30.0%
LPG
0.314
Indigenous
0.5%
Production Natural Gas
42.663 29.312
68% 48.6%
Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2007, Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP),
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2008.
Exhibit 2: Pakistan Energy Consumption, 2006‐07
Total Energy Consumption, 2006-07 Total Energy Use, 2006-07

36.005 MTOE 36.005 MTOE
Transportation Other
Electricity 9.721 0.742
5.922 27%
Oil 2%
16%
10.575
29% Domestic
7.605
Coal 21%
4.149
12%
LPG
0.658 Commercial
2% 1.377
Industry
Natural Gas 15.792 Agriculture 4%
14.701 44% 0.767
41% 2%
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2008.

3 The Pakistan Energy Market
3.1 Supply and Resource Availability
Primary energy supply in Pakistan was 60.4 MTOE in fiscal year (FY) 2007,5 with
indigenous gas accounting for 48.6% of the total, followed by oil at 30% (Exhibit 1). Even
assuming a modest GDP growth rate of 6.5% per year, overall demand for energy is
expected to increase by a factor of 3.5 over the next 20 years. Demand for energy is
closely linked to the overall economic growth rate, and variations of over 25% in total
demand can occur over a 20‐year period for a one percent change in the average annual
economic growth rate. Given Pakistan’s current plans for the development of its energy
resources, the deficit in energy supply that will have to be filled with imported fuels is
expected to increase from the current 28% to 62% of the total by FY2025. While the
exploitation of the limited reserves of indigenous oil and gas continues at an adequate
level, the country is rich in coal and hydel resources which have so far remained grossly
underutilized. The development of lignite reserves in Thar, Sindh, that constitute the
bulk of the country’s coal resources, is constrained mainly by challenging mining
conditions and the large financial outlays required to exploit them, while the bulk of the
hydel opportunities are situated in remote locations where infrastructure
development—such as roads and transmission lines—poses a additional costs. Pakistan
has, therefore, given priority to the import of natural gas, LNG, and power from
resource‐rich countries in the region in the medium term until domestic resources can
be more fully utilized.
Key elements of an action plan being pursued by the government to enhance the
nation’s energy supplies, and to manage risks associated with delays in resource
development and rising world energy prices, include fast‐tracking imports of natural gas
and LNG from neighboring countries to meet near‐term energy requirements, and
accelerated development of Thar coal and of large‐scale projects for hydroelectric
power generation to ensure energy security in the longer term. In addition to the
development of conventional energy resources, programs are being implemented to
enhance the efficiency of the energy sector through mainstreaming of renewable
energy, undertaking integrated energy planning, and improving demand‐side
management to optimize the use of available resources.
3.1.1 Natural Gas
Pakistan is a significant producer of natural gas. As of June 30, 2007, Pakistan’s total
remaining recoverable gas reserves were estimated at 32.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf),6
which are adequate for meeting the country’s gas requirement for about 23 years at the
current production rate of 3.87 billion cubic feet per day (Bcfd). Almost all the presently
identified oil and gas reserves are onshore. Historically the Sui gas field has been one of
the country’s major producers and had remained central to gas supplies and associated
infrastructure development. However, sizeable gas discoveries in the past decade,
including Qadirpur, Miano, Sawan, Bhit, and Zamzama—with total production of about

5
i.e., July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007.
6
Equivalent to 28.18 Tcf normalized to 900 Btu/cf.

1.5 Bcfd—have changed the overall gas supply situation in the country and have shifted
the resource base from Sui to these newly developed fields in the south. A major
discovery at the Gurgari gas field, near Kohat, has also recently been made in the NWFP.
The bulk of natural gas production in the province of Sindh is concentrated in and
around the Indus River Basin.
The GoP fixes the price at which gas is purchased from producers. The pricing formula
for each gas field depends on the pricing policy in force at the time the discovery is
declared commercial. All the fields that declared commercial production up until 1985
had their wellhead prices set on a ‘cost‐plus’ basis. Thereafter, between 1985 and 1994,
prices of all new gas discoveries were generally linked with price of high‐sulfur fuel oil
(HSFO). However, under the Petroleum Policy, 1994, the producers’ prices were indexed
with the C&F price of baskets of imported Arabian/Persian Gulf crude. In December
1999, a new inflection‐point based pricing framework with a discounted price
mechanism was defined, linked to the price of a basket of Arabian/Persian Gulf crude
oils. The economic package for the offshore production is based on a Production Sharing
Agreement (PSA).
Natural gas plays an important role in Pakistan’s economy, meeting over 50% of the
country’s demand for commercial energy.7 However, despite the healthy share of gas in
the energy mix, piped gas is available to only about 18% of the population of the
country. At present, natural gas accounts for 57% of the energy supply requirements of
the domestic sector, 53% for the commercial sector, 57% for the industrial sector (which
could be even higher sans forced winter supply curtailment), 13.6% for the
transportation sector (in the form of CNG), and 57% of the fuel used in thermal power
generation. In addition, the fertilizer sector utilizes 12.6% of the total gas supply as
feedstock. The annual compound growth rate (ACGR) for gas consumption during the
period 2001‐2007 was almost 8.2%.8
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) use in Pakistan has been growing at an ACGR of 12.6%
over the period 2001‐2007, and is used mainly in the domestic (67%) and commercial
(31%) sectors as a heating fuel. In urban and rural areas not connected to the gas
pipeline network, LPG is the preferred substitute and is sold at its economic cost. As it is
the less developed areas that generally lack gas pipeline connections, it is the poorer
strata of the urban and rural population has to rely on non‐subsidized LPG, with those
that cannot access or afford it resorting to traditional biomass fuels.
3.1.2 Oil
Oil is an important component of Pakistan’s energy economy with its 30% share in the
national primary energy supplies. While Pakistan’s current gas reserves are ranked sixth
highest amongst Asia‐Pacific countries, its oil reserves—at a modest 353.4 million US
barrels—are inadequate to meet the country’s needs. Pakistan thus has to depend upon
imports of crude oil, furnace oil (FO) and high‐speed diesel (HSD) to the extent of 73.4%
of its requirements (in FY2007) for these commodities. During FY2007, Pakistan
imported crude oil and petroleum products worth US$ 7.45 billion, out of which refined

7
Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2006, Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP), Islamabad, 2007.
8
Ibid.

petroleum products accounted for US$ 3.67 billion. About US$ 849 million surplus

petroleum products, including naphtha and motor gasoline, were exported during the
same period. The seasonal nature of energy demand in the country, and seasonal as well
as annual variations in hydel power generation, make the oil sector a critical element in
the nation’s energy management and security concerns.
Pakistan has fairly well‐developed infrastructure for meeting the requirements of its
growing energy markets. This consists of port handling facilities, a network of trunk
pipelines transporting over 12 MMTPA (million tonnes per annum) of crude oil and
products, seven refineries operating with a combined capacity of 13.2 MMPTA, 72
storage depots with a combined storage capacity of 2.8 million tonnes, and a network of
6,087 retail outlets operated by nine oil marketing companies (OMCs). During FY2007,
local refineries processed 11.2 million tonnes of crude oil, of which 3.1 million tonnes
(663,392 barrels/day) were produced indigenously and the rest imported. The average
utilization of refining capacity in the country thus remained at 85% of available capacity.
Karachi is the only seaport in the country with two port terminals, i.e., Karachi Port and
Port Qasim, which have a combined operational handling capacity of 35 million TPA.9
3.1.3 Coal
Pakistan is potentially rich in coal resources. According to the estimates summarized in
Exhibit 3, Pakistan’s potential coal reserves exceed 185 billion tonnes. Current domestic
production, however, is only 3.6 million tonnes/year, confined to small deposits
scattered throughout the country, and meets about 45% of the local demand which
exceeds 7.5 million tonnes/year. The quality of coal mined is generally poor, and it is
mainly utilized in the brick and cement industries. Some small‐scale coal‐fired power
generation units that were installed in the 1950s were later de‐commissioned as natural
gas became increasingly available in the country. A power plant of 150 MW capacity has
been installed by WAPDA at Lakhra in Sindh with Chinese assistance, based on fluidized
bed technology. Capacity utilization of this plant, however, has been low and it has
remained inoperative for extended periods on account of equipment breakdowns.
Exhibit 3: Coal Reserves, FY2007
Province/ Reserves Heating Value
Region Million Tonnes Btu/lb
Sindh 184,623 5,219-13,555
Balochistan 217 9,637-15,499
Punjab 235 9,472-15,801
NWFP 90 9,386-14,217
AJK 9 7,336-12,338
Total 185,173
Source: Geological Survey of Pakistan and Pakistan Energy Year Book 2007,
Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP), Islamabad: 2008.

9
A second new deep‐water port at Gwadar has not become fully operational yet.

As indicated in Exhibit 3, the bulk of Pakistan’s coal reserves are located in the Sindh
province, most of which are associated with the Thar field located in southern Sindh. In
view of the availability of coal resources in the country, and consistent with the
government’s strategy to diversify the fuel mix and to base further expansion of power
generation capacity on least‐cost principles, the GoP has now given high priority to the
development of coal‐based power generating capacity in Thar. In the Medium Term
Development Framework 2005‐10, a target of 10,000 MW of coal‐based power
generation capacity has been set out to be achieved by 2020. The option of producing
pipeline quality gas and liquid fuels from coal is also under active consideration, in view
of the heavy national dependence on imported oil and petroleum products
The Thar coal resource, however, presents challenges in mining and utilization that are
related to its high salinity and moisture content, a high stripping ratio, the presence of
multiple aquifers, and a high risk of spontaneous combustion. While these reserves
present an opportunity for supplying indigenous primary energy, extensive
investigations and development efforts will be required to convert this resource into a
sustainable fossil fuel reserve.
3.1.4 Electricity
Power Generation
The installed electricity generation capacity in Pakistan in 2007 was 19,420 MW,
producing 98,384 GWh, and has been largely stagnant at this level for the previous three
years.10 The primary energy sources utilized for power production are natural gas
(36.4%), hydro (32.5%), oil (28.5%), nuclear and imported (2.5%), and coal (0.1%).
The WAPDA system, including independent power producers in its service territory,
represented 90% of Pakistan’s total installed generation capacity with the KESC system
making up the remainder (Exhibit 4). At present, countrywide shortfalls in power supply
are a daily reality. For instance, the system peak load deficit was 978 MW on May 2,
2007. This compares with the estimated underrated power capacity of 800 MW.
To meet projected electricity demand, Pakistan’s power generation requirements are
expected to grow to 162,590 MW by 2030, or an average increment of 5,700 MW per
year. This would pose a real challenge to the economy and provide a compelling reason
to seriously include renewable energy and energy efficiency as a way of minimizing the
cost of additional electricity and fuel supplies, as well as the substantial associated
economic risks of failing to achieve the capacity installation target.
Transmission and Distribution
In March 2007, at the national transmission level, power losses (including
transformation and grid stations losses) were 8% of the net generated power, an
increase over the year before, where losses stood at 7.6%. In the same month, losses in
distribution added up to 18.2% in 2007 and 19.1% in 2006. Total transmission and
distribution (T&D) losses amounted to 23.2% in 2007 and 25.0% in 2006.

10
The last significant capacity addition to the country’s power generation capacity was the 1,450 MW Ghazi‐Barotha
hydroelectric project commissioned in 2004.

Exhibit 4: Installed Power Generation Capacity, FY2007
System Capacity
WAPDA MW
Hydro (WAPDA and Others) 6,479

Thermal (GENCOs) 4,900
Thermal (IPPs) 5,560
Nuclear (PAEC CHASHNUPP) 325
Subtotal (WAPDA System) 17,264
KESC MW
Thermal (KESC) 1,756

Thermal (IPPs) 262
Nuclear (PAEC KANUPP) 137
Subtotal (KESC System) 2,155
Total Installed Capacity 19,420
Islamabad: 2008.
T&D losses are a mix of ‘technical’ and ‘non‐technical’ losses. Technical losses require
investments in infrastructure in order to bring them down to an acceptable level. Non‐
technical losses are a consequence of mismanagement and illegal connections (i.e.,
theft), which hopefully the privatization of distribution companies should significantly
contribute in redressing. In the meantime, important efforts to improve the situation are
being made with modest year‐on‐year improvements.
As part of its infrastructure development efforts, the GoP has initiated an important
investment program to improve the electricity T&D system in the country. This program
is to be implemented during the period 2007‐2016 at a total cost of US$ 3.9 billion, of
which the ADB, under its Power Transmission Enhancement Investment Program for
Pakistan, is providing US$ 800 million. The World Bank, in collaboration with four
electricity distribution companies (DISCOs), is also currently preparing a project to
reduce secondary transmission and distribution energy losses. The DISCOs have
prepared their component evaluation that includes both technical investments and
administrative/managerial measures. Loss reduction has potentially been estimated in
one case to improve from 15% to 12.2%, and in another from 25% to 21.5%.
3.1.5 Alternative and Renewable Energy
Pakistan has not yet been able to successfully attract significant private sector
investments in renewable energy generation. The AEDB, the body created specifically for
this function, has so far focused almost exclusively on wind power IPPs, which have been
dogged by tariff disputes (see Section 3.6.2) and other operational issues, even though
substantial additional incentives have been on offer from the GoP (e.g., concessional
land leases, wind speed risk cover, power evacuation guarantees, fiscal exemptions,

etc.). However, it is anticipated that these issues will be eventually resolved, and at least
a handful of wind IPPs will be able to break ground in the coming year.
Small hydro schemes have traditionally been the preserve of provincial governments,
with several hundred micro hydel turbines having been installed primarily in the
northern mountainous regions by SHYDO, NAPWD, and AKRSP. The ADB has recently
processed a loan of US$ 110.4 million11 for eight run‐of‐the‐river mini and small hydro
projects, both high‐ and low‐head, in the NWFP and Punjab provinces, while its private
sector financing is involved in the first medium‐sized hydro IPP in Pakistan, the US$ 125
million 84 MW New Bong Escape project in AJK. These pioneering projects are expected
to set the stage for greater private sector involvement in tapping Pakistan’s large
hydroelectric potential (estimated to be over 45,000 MW) based on large rivers, smaller
tributaries and mountain streams, and the country’s extensive irrigation canal system.
The New Zealand government is currently financing a pilot‐scale biomass conversion and
power generation project at the Landhi cattle colony in Karachi, based on methane
production from animal waste, which has substantial scale‐up and replication potential
at similar dairy farms in the country. Some initial assessments for municipal solid waste‐
to‐energy and landfill methane recovery are also being conducted in the major cities.
The country has recently experimented with limited sales of ethanol‐blended gasoline in
Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad. Biomass, waste, and biofuel resources represent a
promising future alternative energy market for Pakistan, depending on how quickly the
GoP can develop the necessary policy and support infrastructure for private sector
participation in such supplies and services.
The market potential is particularly high for exploiting solar energy, both photovoltaic
and thermal systems, where current deployment of such systems is very limited.
Recently introduced ‘net metering and sales’ permitting, which allows injection of
surplus, small‐scale generation to the grid at attractive rates, when properly developed
and paired with suitable end‐user financing, could open up a huge market for rooftop PV
panels in Pakistan, especially in grid‐connected localities, for servicing non‐time critical
and daytime loads (water pumping, fans, etc.), thereby helping supplement electricity
provision, shift peak loads, and reduce consumer bills. Thermal water heating, again in
combination with gas heating, could also find ready acceptance by both gas utilities and
their domestic customers. Commercial use of RE (in industry and large buildings) could
also be implemented through a combination of incentives, support products and
services, and appropriate regulations.
3.2 Consumption and Sectorwise Demand
In FY2007, the consumption of natural gas in Pakistan was 3,348 MMscfd, recording a
0.1% decrease as compared to the previous year due to supply constraints, which fell
short of system‐wide demand by approximately 700 MMscfd.
Pakistan consumed 16.8 million tonnes of petroleum products during FY2007,
registering an overall growth of 15% compared to the previous year. The country’s

11
Out of a total project cost of US$ 149.9 million, including funding for additional feasibility studies and institutional
capacity building.

economic revival triggered increased consumption of furnace oil and light diesel oil
(LDO)—by 46% and 9%, respectively—in the power and agricultural sectors. However,
the impact of higher oil prices was reflected in the demand for petroleum products, as
the combined demand for motor gasoline, HSD, kerosene and aviation fuel decreased by
1.3% in FY2007. The shortage of gas for power generation was the other factor
responsible for the high consumption of furnace oil. The demand was met through
import of 8.2 million tonnes of crude oil and 8.3 million tonnes of petroleum products,
costing the country US$ 7.4 billion in foreign exchange.
In FY2007, coal imports recorded an increase of 73% (excluding supply for Pakistan
Steel), contributing to an overall increase of 2.3% in the consumption of coal over
FY2006 as local coal production recorded a drop of 25% over the previous year.
Electricity consumption in FY2007 was around 72,712 GWh, as compared to 67,603 GWh
in the preceding year, thus recording an increase of 7.6%. Major increases occurred in
domestic, industrial and commercial electricity consumption.
3.2.1 Industrial Sector
The industrial sector represented 43% of the total commercial energy consumption in
Pakistan during 2006‐07, a share that remained unchanged from the previous year.
Energy supply to industry was based on oil products (10.3%), gas (52.6%), electricity
(10.9%), and coal (26.3%).
In 2005, the total number of industrial electricity connections in Pakistan was over
226,000, of which 99% had loads under 70 kW supplied through the 11 kV and 440 kV
distribution network. The balance of industrial consumers was supplied through
dedicated feeders, and accounted for about 52% of the total consumption in the
industrial sector.
The share of industry in total electricity consumption in Pakistan has decreased over the
past ten years, and is currently 28% for WAPDA and 36.7% for KESC, compared with
34.7% and 40%, respectively, in 1990.12 This seems contradictory, however, to recent
economic growth trends in Pakistan. Beginning at the turn of the century, Pakistan has
entered a period of strong economic development: between 2000 and 2004, the
industrial sector improved its share of GDP from 22.6% to 24.5%, whereas agriculture
declined from 26.2% to 23.3%. The manufacturing sector increased from 14.8% in 1999‐
2000 to 17.5% in 2003‐2004, with private sector real investment in large‐scale
manufacturing registering a 25.4% increase in 2003‐2004. Thus, although the decreasing
portion of industry in total electricity demand apparently does not seem to fit this
economic evolution, it indicates an even faster rise in power consumption by other
categories, particularly the domestic sector.
3.2.2 Residential Sector
In FY2006, the domestic sector in Pakistan comprised over 14 million households, up
from 8 million a decade ago. The most dominant household energy mix changed from

12
Raza, HA, Energy Security for South Asia: Pakistan, SAARC Working Group on Energy, Hydrocarbon Development
Institute of Pakistan, Islamabad.

kerosene‐biomass‐electricity in 1994 to biomass‐electricity in the subsequent survey

years. Natural gas‐electricity, undoubtedly the top combination in the so‐called ‘energy
ladder’, moved from being the fourth most prevalent energy mix in the first three
surveys to second in 2001.13 Consequently, in FY2007, of the total domestic energy
consumption of 7.6 MTOE, oil accounted for only 1.4% while natural gas and electricity
represented 57% and 35.7%, respectively, followed by LPG at 5.8%. Currently, the
domestic sector accounts for approximately 45.8% of total electricity consumption in the
country.
Electricity is available to about 50% of Pakistan’s population (see Exhibit 21), and the
average consumption per household is currently 172 kWh per month. More than 80% of
households with access to electricity had incomes of less than Rs 4,500 a month and
consumed on average 60 kWh per month. 14% of electrified households, with household
incomes of up to Rs 7,500 a month, consumed on average 180 kWh per month. The
remaining 6% are urban households that can afford air conditioners and other
appliances, consuming an average of 1,650 kWh monthly.
Electricity tariff rates for household/residential consumers are still subsidized by the
GoP. Based on data provided by WAPDA and electricity distribution companies, the
average rate for residential users was Rs 3.34/kWh (less than US$ 0.06/kWh) during
FY2003. The cost of supply to households was well in excess of US$ 0.08/kWh. In
FY2006, this subsidy translated into an annual cost for the GoP of over Rs 80 billion. This
is a situation where using distributed renewable energy, along with energy efficiency
and demand management programs, as a buffer may help public authorities to
rationalize household tariffs to reflect their true economic value.
3.2.3 Commercial Sector
During the year 2006‐07, the commercial sector consumed 1.38 MTOE, or 3.8%, of the
total commercial energy supply in Pakistan, mainly gas (53.3%), electricity (31.7%), and
LPG (15%). This sector had over 2.1 million electricity consumers, with an estimated 92%
of small‐ and medium‐sized shops consuming approximately 60 kWh per month. It is
possible, however, that a significant number of commercial establishments are currently
registered as ‘residential’ to take advantage of the subsidized tariff.
3.2.4 Transportation Sector
The transportation sector in Pakistan consumed a total of 9.72 MTOE of energy supplies
in FY2007, divided between high speed diesel (68.4%), natural gas (13.6%), motor spirit
(12.2%), aviation fuel (5.6%), with others (HOBC, kerosene, LDO, furnace oil, and
electricity) contributing the remainder.
In 2007, Pakistan became the second‐largest user in the world of compressed natural
gas (CNG) as a transportation fuel, with 1.55 million vehicles, or a quarter of the total
number, employing this technology on its roads.14 In 2006, Pakistan consumed 130

13
ESMAP, Household Use of Commercial Energy, The World Bank, February 2006.
14
Just behind Argentina with 1.65 million and ahead of Brazil with 1.425 million CNG vehicles, according to the
International Association of Natural Gas Vehicles (IANGV). By some estimates, Pakistan is slated to become the
leading country in world rankings before end‐2007.

million cubic feet per day of natural gas as CNG for transportation, which formed 10% of
all road transport fuels, while gasoline constituted 14% and diesel oil 76%. There are
currently 1,700 CNG fueling stations in the country, 65% of which are dedicated CNG‐
only stations while 35% are co‐located with liquid fuel dispensing sites, with 200 more
under construction and some 4,000 new license applications pending.
The development of the CNG industry in Pakistan has been achieved not through
government directives but through market‐oriented policy instruments and consumer
choice. Higher gasoline prices (presently the price of CNG represents 46% of the market
price for gasoline) gave a solid push to a market switchover from gasoline to CNG. Other
policy incentives, such as deregulated pricing of CNG, liberal licensing, investor‐friendly
institutional support, and tax and duty exemption on conversion kits and dispensing
equipment, were equally responsible for this dramatic, en masse fuel substitution. Both
users as well as private investors have been quite enthusiastic and responsive to the
CNG policy regime. As a result, an investment of US$ 500 million has been made by the
private sector, mostly small and medium enterprises, in establishing the required
infrastructure for refueling, conversion and manufacturing, and about 28,000 new jobs
have been created in this industry.
3.2.5 Agriculture Sector
Total energy consumption in the country’s vast agricultural sector amounted to only
0.77 MTOE in 2006‐07, consisting mostly of electricity (86.8%) and oil (13.2%). Electricity
is mainly used in the agricultural sector for tubewells for irrigation as well as for the
control of salinity and water logging. The bulk of agricultural consumption is in the
WAPDA system. Agricultural consumers account for about 12.1% of total electricity
consumption in the country. High growth rates in electricity demand were seen in this
sector during 1985‐1989 (e.g., 27.3% in 1998), and were primarily due to the
introduction of a flat‐rate retail agricultural tariff. Negative growth rates were witnessed
during 1998 to 2000, as the utility withdrew flat rates for the tubewells and most private
tubewells converted to diesel oil operation.15 On average, tubewell efficiencies remain
low and can be significantly improved, while this sector could also benefit greatly from
dispersed renewable energy supplies, particularly micro hydel, wind, and biogas.
3.3 Resource Potential and Infrastructure
The country’s oil and gas reserves are dominated by natural gas that has a 90% share in
the total hydrocarbon reserves on an energy‐equivalent basis. At present rates of
production, Pakistan’s proven oil and gas reserves are estimated to last for 14 and 21
years, respectively.
Pakistan’s total recoverable gas reserves are estimated at 32.4 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), as
of June 2007. Natural gas production during FY2007 was 3,873 million standard cubic
feet per day (MMscfd), showing a 1% increase from the previous year. Pakistan
possesses an extensive, well‐developed gas transmission and distribution network
operated by two utilities: the Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL) and the Sui

15
Raza, HA, Energy Security for South Asia: Pakistan, SAARC Working Group on Energy, Hydrocarbon Development
Institute of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Southern Gas Company Ltd. (SSGCL). In addition, there exists an independent gas
network supplying low‐Btu gas from dedicated gas fields, such as Mari and Kandhkot, to
a number of power and fertilizer plants.
Indigenous crude oil reserves are estimated at 353 million barrels as of June 2007.
Average daily oil production was 65,577 barrels in FY2007, recording an increase of 2.8%
over the last year, but still meets only 17% of the total demand for the country. Pakistan
is thus heavily dependent on import of crude oil, furnace oil (FO) and high‐speed diesel
(HSD).16 Local crude oil falls in the API gravity range of 25‐50, with some exceptions. In
addition to crude oil, Pakistan also produces oil and gas condensate from various fields
across the country. Both domestically produced crude oil and condensate are processed
in local refineries, which are designed for medium and light crudes, except Attock
Refinery Limited, which can process heavier crude oil.
Although, the country is rich in coal resources, estimated to be 185 billion tonnes, the
share of coal in the total energy mix is currently a meager 7%. These coal reserves are
largely attributed to the Thar deposits which, at an estimated 175 billion tonnes, are the
third‐largest in the world. Proper estimation of the quality, scale, and economics of Thar
coal will only be known after detailed test pit investigations are undertaken.
Pakistan’s energy resource potential is illustrated in Exhibit 5. The reserve‐to‐production
ratio is currently 14 and 21 for oil and gas, respectively, while for coal it is 678. Only
about 16% of the country’s available hydel potential has been realized so far. As
mentioned earlier, there are major unexploited reserves of coal in the Thar Desert in the
Sindh province. The development of these reserves, however, presents significant
challenges: the coal is of relatively low quality with a heating value of 5,700 Btu/lb,
sulfur content of over 1%, ash over 6%, and moisture of about 50%. The overburden to
be removed to access the coal seams is soft and has a depth of between 175 to 230
meters, indicating the need for capital intensive open‐pit mining. Limited water
availability in the area also poses a challenge, while substantial infrastructure needs to
be put in place before investment in coal mining and coal‐based power generation at
this remote location can take place.
There is increasing recognition of the economic benefits associated with hydropower
generation and storage of water for agricultural use. The government’s plans, therefore,
include an aggressive hydroelectric power development program. Most of the potential
sites are in the mountainous regions in the north of the country, where construction of
access roads and resettlement of affected populations pose significant challenges.
In view of the outlook, risks, timeline, and costs of initiating large‐scale exploitation of
the domestic energy resource base, Pakistan has given high priority to tapping regional
energy supplies as a near‐term solution to meeting its energy requirements, and several
projects for the import of natural gas from countries in the Middle East and Central Asia
have received serious attention recently. These include pipelines for import of gas from
Turkmenistan, Iran, and Qatar, respectively. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) import projects
are also being implemented. In addition, import of power from Tajikistan and

16
Although local crude production may double in a few years’ time on account of sizeable recent discoveries in Kohat
district in the north of the country.

Kyrgyzstan, which are rich in hydel resources, is also under active consideration. The
development of these options for importing energy has been constrained by the
sensitive regional security environment, volatility in the international energy market,
and the complexities associated with the formulation and implementation of large cross‐
border energy transactions.
Exhibit 5: Indigenous Energy Resource Potential, FY2007
Resource Estimated Energy

Potential Content
Oil 353 million bbl 47 MTOE
Gas 28 Tcf @ 900 605 MTOE

Btu/scf
Coal, Measured 3,303 MT 1,477 MTOE
Coal, Inferred 56,382 MT 25,220 MTOE
Coal, 113,798 MT 50,903 MTOE

Hypothetical
Oil Gas Coal
Installed Hydel 6,479 MW Measured
Potential Hydel 41,722 MW

Fuel Annual Production Reserves-to-Production Ratio
Oil 25 million bbl 14
Gas 1.4 Tcf @ 900 20

Btu/scf
Coal 3.64 MT 907
Hydel Potential 16%

Realized
Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook, 2007, Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP), Islamabad: 2008
Pakistan Hydel Power Potential, Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB), Islamabad: Undated.
Pakistan has a fairly well‐developed energy infrastructure. The natural gas transmission
infrastructure connects to over 4 million households and commercial establishments, in
addition to the bulk of the industries and thermal power generating units in the country,
and includes about 10,000 km of high‐pressure transmission pipelines and about
250,000 hp of compression capacity. A network of oil pipelines transports crude oil and
products to inland refineries and market centers. The ports at Karachi are equipped to
handle import of crude oil and petroleum products in large enough volumes that
account for a major fraction of the country’s consumption, as well as limited quantities
of coal. The power transmission and distribution network serves over 16 million
residential, commercial, and industrial customers, and includes over 40,000 km of high
tension transmission lines.

3.4 Sector Organization
Pakistan’s energy sector is administered largely through federal government ministries
and agencies. Provincial government involvement is restricted to small‐scale power
generation (<50 MW capacity plants), to exploration and mining leases for natural
resources other than oil and gas (i.e., coal), and to permitting for renewable energy
projects (wind, hydel, etc.).
3.4.1 Government Agencies
Exhibit 6 provides a list of government agencies that are directly or indirectly relevant to
the management and development of Pakistan’s energy policies, resources,
infrastructure, and end uses.
The Planning Commission is responsible for overall energy planning and infrastructure
development in the country. It is supported by the Energy Wing of the Planning and
Development Division for technical advice and approval of all public sector energy
investments.
The Ministry of Water and Power (MoWP) is the GoP’s executive arm for all issues
relating to electricity generation, transmission and distribution, pricing, regulation, and
consumption in the country, and exercises this function through its various line agencies
as well as relevant autonomous bodies and utilities. It also serves to coordinate and plan
the nation’s power sector, formulate policy and specific incentives, and liaise with
provincial governments on all related issues. Through the Private Power and
Infrastructure Board (PPIB) and the Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB), the
Ministry provides private investors with one‐window facilities for undertaking
conventional and renewable IPPs, respectively.
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), an autonomous agency, is exclusively
responsible for the country’s civilian nuclear power program.
The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources (MoPNR), likewise, administers the oil
and gas sector through its various technical directorates. Oil and gas exploration and
production policies, concessions, and licenses are managed by the MoPNR, while those
for other minerals, including coal, are the preserve of provincial governments. The
Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP) is the principal GoP agency for
compiling national energy statistics as well as for R&D in fossil fuel applications.
The Ministry of Environment (MoE), through the newly established CDM Cell, is the
Designated National Agency (DNA) for Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects in
the country and for climate change‐related policies and activities. The Pakistan
Environment Protection Agency (Pak EPA) also serves as one of its line agencies and
technical arms, as does ENERCON, the National Energy Conservation Centre, responsible
for promotion of energy efficiency and conservation in the country.
The Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST), through its various line agencies, is also
engaged in energy‐related research, standardization, and certification. Other ministries,
such as those for industries, communications, railways, housing, and food and
agriculture, are also relevant for policies, incentives and facilities impacting energy use
and energy efficiency in the key areas of industry, transportation, farming, and buildings.

Exhibit 6: GoP Agencies Relevant to Energy Production, Management and End Use
Agency Subordinate Agency/Department
Planning Commission Planning and Development (P&D) Division (Energy Wing)

Ministry of Water and Power Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)
Private Power Infrastructure Board (PPIB)
Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB)
Ministry of Petroleum and Directorate General, Gas (DGG)
Natural Resources Directorate General, Oil (DGO)
Directorate General, Mineral (DGM)
Directorate General, Petroleum Concessions (DGPC)
Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (HDIP)
Ministry of Environment National Energy Conservation Centre (ENERCON)
CDM Cell
Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak EPA)
Ministry of Science and Pakistan Council for Renewable Energy Technologies (PCRET)
Technology Pakistan Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (PCSIR)
Pakistan National Accreditation Council (PNAC)
Ministry of Industries, Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC)
Production, and Special Engineering Development Board (EDB)
Incentives National Productivity Organization (NPO)
Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA)
Ministry of Textile Industry
Ministry of Communications National Transport Research Centre (NTRC)
National Highway Authority (NHA)
Ministry of Railways Pakistan Railway (PR)
Ministry of Finance and Finance Division (Federal Board of Revenue, FBR)
Revenue Economic Affairs Division (EAD)
Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Pakistan Agriculture Research Council (PARC)
and Livestock National Agriculture Research Council (NARC)
Ministry of Housing and Works Public Works Department (PWD)
Pakistan Housing Authority (PHA)
Ministry of Defence Pakistan Armed Forces
Paramilitary, Border, Airport, and Maritime Security Forces
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC)
Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD)
Ministry of Defence Production Defence Production Division
Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC)
Provincial Governments Planning and Development Departments
Irrigation and Power (I&P) Departments
Mines and Mineral Development Departments
Environment Protection Departments
Resource Development Corporations/Authorities
Municipal Administrations and
Local Governments

City planning and building regulation, which can potentially influence the large
residential and commercial sector energy demand, is a function of local governments
and municipal administration bodies.
Finally, the Ministry of Finance and Revenue (MoFR), defines and approves all financial
and fiscal terms and incentives applicable to the energy sector, including the tax and
customs regime (through the Federal Board of Revenue, FBR), investment terms, income
and profit repatriation, etc. The MoFR, through its Economic Affairs Division (EAD), also
coordinates all external assistance and IFI financing to the energy sector in the country.
3.4.2 Utilities and Energy Providers
A listing of relevant energy utilities and service providers in Pakistan is given in Exhibit 7,
and the institutional organization of the main market segments briefly described below:
Power
The power market in Pakistan is undergoing significant long‐term structural reforms,
with the ultimate objective of introducing a deregulated and efficient industry operating
on competitive market principles with the full participation of the private sector in all
aspects of infrastructure and service provision. The Water and Power Development
Authority (WAPDA), the erstwhile national power monopoly, has been unbundled into
separate generation, transmission, and distribution entities,17 while the vertically‐
integrated utility serving the Karachi metropolitan region, the Karachi Electric Supply
Corporation (KESC), has been privatized. These corporatized entities have been
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and are
managed by their respective boards of directors. A significant IPP and captive power
generation capacity is also operational in the country, completely replacing new public
investment in thermal power production, with planned private investment also
increasing in wind and small hydro projects. Independent power producers consist of 16
thermal IPPs in operation, with several more in the pipeline, including the country’s first
hydroelectric IPP project. WAPDA continues to oversee the construction and operation
of large‐ and medium‐sized hydroelectric dams for power production, as well as to
manage their use for irrigation through its Water Wing.
Oil and Gas
The oil and gas industry in Pakistan consists of a mix of private and public sector entities
that fall under the policy and administrative control of the Ministry of Petroleum and
Natural Resources (MoPNR) and are regulated by the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority
(OGRA). Within the MoPNR, the office of the Director General of Petroleum Concessions
(DGPC) is responsible for the award and management of oil and gas exploration and
production licenses in the country under the GoP’s petroleum policy, which is revised
from time to time (with the July 2007 version currently in effect). The Oil and Gas
Development Corporation (OGDC) and Pakistan Petroleum Ltd. (PPL) are the two state‐
owned exploration and production (E&P) companies that are together responsible for

17
Consisting of four generating companies (GENCOs), one T&D company (NTDC), and nine distribution companies
(DISCOs), all operating under the administrative control of the Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO).

about 54% of oil and 44% of natural gas production in the country. The balance
production of oil and gas is accounted for by about 11 companies in the private sector,
with additional companies engaged in exploratory drilling. The Directorate General of Oil
(DGO) is responsible for the administration of oil refining, import, distribution and retail
operations in Pakistan. The Pakistan State Oil Company (PSO), accounts for about 70% of
the retail oil market, with the bulk of the balance shared by three private sector
companies. The Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL) and Sui Southern Gas Company
Ltd. (SSGCL) are state‐owned corporations that together account for over 79% of the gas
transmission and distribution operations in the country. Independently‐owned pipelines
dedicated to supplying lower calorific value gas to power and fertilizer units account for
the remaining business. The Directorate General of Gas (DGG) in the MoPNR is
responsible for policy making and administrative management of the natural gas, LPG,
and compressed natural gas (CNG) industry in the country. The LPG and CNG business is
almost entirely owned and managed by the private sector. The government is
considering import of liquefied natural gas (LNG), by both the public and private sectors,
under an LNG policy that is currently under preparation.
Coal
Development and utilization18 of coal resources falls under provincial governments’
jurisdiction, while actual mining and sales are carried out largely by the private sector,
with some public sector participation. The country’s large lignite deposits at Thar are,
under the aegis of the Sindh Coal Authority, moving beyond preliminary stages of
mineability assessment to more detailed evaluation, and will likely eventually involve
foreign investments for full‐scale commercial exploitation. Coal is also imported by
private companies, as well as large consumers such as the Pakistan Steel Mills for its
coking needs.
Nuclear
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) builds and operates the country’s
civilian nuclear power plants and conducts related fuel production, engineering and
maintenance, training, and R&D through an elaborate network of specialized
subordinate institutions and agencies employing a large pool of skilled manpower.
Renewables
Small hydro development has principally been undertaken by provincial agencies, such
as the Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO), the Northern Areas Public
Works Department (NAPWD), and NGOs such as the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme
(AKRSP), primarily in the mountainous north of the country. A number of grid‐connected
wind IPPs are in late stages of project approval, but none have achieved financial closure
so far. Some pilot and demonstration‐scale activity is also underway in biomass
conversion and waste‐to‐energy based power generation, while the country’s sugar
industry engages in bagasse‐based electricity production for self‐use as well as for sale
to the grid.

18
Coal used for power generation is managed by PPIB and WAPDA, while the cement and brick industry purchase
directly from coal producers.

Exhibit 7: Energy Utilities and Suppliers
Segment Supplier
Electric Power
Thermal, Hydel, and Nuclear Generating Companies (Thermal, 4)
Generation Independent Power Producers (Thermal, 16)
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA
Hydel)
Small Power Producers (Thermal)
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (Nuclear, 3)
High-Tension Transmission National Transmission and Dispatch Company
(NTDC)
Low-Tension Distribution Distribution Companies (9)
Oil and Gas

Exploration and Production E&P Companies (26)
Pakistan Petroleum Exploration and Production
Companies Association (PPEPCA)
Oil Pipeline Companies PakArab Refinery Company (PARCO)
Asia Pipelines Limited (APL)
Oil Refineries PakArab Refinery Company (PARCO)
National Refinery Limited (NRL)
Pakistan Refinery Limited (PRL)
Attock Refinery Limited (ARL)
Bosicor Pakistan Limited (BPL)
Dhodak Refinery Limited (DRL)
ENAR Petrotech Refinery (ERL)
Oil Marketing Companies Pakistan State Oil Company Limited (PSO)
Shell Pakistan Limited (Shell)
Chevron Pakistan Limited (Caltex)
Total-PARCO Pakistan Limited (Total)
Attock Petroleum Limited (APL)
Private Companies (4)
Gas Transmission and Distribution Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL)
Utilities Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SSGC)
Mari Gas Company Limited (MGCL)
LPG Companies (58)
CNG Companies (5,476 site licenses)
Coal Thar Coal Company Limited

Lakhra Coal Development Company Limited
Coal Importing Companies
Renewables
Small Hydro Sarhad Hydel Development Organization (SHYDO)
Punjab Irrigation and Power (I&P) Department
Northern Areas Public Works Department (NAPWD)
Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)

3.4.3 Regulators
The regulatory framework for the energy sector in Pakistan (Exhibit 8) is relatively new
and in the process of consolidating powers and acquiring technical sophistication. The
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) was established in 1997, the Oil
and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA) in 2002, and the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory
Authority (PNRA) in 2001. These autonomous agencies, to varying degrees, are in need
of internal capacity building, but otherwise fully functional and with their roles
established in price and procedure setting, licensing, performance and safety standards,
operational accounting, and implementation of rules and penalties. Coal mine leases and
operations are regulated by the provincial governments’ mineral development
corporations/authorities.
In addition to these, several other regulatory agencies are also relevant to energy‐
related activities in Pakistan. The Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak EPA),
established in 1984, is the apex regulatory body for all aspects relating to the quality of
air, water, natural resources, and social environment in the country, and functions under
the Ministry of Environment. Provincial EPAs are responsible for such functions within
their geographical jurisdictions, and may augment the regulations set at the federal
level. The country’s central bank, the State Bank of Pakistan, regulates monetary policy
and financial institutions, sets prudential guidelines, defines foreign exchange
transaction and repatriation rules, and provides foreign investment risk cover and
guarantees, where applicable. The establishment, certification, and regulation of
metrology, performance and quality standards, and testing is carried out by the Pakistan
Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQA), formed in 2000; its effectiveness in
instituting energy efficiency and emissions standards for equipment and materials,
however, is presently very limited. Buildings and urban planning, and energy use therein,
is regulated by the respective municipal administration of each city, and funded by the
local government which is also directly involved in land use planning, zoning, and
infrastructure investments.
Exhibit 8: Relevant Regulatory Agencies
Sector Regulating Agency
Electric Power National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA)
Oil and Gas Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA)
Nuclear Power Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA)
Standards Pakistan Standards and Quality Control Authority (PSQCA)
Environment Pakistan Environmental Protection Agency (Pak EPA)

Provincial EPAs/EPDs
Urban Planning and Local governments

Services Municipal administrations
Monetary and Prudential State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)

3.5 Policy Framework
National policies, regulatory measures, and legislation that impact the production and
use of energy in Pakistan are listed in Exhibit 9. In addition, the National Transport
Research Centre (NTRC) is currently preparing a policy for road transport, including
measures for system‐wide efficiency improvements, and a policy for the import of LNG is
under preparation by the MoPNR. The current ADB TA (4881‐PAK) aims to formulate a
comprehensive set of medium‐term policy measures for the development of renewable
energy resources to succeed the 2006 RE IPP policy guidelines.
Exhibit 9: Policy Framework Relevant to Energy Production and Use
Policy Target Areas
Policy for Power Generation, 2002 Independent power producers (IPPs)
Pakistan Petroleum Policy, 2007 Oil and gas exploration and

production (E&P)
Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for On-grid RE IPPs

Power Generation, 2006
National Energy Conservation Policy, 2006 Demand-side management and

energy efficiency market
Pakistan Environment Protection Act, 1997 Clean, renewable energy use, and
National Conservation Strategy, 1992 resource conservation
National Environment Policy and Action Plan, 2005
National Environment Quality Standards (Revised), Point emissions and pollution control
1999
National Forest Policy, 2001 Biomass use and resource

conservation
Small and Medium Enterprise Policy, 2006 Energy efficiency and RE market
The existing policies focus largely on the production and management of energy supplies
and related infrastructure investments, with those aimed at regulating the demand side
relatively weak in specificity and enforcement. As a result, energy use in the country per
se is not regulated, and Pakistan has from time to time had to resort to mandatory
energy quotas and usage restrictions when faced with severe supply constraints. These
include forced outages (‘load shedding’), where the supply of network electricity and
natural gas itself is deliberately rationed out to ‘low’ priority consumer categories in
order to manage seasonal generation/production shortages or grid imbalances due to
excess loads. Mandatory usage restrictions include, for example, the current (i.e., 2007‐
08) requirement of commercial close‐of‐business timings and a ban on billboard lighting.
Such supply and usage regulation represents an extreme, short‐term coping mechanism
and therefore varies from time to time in its extent and severity, depending on the
prevailing supply shortfall. These methods, however, represent a simplistic and ad hoc
approach to energy use management which extracts a real and unaccounted for
economic cost far beyond the direct impact of such disruption, which can instead be
better managed through more sophisticated pricing, DSM, and end‐use regulation.
However, given the prevailing electricity supply shortages and increasing gas demand,
forced supply quotas and use restrictions are expected to continue in the near future.

3.6 Comparative Costs
This section presents the comparative costs of energy service delivery in Pakistan by
resource type. Pakistan is considered a mature energy market in terms of its well
defined pricing structure at all levels of the supply chain.
3.6.1 Production Costs
Pakistan’s indigenous energy supplies currently derive from natural gas, crude oil,
hydroelectric and nuclear power production assets. The country imports energy mainly
in the form of crude oil, high‐sulfur fuel oil (HSFO), high speed diesel (HSD), and coal to
meet the deficit between local energy production and national demand (Section 3.1).
The Government of Pakistan has offered attractive policies for private investment in
almost all of these energy resources19 and set up institutions to facilitate developers. At
the same time, the GoP has established a framework for the determination of retail
prices for imported energy supplies. A brief review of the procurement costs and pricing
mechanism for both indigenous and imported energy resources is provided here.
Crude Oil
Crude oil is principally imported from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar by local
oil refineries on an international market‐based pricing formula. The prices of imported
as well as local crude oil and petroleum products are thus vulnerable to fluctuations in
petroleum product prices in the international market. During FY2007, the average price
of crude oil prevailing in Pakistan based on this arrangement was approximately
US$ 62/bbl.
Natural Gas
The GoP fixes the wellhead price at which natural gas is purchased from producers by
the gas utilities. The bulk purchase pricing formula for each gas field, in effect, depends
on the pricing policy in force at the time the field discovery is declared commercial. All
the fields that declared commercial production up to 1985 had their wellhead prices set
on a ‘cost‐plus’ basis. Thereafter, between 1985 and 1994, prices of all new gas
discovered were generally linked with the carriage and freight (C&F) price of HSFO.
However, under the 1994 Petroleum Policy, the producers’ prices were indexed with the
C&F price of baskets of imported Arabian/Persian Gulf crude. The gas pricing mechanism
has thus been revised in the past in the following manner:
• 1985‐1991: Producer prices linked to 66% of HSFO price, less negotiated discount
• 1991‐1992: Linkage increased to 75% of HSFO price, less negotiated discount
• 1992‐1993: Linkage increased to 100% of HSFO price, less negotiated discount
• 1993‐1994: Floor price of US$ 80 per tonne, plus 50% of remaining equivalent
HSFO price differential (if positive)
• 1994 & 1997 Petroleum Policies: Based on geological prospects and available gas
transmission infrastructure, the country was divided into three prospective

19
Except for nuclear power generation, which is undertaken solely by the state.

zones. Producer prices were linked to 77.5%, 72.5% and 67.5% of the price of a
basket of imported crude oil for discoveries in Zones I, II and III, respectively.
• December 1999: The GoP modified the gas‐pricing framework as spelt out in the
previous petroleum policies of 1994 and 1997. A new inflection‐point based
pricing framework with a discounted price mechanism was defined. This
discounted price was applicable whenever the C&F price of a basket of imported
Arabian/Persian Gulf crudes exceeded US$ 15/bbl during the six months prior to
price notification. The details of this price‐discounting mechanism, also known as
a sliding‐scale mechanism, are presented in Exhibit 10.
• May 2000: The producer price mechanism offered in December 1999 was
modified to account for international inflation in oil prices. The discounting
mechanism mentioned above is applicable for the first four years from the date
of the signing of the Gas Sales Agreement (GSA), after which the inflection points
of US$ 15‐20‐25/bbl are raised by US$ 1.
• 2001 Petroleum Exploration and Production Policy: The formula was further
modified by adding a ceiling price of US$ 36/bbl to the 1999 policy mechanism.
Exhibit 10: Gas Price Discounting Mechanism
Ruling Price Applicable Price
US$/bbl US$/bbl
Below US$ 10/bbl Fixed at US$ 10/bbl (floor)
US$ 10-15/bbl 100% of ruling price
US$ 15, plus 50% of the amount by which the price

US$ 15-20/bbl
exceeds US$ 15/bbl
US$ 17.50, plus 30% of the amount by which the price

US$ 20-25/bbl
exceeds US$ 20/bbl
US$ 19, plus 20% of the amount by which the price

Above US$ 25/bbl
exceeds US$ 25/bbl
Source: Directorate General Petroleum Concessions (DGPC), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
It is expected that this sliding‐scale formula will continue to apply to new pricing
agreements, with modifications in the inflection points and ceilings to cater for oil price
escalations. Exhibit 11 illustrates the applicable current wellhead gas prices for fields
supplying gas to the SNGPL, the SSGCL as well as independent fields dedicated to specific
power and fertilizer plants in the country.
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
In 2006, the GoP linked the LPG base stock price to FOB Saudi ARAMCO Contract Price
(CP) for propane and butane, published in Platts for the previous month taking a
propane‐butane ratio of 40:60. However, in December 2007, the GoP decided to use this
price as a ceiling for LPG prices in the country, and producers were allowed to offer
discounts on these prices in their retail operations. The average local market price of
LPG, on June 30, 2007, stood at US$ 12.6/MMBtu.

Exhibit 11: Wellhead Gas Prices (as of June 30, 2007)
Wellhead Price
Field
US$/MMBtu
Adhi 1.50
Badar 2.25
Badin Deep Fields 3.20
Bhangali 2.10
Bhit 3.54
Bilal North & Bilal-1 2.23
Chanda 2.71
Dakhni 1.50
Daru 1.31
Dhodak 1.32
Dhurnal 0.27
Hasan 2.33
Kadanwari 6.95
Kandhkot 1.63
Kausar Deep-1, Usman, Umar
2.52
& Ali-1
Loti 1.41
Mazarani 1.75
Meyal 1.31
Miano 3.29
Naimat Basal & Siraj South 2.52
Nandpur 3.79
Pariwali 3.54
Pindori 3.54
Pirkoh 1.41
Qadirpur 2.71
Ratana 3.98
Rehmat 2.52
Sadkal 4.19
Sara/Suri 1.24
Sari Hundi 4.17
Sawan 3.29
Suri 1.63
Turkwal 3.54
Uch 3.92
Zamzama 3.20

Petroleum Products
Ex‐refinery petroleum products are priced in accordance with a formula based on the
C&F import parity prices (IPP), incidental costs,20 and import duty.21 The Ex‐refinery
prices are determined by OGRA as part of the build up for determination of consumer
prices.
In the determination of the IPP, the prices of naphtha, HSD, kerosene, and HSFO
are taken from Platts.22 The bases of the prices of other products are presented
in Exhibit 12.
Exhibit 12: Price Calculation of Petroleum Products Not Published by Platts
Source: Oil industry and HBP market intelligence.
Product Pricing Basis
JP-1 Kerosene + US¢ 1 per gallon
JP-4 50% naphtha + 50% kerosene
JP-8 100% kerosene
LDO 80% HSD + 20% FO
MOGAS Naphtha spot price + Caltex Bahrain-posted price differential of

Naphtha and MS-87 RON, moving average of last three years, subject
to a maximum differential of US$ 60/tonne
HOBC Naphtha spot price + MS-87 RON premium and extrapolated to MS-97
RON based on unitary method
Source: Oil industry and HBP market intelligence.
These local prices move upwards and downwards according to international price
fluctuations, particularly in the Arabian Gulf market. The various price components,
except for IPP (which is directly related to global prices), are comparatively stable. The
prices of HSFO and HSD have been completely de‐regulated by the GoP and these are
also primarily linked with the prevailing prices of these commodities in the Arabian Gulf
region. However, oil refineries are assured a certain offtake price for their products. As
diesel fuel meets a large percentage of land transportation requirements in the country
(70% of total in 2005‐2006), its production is encouraged through a 10% premium over
the international market price in its offtake price paid to refiners. Gasoline prices carry
no such benefit. The current ex‐refinery prices of major petroleum products in Pakistan
are given in Exhibit 13.

20
As of FY2002, ‘incidental costs’, also referred to as ‘incidentals’, include marine insurance (0.108% of C&F for white
and 0.9% for black oil products), letter‐of‐credit commission (0.15% of C&F cost), bank service charges (0.1% of C&F
cost), wharfage (Keamari: Rs 29 per tonne, FOTCO: Rs 25 per tonne), and ocean losses (0.5% of C&F cost).
21
As deemed duty in the calculation of ex‐refinery prices of HSD (10% ad‐valorem), kerosene, LDO, and JP‐4 (5% ad‐
valorem plus 1% surcharge) in the IPP.
22
Platts, a division of The McGraw‐Hill Companies based in the US, is a leading independent global provider of energy
and metals information and is widely used as a respected and reliable source of industry information. For details,
see www.platts.com.

Exhibit 13: Ex‐Refinery Prices of Petroleum Products (as of June 30, 2007)
Product Ex-Refinery Price

US$/MMBtu
JP-1 15.8
JP-4 17.5
JP-5 18.0
MOGAS 23.0
HOBC 17.5
Kerosene Oil 14.0
LDO 12.8
HSD 15.3
HSFO 8.8
Source: Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary Part II) Notification,
Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), Islamabad: June 15, 2007.
Coal
Presently Pakistan is using indigenous as well as imported coal mainly to fuel brick kilns
and the cement industry. Coal utilization, however, stands at only a fraction of a percent
in the country’s total energy consumption. Power generation capacity based on coal is
presently merely 150 MW, based at Lakhra, which is also plagued by chronic technical
problems and low plant utilization factors.
Local coal is mostly of low quality, having a heat content in the range of 5,000‐6,000
Btu/lb, although some deposits are ranked at higher quality of around 10,000 Btu/lb.
The price of local coal in June 2007 ranged between US$ 1.8/MMBtu to US$ 2.2/MMBtu,
depending on quality. By comparison, the price of imported coal is around
US$ 2.7/MMBtu.
Electricity
The electricity regulator, NEPRA is responsible for approving the purchase price of
power from all producers in Pakistan. In the mid‐1990s, a stimulating pricing policy was
adopted and several independent power producers (IPPs) entered the market. From
10,500 MW in 1992‐1993, the power production capacity in the country grew to 17,500
MW in by 2001‐2002. By 2002, these incentives had been watered down and new
capacity installation slowed down significantly. At that time, there was still some surplus
capacity available in the system and the rising electricity demand was thus easily
satisfied. This situation did not last long, however, as installed generation capacity
stagnated while the economy, and consequently electricity demand, picked up rapidly
post 2000. Presently, Pakistan is experiencing severe electricity shortages throughout
the country, with new generation projects currently in the implementation pipeline
insufficient for resolving the crisis in the near future. ‘Load shedding’ is once again, after
a gap of over a decade, a daily reality even in big cities and major industry, and the
supply situation is expected to become worse before new investments in additional

generation can be commissioned. In the meantime, a large number of private industrial
plants continue to install their own ‘captive’ power production facilities to circumvent
frequent and unpredictable outages and to keep their operations going. In 2007, the
GoP allowed such plants to sell their surplus power to the grid in order to augment
overall supply and capacity utilization of generation assets in the country.
NEPRA has broadly adopted the principal of ‘cost‐plus’ basis, built on a 15‐16% rate of
return on asset value, in determining power offtake tariffs. Despite different risk profiles
associated within and across each of the market functions, NEPRA uses a uniform
mechanism and rate‐of‐return allowance across the board for all types of power
generation resources and technologies. Fuel price variation is allowed to be passed
through to the ratepayer at an approved thermal efficiency rating of the power plants.
The country has been inconsistent in terms of offering policies and conditions to attract
investment in feasible indigenous and imported energy resource development. During
implementation of the 2001 Power Policy, the government had to stop processing a
number of gas‐based combined cycle power plant proposals as natural gas allocations
were redirected to other priority economic sectors. In the 2001 Power Policy, the
government imposed additional taxes on oil‐based generation to discourage escalating
imports that later had to be removed as eventually gas became scarce, and fuel oil was
left as the only remaining choice for power generation to revert to. The government has
not been able to propose dynamic policies for the development of abundant indigenous
hydroelectric and coal resources in the country, nor for the large‐scale import of coal for
power generation which would still be cheaper than imported oil for this purpose. The
AEDB has offered an RE‐based power policy since 2006, but it has yet to pass the test of
time as so far no RE IPP project has matured, and related regulations and legal
requirements (grid interconnection, carbon credits, etc.) have not been fully developed.
Exhibit 14: Cost of Power Generation at Crude Oil Price of US$ 60/bbl and
Coal Price of US$ 60/Tonne
12
10
6.94
6
US ¢/kWh
4.82 2.47 1.95 1.07

3.20 0.12
4
1.00 1.00
0.88 0.98 0.88 5.01 4.62

2
3.23 3.23
2.04 1.87 2.04
0
CCGT on CCGT on FO CCGT on LNG Steam Coal- Steam Coal- Hydel RoR Nuclear
Natural Gas Thar Imported
Capital Cost O&M Cost Fuel Cost

Exhibit 15: Cost of Power Generation at Crude Oil price of US$ 90/bbl and
Coal Price of US$ 75/Tonne
14
12
10
10.40
8
US ¢/kWh
6.96
6
2.47 2.44
4.29 0.12 1.07
4
1.00 1.00
0.88 0.88 5.01 4.62

0.98
2
3.23 3.23
2.04 1.87 2.04
0
CCGT on CCGT on FO CCGT on LNG Steam Coal- Steam Coal- Hydel RoR Nuclear
Natural Gas Thar Imported
Capital Cost O&M Cost Fuel Cost

The exhibits above compare the current cost of power generation in Pakistan based on
different technologies and fuel sources using the NEPRA tariff determination
methodology and imported crude and coal prices corresponding to US$ 60/bbl and
US$ 60/tonne, respectively (Exhibit 14), and US$ 90/bbl and US$ 75/tonne, respectively
(Exhibit 15). These data have been used in the economic calculations provided in Annex
VII.
3.6.2 Energy Pricing
As in a number of counties in the world, energy pricing remains a politically sensitive
issue in Pakistan. Higher international primary energy prices have brought urgency
within the country to the need for bridging the gap between domestic and international
prices, as well as for removing relative price distortions between different forms of
energy. The GoP has been reluctant to price energy to fully reflect its economic cost
because of concerns about the adverse effects of price increases on industrial
competitiveness, household budgets (especially those of low‐income families), and on
general inflation—i.e., both immediate economic impacts and longer term social and
political ramifications.
The price of energy should ideally reflect its environmental externalities. This measure,
though hardly implemented anywhere with much success as it faces enormous political
and societal resistance, implies that governments would have to modify the tariff
structure for energy (typically electricity) and reduce unnecessary subsidies on energy. If
done, such an approach should always be undertaken as a combined policy initiative in
concert with renewable energy development and energy efficiency programs.

Electricity
In terms of implications for RES‐E, the pricing policy in Pakistan’s power sector is not
optimal on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, NEPRA is responsible
for fixing the purchase price of power from producers. It also determines the
transmission wheeling charges and distribution margin for T&D companies that are
integral components of cost of electricity services for consumers. The consumer tariff
thus should reflect the true cost of service delivery, taking in to consideration real
investments and the cost of operations and service standards across the market chain.
The tariff mechanism should also be flexible to be able to respond to variations in fuel
prices without significant regulatory lag to protect both the consumers as well as
operating entities in the power sector.
Furthermore, on the demand side, tariffs are presently fairly uniform all over the
country for each category of customer in each DISCO region. This precludes the true
‘delivered’ price of electricity from being charged to the consumer, which induces waste
and uneconomic use of the resource on the one hand and removal of ‘least cost’
incentives on the supply side, as the difference is made up through subsidy support to
the power utilities by the government. The DISCOs’ purchase price from the NTDC is
based on the system‐wide average cost of production, while NEPRA determines an
appropriate consumer tariff for each DISCO. The difference between the differentiated
NEPRA‐determined retail tariffs and the uniform GoP‐notified actual ratepayer charges
are paid as subsidy to the DISCOs. In this manner, for example, residential base‐level
consumption is subsidized and industrial and commercial sector consumers are charged
higher tariffs to compensate for the difference. The impact of such a tariff structure is
generally negative in economic terms: it creates higher demand, reduces incentives for
efficient energy use as well as for developing and purchasing from RE generators,
increases the cost of production and business for the industrial and commercial sectors,
and significantly impacts on public finances in the form of a recurring annual power tariff
support subsidy provision of over US$ 1.33 billion (in 2007).
Exhibit 16 presents the average per unit electricity delivery costs, consumer tariffs, and
subsidy support provided for different consumer categories by the government.
Exhibit 16: Average Consumer Electricity Tariffs
US¢/kWh
Subsidy
Cost of Consumer
Category (Cross
Service Tariff
Subsidy)
Residential 7.5 6.0 1.6

Commercial 13.7 12.1 1.6
Industrial 8.8 7.8 1.0
Bulk 10.1 9.6 0.6
Agricultural 8.2 6.5 1.7
Other 8.0 10.0 (2.0)
Average 8.5 7.2 1.3
Source: Notification SRO 150 (I)/2007 to 158 (I)/2007, Ministry of Water and Power, Government of Pakistan,
Islamabad: February 23, 2007.

Natural Gas
As with electricity tariffs, the government fixes consumer gas prices and maintains them
at a uniform level throughout the country. The two utilities, SNGPL and SSGCL, supplying
gas to consumers in their respective operational territories are not required to maintain
or provide a breakdown of costs of service delivery for different segments of the
transmission and distribution system or for supplying gas to different consumer
categories. The cost of supplying gas to customers at various locations is therefore not
accounted for and, regardless of the difference in delivered cost based on location of
service provision, all consumers within the same category pay a uniform price.
It is however, important to note here that the gas sector in general does not receive any
external subsidies from the government, and these differences are accounted for
internally: the industrial, power generation, and commercial sectors provide a cross
subsidy to low‐income domestic and fertilizer feedstock consumers, which is built into
their GoP‐notified tariffs (Exhibit 17). The cost of gas nonetheless represents only 55% of
alternative fuel oil price for industry, while for the residential sector it represents only
35% of alternative fuel costs. In such conditions, it is not surprising, for instance, that
solar water heaters have hardly displaced gas‐fired heaters in the local market.
Exhibit 17: Average Consumer Gas Tariffs
Rs/MMBtu
Cost of Cost of Consumer Cross
Service Service Tariff Subsidy
SNGPL SSGCL
Residential 2.3 2.3 2.3 0.0

Commercial 4.5 4.4 4.5 0.1
Industrial 4.0 4.0 4.0 0.0
Fertilizer Feedstock 1.3 0.6 1.1 0.2
Others 4.2 4.4 4.4 0.2
Average 3.6 3.4 3.4 0.0
Source: Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), Islamabad.
According to the prevailing policies of the GoP and the methodology adopted by the Oil
and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), the consumer price of natural gas in Pakistan
comprises (i) the ‘prescribed price’ for the gas companies, and (ii) a ‘gas development
surcharge’ (GDS). OGRA fixes the prescribed price for the gas utilities through public
hearings during which relevant stakeholders are consulted. The prescribed price includes
the following elements:
• Producer gas prices, which are linked to international prices of crude oil and
HSFO
• Excise duty
• Transmission and distribution costs
• Depreciation

• Minimum return to the gas companies, as stipulated in World Bank/ADB loan
covenants.
The prescribed price is designed to enable the two gas T&D companies to achieve fixed
returns on assets; the difference between consumer tariffs and prescribed prices is the
GDS. The GoP determines consumer gas prices after adding or subtracting the GDS to
the prescribed prices, and advises OGRA for notification in the Official Gazette of
Pakistan.
The cost of gas for industry is 40% of the price of crude oil, and for the residential sector
it is 22%. As gas imports are expected to increase in the near future, the average market
price is also expected to increase, and consumers will have little choice but to adjust to
it. This is expected to slow down the overall increase in gas demand.
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
Where the natural gas distribution grid is not present, LPG is substituted as a domestic
cooking and heating fuel. This is generally the case in many poor urban and rural areas
of the country. The market price for LPG is its ‘economic’ price, without any subsidy
involved. This translates into the anomalous situation where the poorest end up paying
the highest gas prices in the country.
Petroleum Products
The subject of ex‐refinery petroleum product pricing has been discussed previously in
Section 3.6.1. Except for fuel oil and HSD, other petroleum product sale prices are
determined by OGRA on the basis of a formula provided by the government. The import
of HSFO and HSD has now been deregulated, and OMCs are allowed to import these
fuels and fix their sale prices on the basis of average cost of import and local supply
prices.
Exhibit 18: Consumer Prices of Petroleum Products as of June 30, 2007
Retail Price
Product
US$/MMBtu
JP-1 18.2
JP-4 20.1
JP-5 20.7
Premium Motor Gasoline 27.7
HOBC 32.0
Kerosene Oil 17.0
Light Diesel Oil 14.2
HSD 16.9
HSFO 11.5
Source: Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary Part II) Notification,
Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), Islamabad: June 15, 2007.

OGRA reviews, fixes, and notifies the ex‐depot prices of the remaining regulated
petroleum products, i.e., motor gasoline, kerosene, aviation fuels, and LDO, on a
fortnightly basis in accordance with the approved pricing formula. The prices are
uniform at 29 depot locations and are pegged to Arabian Gulf prices. The OMCs are
allowed an Inland Freight Equalization Margin (IFEM), a distribution a margin of 3.5%,
and dealer’s margin of 4% on the value of the products. The OMCs have also been
allowed to charge the secondary freight costs from depots to retail outlets over and
above the ex‐depot prices under the freight pool mechanism. Current retail prices of
major petroleum products are given in Exhibit 18 above.
Alternative Energy
The pricing for alternative energy in Pakistan has been a contentious issue lately. This is
primarily because neither NEPRA, the body that determines commercial power tariffs for
grid‐connected power, nor the AEDB, meant to facilitate alternative and renewable
energy investments in the country, has as yet undertaken a proper economic and
comparative analysis of various renewable energy options in the local context, including
their external and marginal avoided costs (this analysis is provided in Annex VII). In the
absence of such a basis, the determination of tariffs on a ‘cost‐plus’ formulation deriving
from dynamic market prices of generation equipment and equalizing risk perceptions
with those for more established generation technologies (who are offered similar
financial returns) becomes subject to debate, while absolute RE power purchase figures
are also often incorrectly compared with corresponding conventional generation costs
that do not account for hidden subsidies for the latter or the external benefits of clean,
renewable energy. Under the Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power
Generation, 2006, the Ministry of Water and Power issued guidelines for the
determination of wind and small hydro IPPs using such a formulation in December 2006,
on which grounds NEPRA has since issued tariff notification for several private sector
wind power producers in the range of US$ 95‐105/MWh (levelized), but these have not
yet resulted in any proposed projects from achieving financial closure.23
In light of the above, there is a strong case for undertaking a more comprehensive
evaluation of such alternative energy pricing, including from additional sources presently
not addressed (biomass conversion and waste‐to‐energy, solar, etc.) which takes into
account Pakistan’s current power generation market, as well as properly accounts for
external costs and benefits, including environmental and carbon credits, peak load
reduction, and reduced transmission and distribution losses that smaller, dispersed
renewable energy generation can bring about for grid‐connected loads. For off‐grid
applications in particular, measures to reduce the price of small‐scale renewable energy
(micro wind and hydro, biogas, solar PV, etc.), can have a profoundly positive effect on
rural energy access and poverty alleviation, and therefore needs urgent consideration in
Pakistan where the potential for such technologies is extremely high, yet presently
underdeveloped.

23
Although a few are in advanced stages of finalization. Apart from tariff negotiations, most wind IPPs have also been
stymied by the strong international demand for turbines, which has resulted in rising equipment prices and long
delivery times.

4 Projected Supply and Demand
This section presents the projected energy demand and supply picture for Pakistan
under normal economic growth conditions corresponding to an average 6.5% annual
growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country. Pakistan is expected to
remain a net energy importer in the foreseeable future and, therefore, based on the
price of imported energy and security of supplies for the country, several energy import
scenarios have been discussed and their respective implications evaluated. This should
set the context in which alternative renewable energy options can be assessed in terms
of their economic merits and externalities, in addition to their financial costs.
4.1 Fueling Economic Growth
Exhibit 19 presents a comparison of per capita energy consumption of various Asian
economies, including Pakistan. Pakistan has lower per capita energy use even when
compared with the other regional developing economies, such as Thailand, China,
Indonesia and Malaysia, and far below the average for developed OECD countries, but at
par with nations with similar per capita incomes, such as India and Viet Nam.
Exhibit 19: Energy Use Per Capita for Selected Asian Countries, 2003
Singapore
Brunei
Taipei,China
Korea, Rep. of
Japan
Malaysia
Thailand
Mongolia
Korea, PDR
China, People's Rep. of
Indonesia
Philippines
India
Pakistan
Viet Nam
Sri Lanka
Developing Asia
Lao PDR
Bangladesh
OECD Asia
Burma
World
Nepal
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
TOE/Capita
Source: International Energy Outlook 2006, Report # DOE/EIA‐0484(2006), Energy Information Administration,
US Department of Energy, Washington, DC: 2006.

In terms of per capita electricity consumption, this disparity across economies is even
more apparent (Exhibit 20). Furthermore, there exists a huge latent demand for energy
services in Pakistan that cannot presently be met due to resource constraints, as
illustrated by the low levels and quality of electrification for a major portion of the
population (Exhibit 21), which will invariably improve in the future as the country
develops to achieve standards prevalent in more advanced economies. It can thus be
inferred that per capita, and therefore total, energy consumption in Pakistan is expected
to rise rapidly with continued growth of the economy. For instance, in comparison to
Pakistan’s annual per capita electricity consumption of 469 kWh in 2002, the average
world consumption was 2,465 kWh/year and that in the OECD countries 8,615
kWh/year.
Exhibit 20: Electricity Consumption Per Capita in Asia, 1980 & 2002
Brunei
Japan
Singapore
Korea, Rep. of
Malaysia
Thailand
Mongolia
Philippines
India
Pakistan
Indonesia
Viet Nam
Development Threshold
Sri Lanka
2002
Myanmar 1980
Lao PDR
World 1980
World 2002
Bangladesh
Nepal
Cambodia
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000

kWh/Capita

Source: Human Development Reports, United Nations Development Programme, New York: 2006
(http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data).
A level of at least 4,000 kWh/year is considered necessary for a UNDP Human
Development Index (HDI) country value of 0.9—corresponding to ‘developed society’
status—to be achieved, indicating the vast potential for increased energy use and social
development in Pakistan. Furthermore, Pakistan lies on the initial, steeply rising part of
the HDI‐per capita electricity consumption curve, which means that even incremental
improvements in its per capita electricity use can result in a large increase in its national
HDI ranking, implying a very high economic and social development payback for
expanded delivery of affordable energy services.24

24
For a full discussion of the relationship between energy use and economic and social development, see Masud, J, D
Sharan, and B Lohani, Energy for All: Addressing the Energy, Poverty and Environment Nexus in Asia, Asian
Development Bank, Manila: 2006 (http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Energy‐for‐All).

With an expected annual GDP growth rate of over 6% compounded with a net annual
population increase of 2% in the coming years, the prospects for accelerated energy
demand in the country, therefore, remain strong.
Exhibit 21: Access to Electricity in Selected Asian Countries, 2000
Singapore
Korea, Rep. of
Japan
Malaysia
Mongolia
Philippines
Thailand
Viet Nam
Sri Lanka
Indonesia
Pakistan
India
Bangladesh
Korea, PDR
Cambodia
Nepal
Myanmar
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Percentage of Total Population

Source: Earth Trends: Environmental Information, World Resources Institute. Washington, DC: 2006 (http://earthtrends.wri.org).
4.2 Energy Supply and Demand Scenarios
In view of the rising price of crude oil, the cost of meeting the energy requirements of a
rapidly expanding economy such as Pakistan’s can be substantial. However, the country
has a range of options available to manage its future energy supply and demand needs.
The choices ultimately made will be determined by the extent to which risks associated
with variations in the prices and availability of fuels in the international market can be
managed, as well as how well the cost of delays or inability to develop indigenous
resources can be absorbed.
4.2.1 Projected Energy Demand
The energy market in Pakistan has historically been characterized by suppressed
demand due to limited supplies and the lack of adequate infrastructure for provision of
energy services to consumers, a factor that has hindered the country’s economic growth
and reduced industrial investments in the country. However, realizing these limitations,
the government is now seriously evaluating plans to provide sustained and affordable
energy to all sectors of the economy and reduce the current deficit between supply and
actual, as well as latent, demand.

Based on 30 years of macroeconomic data, the three probable country growth scenarios
considered for this study can be associated with ‘normal’, ‘high’, and ‘low’ growth in
GDP over the projection period. The average actual growth trend in the GDP converges
to approximately 6.5% per annum, which has been taken as the ‘normal’ growth
scenario.
The projected energy demand at an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.5% is
summarized in Exhibit 22. This demand has been worked out on the basis of
unconstrained availability of fuels to meet the energy needs of all sectors, keeping in
view their respective consumption economics as well as the unavoidable infrastructure
and technical constraints that are expected to prevail in the foreseeable future. Over the
next 18‐year period, overall demand for energy in this scenario is expected to increase
by a factor of 3.3, from the current level of 60 MTOE to 198 MTOE in 2025. The share of
oil in the energy mix is expected to drop, in view of higher oil prices in the international
market and the government’s policy to switch to lower cost alternatives for power
generation, including renewable and nuclear sources.
Exhibit 22: Projected Energy Demand Under Normal GDP Growth
FY07 FY10 FY15 FY20 FY25 FY07 FY10 FY15 FY20 FY25
Million TOE % Share
Oil 18 20 29 39 47 30 25 27 26 24
Gas 30 45 55 68 93 49 56 50 46 47
Coal 4 7 9 13 16 7 8 8 8 8
Hydel 8 8 13 22 29 13 9 12 15 15
Renewables - 1 1 3 5 0 1 1 2 2
Nuclear 1 1 2 4 7 1 1 2 3 4
Total 60 80 110 148 198 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Medium‐Term Development Framework: 2005‐10, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2005.
Note: Adjusted to GDP growth rate of 6.5% and updated for the base year FY2007 and national power generation plan.
Sensitivity of demand for energy to the economic growth rate is illustrated in Exhibit 23.
As mentioned earlier, alternative scenarios for economic growth assuming average
annual economic growth of 5.5% and 7.4% were also considered to evaluate the impact
of GDP growth on total demand for energy. The 7.4% GDP growth rate corresponds to
the ‘optimistic’ economic scenario stated in the GoP’s MTDF, while the 5.5% rate
represents a ‘reasonably conservative’ outlook. Over the next 18‐year period, the
demand for energy under these different economic trends varies by more than 25%,
dropping to 155 MTOE for a GDP growth rate of 5.5%, and increasing to 246 MTOE for
an economic growth rate of 7.4%.

Exhibit 23: Energy Demand Forecasts at Various Economic Growth Rates
300
6.5% Average Annual GDP Growth
250 5.5% Average Annual GDP Growth
7.4% Average Annual GDP Growth
200
Million TOE
150
100
50
0
1996 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
Source: Medium‐Term Development Framework: 2005‐10, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2005.
Note: Adjusted to GDP growth rates shown.
4.2.2 Projected Energy Supply and Deficit
Supply‐side projections assume the implementation of current long‐term national plans
for power generation, with emphasis on the development of coal, hydel, and nuclear
resources for this purpose, consistent with the government’s policy to maximize the
utilization of indigenous resources and diversify the energy mix.
In all three economic growth scenarios evaluated over the next 18 years, Pakistan’s
estimated energy needs far exceed available indigenous supplies, and the country’s
reliance on imported fuels is therefore expected to continue to increase with time. The
following energy supply cases were analyzed by taking into consideration total energy
requirements, energy deficits and imports, and the cost of imported energy:
• Base Case: Unconstrained gas imports
• Low Gas Case: Imported pipeline gas not available, LNG and imported coal to
replace imported gas assumed in the Base Case
• Low Hydel Case: Imported coal to replace hydel power generation assumed in
the Base Case
• Low Gas, Low Hydel Case: Imported coal to replace hydel power generation
assumed in the Low Gas Case.
The bases and assumptions for each of these scenarios are explained in more detail
below.

The Base Case
The Base Case assumes that the country will be able to import natural gas to meet
emerging energy deficits. This is the least‐cost option, given Pakistan’s proximity to gas‐
surplus regions of the Middle East and Central Asia, the relatively low cost of
transporting large quantities of gas through pipelines, and the economic advantage
offered by utilizing natural gas in end‐uses such as fertilizer production, power
generation with high‐efficiency combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT), cogeneration, and
compressed natural gas (CNG) use for road transportation. This case assumes that the
gap in power generation capacity—after accounting for the generation planned on
hydel, nuclear, and renewable resources—would be filled by CCGT units operating on
imported natural gas.
Low Gas Case
The Low Gas Case represents a scenario in which imported pipeline gas is not available,
and the deficit has to be made up with alternative fuels. In this case, the country would
need to import LNG to meet established demand, also referred to as ‘essential demand’,
for natural gas in the residential, commercial, fertilizer, and industrial sectors, as well as
for generation capacity in the power sector that can operate only on natural gas. The
power generation capacity fueled by imported gas in the Base Case would need to be
operated on imported coal.
Low Hydel Case
The Low Hydel Case represents a situation under which, on account of adverse
environmental or political factors, implemented hydel capacity additions are reduced by
30% over the Base Case, and the resulting gap in power generation is filled with
imported coal‐fired thermal plants. The country is assumed, however, to be able to
import gas through pipelines to meet its demand for gas.
Low Gas, Low Hydel Case
The Low Gas, Low Hydel Case represents circumstances under which hydel capacity
additions are reduced by 30% as above, and the resulting power generation gap is fueled
by imported coal. Imported gas through pipelines is also assumed not to be available in
this case, and the country would therefore have to meet its essential gas requirements
through imported LNG shipments.
The projected indigenous energy supply and deficits corresponding to a 6.5% average
GDP growth rate are summarized in Exhibit 24. Domestic oil and gas production is
expected to increase marginally in the near term, but decline in the long run.
Overall, the availability of coal, hydel, nuclear, and renewable power generation is
projected to improve significantly from current levels by 2025, in line with the GoP’s
resource development plans. The availability of energy from these sources, however,
will not be enough to meet the growing demand of the economy. The total energy
deficit—which is presently 18 MTOE, or 29% of energy demand—is expected to increase
to 123 MTOE, corresponding to 62% of total demand, by 2025. This outlook clearly
indicates a need to accelerate the development of the indigenous resource base, and to

supplement this with arrangements to acquire affordable energy from reliable external
sources.
Exhibit 24: Projected Energy Supply and Deficits
Million TOE
FY07 FY10 FY15 FY20 FY25
Indigenous Supply
Oil 3 4 4 3 2
Gas 30 39 34 25 19
Coal 2 2 5 8 12
Hydel 8 8 13 22 29
Renewable and Nuclear 1 1 3 7 12
Total Indigenous Supply 43 55 59 65 75
Total Energy Requirement 60 80 110 148 198
Deficit 18 25 51 83 123
Deficit as % of Energy Requirement 29 32 46 56 62
Source: Medium Term Development Framework: 2005‐10, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2005.
Note: Adjusted to GDP growth rate of 6.5% and updated for national power generation plans.
4.3 Projected Energy Balances
Based on the country’s expected energy demand growth, availability of indigenous
energy resources, and assuming various energy import options, the projected mix of
indigenous and imported energy required to meet Pakistan’s needs in the Base Case
corresponding to a 6.5% average GDP growth rate is summarized in Exhibit 25.
Exhibit 25: Projected Supply for Imported Energy Resources (Base Case)
Million MTOE
Total Demand 60 80 110 148 198
Imported Energy Required 18 25 51 83 123

Oil 15 15 25 36 45
Gas/LNG 0 6 21 43 74
Coal 3 4 4 4 4
The projected mix of imported energy supply under the Low Gas scenario,
corresponding to a 6.5% annual GDP growth rate, is shown in Exhibit 26. In this case, the
total energy demand is seen to increase compared to the Base Case due to reduced
power generation from more efficient gas‐based combined cycle units and consequent
increase in the use of lower efficiency coal‐based plants. Similarly, the differences in
operating efficiencies for the other power generation options have also been taken into
account.

Exhibit 26: Projected Supply for Imported Energy Resources Under the Low Gas Supply
Scenario
Million MTOE
Total Demand 60 80 111 151 205

Oil 15 15 25 36 45
Gas/LNG 0 5 17 34 50
Coal 3 5 10 17 35
The projected mix of imported energy supply under the Low Hydel scenario
corresponding to a 6.5% annual GDP growth rate is given in Exhibit 27.
Exhibit 27: Projected Supply for Imported Energy Resources Under the Low Hydel
Supply Scenario
Million MTOE
Total Demand 60 80 110 148 197

Oil 15 15 25 36 45
Gas/LNG 0 6 21 43 74
Coal 3 6 6 8 10
The projected mix of imported energy supply under the Low Gas, Low Hydel supply
scenario corresponding to a 6.5% annual GDP growth rate is summarized in Exhibit 28.
This case also assumes no gas imports—therefore, total energy demand increases for
the same reasons as in the Low Gas Case.
Exhibit 28: Projected Supply for Imported Energy Resources Under the Low Gas, Low
Hydel Supply Scenario
Million MTOE
Total Demand 60 80 111 150 204

Oil 15 15 25 36 45
Gas/LNG 0 5 17 34 50
Coal 3 7 13 23 43

5 Economic Implications
5.1 Scenario Impacts on Costs and Financing Needs
Based on current import parity prices, corresponding to a crude oil price of US$ 90/bbl,
the economic cost of Pakistan’s primary energy supply in 2006 is estimated at US$ 22
billion, of which about half is attributable to oil used in the transportation sector. The
cost of power generation at current energy prices ranges from US¢ 14/kWh for fuel oil‐
fired plants, to US¢ 7/kWh for power plants operating on imported gas. With the
existing plans for the development of indigenous resources, and unconstrained
availability of imported gas and LNG, the Base Case cost of imported fuels is expected to
increase from US$ 7 billion in FY2006 to US$ 58 billion in 2025.
An assessment of the long‐term cost of energy supply under alternative scenarios
indicates that, compared to the Base Case, an aggressive development of the Thar coal
resource will help to reduce the annual energy import bill by about US$ 1 billion by
FY2025. In case pipeline gas imports do not materialize, substitution of imported gas
with imported LNG and coal will increase the cost of imported energy by over US$ 4
billion by the same year. The corresponding cost of delays in development of large‐scale
hydel projects is estimated at over US$ 5 billion annually by FY2025.
5.2 Optimum Role of Renewable Energy
The development of renewable energy (and improvements in system‐wide energy
efficiency and intensity of use) can not only help offset some of the increased generation
costs under the various scenarios considered above, but also afford reduced overall
economic costs of energy supply in each case due to RE’s positive economic, social, and
environmental externalities.
A detailed assessment of feasible RE deployment and associated financial and economic
costs under different supply scenarios is provided in Annex VII. This analysis shows that,
while the total RES‐E (renewable energy source‐electricity) potential in the medium term
for Pakistan, based on all feasible RE technologies and with all barriers to RE deployment
removed, is 55 TWh/year (or 22% of total power generation) by 2020, the optimum
penetration of RES‐E (based on economic least‐cost evaluation) is 25 TWh/year (or
10.3% of total generation in 2020).25 This compares with a natural penetration level of
RES‐E estimated to be 17 TWh/year by 2020 if only direct project‐wise financial costs,
compared to alternative conventional generation, are considered.
A higher share of RES in the generation mix results in different cost‐benefit implications
for the economy. Under the optimal case, the cost of generating 25 TWh/year through
renewable energy technologies would be US$ 1.8 billion/year, and the economic benefit
to society would be of the order of US$ 2.1 billion/year, shared between producers and
consumers in the ratio 65:35, respectively.

25
The estimated RES‐E penetration rates are sensitive to assumptions used to calculate them, notably the cost of
capital in the case of ‘optimal’ deployment and the mix of conventional supply alternatives in the case of ‘natural
penetration’.

Thus, it can be concluded that given Pakistan’s projected energy requirements and
supply options, renewable energy can play an important role in closing the gap between
cost‐effective supply and ever increasing demand in a manner that produces a net
positive benefit to the economy and society as a whole. This observation is further
strengthened when the many additional benefits of distributed RE use (including non‐
power RES, such as biogas and biofuels) are also taken into consideration.
It is therefore imperative for the Government of Pakistan to evolve a policy and
regulatory environment that encourages the development of this untapped potential
based on a careful evaluation of the economic feasibility of different RE technologies.

Annex VII: Working Paper 4:
Study of Costs and Potential Penetration of
Ongrid RE under Different Policies

Working Paper No. 4
Study of Costs and Potential Penetration
of Ongrid RE under Different Policies
Contents
Exhibits ..................................................................................................................... 245
1 Objective .............................................................................................................. 249
2 Methodology for RES Cost and Penetration Assessment ...................................... 249
1.1 General Approach .............................................................................................. 249
1.2 General Assumptions of the Model .................................................................. 253
1.3 Long Run Conventional and RES Supply Curves ................................................ 254
1.4 Demand Parameters .......................................................................................... 258
1.5 Data Assessment ............................................................................................... 258
1.6 RES Technologies Included in the Model .......................................................... 258
2 RE Supply Curves .................................................................................................. 264
2.1 Biogas................................................................................................................. 264
2.2 Solid Biomass ..................................................................................................... 267
2.3 Waste‐to‐Energy ................................................................................................ 271
2.4 Small Hydro ....................................................................................................... 272
2.5 Solar Photovoltaic .............................................................................................. 274
2.6 Solar Thermal..................................................................................................... 275
2.7 On‐shore Wind .................................................................................................. 277
3 Incremental RE Supply Curve for 2020 .................................................................. 279
4 Incremental Conventional Supply Curve for 2020 ................................................. 280
5 Costs and Potential of RES Penetration under Different Policies ........................... 283
5.1 Natural Penetration of Renewable Energy Sources .......................................... 283
5.2 Optimal Quota of Renewable Energy in 2020 ................................................... 285

5.3 Analysis of Single Feed‐in Tariff Mechanism ..................................................... 287
5.4 Analysis of Technology‐based Feed‐in Tariff Mechanism ................................. 289
5.4.1 Optimal Quota‐constrained Analysis..................................................... 289
Cost‐efficient Case .................................................................................. 289
Industry Policy‐driven Case .................................................................... 290
5.4.2 Exhausting the Medium‐term Potential ................................................ 291
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis............................................................................................. 291
6 Initial Thoughts on Medium‐term Policy ............................................................... 296

Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Partial Market Equilibria............................................................................ 250
Exhibit 2: Equi-marginal Principle Illustrated ............................................................ 250
Exhibit 3: Cost-efficiency Approach.......................................................................... 252
Exhibit 4: Equi-marginal Principle in the Real World ................................................ 253
Exhibit 5: Single RE Supply Curve Computation...................................................... 255
Exhibit 6: RE Potential Assessment ......................................................................... 256
Exhibit 7: Pakistan’s Livestock Population for Biogas Potential Estimation, 2006 ... 265
Exhibit 8: Agricultural Biogas-based Power Supply Curve ....................................... 265
Exhibit 9: Landfill Gas-based Power Supply Curve .................................................. 266
Exhibit 10: Sewage Gas-based Power Supply Curve ................................................ 267
Exhibit 11: Bagasse-based Power Supply Curve ....................................................... 269
Exhibit 12: Annual Residues Produced by Crop Type ............................................... 270
Exhibit 13: Non-bagasse Biomass-based Power Supply Curve................................. 270
Exhibit 14: Urban Population of Pakistan ................................................................... 271
Exhibit 15: Waste-to-energy Supply Curve ................................................................ 272
Exhibit 16: Econometric Estimation of Investment Costs for Small Hydro ................. 273
Exhibit 17: Small Hydro-based Power Supply Curve ................................................. 274
Exhibit 18: Solar PV Area Estimation for Pakistan ..................................................... 274
Exhibit 19: PV-based Power Supply Curve ................................................................ 275
Exhibit 20: Solar Thermal Area Estimation for Pakistan............................................. 276
Exhibit 21: Solar Thermal-based Power Supply Curve .............................................. 277
Exhibit 22: Wind potential estimation (near-grid constrained and unconstrained) ..... 278
Exhibit 23: Wind Potential Maps of Pakistan .............................................................. 278
Exhibit 24: On-shore Wind-based Power Supply Curve............................................. 279
Exhibit 25: Total RES-based Power Supply Curve for 2020
(Medium-term Incremental Potential) ....................................................... 279
Exhibit 26: Basic Data for Determination of Private Supply Curve for
Conventional Energy ................................................................................ 280
Exhibit 27: Basic Data for Social Supply Curve for Conventional Energy .................. 282
Exhibit 28: Private and Social Supply Curves for Conventional Energy for 2020 ...... 283
Exhibit 29: Optimal RES-E Penetration under Private Costs ..................................... 284
Exhibit 30: RES-E Technology-wise Penetration under Private Costs....................... 284
Exhibit 31: Optimal RES-E Penetration under Social Costs....................................... 286
Exhibit 32: RES-E Technology-wise Penetration under Social Costs ........................ 287

Exhibit 33: Distribution of Producer Surplus by RES-E Technology under

Single Feed-in Tariff ................................................................................. 288
Exhibit 34: Producer Surplus under Multiple Feed-in Tariffs
(Cost-efficient Approach) .......................................................................... 290
Exhibit 35: Surplus under Multiple Feed-in Tariffs
(Industry Policy-driven Approach) ............................................................ 290
Exhibit 36: Surpluses under Multiple Feed-in Tariffs Exhausting
Medium-term RES-E Potential ................................................................. 291
Exhibit 37: Sensitivity Analysis (Differences from Base Case) ................................... 293
Exhibit 38: Consumer and Producer Surpluses under Different Cases
(Private Cost Evaluation) .......................................................................... 293
(Single Feed-in Tariff) ............................................................................... 294
(Multiple Feed-in Tariffs Exhausting Medium-term Potential) ................... 294
(Multiple Feed-in Tariffs with All-technology Portfolio) ............................. 295

bbl Barrel
BP Basis point
CH4 Methane
CHP Combined heat and power
CO2 Carbon dioxide
EU European Union
FO Furnace oil
GHG Greenhouse gas
GW Gigawatt
ha Hectare
HDR Hot dry rock
IGCC Integrated gasification combined cycle
kg Kilogram
kWh Kilowatt‐hour
KWSB Karachi Water and Sewerage Board
LRMC Long run marginal cost
m meter
MC Marginal cost
MPC Marginal private cost
MSB Marginal social benefit
MSC Marginal social cost
NOx Nitrous oxides
PV Photovoltaic

RE Renewable energy
SO2 Sulfur dioxide
SS Small‐scale
TWh Terawatt‐hour
W Watt
WACC Weighted average cost of capital


Study of Costs and Potential Penetration
of Ongrid RE under Different Policies
1 Objective
This Annex presents an economic assessment of renewable energy sources (RES)
deployment options in Pakistan, in order to fine‐tune the tools required for the design of
a successful medium‐term RE policy for the country. More specifically, the objective of
this document is two‐fold: firstly, to evaluate the cost structures of RES in Pakistan,
classifying different renewable sources by the marginal cost of tapping them; secondly,
to analyze the social and private costs and the potential penetration of each type of RES,
under different policy environments. As will be explained later in this document, the
economic assessment of RES has some limitations—however, the model provided in this
paper should allow policy makers to move forward on a more sound analytical basis.
2 Methodology for RES Cost and Penetration Assessment
1.1 General Approach
In basic economic theory, one prerequisite for economic efficiency is that the marginal
benefit of any given activity should be equal to its marginal cost. With respect to the use
of electricity, this would require that the marginal social benefit (MSB, commonly
defined as ‘demand curve’) attributed to the consumption of, say, one kilowatt‐hour of
electricity, is exactly offset by the marginal social cost (MSC, commonly defined as
‘supply curve’, incorporating the cost of externalities) of generating this kWh, in order to
achieve 'Pareto‐optimality'1. In all other cases, society would be better off providing and
using more (i.e., where MSB exceeds MSC) or less (i.e., where MSC exceeds MSB)
electricity. Exhibit 1 shows this graphically.
The socially optimal amount of electricity, in this case, is at QE*, where the marginal
social cost of electricity production equals the marginal social benefit (at price PE*) of
consuming this electricity. In this figure, QE denotes the allocation (consumption) of
electricity with no internalization of external costs (MPC, or private supply curve), i.e.,
electricity supply depends on marginal private costs. From an economic efficiency
perspective, this private supply curve is incomplete due to a number of market failures

1
An economic system that is Pareto‐optimal or Pareto‐efficient implies that no individual can be made better off
without another being made worse off. Here 'better off' is often interpreted as "put in a more preferred position."
It is commonly accepted that outcomes that are not Pareto‐optimal are to be avoided, and therefore Pareto
efficiency is an important criterion for evaluating economic systems and public policies. If economic allocation in
any system (in the real world or in a model) is not Pareto‐optimal, there is theoretical potential for a Pareto
improvement—an increase in Pareto‐efficiency: through reallocation, improvements to at least one participant's
well‐being can be made without reducing any other participant's well‐being.

that justify state intervention; in the case of RES in electricity (RES‐E) markets, these
generally fall under two categories: (1) externalities associated with various sources of
energy, including environmental and security of supply, and (2) under‐investment in
technological progress and innovation.
Exhibit 1: Partial Market Equilibria

In fact, when analyzing policies to promote RES‐E, we should be more concerned with
the allocation of electricity generation amongst the various technologies, such as RES
and conventional sources of energy. In this respect, economic efficiency would require
that the marginal cost of producing the quantity QE* be equalized amongst the sources,
so that the marginal social cost of conventional electricity generation (MSCConventional)
equals the marginal social cost of RES‐E generation (MSCRES) in QE*. This is known as the
principle of 'equi‐marginality' in economic theory. Exhibit 2 illustrates the equi‐marginal
principle.
Exhibit 2: Equi‐marginal Principle Illustrated

In this figure, AE denotes the allocation of electricity generation between conventional
and renewable sources of energy, where the share is determined by the respective
marginal private costs (MPC). In contrast, the socially optimal allocation would be where
marginal social costs are equalized, i.e., at AE*, resulting in the relative shares Q(RES)

and Q(conventional), which is usually attained only when all external costs are
internalized.
However, the electricity market is severely distorted in that external costs tend not to be
internalized, so market regulation is justified on the grounds of normative theory. These
market failures have a propensity to suppress the complete marginal (social) cost
associated with the various forms of electricity generation, which should ideally be used
in the decision‐making process of the economic actors, such as utility companies.
Therefore, in such a distorted market, neither the first criterion (MSB = MSC) nor the
second (MSCConventional = MSCRES) for obtaining optimum economic efficiency in electricity
markets are necessarily met, and the government thus has a role to play as a regulator.
The discussion so far has revolved around a description of what in economics is called
the 'first‐best' solution, in the sense that it assures economic efficiency, where the
marginal social costs equal the marginal social benefits of a given policy or activity.
However, this seemingly simple framework is hard to translate into a reliable cost‐
benefit test, since a large number of input parameters are at the core of much of the
academic debate, and other parameters are rather difficult to assess; for instance, the
use of a discount rate for costs and benefits, the value of avoided external costs, such as
CO2,2 and the time‐path of RES installations, all have a big influence on the final verdict
but are rather difficult to quantify.
Therefore, although these kinds of studies can give us, as explained later in Exhibit 4, an
overall idea of where the optimal allocation can be found, in the real world, however,
the concept of cost‐efficiency suggests that regulators set an objective based on
available scientific and technical data, and then try to ensure that this objective is met at
‘least’ cost. In doing so, policy makers make sure that, if efficiency cannot be maintained
in the strict economic sense, then at least, reaching the goal does not result in a waste of
the society's resources. Consequently, economists suggest striving instead for the
'second‐best' solution, which is commonly known as 'cost‐efficiency'.
The question then is how policy makers can ensure cost‐effectiveness in the expansion
of RES‐E on a practical basis. The answer to this is surprisingly simple and can be best
explained with the help of Exhibit 3. This figure shows the stylized marginal cost curves
of three RES (A, B, C), which exhibit different slopes. While the marginal (social) cost
curve of source ‘C’ has a relatively gentle slope, the cost curve of source ‘A’ rises much
more steeply. Cost‐efficiency would be attained once the equi‐marginal principle holds
among these RES, so that MSCA = MSCB = MSCC. This is also referred to as ‘static
efficiency’, implying that no other allocation of generation capacity amongst different
RES will yield a lower overall cost of providing a given share of RES. All it takes to achieve
this static efficiency, in this case, is a uniform price, p* (single feed‐in tariff), for
renewable energy from different sources, which would then be set against the marginal

2
A very well‐known reference is the work by Sundqvist that found vast differences for external costs across
externality studies, e.g., ranging from 0.06 cents/kWh to 72.42 cents/kWh for coal. See Sundqvist, T. “What causes
the disparity of electricity externality estimates?”, Energy Policy, Vol. 32, Issue 15, Elsevier Ltd., Amsterdam:
October 2004.

cost curves by economic actors, and yield the quantities QA, QB and QC with the sum of
the three, giving the total RES share at price p*. What the equi‐marginal principle
therefore implies is that there will most likely be a mix of various RES, unless one form of
electricity generation has a marginal cost curve that dominates all the others, i.e., it is
always below the MC curves of other RES.
Exhibit 3: Cost‐efficiency Approach

Coming back to the real world, the result of such studies is shown in Exhibit 4. This
figure is quite similar to Exhibit 3; however we do not present simple MSCs but bounds,
i.e., MSC(RES)h represents the highest social supply curve for RES that can be computed;
on the contrary, MSC(RES)L stands for the lowest one. The same analysis can be
performed regarding conventional energy supply curves. Due to high uncertainty in
setting the parameters required to compute these supply curves (e.g., RES costs and
potentials, technological progress in both conventional and RES, discount rates,
environmental costs, non‐environmental externalities, etc.) we are not able to set a
single social supply curve, but a probable range. Therefore, we are not able to define a
single optimum mix, but a space of potential first‐best solutions, as defined by the area
‘abcd’ in Exhibit 4. Consistent with this area solution, we find a range of prices (Ph‐PL),
and the corresponding shares Q(RES):Q(Conventional) can therefore vary a lot. Despite
the inaccuracies of this type of analysis, it is the best available tool to evaluate policy
decisions either within the area solution, or outside it. For instance, in this case, we
assume that the government has decided to set a policy at PE*:QE*, which is a boundary
point solution for the first‐best space of solutions. Based on this model, we can
compute:
1. How different is that choice from the market outcome (PE:QE),
2. What RES technologies (and what range of these technologies) will be developed
under this single feed‐in tariff (PE*), and
3. What is the private cost of the policy (i.e., [PE* – PE] x [QE* – QE]),
amongst other interesting policy evaluations.

Exhibit 4: Equi‐marginal Principle in the Real World

However, policy makers may not be concerned solely with static efficiency, which does
not take into account long‐term prospects and technological innovation, and can
therefore define a policy decision outside the first‐best space of solutions. In Europe, it is
understood that any instrument to promote RES should also lead to ‘dynamic efficiency’,
i.e., should give economic agents an incentive to continuously lower their costs through
technological progress. In that sense, single feed‐in tariff or quota systems that are best
for static efficiency are replaced with targeted feed‐in tariffs incorporating technology‐
specific rates or hybrid schemes. There thus appears to be a trade‐off between static
and dynamic efficiency. In general, feed‐in tariff schemes tend to be used to provide
strategic support for innovative technologies, much more than other primary support
schemes such as, in particular, tradable green certificates. On the other hand, green
certificates schemes, amongst other technology‐neutral schemes, tend to be used to put
more emphasis on static efficiency, to give preference to renewable energy technologies
with comparatively lower costs, as was explained in Annex IV.
The model presented here for assessing the impact of Pakistan’s on‐grid electricity
market on the development of new renewable generation is based on:
• General assumptions (target year, static or dynamic efficiency considered,
incremental or total modeling, etc.);
• Social and private supply curves (given costs or probabilistic approach, potential
estimation by RE class, discount rate, monetarization of externalities, etc.); and
• Demand side perspectives (energy efficiency, demand forecasting, etc.).
1.2 General Assumptions of the Model
The first task in developing the model is to set general assumptions concerning most of
the variables included in the model. These assumptions include:
• Definition of the target year: The target year in this study is set at 2020 because
of the goal of defining a medium term policy.

• Definition of the modeling approach: The model is defined as incremental.
Under an incremental approach, the social and private supply curves for both
RES and conventional are computed without considering the installed capacity in
any type of energy. Similarly, only the incremental demand (total demand
forecasted for 2020 less existing total demand) is considered. Decommissioning
of existing conventional plants during the period of analysis is examined; see
Annex VI for details of this assessment.
• Efficiency assessment: The goal of this study is mostly related to static efficiency
assessment; therefore, we compute the supply curves employing current costs
for different technologies. In some comparable studies, costs were forecasted for
the end of the analysis period (generally 2020 or beyond), employing experience
curves that describe how costs decline with cumulative production. Forecasting
technological development is a crucial activity but not an easy one, especially for
a long‐term horizon; considerable efforts have been made recently to improve
the modeling of technology development in energy models; nevertheless, the
introduction of this dimension adds other drivers of uncertainty to the model. In
general, an experience curve is expressed as: CCUM (costs per unit as a function
of output) = C0 (costs of the first unit produced) x CUM (cumulative production
over time) ^ b (experience index).3 The estimation of ‘b’ for each technology is
rather difficult and inaccurate. Besides these problems, technological progress is
not endless for each technology; generally it presents an S‐shaped curve. In our
opinion, the complexity and uncertainty regarding the incorporation of
technological progress to the model does not adequately trade off with effort. In
the model provided in this analysis, we therefore employ current costs for the
different technologies. This approach penalizes infant technologies such as solar
and tidal and wave, for instance.
1.3 Long Run Conventional and RES Supply Curves
In general, renewable energy sources are characterized by a limited resource, with
output costs rising with increased utilization—as, for example, in the case of wind power
sites, where best wind conditions will be exploited first and, as a consequence, once
such options have been exhausted, the use of less optimal sites will result in higher
generation costs. As stated previously, a proper tool to describe both costs and
potentials is the (static) marginal cost‐resource (or supply) curve. In principle, a supply
curve describes the relationship between (categories of) technically available potentials
(e.g., wind energy, hydropower, biogas, etc.) and the corresponding (full) costs of
utilizing this potential at a certain point of time.
On the left‐hand side of Exhibit 5, a theoretically ideal continuous supply curve is
depicted, taking into account that every location is slightly different from the other and,
hence, looking at all locations—e.g., for wind energy in a certain geographical area—a
continuous curve emerges after these potentials have been classified and sorted in a

3
In many studies, a well‐known rule of thumb, empirically proven, is commonly employed: costs decline by a
constant percentage with each doubling of units produced.

least‐cost way. The stepped function as shown on the right‐hand side represents a more
practical approach, as in real life the accuracy needed for a continuous design is
impossible. Thereby, sites with similar economic characteristics—e.g., in case of wind,
sites with same range of full‐load hours—are described by one band and, hence, a
stepped curve emerges. Exhibit 5 shows a single RES supply curve; by adding all the
different RES supply curves, sorting each step as a function of its cost, the total RES
supply curve can be computed. Similarly, the conventional supply curve is calculated
based on the available expansion plan defined by the relevant national generation
planning authority.
Exhibit 5: Single RE Supply Curve Computation
Immediately, two questions arise: Which cost should we employ, and how do we assess
the potential? As this is an incremental study, all plants will be new; in case of new
plants the economic conditions are described by long run marginal costs (LRMC). With
respect to the potentials, we follow the OPTRES approach4: for new options, the
additional achievable medium‐term potentials need to be assessed for each RES
category at the country‐level, representing the maximal additional achievable potential
up to the target year under the assumption that all existing barriers can be overcome
and all driving forces are active; it represents the upper boundary of what can be
realized for a certain RES category. It is obvious that for electricity generation a broad
set of different technologies based on RES exists today; a sound research study,
exploring deeper into those potentials which are more feasible in the medium term,
would be required.
As shown in Exhibit 6, the definition of potential is not straightforward. At least, four
classes of RES potentials should be evaluated:
• Theoretical potential: For the theoretical potential to be derived, general physical
parameters have to be taken into account (e.g., based on the determination of
the energy flow resulting from a certain energy resource within the investigated
region). This represents the upper limit of what can be produced from a certain
energy resource, from a theoretical point‐of‐view—of course, based on current
scientific knowledge;

4
Report of the IEE project OPTRES: Assessment and Optimisation of Renewable Support Schemes in the European
Electricity Market, February 2006.

• Technical potential: If technical boundary conditions (i.e., efficiencies of

conversion technologies, overall technical limitations, as, for example, the land
area available for installing wind turbines) are considered, the technical potential
can be derived. Technical potentials can be assessed in either a static or dynamic
context, i.e., with increased R&D, conversion technologies might be improved
upon and, hence, the technical potential could increase;
• Realizable potential: The realizable potential represents the maximal achievable
potential, assuming that all existing barriers can be overcome and all driving
forces are active. Thereby, general parameters are taken into account, as for
example, market growth rates, planning constraints, etc.
• Medium‐term potential: The medium‐term potential is equal to the realizable
potential in the target year.
Exhibit 6: RE Potential Assessment
Once we have defined that we need LRMC for each step and for each RE/conventional
source, as well as the medium‐term potential for each step as previously defined, the
next task is to compute the supply curves. As mentioned earlier, this task is a rather
complex one, requiring definitions of many aspects.
Supply curve assessment: We followed two different approaches depending on the
quality of available information. In those cases where information about potential and
costs was good enough (on‐shore wind, for instance), we define a curve based on
detailed bottom‐up cost assessment. In all other cases—where information was not
available or accurate—we develop a probabilistic cost approach by simulating a large
number of scenarios and combining values for different key parameters. In order to
provide a more realistic simulation, each of the available technologies (plant
specifications for each step) has been modeled using a different combination of values
for the following cost drivers: (1) investment costs; (2) fuel costs for some RES bearing
opportunity cost (biogas and biomass, for instance); (3) efficiency factors in some types
of RES, and (4) load factors, in case this information is not available. In particular, for
each of these cost drivers, four scenarios are considered: a low value, a mid‐low value, a

mid‐high value and a high value scenario, characterized by levels of the cost drivers
corresponding to the 10th, 40th, 60th and 90th percentile of a uniform distribution. In both
cases, O&M costs are assumed to be a fixed percentage of the investment costs, defined
by technology. We consider neither innovative technologies such as IGCC,5 carbon
sequestration, etc., in conventional energy (see Annex VI), nor some of the infant RES
technologies described in Section 1.6.
Monetization of externalities: As is well known, it is estimated that the cost of
electricity production from coal and oil would double, and that of power production
from gas would increase by 30%, if externalities were considered. For the sake of
simplicity we consider the following costs of externalities: (1) global environmental
costs, (2) air quality, and (3) fuel dependency.
We do not consider the cost of externalities affecting RES because: (1) the cost for hydel
projects does include environmental and social costs; (2) we assume them to be
negligible for wind power (visual interference, noise, and bird kills) and solar thermal
and photovoltaic (land use); (3) they are not relevant for the other RE technologies; and
(4) we do take into account positive externalities, such as job creation and indigenous
technology development. The only case in which we took externalities into account was
regarding biomass because, as is later explained, coal is needed to increase the annual
load factor of such plants.
Scale assessment: We also develop ad hoc cases based on our experience in emerging
countries, regarding the development of large‐scale hydel and medium‐scale thermal
(reciprocating engines plants). As is well known, due to the high financial barriers in
developing large‐scale hydel, these projects tend to be less developed than would be
expected through efficient planning. On the contrary, reciprocating engine plants and
similar fast installation technologies tend to be developed more than would be
recommended under sound planning. This issue was discussed in more depth in Annex
VI.
Return on invested capital: From an economic point of view, the best approach is to
assume that investment is recovered within the lifetime of the plant; plant lifetimes, in
turn, depend on technology, ranging from 25 years for most RES‐E technologies to as
much as 50 years for hydel plants. However, this approach has a huge drawback; it does
not take into consideration the financial barriers to investment. In order to compute
each technology’s LRMC, we prefer employing a common period of 20 years for all
technologies.
Determination of capital costs: Scenarios for the capital costs (real pre‐tax ‘plain vanilla’
WACC6) are set at 10%, 12%, and 14%, respectively.
Grid and reserves costs: Grid investment costs are not included in the analysis because
we estimate the potentials for the different RES constrained to installations less than 25

5
Integrated gasification combined cycle.
6
Weighted average cost of capital.

km from existing transmission lines, whenever such information is available, and hence,
grid interconnection costs are assumed to be negligible. As is well known, some of the
RES‐E are volatile in the short term (non‐firm energy) and therefore, the system requires
both operational and ‘cold’ reserves. Our model does not consider the cost of these
backup reserves, as its determination would require detailed simulations of the power
system which are beyond the scope of this study.
1.4 Demand Parameters
We will employ the forecasted demand for 2020 presented in Annex VI. According to
our study, 152 TWh is the incremental energy demand for the period 2008‐2020, and
the need for the corresponding additional power generation capacity is around 35 GW,
though this would depend on the technological mix. For more details, see Annex VI.
1.5 Data Assessment
Currently, no complete detailed assessment of the cost and potentials for different RES‐
E technologies applicable to Pakistan exists that could enable a computation of the RES‐
E supply curve for the country. Therefore, we have identified a combination of
methodologies and sources to obtain a first estimate of the parameters that will form
the base of our model.
Investment and O&M costs for different technologies were assessed: (1) if available data
could be gathered from Pakistani projects, these data were privileged, and (2) when
these data were not available, international experience from our database was taken as
reference in which we give priority to regional costs (mostly Indian), followed by
European ones. Regarding the potentials, the methodology and the sources employed
depend on the technology under consideration. In Section 2, the costs and methodology
for estimating the potentials for each technology are provided.
Investment, O&M, and fuel costs for conventional energy have been thoroughly
analyzed in Annex VI. An expansion plan for the period 2008‐2020 based on long‐run
least‐cost simulations is also provided. The incremental private conventional energy
supply curve provided in this report is based on the results of that study.
1.6 RES Technologies Included in the Model
In this analysis, the following RES technologies have been considered:
Biogas: Biogas is the gaseous by‐product that results from a natural decomposition
process of organic matter. The anaerobic decomposition of such substances comprises
the conversion of high‐molecular organic bonds, under the absence of oxygen, into low‐
molecular compounds. This process includes the production of a mixed gas, commonly
referred to as ‘biogas’, consisting of:
• 50%‐70% methane (CH4);
• 20%‐40% carbon dioxide (CO2); and
• Other elements.

The energetic content of biogas is positively correlated to its methane content. In
addition, the energetic use of methane is highly welcome from an ecological point of
view, as atmospheric releases of methane are 8 to 25 times more damaging than
equivalent CO2 emissions from a global warming perspective.7
This RES technology comprises of the following subcategories:
• Agricultural biogas: This resource results from an anaerobic digestion process of
biological deposits, such as:
o farm slurries; and
o biodegradable fractions of municipal waste.
• Landfill gas: The main input is the solid waste deposited in landfill sites.
• Sewage gas: As primary resource, this requires wastewater or sewage, processed
and refined in a treatment or purification plant.
Biogas is a non‐fluctuating energy resource as there is no seasonal dependence of its
source inputs. Therefore, the generator can decide when to start or stop power
generation.
In this study we will concentrate on on‐grid power generation based on biogas from
farm slurries, landfills, and urban domestic sewage gas. Biogas obtained from the
biodegradable fraction of municipal waste is a very convenient alternative for off‐grid
and will be evaluated separately at a later stage along with other off‐grid RES options.
Biogas from industrial sewage is not considered because it would require a very specific
assessment customized to each of Pakistan’s industrial clusters, a study that is not
presently available as the potential cannot be properly estimated based on general
assumptions.
Solid biomass: Commonly, the definition of solid biomass includes four categories:
• Forestry products;
• Forestry residues;
• Agricultural products; and
• Agricultural residues.
Based on this definition, a separate assessment of the potential should be undertaken
for each category. However, conversion technologies in each case are very similar and
differences are negligible.
Electricity generation from solid biomass is characterized by:
• High variable costs due to high volatility in the quality of biomass used as input,
plus the non‐existence of a biomass market (as a commercial commodity).

7
Over a 500‐ and 100‐year time horizon, respectively.

• Non‐volatility of the power output: as in thermal conventional generation, the
generator can decide when to start or stop the plant in order to maximize profits;
however, some types of biomass are not available uniformly throughout the year
and other fuels may be required to optimize returns on investment.
• Various energy conversion concepts: Today, apart from ‘simple’ combustion, a
variety of tested technological methods exist for power production from
biomass. In general, a distinction must be made between biomass‐fired CHP8
plant, biomass‐fired power plant, and co‐firing plants.
• Differences in efficiency, brought about by plant size.
• Transportation distances, with short ones preferable as the economics of power
production are very sensitive to this cost element.
We have focused our study in agricultural residues (bagasse, rice husk, straw, etc.). The
issue of agricultural products (‘energy’ crops) is complex and is being discussed in many
countries because of its potential effect on the price of cereals for food. Hence,
considering the huge potential of Pakistan in other types of renewables, we do not
consider developing energy crops locally as of paramount importance at this stage.
Additionally, it is considered more appropriate, from an economic point of view, to
employ energy crops for developing biofuels. The case of forestry is also difficult to
assess. Forestry products are considered renewable if they are related to net additions
of forests; as can be imagined, this requires a sophisticated and precise monitoring
mechanism that increases the administrative cost of this alternative. In particular,
Pakistan is facing acute forest depletion and therefore this alternative would not be a
suitable one to explore as it could increase deforestation pressures. In any case, forestry
residues usually have a very high alternative use cost and, thus, this is usually not a
cheap source of biomass.
Waste‐to‐energy: the energetic part of waste can be considered a ‘renewable’ energy
source. Electricity generation from waste is characterized by:
• Low variable costs but high investment costs, due to the fact that these plants
require a high effort for cleaning and purifying the input material.
• Non‐volatility of the power output.
• Short distance for waste transportation being desirable.
Regarding waste‐to‐energy, we should bear in mind the best practices in the world—as
employed in Denmark, for instance. There are four possible disposal alternatives for
waste, if collected: (1) recycling; (2) waste‐to‐energy solutions; (3) landfills; and (4)
probably, the worst one—open dumps. In the case of Denmark, there are no open
dumps; 8% of the total waste is deposited at landfills, 26% is used for waste‐to‐energy,
and the largest share (66%) is recycled. In the EU, new landfill sites are, in most member
countries, not allowed to be developed any more. In our analysis of potential and costs,

8
Combined heat and power.

we will take into account the fact that landfills should not be encouraged and waste‐to‐
energy is the second‐best management solution.
Geothermal: Geothermal power is energy generated by heat stored beneath the Earth's
surface. This generation is characterized by:
• High investment costs: high level of uncertainty in the planning phase increases
investments costs.
• Low‐temperature energy extraction technology is currently under development.
• Low volatility of the power output: geothermal represents an almost non‐
fluctuating source of energy.
In this report, we only take into account proven technologies for geothermal energy,
namely flash steam power plants (that need hot water above 180 °C from geothermal
reservoirs) and binary‐cycle (in which the water used is cooler than that in flash steam
plants but higher than 85 °C). Other infant technologies, such as hot dry rock (HDR)
geothermal energy and any other type of low‐temperature design, are not considered.
Additionally, we were not able to get accurate data about the potential for low‐
temperature geothermal energy in Pakistan. General assumptions for estimating
potential and cost for geothermal are not easy to make; for instance, drilling costs that
may be up to 50% of the total cost, depend on site conditions. Therefore, we have not
included geothermal generation in our analysis as an option for Pakistan at this stage.
Small hydropower (installed capacity below 50 MW): Electricity generation from small
hydropower plants is characterized by:
• Proven technology: Amongst all RES technologies, hydel represents the most
widely explored option. The various conversion technologies applied are
commonly used and commercially well proven.
• Low short‐term volatility, high medium‐/long‐term volatility of power output:
Hydel represents a fluctuating source of energy. In contrast to wind and solar PV,
the volatility appears in the medium to long term. It is characterized by a strong
seasonal dependence, but high annual differences may also occur.
• High initial investment costs: A huge hindrance for small‐scale hydel plants
results from the high up‐front investment costs and long construction times
typically involved.
• Low social acceptance: Public resistance to hydroelectric projects has been rising
in most parts of the world since the 1980s, though this is a problem primarily for
large‐scale hydel, particularly those with associated large reservoirs.9

9
Though obviously also a renewable energy source, large‐scale hydroelectric is considered, both generally and for the
purposes of this study, to fall in the ‘conventional’ energy category due to its higher external costs as well as
established status vis‐à‐vis other ‘mainstream’ power generation technologies.

Photovoltaics: Photovoltaic (PV) power cells use a specific spectrum of sunlight to
produce electricity through the photoelectric effect. In principle, there are four primary
applications for PV power systems:
• As off‐grid domestic rooftop PV systems, that can provide power to remote,
isolated communities.
• As grid‐connected distributed PV systems, installed to supply power to a building
or other load that is also connected to the utility grid.
• As grid‐connected centralized PV systems, installed for two main purposes: as an
alternative to centralized power generation from fossil fuels or nuclear energy;
or for strengthening the utility distribution grid.
• As off‐grid non‐domestic systems, to provide power for a wide range of
applications, such as telecommunications, water pumps, etc.
For the purposes of the model, only grid‐connected (both centralized and distributed)
PV systems are of relevance. The most important characteristics with respect to grid‐
connected PV systems are:
• High volatility of the power produced: Due to the strong dependence of the
power output on available sunlight, short‐, as well as medium‐ to long‐term
fluctuations in output appear;
• High initial investment costs.
Solar thermal: Solar thermal power plant technology has, for several years now, been
considered a promising new option for power generation. Nevertheless, only a few
(hybrid) solar thermal plants are operating well worldwide. In principle, several
technological options appear:
• Parabolic trough plant: Large cylindrical parabolic mirrors concentrate the
sunlight onto a line of focus. Several of these collectors in a row form a solar
field. Molten salt is used to transport the heat to a (conventional) gas or steam
turbine.
• Power tower plant: The solar field feeding a central receiver system (i.e., the
power tower) is made up of several hundred ground‐based mirrors which
concentrate sunlight upon a raised receiver in a central tower. As in the case
above, air or molten salt is used to transport the heat to a (conventional) gas or
steam turbine.
• Dish/Stirling technology: Parabolic dish concentrators in this case are, contrary to
the one above, rather small units—in the range of kilowatts—each driving
individual Stirling (high efficiency, closed‐cycle, regenerative, hot air technology)
engines whose output can be used separately or combined.
Trough and power tower plant are usually equipped either with a thermal storage block
or a hybrid fossil burner in order to guarantee a non‐fluctuating power supply.

In this paper, we only consider parabolic plants as they are more efficient than power
tower plants. Dish/Stirling technology is a very good option for off‐grid alternatives, and
will be treated at a later stage.
Tidal and wave: In principle, a distinction can be made with respect to application type,
i.e. shoreline, near‐shore, and off‐shore devices. Off‐shore tidal and wave power is still
in the R&D stage. We do not consider this technology further here because, due to its
infancy, any assessment would be quiet inaccurate for the policy horizon under
consideration.
Wind, on and off‐shore: Among the currently available and commercially viable
renewable resources, wind is one of the cheapest possible sources of renewable energy.
When considering the total capital investment costs of locating and building new
electricity generation facilities, in some cases, it can even be competitive with
conventional power generation technologies. This explains the keen interest power
companies and private investors worldwide have taken in wind energy in recent years.
Electricity generation from wind power is characterized by:
• High volatility of the power output: Due to the strong dependence of the power
produced on the wind speed (power scales as the cube of wind speed), short‐ as
well as a medium‐ to long‐term fluctuations can appear in wind‐based
generation. In this context, wind power prediction methods have been
developed to partially overcome the associated lack of certainty. The quality of a
possible wind plant site can thus be determined by deriving the local wind
climate, i.e., an analysis of average annual wind speeds and wind speed
distribution.
• Standardized and proven power conversion technology: The stable and growing
demand for wind power—starting in Europe within the early 1990s—led
especially Denmark, Germany, and Spain to become leading countries in wind
turbine manufacturing (at present, India and USA are also key players).
Technological solutions between manufacturers may differ in detail, but in
general terms, the overall concepts utilized are proven and well established.
Typical plant sizes increased rapidly during the 1990s, driven mainly by the
growing demand for off‐shore developments. Currently, the size of typical on‐
shore turbines is in a range of 1 to 2 MW and for off‐shore, the largest available
turbines are now almost in the 5 MW class.
In this study, we only consider on‐shore wind farms. This is because, as will be shown
later, the potential for on‐shore wind is huge—even taking into account only the highest
speed classes, it is large enough to exceed operational constraints. Therefore, we believe
that on‐shore wind generation is a realistic and economic option for the medium‐term
policy horizon under analysis.
In the following sections, a computation of the supply curves for each RE technology and
for the aggregated supply curve relevant to Pakistan is provided.

2 RE Supply Curves
As we have previously explained, the supply curve for each RES technology is based on
the medium‐term potential—not all the theoretical potential—and on the actual costs
for the different technologies. Another issue that is important to point out is that
Pakistan has no accurate estimation of potentials for any RES technology. We based our
analysis on an indirect approach taking into account available information; though we
believe the conclusions of our analysis are valid, it is important to fine tune these kinds
of studies in the future.
2.1 Biogas
In the case of bio‐energy, some problems arise in estimating the country potential due
to the fact that in this case the same input can be used with different energy conversion
technologies. For example, sugarcane can be used to produce sugar and electricity (i.e.,
with a cogeneration plant), but can also be used to produce biofuels (e.g., ethanol).
Some agricultural residues can also alternatively be used in either a biogas digester or a
biomass plant. This led us to the necessity of making some assumptions on crops and
other biomass inputs for the determination of Pakistan’s bio‐energy potential.
Nevertheless, these assumptions were made based on sound criteria and international
experience.
In the case of biogas, the approach for the derivation of the primary potential figures is
explained in more detail separately for each subcategory below.
Agricultural biogas: Farm slurries are the most common input in biogas digesters. The
potential has been assessed by evaluating the existing livestock population in Pakistan
by type of animal (buffaloes, cattle, goats, sheep, poultry, camels, asses, horses and
mules have been considered, see Exhibit 7). As can be seen, in terms of numbers, farm
livestock in Pakistan comprises mainly of poultry which assures a large manure potential
for biogas development. Once livestock has been assessed, the second step is to
determine the expected total amount of manure by type of livestock. This was achieved
by multiplying each type of livestock by its average deposition. Finally, standard energy
content in terms of biogas (1.1 kWh/kg) was used to determine potential availability of
biogas‐based energy. The medium‐term penetration for 2020 is estimated to be 1% of
total potential biogas, as the typical project size of this type tends to be small, due to the
slurries’ collection cost. We thus obtain 2.8 TWh of medium‐term potential for
agricultural biogas.
Regarding costs, we have employed the following parameters:
• Investment cost range: As we found a very large variation in investment costs in
this technology between experience in the region and Europe, we define a range
assuming the current investment cost in India as the lower bound and average
European cost as the upper bound. We have thus derived the range US$ 886‐
2,350/kW.
• O&M cost: 7% of investment cost per year.

• Fuel cost: We have employed US$ 28/MWh, including the cost of collection,
based on available information (e.g., Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission,
Government of India: Tariff Order 2/2007).
• Self consumption: 8% of output.
• Energy conversion efficiency: 0.92 kg/kWh.
• Load factor range: 60‐80%.
Exhibit 7: Pakistan’s Livestock Population for Biogas Potential Estimation, 2006
73.0%
Buffaloes
Cattle
Goats
Sheep
Poultry
Camels
Asses
Horses
5.0% 0.2% Mules
10.2% 5.2%
5.6% 0.8%
0.1%
0.0%

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, 2006‐7, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2007
Using this information and the probabilistic cost approach described earlier, the
agricultural biogas technology supply curve was computed. It is presented in Exhibit 8
for medium‐term penetration assessment in Pakistan.
Exhibit 8: Agricultural Biogas‐based Power Supply Curve
140
120
100
USD/MWh
80
60
40
20
Biogas
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
GWh/a

Landfill gas: Due to its relationship with waste, landfill gas potential was estimated vis‐à‐
vis waste‐to‐energy and sewage gas. Firstly, the amount of solid waste generation
expected in the target year was estimated. Then, it was assumed that 20% of this waste
will be landfilled—which, in the absence of any relevant data, represents a reasonable

first estimate. By applying figures with respect to medium‐term penetration (50%) and
energy content (200 m3 of landfill gas per tonne of waste with 70% of methane content),
the primary potential for landfill gas in Pakistan in 2020 was derived—around 300
GWh/year (see Exhibit 9).
• Investment cost range: US$ 1,430‐1,840/kW (based on current European costs).
• Fuel cost: In this conservative estimation, we assumed zero cost for the landfilled
waste; however, it is important to mention that some experts argue in favor of
setting a negative cost to the landfilled waste due to the methane emissions
produced.
• Energy conversion efficiency range: 32‐36%.
Using this information and the probabilistic cost approach, the supply curve for landfill
gas was computed and is presented in Exhibit 9 for medium‐term penetration in
Pakistan.
Exhibit 9: Landfill Gas‐based Power Supply Curve
80
70
60
50
USD/MWh
40
30
20
10
Landfill
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
GWh/a

Sewage gas: Water disposal per capita and collection by sewage plants were estimated
by using information from the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB); the amount
of sewage sludge was assumed to be 10% of total collected sewage. The medium‐term
potential for electricity from sewage gas was calculated by applying an average gas
energy content of 6 kWh/m3, an electrical conversion efficiency of 30%, and a medium‐
term penetration of 20%. Based on these assumptions, we estimate 120 GWh/year as
the potential for power generation from sewage gas in Pakistan.

• Investment cost range: US$ 2,300‐3,400/kW (based on current European costs).
• Fuel cost: As in the case of input cost for landfill gas, we assumed no cost for raw
sewage.
Using this information and the probabilistic cost approach, the supply curve for sewage
gas was computed and is presented in Exhibit 10 for medium‐term penetration in
Pakistan.
Exhibit 10: Sewage Gas‐based Power Supply Curve
160
140
120
100
USD/MWh
80
60
40
20
Sewage
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
GWh/a

2.2 Solid Biomass
As already commented, the energetic use of biomass stands in competition to its
alternative uses—e.g., use of bagasse and straw in particle board manufacture, as well
as for cellulosic ethanol—and, in addition, competition also occurs within the energetic
fraction—e.g., solid biomass, such as wood, represents a traditional fuel for domestic
heating, especially in rural areas, or, in certain cases, can be used for biofuel production.
As discussed previously, we focus here on agricultural residues. The derivation of the
primary energy potential for agricultural residues was derived using the following
assumptions:
• The most prominent representative of this category is straw, residues from rice
and other crops, and bagasse—all common agricultural byproducts which can be
utilized for combustion. These two categories present a large potential for RES

development in Pakistan, given the scale of its agricultural sector. The approach
followed for this category is to divide agricultural residues in two main
subcategories:
o Sugarcane bagasse: This residue is abundant in Pakistan due to the large local
production of sugarcane, and is well suited for RE‐based cogeneration (even
though sugarcane bagasse has alternative uses, such as input for paper or
biofuel production, as already mentioned).
o Straw and other agricultural residues: Straw and crop residues from wheat,
rice and cotton, among others, have also been considered for the estimation
of biomass potential.
Bagasse‐based Cogeneration: Electricity potential for this technology was estimated by
first determining annual forecasted sugarcane production; this was achieved by
multiplying the peak production area (1,100,000 ha in 2002‐3) with the peak production
yield (5.32 tonnes/ha) in order to reflect possible medium‐term productivity
improvements. Average energy content (around 4 kWh/kg) was applied to sugarcane
bagasse (estimated to be 30% of the production). Plant efficiency was assumed to be
low (24%), as these plants produce both steam and electricity (CHP plants), and
medium‐term penetration is expected to be large (30%) due to the characteristics of
sugarcane production. We thus estimate around 5 TWh/year as the medium‐term
potential for bagasse‐based power generation in Pakistan.
• Investment cost range: US$ 887‐1,280/kW (based on current Indian costs).
• Fuel input: Bagasse (5 months/year during sugarcane crushing season) and coal
(approximately 4 months/year during non‐crushing season).
• Fuel cost: For coal, we employed the same price as for the computation of the
conventional supply curve (coal at US$ 75/tonne as defined in Annex VI). For
bagasse, the alternative‐use cost in this study was estimated based on the cost of
coal. The idea is simple: if the opportunity cost of the bagasse (for instance, in
the paper industry) is less than the cost of buying coal, the producer will burn
bagasse, and vice versa. We therefore employed around US$ 30/MWh based on
this assumption.10
• Average energy conversion efficiency: 1.16 kWh/kg.

10
Based on Indian price ratio of bagasse:coal, applied to a local coal price of US$ 75/tonne (Indian data from Gujarat
Electricity Regulatory Commission, Government of India: Tariff Order 1/2007).

In the case of this technology, private and social costs of generation are different
because of the consumption of coal. We have estimated the social cost of bagasse‐based
energy generation taking CO2 emissions and associated costs at 0.9 kg/kWh and US$
30/tonne of CO2, respectively (same figures as employed for conventional energy).
Using this information and the probabilistic cost approach, the supply curve for bagasse‐
based cogeneration was computed and is presented, both in private and social terms, in
Exhibit 11 for medium‐term penetration in Pakistan.
Exhibit 11: Bagasse‐based Power Supply Curve
90
80
70
60
USD/MWh
50
40
30
20
10
Co-gen (social) Co-gen (Private)
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
GWh/a

Other Solid Biomass‐based Generation: Straw and other crop residue potential was
estimated following an almost identical approach as for sugarcane bagasse. First, peak
production was determined for the relevant crops (wheat, cotton, rice, maize, and other
minor crops). Second, respective annual crop production was multiplied by its relevant
average residue factor and heat content, the results of which are shown in Exhibit 12.
Lastly, international experience shows that 5% for medium‐term penetration is a
feasible value for biomass penetration, due to the current difficulties in organizing a
biomass market which provides a clear price signal to electricity generators. We
obtained around 5 TWh per year as the medium‐term potential.
• Investment cost range: US$ 1,060‐1,250/kW. This range basically represents an
average between Indian and European costs for this technology.
• Fuel cost: We have assumed that this technology will run only on agricultural
residues; however, the alternative cost in this study was estimated based on the
cost of coal (at US$ 75/tonne). Again, the simple argument here is that if the
opportunity cost of rice husk, for example, is less than the cost of buying coal,

the producer will burn rice husk, and vice versa. We have therefore employed
around US$ 34/MWh as the fuel cost based on this assumption.
• Energy conversion efficiency: 1.16 kWh/kg.
Exhibit 12: Annual Residues Produced by Crop Type
Other
Wheat
Maize
Rice
Cotton
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Mill ton

Using this information and the probabilistic cost approach, a supply curve for non‐
bagasse based power generation was computed and is presented in Exhibit 13 for
medium‐term penetration in Pakistan.
Exhibit 13: Non‐bagasse Biomass‐based Power Supply Curve
100
90
80
70
60
USD/MWh
50
40
30
20
10
Biomass
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500
GWh/a

2.3 WastetoEnergy
In order to derive the incremental medium‐term potential for waste‐to‐energy (WTE)
generation, the amount of waste expected to be generated in the year 2020 needs to be
estimated. To obtain a reasonable projection, the following methodology has been used:
first, an econometric regression has been undertaken to estimate urban population in
Pakistan on 2020 as presented in Exhibit 14.
Exhibit 14: Urban Population of Pakistan
80
70
60
50
urban pop (mill)
40
30
20
10
Urban Population Estimated Urban Population

0
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey, 2006‐7, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad: 2007
Second, the total amount of waste produced was determined by multiplying the
country’s urban population by average waste produced per person: 166 kg/person
(based on data for India) per year. In addition, it has been assumed that waste collection
will gradually improve in Pakistan’s cities to cover 50% of total waste generated by 2020.
Finally, medium‐term WTE penetration was estimated to reach 15% of collected waste,
as waste‐to‐energy is the best alternative for the non‐recyclable proportion of waste
and international experts’ recommendations encourage the deployment of this
technology. Based on these parameters, we obtain 500 GWh/year as the potential for
WTE generation by 2020.
Costs have been estimated according to the following parameters:
• Investment cost range: US$ 2,000‐5,800/kW (based on AEDB prefeasibility
studies and current European costs).
• O&M cost: 3.7% of investment cost per year.
• Fuel cost: Following the same consideration as for landfill and sewage gas, we
have assumed no cost for the waste input.

Using this information and the probabilistic cost approach, the supply curve was
computed and is presented in Exhibit 15 for medium‐term WTE penetration in Pakistan.
Exhibit 15: Waste‐to‐energy Supply Curve
250
200
150
$/MWh
100
50
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
GWh/a
WTE

2.4 Small Hydro
Pakistan has abundant water resources for electricity generation using small‐scale hydel
(‘small’ hydro is defined by the Government of Pakistan (GoP) as plants with capacity up
to 50 MW). According to existing information,11 this technology’s medium‐term
potential amounts to 1,800 MW, spread over more than 550 projects (this corresponds
to around 12 TWh/year). The majority of these potential projects have not yet
progressed beyond preliminary identification, but those few that have reached the
implementation stage provide important information regarding investment costs in this
sector.
As part of this study, we have requested from relevant provincial authorities information
about the main features and costs of different projects (basically, installed capacity and
annual generation) and have obtained very useful information. However, some
information gaps exist, and in some cases the energy outputs we obtained based on this
information were unrealistic.
In order to calculate the load factors and investment costs for projects for which such

information was not readily available, the following approach was adopted:
• An econometric estimation for investment costs (in US$/kW) related to the
project size, with a floor at US$ 2,000/kW for projects smaller than 5 MW and

11
Pakistan Hydel Power Potential, Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB), Government of Pakistan: Islamabad
2005 and stakeholder data.

US$ 1,750/kW for projects between 5 MW and 50 MW. The regression can be
seen in Exhibit 16. In those cases where investment cost was lower than
US$ 1,750/kW, or where we have no data, the result of this regression was
employed.
• Where we had no data about expected annual generation, we developed
statistical estimation of load factors. We also assumed a cap on plant load factors
at 80%, even though in available feasibility studies projected load factors shown
were higher. For plants with an installed capacity below 3 MW, the load factor
has been assumed to be 80% for all plants.
Exhibit 16: Econometric Estimation of Investment Costs for Small Hydro

Other cost drivers for small‐scale hydel are summarized below:
• Extra investment cost factor: 5% (due to differences in the construction duration
between hydel and other RE technologies)
Exhibit 17 presents the supply curve for small‐scale hydel technology in Pakistan.

Exhibit 17: Small Hydro‐based Power Supply Curve
300
250
200
USD/MWh
150
100
50
SS hydel
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
GWh/a

2.5 Solar Photovoltaic
For analyzing solar potential in Pakistan, the baseline information is provided by the
solar irradiation map developed for Pakistan by the US National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL), based on GSTHOMER software. This software allows computing
suitable land area by available solar irradiation (for both photovoltaic and solar thermal)
estimated as kWh/m2‐day, according to an indirect methodology which is described in
the technical papers provided by NREL. ‘Suitable’ land means areas where PV solar farms
can be installed. Additionally, we develop two different estimations: (1) solar PV which
can be developed in urban areas (e.g., rooftops); and (2) PV in non‐wooded areas for
open‐field solar farms. Exhibit 18 presents the PV solar maps of Pakistan obtained with
the NREL software.
Exhibit 18: Solar PV Area Estimation for Pakistan
Direct Solar Irradiance (kWh/m2‐day)
Open Field PV Area Estimation Rooftop PV Area Estimation

Once suitable areas have been estimated, the next step is to adjust them by a full load
factor which reflects the average amount of hours per day during which the solar cell is
expected to produce at peak capacity. This factor has been assumed (according to
international experience) equal to 0.75 for rooftop installations and 0.78 for open‐field
projects.
Medium‐term penetration is assumed to be low for open‐field projects, as solar PV is the
most expensive RE technology and in several places this technology has to compete with
other alternative land uses. Therefore, medium‐term penetration for open field PV
projects in Pakistan is taken as 0.3% of estimated total available area, while for urban
rooftop applications the penetration is estimated to be at 10% of the estimated
available area. Even under these assumptions, the medium‐term potential for solar PV in
Pakistan is very significant, at around 4.5 TWh/year. As this is less than 3% of the total
electricity generation expected in 2020, it is not necessary to consider operational
constraints, as in the case of wind generation.
• Investment cost: US$ 5,080‐5,930/kW (based on current European costs).
• O&M cost: 1% of investment cost.
Exhibit 19 presents the supply curve for photovoltaic power generation based on these
hypotheses and the probabilistic cost approach.
Exhibit 19: PV‐based Power Supply Curve
500
450
400
350
300
USD/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
PV
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
GWh/a

2.6 Solar Thermal
As already mentioned above for the PV supply curve, the potential for solar thermal
projects has been identified using the same software algorithms to estimate solar direct
irradiation maps for Pakistan provided by NREL, as presented in Exhibit 20.

The assessment of medium‐term solar thermal penetration is based on assumptions
with respect to land use (i.e., 0.2% of total estimated available area). Next, electricity
generation potentials are derived by applying plant‐specific conversion efficiencies. We
thus obtain an estimation of about 900 GWh/year of solar thermal generation in
Pakistan in 2020.

Exhibit 20: Solar Thermal Area Estimation for Pakistan
Direct Solar Irradiance (kWh/m2-day)
• Investment cost: US$ 2,880‐4,465/kW (based on current European costs).
• O&M cost: 6% of investment cost.
• Expected Load factor range (%): 22‐25%.
Exhibit 21 presents the supply curve for solar thermal power generation technology
based on these hypotheses and the probabilistic cost approach.

Exhibit 21: Solar Thermal‐based Power Supply Curve
450
400
350
300
USD/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
Solar Th
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
GWh/a

2.7 Onshore Wind
Similar to the solar case, the base information to compute on‐shore wind potential in
Pakistan is the wind density map developed by the NREL based on GSTHOMER software.
This software allows a direct computation of the land area under different wind density
classes, estimated as W/m2 at 50 m height above ground level, according to an indirect
methodology which is described in technical papers provided by NREL. The software
works with seven different average wind speed classes, ranging from 0 to more than 8.5
m/s. ‘Suitable’ land again refers to areas where wind farms can be installed. Additionally,
we have developed two different estimations: (1) the potential constrained by setting
the distance to the electricity grid network to be no greater than 25 km; and (2) the total
theoretically feasible potential, with no grid proximity constraint.
There have been other estimations of the wind potential in Pakistan made in the past.
Recently, NREL presented the results of its studies for Pakistan: under some assumptions
[i.e., maximum capacity of 5 MW per km2 in areas corresponding to Class 4 and higher
(more than 400 watt/m2)], they found that 26,400 km2, about 3% of Pakistan’s total land
area, is appropriate for installing wind farms producing a total of up to 130 GW. The
AEDB has identified a potential of 50 GW and indicated the GoP’s intent to help develop
approximately 3,700 MW of wind power by 2020, a very small part of the total potential
but probably in line with technological (transmission power stability) constraints. As can
be seen, the main difference between the two cases lies in the development of the huge
wind potential in the vast but remote Balochistan province.
We have carried out our simulations based on GSTHOMER software calculations, but
with our own assumptions added on top. On the one hand, our estimations are more
constrained because of the condition of proximity to existing power lines; on the other
hand, we consider that current technology allows greater harvest potential—from 5 to
6.5 MW/km2, depending on wind conditions. There are also probably some differences
in the definition of suitable land. Once we get the potential for each cluster, we estimate
the expected annual energy employing a Weibull‐based modeling method—by
employing a Weibull distribution with k = 2 and wind speed as mean—and a typical

power curve for wind turbines of 2 MW at an air density of 1.225 kg/m3. Wind potential
was scaled from 50 m to 80 m employing the standard rule of 1/7.12
A further restriction should be applied in order to consider aspects of grid integration
and balancing. Based on other countries’ experience and past studies, we have assumed
that the maximum achievable potential for electricity from wind can be limited to 10%
of the expected gross electricity generation in 2020. This leads to approximately 23
TWh/year (around 9,000 MW), according to our estimations, of realizable wind power
potential in Pakistan by 2020. In Exhibit 22 and Exhibit 23, the potentials for each of 5
wind class clusters are shown both analytically and graphically.
In order to compute the supply curve for wind power in Pakistan, shown in Exhibit 24,
we believe that, given the current worldwide wind turbine market conditions, an
average investment cost of US$ 2,000/kW‐installed is a reasonable assumption.
However, in order to assess the uncertainty regarding investment cost, we have taken
an average between US$ 1,800‐2,200/kW. For O&M costs, we assume US$ 50/kW‐
installed per year.
Exhibit 22: Wind potential estimation (near‐grid constrained and unconstrained)
Expected
Expected
Km2 Km2 non- Potential Potential (non- Average load Generation
Class Type Generation (Non-
(constrained) (constrained) (constrained) (MW) constrained)(MW) factor (constrained)
constrained) (TWh)
(TWh)
2 Marginal 20,570 93,511 117,249 533,013 21.5% 221.1 1,005.3
3 Fair 9,921 39,324 57,542 228,079 27.2% 136.9 542.4
4 Good 3,421 16,280 20,526 123,156 32.8% 59.0 354.0
5 Excellent 522 4,391 3,263 20,391 36.4% 10.4 65.1
6&7 Oustanding 18 2,445 113 703 41.4% 0.4 2.5

Exhibit 23: Wind Potential Maps of Pakistan
Constrained Estimation Unconstrained Estimation

12
This rule states that the relationship between wind potential and wind speed when height is modified is given by
[Pota/Potb]=[Wind Speeda/Wind Speedb]3*A where A = 1/7 and a and b are the different heights.

Exhibit 24: On‐shore Wind‐based Power Supply Curve
Operational constraint
140
120
100
80
USD/MWh
60
40
20
Wind
0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
GWh/a
3 Incremental RE Supply Curve for 2020
In this section, we compute the combined RES‐E supply curve for 2020 by adding up the
supply curves of each of the different technologies considered above and re‐ordering
them based on economic merit order. The total incremental RE supply curve for Pakistan
is illustrated in Exhibit 25.
Exhibit 25: Total RES‐based Power Supply Curve for 2020
(Medium‐term Incremental Potential)
450
400
350
300
USD/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
TWh/a


As can be seen, according to our rough estimation, the total medium‐term potential for
RES‐based on‐grid power generation in Pakistan is around 55 TWh/year. The supply
curve is relatively low‐stepped (from US$ 50/MWh to US$ 120/MWh) up to 50 TWh, and
then becomes extremely steep because of the high cost of some technologies and the
higher extraction cost part of different supply curves. Note that the private and social
supply curves are quite similar in the case of RES technologies, as the only technology on
which external cost has an important effect is bagasse‐based CHP.
4 Incremental Conventional Supply Curve for 2020
The incremental private (i.e., without externalities) supply curve for conventional energy
is drawn based on the outputs of Annex VI. In that document, the cost of different
conventional technologies that can be installed during the period 2008‐2020, based on
an international crude oil price scenario of US$ 90/bbl, and corresponding investment
costs based on 2007 levels, were assessed. Additionally, the optimal shares for each
generation based on a simulation model for least‐cost expansion, were computed.
Exhibit 26 summarizes the key parameters required to compute the private supply curve
(for details, please refer to Annex VI).
The exhibit also shows some sensitivities that will be later employed. Basically, we
simulate two kinds of sensitivities: (1) regarding the cost of capital, and (2) regarding
variations from the optimal least‐cost expansion plan, such as those caused by the
development of fewer hydel plants than expected, less CCGT capacity running on gas, or
combination of these cases.
Exhibit 26: Basic Data for Determination of Private Supply Curve for Conventional Energy
Technology-wise private cost of Conventional Generation - Expected Incremental generation 2008-2020
New CCGT New CCGT Steam Turbine Large Hydel Nuclear
Generation Options
Natural Gas Fuel Oil Local Coal
Total Investment cost (USD/KW) 882 812 1,400 1,547 2,000
Thermal Efficiency (%) 50% 43% 38%
Fuel Cost (USD/MMBtu) 6.29 13.77 2.75
Capital Cost (USc/KWh) 1.79 1.64 2.48 5.01 3.33
O&M Cost (USc/KWh) 0.59 0.81 0.61 0.47 0.63
Fuel Cost (USc/KWh) 4.29 10.92 2.47 - 1.07
Total Generation Cost (USc/KWh) @12 % 6.67 13.38 5.56 5.48 5.04
Expected Incremental generation 2020
25.05 17.11 28.54 69.18 11.94
(TWh) [Base Case]
Expected Incremental generation 2020 (TWh)
24.89 17.26 61.70 36.02 11.94
[Low Hydel Case]

9.54 19.26 41.89 69.18 11.94
[Low Gas Case]
9.54 22.98 71.33 36.02 11.94
[Worse Case]

As was previously mentioned, the cost figures for electricity production from coal and oil
would be substantially increased if externalities are taken into account. In this analysis,
we take into account the following external costs:
Global environmental costs: These include all greenhouse gas emissions having a global
impact on the earth’s climate. The generation of energy from renewable sources avoids
CO2 emissions that would otherwise have been released with fossil power generation;
hence, we need to add related costs (of climate change impact or mitigation) to fossil
fuel‐based conventional generation. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume the
cost of CO2 abated at €20/tonne (US$ 30/tonne), based on the EU‐ETS forward curve
(European CO2 market) and standard average greenhouse gas (GHG) emission rates by
technology. Specifically, we employed an average emission rate of 375 g‐CO2/kWh for
gas‐based CCGT, 900 g‐CO2/kWh for coal plants and 500 g‐CO2/kWh for fuel oil‐based
CCGT.
Air quality: While CO2 emissions from conventional power production are critical due to
their global warming potential, nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides do not spread in the
atmosphere on a global scale, but are responsible for local/regional pollution close to
their emission sources. Similar to the case of CO2, as most alternative RES‐E technologies
do not emit neither NOx/SO2 nor particulates, the additional cost of local pollution
impacts should be added to those for conventional power generation in order to make
comparisons with RES meaningful. A suitable reference for this cost is the cost of limiting
the emission of NOx, SO2 and particulates, and a good reference figure in OECD countries
for limiting the three pollutants is US$ 100/kW13 (most of the cost is SO2‐related) and
variable costs of around US¢ 0.25/kWh. Depending on the plant load factor, the external
cost of local air quality‐related impacts range from US$ 4/MWh to US$ 6/MWh.
Fuel dependency: Rising oil prices and the concomitant general increase in energy prices
(oil derivatives, gas, and even coal, with some lag), reveal the vulnerability and
dependency on energy imports of most economies, to which Pakistan is no exception as
is a net importer of energy. Several recent studies (IMF, 200014; EIA, 200415; EU‐DG
ECFIN, 2003‐200616; among others17) have evaluated the effects on national economies
of a sustained oil price increase. All these reports agree that a sustained increase in oil
price would cause a decrease of about 0.3%‐0.4% in GDP growth during the first two to
four years in the OECD countries, and up to 3% in the least developed countries. In
emerging countries, such as Pakistan, the average effect stands for 1% decrease in GDP

13
There is a range between US$ 80/kW and US$ 140/kW. We preferred to be conservative.
14
“The Impact of Higher Oil Prices on the Global Economy”, December 8, 2000. Research Department Paper.
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington: 2000.
15
“Analysis of the Impact of High Oil Prices on the Global Economy”, International Energy Agency, Paris:2004.
16
See www.ExternE.info for relevant papers.
17
E.g., Huntington, H G, “Shares, Gaps and the Economy’s Response to Oil Disruptions”, Energy Modelling Forum,
Stanford University, Stanford: 2004; Bohi, DR & MA Toman, The Economics of Energy Security, Kluwer. Boston:
1996; Brown & Yucel, “Energy Prices and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Interpretive Study”, Quarterly Review of
Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas, TX: 2001; Costantini, V & F Gracceva, “Social Costs of
Energy Disruptions”, INDES Working Paper No. 6, Centre for European Policy Studies: 2004;. Cunado J, “Do Oil
Shocks Matter? Evidence for Some European Countries”. University of Navarra: 2000.

growth during that period. This kind of analysis underestimates the real effect of fuel
dependency, because it does not consider other impacts, such as price volatility,
shortages, etc. We follow the traditional approach of modeling only a price increase as
the other effects are rather complex to estimate accurately, and there is no sound
international agreement on how to properly assess them. Before carrying out an
estimation of the impact of external fuel dependency for Pakistan, a statement should
be made: calculating the effect of oil dependency on security of supply is rather complex
and full of assumptions; different studies have computed this effect for different
countries, and the range derived from international experience is very large—from US$
5/MWh to US$ 300/MWh. In our assessment, we have assumed: (1) an average
probability of price increase of 20% over a four‐year period, which is a reasonable figure
with respect to other similar studies and considering that we are working under a crude
oil base case of US$ 90/bbl; (2) the effect on GDP was assessed considering a four‐year
impact of 1% per year, taking 2006 as base year GDP; and (3) the share of oil and gas
imported for the power sector in 2020 was assumed to be 20% of total oil and gas
imports (see Annex VI).
The external cost of different conventional power generation technologies arrived at
based on these assumptions are presented in Exhibit 27.
Exhibit 27: Basic Data for Social Supply Curve for Conventional Energy
Technology-wise Social Cost of conventional Generation
New CCGT New CCGT Steam Turbine Large Hydel Nuclear
Generation Options
Natural Gas Fuel Oil Local Coal
Private generation cost (Usc/kWh) 6.67 13.38 5.56 5.48 5.04
C02 Ext. Cost (USc/kWh) 1.11 1.5 2.7
Local Pollut. Ext. Cost (USc/kWh) - 0.45 0.43
Security of supply. Ext. Cost (Usc/kWh) 2.48 2.48
Total Generation Cost (USc/KWh) 10.26 17.82 8.69 5.48 5.04

Based on the analysis given in Annex VI and the assessment of externalities previously
described, we may draw the private and social supply curve for conventional energy in
Pakistan for 2020, which is shown in Exhibit 28.

Exhibit 28: Private and Social Supply Curves for Conventional Energy for 2020
200
180
160
140
120
USD/MWh
100
80
60
40
20
Conventional Private Curve Conventional Social Curve

0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
TWh/a
5 Costs and Potential of RES Penetration under Different Policies
5.1 Natural Penetration of Renewable Energy Sources
The first element that we need to identify is whether, under a private cost analysis,
there are economic signals that may foster the development of RE in the event that all
other barriers (administrative, regulatory, financial,18 etc.) are removed. The analysis is
shown in Exhibit 29. This is similar to Exhibit 2, but in this case the private supply curves,
both for RE and conventional energy, are the results of our estimations for Pakistan in
the medium term.

18
By financial barriers, we mean the case in which—from an economic point of view—some technologies could be
developed but because, for example, of difficulties in the credit market, small producers cannot access the funds
needed to develop these projects, and such opportunities are therefore not realized.

Exhibit 29: Optimal RES‐E Penetration under Private Costs
400
375 RES-E Supply Curve
350
Conventional Private Supply Curve
325
300
275
250
$/MWh
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
TWh/a

In Exhibit 29, from the part (X:Y) in which both supply curves meet each other, we can
get the optimal amount of RE penetration and the marginal cost of RE (the cost of the
last RE plant that is cheaper than the last conventional plant replaced). In this case, we
observe that the natural penetration of RES‐E should be around 17 TWh/year—which is
around 7% of total power generation expected in 2020. As we can see in Exhibit 30,
almost 60% of this share is comprised of hydel plants that are cheaper than CCGT
running on fuel oil (FO), which establish the price of avoided generation. The other two
RE technologies that should be developed are bagasse‐based CHP and other types of
biomass.
Exhibit 30: RES‐E Technology‐wise Penetration under Private Costs
RES-E Penetration (@ Private Cost)
(Tech; TWh/a; %)
SS Hydel
9.6
Wind 56.4% Landfill
0.0 0.3
0.0% 1.7%
Solar Th
0.0
0.0%
Sew
0.0
0.0%
PV Biogas
Co-gen 0.7
0.0
4.1 3.8%
0.0% WTE 23.9% Biomass
0.0 2.4
0.2% 13.9%

This result shows that all future CCGTs running on FO should be replaced by some RES‐E,
such as small‐scale hydel and biomass. The fact that this energy is not currently

developed indicates that some barriers may exist, especially if we consider that the
marginal cost for RE is around US$ 75/MWh and the cost of generation based on FO is
higher than US$ 125/MWh.
Another important piece of information that can be derived from Exhibit 29 is the
manner in which the avoided cost of generation based on FO is distributed amongst
different players when replaced by cheaper RES‐E generation. The avoided cost is
distributed between:
• The cost of generation based on RES‐E; and
• The surplus, which can be distributed between the producers and consumers.
These three different areas are drawn in Exhibit 29 (colored bars) in order to show how
they are computed. The objective of a good renewable energy policy is to maximize the
total surplus, regardless of how this surplus is distributed between producers and
consumers. We will analyze in the following sections how the distribution of the surplus
depends on the designed incentive mechanism. In this case, the generation cost of the
RES‐E plants that replaced the CCGT (FO) is around US$ 1,027 million per year (2020),
the producer surplus is US$ 235 million, and the consumer surplus is about
US$ 1,024 million; therefore, total surplus is US$ 1,260 million. This means that Pakistani
society can gain up to around US$ 1.3 billion per year if some of the existing barriers—
that are effectively blocking the effect of economic signals—are removed.
It should be noted that this analysis is not considering the cost of peaking plants, as it is
based on the medium‐term need for energy, not operational capacity. This may
underestimate the real avoided cost because it is not considering the cost of peaking
plants (gas open turbines or reciprocating engines), which costs are probably higher than
the cost of the CCGT running on FO because the load factor is much lower for peaking
plants.
5.2 Optimal Quota of Renewable Energy in 2020
A renewable energy policy should be based on a social assessment of cost and benefits.
The analysis given in the previous section does not consider externalities; therefore, it
forms a limited analysis meeting only minimum requirements. In order to identify
optimal penetration under proper social assessment, the analysis performed in
Exhibit 29 must be redone, but this time considering the social supply curves, both for
RES‐E and for conventional energy. This is shown in Exhibit 31. In this case, we observe
that optimal penetration of RES‐E in Pakistan should be around 25 TWh/year, which is
around 10.4% of total grid electricity generation expected in 2020. It can thus be
surmised that market failure (resulting in externalities not being internalized) would
hamper the development of about 8 TWh/year (= 25 TWh/year – 17 TWh/year) of
renewable energy in 2020. To develop this extra 8 TWh/year, an economic incentive
mechanism is required, as will be discussed later, assuming that all other barriers to the
development of the first 17 TWh of RES‐E have already been removed.

Exhibit 31: Optimal RES‐E Penetration under Social Costs

400
375 RES-E Supply Curve
350
Conventional Social Supply Curve
325
300
275
250
$/MWh
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
TWh/a

As we can see in Exhibit 32, under social cost assessment, not only hydel and biomass
plants but also biogas (farm slurries, sewage, landfills, etc.) and wind power plants
would be required to replace both CCGTs running on FO and natural gas; as a matter of
fact, all FO‐based generation is replaced, as well as around 15% of gas‐based generation.
The largest share of RE generation is from hydel, as in the previous case. Definitely,
small‐scale hydel is the cheapest option for developing RES‐E in Pakistan, and should be
encouraged as early as possible. It is also important to note that some RES‐E
technologies, such as solar PV or solar thermal, are not economically feasible as on‐grid
solutions in current price/technology conditions. The penetration of waste‐to‐energy in
the medium term is very small as it is a very expensive technology; however, the
development of this technology is also related to waste management and can result in
multiple benefit streams (improved sanitation and lower health costs, etc.), while open
dumps and landfills are not a sustainable alternative. Thus, this technology may be
developed for some of these other reasons.
From Exhibit 31, we can compute the distribution of the avoided cost. In this case, the
cost of generation based on RES‐E is around US$ 1,800 million per year in 2020 and the
total surplus stands at US$ 2,100 million per year in 2020. It is relevant to observe that
total surplus increases by US$ 740 million with respect to the natural penetration case.
This implies that market failure results in extracting around US$ 800 million per year
from Pakistani society.

Exhibit 32: RES‐E Technology‐wise Penetration under Social Costs
RES-E Penetration (@ Social Cost)
(Tech; TWh/a; %)
Landfill
0.3
1.2%
SS Hydel
11.2
44.1%
Sew
0.1
0.2%
Wind
2.8
11.0%
Biogas
2.2
Solar Th Co-gen 8.5%
0.0 4.6
0.0% 17.9%
PV Biomass
WTE
0.0 4.2
0.2
0.0% 16.5%
0.7%

5.3 Analysis of Single Feedin Tariff Mechanism
The simplest RES‐E incentive mechanism would be to set a single feed‐in tariff—that
means establishing only one feed‐in tariff for all technologies—at the marginal cost of
RES‐E generation under the social cost assessment case, which according to the analysis
presented here, is US$ 103/MWh. This mechanism should be equivalent to setting a
quota at 10.4% of total generation in 2020. However, as was explained in Annex IV, the
effectiveness of the quota system is worse than the feed‐in system because of the
complexities of designing a secondary market for green certificates and the penalties to
be applied when the quota is not fulfilled.
The single feed‐in tariff is said to have two mains drawbacks:
• It does not foster the development of certain technologies, basically those
technologies that are more expensive than the marginal cost of supplying the
optimal quota of RES‐E in total generation (in this case, all technologies with
costs higher than US$ 103/MWh).
• It may generate high producer surplus—and, hence, decrease the consumer
surplus, given a total surplus.
It must be understood that neither the first shortcoming nor the second are
disadvantageous from an economic point of view as they are not related to economic
efficiency: the first one is about long‐term industrial policy, while the second relates to
wealth distribution. The first shortcoming will be addressed in this study by analyzing
how the total surplus is affected when industry‐driven policies are put in place.
Regarding the distribution of the surplus, it is important to observe that:
• As a rule of thumb, multiple or technology‐based feed‐in tariffs tend to reduce
the producers’ surplus, given a total surplus.

• A cost‐plus approach, in which the cost is assessed for each plant, under the
hypothesis of no information asymmetry, makes the producers’ surplus tend
towards zero, maximizing the consumers’ surplus.
• The producers’ surplus is a consequence of the inframarginal rents. Inframarginal
rents can be observed in all markets, from cookies to power pools, and represent
a natural incentive for investors to perform an activity.
• The amount of producer surplus depends on the slope of the RE supply curve in
the part that is lower than the conventional supply curve. The higher the slope,
the greater the producer’s surplus. That is why it is extremely important to have
an idea of the RE supply curve before designing an incentive mechanism for RE.
• The removal of all of the producers’ surplus by applying a cost‐plus mechanism
will: (1) on one hand, decrease the incentive to invest in RE technologies; and (2)
on the other hand, make investors game against the cost‐plus mechanism—a
mechanism in which the information advantage is on the producers’ side;
besides that, the cost‐plus mechanism carries additional administrative burden
and tends to delay the development of RES technologies.
In this study, we focus on analyzing how the producer’s surplus changes under different
policies, starting with a single feed‐in tariff. As shown in Exhibit 33, the total surplus
under a single feed‐in tariff in Pakistan in 2020 would be around US$ 2.1 billion,
distributed with about US$ 800 million for producers and US$ 1.3 billion for consumers.
Exhibit 33: Distribution of Producer Surplus by RES‐E Technology under Single Feed‐in
Tariff

WTE
Wind
SS Hydel
Solar Thermal
Sewage
PV
Landfill
Biomass
Biogas
Bagasse
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

M$/a

It is very interesting to note that the producer surplus is almost three‐times higher in
comparison with the case of natural penetration, while the consumer surplus increases
by only 30%. In Exhibit 33, it can be observed how the US$ 800 million of producer
surplus is shared amongst the producers using different technologies. As can be seen in
the exhibit, small‐scale hydel plants get the major share of the producer’s surplus

(around US$ 500 million in 2020), and this extra revenue is actually an incentive to
develop hydel plants.
5.4 Analysis of Technologybased Feedin Tariff Mechanism
We simulate three different cases in order to identify changes in total surplus and in its
distribution between producers and consumers:
• Optimal quota‐constrained analysis—cost‐efficient case: In this case, we
assume the same technologies, and the same penetration for each RES‐E, as we
did under the optimal quota analysis, but shift from a single feed‐in tariff to
multiple feed‐in tariffs.
• Optimal quota‐constrained analysis—industry policy‐driven case: In this case,
the same penetration (10.4%) for RES‐E is considered, but all RES‐E technologies
are taken into account, including those that they do not qualify under the
optimal quota analysis. Therefore, the total RES‐E amount is the same, but the
composition of the portfolio is different.
• Exhausting the medium‐term potential: In this case, we define a set of feed‐in
tariffs that serve as an economic signal for producing about 55 TWh of renewable
energy, instead of 25 TWh that is implicit in the optimal quota.
Except for the first case, the proposed alternatives are not cost‐efficient and, hence, it
can be expected that the total surplus will be lower under the second and third cases.
5.4.1 Optimal Quotaconstrained Analysis
Cost‐efficient Case
In Exhibit 30 we can see the RES‐E portfolio feasible under an optimal quota analysis.
From the RES‐E supply curve, we can compute which is the more expensive plant for
each technology cheaper than US$ 103/MWh. The costs of these plants would be the
feed‐in tariff (FIT) for each RE. The feed‐in tariffs for each RES‐E generation technology
are shown in Exhibit 34.
The feed‐in tariff for each technology is generally lower than the single feed‐in tariff, as
expected, and hence the producers’ surplus is lower. In effect, the producers’ surplus
decreases from US$ 795 million to US$ 638 million, but the total surplus remains the
same—US$ 2,089 million. Thus, there is an increase in the consumers’ surplus of around
US$ 157 million. From a theoretical point of view, the entire producers’ surplus might be
converted into consumers’ surplus—i.e., total surplus equal to consumer surplus—but
this alternative, as mentioned before, has some drawbacks. Multiple feed‐in tariffs stand
for an adequate trade‐off for allocating producers’ surplus, as they transfer a share to
the consumers but ensure that the producers’ surplus remains high enough to be able to
attract investors.

Exhibit 34: Producer Surplus under Multiple Feed‐in Tariffs
(Cost‐efficient Approach)
FIT by RE Technology
4,500
Gener at i on RE S- E Sur pl us Consumer Sur pl us (USD/MWh)
4,000
Bagasse based CHP 84.8
3,500
1, 2 9 4
1, 4 5 2
Biogas 99.6
3,000
Biomass 86.1
Landfill 73.4
2,500
798 640
2,000
Sewage 101.9
SS Hydel 103.3
1, 5 0 0
Wind 102.3
1, 0 0 0 1, 8 13 1, 8 13
WTE 96.9
500
0
S i ngl e FI T M ul t i pl e FI T
Industry Policy‐driven Case
In this case, we simulate the situation in which all RES‐E technologies must be installed.
The penetration for each RES was computed by multiplying the medium‐term potential
for each RES times the factor ‘optimal quota/medium‐term potential’, which is 45%. The
feed‐in tariff for each RES‐E is computed considering the cost of the most expensive
plant required to cover the required energy from each RES. For instance, in the case of
small‐scale hydel, the penetration under the optimal quota analysis is about 11.3 TWh,
while under the current case it is 3.7 TWh; the cost of the most expensive plant to cover
11.3 TWh per year of generation is US$ 103.3/MWh, but the cost of the most expensive
plant to cover 3.7 TWh per year of generation is US$ 54.1/MWh. The other feed‐in tariffs
(FITs) are computed in a similar fashion. In Exhibit 35, the FITs for each RES‐E are shown.
Exhibit 35: Surplus under Multiple Feed‐in Tariffs (Industry Policy‐driven Approach)
4,500 FIT by RE Technology
Ge n e r a t i o n R ES - E S u r p l u s C o n su m e r S u r p l u s
4,000 (USD/MWh)
Bagasse based
3,500
1, 2 9 4
879 CHP 68.9
3,000 234 Biogas 75.4
2,500
Biomass 69.6
798 Landfill 54.7
2,000 Sewage 96.0
1, 5 0 0 2,791
SS Hydel 54.1
Wind 109.0
1, 0 0 0 1, 8 13
WTE 96.9
500 Solar Thermal 326.8
0 Photovoltaic
371.7
S i ngl e FI T M ul t i pl e FI T
It is important to note that, in this case, cheap energy (small‐scale hydel, for instance) is
replaced by more expensive energy, such as solar PV or solar thermal. This makes the
total surplus decrease from US$ 2,089 million to around US$ 1,100 million. Within the
power sector, this policy would reduce wealth by about US$ 1,000 million every year,
which it is supposed to be created in another area, for instance, through the
development of a local solar PV industry. The most affected agents are the producers
using the cheapest technologies, who stand to lose around US$ 400 million per year as a

result of such a policy. As can be seen in Exhibit 35, the total surplus decreases because
the cost of RES‐based generation increases in the same proportion.
5.4.2 Exhausting the Mediumterm Potential
In this case, we simulate that the total medium‐term RES‐based generation potential—
55 TWh—utilizing all RES‐E technologies, must be installed. Each RES‐E technology’s
penetration is the corresponding total medium‐term potential estimated in this study.
The feed‐in tariff for each RES‐E technology is based on the cost of the most expensive
plant necessary to cover the medium‐term potential. The only exception is the case of
small‐scale hydel that has been capped at US$ 103.3/MWh, because from this point the
supply curve becomes extremely steep and, hence, the inframarginal rent for adding
only 400 GWh of generation per year becomes huge. The feed‐in tariffs for the different
RE technologies can be seen in Exhibit 36.
Exhibit 36: Surpluses under Multiple Feed‐in Tariffs Exhausting
Medium‐term RES‐E Potential
9,000
FIT by RE Technology
8,000
Generation Cost RES-E Surplus Consumer Surplus (USD/MWh)
7,000 1,251 Bagasse based CHP 84.8
6,000
Biogas 117.5
5,000
Biomass 86.1
4,000
Landfill 73.4
3,000
1,294 6,526 PV 430.5
2,000
798 Sewage 134.2
1,000 1,813
Solar Thermal 427.4
0 SS Hydel 103.3
-1,126
-1,000 Wind 127.0
-2,000 WTE
216.8
Single FIT Multiple FIT
Installing 55 TWh of RES‐E generation—about a 22% quota with respect to total
generation in 2020—is not efficient from an economic point of view, because in this case
cheaper conventional energy is replaced by RES‐E technologies that are extremely
expensive. This is notable in the change of the total surplus, which decreases from US$
2,089 million per year in the cost‐efficient case down to about US$ 120 million. As a
matter of fact, the consumers’ surplus becomes negative; this is definitely not a
convenient situation for consumers. The cost of generation based on RE increases from
US$ 1,800 million up to around US$ 6,500 million, and we find a positive producers’
surplus of about US$ 1,240 million per year in 2020.
5.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We now undertake some scenario‐analysis in order to determine the robustness of our
conclusions. We simulate the following sensitivities:
• Cost of capital: In our base case, we have considered a 12% real pre‐tax IRR rate.
We simulate two additional scenarios by adding/subtracting 200 basis points
(BPs) to the base case. Changes in the cost of capital have some effect on our

conclusions, since RES technologies, broadly speaking, are more capital‐intensive
than conventional energy technologies and, hence, ceteris paribus, the higher the
capital cost, the higher the optimal share of conventional energy in the total.
• Changes in conventional supply curve: In the base case scenario, we employ a
conventional supply curve based on the outputs of a least‐cost expansion plan.
Differences from this benchmark may change the value of avoided costs and,
hence, modify the optimal quota of RE and the total surplus.
• Fuel cost: We have employed a base case scenario which assumes the price of
crude oil to be US$ 90/bbl. Deviations from this figure may also alter avoided
costs and, therefore, the conclusions of our study.
For the two first sensitivities, we run the model again and study the differences between
the base case and the new scenarios. In the sensitivity for fuel cost, we undertake a
threshold study—what oil price scenario changes the conclusions of our study?—since
this seems to more convenient than conducting iterative model runs with different oil
prices.
In Exhibit 37 we present the results of five different scenarios from the base case that
demonstrate the sensitivity of the analyses presented in this study to changes in the first
two assumptions bulleted above.
As can be seen, as far as the optimal quota of RES‐E is concerned, only changes in the
cost of capital result in some variations from the base case; as expected, when the cost
of capital decreases down to 10%, the optimal quota for RES‐E increases from 10.4% up
to 14.1%. The natural penetration of RES‐E does not depends on the cost of capital,
however, but on the form of the conventional supply curve; in the ‘worst’ case, natural
penetration increases up to almost 10%.
The ‘low hydel’ and ‘low gas’ conventional supply cases have a limited effect on
results—the effect on both the optimal quota and total surplus is negligible. However,
the ‘worst’ case, in which at the same time there is less hydel and gas generation, has a
relatively important effect on avoided cost because part of this generation is replaced by
CCGT running on FO.

Exhibit 37: Sensitivity Analysis (Differences from Base Case)
Low Base Case
Base
Hydel Low Gas Worst @ 10% Base Case
Case
Case Case Case IRR @ 14% IRR
RE Penetration (@Social) 10.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.7% -1.6%
RE Penetration (@Private) 7.0% 0.0% 0.8% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0%
@Social Costs:
RES-E Generation Costs 1,813 - - - 776 - 274
RES-E Surplus 798 - - - 165 - 113
Consumer Surplus 1,294 - - - 5 - 1
Single FIT
@Private Costs:
RES-E Generation Costs 1,027 27 254 514 - 53 84
RES-E Surplus 235 - 26 76 32 - 19 - 3
Consumer Surplus 1,028 - 1 21 240 30 - 38
Multiple FIT-
@Social Costs:
Exhausting the RES-E Generation Costs 6,526 - - - - 624 651
mid-term RES-E Surplus 1,251 - - - - 8 8
potential
Consumer Surplus -1,126 - - 48 292 632 - 659
Multiple FIT - @Social Costs:
Optimal quota- RES-E Generation Costs 2,791 - - - 766 - 179
constrained
analysis, industry RES-E Surplus 234 - - - 156 - 36
policy driven case
Consumer Surplus 879 - - - 26 - 172
Multiple FIT - @Social Costs:
Optimal quota- RES-E Generation Costs 1,813 - - - 776 - 274
constrained
analysis, cost- RES-E Surplus 640 - - - 127 - 71
efficient case
Consumer Surplus 1,452 - - - 44 - 43
Therefore, both in the ‘worst’ case for conventional supply and in the sensitivities
relating to cost of capital, we can observe discernable changes in the total surplus. In
Exhibit 38 to Exhibit 42, changes in consumers’ and producers’ surpluses in each of the
different sensitivity scenarios analyzed can be observed.
(Private Cost Evaluation)
3,500
Consumer Surplus
RES-E Surplus
RES-E Generation Costs
3,000
2,500
1,268
1,049
2,000
USDMM/a
990
1,028 1,027
1,058
267
1,500
311
232
235 209
216
1,000
1,541
1,281
1,027 1,054 1,111
500 974
0
Base Case Low Hydel Case Low Gas Case Worst Case Base Case @ 10% Base Case @ 14%
IRR IRR


(Single Feed‐in Tariff)
6,000
Consumer Surplus
RES-E Surplus
5,000
1,299
4,000
USDMM/a
1,294 1,294 1,294 1,294

3,000 963
1,293
798 798 798 798

2,000
685
2,589
1,000
1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813
1,539
0
IRR IRR

(Multiple Feed‐in Tariffs Exhausting Medium‐term Potential)
10,000
Consumer Surplus
RES-E Surplus
8,000
1,259
1,251 1,251 1,251 1,251
1,243
6,000
4,000
7,177
USDMM/a
6,526 6,526 6,526 6,526

5,902
2,000
-834
-1,126 -1,126 -1,174 -494
-2,000
-1,785
-4,000
IRR IRR


(Multiple Feed‐in Tariffs with All‐technology Portfolio)
6,000
Consumer Surplus
RES-E Surplus
5,000
905
4,000
390
879 879 879 879
USDMM/a
707
3,000
234 234 234 234
198
2,000
3,557
2,791 2,791 2,791 2,791

2,612
1,000
0
IRR IRR

(Multiple Feed‐in Tariffs with Same Technologies and Penetration as under Single
Feed‐in Tariff)
6,000
Consumer Surplus
RES-E Surplus
5,000
1,496
4,000
USDMM/a
1,452 1,452 1,452 1,452

3,000 767
1,409
640 640 640 640

2,000
569
2,589
1,000
1,813 1,813 1,813 1,813
1,539
0
IRR IRR

Finally, regarding the third sensitivity variable—fuel cost—we have observed that our
conclusions are completely valid even when considering an oil price scenario of US$
40/bbl. In oil price scenarios ranging between US$ 40/bbl and US$ 15/bbl, we can
identify a positive total surplus, but one that is completely appropriated by the
producers. Only when the oil price is lower than US$ 15/bbl the conclusions of this study
lose their validity.

6 Initial Thoughts on Mediumterm Policy
In this study we have carried out a comprehensive cost assessment for the medium‐
term horizon, identifying the natural and optimal penetration of RES‐E and its costs and
benefits for Pakistani society. These analyses allow us to answer a range of questions
that should be addressed before defining a medium‐term renewable energy policy for
the country. We will take into account the following responses to these important
questions in our subsequent policy recommendations to the Government of Pakistan for
the medium‐term on‐grid RES‐E power policy.
Is it necessary to perform this type of cost assessment before designing a policy for RE
incentives?
The analysis presented in this study, though a rough approximation, can provide an
overall idea of where the optimal allocation of RES can be found, along with its costs and
benefits. The concept of cost‐efficiency suggests that policy‐makers set an objective
based on the available scientific and technical data, and then try to ensure that this
objective is met, on least‐cost terms. In doing so, regulators ensure that if efficiency
cannot be maintained in the strict economic sense, then at least reaching the goal does
not result in a waste of the society's resources. To perform this type of study we need
data about costs and potentials for the different RES in Pakistan, but also a large number
of input parameters that are at the core of much of the academic debate, and other
information that is rather difficult to assess—for instance, the discount rate for costs
and benefits, the value of avoided external costs, such as CO2, and the timeline of RES
installation, etc. We found that the information required to compute the cost and
potentials for RE in Pakistan is often non‐existent, sometimes puzzling, and, in general,
spread over a large number of regional and central organizations and therefore difficult
to access and assimilate.
We would like to mention that an RES‐E policy can be defined without first conducting
this type of study. However, although such a ‘blind’ policy may prove to be just as
effective as a policy based on a comprehensive RES‐E supply curve assessment, it would
most likely be less efficient for society (i.e., it would result in more than the optimal RES‐
E share being installed) or may minimize the consumers’ surplus by allocating it fully to
the producers (i.e., because the slope of the supply curve is not known).
This study, the first of its type for Pakistan, is perceived to be adequate for settling
quantitative issues regarding the medium‐term policy for deployment of on‐grid RES‐E
generation in the country. Nevertheless, we believe that continued and more refined
analysis should be undertaken by the GoP in this area as part of its future energy sector
planning and policy‐making process.
Is a natural penetration of RES‐E still possible in the Pakistani context?
We have observed that the natural penetration of RES‐based grid power in Pakistan
should be around 17 TWh in 2020. This is around 7% of total grid‐based electrical power
generation expected for that year. The fact that any capacity approaching this share is

not currently developed indicates that some strong barriers may exist, especially if we
consider that the marginal cost of RES‐E is around US$ 75/MWh and the cost of
generation based on FO is more than US$ 125/MWh. This provides a very strong
economic signal favoring the development of RES‐E, and it can therefore be concluded
that some impediments, of administrative, regulatory, or financial kind, are responsible
for the current lackluster RES‐E deployment in the country.
Almost 60% of this RES‐E share is comprised of hydel plants that are cheaper than CCGT
running on FO, which in turn defines the price of avoided generation. The other two RES‐
E technologies that should be developed in Pakistan are bagasse‐based CHP and other
types of biomass conversion. Definitely, small‐scale hydel is the cheapest option for
developing RE in Pakistan and should be encouraged as early as possible.
What is the optimal RES‐E quota in the medium‐term for Pakistan?
An RES‐E policy should be based on a social assessment of cost and benefits. The
analysis of natural penetration based on private costs alone does not consider
externalities, and therefore represents a limited subset of such an analysis.
We have observed in this study that the optimal penetration of RES‐based power
generation in Pakistan should be around 25 TWh in 2020, which is around 10.4% of total
on‐grid generation expected for that year. Market failure (i.e., externalities not properly
being internalized) thus hampers the development of about 8 TWh of renewable energy
compared to the expected natural penetration of up to 17 TWh in that year. To develop
that extra 8 TWh, an economic incentive mechanism needs to be put in place, assuming
that all other barriers that block the development of natural penetration of RES‐E have
also been removed.
Under social cost assessment, not only hydel and biomass plants, but also biogas (from
farm slurries, sewage, landfills, etc.) and wind energy plants are required to generate, in
order to replace CCGTs running on FO and natural gas—as a matter of fact, all FO‐based
generation would need to be replaced, as well as around 15% of the gas‐based
generation, in our simulation for 2020.
Is there an economic benefit for Pakistani society in developing the optimal quota for
RE, and if so, how much?
We have identified a total surplus of about US$ 2,100 million per year in 2020 in our
base case for optimal RES‐E quota deployment. The total surplus is a measure of how
much wealth is being created within the society as consequence of a policy.
When is the benefit for society maximized?
The benefit for society is maximized when the optimal quota (i.e., 25 TWh in 2020) for
RES‐E is met, and is supplied utilizing all RES‐E plants that are cheaper than the cost of
the marginal plant needed for meeting the optimal quota—in our study US$ 103/MWh
in the base case.

It is important to note that some RES‐E technologies, such as solar PV or solar thermal,
are not as economically viable as other RES‐E on‐grid solutions given the current state of
technology. Therefore, in an optimal solution, they should not be developed. The
penetration of waste‐to‐energy is very small, as it is a very expensive technology;
however, the development of this technology is related to waste management and other
benefits, and this technology may be developed anyway for these other reasons.
How robust are our conclusions?
Regarding the optimal quota of RES‐E, only changes in the assumed cost of capital
generate some variations in the results of this study. When the cost of capital decreases
to 10%, the optimal quota for RES‐E, as expected, increases—from 10.4% up to 14.1%.
When simulating different conventional supply curves, we observe that only the ‘worst’
conventional energy supply case—in which at the same time there is less hydel and gas
generation than in the base case—has a relatively important effect on avoided cost,
because part of this generation is replaced by CCGT running on FO.
Probably, the cost driver that may change the conclusions most is the price of fuel, as it
has a direct impact on the estimation of the avoided cost of (thermal) generation.
Regarding fuel cost, we have observed that our conclusions remain completely valid
even when considering a crude oil price of US$ 40/bbl. In an oil price scenario ranging
between US$ 40/bbl and US$ 15/bbl, we identify a positive total surplus, but one that is
completely appropriated by the producers. For an oil price lower than US$ 15/bbl, the
conclusions of this report cannot be considered valid.
Finally, it is relevant to mention that due to the high uncertainty in the set of parameters
required to compute the supply curves (RES costs, potentials by each RES, technology
advance in both conventional and RES, discount rates, environmental costs, non‐
environmental externalities sin conventional energy, etc.), we have made many
assumptions based on our experience and best available criteria. These assumptions
have an obvious effect on the conclusions; however, we believe that the conclusions
presented in this paper are the most reliable that can be obtained based on available
data in Pakistan.
Are there any arguments for abandoning the cost‐efficient approach? What are the
costs?
The main argument against the cost‐efficient approach is that it does not foster the
development of certain RES‐E technologies—basically those technologies that are more
expensive than the marginal cost of supplying the optimal quota of RES‐E in total
generation (i.e., in Pakistan’s case, US$ 103/MWh). The cost‐efficient approach is a static
one, but policy makers might not be concerned solely with ‘static efficiency’ which does
not take into account long‐term prospects and technological innovation. Therefore, they
may define a policy decision outside the first‐best space of solutions. In Europe, for
instance, it is understood that any instrument to promote RES‐E should also lead to
'dynamic efficiency', i.e., should give economic agents an incentive to continuously lower

their costs through technological progress. In that sense, single feed‐in tariffs or a quota
system that are best for static efficiency are replaced with multiple feed‐in tariffs
designed with technology‐specific tariff rates or hybrid schemes.
It is important to note that in this case, cheap energy (small‐scale hydel, for instance) is
replaced for more expensive energy, such as solar PV, solar thermal, or waste‐to‐energy.
This makes the total surplus decrease from around US$ 2,100 million to US$ 1,100
million in 2020. Within the power sector, this policy thus reduces wealth by about US$
1,000 million per year that it is supposed to be created in another area, for instance,
through the development of a local industry for solar PV, etc. The most affected agents
are the producers of the cheapest technologies (hydel), who stand to lose around US$
400 million per year as a result of such a policy.
Another alternative is to define a policy for installing all medium‐term potential (55 TWh
of RES‐E generation, about 22% of total power generation in 2020) in order to foster a
dynamic industry for all types or RES‐E. This is not efficient from an economic point view,
because cheaper conventional energy is replaced by RES‐E technologies that are
extremely expensive. This is evidenced in the change of the total surplus that decreases
from US$ 2,100 million per year down to about US$ 120 million. As a matter of fact, the
consumers’ surplus in this case is negative, and this is definitely not appropriate for
energy customers.
Multiple‐equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope of this work, but policy makers should
understand that the wealth destroyed by a policy in one sector must be sufficiently
offset by that created in another, in order to get a net overall increase in wealth within
society.
What are the differences amongst various incentives mechanisms (quota system,
single FIT, multiple FITs, etc.) from an economic point of view?
The simplest incentive mechanism would be to set a single feed‐in tariff—i.e., establish
only one feed‐in tariff for all RES‐E technologies—at the marginal cost of RES‐E
generation calculated in the social cost analysis which, according to our estimation, is
US$ 103/MWh. This mechanism should be equivalent to setting a quota at 10.4% of
Pakistan’s total electricity generation in 2020. However, as was explained in Annex IV,
the effectiveness of a quota system is worse than that of a feed‐in system, due to the
complexities in designing the secondary market for green certificates and penalties for
when the quota is not fulfilled. Tendering procurements are a very good mechanism for
starting up the market, but are rather difficult to design as an ongoing policy.
The single feed‐in tariff may generate a high producer surplus and, hence, decrease the
consumers’ surplus, given a total surplus. The immediate alternative—multiple or
technology‐based feed‐in tariffs—tends to reduce the producers’ surplus, given a total
surplus. The extreme alternative—a cost‐plus approach—in which the cost is assessed
on a plant‐basis under the hypothesis of no information asymmetry, makes the
producers’ surplus tend towards zero, thus maximizing the consumers’ surplus.

Therefore, under static economic analysis, the issue of the incentive mechanism is a
matter of wealth distribution and robustness of the incentive.
The amount of producers’ surplus depends on the slope of the RES‐E supply curve in the
part that is lower than the conventional supply curve. The higher the slope, the higher
the producers’ surplus is. That is why it is extremely important to have an idea of the
RES‐E supply curve before designing an incentive mechanism for RES. One example of
the importance of the RES‐E supply curve’s slope can be observed when analyzing the
small‐scale hydel supply curve, which from around the US$ 100/MWh:11 TWh mark
becomes extremely steep and, hence, the inframarginal rents can be huge for adding
even 400 GWh (out of 11 TWh) of generation per year.
It should be noted that small‐scale hydel plants get the major share of the producers’
surplus (around US$ 500 million in 2020 in the base case), and this extra revenue is
actually an incentive to develop hydel plants. As a matter of fact, the producers’ surplus
is an incentive for developing all RES technologies.
The feed‐in tariffs for each technology are generally lower than the simple feed‐in tariff,
as expected, and hence the producers’ surplus is lower. In effect, the producers’ surplus
decreases from US$ 795 million to US$ 638 million, but the total surplus remains the
same—US$ 2,089 million. Therefore, there is an increase in the consumers’ surplus of
around US$ 157 million in the base case for multiple FITs.
Should the producers’ surplus be completely removed?
The producers’ surplus is a consequence of inframarginal rents. Inframarginal rents can
be observed in all markets, from the cookies industry to power pools, and represent a
natural incentive for investors to perform an activity. The removal of all of the
producers’ surplus by applying a cost‐plus mechanism will, on the one hand, decrease
the incentive to invest in RES‐E technologies, and on the other hand, make investors
game against the cost‐plus mechanism—a mechanism in which the information
advantage is on the producers’ side. Besides that, the cost‐plus mechanism is usually a
greater administrative burden and tends to delay the development of RES technologies.
Which incentive mechanisms represent the best trade‐off between effectiveness and
fairness?
In our opinion, multiple feed‐in tariffs provide the optimal trade‐off between allocation
of surplus and effectiveness. It cannot be a coincidence that in most parts of the world,
technology‐based feed‐in tariffs are the preferred mechanism employed. The
temptation of the cost‐plus approach seems to be huge when we think in terms of tariffs
and customer protection, but an RES policy is really a matter of designing incentives that
are adequate to fulfill the optimal quota of RES‐E in the medium term, and therefore is a
matter of efficiency. It is usually better to get 50% of something rather than 100% of
nothing.

Annex VIII: Working Paper 5:
Development of Ongrid RE in Pakistan:
Medium Term Policy Recommendations

Working Paper No. 5
Contents
Exhibits ..................................................................................................................... 305
1 Objective .............................................................................................................. 309
2 Target Markets ..................................................................................................... 309
3 Implementation Period ........................................................................................ 310
4 Targets and Incentives .......................................................................................... 311
4.1 Selection of Policy Instrument .......................................................................... 311
4.2 Incentives and Avoided Cost ............................................................................. 313
4.3 Technology‐wise Feed‐in RE Tariffs ................................................................... 314
4.3.1 Approach for ‘Economic’ Technologies ................................................ 314
4.3.2 Approach for (Currently) ‘Uneconomic’ Technologies .......................... 314
4.3.3 Structure of Tariffs ................................................................................. 315
4.3.4 Indexation for Feed‐in Tariffs ................................................................ 315
4.4 Type of Contract ................................................................................................ 315
4.5 Allocation of Network Investment Cost ............................................................ 316
4.6 Direct Sales ........................................................................................................ 316
4.7 Allocation of Carbon Credits.............................................................................. 316
4.8 Land and Site Access .......................................................................................... 317
4.9 Incentives Other Than Tariffs ............................................................................ 317
5 Pre‐feasibility Studies ........................................................................................... 318
6 Roles of Institutions ............................................................................................. 319
6.1 Power Market Development and Transitional Period ...................................... 319
7 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents ........................................................ 321

8 Procedural Requirements ..................................................................................... 321
9 Implementation of Tariffs and Quotas .................................................................. 323

Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Institutional Roles in RE Development Over the Medium Term ................ 320
Exhibit 2: Illustrative RE Feed‐in Tariffs and Quotas .................................................. 324

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
LMM Locally manufactured machinery
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt‐hour
PC Project Committee
POE Panel of Experts
PSDP Public Sector Development Programme
PV Photovoltaic

RE Renewable energy
RED Renewable Energy Development
RoW Right‐of‐way
TRANSCO Transmission company
TWh Terawatt‐hour

1 Objective
This Annex presents the consultants’ draft proposal for the design of a medium term
policy for the development of on‐grid renewable energy sourced electricity (RES‐E) in
Pakistan. This proposal takes into account the analysis presented in the preceding
Annexes: i.e., best international practice and renewable energy (RE) policy experience
(Annex IV), a diagnosis of Pakistan’s current short term on‐grid RE policy (Annex V), and
a comprehensive economic and comparative assessment of conventional and RE sources
and supply options in the Pakistani context (Annexes VI and VII).
This document presents general guidelines for formulating a detailed medium term RE
policy framework for Pakistan. Once the broad outline of the policy approach, and its
underlying rationale, have been agreed upon by relevant stakeholders, detailed
implementation measures for each RE technology will be provided, constituting a
comprehensive medium term RE policy framework (for the period 2008 to 2012) for the
systematic implementation of RE technologies and scaling up of capacity deployment in
Pakistan, including the use of off‐grid and non‐power RE resources.
The proposal presented in this paper focuses on on‐grid renewable energy. The
geographical demarcation of off‐grid regions and the design of the legal and regulatory
framework for off‐grid and distributed generation will be analyzed in a subsequent
annex (Annex IX).
2 Target Markets
‘On‐grid’ RE means grid‐connected1 power generation fueled by renewable resources
(either to transmission or distribution systems), selling power to the Central Power
Purchasing Agency (CPPA), to electricity distribution companies (DISCOs), or directly to
bulk consumers, utilizing national or regional grids for transmission.
For purposes of RE policy definition, ‘on‐grid RE’ includes the following renewable
energy technologies (RETs), for individual project installed capacity higher than 1 MW:2
• Small hydro of 50 MW or less capacity
• Solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal energy for power generation

1
2
Installations of less than 1 MW capacity will be assessed as part of the off‐grid policy guidelines, as they require a
simplified approach (i.e., delicensing).

• On‐shore wind power generation
• Municipal solid waste‐to‐energy (WTE) power and landfill methane recovery, and
• Bio‐energy resulting from:
o Anaerobic biogas digesters
o Pyrolytic biomass gasification, co‐firing, or cogeneration.
Other potential or incipient RE power generation technologies, such as those based on
wave, tidal, off‐shore wind, geothermal energy, and fuel cells—which could eventually
be relevant to future renewable energy use in Pakistan—are not included in the
mandate of the medium term RE policy regime. The medium term policy thus focuses,
as per the RE development roadmap adopted by the GoP, on the optimal deployment of
currently mature and commercially feasible RETs, with emerging technologies to be
assessed subsequently as they move beyond the R&D and pilot implementation stages.
3 Implementation Period
Although in the current short term Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for
Power Generation, 2006, the medium term policy to be developed was envisaged to be
implemented for a four‐year period, we recognize that incentive‐based policies require
at least five years of sustained promotion in order to be successful.
The analysis of the outcome of the short term on‐grid RE policy (December 2006 to date)
demonstrated that, amongst other issues, such a short period was insufficient in terms
of expectations with regard to its implementation goals. Furthermore, if the policy
regime is slated to change after only two years of application, the additional effort that
investors require to understand the incentive mechanism increases, investment
decisions get deferred in the hope of procuring additional incentives later, and thus
actual capacity deployment may be jeopardized. The consultants’ opinion is that policy
incentives must remain stable and assured over a reasonably extended period in order
for investment confidence to build up, supportive institutional capacity to develop, and
implementation bottlenecks to be gradually and systematically removed.
Therefore it is suggested that the implementation period of the current short term on‐
grid policy be extended to at least the end of 2008, and that of the medium term RE
policy to apply from January 2009 to December 2013 (inclusive).
After the five‐year medium term period, a new RE deployment phase will begin, in
which:
• Technologies that have not been included in the earlier policy phases but may
have matured sufficiently in the interim may also be provided specific incentives.
• The type of incentive mechanisms selected for the medium term may be
changed in light of experience gained as well as given the growth and
sophistication achieved by the local RE industry.
• Specific incentive tools and instruments may be retained from the medium term
phase, but the corresponding values or targets may be revised.

An important aspect regarding various successive policy periods is that of assuring
continuity for projects that have been implemented under a certain policy, i.e., they
should not be subject to any change in the incentives they initially receive over the
applicable project tenure (usually the project’s operational lifetime), even in the case
that the relevant policy or the incentives change in the meantime. This approach
ensures the consistency and stability of an RE deployment climate from the perspective
of both investors and power purchasers, as well as other relevant stakeholders
(financiers, carbon creditors, service providers, end users, etc.); this is considered
especially critical for the long‐term implementation of RE in Pakistan as a conducive
environment for RE development has yet to gain broad acceptance and attract business
confidence.
Consequently, the consultants support the GoP’s undertaking that any RE project that
achieves financial closure before the onset of the next policy phase (i.e., January 2009)
continues to be guaranteed all the incentives defined in the applicable short term RE
policy over the tenure of its Power Purchase Agreement (PPA).
4 Targets and Incentives
4.1 Selection of Policy Instrument
When designing an RE policy, some characteristics of RES‐E technologies should be taken
into account in order to properly incorporate the complexities that these technologies
add to the analysis. Even though most of these characteristics have already been
presented in previous Annexes (particularly Annex VII), some of the key features can be
• Smaller plant sizes (1 to 50 MW), compared to typical conventional generation
options
• Large variation in investment costs (per MW installed)
• Heterogeneous technology options for the same renewable source
• Non‐existence of suitable commodity markets for bio‐energy fuel inputs.
The existence of these differences amongst various RES‐E technologies increases the
asymmetries in information availability as well as the complexities of tariff
methodologies based on a ’cost‐plus‘ approach—therefore, simpler approaches must be
preferred. In this regard, our main recommendation is for Pakistan to discontinue the
present system of negotiated power purchase tariffs and instead implement, as soon as
possible, a traditional feed‐in (or up‐front) tariff for grid‐connected RE generators. We
have already thoroughly analyzed, in Annexes IV and VII, the main advantages and
drawbacks of each alternative mechanism—including their effect on the corresponding
social surplus and the distribution of that surplus between consumers and producers—
and therefore only a brief recapitulation is provided below.
As discussed in Annex V, the current tariff system for unsolicited RE proposals in
Pakistan is based on a ‘cost‐plus’ approach. The cost‐plus formulation requires a case‐

by‐case determination of the applicable tariff for every single producer.3 From a
regulator’s point of view, the advantage of this methodology is the ability to reduce
infra‐marginal rents down to zero and, therefore, maximize the consumer’s surplus.
Nevertheless, this approach presents several major shortcomings, which can be
• Investors, taking advantage of asymmetries in information access (as only the
developer has intimate knowledge of a particular project’s costs and
peculiarities), can game against the mechanism to obtain infra‐marginal rents.
• It decreases the financial incentive to invest in RES‐E technologies, as developers
are deprived of most of the infra‐marginal rents.
• It increases in the administrative burden in processing projects, and increases the
possibility of unavoidable systematic delays.
Therefore, applying a cost‐plus methodology for tariff estimation ensures neither the
maximization of the social surplus, nor the effective deployment of RES‐E technologies.
An alternative approach is to develop a quota system, either by defining a ‘green
certificate’ market or through tendering procurement. As was explained in Annex IV, the
effectiveness of the quota system is worse than the feed‐in system because of the
complexities in designing the secondary market for green certificates and the applicable
penalties for when the quota is not fulfilled. Tendering procurements are a very good
mechanism for starting up the market, which may be necessary for some RE
technologies in Pakistan but rather difficult to design as an ongoing policy instrument.
Furthermore, the main shortfall of this methodology is its crucial assumption of a large
number of participants, so that participants are not afforded credible collusion
opportunities. If this assumption does not hold, and participants are able to collude to
drive up prices, then the outcome of the auction process will probably be far removed
from that of a competitive outcome, and could well minimize consumer surplus.
Feed‐in tariffs (FITs) have been (and still are) very successful in Europe for promoting
RES‐E deployment, and represent the standard option for ensuring renewable
penetration. The main advantages of FITs can be summarized as follows:
• Simplicity in design: The FIT design process implies a technology‐based analysis
of costs, rather than one requiring case‐by‐case analysis.
• Technology‐specific: FIT may be designed equal for all RE technologies, or they
may vary amongst different RETs if the government decides to encourage the
development of a specific technology.
• Transparent and foreseeable: With the tariff defined up front, any investor is
easily able to estimate potential project revenues unambiguously, and thus
decide to invest or obtain financing on a secure basis.
• Cost‐effective: If the feed‐in tariff is set below the relevant avoided social cost, it
would represent a cost‐effective option for the society as a whole.

3
Although up‐front tariffs have been defined for wind power projects in Pakistan, no developer has committed to (or
has planned on) utilizing these tariffs so far.

Nevertheless, FITs have some drawbacks due to nature of the system:
• Even if well designed, FITs will most probably not result in the maximization of
the consumers’ surplus, and
• FIT does not necessarily foster the development of certain technologies (e.g.,
does not encourage use of more costly options that could benefit from eventual
economies of large scale deployment, but instead favors readily available least‐
cost RETs), and therefore does not cater to long‐term prospects and
technological innovation.
It must be understood, however, that neither the first nor the second potential
shortcoming of FITs is necessarily disadvantageous from an economic point of view, as
these are not concerned solely with economic efficiency: the first one relates primarily
to wealth distribution, while the second is more about long‐term industrial policy.
4.2 Incentives and Avoided Cost
One of the most basic principles in energy economics relates to the concept of avoided
costs: the cost a utility would incur in generating the next increment of electric capacity
using its own resources. According to this definition, any policy fostering the
development of the cheapest available technology will increase the consumer’s surplus
when compared to the most expensive technologies. As was presented in Annex VII,
even considering only private costs, nearly 20 TWh per year of renewable energy were
ready to displace more expensive conventional technology (i.e., fuel oil‐based thermal
generation) in Pakistan, with associated savings larger than US$ 1 billion per year. This
scale of RE deployment can be achieved by simply providing incentives to RES‐E through
a single FIT of about US$ 75/MWh.4
Therefore, as there is no RE power market in Pakistan yet, incentives for the
development of RES‐E—even if they generate some producers’ surplus—should be
provided, at least when the renewable option is clearly cheaper than the avoided private
cost, since this option would ultimately save the consumers money. Moreover, from an
economic point of view, incentives should ideally be linked to the avoided social cost—
that is, approximately US$ 103/MWh, if we assume a single RE FIT for Pakistan.
It needs to be recognized that tariffs and incentives are not exactly the same concept. A
tariff is the regulated price of a service that, in theory, should be related to the marginal
cost of providing it; on the other hand, an incentive is not related to the marginal cost—
as a matter of fact, it may be higher to the extent that it remains less than the avoided
cost in social terms.
The consultants’ recommendation for determining the RE‐based power procurement
prices for the medium term policy regime in Pakistan is:
• To set feed‐in tariffs for each technology based on the ‘avoided cost’ approach
for those technologies whose marginal cost is lower than the avoided social cost.

4
Under a cost‐plus regime, conventional fuel oil‐based power generation would have set the tariff at almost
US$ 130/MWh, nearly doubling the incentive for RES‐E.

• To set feed‐in tariff for each technology based on the marginal cost of providing
the quota set by the GoP for those technologies whose marginal cost is higher
than avoided social cost.
4.3 Technologywise Feedin RE Tariffs
4.3.1 Approach for ‘Economic’ Technologies
We consider as ‘economic’ those technologies whose development costs are less than
their corresponding avoided social costs.
For these technologies, the consultants’ recommendation is to set technology‐wise feed‐
in tariffs based on the characteristics of the RES‐E technologies (‘supply curve analysis’),
bounded by the range obtained from the use of private and social aggregated supply
curves for conventional and RES power generation. That means that the RE tariff
approved should lie within the range delimited by private and social avoided costs,
respectively.
• “…bounded by the range obtained from the use of private and social
aggregated supply curves for conventional and RES power generation”: Optimal
penetration of renewable resources implies that the incentives (FIT) should be
set at a level where the avoided cost of conventional power generation equals
the marginal cost of the most expensive RES‐E plant. However, it is a matter of
policy whether the relevant cost curves of conventional and RES power
generation taken for this purpose are those relating to private or social costs. The
use of private or social cost curves will define a range—respectively, the
minimum and the maximum incentives for optimal RES‐E penetration—within
which the feed‐in tariffs should be set.
• “…technology‐wise feed‐in tariffs based on the characteristics of RES‐E
technologies”: the most fundamental problem with a single FIT is the fact that it
relies only on the aggregated RES‐E cost curve, without take into consideration
the slopes of each single RES‐E technology supply curve. The impact of a small
increase in the incentive for one technology may be very large if the elasticity of
the supply curve is high (a flat supply curve) or very small if the elasticity is low (a
steep supply curve).5 Therefore, setting individually differentiated incentives for
each RES‐E technology based on an analysis of their respective supply curves,
bounded by the aforementioned range, is preferable compared to setting a
single uniform incentive for all technologies.
4.3.2 Approach for (Currently) ‘Uneconomic’ Technologies
In addition to these incentives, a FIT may be proposed to foster the deployment of any
specific RES‐E technology that promises additional benefits to society that are not
explicitly included in the social supply curve of that technology. Such benefits may arise
from:

5
Technical criteria may be defined if, for instance, NEPRA considers it necessary, to define the feed‐in tariff
considering the curve’s elasticity, i.e., set the feed‐in when the curve elasticity is 1 or less.

• Reduction of specific local pollutants
• Local or regional development priorities
• Selection of RETs which the GoP considers important from an industrial
development policy point of view, and
• Employment promotion, etc.
The existence of these FITs higher than the corresponding avoided social costs is
recommended for such cases in which the cost of the RET prevents the proper
development of a specific technology–e.g., solar thermal and solar PV, as described in
Annex VII. As these technologies are currently ‘expensive’, a good policy should prevent
a reasonable, justifiable target quota for them (defined in installed MW for a given
period) from being overshot. This quota is a policy matter, and should be defined by the
government. The FIT for these technologies should be capped consistently with the
quota that the GoP defines by employing a supply curve approach.
4.3.3 Structure of Tariffs
Feed‐in tariffs should be denominated in Pakistan Rs/kWh. The feed‐in tariffs should be
based on one‐part pricing approach (i.e., single energy charge). Two‐part tariffs (capacity
payments + energy payments) are difficult for most RES‐E technologies, as most of them
cannot guarantee capacity availability–even in the case of biomass‐based generation,
which may be constrained by seasonal harvests. Despite the fact that some types of
hydel plants may be in a position of providing firm capacity commitments to the system,
for the sake of simplicity we recommend the use only an energy charge.6
4.3.4 Indexation for Feedin Tariffs
Feed‐in tariffs should be adjusted based only on local currency variations. The
indexation of the feed‐in tariffs with the US dollar exchange rate should be automatic on
a six‐monthly basis. Another possibility (to be discussed) is to use as a reference a
currency basket with US Dollar and Euro (i.e., 50:50).
Adjustments in the tariff for variation in other parameters, as it is currently the case,
may excessively complicate the adjustment methodologies without a clear benefit.
4.4 Type of Contract
The RES‐E projects should be implemented on the basis of ‘Build, Own, and Operate’
(BOO).

6
This approach means that the primary energy risk (i.e., wind speed or water inflow variability, volumes or prices of
biomass, etc.) should be allocated to the developer. The consultants are aware that this approach will increase the
risks afforded by these developers, but they take into consideration that: (i) The developers will be in a better
position to handle this risk; (ii) It will promote optimum project design, avoiding the possible over‐investment in
capacity, and (iii) the ranges proposed for the tariffs (if set using the proposed methodology) are attractive enough
for the developers, even if they have to assume the above‐mentioned risk.

4.5 Allocation of Network Investment Cost
It is proposed that the construction of transmission lines for evacuation of power from
any RE IPP should be the responsibility of the NTDC, KESC or a DISCO (depending on the
location and supply voltage of the project) if the length of the connection required from
the project’s outgoing bus bar to existing grid installations is shorter than 20 km, unless
the IPP, of its own choice, undertakes to install such infrastructure on a mutually agreed
upon transmission charge with the NTDC.
The NTDC should bear any of the expenses associated with power balancing on the grid
to accommodate priority dispatch and variability on account of the RE project, and
ensure that these expenditures are made in a timely fashion.
4.6 Direct Sales
with eligible end‐use customers. In that case, prices should not require approval by
NEPRA, but customers should be required to pay ‘wheeling’ charges for the use of the
transmission and/or distribution grid network used to transport the power from the
plant to the purchaser.
We consider that the current allocation of carbon credit revenues between RE investors
(IPPs) and the power purchasers (state entity) is unnecessarily complicated and a
potential impediment, rather than an incentive, for RE projects to apply for CDM
certification. This mechanism was perhaps necessary under the prevailing cost‐plus
tariff determination methodology, under which the RE IPP is already guaranteed a fair
return on investment, and the additional cost of RE power purchase is shifted to the
power purchaser and eventual ratepayer. With fixed feed‐in tariffs, such a situation
would no longer hold, and the RE IPP would have to assume a greater portion of the
financial and project risks involved.
In this respect, it would be both logical as well as administratively simpler for the project
to also assume the risks and benefits of qualifying for and obtaining CERs, along with the
potential revenues associated with them. This would provide several important
advantages over the prevailing methodology for RE carbon credit sharing in Pakistan:
• The allocation of future CER revenues entirely to the RE developer would act as a
much stronger additional financial incentive for developing RE‐based power
generation projects (compared to sharing a part of the proceeds), most of which
would be strong candidates under CDM’s ‘additionality’ clause given Pakistan’s
low‐RE baseline.
• The onus of applying for, validating, obtaining, and undertaking periodic
verification as required under the CDM procedures would rest entirely with the
RE developer, who would be better placed to undertake such tasks either
internally or through contracted expertise, and would absolve government
entitites (e.g., the AEDB, NEPRA, NTDC, etc.) to engage in such cumbersome
activities for which they do not have sufficient administrative or management
capacity.

• The allocation of CERs to the developers is also consistent with the current CDM
practice (in terms of contributing to financial barrier removal) and would
improve the prospects of a greater number of potential RE projects in Pakistan
qualifying for emissions certification, as compared to the current CER‐sharing
mechanism which has yet to be validated by the CDM.
Our recommendation is therefore that the GoP should restrict its role in the carbon
credits market to one of assisting individual developers in obtaining the necessary CDM
certification. It should assist, through expedited DNA endorsement, provision of part
financing for application and validation requirements, establishment and sharing of
relevant emissions inventories, methodologies, and baseline data, and relevant training
and awareness building designed to facilitate project application for, verification of, and
subsequent marketing of carbon credits to the extent possible.
4.8 Land and Site Access
or right‐of‐way (RoW) for project development, as well as providing site access on a
case‐to‐case basis by leasing, acquisition of RoW, and/or construction of road linkages.
However, the primary responsibility for acquiring land and site access should rest with
the project sponsors.
The consultants believe that the current general incentives, as defined in the 2006 RE
policy, are adequate and should be continued into the medium term stage as well. In
summary, the key general incentives are:
Sovereign risk guarantee, including:
• Guarantees to the contractual obligations of GoP entities, including NTDC (CPPA),
WAPDA, KESC, DISCOs and provincial/AJK governments, even though some or all
of the utilities may by restructured or privatized during the term of various
agreements with RE developers.
• Protection against specific ‘political’ risks.
• Protection against changes in the taxes and duties regime.
• Convertibility of Pakistani Rupees into US Dollars at the prevailing exchange rate
and the remittability of foreign exchange to cover necessary payments related to
the project, including debt servicing and payment of dividends.
Financial regime, including:
• Permission for power generation companies to issue corporate registered bonds
and to issue shares at discounted prices.
• Permission for foreign banks to underwrite the issue of shares and bonds by
private RE power companies.
• Non‐residents allowed to purchase securities issued by Pakistani companies
without the State Bank of Pakistan’s permission.

• Abolition of 5% limit on investment of equity in associated undertakings.
• Locally manufactured equipment, components, and machinery required for RE
projects shall be eligible for financing under the State Bank of Pakistan’s Scheme
for Financing Locally Manufactured Machinery (LMM).
• Special financing arrangements specifically aimed at facilitating investments,
technology transfer, and local manufacturing capacity in targeted renewable
energy technologies and projects, i.e., a revolving line of credit under the Public
Sector Development Programme (PSDP) or a Renewable Energy Development
(RED) Fund with multilateral co‐financing.
Fiscal regime, including:
• No customs duty or sales tax on the import of RE plant and equipment.
• No levy of sales tax on plants, machinery and equipment.
• Exemption is already available from income tax, including turnover rate tax and
withholding tax on imports.
• Repatriation of equity, along with dividends, is freely allowed, subject to the
prescribed rules and regulations.
applicable to industry in general.
• Non‐Muslims and non‐residents shall be exempted from payment of Zakat on
dividends paid by the company.
In addition to the above, facilities made available specifically to grid‐connected RE
power projects (small‐scale stande‐alone, captive, and spillover generators) in the 2006
RE policy—i.e., net purchase and sales, net metering, wheeling, and banking—should be
continued into the medium term. In fact, these facilities need to be properly
operationalized through revision of relevant regulations, determination of applicable
tariffs, definition of accounting modalities, and provision of necessary metering
hardware and interconnection arrangements. Pilot scale demonstration of such
mechanisms would greatly help in creating public awareness and devising effective
methods for implementing such useful and innovative ways of promoting widespread
and dispersed RE deployment (especially for rooftop PV, biogas‐based generators, and
micro wind turbines).
5 Prefeasibility Studies
Pre‐feasibility studies are critical for the development of some RE resources (mostly
hydel and some biogas projects) and for relatively immature or new technologies. The
cost and complexity of undertaking such studies is a major barrier for the private sector
seeking to develop RE projects in Pakistan. In our view, the AEDB and provincial
administrations must undertake the lead responsibility of developing these pre‐
feasibility studies, either through GoP and/or IFI financing (grants and/or soft loans).
Once a pre‐feasibility study has been properly completed, the main features of the RE
project should be made public (through websites, newspaper advertisement, and

specially organized workshops) for investor to be made aware of project features and to
be able to independently analyze it. The pre‐feasibility studies may be developed by
internal agency staff and budgets or by hiring external experts and consulting firms
through competitive evaluation. In any case, the quality of the studies must ensure that
potential investors can feel comfortable with them. Multilateral technical assistance in
training and standardizing such RE IPP feasibility assessments can play a role in this
regard.
6 Roles of Institutions
In the medium term RE policy tenure, we do not recommend major changes in the
different roles that each stakeholder institution has in facilitating renewable energy
development and project implementation in Pakistan. However, we consider that some
slight changes (highlighted in bold in Exhibit 1) may improve the effectiveness of the RE
development efforts and help expedite investments. In the following table, the main
roles of the involved institutions are presented.
In particular, we emphasis the urgent need for technical and managerial capacity
building with respect to renewable energy project evaluation and implementation at the
lead RE development agencies: the AEDB in the federal government and provincial/AJK
departments dealing with RE IPPs, as well as in supporting agencies such as NEPRA,
NTDC/CPPA, the DISCOs, the CDM cell in the Ministry of Environment, as well as private
sector investors and financing institutions.
6.1 Power Market Development and Transitional Period
The ongoing development and deregulation of the power market in Pakistan should not
represent a barrier for the proper deployment of RE power generation in the country.
From the moment this policy is implemented and until the CPPA ceases its activities as
the central power purchase agency, all contracts for power generation from RES
concluded under the current RE policy should be signed by the CPPA—excepting those
bracketed as ‘direct sales’.
After the CPPA ceases its activities:
• Neither distributors nor transmission companies should have the right to reject,
in part or in entirety, any contract signed between the CPPA and a RES‐E power
generator; and
• All new contracts signed between RES‐E generators and a distribution or a
transmission company shall never be deemed as ‘direct sales’, and therefore
NEPRA shall always approve the tariff for these contracts.
In addition, RES‐E producers should be allowed to sign sales contracts with
DISCOs/TRANSCOs under non‐discriminatory conditions. Sales contracts must not be an
instrument to hamper the proper development of renewable energy power generation.
NEPRA should establish a future methodology for compensating those
DISCOs/TRANSCOs that are forced to accept contracts with a feed‐in tariff under the
renewable policy.

Exhibit 1: Institutional Roles in RE Development over the Medium Term
Institution Main Role in RE Development
Ministry of Water • Coordinate development of conventional and RE energy sources

and Power • Formulate development policies jointly with Planning Commission
• Issue implementation agreement and security packages with
Ministry of Finance
• Set penetration quota for uneconomic RE technologies
Ministry of Finance • Evaluate impact of proposed policy on the economy as a whole.

(through BOI and FBR) • Approve development policies jointly with MoWP
• Issue implementation agreements and security packages jointly
with MoWP
AEDB • Frame and propose appropriate policies and plans to the GoP
• Develop demonstration programs and projects for off-grid RE
• Promote local manufacturing
• Create awareness and facilitate technology transfer
• Channel international assistance
• One-window facility for processing IPP projects under RE policy
• Develop standard PPAs for each RET
• Develop pre-feasibility studies for RE projects in
coordination with provincial and AJK agencies
NEPRA • Define feed-in tariffs according to the conceptual

approaches provided in these policy recommendations
promptly (within four months)
• Approve the application of pre-defined feed-in tariff to a
specific RE project
• Adjust grid and distribution codes in order not to block the
development of RE IPPs
• Issue licenses for RE power generation projects
WAPDA or CPPA • Sign PPA under consent of AEDB

(as purchasing entity) • Procure all power produced by approved on-grid RE generation
plants during the term of the PPAs and up to cap provided in policy
Power Utilities • Connect RE projects to grid if they comply with requirements of

(NTDC, KESC, & network codes
DISCOs as networks
operators)
PCRET • Foster R&D and technology development relevant to renewable
energy in coordination with the AEDB
Provincial and AJK • Support the implementation of renewable energy projects in close
Agencies coordination with the AEDB
• Facilitate allocation of land use, water rights, and environmental
permitting
• Create awareness of RE amongst end users and customers
• Remove any other local impediments which may hinder RE
development in a province
coordination with AEDB
• Harmonize province RE regulations with national
framework

7 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents
The institutional, legal, and regulatory consents required prior to approval and
implementation of RE IPP projects in Pakistan are summarized below:
AEDB consents:
• Letter of Intent (LoI), followed by a Letter of Support (LoS) and related
guarantees
• Information memorandum for each project, including all technical features of the
project.
NEPRA consents:
• Generation License to construct, own or operate an RE power generation facility
• Special Purpose Transmission or Distribution License, if necessary
• Feed‐in tariff approval for the RE IPP
• Second‐tier Supply Authorization if the project enters into a power sale
arrangement with a bulk purchaser.
Pak EPA consents:
• Initial Environmental Examination (IEE) for hydroelectric and waste‐to‐energy
power generation projects of 50 MW or less capacity.
• IEE/EIA review fee payment.
NTDC/KESC/DISCOS consents:
• Any RE installation must comply with the technical requirements of the
(Transmission/Distribution) Grid Code, depending on the voltage level at which it
is connected to the utility infrastructure.
8 Procedural Requirements
Broadly speaking, the processing schedule foreseen in the 2006 RE Policy (which is
conceptually similar to that provided in PPIB’s 2002 power policy) is adequate in the
consultants’ opinion. However, it must be adjusted to the tariff regime that is proposed
under the medium term RE policy, and should be reduced in overall duration.
A typical revised processing schedule for project proposals for an on‐grid RE IPP project
should consist of the following steps:
Submission of Proposals: Proposals for renewable energy IPP projects, either on ‘raw’
sites or on sites for which the AEDB or provincial administration has carried out pre‐
feasibility studies, may be submitted to the AEDB or designated provincial/AJK
counterpart agency. Any sponsor wishing to undertake a project should have to submit a
detailed information memorandum to the AEDB/counterpart agency (CA), which must
include the following information at a minimum:

• Project name and RET classification (i.e., wind, solar, small hydro, biomass,
hybrid, etc.)
• Project location
• Proposed net installed capacity (MW) and expected annual energy output (MWh)
• Basic outline of plant and structures
• Summary implementation plan, indicating specific project preparation
milestones and expected COD
• Previous history of the project if any, and
• Description of technology and main suppliers, etc.
These proposals shall be examined by a Project Committee (PC) headed by the
Chairman, AEDB and including representatives of the CA from the province/state in
which the project is located. Proposals approved by the PC shall be processed by the
AEDB for issuance of LoI. The time for reviewing the proposal should not exceed 45
working days from the date of submittal.
LoI issuance: The LoI shall require sponsors to carry out a complete project feasibility
study in a period no longer than that predefined for each technology (depending also on
whether a pre‐feasibility study exists as well as the size of the project). The sponsors will
thereby be required to commit to meeting the standards and milestones stipulated in
the LoI. If at any time during the feasibility study period, the AEDB/CA determines that
the sponsors have failed to adhere to relevant milestones/standards or rectify such
default, the AEDB may terminate the LoI and encash the bank guarantee (the proceeds
of which shall be shared with the CA in a predetermined ratio). For issuance of the LoI,
the sponsors shall be required to post, in each case, a bank guarantee in favor of the
AEDB of the value of US$ 500 per MW of the project’s installed capacity, valid for a
period extending six months beyond the original validity of the LoI. Sponsor must post
the guarantee within less than 20 working days from approval of proposal.
On completion, the feasibility study shall be reviewed by an AEDB‐appointed Panel of
Experts (POE), and if approved, the project’s sponsors would be allowed to ask for
application of the corresponding feed‐in tariff to NEPRA within a period not exceeding
three months from date of such approval, and to obtain a generation license from
NEPRA.
Feed‐in tariff petition: The sponsors will file a feed‐in tariff petition with NEPRA through
the AEDB. This is a formal procedure in which NEPRA shall assess if the applicable feed‐
in tariff requested is adequate for the proposed project. NEPRA would have 20 working
days for approval of such a tariff from the date of the petition.
LoS, IA & PPA agreements: After tariff approval by NEPRA, the AEDB shall issue a Letter
of Support (LoS)7 against delivery of a Performance Guarantee of the value of US$ 2,500

7
The Performance Guarantee shall be in the form of an irrevocable direct‐pay letter of credit, issued by an
internationally recognized or a local bank acceptable to the Government of Pakistan, in favour of the AEDB. The
Performance Guarantee must always remain valid for a period not less than three months in excess of the then‐
prevailing financial close deadline

per MW of installed capacity in favor of the AEDB (should be posted within 30 working
days of tariff approval), valid for up to three months beyond the date specified in the
LoS for the project’s financial closure. The Performance Guarantee will secure the
sponsors’ obligations to execute the IA, PPA, and other relevant agreements and achieve
financial closure within the time period specified. If the LoS expires, the IA and PPA and
all other agreements with any governmental entity will automatically terminate. Before
signing the PPA, all consents (see Section 7) must be fulfilled.
Project implementation: The sponsor will be required to submit to the AEDB, on a
format specified by the organization, a mutually acceptable implementation schedule
with specific milestones for progress monitoring. The AEDB and the power purchaser
will require the successful bidder to submit periodic progress reports regarding the
status of contractual obligations, consents, financial and physical progress, and a
summary table showing progress towards achievement of such milestones.
Management of delays in achieving financial close or in achieving commercial operations
will follow IA and PPA procedures.
Guarantee of pass‐through tariffs: In case the RES is connected to a distribution grid,
some guarantee will be required that the distributor will recover the costs associated
with the RE power purchase.
9 Implementation of Tariffs and Quotas
Based on the modeling of conventional and RE supply curves carried out under the
current analysis (see Annexes VI and VII), an example of the design of the proposed set
of technology‐wise feed‐in tariffs for the medium term policy regime is presented in
Exhibit 2. In the case of uneconomic technologies, we assume the target quotas that are
presented in the following table. According to the consultants’ estimation the total
potential RES‐E capacity that could be installed in Pakistan, based on these feed‐in
tariffs, is about 24 TWh/year.

Exhibit 2: Illustrative RE Feed‐in Tariffs and Quotas
RES-E Technology FIT Target Quota
US$/MWh MW
Bagasse-based Generation 76.82 No cap
Biogas 93.98 No cap
Non-bagasse Biomass Generation 85.40 No cap
Landfill Methane Recovery 76.82 No cap
Photovoltaic 430.50 25 MW
Sewage Gas Recovery 102.57 No cap
Small-scale Hydel8 73.95 No cap
Solar Thermal 272.26 25 MW
Wind On-shore9 102.57 No cap
Waste-to-energy 96.3 No cap

8
Of less than 50 MW capacity. This compares with FITs of US$ 75/MWh and US$ 80/MWh proposed for small hydro
projects of capacity 0.5‐5 MW and <0.5 MW, respectively, in Micro‐ Mini‐Hydel (<5 MW) Feed‐in Tariff Study for
Pakistan (Draft), GTZ REEP Project, Islamabad, July 2007.
9
This compares with US$ 95/MWh indicative up‐front tariff currently offered by NEPRA to wind IPPs.

Annex IX: Working Paper 6:
Mediumterm Offgrid RESE Policy
Assessment


Working Paper No. 6
Assessment
Contents
Exhibits ..................................................................................................................... 329
1 Objective .............................................................................................................. 333
2 Issues in Off‐grid RE Services ................................................................................ 333
3 Cornerstones of Off‐grid RES‐E Framework ........................................................... 337
3.1 Simplified and Transparent Regulation ............................................................. 337
3.2 Tailor‐made Regulation ..................................................................................... 338
3.3 Delegation of Specific Regulatory Tasks to Other Government or
Non‐Government Entities.................................................................................. 338
3.4 Socially Acceptable Tariffs and Subsidies .......................................................... 339
3.5 A Larger Dimension of Service Providers .......................................................... 340
3.6 Many Regulatory Models to Choose From ........................................................ 341
3.7 Setting Quality‐of‐Service Standards ................................................................. 342
4 Selected International Experience ........................................................................ 343
4.1 Argentina: Off‐grid Electrification in Jujuy Province ......................................... 343
4.1.1 Tariff and Subsidies ............................................................................... 344
4.1.2 Results ................................................................................................... 345
4.2 Bolivia: The IDTR Program ................................................................................. 346
4.2.1 Results ................................................................................................... 349
4.3 Cambodia: Isolated Privately Operated Mini‐grids ........................................... 350
4.3.1 Results ................................................................................................... 351
4.4 Chile: The PER Program ..................................................................................... 352
4.4.1 Renewable Energy ................................................................................. 353
4.4.2 Results ................................................................................................... 354

4.5 India: The RGGVY Program ................................................................................ 354
4.5.1 Private Involvement .............................................................................. 356
4.5.2 Results ................................................................................................... 357
5 Recent Developments in Pakistan ......................................................................... 360
5.1 Roshan Pakistan Program .................................................................................. 361
6 Quantitative Assessment of RES‐E Deployment .................................................... 362
6.1 Electricity Demand: Simulated Target Villages .................................................. 364
6.2 Electricity Supply: Generation Alternatives....................................................... 365
6.3 Optimization Outcomes .................................................................................... 366
6.4 Medium Term Off‐grid Policy Deployment Costs ............................................. 367
7 Medium Term Off‐grid RES‐E Policy Recommendations ........................................ 369
7.1 Target Markets and Technologies ..................................................................... 369
7.2 Implementation Period ..................................................................................... 369
7.3 Conceptual Approach ........................................................................................ 370
7.4 Targets and Incentives ....................................................................................... 372
7.5 Project Funding .................................................................................................. 373
7.6 Pricing ................................................................................................................ 374
7.7 Incentives Other Than Tariffs ............................................................................ 374
7.8 Roles of Institutions ........................................................................................... 374
7.9 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents .................................................... 375
7.10 Performance Monitoring and Enforcement ...................................................... 377
7.11 Allocation of Carbon Credits .............................................................................. 377

Exhibits
Exhibit 1: Electricity Supply Models ............................................................................ 336
Exhibit 2: EJSED S.A. Customer’s Evolution by Type of Generation Technology ........ 345
Exhibit 3: IDTR Program SHS Connections .................................................................. 350
Exhibit 4: Regional Rural Electrification Coverage in Chile ......................................... 354
Exhibit 5: Progress of RGGVY Projects Sanctioned in India’s Xth Plan ........................ 358
Exhibit 6: India’s XIth Plan – Estimated Electrification Costs Norms for Villages ........ 360
Exhibit 7: Roshan Pakistan Rural Electrification Program Budget .............................. 362
Exhibit 8: Solar and Wind Availability in Target Village Area...................................... 363
Exhibit 9: Main Characteristics of Simulated Target Villages ..................................... 365
Exhibit 10: Off‐grid Generation Technology Alternatives ............................................. 365
Exhibit 11: Additional Simulation Input Parameters .................................................... 366
Exhibit 12: Off‐grid Electrification Deployment Simulation
(Including Hydro Resources) ....................................................................... 367
Exhibit 13: Off‐grid Electrification Deployment Simulation
(Excluding Hydro Resources) ...................................................................... 368
Exhibit 14: Off‐grid Electrification Capital and Fuel Costs for 1,850 Villages ............... 368
Exhibit 15: Proposed Federally Assisted Off‐grid RES‐E Deployment Approach .......... 370
Exhibit 16: Summary of Roles of Institutions in Off‐grid RES‐E Deployment ............... 375

A Ampere
AC Alternating current
Ah Ampere‐hour
BPL Basic poverty line
BST Bulk supply tariff
CBO Community Based Organization
CFL Compact fluorescent lamp
CNE Comisión Nacional de Energía
DC Direct current
DDGS Decentralized Distribution Generation Systems
DVC Damodar Valley Corporation
EAC Electricity Authority of Cambodia
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment
ERTIC Programa de Electrificación Rural y Tecnologías de la Información y
Comunicación
HH Household
ICT Information and communication technology
MSC Medium‐Term Service Contracts
MW Megawatt
NGO Non‐governmental Organization

O&M Operation and maintenance
OBA Output‐based aid
OGREA Off‐grid Rural Electrification Account
PCU Project Coordination Unit
PER Rural Electrification Program (Chile)
PV Photovoltaic
RE Renewable energy
REC Rural Electrification Companies
REDB Renewable Energy Distribution Backbone
REF Rural Electrification Fund
RGGVY Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana
RoW Right‐of‐way
TCE Technical Control Entity
US United States
VEI Village Electrification Infrastructure
W Watt
WTP Willingness‐to‐pay

Assessment
1 Objective
This Annex presents the consultants’ assessment and proposal for the design of a
medium term policy for the development of off‐grid1 renewable energy sourced
electricity (RES‐E) in Pakistan. This analysis takes into account some critical issues
regarding off‐grid renewable energy (RE) services, selected relevant international
experience, and some assessment of the overall costs implied in the ensuing policy
recommendations.
This document presents general guidelines for formulating a detailed medium term off‐
grid RES‐E Policy framework for Pakistan. Once the broad outline of the policy approach,
and its underlying rationale, have been agreed upon by relevant stakeholders, formal
regulation for the medium‐term period (2009 to 2014) will be issued jointly with on‐grid
regulation for the systematic implementation of RE technologies and scaling up of
capacity deployment in Pakistan.
The proposal presented in this paper focuses on off‐grid renewable energy deployment,
as policy measures for on‐grid RE have been discussed in the preceding annexes IV to
VIII. It is relevant to highlight that in the paper the electrification of scattered or grid‐
isolated villages only is considered; traditional electrification based on grid extension
and/or conventionally powered mini‐grids is out of the scope of this review. However,
this proposal cannot be completely divorced from an overall national rural electrification
policy strategy. Unfortunately, the task of rural electrification in Pakistan is distributed
amongst different institutions and programs, which makes a holistic assessment more
difficult.
2 Issues in Offgrid RE Services
The proper design of institutions and regulatory systems for electrification is a complex
undertaking, especially for off‐grid regions. This is due to the fact that the key agents
involved—organizations (public, private, cooperative, or NGOs), system operators, and
end users, amongst others—involved in the development process each have their own,
sometimes conflicting and often uncoordinated, objectives and incentives. In addition, in
order to achieve electrification targets, power supply companies typically use one or
several of the following approaches:

1

• On‐grid solutions: a) traditional grid expansion; or b) bulk resale by community‐
based organizations (CBOs)
• Off‐grid solutions: a) Isolated mini‐grids; b) solar/wind home systems (SHSs and
WHSs); c) battery‐charging stations; d) centralized/decentralized biogas
digesters; amongst others.
Off‐grid solutions are suitable for providing electricity services to isolated places where,
either due to difficulties of physical access, or simply because the cost outweighs
benefits, grid extension is not a feasible option. The implementation of decentralized
technologies often requires decentralized solutions; this requires the involvement of
local governments, small local companies, cooperatives, etc., which consequently
necessitates a ‘tailor‐made’ institutional and regulatory design.
When defining any policy, especially when dealing with off‐grid solutions, policy makers
need to consider two basic rules:
1. Regulation is a means to an end, what ultimately matters is the outcome (in this
case, providing electricity to people who lack this service):
The final objective of the regulation should be that electrification is carried out in a
rapid, sustainable, and cost‐efficient way while meeting minimum acceptable
technical quality‐of‐service standards and end user affordability criteria. If the
designed system cannot achieve this outcome, then it has failed to ‘add value’.
2. Benefits of the regulation must exceed its costs:
The regulator can contribute to maximizing the benefits of electrification by
minimizing the transaction costs of regulation, i.e., the rules imposed by a
regulator cost time and money. Regulation creates both direct and indirect costs.
Direct costs are the ones contemplated in the budget of the regulatory agencies as
well as the costs incurred by agents for the fulfillment of the regulation. In off‐grid
electrification, indirect regulatory costs are probably the highest. In many cases, a
weak economic and financial enterprise fails to fulfill all the regulatory
requirements, stopping it from initializing or completing an electrification initiative.
In such cases, when the regulation pushes the enterprise beyond an ‘inflection’
point, then the design has essentially failed to protect the customer if they are
forced to keep on buying electricity (or other substitutes) at prices (per kWh) much
higher than the ones they could pay from an operator that provides electricity
services.
grid extension and/or conventional energy powered mini‐grids made by large state‐
owned utilities. These extensions have usually been financed by cross‐subsidies between
consumers, or by loans or grants provided by the government. Recently, the spectrum of
electrification models has widened, and the international experience related to the
implementation of those methodologies can be summarized as:
• Grid extension by distribution company (Brazil, Colombia, Ghana, Guatemala,
India, and Nicaragua)

• Grid extension by local government, municipality, or private company (Colombia
and Nicaragua)
• Bulk resale by a cooperative or a private entrepreneur of grid‐supplied electricity
to a new area or an area that had been supplied by an isolated generator
(Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Costa Rica)
• Isolated village mini‐grids combined with an stand‐alone generator (Bolivia,
Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Philippines, and Sri Lanka)
• WHSs/SHSs/biodigestors installed under a dealership or vendor delivery model
(India, Indonesia, Kenya, and Sri Lanka)
• WHSs/SHSs installed under a fee‐for‐service model (Argentina, Laos, Morocco,
South Africa) or a mix of both (Bolivia)
• WHSs/SHSs installed through a legal obligation imposed on the distribution
company (Argentina and Brazil)
• Private or community‐owned and operated battery charging stations (Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Nigeria).
There are several reasons that may explain this variety of electrification models. Some of
these are:
• The existence of private distribution companies: Reforms in the power sector
have usually resulted in some combination of restructuring and privatization.
Private DISCOs are obviously reluctant to supply those customers who will
represent losses to them. Unless the reform package includes explicit incentives
and obligations to promote electrification, private DISCOs will not seek, by
themselves, the electrification of isolates areas. Without proper incentives,
private companies will only focus on existing markets or on the more profitable
ones, usually located on urban areas. This situation is quite different from
traditional state‐owned DISCOs, who can be ‘obligated’ to extend the grid.
• The existence of economies of scale: All distribution companies face economies
of scales in developing a network. Therefore, the direction in which grid
extensions take place moves from highly populated areas to less populated ones.
Marginal—and isolated—consumers are least preferred by DISCOs due to the
high investment costs involved in serving them and their low demand and ability
to pay.
Electrification expenses: Grid extensions can become very expensive in the case
of isolated, far flung areas. As an example, the cost of extending the grid in some
rural areas of Brazil was estimated at US$ 3,000‐4,000 per customer. On the
other hand, off‐grid electrification has the potential to provide basic electricity
services at much lower prices (some typical values range between US$ 300‐1,000
per customer). Hence, off‐grid electrification has the potential to becoming an
economical alternative to typical grid extensions.
• New and improved technologies: Off‐grid technologies have been updated and
upgraded from time to time. Renewable energy has started playing a key role in

off‐grid solutions, with some of the most common RES‐E technologies for off‐grid
application including solar photovoltaic, mini‐and microhydel, small wind, and
biomass. Usually these RES‐E technologies can be mixed with conventional
generation to provide greater reliability to the system.
• Decentralized technologies for decentralized business models: One of the main
characteristics of off‐grid technologies is that they are installed close to end‐
users and far away from centralized administrative or operative entities. Due to
the isolation of customers, traditional business models—and their regulation—
have failed to provide useful management solutions for these customers.
Therefore, off‐grid technologies need business models suited for the purpose in
terms of operation, maintenance, and client service. In some cases, micro‐ or
community‐based enterprises have played a key role in the off‐grid electrification
process.
Exhibit 1 summarizes some of the existing international experience on off‐grid
electrification in order to provide information on regulatory policy options. The range of
models depicted in the exhibit demonstrates that there is no single, ‘unique’ solution for
off‐grid electrification. Moreover, in many cases more than one model is applied within
the same country, which means that regulatory institutions must be flexible enough
maybe to provide a ‘menu of solutions’—with proper incentives for each—amongst
which stakeholders can choose from.
Exhibit 1: Electricity Supply Models
Grid Connected Isolated Single-User

Type
Extension Mini-grid Mini-grid System
Hydel mini-grid
selling to local SHS (Honduras,
customers and Indonesia,
to the main Kenya, Sri
grid (China, Lanka)
Nicaragua) Diesel or hydel
Small & Small grid mini-grid
Decentralized reseller (India) (Cambodia, PV/wind/diesel
Formerly Ethiopia) (Brazil, Chile,
isolated mini- México)
grid now grid Wind or hydel
connected (Argentina,
(Cambodia) Mongolia,
Nepal)
Privatized Off-grid concession (Argentina)

concessionaire
extends grid SHS
Large &
(Argentina, (Bangladesh,
Centralized Technology neutral electrification
Private
Chile, Bolivia,
Guatemala, concession (Senegal)
Morocco, South
Uganda) Africa)

Grid Connected Isolated Single-User

Type
Extension Mini-grid Mini-grid System
Multi-service
cooperative
Cooperative Agricultural
with hydel or
finances grid cooperative
diesel micro-
Cooperative extension using diesel
grid
(Bangladesh, generator
(Bangladesh,
Costa Rica) (Bolivia)
Bolivia,
Philippines)
Community
micro-grids Diesel or PV to
(Brazil, power a school,
Non-governmental
Cambodia, clinic,
Honduras, community
Other
Indonesia, center
Community
Nicaragua, Sri (Argentina)
Organization
Lanka)
PV battery
charging
stations
(Nicaragua)
Small state-
owned utility Municipal diesel
Small &
extends grid or hydel mini-
Decentralized
(Brazil, grid (Bolivia)
Colombia)
State utility
Residual state-
extends grid
owned isolated
and sells at
diesel mini-grid
Large & retail
with fuel SHS (Mexico)
Centralized (Botswana,
subsidies
Public
Mozambique,
(Cambodia,
Thailand,
Nicaragua)
Tunisia)
3 Cornerstones of Offgrid RESE Framework
In formulating an off‐grid RE deployment strategy, several key cornerstone
considerations need to be kept in mind, as described below.
3.1 Simplified and Transparent Regulation
The first cornerstone represents the corollary of the general and widely accepted
principle of regulation mentioned earlier: a good regulatory system always minimizes
regulatory costs. The basis for this principle is simple, since it is of no value to increment
regulation over the minimum necessary threshold as this imposes additional costs on all
stakeholders. Any type of regulation costs money and time to implement and comply
with, and this is true regardless of whether the regulated entity is privately or publicly
owned. Most electricity firms in isolated areas are usually financially weak and barely
commercially viable. Therefore, any increase in regulation can easily put these
enterprises in a difficult situation by undermining their financial viability.

3.2 Tailormade Regulation
The regulation should be adapted to the nature of the entity that is being regulated.
Unfortunately, some statutes do not allow such a tailor‐made approach; usually some of
them are silent regarding grid and off‐grid regulation while others apply the concept of
‘one size fits all’. This is not the best approach, as it can lead to unnecessary disputes
regarding the issues the regulator is legally authorized to delve into under existing
statutes.
As we will explain later in this paper, off‐grid RE electrification can be achieved using a
variety of technologies, regulatory models, and forms of ownership. Therefore, the
regulation of these cannot be generic. Some examples to illustrate this point follow.
Under a ‘fee‐for‐service’ model, one would expect that the regulator, or some other
entity that is acting as its agent, would need to regulate both the price and quality of
service. The rationale is that the SHS operator has been granted a legal monopoly and
therefore consumers need to be protected from possible monopolistic abuses.
Moreover, not only the regulator, but other government agencies would also have a
stake—for instance, because, having provided the subsidies, they would want to ensure
that the government gets ‘good value’ for them. On the contrary, less regulation is
required for off‐grid RE providers that operate as dealers, as there is a presumption that
price regulation is not needed because competition amongst various dealers will itself
protect consumers from monopolistic pricing. These differences can also be observed in
terms of ownership: when a community‐based organization self‐supplies electricity, the
universal regulatory concern that the operator may charge monopolistic prices
disappears. Owners of a cooperative do not have an incentive for price gouging because
this would be equivalent to taking money from one pocket and putting it in another.
Hence, self‐supply offers the possibility of self‐regulation.
3.3 Delegation of Specific Regulatory Tasks to Other Government or Non
Government Entities
The national or regional regulator may allow (or even request) that some specific
regulatory tasks could be performed—on a temporary or permanent basis—by other
governmental or non‐governmental entities. In off‐grid services, it is often more efficient
for the national regulator to delegate traditional regulatory functions for entities that
are providing off‐grid electrical service.
Specific task delegation is especially desirable if an agency in charge of rural
electrification, or a fund that provides capital subsidies (and sometimes also operation
and maintenance subsidies) to enterprises in charge of providing electrification services,
already exists. As an example, an electrification agency may impose price caps that the
distribution company will be required to adhere to in charging its customers. In addition,
the electrification agency may impose specific requirements in certain areas, such as
new connection modalities, technical standards, and quality of service parameters.
These requirements constitute the traditional area of price and quality of service
regulation. Therefore, in this case the electrification agency becomes the de facto
regulator.

If the electrification agency thus becomes a de facto regulator—due to the conditions
and requirements imposed to the operator in lieu for the subsidies—then it makes sense
to transform this entity into the official regulator for several reasons:
• The electrification agency usually has a better knowledge of the technical and
operational aspects of service deliver than the regulator, particularly in the case
of isolated, rural service provision.
• The electrification agency has a better understanding of the cost implications of
different regulatory requirements.
• If the regulator decides to undertake traditional regulatory tasks, it would simply
reenacting many of the determinations already made by the rural electrification
agency for the preceding reasons.
• There is an obvious need for coordination between the electrification agency and
the regulator, although mandated coordination between different government
entities is usually slow and tends to produce conflicts.
• The two primary sources of income for typical off‐grid operators are subsidies
and tariffs. Therefore, subsidy rules and tariff regulation need to be coordinated
closely.
• It would avoid confusion and create greater clarity, thereby reducing regulatory
risks.
• It would minimize the risk of duplication and overregulation.
All of these reasons suggest that regulatory task delegation—whether formal or
informal, temporary or permanent—constitutes a cornerstone strategy for rural isolated
electrification. However, there are some activities that are better performed in a
centralized manner, for instance, the creation and use of (legal) model documents to be
employed for the relationships between investor/communities/organizations and
customers, provincial governments, etc. Such documents, for instance may include
model power supply agreements, model subsidy contracts, and model bidding
documents.
3.4 Socially Acceptable Tariffs and Subsidies
The rationale of subsidies for off‐grid electricity provision is to diminish the gap between
high electrification costs and the typically low capacity to pay (i.e., incomes) of residents
in isolated, scattered, or remote areas. As in all cases, the government, rather than the
regulator, has primary responsibility for deciding the level of subsidies, the form of
subsidies (subsidies to the enterprise, subsidies to some or all consumers, or both), and
the mechanism for funding the subsidies (external budget transfers, grants or loans, or
cross‐subsidies). The regulatory agencies should have primary responsibility for
periodically informing the government as to how much the electricity service would cost
with and without subsidies.
There are three critical issues relating to such subsidies:
• One‐time connection subsidies that reduce connection costs for the poor should
be favored over ongoing consumption subsidies.

• Output‐based subsidies that are given in return for performance should be
preferred.
• Availability of funds should be carefully addressed. For example, rural
electrification funds set by law and collected via a levy on grid‐connected
customers bills are safer than state budget provisions.
Regarding tariffs, they should be socially acceptable and thus linked to the ‘willingness‐
to‐pay’ (WTP) of the target customer base. In addition, the regulatory agency should
take account of grants or contributions received from government ministries, national or
subnational electrification funds, international donor organizations, or monetary or in‐
kind contributions from customers. As a general rule, the level of tariffs should be
reduced to take account of grants or contributions of labor, while recognizing that tariffs
must recover O&M and the cost of future replacements of any capital equipment
required for the sustainable provision of the service.
As the billing cost may be important in this type of business, the regulation should
encourage technologies or billing arrangements that will allow consumers to control the
amount and timing of their expenditures and thus reduce or manage their individual
expenses.
Flexibility in pricing is another relevant element of proper regulatory design. Even when
consumption is subsidized, consumers may want to pay more for higher levels of
electricity service, such as more kilowatt‐hours (kWh) received, stable voltages, and
fewer outages. If consumption subsidies are given, they should be limited to the
amounts needed for basic human needs. To some extent, regulation should allow
suppliers and individuals or groups of consumers to negotiate direct agreements that
cover the term and conditions of electrical service, provided such agreements are
consistent with the regulation’s general principles and standards.
The issue of what ‘basic human needs’ means is also critical. For instance, there has
been a lot of controversy regarding off‐grid RE‐based electrification with very low per‐
household installed capacities, the so‐called ‘poverty lighting’ problem. The ultimate
goal of an off‐grid electrification policy should be the social integration and sustainable
development of the communities concerned, and therefore minimum needs should be
carefully addressed in each case.
3.5 A Larger Dimension of Service Providers
In the off‐grid RE arena, an electricity supplier can be a private/state‐owned company, a
partnership, an individual, a cooperative, an NGO or a sub‐national government body.
This can also have some implication on regulation details. For instance, it is evident that
an authorization granted by the government to provide electrical service of sufficient
duration and exclusivity, as an incentive for the supplier, will lead to improvements in
the number and quality of connections achieved. However, such authorizations cannot
be costly and complex; as a general rule, smaller entities should have fewer and simpler
regulatory requirements applicable to them.
The nature of regulation should also be allowed to vary, depending on the type of entity
that owns the facilities that are being regulated. Consider, for example, the case of an

isolated hydel mini‐grid. Such a system could be owned and operated by a private
company, a cooperative, or some other community‐based organization. In each case, the
technology remains the same and the legal document issued by the regulator may also
be the same, but the process of regulatory review, especially with respect to consumer
prices, may be different. The private mini‐grid operator will be trying to maximize profits
by charging the highest prices that it believes that its customers can pay. The situation is
different for a cooperative, in which the owners are also the consumers; if the owner‐
members of the cooperative decide to raise prices, they themselves would have to pay
the higher prices, being also the customers. However, this does not mean that the
regulator should take a completely ‘hands‐off’ approach. It would be naïve to believe
that community‐based organizations will always have good governance; as a matter of
fact, good governance is easier to achieve in small communities, but when the
community becomes larger, any form of ownership requires regulation, even if it is a
light‐handed one.
3.6 Many Regulatory Models to Choose From
Regulatory models for off‐grid electrification services can be classified in two types for
analysis: the ‘fee‐for‐service’ model and the ‘dealership’ or ‘vendor’ model. However, in
the real world, hybrid approaches are the most common.
Under the ‘fee‐for‐service’ or ‘long‐term authorization’ model, installations are owned
by the operator. Fee‐for‐service operators often receive capital cost subsidies from the
government to lower their connection charges for customers (and in some cases,
ongoing operating and maintenance expenses). Under the fee‐for‐service model,
operators often work under a concession or license that grants an exclusive right and
obligation to provide service within a specified geographic region for a specified period
(usually 15‐20 years). The concessionaire is granted a legal monopoly (and a capital
subsidy) in return for a specified obligation to serve. The subsidy grant is often bid out,
so that there is competition ‘for the market’.
In contrast, a provider who is a ‘dealer’ operates under a very different business model.
The dealer may receive a nonexclusive franchise from the government under the
expectation is that the dealer will be one of several dealers, all of whom are competing
‘in the market’ to provide the installations to potential customers, usually at fixed
subsidies. Typically, the dealer‐provider will sell the equipment and, ideally, installation
(with or without financing) to a customer. It will have no ongoing obligation to that
customer, unless the dealer is willing to offer an extended warranty or ongoing service
agreement. Once the equipment is purchased, it is owned by the customer.
As mentioned above, there are a lot of intermediate approaches. An interesting one is
‘medium‐term service contracts’ (for instance, the Bolivia IDTR project). This novel
business model tries to combine the strengths of the fee‐for‐service and dealer models.
Under this hybrid approach, subsidies are provided in return for five‐ to seven‐year
obligations to develop and serve small local markets. The winners of the medium‐term
service contracts have the obligation to install a minimum number of equipment sets
over a period of less than three years, to service systems during an additional four years
(starting from the date of installation), to develop local markets on the demand and
supply side by educating users about the employed technologies, to report on their own

performance, and to conduct user interviews for project evaluation. The operators are
free to choose between cash sales, microcredit, and finance or operate leases, and
therefore have considerable freedom to choose the best business solution for their
respective geographic areas and market conditions.
3.7 Setting QualityofService Standards
Quality‐of‐service standards should be realistic, affordable, verifiable and enforceable.
It is counterproductive to try to impose quality standards that are impossible to meet.
However, this does not mean that they should be altogether ignored. The main issue
regarding quality standards is that they are hard to specify and monitor, especially in
isolated or remote rural areas. In addition, when quality‐of‐service standards cannot
keep up with people’s expectations, disputes increase—this is particularly important in
the case of WHSs and SHSs—regarding remedial measures and responsibilities. Due to
the fact that they are difficult to regulate, quality standards usually do not receive
proper attention by the regulator. The risk in ignoring quality‐of‐service is that the
benefits accruing from electrification projects may quickly disappear if the service
quality falls short of customers’ requirements.
Quality‐of‐service standards should be based on the following operational parameters:
• Quality standards can be established on an input basis, an output basis, or a mix
of both. They should be established for those dimensions of service that are
important to consumers, controllable by the operator, and capable of being
measured on a reasonably objective basis.
• Quality standards do not have to be uniform across all customer categories or
geographic areas. Instead, they should be based on customer’s preferences and
their willingness to pay for the costs of providing the specified level of quality—
higher quality almost always costs more money.
• Standards should be established for both technical and commercial dimensions
of service. They may be:
o Guaranteed standards, where the standard must be achieved for every
specified customer.
o Overall standards, where the standard must be achieved on average over a
stated period across a specified customer category, but need not to be
satisfied at all times for all customers in the category.
o The operator must inform its customers of these standards.
• Penalties and rewards, as well as the standards, should be phased in over a
reasonable period. Any penalties should be proportionate to the extent of
noncompliance and the costs likely to be incurred by the operator in meeting the
standards.
• Where feasible and efficient, penalties should be paid to individual customers.
Otherwise, penalties should be used to provide subsidies to poor customers.
Penalties shall never be used to support the regulator’s budget.

• Any changes in the standards should be synchronized with regulatory
proceedings to update tariffs for a new tariff‐setting period.
• The regulatory agency should have the legal authority to delegated or contract
out quality‐of‐service monitoring and imposition of penalties to a third party,
subject to appropriate oversight and dispute resolution processes.
• The regulatory agency should establish a reliable, objective, and publicly
available monitoring system that compares the quality of service provided by
different operators.
4 Selected International Experience
Examples from global experience of off‐grid electrification can provide useful lessons for
the design of an effective policy and regulatory regime.
4.1 Argentina: Offgrid Electrification in Jujuy Province
Argentina has been a pioneer in the development of a new methodology for electricity
deployment in rural isolated areas. Under this approach, concession areas were granted
with exclusivity rights to private investors in an auction process. Companies bid for the
subsidy, and the concession is awarded to the investor who requests the smallest
subsidy. In addition, the concessionaire decides which technology will be used to
provide the electricity service (solar, wind, mini hydel, etc.).
The concession developed in the province of Jujuy—as well as in provinces across the
country—provides exclusivity for electricity service delivery, creating regulated
monopolies (In Jujuy the concession was granted to EJSED S.A.). Therefore, effective
regulation becomes paramount for the success of the project. The electricity service is
guaranteed for a long period of time, in this case 15 years of the concession period.
In the Argentinean case, concessions were preferred to other alternatives due to several
factors including:
• The creation of a market with enough critical mass to provide commercially
sustainable business opportunities for private investors.
• The possibility of attracting larger companies with sufficient internal financing
resources.
• The simplification of the administration processes involved.
• The prospects for economies of scales and, consequently, cost reduction to be
achieved.
• Even though EJSED S.A. provides electricity services using a variety of different
technologies—SHS, diesel mini‐grid, solar/wind mini‐grid and micro hydel mini‐
grid—the experience of the company with SHS has been the most successful,
given that most of the target population is scattered and solar radiance is very
high in this part of Argentina.

The product included in the tender process is defined as ‘electricity services’. Under the
concession contract, EJSED S.A. is obligated to guarantee the generation of
7.5 kWh/month of electricity (which, in most cases, is generated using two solar
photovoltaic panels (50 Wpeak each), a 12 A load control and a 160 Ah battery)2. This
system remains EJSED’s property throughout the concession period (i.e., no transfer to
the user is allowed). In addition, it is the user’s responsibility to procure and install all
components required from the electrical connection to inside the house (cables, fuses,
plugs, light bulbs, switches, etc.).3
There are no formal contracts between EJSED S.A. and their customers. The user needs
only to complete a form requesting the service in which some basic rules and terms are
established. The customer pays an installation fee and a monthly fee for the use of the
service. In case of a re‐connection, the fee is nearly twice the initial installation fee, as
this charge is not subsidized.
4.1.1 Tariff and Subsidies
Tariff setting is made at the provincial level. Electricity tariffs, based on technical and
economic principles, allow the recovery of cost plus an investment return for the service
provider.
In the case of SHS, off‐grid electricity is not measured; the user only pays with respect to
the size of the system s/he is employing. The tariff is therefore designed based on the
sizes of the photovoltaic panels and the battery, i.e., the investment cost. Thus, the
monthly fee allows the recovery of the investment plus the present value of the
operation and maintenance cost, including battery replacements.
Tariff subsidies are either based on the residential expenditure for lightning and radio
(‘avoided cost’) or on the customer’s ‘willingness‐to‐pay’ (WTP).4 The monthly
expenditure on kerosene, candles, batteries, and bottled gas can be used as a fair
indicator of the upper bound for the electricity tariff. From a social point of view, if
electricity costs are higher than alternative energy sources, then a subsidy should be
provided to span the gap.
In the case of Jujuy province, the concessionaire finances 40% of the investment cost,
10% is paid by the customer, while the remaining 50% is paid by the provincial
government. The monthly fee is used to pay the present value of the operation and
maintenance cost, plus the 40% of the investment cost. For very poor families, the
concessionaire provides financial services for the installation fee.
Under the PREMER program, subsidies are covered through a rural electrification fund
(Fondo de Desarrollo de la Electricidad), World Bank loans, and a Global Environment

2
This system allows the use of: two 15W light bulbs for 4 hours/day; one 10 W radio for 3 hours/day; one 20 W
radio‐cassette player for 1 hour/day; and one 80 W TV (b&w) for 1 hour/day.
3
In some regions, the government provides subsidies for the purchase of these components.
4
The analysis of willingness‐to‐pay can be a good methodology for assessing subsidies, but—contrary to expectations
—some studies have shown that WTP is usually less than payment capacity. For example, many customers think
that switching to electricity is worthy if this change diminishes the energy bill without considering the additional
benefits associated to the use of electricity.

Facility (GEF) grant. These funds were used to provide subsidies during the first six years
of the program; afterwards, additional funds came from a Tariff Compensation Fund,
also established by the national government. Tariffs and subsidies are revised biannually
if costs or market conditions are deemed to have changed substantially in the interim.
4.1.2 Results
The cumulative experience gained in off‐grid electrification in Argentina through several
years of operation of the program described above has provided an important quantum
of information for analysis purposes. Exhibit 2 presents the evolution of EJSED S.A.
customer numbers by generation technology. As can be seen, SHS has been very
successful technology, bearing in mind that the process was adversely affected by the
Argentinean economic crisis during 2001‐02.
Exhibit 2: EJSED S.A. Customer’s Evolution by Type of Generation Technology

The two prominent ‘jumps’ in the SHS connection trend may be explained by the
following:
• The first public audience was held in May 1999 and set the new tariffs for the
period 1999‐2001. In addition, it was determined that off‐grid customers should
pay the same connection fee as on‐grid customers, instead of a connection fee
based on installed capacity.
• A second public audience was held and new tariffs were set for the period 2001‐
2003.
Despite the success in terms of customer numbers, several issues with the initiative still
need to be addressed. These flaws have been allocated to two main categories:
Operational shortcomings:
• Lack of customer training programs. These training courses should instruct
customers on the proper use and capabilities of the installations.
• Clients continue to face problems related with electricity connections inside their
houses which they cannot resolve on their own.

• High replacement costs for low energy consumption light bulbs (i.e., CFLs) not
compensated for in the tariffs.
• Use of system elements which are incompatible with the generation technology
employed.
• Customer manipulation of generation equipment.
• Technical reviews are sometimes impossible to be successfully completed due to
unavailability of or difficulties in accessing the customer, especially those located
in isolated or distant locations.
• Non‐existent or poor communication capabilities (on the customer’s side) to
schedule visits or to report anomalies in the system.
• Deficiencies in the anomalies reported (users cannot properly describe the
problems encountered).
Commercial shortcomings:
• Billing delivery is often difficult due to isolation of communities served.
• Collection is difficult because customers do not use the payment facilities and
procedures provided, and instead wait to be contacted.
• An electrical malfunction inside the house or a burnt light bulb creates collection
problems, as clients refuse to pay for a service they did not utilize.
• Difficulties encountered in collecting charges for equipment that has been
damaged by the client.
• In SHS, cutting off the service due to non‐payment implies the withdrawal of all
the equipment (in this case, usually the service is not restored due to high
reconnection costs).
4.2 Bolivia: The IDTR Program5
With the financial assistance of the World Bank, Bolivia launched a ten year, three‐phase
adaptable program in 2005 to increase access to electricity, information, and
communications services in rural areas by using innovative, decentralized public‐private
business models and focusing on productive uses and training of suppliers and users.6 As
part of this program, output‐based aid (OBA) subsidies for innovative ‘Medium‐term
Service Contracts’ (MSC) aimed at local market development for SHS were be
competitively awarded in several tenders.
The purpose of the Bolivia ERTIC Program7 is to expand and improve the delivery of
infrastructure services through private‐sector led mechanisms as a catalyst for the

5
Programa de Infraestructura Descentralizada para la Transformación Rural.
6
The other two phases of the program are related to transmission and distribution grid expansions and the
development of rural mobile telephony.
7
The Bolivia ERTIC Program (Programa de Electrificación Rural y Tecnologías de la Información y Comunicación) and
the Medium‐Term Service Contracts are financed by the World Bank. Locally, the program is technically

development of rural areas in Bolivia, with a focus on decentralized electricity services
and information and communication technologies (ICT). The basic program strategy is to
stimulate the market by assuring the long‐term availability of local support through the
development of selected local market areas via the so called ‘SHS Medium‐Term Service
Contracts’ (MSC).
The basis for any successful OBA‐based transaction is a careful design of the subsidy
allocation, service obligations, and enforcement mechanisms. This is of special
importance for off‐grid projects aimed at attracting private sector operators to remote
rural markets.
More specifically, during Phase 1, a tender process was carried out—the winners were
Isofoton and Energetica—with these MSCs for providing electrification services in four
large blocks of the country. These electrification services include SHS installation, credit
services for paying connection fees, operation and maintenance services, and local post‐
sales technical services development through training courses.
Some of the basic guiding principles for the transaction included:
• Service sustainability is ensured by the MSC, given that after the installation of
the SHS equipment, the service providers have to provide post‐sales services and
market development activities for an additional period of about three years.
• The winning bidder has the obligation to develop the local market in his
respective area via capacity building and monitoring tasks on the supply side
(e.g., training local spare parts and repairs specialists, who would later be able to
cater to future market needs) and demand side (e.g., training users and
promoting future sales of PV for domestic, productive, and public uses). Hence,
each concessionaire will help reduce initial information barriers in his respective
market area—an additional service that will be checked, just as the SHS
installations themselves, through random audits.
• Subsidies are paid against outputs (i.e., users provided with satisfactory service,
local market development services successfully delivered, etc.).
• To allow cost reduction and service improvements through creative business
models by bidders—while assuring service quality over time—the bidding and
service contracts allowed for a ‘well informed freedom of choice’ for service
providers and users by permitting for different ways of reaching the desired
outputs (e.g., system sizes and payment options), while fixing minimum service
standards.
• Productive and public uses are facilitated with additional targeted subsidies.
The MSC service obligation sets the local market development pattern via specific
activities which are mostly part of the concessionaire’s obligations:

coordinated by the Program Coordination Unit (UCP) of the Ministry of Electricity and Alternative Energies of the
Government of Bolivia.

• Household visits (about once or twice a year) for checking the systems, training
users, and performing basic monitoring tasks via simple questionnaires to be
signed by the users (this decentralization of monitoring allows for close
monitoring of compliance by the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) via audits at
low costs);
• Ongoing promotion of PV for domestic, productive, and public uses in the service
area; and
• Establishment of local microenterprise networks that sell spare parts and repair
systems (all operators and technicians participate in a yearly ERTIC Program
training seminar where early lessons are discussed and capacity is checked).
Each MSC will be supervised by the Technical Control Entity (TCE) within the PCU of the
Ministry of Electricity and Alternative Energies. To protect customers’ rights, ensure that
service quality standards are met, and market development activities and other services
are carried out, the TCE contracts with specialist firms to conduct random audits.
In the ERTIC program, emphasis is placed in a scheme oriented towards the ‘service
provided’. Thus, the attention and the subsidy payments are geared to what is really
relevant: the final product delivered.
A general difficulty in service specification arises from tensions that existed between the
need to lay down a precise description of the service to be provided and the need to
allow for flexibility and scope for innovation after the award has taken place. By focusing
to the extent possible on desired ‘outputs’ and not on the particular characteristics of
the equipment/service supplier and his business plan, a more flexible framework is
made available, which gives service providers as much freedom as possible for
responding to customer demands in an innovative manner. Providing this flexibility—
while assuring quality—is a program objective. For example, PV equipment suppliers are
allowed to join local microcredit organizations, community organizations, or NGOs in a
partnership for providing the services under the necessary quality standards and
conditions. These partnerships are paid the subsidies upon meeting at least three basic
objectives:
• A share of the subsidies (direct customer subsidies) is paid to the provider based
on actual installations achieved;
• Another share is paid against meeting performance targets related to service
quality, training of local technicians, yearly visits, user training, and submitting
regular monitoring protocols (as mentioned above); and
• A third share is paid based on meeting market development goals, such as
creating a local spare parts market.
As an ‘output oriented’ program, the minimum characteristics of the ‘service to be
delivered’ were defined in the bidding documents, such as:
• Minimum number of users to be connected,
• Quality of service that must be achieved, as well as quality of PV systems allowed
under the program,

• Minimum conditions for managing and maintaining the service,
• Capacity building and training of local technicians and users in the management
and maintenance of the service,
• Other obligations related to the development of the market and the creation of a
sustainable service.
The bidding documents included a description of different payment options (e.g.,
maximum values for upfront cash, monthly payments, quarterly payments), each of
which was related to the system size chosen by the customer.
The project provides several types of subsidies:
• Direct up‐front OBA customer subsidies on the initial investment cost, paid to the
supplier on the basis of actual installations achieved;
• OBA service quality subsidies, paid to supplier against installation and service
performance targets achieved;
• OBA market development service subsidies, paid to the supplier against training
of local technicians, yearly visits, users training, etc.; and
• Indirect market development subsidies (aggressive overall promotion activities,
support to the formulation of business development strategies, training and
technical assistance), as well as the benefits from ERTIC central TA activities.
It is important to note that the planned payment of OBA subsidies over a medium term
period are against installation and basic service performance targets and do not cover
replacement costs (which are not be subsidized in any way, except for the replacement
of the first battery). The same applies to any irregular service visits ‘on demand’ that the
user might require, as long as they don’t result from system failures under the
operator’s responsibility.
4.2.1 Results
The fact that the program has been recently implemented makes the assessment and
proper analysis of the results difficult, not only in terms of SHSs installed but on the
evolution and fulfillment of the additional objectives of the program.
Exhibit 3 shows the evolution of SHSs installed under the program. As can be seen, after
a slow start during the first six months of program implementation, the number of new
customers has significantly increased, reaching 2,700 in the first eighteen months.

Exhibit 3: IDTR Program SHS Connections
3,000 500
450
2,500
400
350
Cummulative Total
New Connections
2,000
300
1,500 250
200
1,000
150
100
500
50
0 0
may-06
ene-07
mar-07
may-07
abr-06
jun-06
ago-06
sep-06
feb-07
oct-06
nov-06
abr-07
jun-07
ago-07
sep-07
jul-06
jul-07
dic-06
Monthly SHS Installed Cummulative SHS installed

4.3 Cambodia: Isolated Privately Operated Minigrids
In Cambodia, many small private firms operate isolated mini‐grids, providing electricity
services to hundreds of residential customers and small companies. These firms,
informal and spontaneous, known as ‘Rural Electrification Companies’ (REC), are not the
result of any formal governmental program; they exist simply because there are people
willing to pay for electricity and others able to sell it. Unfortunately, these RECs have
faced a number of challenges, such as:
• Increasing numbers of residential customers,
• Demand for increasing the number of service hours, and
• Improvements required in the distribution infrastructure.
In order to overcome these issues, RECs need capital or access to credit lines, which
most do not have. Where credit is available, interest rates are usually high (20% or
higher) and additional collateral requirements stringent. In order to help overcome such
financing difficulties, the Cambodian government has created a Rural Electrification
Fund (REF) with the objective of providing subsidies and technical assistance to RECs.
An illustrative example is provided by an REC located in the village of Smau Khney. In
2004, GRET, a French NGO, developed a form of decentralized regulation for this REC.
The regulatory arrangement is based on a 15‐year ‘contract of power supply’ between
the Commune Electrification Committee (a local government unit) and a local private
developer living in the village. The power supply contract is supported by a second
contract between GRET and the Commune Electrification Committee that provides a
US$ 45 grant for each new household that is connected as either a metered or non‐
metered customer. This arrangement has effectively led to a sharing of regulatory
responsibilities between the Electricity Authority of Cambodia (EAC), the national
electricity regulator, and the commune government.

The principal obligations and requirements in the power supply contract are:
• Technical engineering requirements (for example, grounding, types of poles, and
distance between poles and cables).
• Location of meters.
• Responsibility for meters that are intentionally broken or tampered with.
• Number of new customers to be connected.
• Limit on time to connect new customers.
• Amount of the capital cost subsidy (US$ 45 per household).
• Connection and reconnection rules for customers.
• Duration of service on weekdays (6 hours) and weekends (11 hours).
• Subsidized tariff for poor households (US$ 1.20 per 10 watt lamp per month).
• Duration of the contract (15 years).
• A local system for handling complaints.
• Funding of subsidies for poor customers and the administrative expenses of the
Commune Electrification Committee through an annual US$ 5 fee per household.
The contract is as an example of ‘regulation by contract’, since it includes engineering
requirements that affect technical quality of service (quality of the conductors, distance
between poles, and minimum voltage levels at different locations on the distribution
grid) and economic requirements that affect commercial quality of service (hours of
service and tariffs for poor households). In addition, it specifies the actual tariffs to be
paid by poor households.
However, the contract does not completely replace the regulator, as it includes two very
specific disclaimers that state that both tariffs and general conditions of service will
simply reflect the decisions of the EAC. Therefore, the contract can be viewed as an
example of a partial, downward delegation of regulatory responsibilities to the
community organization that represents the interests of the final consumers. It clearly
does not eliminate regulation by the EAC, since the REC is still required to get a license
from the EAC. However, the power supply and incentive contracts complement and
particularize the EAC’s more general regulatory rules.
4.3.1 Results
The program has been successful in that 220 new households have been connected in
slightly more than a year, average monthly consumption is reported to have increased
from 8 to 16 kWh, and the developer has plans to install more generation capacity.
This sharing of regulation for an isolated mini‐grid appears to produce at least three
major benefits.
• First, the village government became an active agent in the process because it
directly negotiated the contract with the local developer. Consequently, the
village government views itself as responsible for ensuring that the developer

complies with the terms and conditions of the supply contract. This is quite
different from relying on a regulator in the capital to administer a license whose
terms and conditions may be unknown to the village and largely beyond its
control. The fact that the village negotiated the contract gives it a greater stake
in the success of the enterprise.
• Second, the village government can assist in monitoring compliance with quality‐
of‐service standards. It is easy for a national regulator to issue quality standards
for decentralized energy service providers. However, it is difficult and expensive
for a national regulator to actually monitor whether the providers in distant and
isolated villages are actually complying with the standards. If a village
government is actively involved, it can act as the regulator’s ‘eyes and ears’ at
the local level. This is likely to be more effective and less costly than if the
regulator were to try to maintain a large compliance staff in the capital that
would need to make numerous field trips to villages around the country.
However, if the village government is going to perform the monitoring function,
it will need resources. In Smau Khney, the power supply contract requires that
the private operator provide the Commune Electrification Committee with an
annual budget of about US$ 200.
• Third, it allows communities to act as ‘monitors’, rather than ‘operators’.
Collective decision‐making is always slower than individual decision‐making.
Moreover, committees and boards are susceptible to personality and political
conflicts. This is not to say that it is impossible for a community to own and
operate a mini‐grid system or buy in bulk from the main grid. There are
successful examples in Bangladesh, Costa Rica, and the Philippines, among
others. But if a community‐based organization, whether a cooperative or village
electrification committee, is to be successful, it often requires considerable time
and nurturing. Therefore, in many countries, it may be more efficient to limit the
role of the community to that of a regulatory monitor rather than a system
operator.
Although the sharing of regulation between the national and regional regulator can
produce these benefits, it may also produce costs. The biggest danger is that there will
be overregulation. The combination of national and local regulation could lead to too
many requirements, which may conflict, and too many approvals, which may cause
delays. In general, this does not appear to have been the case in Smau Khney. The
national regulator reviewed the ‘supply contract’ to ensure that it did not conflict with
the license that it had issued.
4.4 Chile: The PER Program
With the aim of providing electricity services to rural customers, the Chilean government
launched its Rural Electrification Program (PER) in 1994. The program basically provides
subsidies to transmission grid extensions to areas in which the DISCO’s internal rate of
return (IRR) is negative but the cost‐benefit analysis yields a positive rate of return.8

8
The benefit for the society as a whole increases with the development of the project.

The main basis of the program can be summarized as follows:
• The government subsidizes projects with positive social rate of return but
negative DISCO’s IRR.
• Projects must be co‐financed between the government, the DISCO, and the
prospective customers.
• The investment program decision is decentralized. Every region (province) has
full legal authority to decide where, how, and how much to invest in rural
electrification projects.
• Governmental subsidy is only directed to investments (up to 100%); no subsidy is
granted for operation or maintenance.
• Operation and maintenance cost must be recovered from customers through a
tariff.
• The owners of the infrastructure can be individual customers, a cooperative, a
municipal government, or a DISCO.
The regulator (Comisión Nacional de Energía, or CNE) is responsible for the coordination
of PER. Regarding this program, its mission is to:
• Define the goals and the main strategic lines of the program;
• Supervise its fulfillment in coordination with regional governments;
• Distribute the annual provision for rural electricity projects to various regions in
accordance with the national budgetary stipulations;
• Help elaborate technical studies for rural electrification projects, in particular,
those related to the deployment of renewable energy in isolated communities;
and
• Seek international credit lines for financing rural electrification projects and
optimize the use of public funds for this purpose.
4.4.1 Renewable Energy
Since 2001, the national government, with the support of the United Nations‘ Global
Environment Fund (GEF), has been developing a program to promote the use of
renewable energy for off‐grid electrification, such as mini‐and microhydels, solar
photovoltaics and small‐scale wind generators. SHSs are being deployed in the four
northern regions in isolated rural areas. In these regions, the program established
training courses for customers as well as cooperatives and microenterprises for
operation and maintenance purposes. In addition, the CNE, in coordination with regional
and community governments, is carrying out technical and economical feasibility studies
for small‐scale wind and hydel projects. During 2001, a pilot project was developed in
Tac Island with a hybrid wind‐diesel system that provides electricity to the 72
households on the island.

4.4.2 Results
The PER has been very successful in several key aspects, such as service coverage. The
PER allowed an increment in the national coverage of 37%—from 53% in 1992 to 90% in
2005—as can be seen in Exhibit 4.
The exhibit shows that seven regions have already achieved a 90% coverage ratio.9 The
efforts made by IX Region of La Araucanía, which went from 23% coverage to 83%, are
particularly worth remarking, as are those of X Region of Los Lagos that increased its
coverage from 38% to 87% between 1992 and 2005. These regions represent the largest
shares of rural and indigenous populations in the country.
Exhibit 4: Regional Rural Electrification Coverage in Chile
1992
2005
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII Reg
Met
Regions

4.5 India: The RGGVY Program
During 2005, the Indian government launched the Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran
Yojana (RGGVY) Program, a five‐year program (that merged and consolidated all other
existing similar programs under its umbrella) to provide electricity service access to all
villages and habitations in the country. To implement the program, the government of
India developed a Rural Electrification Policy in August 2006.
This policy sets the framework for the deployment of rural electricity across the country.
To achieve this, the policy defined:
• A Rural Electrification Plan, which has to be developed by state governments and
details the electrification delivery mechanisms considering, inter alia, the
available methodologies, environmental norms, fuel availability, number of
unelectrified households, distance to the grid, etc.

9
II Region of Antofagasta, V Region of Valparaiso, VI Region of Libertador Bernardo O’Higgins, VII Region of Maule,
VIII Region of Bio, XI Region of Aisén del General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo and the Metropolitan Region

• Villages considered in the policy, including census villages and rural households
below the poverty line.
• The participation of private individuals and other non‐governmental institutions
for the effective deployment of rural electrification in villages.
• An ‘electrified’ village as a village certified by the Gram Panchayat confirming
that:
o Basic electrification infrastructure, such as distribution transformers and
distribution lines, is provided in the inhabited locality, as well as a minimum
of one Dalit basti/hamlet, where it exists;
o Electricity is provided to public places such as schools, panchayat office,
health centers, dispensaries, community centers, etc.; and
o The number of households electrified is at least 10% of the total number of
households in the village.
In addition, the policy defines the main goals to be achieved. These are:
• To provide electricity access to all households by 2009; and
• To assure quality and reliable power supply at reasonable rates.
To achieve these goals, the RGGVY program develops a three‐basis project:
• The construction of a Rural Electricity Distribution Backbone (REDB), with at least
one 33/11 kV (or 66/11 kV) substation in each block.
• The development of a Village Electrification Infrastructure (VEI), with at least one
distribution transformer in each village/habitation.
• The deployment of Decentralized Distribution Generation Systems (DDGS) where
grid supply is not feasible or cost‐effective.
REDB, VEI, and DDGS have also to fulfill the requirements of the agriculture and other
activities including irrigation pump sets, small and medium industries, cold chains,
healthcare and education, and ICT to facilitate the development of rural regions.
In addition, the program presents other key features such as:
• Rural households below the basic poverty line (BPL) get 100% subsidy on
connection fee charges.
• Central government provides a 90% capital subsidy for the overall cost of the
project.
• A franchise program is developed for the implementation of grid expansion
projects at the local level. These franchises can be awarded to private individuals,
NGOs, cooperatives, community associations, etc. The design of the
implementation model ensures revenue sustainability to the franchise for its
proper development and promotion.
• A conducive environment for the private deployment of mini‐ and micro‐grids.
For these types of projects, while developed by private individuals, the role of

the government is to simplify procedures and requirements to facilitate and
expedite installation.
• No discrimination in hours of supply between rural and urban households.
To provide support and coordination in the program, the Rural Electrification
Corporation Ltd. (REC) has been designated as the nodal agency for program
implementation. All governmental funds for the program are channeled through REC
which, apart from the capital subsidy, provides the remaining funds on soft terms. In
addition to its financial duties, REC also establishes the framework for implementation,
including the formulation of technical specifications, procurement and bidding
conditions, guidelines for project formulation, field appraisals, and concurrent
monitoring. REC is also responsible for complete oversight on the program from concept
to completion.
To achieve these functions, REC has reached an agreement with NTPC (the largest power
company in the country), PowerGrid (central transmission company), NHPC (largest
hydel company in the country), and DVC (Damodar Valley Corporation) to make
available the project management expertise and capabilities of these organizations to
states wishing to use their services. States may choose from amongst the following
options:
• Project formulation, development, and implementation involving system
planning, design, engineering, and procurement of goods and services and
construction/implementation/commissioning of the projects covered under the
program.
• Formulation and preparation of reports, project approvals, advisory support for
procurement, project monitoring, and supervision of quality of work.
• Project monitoring and supervision of quality of work during construction.
In addition to coordination and implementation assistance from different stakeholders
at the national and state levels, the policy promotes the directly involvement of district
committees. This participation is in the form of coordination and review of the
electrification process in their respective districts, as well as the review of quality‐of‐
service standards attained and the promotion of energy efficiency and conservation. The
policy also grants the possibility to state governments to extend the role and
responsibilities of these committees.
As previously mentioned, private involvement in the program is an important part of the
Indian off‐grid electrification development. For this to be achieved, the provision of
transparent procedures is essential.
4.5.1 Private Involvement
In India’s Rural Electrification Policy, the participation of non‐governmental agents is
acknowledged in two different forms:
• First, by franchises, which is the proposed model in the methodology for the
deployment of gird expansion electrification. As such, they are the responsible
for the distribution of electricity within the village’s borders.

The management of these rural distribution entities is developed by a franchisee
institution. These institutions can be non‐governmental organizations (NGOs),
users’ associations, cooperatives, or individual entrepreneurs. The franchisee
arrangements may be for systems including feeders from substations or from
distribution transformers. Also, they must entail purchase of bulk power (input
based) and operation and maintenance of the distribution infrastructure. A
franchisee arrangement is not a revenue model per se, but it is envisaged as a
mechanism to ensure that commercial losses are reduced, energy supplied is
billed and revenue is collected. In order to maintain the franchise’s revenue
sustainability, a bulk supply tariff (BST) is determined based on the consumer
mix, the prevailing consumer tariff, and a likely load. This BST is fully factored
into de submissions of the state utilities to the State Electricity Regulatory
Commissions (SERCs) for their respective revenue requirements and tariff
determinations. State governments, under the Electricity Act, are required to
provide the requisite subsidies to their respective state utilities if they require
the tariff for any category of consumers to be lower than that determined by the
SERC.
• Second, for projects in isolated areas which are not envisaged to be connected by
grid expansions, the policy allows private individuals to develop what the policy
defines as ‘stand alone’ systems. These systems are mini‐ and micro‐grids to
provide electricity services in off‐grid locations.
A person entering in this framework has the responsibility for the generation and
distribution of power in the target village. The retail electricity tariffs are set
based on mutual agreement between the developer and the customers. If the
developer receives any financial assistance and/or subsidy from the government
(national or state) or from other agencies, it must be fully passed on to the final
customers. The appropriate state commission has the right to audit the tariff
scheme to verify the appropriate fulfillment of this provision. The state
governments are responsible for the implementation of simplified administrative
procedures to facilitate the development of these small enterprises. In addition,
institutional arrangements for backup services and technical support also have to
be promoted.
4.5.2 Results
According to latest available information, the progress of the RGGVY Program for
projects sanctioned in the Xth Plan is presented in Exhibit 5. Even though the data
provided by the government shows substantial coverage, with more than 40,000 villages
and 5,000,000 rural (and BPL) households electrified, little information is available for
comparison on important issues such as electrification costs per household, classification
of projects according to applied technology, and so forth.
However, the government has published estimations of its cost norms for the projects to
be sanctioned in the XIth plan, and these are presented in Exhibit 6.


Exhibit 5: Progress of RGGVY Projects Sanctioned in India’s Xth Plan
March 2008
th
Sanctioned in X Plan Award Status Achievements
Projects
Villages
Unelectrified
Villages
Electrified
HH (Lakh)
Access to Rural
BPL HH (Lakh)
Connection to
(Mill. US$)
Sanctioned Cost
Awards
(Mill. US$)
Sanctioned Cost
(Mill. US$)
Award Cost
(Mill. US$)
Fund Disbursed
Villages
Unelectrified
Villages
Electrified
HH (Lakh)
Access to Rural
Certif. Received
Panchayat
BPL HH (Lakh)
Connections to
State
Andhra
17 0 21,623 31.66 21.14 162.04 17 162.04 162.04 92.23 5,614 10.25 8.33
Pradesh
Arunachal
2 237 321 0.07 0.04 10.83 50.57
Pradesh
Assam 3 903 1,746 1.91 1.49 39.51 3 39.51 47.53 26.50 84 175
Bihar 26 17,125 0 8.43 8.43 373.95 26 373.95 482.16 400.60 13,362 0.83 2,194 0.68
Chattisgarh 3 117 3,504 2.70 1.22 37.24 3 37.24 39.77 26.01 296 0.15 0.15
Gujarat 3 0 2,409 2.43 1.88 15.21 3 15.21 21.19 7.88 1,247 0.78 886 0.78
Haryana 4 0 1,075 1.17 0.49 12.12 4 12.12 17.81 9.43 15 0.07 0.07
Himachal
1 0 1,118 0.03 0.01 6.26 1 6.26 6.65 1.92 0.00 0.00
Pradesh
Jammu &
3 103 1,444 0.99 0.60 24.41 2 18.37 19.19 12.35 169 0.04 0.04
Kashmir
Jharkhand 13 8,727 4,379 14.70 9.42 319.30 13 319.29 431.15 222.29 1,259 619 0.03 0.03
Karnataka 17 49 21,152 13.20 6.32 93.85 17 93.85 160.44 121.22 47 17,463 4.25 47 3.75
Kerala 1 0 38 0.24 0.18 4.94 1 4.94 4.86 5.04 0.07 0.07

Madhya
8 115 9,653 5.66 3.11 98.90 8 98.90 133.09 65.72 15 50 0.01 0.01
Pradesh
...Continues

...Continued
Projects Sanctioned in Xth Plan Award Status Achievements
Villages
Unelectrified
Villages
Electrified
HH (Lakh)
Access to Rural
BPL HH (Lakh)
Connection to
(Mill. US$)
Sanctioned Cost
Awards
(Mill. US$)
Sanctioned Cost
(Mill. US$)
Award Cost
(Mill. US$)
Fund Disbursed
Villages
Unelectrified
Villages
Electrified
HH (Lakh)
Access to Rural
Certif. Received
Panchayat
BPL HH (Lakh)
Connections to
State
Maharashtra 4 0 4,052 3.56 2.63 19.72 3 12.87 13.17 6.76 1,080 0.58 219 0.56
Manipur 2 186 270 0.25 0.14 16.02 1 11.68 17.24 4.64 36 13 0.01 0.01
Meghalaya 2 174 797 0.41 0.24 11.50 2 11.50 13.29 4.99
Mizoram 2 90 209 0.15 0.09 10.44 0.16
Nagaland 2 12 279 0.22 0.14 4.06 2 4.06 4.53 2.52
Orissa 4 2,602 4,637 5.99 3.35 108.53 4 108.53 110.28 60.77 0.00 0.00
Punjab 0.75
Rajasthan 25 1,705 15,608 10.09 7.00 113.31 25 113.31 128.09 81.07 1,628 8,419 4.38 793 2.55
Sikkim 2 16 158 0.10 0.04 6.53
Tamil Nadu 25.20
Tripura 1 48 72 0.21 0.13 4.90 0.27

Uttar
64 29,051 3,287 16.94 11.21 679.88 64 679.88 996.37 717.26 26,985 448 4.47 20,718 4.47
Pradesh
Uttarakhand 13 1,469 14,105 3.57 2.82 160.97 13 160.97 183.22 118.59 1,226 5,230 0.83 1,171 0.83
West Bengal 13 4,283 0 1.46 0.98 96.26 13 96.26 95.96 100.32 3,184 0.95 1,398 0.59
Total 235 67,012 111,936 126.14 83.10 2,430.63 225 2,380.72 3,088.00 2,165.04 47,826 40,838 27.70 27,426 22.92

Exhibit 6: India’s XIth Plan – Estimated Electrification Costs Norms for Villages
Electrification Type Cost (US$)
Electrification of unelectrified village
In normal terrain 32,500
In hilly, tribal, desert areas 45,000
Intensive electrification of already electrified village
In normal terrain 10,000
In hilly, tribal, desert areas 15,000
Cost of electricity connection to BPL household 55
5 Recent Developments in Pakistan
Annexure B of Pakistan’s short‐term RES‐E Policy10 provides a brief set of guidelines for
the development of off‐grid small hydel projects, and contains some provisions for other
RES‐E technologies as well. At present, there is no other policy for off‐grid electricity
investments and the lack of a documented off‐grid electrification strategy creates
confusion amongst stakeholders which, in turns, greatly affects the development of rural
electrification. Traditionally, however, an aggressive rural electrification program has
been pursued by the Government of Pakistan primarily through direct edit to the state‐
owned power utility for grid extensions and some public investments in isolated grids
and generation based on diesel and small hydels, with little or no private sector or
community involvement.
Currently, there also does not exist a formal definition of the off‐grid areas11, nor has the
isolated/scattered population been properly delimited for which grid extension would
be uneconomical into the foreseeable future.12 This is an essential first step for
designing any rural electrification project as a means for fully understanding the key
characteristics of the unelectrified villages assessing the deployment of suitable
generation technologies.
In addition, the guidelines stated in Annexure B of the 2006 RES‐E Policy assign identical
roles to the AEDB, provincial, and AJK governments for RE implementation. This is
counterproductive, as it creates a duplication of tasks amongst national and provincial
institutions, as well as potential conflicts of interest and coordination problems between
the different stakeholders involved.

10
Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation, 2006, Alternative Energy Development Board
(AEDB), Ministry of Water and Power, Islamabad, December 2006.
11
However, any project feeding power to national/regional grid at 11 kV or above can be defined as an ‘on‐grid’
project.
12
However, for practical purposes, communities living more than 20 km beyond the existing grid network can be
considered isolated/scattered populations.

Even though precise data are unavailable, it is estimated that until 2006, approximately
40,000 villages in Pakistan lacked electricity services. In the southern province of
Balochistan, as much as 90% of the villages do not have access to grid power and are
widely dispersed, with an average population density as low as 22 inhabitants/km2.
Several projects have been initiated by the federal government in Pakistan with different
outcomes. The Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) has been actively
participating in such efforts, with the promotion of stand‐alone SHS (Sindh and
Balochistan) as well as micro and mini‐hydel projects (AJK, Punjab and NWFP). Probably,
the most ambitious project was the Khushal Pakistan program launched in 2001, which
envisaged 100% electricity coverage by the end of 2007, a target which was definitely
not accomplished.
Currently, the most active project, in terms of rural electrification, is the Roshan Pakistan
program. The objective is to provide electrification services to 7,874 isolated villages:
6,968 towns are located in the Balochistan province alone, while the 400 remaining
belong to the Sindh province. In terms of socioeconomic outputs, the program aims to
improve the standard of living in these communities by providing access to lighting, ICT,
and drinking water, and, by displacing fossil fuels for lightning, better health conditions.
5.1 Roshan Pakistan Program
The AEDB is heading this project and is responsible for its overall planning and
implementation. In addition, provincial governments are highly involved in several
aspects, such as, village selection, on‐site implementation, and operation and
maintenance services. Private companies are involved in:
• Supply and installation of SHS systems,
• Operation and maintenance services (only during the first year),
• Training of operators, and
• Providing user information.
The AEDB has selected solar photovoltaic panels as the technology to be deployed, with
systems of varying sizes according to users’ needs. The federal government provides
capital investment subsidies according to criteria based on household members and
dwelling size. Fees paid by customers are proportional to the chosen system capacity.
In its first phase, the program is expected to provide SHSs to 400 villages (300 in
Balochistan and 100 in Sindh) and it is expected to be completed during 2009.
The federal government is providing subsidies for capital investments (see Exhibit 7),
with the amounts varying according to the number of occupants and rooms in the
dwelling. The users pay only for the operating and maintenance costs.

Exhibit 7: Roshan Pakistan Rural Electrification Program Budget
Million Pakistan Rupees
Approved 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-09

Province Project
Budget Allocated Utilized Allocated Utilized Requested
Balochistan 887.718 20.674 20.674 135.000 34.524 366.030
Sindh 280.042 79.326 79.326 115.000 65.476 85.716
Total 1,167.760 100.000 100.000 250.000 100.000 451.746
According to the program baseline, users will pay for energy services (‘fee‐for‐service’)
to cover operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. O&M will be carried out by operators
based in villages and trained for this purpose. In addition, local operators will be backed
by private companies through training courses and equipment maintenance contracts
during the first year.13 The selection of private companies is done through a tendering
process.
In our view, this program is generally well‐designed but has some drawbacks, such as
the lack of service provision (O&M) for a reasonable period, while the time required for
new connections is too long. In the following section, we propose a mechanism that tries
to overcome the shortcomings of this program but it is otherwise based on the same
principles.
6 Quantitative Assessment of RESE Deployment
The purpose of this section is to analyze different alternatives of off‐grid electrification
technologies in order to provide a framework for a discussion on the targets and costs of
implementation of the proposed off‐grid RES‐E policy for Pakistan.
Lack of sufficiently detailed information regarding presently unelectrified villages and
scattered populations hampers the possibility of developing an in‐depth analysis on total
deployment costs. However, we believe that some important conclusions regarding
electrification costs can be drawn from the analysis presented below.
For developing this assessment we have largely relied on information regarding solar
irradiation and wind speeds generated by the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory
(NREL), as described in Annex VII. In addition, NREL’s HOMER software14 has been

13
From the second year onwards, the O&M is in charge of the provincial governments.
14
HOMER is a computer model that simplifies the task of evaluating design options for both off‐grid and grid‐
connected power systems for remote, standalone, and distributed generation (DG) applications. HOMER's
optimization and sensitivity analysis algorithms allow evaluation of the economic and technical feasibility of a large
number of technology options and account for variation in technology costs and energy resource availability.
HOMER can be used to model both conventional and renewable energy technologies. HOMER can be freely
downloaded from www.nrel.gov/homer.

employed for optimization purposes to simulate electrification deployment alternatives
under different demand and supply scenarios in the country.
Demand and supply specification for these simulations constitutes a paramount element
in the cost assessment of policy implementation, as the electricity sector presents large
economies of scale (on the demand side of the equation) and is highly dependent on the
different inputs resources employed for generation purposes (relative scarcity of one
input or fuel with respect to others may have a large impact on electrification
technology selection and associated costs).
In order to overcome theses shortcoming, a set of different demand‐supply alternatives
are evaluated to obtain a range of results which should allow a better understanding of
the impact of deploying different electrification technologies under different demand
(villages’ sizes) scenarios.
However, the application of this procedure does not entirely resolve the ‘availability of
natural resources’ issue, as this relies on the specific geographical location of each target
village. To work out this aspect, an existing representative village with average solar
irradiation and wind speed incidence has been chosen as the base reference case.
The village of Kardh, located at the border of the Balochistan‐Punjab provinces,15 has
been selected to serve this purpose. The main geospatial characteristics of the area are
(see also Exhibit 8):
• Average wind speed: 4.97 m/s
• Average solar irradiation: 5.75 kW/h/d
• Average clearness index: 65%
• Altitude: 700 m above mean sea level.
Exhibit 8: Solar and Wind Availability in Target Village Area
Monthly Averages
Solar Irradiation & Clearness Index Wind Speed
7
8 100%
7 90% 6
80%
6 5
70%
kWh/m2/d
5 60% 4
m/s
4 50%
3
3 40%
2
30%
2
20% 1
1 10%
0
0 0%
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Wind Speed (m/s)
Daily Radiation (kWh/m2/d)

Clearness Index
Two important natural resources remain to be assessed for this prototypical village,
hydro and biomass resources, and their impact on rural development is anything but

15
According to GST HOMER information, the village is located at 29o 5’ N, 69 o 6’ E.

negligible. However, for the sake of simplicity of this assessment and in order to
maintain a conservative approach, some assumptions need to be established.
• Hydro resources: A binary approach has been used for this resource: the water
resource either exists or does not; however, if available, stream volumes are
assumed to always be sufficient for target village needs on annual average
basis,16 with larger villages representing larger stream flows.
• Biomass resources: Several specific issues complicate the analysis of this RES:
o Both availability and energy content of different biomass types are
characterized a large degree of variability.
o Biomass presents a set of significant alternative uses to electricity generation.
Biomass burned for cooking and/or heating is the most traditional one. Other
options, such as biogas generation for cooking/heating and also lightning
(with the aggregated value of the fertilizer as a by‐product) are also possible.
Biomass is also a valuable industrial input, such as for paper and board
manufacture.
o If biomass is used as a generation technology, a market for biomass should be
created to ensure the long‐term availability of the resource for power
generation.
Therefore, a plausible assumption is that biomass will be used for social development
and economic purposes through means other than for electrification, and will therefore
not be considered in this assessment.
6.1 Electricity Demand: Simulated Target Villages
Economies of scale play a key role in the quantitative assessment of the electrification
processes as their existence allow average electrification costs to be reduced.
In order to introduce this concept into the analysis, a set of simulated target
communities with different household numbers—and electricity demand—has been
developed. Four types of settlements have been assumed: scattered households; small
settlements (hamlets); small villages, and regular villages.
Household numbers as well as electricity demand and references have been summarized
in Exhibit 9. For each type of settlement, an average hourly load curve has been
designed to be employed by HOMER to optimize the generation mix.

16
High stream flows during the monsoon period (from June to September) and low hydro values for the remaining
months of the year.

Exhibit 9: Main Characteristics of Simulated Target Villages
Simulated Target Villages Characteristics
Small electricity demand, explained mainly by the substitution of candles

Scattered Population and oil lamps for LED or low consumption lighting plus the introduction of
(less than 25 households) other electricity devices, such as radio, small fan and B&W TV set.
Electricity demand is estimated at 485 Wh/d, with a peak load of 196 W.
Electricity demand is estimated for a small settlement with an average

Small Settlement number of 50 households, including a small shop.
(50 households) Electricity demand is estimated at 76 kWh/d, with a peak load of 10 kW.
Small set of houses, with an average number of 100, including a shope, a

rural school, and a small workshop.
Small Village
Electricity demand is estimated at 831 kWh/d, with a 100 kW peak power
(100 households)
demand.
Large set of houses, with an average number of 280, which includes a small
Village market, small school, dispensary, and other workshops.
(280 households) Electricity demand is estimated at 4.3 MWh/d, with a 500 kW peak load.

6.2 Electricity Supply: Generation Alternatives
The size of the target villages’ electricity demand affects the selection of the generation
technology to be deployed and, due to the existence of economies of scale, the cost of
electrification. For every type of village, a set of generation technologies have been
designed to provide electricity services. Generation technologies included in the analysis
can be divided in five categories: batteries; diesel generators; mini/microhydels; solar PV
panels; and mini/micro wind generators.
Even though available generation technologies are the same for every type of village,17
the generation capacity deployed for each technology would vary from village to village.
Exhibit 10 summarizes the technologies and their costs employed in the optimization.
Exhibit 10: Off‐grid Generation Technology Alternatives
Technology Standalone Small Settlement Small Village Village
Tech: DC 6V 320 Ah
Battery Cost: US$ 340
O&M: US$ 10/yr
Tech: AC 5 kW Tech: AC 20 kW Tech: AC 50 kW

Diesel
N/A Cost: US$ 6,000 Cost: US$ 18,000 Cost: $28,000
Generator
O&M: US$ 0.2/hr O&M: US$ 0.5/hr O&M: US$ 0.8/hr
Tech: AC 10 kW Tech: AC 100 kW Tech: AC 500 kW

Hydel* N/A Cost: US$ 115,000 Cost: US$ 0.56 mill. Cost: US$1.7 mill.
O&M: US$ 45/yr O&M: US$ 1,400/yr O&M: US$ 7,200/yr

17
For standalone (isolated household) application, diesel and hydel have not been considered as demand in these
cases would be too small to justify such supply systems.

Technology Standalone Small Settlement Small Village Village
Tech: DC 1 kW
PV Cost: US$ 6,000
O&M: US$5/yr
Tech: DC 0.5 kW Tech: AC 2.5 kW Tech: AC 30 kW

Wind Cost: US$ 1,400 Cost: US$ 4,200 Cost: US$ 50,400
O&M: US$ 100/yr O&M: US$ 100/yr O&M: US$ 500/yr
* It is assumed that hydel projects are 1 km distant from the settlement.
In addition to generation costs, there are other important parameters to be considered
in the analysis, such as converter costs, fuel costs, project rate of return; project lifetime,
and grid connection costs (see Exhibit 11). With respect to quality of service, a maximum
of 5% of total annual capacity shortage has been set as standard target for all
alternatives analyzed.
All these parameters, excepting grid connection costs, were included in the optimization
software runs. The exclusion of grid connection costs in the optimization process does
not alter the order of merit of generation technologies, as it represents a fixed expense
that affects all technologies by the same amount.
Exhibit 11: Additional Simulation Input Parameters
Small
Technology Standalone Small Village Village
Settlement
Converter Capacity: 1 kW; Cost: US$ 800; O&M: -
Fuel (Diesel) N/A Fuel price*: US$ 0.48/l
Connection cost: US$ 150/household

Grid Costs N/A
Hydel transmission line: US$ 3,500
Project Lifetime 25 years
Rate of Return 12% per year before taxes
Shortage Capacity 5% of total annual capacity
* Average diesel price, not including transportation costs to remote areas.
6.3 Optimization Outcomes
Exhibit 12 and Exhibit 13 present the results of the optimization process, including and
excluding hydro resources, respectively. As can be seen, when hydro resources are
available, hydel generation becomes the optimum technology in small and large villages
and provides the cheapest form of electrical energy. If hydro resources are not available,
however, then a hybrid system composed of wind generators plus a diesel generator
and batteries are the optimum solution to develop.
Also, from the analysis of the results, it is clear how economies of scale affect the cost of
electricity. The larger the settlement, the lower the cost of electricity, and therefore a

proper analysis of target villages sizes becomes essential for choosing the cheapest
generation source.
6.4 Medium Term Offgrid Policy Deployment Costs
Lastly, as a rough guideline for analyzing the cost of implementing Pakistan’s off‐grid
RES‐E policy, let us assume that 7,400 villages still remain to be electrified at the end of
the first phase of the Roshan Pakistan Program, and that the target of the medium term
policy is to electrify 25% these—approximately 1,850 villages—using RE technologies.
By employing information from the last country census, it can be assumed that the
distribution of unelectrified settlements can be segregated as follows:
• Standalone: 30%
• Small Settlements: 30%
• Small Villages: 20%
• Villages: 20%
Exhibit 12: Off‐grid Electrification Deployment Simulation (Including Hydro Resources)
Optimization Model Outcomes (Optimum Generation Mix)
User Type
First
Second Third Fourth Fifth
(Optimum)
PV+B W+B PV+W+B

Standalone IC: US$ 735 IC: US$ 1,485 IC: US$ 2,135 - -
CoE: 0.668 CoE: 1.82 CoE: 2.34
W+D+B PV+W+D+B PV+D+B W+D PV+D

Small
IC: US$ 486 IC: US$ 758 IC: US$ 506 IC: US$ 284 IC: US$ 472
Settlement
CoE: 0.414 CoE: 0.441 CoE: 0.490 CoE: 0.637 CoE: 0.684
H+B H+D H+W H+G+B H+W+B

Small
IC: US$ 5,788 IC: US$ 5,780 IC: US$ 6,104 IC: US$ 5,968 IC: US$ 6,292
Village
H H+B H+W H+PV H+D

Village IC: US$ 6,071 IC: US$ 6,151 IC: US$ 6,251 IC: US$ 6,329 IC: US$ 6,171
Note: B: Batteries; D: Diesel; H: Hydel; PV: Photovoltaic; W: Wind; IC: Investment capital (per household); CoE: Levelized cost of electricity
in US$/kWh.

Exhibit 13: Off‐grid Electrification Deployment Simulation (Excluding Hydro Resources)
Optimization Model Outcomes (Optimum Generation Mix)
User Type
First
Second Third Fourth Fifth
(Optimum)
PV+B W+B PV+W+B

Standalone IC: $735 IC: $1,485 IC: $2,135 - -
CoE: 0.668 CoE: 1.82 CoE: 2.34
W+D+B PV+W+D+B PV+D+B W+D PV+D

Small
IC: $486 IC: $758 IC: $506 IC: $284 IC: $472
Settlement
W+D+B W+D PV+W+D+B PV+D+B PV+D

Small
IC: $1,699 IC: $1,321 IC: $2,899 IC: $1,701 IC: $1,667
Village
W+D+B PV+D+B PV+W+D+B W+D PV+D

Village IC: $904 IC: $985 IC: $1,333 IC: $2,198 IC: $929
Note: B: Batteries; D: Diesel; H: Hydel; PV: Photovoltaic; W: Wind; IC: Investment capital (per household); CoE: Levelized cost of electricity
in US$/kWh.
Only as a practical assumption—although no empirical evidence exists to support this—
let us assume that 50% of the simulated villages and small villages possess hydro
resources and that all villages are to be electrified using the optimal technology mix. In
such a scenario, the investment cost of implementing this policy would be US$ 519
million dollars, as shown in Exhibit 14.
Exhibit 14: Off‐grid Electrification Capital and Fuel Costs for 1,850 Villages
Invested Fuel
Cost of Electricity
User Type Capital Expenditure
(US$/kWh)
(Mill. US$) (Mill. US$/year)
Standalone
5.7 0 0.668
(7,770 HH)
Small Settlement
13.5 1.8 0.414
(27,750 HH)
Small Village 0.266 (Hydel)

138.5 7.3
(370,000 HH) 0.301 (No hydel)
Village 0.150 (Hydel)

361.3 51.9
(1,036,000 HH) 0.267 (No hydel)
Total 519.0 61.0
As shown in Exhibit 14, deployment decision does not only depend on invested capital
expenditures. Hybrid mini‐ and micro‐grids that include diesel generation are available
at small capital investment, but with a variable cost driven by fuel consumption, and

therefore lead to higher cost of electricity; on the other hand, villages with hydro
resources available face larger capital investments to develop hydel projects, but are
compensated by lower electricity costs subsequently.
The estimated capital cost to electrify all the target 7,400 villages in Pakistan would be
roughly four times this value, that is, approximately US$ 2.1 billion.
7 Medium Term Offgrid RESE Policy Recommendations
7.1 Target Markets and Technologies
For the purpose of Pakistan’s medium term RES‐S policy, the target population is that
living in off‐grid villages and remote scattered households. These villages/scattered
dwellings can be supplied electricity based on renewable sources of energy generation,
either by stand‐alone or mini‐grid systems. RES‐E technologies included in this portfolio
consist of, at a minimum:
• Bio‐energy resulting from anaerobic gas digesters, pyrolitic biomass gasification,
and co‐generation.
Any type of national and/or regional grid expansions is outside the scope of this policy,
as well as any RE project that plans to electrify a village with an installed generation
capacity larger than 1 MW.18
This policy is developed exclusively for off‐grid rural and isolated areas. These areas are
defined as currently unelectrified villages that are not included in any national or
regional grid expansion plan for the next ten years and are located beyond 20 km from
the existing power grid. The AEDB, along with the distribution utilities, is responsible for
elaborating (and properly updating) a list of villages falling under the purview of this
‘target’ definition, and this list should include at the very least: the name of the village
and province, geospatial coordinates, number of inhabitants, and number of
households.
The implementation period of this policy is January 2010 to December 2014, as we
understand that incentive policies require at least five years to have an adequate chance
to succeed, as previously recommended in Annex VIII.

18
Covered separately under the on‐grid RES‐E Policy.

7.3 Conceptual Approach
In our approach, off‐grid electrification can be developed either:
• Via national‐provincial coordination in which provincial governments compete
for federal government assistance to finance their off‐grid projects.
Under the first mechanism, provincial governments are fully in charge of developing the
electrification projects within their territorial jurisdiction. Each province may develop a
simplified regime for off‐grid project deployment, following which bilateral agreements
between the parties involved must be reached to enforce project implementation. These
agreements are arranged solely by the relevant parties which decide on tariffs, quality of
service, and other contractual terms.
Under the second alternative, a coordinated plan has to be set up to assign
competences to the different parties involved in order to maximize their operational
potential and capabilities for achieving effective and efficient off‐grid rural
electrification. The main characteristics and tasks for stakeholders in this respect are
summarized in Exhibit 15.
Exhibit 15: Proposed Federally Assisted Off‐grid RES‐E Deployment Approach
Ministry of Water OGREA Budget

and Power Request
Assessment of
AEDB Off-grid National Off-grid Project Guidelines for
OGREA Settlem ent
Villages and Scattered Portfolio Managem ent Authorizations
Populations
Provincial Authorization
Governments Awarded Tendering Perform ance
Project Proposals Issuance and
(REAs) Projects Procedure Monitoring
Tariff Setting
Interested Priv.
Stakeholders Inverstors
NGOs Project Execution
Cooperatives
Individuals

As can be seen in the exhibit, the main features of the regulation proposed are as
follows:
decide the allocation of national funds to different off‐grid electrification projects
based on rules previously defined by the Government of Pakistan;

• The AEDB will create and update, with the assistance of the power utilities and
provincial governments, a complete assessment of the unelectrified villages and
scattered communities able to be supplied by RES‐E technologies which shall be
approved as the off‐grid electrification ‘target’ population for the medium term
(2010‐2014) by the Federal Cabinet;19
• Provincial governments—through their respective Rural Electrification Agency

(REA)20—will be the key stakeholders for promoting off‐grid rural electrification
within their provincial borders. Based on the list of annual target
villages/populations developed by them in collaboration with the AEDB and
approved by the latter, each REA will prepare and submit to the AEDB a village‐
specific electrification project in which, at least, the following aspects shall be
covered:
o Socioeconomic characteristic of target village/scattered population.
o Total cost of the project, segregated between capital and operational
expenditures.
• The proposed off‐grid projects should not strictly focus on providing electricity
services only. It is highly desirable that projects should include, to the extent
feasible, domestic equipment, water installations, and or any other facility that
could help to improve the social and human development of the target
village/scattered population, as well as provide for their maintenance by
qualified personal.
• Each project must strictly comply with the guidelines proposed by the AEDB for
proper comparison, benchmarking and analysis. Therefore, it is essential that
rules are set for this purpose in a clear and transparent manner. It should be the
duty of the AEDB to document simplified procedures for project approval,
including criteria for ranking the projects and the definition of the parameters
needed to obtain comparable project proposals (e.g., the costs of different
generation technologies).

19
Any village and/or scattered population not included in the approved list finalized by the AEDB will be excluded
from the off‐grid electrification program and not be eligible for the provisions of the present policy.
20
Or any related agency/department designated as such by the provincial government for the development of all off‐
grid rural electrification projects in its territorial jurisdiction.

• The AEDB will collect all project proposals and will create an annual project
portfolio. This portfolio will be organized according to a merit order based solely
on the social cost‐benefit analysis of the project.
government will call for tenders for granting, at least, a 10‐year Authorization to
develop off‐grid electricity services following technology specifications stated in
the electrification project. If convenient (i.e., for proximate villages), several
projects may be combined for tendering under a single authorization.
• The primary criterion for selecting the winning bid for each Authorization will be
‘least subsidy’ demanded for capital investments for electrification/installation.
• All types of stakeholders (cooperatives, NGOs, private individuals, and private
companies) would be eligible to participate in the tender process if they meet a
minimum set of technical qualifications to be defined by provincial REAs with the
guidance of the AEDB.
apply to specific project tenders. In the Authorization, at a minimum the
following contents would be included:
o Applicable tariffs.
o Quality‐of‐service regulation, including standards adjusted for each
technology and fines for non‐compliance.
o Community capacity‐building (provision of technical training and other
incentives to promote the regional development of the area).
7.4 Targets and Incentives
Under the proposed medium term off‐grid RES‐E policy, at least, 25% of the off‐grid non‐
electrified villages identified by the AEDB should be supplied with electricity by
December 31, 2014. In order to achieve this target, the federal government will provide
subsidies for capital investments to the extent of 70% of the total investment required
for the RES‐E project approved by the AEDB.
The AEDB will approve projects according to a merit order based on social cost‐benefit
analysis. The social cost‐benefit analysis should consider:
• The subsidy requirement (total and as a share of total cost).
benefits. Included, in this respect, should be the expected improvement in, for
instance, water sanitation, education, health, gender issues, employment,

incomes, and other sustainable and human development indicators of the
community—instead of just kWh supplied.
The remaining capital and O&M costs, including replacement costs, would be financed
by:
• The tariffs for the off‐grid services defined by the provincial REA, taking into
account the customers’ ability to pay.
• Community contribution to such schemes may be in the form of sweat equity
• NGO contributions.
As subsidies are provided, they should be limited to the amounts needed for basic social
pay more for higher levels of electricity service, such as more kWhs received and better
quality of service. In that case, the extra quality and quantity must be paid for by the
customer as per provisions in the bilateral agreement with the service provider.
7.5 Project Funding
(OGREA) in the budget for the AEDB should be created. This account could be financed
by:
Finance will be made by the Ministry of Water and Power as estimated by the
AEDB/REAs according to the needs imposed by the off‐grid electrification project
targets, and
provide.
The OGREA settlement is an attribute restricted solely to the AEDB. Once projects have
been awarded, tender procedures will direct the transfer to the respective REAs.
Delivery of subsidies should be output‐based and only related to capital expenditures.
The REAs directly or the through the local government will monitor the fulfillment of the
milestones defined in the Authorization in terms of investment, and ask the AEDB for
subsidy delivery in the form of funds transferred directly to the holder of the
Authorization. The AEDB may develop spot monitoring of the projects in order to cross‐
check the use of these national subsidies.
Additionally, the government—through state‐owned banks—will provide financing
facilities at preferential rates, collateralized by the future stream of subsidy deliveries
defined in the Authorization.

7.6 Pricing
The level and structure of the service tariff will be the sole responsibility of the
provincial governments, to be developed in cooperation with local governments. The
REAs will define the tariff structure for each Authorization according to the following
criteria:
• In stand‐alone systems, a one‐part tariff (Rs/customer) should be preferred.
each customer will have a power limiter installed in order to disconnect him/her
if the contracted capacity is exceeded.
• In those cases in which the customer is willing to pay for a higher quality or more
energy than required for basic needs, a metering device may be installed.
As stated in Annex VIII, the consultants believe that the current general financial and
fiscal incentives, as defined in the 2006 on‐grid RES‐E Policy, are adequate and should be
continued into the medium term as well and extended to off‐grid RES‐E investors.
Additional facilities and incentives may be provided to encourage the local manufacture
of RES‐E technologies, with a view to bringing their costs down and improving
availability of spares and local service and maintenance capabilities. It is not considered
necessary to issue sovereign risk guarantees for these types of projects, however.
In the medium term off‐grid RES‐E policy, we do recommend a greater involvement of
provincial institutions, as international experience shows positive results in off‐grid rural
electrification deployment when regional and local governments actively participate in
the decision‐making and implementation process. According to this view, provincial
governments should be directly involved in the activity of providing electricity services to
inhabitants living in scattered/isolated regions. Local stakeholders should also have an
active role in the process as a means to enhancing community acceptance and ensuring
successful deployment and operation.
The AEDB would play a key role in off‐grid electrification development as it is not only
the main coordinator of the process at the national level, but will also be in charge of
setting guidelines for project formulation, implementation, and financing. Additionally,
the AEDB will elaborate the list of off‐grid villages and scattered population to be
supplied by off‐grid RES‐E solutions updated on an annual basis.
The Ministry of Water and power will define the budget request for the OGREA. In
addition, the Ministry will provide all the necessary means to assure that the fund is
created and properly managed.

In Exhibit 16, a summary is provided of the proposed roles for each of the relevant
institutions involved.
7.9 Institutional, Legal and Regulatory Consents
The broad division of institutional responsibilities proposed for off‐grid RES‐E
deployment in Pakistan is shown in Exhibit 16.
projects and enable small communities and investors to participate fully in these
schemes. Due to the characteristics of the proposed arrangements, no regulatory or
operational consents by NEPRA and NTDC/DISCOs are envisaged for such projects.
Exhibit 16: Summary of Roles of Institutions in Off‐grid RES‐E Deployment
Institution Main Role
Ministry of Water and • Define budget request for Off-grid Rural

Power Electrification Account (OGREA)
Alternative Energy • Develop demonstration programs and projects for off-

Development Board grid RE
(AEDB) • Promote local manufacturing
• Program coordinator
• Set parameters for project cost-benefit analyses
• Decide on projects’ merit order
• OGREA management and issue payment order for
approved projects
• Develop standard authorizations
National Electric Power • None

Regulatory Authority
(NEPRA)
Pakistan Council for • Foster R&D and technology development relevant to

Renewable Energy renewable energy, in coordination with the AEDB
Technologies
(PCRET)

Provincial and AJK • Support the implementation of renewable energy

Agencies projects in close coordination with the AEDB
• Facilitate allocation of land use, water rights, and
environmental permitting
• Create awareness of RE amongst end users and
customers
• Remove any other local impediments which may hinder
RE development in a province
• Create provincial Rural Electrification Agencies
REAs)
• Decide on renewable generation technology to be
implemented in each project.
• Elaborate project cost-benefit analysis based on
parameters previously set by the AEDB.
• Cofinance approved rural electrification projects.
• Call for tender process for construction/operation
of each awarded project.
• Set tariff for off-grid services and monitor
performance
WAPDA or CPPA • None

(as purchasing entity)
Power Utilities • None

(NTDC, KESC, & DISCOs as
networks operators)
In relation to the AEDB consents, our proposal is to eliminate the Letter of Intent (LoI),
Letter of Support (LoS), and related guarantees that are required for on‐grid RE projects.
The only consents that should be necessary is the Project Information Memorandum
(PIM) for each project, which would include all technical and economic features of the
project. This is the information that the AEDB will utilize to develop the national
portfolio of off‐grid RES‐E projects and develop the ranking for subsidy delivery. In case
the project does not require national funding support, this consent will also not be
required.
Concerning environmental issues, we propose that the federal and provincial
Environmental Protection Agencies (EPAs) remove the requirement of an Initial
Environmental Examination (IEE) for off‐grid RES‐E projects of up to 1 MW capacity.
However, a basic environmental compliance and impact checklist will be developed by
the EPAs and required to be completed by the provincial REAs for all projects, primarily
to ensure that water rights, flows, and community interests are not unduly infringed
upon. Additionally, as a condition of the Authorization, the project developer should
certify how proper design, engineering, construction, and safety criteria will be
addressed in the execution of the project.

huge regulation costs. The monitoring process has two main parts:
milestones defined in the Authorization being reached, as a trigger for the AEDB
to release subsidy payments.
involves monitoring that service quality standards defined in the Authorization
are met throughout its period of validity. The regulator should establish
standards for product quality, service quality, and commercial quality. Product
quality includes stability of voltage and stability of frequency relative to
benchmark reference levels. Service quality includes targeted hours of service,
number and duration of interruptions, and safety of the system. Commercial
quality includes connection, accuracy in meter readings (for customers whose
service requires meter reading), accuracy in billing, and response time to resolve
customer complaints. It should be note that fewer standards that can be
effectively monitored are preferable to many standards that are poorly
monitored.
Performance monitoring and enforcement will be the responsibility of the provincial
REAs. REAs should consider a more flexible approach than the traditional role of the
regulator in monitoring quality, given that because of the dispersed, small size, and
often isolated location of these electrification projects, the cost of an active regulation
may be a huge burden. The REAs should develop a program of awareness amongst their
service provider. The monitoring should be based on customers’ (or other stakeholders’)
claims.
It is considered logical, as well as administratively simpler, for RES‐E investors to assume
the risks and benefits of qualifying for and obtaining CERs, along with the potential
revenues associated with them. However, the AEDB could assist project developers
applying for CDM registration through programmatic or clustered, single‐umbrella
application cover. In such cases, cost and revenue sharing arrangements can be
developed subsequently, as necessary.

ADB TA 4881PAK:
Final Report
AEDB’s Capacity Assessment and
Institutional Needs
and
Mercados EMI, Spain

Asian Development Bank
Manila

Final Report
AEDB’s Capacity Assessment and
Institutional Needs
Contents
Appendices .................................................................................................................. iii
Exhibits ........................................................................................................................ iv
Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................................................ v
1 Objective .................................................................................................................. 1
2 Situation Analysis ..................................................................................................... 3
2.1 Background to RE Deployment in Pakistan ........................................................... 3
2.1.1 Potential, Targets, and Achievements....................................................... 3
2.1.2 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Landscape ......................................... 5
2.2 Establishment and Development of the AEDB ...................................................... 6
2.3 Performance Issues ............................................................................................... 7
3 Diagnostic Evaluation ............................................................................................... 8
3.1 Strategic Objectives ............................................................................................... 8
3.1.1 GoP’s RE Vision and AEDB Response ......................................................... 8
3.1.2 Mandate .................................................................................................. 11
3.1.3 Renewable Energy Key Stakeholders ...................................................... 12
3.1.4 Target Setting .......................................................................................... 15
3.1.5 Prioritization of Renewable Energy ......................................................... 16
3.1.6 Key Findings ............................................................................................. 18
3.2 Plans and Timelines ............................................................................................. 18
3.2.1 Key Findings ............................................................................................. 19
3.3 Resource Deployment ......................................................................................... 20
3.3.1 Manpower Levels .................................................................................... 20
3.3.2 AEDB´s Organizational Structure ............................................................. 20
3.3.3 Salary Structures ...................................................................................... 22
3.3.4 HRD, Training, and Staff Appraisals ......................................................... 23
3.3.5 Staff Attrition and Morale ....................................................................... 23
3.3.6 Key Findings ............................................................................................. 23

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 i
Asian Development Bank AEDB Capacity Assessment
TA 4881‐PAK: Final Report and Institutional Needs
3.4 Financing .............................................................................................................. 24
3.4.1 Key Findings ............................................................................................. 26
3.5 Business Processes .............................................................................................. 26
3.5.1 Key Findings ............................................................................................. 28
3.6 Market Intelligence, Communication, and Information Systems ....................... 28
3.6.1 Key Findings ............................................................................................. 30
4 Remedial Measures ................................................................................................ 31
4.1 Institutional Mandates, Roles, and Targets ......................................................... 31
4.2 Overall Strategic and Planning Capability ........................................................... 33
4.3 Human Resource and Technical Capability ......................................................... 36
4.3.1 Staffing Levels .......................................................................................... 37
4.3.2 Salary Structures ...................................................................................... 39
4.3.3 Training .................................................................................................... 39
4.3.4 Technical Training Courses ...................................................................... 40
4.4 Financing .............................................................................................................. 42
4.4.1 On‐ grid Expenditures .............................................................................. 42
4.4.2 Off‐grid Expenditures .............................................................................. 42
4.5 Business Processes .............................................................................................. 42
4.6 Communication, Marketing, and Business Intelligence ...................................... 44
4.7 Institutional Linkages ........................................................................................... 45
4.8 AEDB´s Performance Evaluation ......................................................................... 45
4.8.1 Institutional Evaluation ........................................................................... 46
4.8.2 Service Evaluation ................................................................................... 46

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 ii
Appendices
A AEDB Capacity Assessment Information Request ........................................................ 51
B Proposed AEDB Key Job Descriptions ........................................................................... 55


R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 iii
Exhibits
Exhibit 1: MTDF Energy Mix Plan Projections ................................................................ 11
Exhibit 2: AEDB’s Strategic Roadmap ............................................................................. 12
Exhibit 3: Institutional Roles in On‐grid RE Development over the Medium Term ....... 13
Exhibit 4: Institutional Roles in Off‐grid RE Development over the Medium Term ....... 14
Exhibit 5: AEDB Wind Power Development Plan (2011‐2020) ....................................... 15
Exhibit 6: AEDB Medium‐term Wind Power Development Plan 2011‐2020 ................. 18
Exhibit 7: AEDB Long‐term Vision for Wind Power Development ................................. 19
Exhibit 8: AEDB Staff Breakdown by Office and Grade .................................................. 20
Exhibit 9: AEDB Organizational Chart ............................................................................. 21
Exhibit 10: Summary of AEDB Income and Expenditure, 2007‐ 08 .................................. 24
Exhibit 11: Expenditure on AEDB Development Projects ................................................ 25
Exhibit 12: Current Donor Funding of Alternative Energy Programs in Pakistan ............ 25
Exhibit 13: Wind Power Projects – AEDB Activity Flow Chart .......................................... 27
Exhibit 14: Proposed AEDB Strategic Roadmap ............................................................... 33
Exhibit 15: Economically Feasible RES‐E Projects by Technology (2020) ......................... 34
Exhibit 16: Annual Future Deployment of Feasible RES‐E Projects in Pakistan ............... 35
Exhibit 17: Optimum Penetration of RES‐E to 2020 at Social Cost .................................. 35
Exhibit 18: Proposed AEDB Organization Chart ............................................................... 36
Exhibit 19: Staff by Department ....................................................................................... 37
Exhibit 20: Proposed AEDB Organizational Structure ...................................................... 38
Exhibit 21: On‐grid Technical Staff Estimate ................................................................... 39
Exhibit 22: Off‐grid Technical Staff Estimate .................................................................... 39
Exhibit 23: RE Stakeholder Map ....................................................................................... 45
Exhibit 24: Suggested AEDB Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Targets .................. 46

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 iv
ACR Annual confidential report
AEF Alternative Energy Fund
AJK Azad Jammu & Kashmir
BG Bank guarantee
CERA Certified Emissions Reduction Agreement
CSF Critical success factor
DGNRER Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy Resources
DNA Designated National Agency
EPC Engineering, procurement, & construction
ESCO Energy services company
FTE Full‐time employee
GEF Global Environment Fund
GW Gigawatt
GWh Gigawatt‐hour
HR Human resources
HRD Human resource development
IRET Institute of Renewable Energy Technologies
IT Information Technology
km Kilometer
KPI Key performance indicator
LoI Letter of intent
M&E Monitoring and evaluation

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 v
MHP Micro hydropower
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt‐hours
NARC National Agricultural Research Centre
NIST National Institute of Silicon Technology
NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory
NUST National University of Science and Technology
O&M Operation and maintenance
ODC Other direct costs
OGDC Oil & Gas Development Corporation
OGREA Off‐grid Rural Electrification Account
OH Overheads
PCAT Pakistan Council for Appropriate Technologies
PG Performance guarantee
PPA Power purchase agreement
PPIB Private Power Infrastructure Board
PPP Public‐private partnership
PSC Public sector comparison
PV Photovoltaic
QA Quality assurance
RE Renewable energy
REA Renewable Energy Agency
RES‐E Renewable energy sourced electricity
SHYDO Sarhad Hydropower Development Organization

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 vi
SOP Standard operating procedure
SS Small‐scale
TPES Total primary energy supply
TW Terawatt
TWh Terawatt‐hour
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
US DOE United States Department of Energy
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VFM Value‐for‐money

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 vii

ADB TA 4881-PAK:
AEDB’s Capacity Assessment
and Institutional Needs
1 Objective
This report presents the consultant’s institutional assessment of the Alternative Energy
Development Board (AEDB) and associated recommendations to strengthen AEDB´s
capabilities in line with the implementation requirements of Pakistan’s Medium Term
Renewable Energy Policy being developed under the Asian Development Bank’s TA
4881‐PAK.
This report builds on the findings and recommendations of previous documents relating
to national renewable energy (RE)1 development strategy and policy recommendations
prepared under the TA, particularly Working Papers No 2, 3, and 4.
The scope of this paper covers a broad range of topics, from AEDB´s basic mandate
through to operational considerations suited to the proposed policy approach. AEDB´s
organizational capability has been assessed against eight key dimensions:
• Mandate and Mission Objectives
• Strategy and Planning
• Business Processes
• Human Resources and Training
• Finance
• Market Intelligence, Communication, and Information Systems
A four‐step approach was used to gather information for purposes of conducting an
assessment of AEDB’s existing capacity, analyzing gaps, and formulating
recommendations:
• Personal interaction with AEDB´s senior management
• Fact‐based analysis of AEDB´s main business areas (e.g., processes, HR, IT, etc.)
• Face‐to‐face interviews with key external players relevant to AEDB´s operations
(e.g., government agencies, donors, RE project sponsors, etc.)

1
Following common practice, in this document the term ‘renewable energy’ (or RE) excludes large hydro (i.e., above
50 MW capacity), but includes small hydro and ‘new’ renewables (i.e., solar photovoltaic and thermal, wind,
biomass conversion, waste‐to‐energy, etc.). It does not include traditional biomass (fuel wood, agricultural and
forestry wastes, dung, and other unprocessed biomass fuels) combustion for domestic cooking and heating
purposes.

R9CA1PRP ‐ AEDB CAPACITY ASSESSMENT: 11/03/09 1
• Detailed information request questionnaires specifically designed to solicit
existing documentation and information on AEDB’s organization and
management (Appendix B).
While carrying out this assessment, particular emphasis was placed on key RE
stakeholders’ and potential investors’ interests and perspective.
This report is structured in the following three parts:
• Situation analysis of current AEDB capacity, as it relates to its presently
conceived tasks, operational strategy, and perceived priorities;
• Diagnostic evaluation of the effectiveness (i.e., strengths and weaknesses,
accomplishments and failures, etc.) of its performance thus far;
• Remedial measures for addressing perceived shortcomings, as well as additional
requirements and modifications specifically envisaged for its role in successfully
implementing the GoP’s medium‐term RE policy regime.
We understand that a detailed institutional assessment of AEDB is presently being
conducted by the GoP, the findings of which are not available to the consultants.
Therefore, we have placed greater emphasis on developing capacity‐related
recommendations for the medium‐term future, in anticipation of approval by the
government of the overall RE policy recommendations being developed under this TA.

2 Situation Analysis
2.1 Background to RE Deployment in Pakistan
Pakistan is a significant user of hydropower (currently about 34% of total generation
capacity) and traditional biomass. Most hydroelectric generation comes from large
schemes, although small hydro projects are now attracting some attention. However,
the use of other modern renewable technologies in Pakistan remains insignificant,
despite the fact that per capita energy use in the country has been increasing at almost
5% per annum (with electricity generation growing by almost 6%) in recent years, while
the share of oil and natural gas in total energy supplies remains at 30% and 50%,
respectively, even as oil import prices hit record highs and indigenous gas production
has leveled off recently.
2.1.1 Potential, Targets, and Achievements
The potential for the large‐scale development of renewable energy in Pakistan is
considerable, although a systematic assessment of economically viable resources has yet
to be undertaken for specific technology applications.
By some estimates, 50 GW of hydropower and a similar amount of wind power potential
exists, of which only about 16% of hydel potential has been harnessed so far, inclusive of
large dams. The current small hydro capacity consists of high‐head plants set up in the
northern mountainous regions, which collectively amount to only about 64 MW,
although significant low‐head possibilities also exist given the country’s extensive
irrigation canal network. Most regions of Pakistan receive abundant solar irradiation—
on the order of over 2 MWh/m2 and 3,000 hours of sunshine a year, which is at the
highest end of global insolation averages. Commercially exploitable wind resources also
exist in many parts, especially in southern Sindh and coastal Balochistan. Detailed wind
mapping could also reveal suitable sites in the interior parts of the country and in the
mountainous regions.2 To date, limited‐scale ground‐based wind data collection has
been undertaken in the southern regions of the country.3 However, no commercial wind
farms currently exist in Pakistan, and only a few micro turbines have been set up at the
community level for demonstration purposes.4
Pakistan’s large agricultural sector produces copious amounts of biomass in the form of
crop and livestock wastes and residues—such as bagasse, rice husk, and dung—much of
which is currently collected and used outside the commercial economy as unprocessed
fuel for cooking and household heating. This results in significant health impacts due to
indoor air pollution and loss of productive labor employed in fuel gathering, especially
for rural women. More efficient, modern biomass applications include anaerobic biogas

2
As indicated by the country‐scale wind and solar incidence maps based on computational algorithms published by
the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) in 2007.
3
41 wind masts have been established by the Pakistan Meteorological Department, and some additional ones
operated by private and donor‐assisted projects, in Sindh and Balochistan in recent years.
4
Although a few wind IPPs are in advanced stages of project preparation, with at least one slated to commence
construction in 2009.

digesters, biofuel production (ethanol, biodiesel, and bio‐oil), pyrolytic gasification, co‐

firing and cogeneration, feedstock (including municipal solid waste‐to‐energy), and
improved cook stoves. In Pakistan, other than the use of bagasse for self‐generation in
the sugar industry, and some work on better cook stove design, virtually none of these
biomass conversion or end‐use technologies has been deployed beyond the
experimental stage. Pakistan’s geothermal potential remains unexplored, particularly
the occurrence of sites with sufficiently high pressures. Wave and tidal power, although
still in the technology development phase, could also eventually find applications along
the country’s 1,046 km‐long coastline.
Recently, the Government of Pakistan has placed increased emphasis on the
development of the country’s renewable energy resources, initially setting an indicative
target in 2003 of achieving 10% of installed generation capacity through RE by 2010
(exclusive of large hydro). However, this non‐binding target has been revised
downwards repeatedly: to 5% in February 2005, and 1.1% currently.5 This is
symptomatic of both an absence of proper economic and technical appraisal of
beneficial RE applications in the local context,6 as well as an inability to sufficiently
mobilize the necessary policy, legislative, institutional, and financial support for
achieving realizable goals.7 Nevertheless, the necessary lessons from local and
international experience vis‐à‐vis the approach, scope, supporting frameworks,
sequencing, inter‐agency coordination, and practical implementation modalities
required for a successful and comprehensive renewable energy development strategy
are being gradually assimilated.8 Designated government counterpart agencies9 have
also been only partially successful in utilizing available international assistance so far,
resulting in largely uncoordinated and intermittent support to the local RE development
process.
In comparison to the situation in Pakistan, regional countries have already taken
considerable strides in implementing renewable energy capacities—in small hydro (India
and Nepal), solar PV (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal), solar thermal (India and
Nepal), biogas (India and Nepal), wind (India), and biofuels (India)—building
incrementally on sustained local effort and capitalizing on international financing and
collaboration opportunities. Pakistan thus needs to accelerate, in a nationally
coordinated and institutionalized manner, its RE facilitation efforts on similar more
comprehensive and larger scale bases.

5
Planning Commission, Medium Term Development Framework 2005‐2010, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad:
May 2005.
6
This is a gap specifically addressed in Working Paper 4.
7
Towards this end, a reassessment of the government’s strategic approach and specific policy recommendations for
the medium‐term (2009‐2014) are the objective of the current ADB TA (4881‐PAK), and outlined in Working Papers
5 and 6.
8
See, for example, Working Papers 1 and 2.
9
For example, the Global Environment Facility (GEF) ‘National Focal Point’ and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) ‘Designated National Agency (DNA)’, both in the Ministry of Environment.

2.1.2 Institutional, Legal, and Regulatory Landscape
At the beginning of the current millennium, the institutional and policy landscape
relating to RE activities in Pakistan presented a cluttered picture. There were a variety
of agencies claiming mandates, sometimes overlapping and conflicting, that related
ultimately to renewable energy use in the country, while at the same time several key
organizations that would logically have a major role to play in this respect remained
uninvolved. For instance, a Directorate General of New and Renewable Energy
Resources (DGNRER) was formed in the early 1970s within the Ministry of Petroleum
and Natural Resources, with a view to piloting and implementing renewable energy
sourced electricity (RES‐E) projects, primarily for rural electrification. The Pakistan
Council for Renewable Energy Technologies (PCRET) was established in 2001 to conduct
similar technical research and demonstration projects, and was itself a result of the
consolidation of several agencies previously working on different aspects of RE
development, i.e., the National Institute of Silicon Technology (NIST) and Pakistan
Council for Appropriate Technologies (PCAT). The Sarhad Hydropower Development
Organization (SHYDO) was created in 1986 specifically for the purpose of developing
small hydro projects in the NWFP, while NGOs, such as the Aga Khan Rural Support
Programme (AKRSP), independently undertook microhydel schemes in the Northern
Areas. The military established its own solar PV projects under the EME Workshop
based in Rawalpindi, while some academic (e.g., at NUST) and donor‐assisted (e.g., GTZ
and UNDP/GEF) RE initiatives were also undertaken.
The Government of Pakistan established the Alternative Energy Development Board
(AEDB) in 2003 to promote the use of renewable energy and help realize the
achievement of national targets (see following section). As a one‐window facilitator of
renewable energy investments, this was a welcome and necessary step towards
consolidating the RE institutional framework, although the organization is constrained
by internal capacity issues and an arbitrary mandated ceiling of 50 MW project size, with
larger RE IPPs being processed by the Private Power and Infrastructure Board (PPIB).10
Other relevant organizations for renewable power projects are the National Electric
Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), the various corporatized entities of the Water and
Power Development Authority (WAPDA), including the National Transmission and
Dispatch Company (NTDC), and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC). None of
the utilities have as yet been engaged by any private RE power project in the country,
although grid interconnection studies for wind IPPs are underway and some of the
corresponding tariff determinations and power purchase agreements have been
negotiated with the regulator. The Ministry of Environment also stakes a claim to
renewable energy projects due to their climate change implications, being the
Designated National Agency (DNA) for CDM registration.
There is also an apparent overlap of AEDB’s functions with the provincial governments’
entitlement to develop power projects of up to 50 MW capacity on their own. The
situation becomes more complex if this is to be executed through a distinct corporate
entity or if the project is to be connected to the national grid, as this would elicit

10
With the exception of wind IPPs, which are exclusively in AEDB’s domain regardless of their installation size.

NEPRA’s regulatory role and presents certain legal anomalies that have yet to be tested
and resolved in the context of RE power projects.
With a few exceptions, renewable energy does not currently merit special treatment
under Pakistan’s legal and regulatory framework, and such projects are largely
subsumed into the broader classification of ‘power sector projects’. This results in the
market penetration of renewables being subjected to the same principles and criteria as
conventional energy projects, with hidden subsidies, existing market bias, new
technology risks, and lack of accounting of external costs and benefits all working
against the introduction of renewable energy investments.
In terms of a holistic assessment of all feasible renewable energy resource and
technology options—their prioritization, specific application areas and targets, unique
marketing needs, time‐bound action plans, systematic barrier removal, implementation
of institutional arrangements and coordination, and commitment of financial support
and mechanisms—no coherent, integrated government strategy exists. Some of these
issues are relevant to the performance of AEDB, while others relate to the absence of a
systematic policy approach to renewable energy development on a national scale. The
current policy11 was devised specifically for the short term (originally to end‐June 2008,
now to be extended into 2009) to facilitate several wind IPPs already in the AEDB
pipeline, while the medium term (2009‐2014) policy development initiative under the
present ADB TA is meant to address exactly some of these earlier shortcomings and help
develop a more enabling environment for AEDB to be able to meet its objectives.
2.2 Establishment and Development of the AEDB
The Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) was created on May 12, 2003 under
a Presidential decree12 with the aim of promoting and facilitating the exploitation of
renewable energy resources in the country so as to achieve the GoP’s RE deployment
targets. The AEDB’s functions include framing appropriate policies and plans,
developing projects, promoting local manufacturing, creating awareness and facilitating
technology transfer, channeling international assistance, and coordinating all such
activities as a supreme national facilitating agency for the development of renewable
energy in the country. It has also been designated as a ‘one‐ window’ facility for
processing RE power generation projects of less than 50 MW capacity in the country.10
The AEDB Ordinance provides financial and operational autonomy to the organization.
The Board was, for its initial four years, headed by a full‐time Chairman. In 2008, the
Federal Minister, Water and Power was made the Board’s honorary Chairman, with a
new position of a full‐time Chief Executive created to head its operational activities. The
Board also includes ex‐officio members from concerned government
ministries/divisions, as well as five members from the private sector, including two full‐
time technical members. In addition, it hires professional staff on competitive market

11
Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB), Policy for Development of Renewable Energy for Power Generation,
2006, Ministry of Water and Power, Islamabad: December 2006.
12
Initial vide Notification No. F.1/7/2003/Admn II, dated May 12, 2003, subsequently converted to Presidential
Ordinance on April 30, 2005 and published as Ordinance No. LVI of 2007, Gazette of Pakistan, Government of
Pakistan, Islamabad: October 3, 2007.

salaries, free from civil service rules and conditions. The Board relies on funding from
the government and other international and domestic financial institutions.
The AEDB was initially tasked with the fast‐tracked development of renewable energy
projects in Pakistan, initially placed under the Cabinet Division and reporting directly to
the Prime Minister. It thus had the requisite GoP political support behind it from the
outset, and it took advantage of this position by creating a highly visible profile for the
organization with ambitious plans and targets that were assiduously promoted through
the media and public events. From the beginning, the organization focused its activities
predominantly on wind power development through the private sector, and for this
purpose undertook concerted efforts to engage with interested local and foreign
investors. Its capacity development and growth in subsequent years was thus heavily
oriented towards achieving this mission, and by 2006 it found itself deeply entrenched in
wind IPP project negotiations on behalf of some of the 93 LoIs it had issued earlier
(along with 23,646 acres of land concessions it had persuaded the Government of Sindh
to provide on highly concessionary terms to 15 wind farms, with another 10,330 acres
provisionally allocated to seven additional projects).
2.3 Performance Issues
Nevertheless, despite this progress, the AEDB’s growth as a professional RE
development agency remains less than satisfactory, particularly with respect to RE
applications other than wind power. Despite having undertaken some pilot
electrification through PV systems in about 1,000 rural households in all four provinces
and 100 microwind generators in villages in Sindh and Balochistan during 2004‐05, the
AEDB has not developed the internal capacity nor institutionalized plans for the
sustainable, scaled‐up deployment of other commercially viable RETs (e.g., small hydros,
biomass‐fueled generation, etc.) or for off‐grid rural electrification. It has, in recent
years, also been substantially supported by some donor agencies in helping promote
renewable energy policies and projects through targeted technical assistance,13 but this
has not yet been leveraged to the AEDB’s own technical capability enhancement. At
present, the Board’s primary objective appears to be to ensure that at least a few of the
wind IPP projects originally sanctioned through the LoIs achieve financial closure and can
start construction by 2009. Thus, judging by its own initial projections, even allowing for
the realization of some wind power capacity by next year, the outcome of the AEDB’s
efforts over the past five years of its existence does not appear to be in line with its own
stated objectives, and there seems to be a need to re‐evaluate its strategic approach
and internal planning and executive capacity.

13
Such as the GTZ’z Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (REEE) project, the ADB’s Renewable Energy
Development Sustainable Investment Programme (REDSIP), and the USAID’s Pakistan RE resource assessment
assistance through the NREL.

3 Diagnostic Evaluation
The situation analysis of the current institutional capacity for RE development in
Pakistan presents a mixed picture: several government‐ and donor‐supported initiatives
have been undertaken in the past, but these have largely been disjointed and
fragmented, with no clear sustainability mechanisms or long‐term strategy, policy, and
institutional frameworks yet in place to further their goals. This has resulted in some
isolated successes and progress in some aspects of framework and capacity
development, but not to the extent required to firmly initiate large‐scale deployment of
RETs in the country, nor a reliable vision of when such capacity would indeed be
achieved.
This section provides the consultants’ evaluation of some of the factors responsible for
this situation, along with some broad prescriptive solutions that could be considered in
devising a more effective response strategy for meeting the GoP’s RE development
objectives and the commensurate role and capacity of the AEDB over the medium term
future.
3.1 Strategic Objectives
3.1.1 GoP’s RE Vision and AEDB Response
The strategic targets set for RE development in Pakistan in the MTDF by the Planning
Commission do not appear to be derived from a comprehensive cost‐benefit analysis of
renewable versus other energy options, and thus at best represent indicative—rather
than necessarily achievable—targets based on a practical, RET‐wise energy mix.
Furthermore, by repeatedly lowering the overall penetration target for RE‐based
electricity by 2020, the GoP has ensured that even these goals are considered flexible,
rather than mandatory. This has resulted in not only undermining the AEDB’s
development as a mission‐oriented organization, but also ensured that RE remains an
unreliable future option in the minds of the country’s energy planners, policy makers,
and investors.
Furthermore, even given a non‐binding planning target, the AEDB failed to assess,
elaborate, and plan its own strategy professionally for achieving the GoP’s stated
objectives. Instead of taking the broad mandate and clear intent of the GoP for
substantially increased RE deployment in the country and developing it further into
economically and operationally feasible plans, RET‐wise strategies (including for non‐
power RE development which the MTDF omits from its targets), and intermediate
actions and milestones, the AEDB set about adopting ad hoc approaches to both RE
capacity development (i.e., almost exclusively through wind IPPs) and rural
electrification (through standalone PV and wind home systems). There was no
systematic socioeconomic analysis undertaken of the various RET technologies,
resources, and markets in Pakistan that could help guide the AEDB develop its annual
operational plans, recommend appropriate policy measures, mobilize resources and
develop its own capacity accordingly, and ensure that the least‐cost RE projects get
priority attention.

Instead, the Board locked itself into a very difficult track, of meeting ambitious GoP
targets with an arbitrarily selected RET focus. For instance, by selecting the locally
untested and relatively expensive and sophisticated wind turbine technology for
initiating large‐scale RES‐E capacity installations, the AEDB unwittingly made several
strategic errors that have affected its own effectiveness since, both perceived and real:
• For Pakistan, small hydro—followed by biomass conversion—are by far the
lowest‐cost and technologically easily indigenized RET, with vast resource
potential for both, especially in difficult, off‐grid terrain where conventional
power generation and grid extension is particularly costly. Thus, these
technologies are not only financially and practically inherently more feasible and
readily deployable, but enjoy the advantage of higher avoided costs which would
also make them financially very attractive to the utilities and rate payers. By
contrast, grid‐connected wind IPPs in the Keti Bandar‐Gharo wind corridor
especially selected by the AEDB for accelerated development, have to compete
directly with large hydel and CCGT‐supplied power on the national grid, suffer
from relatively lower plant factors and, being relatively new technology, higher
financial risks and costs. Not surprisingly, these projects have been plagued by
protracted tariff negotiations with NEPRA, with the regulator and utilities
unwilling to accept premium prices demanded for their variable output under
dispatch priority, while providing interconnect and backup supplies at additional
cost.
• Having committed itself to the wind IPP route, the AEDB found itself largely
advocating on behalf of private investors with government agencies for the
necessary tariffs, permits, incentives, and guarantees deemed necessary to invite
investment in this relatively new area. While this was in keeping with the AEDB’s
stated role as a ‘one‐window’ facilitator of private RE investment, it was however
perceived by most other key stakeholders—regulators, utilities, and competing
generators—as favoring wind investors unnecessarily. This argument holds some
merit, although if only because the AEDB was following NEPRA’s own ‘cost‐plus’
pricing formulation to justify high tariffs and risk guarantees to the wind IPPs.
The AEDB thus was embroiled in justifying investors’ escalating capital costs and
power buyback demands on the one hand, while itself not having established
economic price benchmarks for wind power nor being privy to the actual IPP
project costs. This situation could have been avoided, for instance, by offering an
initial fixed quota of wind power purchase on competitive tenders, instead of on
a guaranteed returns and wind risk cover basis. In the process, however, not
only did the AEDB get embroiled with haggling on behalf of the IPP sponsors with
key agencies, which at times led to acrimony and the creation of a degree of
mistrust between itself and the regulator, but also had to put in considerably
more effort into such case‐by‐case negotiations, at the detriment of its other
activities. This singular and consuming preoccupation with wind IPP
development has been a cause for both good (in terms of organizational
understanding of IPP requirements) and bad (in terms of actual projects realized
and other RET capacities developed) with respect to AEDB’s own capability
development, but overall has not been an optimal strategy by any means.

• The AEDB’s other strategic mistake with respect to its GoP‐assigned targets
was—in the absence of an internal evaluation and planning process—its inability
to assess, request, and secure the necessary technical, manpower, and financial
resources from the government in order to fulfill its mandate. This oversight
eventually cost the organization dearly, as it accepted a very ambitious mission
without the necessary means for achieving its objectives. In fact, for much of its
existence, the AEDB has had to fight for even the rudimentary staffing and
budgeting resources that it had originally been sanctioned, its continued efforts
in this regard being stymied by the increasingly mixed views on its performance
so far by decision‐makers within the GoP. This is a vicious cycle that must be
broken, and the Board should be provided with clear means and a reasonable
timeline to mature and establish itself as a professional body, before a realistic
appraisal of its performance and regular accountability mechanisms to gauge its
effectiveness are deployed.
• The AEDB’s considerable investment in wind IPP development also detracted it
from other RE project development, internal planning, capacity building and
training, and donor coordination activities that could have helped salvage its
reputation had they been undertaken with greater vigor. Thus, for instance, the
AEDB remains without an operational mechanism to facilitate the regular
disbursement of REDSIP tranches,14 in coordination with provincial and regional
governments, for public sector RE projects, or for sustainable development of
off‐grid RE‐supplemented electrification, or for specific biomass projects—all
areas in which it could easily have achieved visible results with much less effort
than that expended on wind IPP development so far. As for wind power, the
AEDB would have done well to simultaneously explore off‐grid locations to install
pilot demonstration‐type projects (for which GEF funds were readily available to
it), as the higher tariffs could more easily be justified here on grounds of even
higher avoided electricity supply costs and greater local socioeconomic benefits.
• Finally, the AEDB does not seem to have undertaken a thorough internal review
of its strategy and planning processes, despite the evident lessons and difficult
experience it has faced in meeting its initially‐publicized objectives. To an extent,
the organization became a victim of its own hype, and has taken longer than
necessary to evaluate its performance, ‘unlearn’ errant strategies, and
implement corrective actions. The MoWP, in the 2006 RE Policy, laid out a
phased roadmap in which the initial policy regime was deliberately curtailed to
the short term (i.e., to June 31, 2008, now to be extended to 2009), to allow for a
more thought‐out policy strategy to be developed for the subsequent medium
term. In effect, this should provide the AEDB with the necessary means to
review its strategic direction, and to proceed in a more rational manner by
‘reinventing’ itself for the future.

14
The ADB’s REDSIP multi‐tranche financing facility (MFF) has made a considerable fund of USD 0.51 billion available
to the GoP for ready financing of public sector RE projects; however, its disbursement has been very slow for the
first two tranches, with the provincial governments and AEDB failing to come up with a pipeline of RE projects and
the necessary implementation capacities. At present, there are no visible project identification preparations
underway either for the third REDSIP tranche.

3.1.2 Mandate
AEDB´s strategic directions and targets are currently defined by two main documented
sources, the AEDB Ordinance and the GoP’s Medium Term Development Framework
(MTDF). The Ordinance describes broad strategic directions for the organization which
are supplemented by the quantitative objectives relating to national energy security set
by the government in the MTDF. These objectives are:
• 7% of total national power generation capacity (i.e., 9,700 MW), or 2.5% of total
primary energy supply (TPES), to be generated through renewable energy
technologies by 2030 (Exhibit 1).
• Electrification of 7,874 remote villages in Sindh and Balochistan provinces
through renewable energy technologies, out of a total of 12,585 to be electrified
throughout the country by 2010.
• Development of a comprehensive plan for the development of solar products
(solar lights, solar fans, solar cookers, solar geysers) through the participation of
the private sector.
Exhibit 1: MTDF Energy Mix Plan Projections
180
Oil
160
Natural Gas
Coal
140 Renewables
Hydro
120 Nuclear
100
MTOE
80
60
40
20

Source: Medium Term Development Framework 2005‐2010, Government of Pakistan.
In parallel, the AEDB has been involved in the implementation of pilot projects across
Pakistan which has resulted in numerous activities on the ground, including:
• Solar electrification
• Solar water pumping
• Micro and mega wind projects
• Microhydel
• Biodiesel
• Fuel cells
• Earthquake relief.

We are not aware of any strategic roadmap or internal planning clearly linking AEDB’s
actual activities on the ground to the directions and objectives set in the Ordinance and
MTDF. For instance, how do the first two objectives listed above from the MDTF (7% of
total national power generation by 2030 and electrification of 7,874 villages) break
down into specific AEDB actions and achievable annual targets?
Using the Ordinance and MTDF, Error! Reference source not found. aims to rebuild
AEDB´s strategic roadmap linking AEDB´s strategic goals to its operational performance
targets. The exhibit highlights some gaps in the roadmap which would need to be
addressed for AEDB to meet the MTDF objectives stated above. It is pertinent to
mention here that the limited visibility of overall internal strategic planning,
documentation, and communication within a ‘lead’ institution such as the AEDB can also
have a potentially adverse or demoralizing effect on prospective investors, suppliers,
financiers, and other agencies involved in renewable energy development in the
country.
Exhibit 2: AEDB’s Strategic Roadmap
Strategic
Vision Mission CSFs KPIs/Targets
Objectives
Develop national strategy,

policies, and plans Not defined Not defined
Promote all alternative energy resources in Pakistan
Evaluate, monitor, and

certify RE projects Not defined Not defined
Not defined
• % of LOIs materialized
Facilitate power generation • % of electricity produced from RE
through RE sources: • Set up as one-window facility • # RES-E generation licences issued
• Cost/benefit
• Identify RE project opportunities • 700 MW wind by 2010
Ensure 7% national power
capacity from RE by 2030 • Promote and facilitate RE projects
• # villages electrified
• Conduct feasibility studies • # houses electrified
Electrify 7,874 villages in • Carry out technical and financial • Cost/benefit
Sindh & Balochistan through
evaluations of proposals • Quality of feasibility studies?
RE by [date not defined] • Provide assistance in licensing and tariff • # months for project implementation
petitions
• % of private sector involvement
• Coordinate activities with national agencies • # projects developed
Build up plan for development
of solar energy with • Assist in the implementation projects • # beneficiaries from projects
participation of private sector • # months project implementation
• Set up alternative RE pilot projects • # villages electrified
• Budgeted vs. actual outlays

Note: CSF: Critical success factor, KPI: Key performance indicator.
3.1.3 Renewable Energy Key Stakeholders
The AEDB has a key role in coordinating the activities and promoting the interests of key
renewable energy stakeholders in Pakistan. This function requires in‐depth knowledge
of the activities of each stakeholder category and strong working relationships with all
parties involved. In this respect, Exhibit 3 presents the proposed roles of key
government agencies in on‐grid RE development over the medium term, while Exhibit 4
illustrates the case for off‐grid RE‐based electrification

Exhibit 3: Institutional Roles in On‐grid RE Development over the Medium Term
Institution Main Role in RE Development
Ministry of Water • Coordinate development of conventional and RE energy sources

and Power • Formulate development policies jointly with Planning Commission
• Issue implementation agreement and security packages with
Ministry of Finance
• Set penetration quota for uneconomic RE technologies
Ministry of Finance • Evaluate impact of proposed policy on the economy as a whole.

(through BOI and • Approve development policies jointly with MoWP
FBR) • Issue implementation agreements and security packages jointly
with MoWP
AEDB • Frame and propose appropriate policies and plans to the GoP
• Develop demonstration programs and projects for off-grid RE
• Promote local manufacturing
• One-window facility for processing IPP projects under RE policy
• Develop standard PPAs for each RET
coordination with provincial and AJK agencies
NEPRA • Define feed-in tariffs according to the conceptual

approaches provided in these policy recommendations
promptly (within four months)
• Approve the application of pre-defined feed-in tariff to a
specific RE project
• Adjust grid and distribution codes in order not to block the
development of RE IPPs
• Issue licenses for RE power generation projects
WAPDA or CPPA • Sign PPA under consent of AEDB

(as purchasing entity) • Procure all power produced by approved on-grid RE generation
plants during the term of the PPAs and up to cap provided in policy
Power Utilities • Connect RE projects to grid if they comply with requirements of

(NTDC, KESC, & network codes
DISCOs as networks
operators)
PCRET • Foster R&D and technology development relevant to renewable

energy in coordination with the AEDB
Provincial and AJK • Support the implementation of renewable energy projects in close
Agencies coordination with the AEDB
• Facilitate allocation of land use, water rights, and environmental
permitting
• Create awareness of RE amongst end users and customers
• Remove any other local impediments which may hinder RE
development in a province
coordination with AEDB
• Harmonize province RE regulations with national
framework
Source: ADB TA 4881‐PAK Working Paper 5.

Exhibit 4: Institutional Roles in Off‐grid RE Development over the Medium Term
Ministry of Water and • Define budget request for Off-grid Rural

Power Electrification Account (OGREA)
Alternative Energy • Develop demonstration programs and projects for off-

Development Board grid RE
(AEDB) • Promote local manufacturing
• Program coordinator
• Set parameters for project cost-benefit analyses
• Decide on projects’ merit order
• OGREA management and issue payment order for
approved projects
• Develop standard authorizations
National Electric Power • None

Regulatory Authority
(NEPRA)
Pakistan Council for • Foster R&D and technology development relevant to

Renewable Energy renewable energy, in coordination with the AEDB
Technologies
(PCRET)
Provincial and AJK • Support the implementation of renewable energy

Agencies projects in close coordination with the AEDB
• Facilitate allocation of land use, water rights, and
environmental permitting
• Create awareness of RE amongst end users and
customers
• Remove any other local impediments which may hinder
RE development in a province
• Create provincial Rural Electrification Agencies
REAs)
• Decide on renewable generation technology to be
implemented in each project.
• Elaborate project cost-benefit analysis based on
parameters previously set by the AEDB.
• Cofinance approved rural electrification projects.
• Call for tender process for construction/operation
of each awarded project.
• Set tariff for off-grid services and monitor
performance
WAPDA or CPPA • None

(as purchasing entity)
Power Utilities • None

(NTDC, KESC, & DISCOs as
networks operators)
Source: ADB TA 4881‐PAK Working Paper 6.

In its one‐stop RE facilitation role, the AEDB needs to develop a strong network of
contacts and relationships within each of the entities listed in the preceding two
exhibits. The AEDB would need to act as an umbrella for all RE‐related activities and
foster cooperation amongst the various institutions involved in RE activities, as well as
serving as the central repository of all information, data, and networking links related to
renewable energy in Pakistan.
3.1.4 Target Setting
Key time‐bound quantitative interim RE capacity deployment targets are necessary for
the government to be able to assess and review the performance of the AEDB in
promoting and developing RE and meeting its long‐term goals. This is turn would
increase the accountability as well as the credibility of the agency and allow corrective
mid‐course actions to be taken, if necessary, in response to any shortfalls observed. The
AEDB has developed and documented some measurable targets against which its
performance could be evaluated in two specific areas so far: wind power generation and
RE‐based rural electrification.
For wind power generation, AEDB’s short term (2005‐2010) and medium term (2011‐
2020) plans set forth the targets highlighted in Exhibit 5 below. The aim is to reach 3,730
MW of installed wind power generation capacity by 2020 and 9,700 MW by 2030.
Exhibit 5: AEDB Wind Power Development Plan (2011‐2020)
A few of points are worth noting here:
• The Government’s long term vision of 9,700 MW of power generation
from renewable energy by 2030 seems to be planned to be achieved
solely through wind turbines, disregarding other renewable energy
technologies (RETs).
• There is no breakdown or quantitative analysis to detail how the target of
9,700 MW by 2030 is actually to be reached (i.e., annual capacity
additions, costs, locations, etc.).

• No detailed plans have been shared with the consultant that assess the
actual feasibility, from AEDB´s own capacity viewpoint, of implementing
the actions and facilities that would be required to reach these targets.
Under Rural Village Electrification, the MTDF sets the target of electrifying 7,874 villages
in Sindh and Balochistan provinces (6,968 and 906 villages, respectively). The main
delivery mechanism to meet program objectives are solar PV and wind power to supply
electricity and associated appliances (SHSs, WHSs, efficient lighting, solar cookers, solar
water disinfectors, etc.).
To date, eleven villages, totaling a thousand households, have been electrified using
solar PV systems . Another 18 villages with 691 houses (100 turbines) have been
provided electricity through 100 micro‐wind generators installed. While this represents a
useful start and provides operational experience and demonstration benefits, the AEDB
does not seem to have conducted detailed planning on critical issues relating to:
• Cost‐effective choice of RETs to be deployed, given village characteristics and
available RE resources.
• Program design for scaling up village electrification through RES‐E, including cost
and management requirements.
• Demarcation of future villages/areas to be electrified using RES‐E, including
socioeconomic benefit‐cost analysis against alternative options (hybrid and
standalone thermal, grid extension, etc.) and annual deployment targets.
• Financial and institutional sustainability of large‐scale RES‐E deployment in
unelectrified villages, including project selection criteria, delivery mechanisms,
service charges, and cost and revenue sharing, etc.
Therefore, at this stage, it is unclear what AEDB’s development and rollout plans are to
support the rural electrification program outlined in the MTDF of electrifying villages
through RE, nor does there appear to be any systematic effort underway to address this
planning requirement.
Thus, for both grid‐connected and off‐grid RES‐E deployment, the AEDB’s approach,
technology selection, and activities appear to be ad hoc, short‐term, and project‐based.
It seem evident that while the organization is trying to gain experience through limited
intervention and somewhat arbitrary focus in a ‘bottom up’ approach, it has not yet
attempted to define its activities in a ‘top down’ manner, i.e., by working backwards
from its assigned long‐term RES‐E capacity targets to determine the most economic RET
mix, institutional and policy requirements, resource and capacity needs, and related
timelines and workplans.
3.1.5 Prioritization of Renewable Energy
The AEDB´s mandate is broad and encompasses a wide range of on‐grid and off‐grid
RETs (solar PV and thermal, wind, small hydel, biomass conversion, biofuels, WTE, etc.).
To our knowledge, there is no evidence of a systematic and economic prioritization of
the various RETs undertaken by the AEDB against deployment scenarios (e.g., on‐ and
off‐grid, centralized and distributed, geographical and end‐use markets, etc.) or relevant

financial and social costs (e.g., alternative conventional generation, fuel prices, avoided
costs, externalities, etc.) that could help trigger corresponding implementation
strategies as well as providing sound justification for resource allocation and pricing in
favor of RE supplies. The AEDB’s initial, continuing and predominant emphasis has been
on developing grid‐connected wind IPPs (and that too in a prescribed ‘wind corridor’ in
southern Sindh), and in facilitating private investors by negotiating favorable
government incentives, risk guarantees, and tariffs on their behalf. This approach has
several obvious drawbacks:
• By directing all of its attention on a single RET, the AEDB has not been able to
evaluate other feasible alternatives and facilitate their development in the
interim, just as its own capabilities and experience in these RETs has remained
stunted.
• By not conducting a sustained economic evaluation of different RETs, and in
particular for prioritized wind generation, the AEDB has not been able to
determine justifiable tariffs on avoided or least cost basis, and has instead spent
considerable effort in supporting IPP petitions with the regulator based on ever‐
escalating financial costs, which in turn has perhaps created an unnecessary
impression of unduly favorable terms being offered to the wind IPPs and a
certain level of institutional discord on the subject within the government.
• By placing its emphasis almost exclusively on wind IPPs, including publicizing
unconfirmed investor interest in projects prematurely (e.g., LoIs signed,
unlimited capacity quota) and making hasty concessions (e.g., with respect to
investor screening, allocating land leases, etc.), the AEDB exposed itself to the
risk of a failure or delay in corresponding capacity deployment (for these or other
reasons) becoming the sole measure tarnishing the institution’s performance and
public perception. This appears to have happened, placing further pressure on
the organization to deliver on a difficult target (wind farms represent a new,
sophisticated technology locally, involve high capital costs, and rely on
unpredictable overseas suppliers and prices, etc.).
• The lack of attention to other feasible and more accessible RETs (in particular,
small hydro and biomass conversion) by the AEDB has resulted in many ready,
fast track, and least cost options not being developed, or their potential and
feasibility being properly assessed, or available financing (such as ADB’s REDSIP
facility and CDM) from being optimally utilized, representing an economic loss to
the country and additional time now being required to develop these options.

3.1.6 Key Findings
• No developed strategic roadmap or annual workplans clearly articulating RE
deployment objectives and operational goals in place.
• Limited overall RE evaluation, prioritization, and project portfolio development
and management capability exists.
• Limited measurable targets, key performance indicators (KPIs), to assess
AEDB´s performance and implementation efforts
• Where targets do exist, it is unclear how they were devised or will be achieved,
given the lack of detailed plans.
• Lack of comparative socioeconomic RET benefit‐cost evaluation and pricing
capability.
3.2 Plans and Timelines
As stated earlier, the AEDB has developed short‐ (2005‐2010) and medium‐term plans
(2011‐2020), mainly for wind power installation. These plans set overall generation
targets on a yearly basis. The short‐term plan establishes the development of 700 MW
of wind energy by year 2010 by private investors, while the medium‐term plan targets
3,730 MW by 2020. The long‐term vision (up to 2030) is to achieve 9,700 MW (Exhibit 6
and Exhibit 7).
Exhibit 6: AEDB Medium‐term Wind Power Development Plan 2011‐2020
Year Additional Wind Power Cumulative Wind Power

Generation Capacity Generation Capacity
(MW) (MW)
2011 200 680 (by 2010) + 200 = 880

2013 20 880 + 200 = 1,080
2014 150 1,080 + 150 = 1,230
2015 200 1,230 + 200 = 1,430
2016 250 1,430 + 250 = 1,680
2016 250 1,680 + 250 = 1,930
2017 400 1,930 + 400 = 2,330
2018 400 2,330 + 400 = 2,730
2019 500 2,730 + 500 = 3,230
2020 500 3,230 + 500 = 3,730
Source: AEDB website (www.aedb.org).

Exhibit 7: AEDB Long‐term Vision for Wind Power Development

Source: AEDB Profile, 2005‐2006.
Beyond this, there does not appear to be any evident of further planning detailing how
such targets are to be achieved, and what mechanisms the AEDB intends to deploy in
case interim results are not achieved as indicated in the timelines. Typically, Level 1‐3
plans would be expected to be in place, where Level 3 plans would list the subtasks and
activities required to meet the targets set in the Level 1 (or master) plan. Level 3 and 2
plans would roll up to the Level 1 plan, which would highlight the main planning
building blocks with associated timeline.
A ‘bottom up’ planning exercise would be beneficial in this respect on several accounts:
• To validate how realistically ‘achievable’ the government RE targets are.
• To provide an understanding of the level of effort, timeline, and resources
required to meet set targets.
• To provide greater clarity and confidence in the AEDB´s overall delivery
capability.
• To allow for the establishment of measurable internal milestones and indicators
for assessing the AEDB´s performance.
• To allow for the development of corrective actions and feedback loops for the
AEDB to pre‐empt shortfalls and refine or redirect its efforts.
To our knowledge, no other targets or plans have been created by the AEDB for the
development of RETs other than grid‐connected wind farms.
3.2.1 Key Findings
• No systematic ‘bottom up’ approach to planning.
• Lack of detailed RET‐wise plans, timelines, and interim performance indicators.
• No overall master plan setting institutional direction, growth, and capacity
building directions.

3.3 Resource Deployment
3.3.1 Manpower Levels
The AEDB currently has 102 staff members on its payroll, spread over three offices
located in Islamabad, Karachi, and Quetta (Exhibit 8). The majority (85%) of the staff is
located at its headquarters in Islamabad. A quarter of the AEDB’s personnel (i.e., 26
persons) are officers, with the remaining staff involved in support functions.
Exhibit 8: AEDB Staff Breakdown by Office and Grade
Islamabad Office Karachi Office Quetta Office
Of f icer
Of f icer 17%
28%
Non-
Of f icer Non- Non-
72% Of f icer Of f icer
83% 100%

Source: Alternative Energy Development Board.
Against the AEDB´s proposed organizational chart,15 there are numerous key positions
not presently filled in. At this stage, it is unclear whether this is a result of underfunding,
shortage of qualified candidates, uncompetitive financial packages offered, or staff
turnover.
The AEDB´s organizational chart indicates a total staff strength of 101, with only 23 staff
currently posted and 78 vacancies. These vacancies include senior and mid‐level
positions within the organization and exclude any support/administrative staff. At this
stage, it is unclear whether the vacancies would require support staff in line with AEDB´s
current officer/support staff ratio of 1:4. Overall, the AEDB´s currently planned staffing
level is 180 full‐time employees (FTEs).
3.3.2 AEDB´s Organizational Structure
The AEDB is presently organized around four main departments:
• Power Projects, which manages RE pilots and IPPs (excluding hydro).
• Energy Management, groups policy, quality, financing, and hydro functions.
• Finance and Administration, for institutional management functions.
• Institute of Renewable Energy Technology (IRET), for training and technical
capacity development in RETs.

15
Approved by the Board but not yet officially sanctioned by the GoP.

As mentioned in the previous section, 78% of all posting identified in AEDB´s
organizational chart are currently vacant (see Exhibit 9). In particular, several technical
postings which would be key to the identification and development of renewable energy
projects remain unfilled. They include:
1. Director, Hydro
1. Director, Solar
2. Director, Wind
3. Director, Biomass
Exhibit 9: AEDB Organizational Chart
Board
Chairman
CEO Secretary
Energy
Power Project Finance & Admin Pro Rector IRET
Management
(General Director) (General Director) (General Director)
(General Director)
Solar Thermal
Policy Director Finance Director
Director
Solar PV Director Hydro Director Admin Director
CDM/Emerging International
Wind Director Technologies Cooperation
Director Director
Provincial
Biomass Director TMM/QA Director Coordination
Director
Marketing/Logistics
Director

Source: AEDB.
The AEDB´ current organizational structure contains most of the key roles that would be
expected in an organization with its mandate. However, a realignment of some functions
would enable a clearer demarcation of roles and responsibilities, as some anomalies
appear to exist:
1. The Director, Hydro belongs to the Energy Management department, whereas all
other forms of Renewable Energy are allotted to the Power Projects department.
2. The Finance and Administration department is composed of mixed functions and
activities (e.g., International and National Coordination, Marketing and Logistics).
3. The role of the Director, Marketing seems unclear.

4. Emerging technologies functions would appear to benefit from synergies with
the Institute of Renewable Energy Technology (IRET) rather than the Energy
Management Department
5. Training and Quality Assurance functions would need to be split. Quality
Assurance would need to be relocated to ensure the visibility and independence
of the function
6. There is no mention of IT or business intelligence activities within the
organizational structure.
In Working Paper 4, the consultants have identified several RE generation mixes where
hydel is preponderant, given, amongst other criteria, Pakistan’s abundant hydel
potential and its low life‐cycle costs per unit of energy produced. It is worth noting that
the AEDB´s current staffing across different RETs does not reflect Pakistan’s hydel
priorities that would result from a ‘least cost’ generation mix. Indeed, the current
organogram shows AEDB´s Wind Directorate to be the department with most staff.
Although this follows from the discussion in Section 3.1.5, the AEDB was unable to
provide a rationale for this bias.
The lack of detailed job descriptions hindered the consultant’s effort to identify where
specific key activities and roles lie in the present institutional structure:
• Economic assessment of renewable energy sources, markets, and deployment
options, as detailed in Working Paper 4.
• Renewable resource data collection and dissemination, as per AEDB´s mandate.
• Administration and maintenance of client and vendor databases, project site
inventory, archive of project feasibility studies, and other relevant information.
There is no distinct Information Technology and/or Services department to
support AEDB´s activities and facilitate investor and public enquires.
3.3.3 Salary Structures
At the time of writing this report, the AEDB´s salary structure had not been shared with
the consultants. However, we were given to understand that AEDB´s compensation can
be commensurate with market rates and that the organization is not strictly bound by
government salary structures. This is stated explicitly in the AEDB Ordinance, which
assigns the Board the right to regulate:
• “Terms and conditions along with remuneration and privileges, etc., for
appointment of officers, staff members, experts, advisors, and consultants, etc.;
• “Prescription of different scales and grades, etc., for the remuneration and
privileges of officers, staff members, experts, advisors, and consultants, etc., of
the Board.”
Various renewable energy stakeholders in Pakistan interviewed during the course of this
TA have reported an acute shortage of qualified renewable energy technical staff. This
would necessarily result in a competitive job market for such professionals, where the
AEDB might not be best placed to attract the most talented individuals unless it offers
attractive working conditions, remuneration, and benefits to its employees. At least in

terms of job security, long‐term service benefits, contract extensions, and even payment
of salaries on time—leaving aside the matter of actual compensation levels—the
anecdotal evidence of the AEDB’s ability to inculcate employee confidence and faith in
career advancement appears to have been less than satisfactory so far.
3.3.4 HRD, Training, and Staff Appraisals
As part of the overall compensation package, human resource development (HRD) and
on‐the‐job training is a key element for recruiting, retaining, and improving any
organization’s workforce. The AEDB has provided its officers the opportunity to attend
local training sessions and workshops, mostly in collaboration with donor agencies, as
well as participation in international trade fairs, conferences and study tours. However,
at this stage, there is no structured training program being carried out in specific
technical or managerial skills, nor does there appear to be any formal training needs
analysis having been conducted. Course and trainee selection appears to be somewhat
arbitrary, subject to availability, rather than based on specific and systematic
departmental and personnel professional development goals. There are no regular staff
appraisal mechanisms instituted that can monitor technical and management skills
development, other than the standard GoP annual confidential reports (ACRs).
These HRD and staff training and evaluation deficiencies can seriously undermine the
AEDB’s ability to incrementally build its institutional capacity, ensure the provision of
proper design and management of its expanding programs and projects, and instill the
necessary confidence both within its staff and amongst its various interlocutors
(investors, donors, government agencies, etc.) about its professional capabilities and
ability to deliver on its functions and pledges.
3.3.5 Staff Attrition and Morale
We understand staff attrition to be in the order of 20% per year, which is above average
acceptable rates. Various reasons can be put forward for this—which can be collectively
attributed to an overall lack of a truly professional environment that can result in higher
levels of job satisfaction and future career prospects within the organization for all levels
of staff—but it is not surprising that they can lead to unnecessary staff turnover, unfilled
vacancies, and a drain of the AEDB´s scarce resources and nascent experience base.
3.3.6 Key Findings
• An organization not fully aligned and structured to meet its strategic objectives.
• Organizational structure and staffing levels would need to be streamlined, with
key functions realigned.
• Inadequate remuneration mechanism, which fails to attract and retain best
available talent.
• Lack of HRD and training programs geared towards long‐term professional
capacity building.
• Significant staff shortages, especially in key technical roles.

3.4 Financing
AEDB´s financing relies on funds, loans, and grants provided by the federal government,
provincial or local authorities, donor agencies, and charges for services, which are placed
in the Alternative Energy Fund (AEF) specifically created under the AEDB Ordinance to
enable it to meet its recurring operational expenses (e.g., salaries, establishment costs,
etc.) as well as for program and project execution. Initially, the federal government has
unwritten the entire expenditure of the AEDB, until such time that the AEDB can fully
finance the AEF from its own resources, charges, and revenue streams.
During the year 2007‐08, 75% of the Board’s income derived from funds provided by the
federal government, and only 10% of the total income was generated by AEDB service
charges to private entities. Expenses were primarily related to personnel and
operational costs, with a small amount for reparation and maintenance, as illustrated in
Exhibit 10.
The AEF is also used by the AEDB to promote its pilot RE demonstration and deployment
projects in recent years. In the years 2004‐05 and 2005‐06, around 46% of the budget
allocated was to promote the Solar Home Program, which consisted of electrification of
remote villages through solar PV technology, with 1,001 houses electrified under this
program (Exhibit 11).
The financing of AEDB’s focal RES‐E technology so far, wind power, is based on private
investment in IPPs; at present, seven investors have finished detailed feasibility studies
and have applied for generation licenses from NEPRA, of which five have been granted.
Exhibit 10: Summary of AEDB Income and Expenditure, 2007‐ 08

Source: Summary of Income and Expenditure of Alternative Energy Fund during 2007‐08, AEDB.

Exhibit 11: Expenditure on AEDB Development Projects
50.000
45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
(Mill PKR)
25.000
20.000
15.000
10.000
5.000
0
Pilo Project Pilot Solar Supply Solar
Emerging 100 Solar Solar Fuel cell
Wind Project Homes Chain Bio Diesel Water
Tech Homes Thermal Vehicle
Turbines Micro Program Mechanism Punping
2004/2005 22.400 15.400 9.600 3.900 46.540

2005/2006 3.534 2.400 2.167 40.000 3.000 13.849 11.667 1.271 10.000
2006/2007 9.700 2.276 931 5.000
2007/2008 12.550 3.140 1.525 10.260

Source: Summary of budget and expenditures of development projects provided by AEDB
The information provided to the consultants by the AEDB shows that a budgeting and
expenditure development process exists within the organization, although the criteria
for deciding on allocation of funds is not clear. At present, the data provided contain ten
projects for the period 2004‐05 to 2007‐08, including details on allocated amounts and
expenditures for every project.
Other financing sources comprise of different international financing institutions and
bilateral programs that have granted funds for the development of alternative
renewable energies, such as those shown in Exhibit 12.
Exhibit 12: Current Donor Funding of Alternative Energy Programs in Pakistan
Donor Amount
(Million USD)
UNDP/GEF 3.82
GTZ 3.5
ADB 0.7
USAID 1.9
Total 9.92
Source: Alternative Energy Development Board.
It is clear that a master plan is necessary to link the AEDB’s detailed annual workplans,
establishment and recurring costs, budgetary allocations, and project‐wise resource
requirements with sources of government and self‐generated income, IFI financing, and
other available funding to provide for a sustainable and practical transition to the
organization’s long‐term financial viability and resource mobilization activities.

3.4.1 Key Findings
• The AEDB relies primarily on the government’s financial support.
• External financing options have been explored only for commercial wind IPPs.
• No direct links of budgetary allocations with institutional workplans and targets
exist.
• Mechanisms and master plan for mobilizing increased resources for transition
to future self‐sustainability not addressed.
3.5 Business Processes
A set of rules (or procedures) for the establishment of the Board and the conduct of its
business have been defined. The rules present the nomination of members, functions,
duties, meetings, etc.
A sequence of activities for establishing an RE IPP exists only for wind and small hydro
power projects in the current policy framework, for which the AEDB is the implementing
agency. For other RETs, such information has not been developed, and the AEDB’s
existing business processes are primary focused on promoting wind energy (see Exhibit
13 for relevant process details).

Exhibit 13: Wind Power Projects – AEDB Activity Flow Chart

Source: AEDB Web Page
In an organization such as AEDB, detailed business process would be expected to cover
all core business activities, such as:
• Annual Planning and Budgeting
• Employee and Office Management
• Financial Management

• Financial and Administrative Audits
• Project Management
• Reporting and Communications
• Monitoring and Evaluation
• Information Processing and Dissemination
• Document Control, Management, and Archiving
• Public Relations
• Investor Screening and Evaluation
• Project Feasibility Assessment
• Tendering and Bid Evaluation
• Procurement
• Inventory
Apart from annual financial audits conducted by an independent chartered accountant
engaged by the AEDB, and given that the Board has now been in existence for five years,
a general audit by the Auditor General of Pakistan’s office would also prove beneficial at
this stage.16 It is commendable that an independent administrative audit of the AEDB is
presently being undertaken by the GoP, the findings of which were not available at the
time of writing of this report.
3.5.1 Key Findings
• Business processes need to be developed in key functional and administrative
areas and fully documented in a set of AEDB standard operating procedures
(SOPs).
• AEDB should establish, in addition to annual financial audits, a schedule of
externally‐conducted institutional and performance audits in order to be able
to highlight key deficiencies and undertake timely remedial strategies.
3.6 Market Intelligence, Communication, and Information
Systems
From its inception, the AEDB has stressed public awareness‐raising about renewable
energy use and undertaken sustained interaction with private investors interested in RE
IPPs. This has been achieved largely through individual meetings, promotional road
shows, conferences and workshops, media interaction, participation in trade fairs and
seminars, and active advocacy on the part of the AEDB of RE stakeholder interests within
the government.

16
As per Auditor General’s (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2001 (XXIII of 2001).

However, as with many of its other functions, this important role is performed largely on
an ad hoc basis, making use of available opportunities (e.g., donor support, vendor‐
sponsored events, trade events, etc.) or personal initiative by key officials. There is no
separate budgetary provision or plan for promotional and awareness raising activities by
the AEDB in line with its overall organizational workplan objectives. In fact, partly
because of the disconnect between its public relations vigor and actual implementation
capacities, the organization has often suffered the fallout of an ‘oversell’, especially with
regard to wind IPP development (against LoIs publicized) and actual RE deployment
(against oft‐repeated GoP RE targets).
The organization has so far also not been the focal point for the development and
dissemination of RE resource potential data, which is essential for facilitating investor
actions beyond the initial expressions of interest. A key function of the AEDB could be as
the custodian and clearing house of consolidated data, including the conduct of
additional resource mapping and measurements, which could then be made publicly
available at little or no cost to all concerned stakeholders. Instead this function has so
far been housed in disparate organizations, each of which follow their own
standardization, measurement, and dissemination protocols, making the information
difficult and costly to access as well as undermining its bankability and currency. For
instance, ground‐based wind monitoring is conducted and collated by the Pakistan
Meteorological Department (PMD), and does not conform to internationally acceptable
measurement standards; computed countrywide solar insolation and wind speed maps
developed by the US NREL are available with the AEDB but not placed on its web site,
nor yet been cross‐verified with actual existing values; small hydro site identification and
feasibility studies conducted by GTZ/KFW reside with the PPIB, but have not been
updated or added to for over a decade; information on bagasse use is collected by the
Pakistan Sugar Mills Association (PASMA), but not publicly available; there is little or no
consolidated information on other biomass resources, and what exists is scattered
amongst various institutions (e.g., NARC); etc.
The consultant has been made aware of several small information repositories within
the AEDB, such as organizations involved in the development of biomass/waste/biogas,
and a list of solar equipment suppliers.
However, the consultant has not come across the sort of organized, detailed, and up‐to‐
date databases that a central, one‐window organization such as the AEDB would be
expected to maintain, for example:
• Comprehensive databases of technologies, international trends, manufacturers,
vendors, potential investors, key contacts, organizations, associations, events,
etc., relevant to RE development.
• RE resource and market data (wind data, solar maps, comparative costs,
consumers and applications, geographical potential, etc.).
• Library and information services on technical aspects of RE projects and
implementation mechanisms.
• Database of project sites, feasibility studies and project‐specific information by
RET.

• Directory of RE financing options, programs, and mechanisms, along with
information on eligibility criteria and application procedures.
As part of its knowledge transfer and sharing role, the AEDB would need to log and
update such information on a systematic and regular basis, with convenient access and
dissemination mechanisms set up (such as through a much expanded, data‐intensive
web portal). To the extent that related information is presently being processed by the
AEDB, it is done in a largely unorganized manner, reducing its utility and convenience
both for the information seeker as well as the provider.
The AEDB is currently a member of the Pakistan Wind Energy Association and World
Wind Energy Association. The Consultant has not been made aware of any other trade
or association memberships by the AEDB, nor of any significant publications to its credit.
The membership of relevant professional bodies of international stature, and
contribution to reputable journals on RE technologies and applications, should be an
important means by which the AEDB can elevate its own technical capabilities and
professional credibility, channel technology transfer, facilitate international
collaboration and partnerships, and visibility.
3.6.1 Key Findings
• Information collection and dissemination role of the AEDB is not organized, and
key elements remain with other institutions with little coordination or
consolidation.
• The AEDB should assume the role of a central clearing house of information on
all aspects of RE development, but at present its capabilities in this respect are
very limited.
• Interaction with international RE actors, activities, associations, fora, and
publications needs to be undertaken through more meaningful collaboration
and participation to expedite transfer of knowledge, skills, and help build the
AEDB’s credibility.
• The AEDB has been successful in raising the profile of RE in general, but has not
been able to follow up effectively on the interest and expectations thus
created.
• Standalone PR activities are regularly undertaken, but do not roll up to a master
information and communication plan.
• Absence of structured and detailed data repository and dissemination
protocols, infrastructure, and mechanisms.

4 Remedial Measures
In this section, we suggest basic remedial measures that the consultants deem necessary
to:
• Transform the AEDB into a more professional, streamlined entity that is better
able to deliver on its stated objectives by filling in existing capability gaps in
terms of resources and operations.
• Augment the AEDB’s capacity in line with the consultants recommendations on
the medium‐term RE policy regime, to ensure effective implementation of
specific roles and facilities envisioned therein.
As with the preceding diagnostic evaluation of the current capacity of the AEDB, future
capacity‐building recommendations are addressed for all primary aspects relevant to the
organization’s functioning:
• Mandate and Mission Objectives
• Strategy and Planning
• Business Processes
• Human Resources and Training
• Finance
• Market Intelligence, Communication, and Information Systems
4.1 Institutional Mandates, Roles, and Targets
Given that the AEDB is still a relatively young organization, and that the next phase
(medium term) will be crucial to its ultimate success as an effective arm of the GoP for
achieving its RE deployment targets, a broad strategic capacity development outline can
be drawn up for the organization that allows its systematic evolution into a professional
agency that can play its assigned leadership role more effectively and instill greater
confidence amongst all RE stakeholders in its capabilities. Such a strategic vision for the
AEDB would consolidate on its existing strengths and resources, additional GoP
commitments, available donor‐provided technical assistance, as well as activities to be
undertaken by the AEDB itself in the future. Such a strategy would consist of:
• An economic cost‐benefit analysis of various commercially mature RES‐E
technologies readily implementable in Pakistan, with a technology‐wise
prioritization of capacity development potential based on least cost economic
principles (including, to the extent possible, externalities). This would define the
basic rationale, targets, and mix to be developed in the long run towards which
all of AEDB’s actions can be directed. To an extent, Working Paper 4 provides
the necessary methodology for this purpose which can be further refined,
discussed amongst all stakeholders and potential investors, and updated by the
AEDB from time to time.

• The adoption of a policy approach towards developing RE IPPs, based on the
economically feasible RETs and targets determined above, including pricing, tariff
mechanisms, incentives, and regulatory measures required to facilitate private
and public investments in such projects, and leveraging of available local and
international facilities towards this end (e.g., fiscal measures, carbon financing,
grants and technical assistance, etc.). Working Paper 5 recommends, for the
medium term (i.e., to at least 2014), the establishment of RET‐wise feed in tariffs,
including an upper RES‐E price cap (based on system‐wide long‐term marginal
cost of incremental supplies), and limited, tendered quotas of some key RETs
that may presently be uncompetitive.
• The development of an off‐grid RES‐E deployment plan, with provisions for
operational and financial sustainability into the future, on a large scale. The
development of pilot rural electrification schemes should only be undertaken as
a prelude to such a program to test its elements and deployment options, not as
a standalone activity in itself as is presently being done under the Roshan
Pakistan program. Working Paper 6 outlines a plan for the establishment of a
nationally‐funded off‐grid RE‐based electrification program that can serve as a
useful model for detailed design.
• The development, through additional TA support, of programs and policies for
facilitating non‐power RE applications (such as biogas and biofuels), in concert
with relevant suppliers and market players.
• Based on the above, the development of quarterly, annual, and five‐year work
plans for the AEDB, for both routine as well as program and project activities
envisaged, along with specification of the corresponding timelines, financial and
human resource requirements, organizational structures, business processes,
KPIs, and monitoring and reporting means. Such plans should be developed to
build up AEDB’s capacity gradually over the plan period, prioritizing key actions
up front and deferring less critical elements of its mandate to later stages. It is
important that such a planning process clearly defines the focus and methods to
be adopted for achieving both short‐ and long‐term objectives of the
organization. For the next at least three‐year period, an upfront lump sum
provision of the necessary financial resources—to help the AEDB fund its
establishment and recurring requirements and recruit the best available talent—
should be provided by the GoP and supplemented by donor grants.17
• Mechanisms for stakeholder feedback, internal performance evaluation,
planning and policy updates, continuing staff and technical resource
development, and eventually self‐generated revenues, should become the basis
for the sustained growth and development of the AEDB beyond the next five
years.
Clear linkages between the different components of the AEDB´s strategic roadmap are
necessary to develop an operational approach which is both implementable and
measurable. Exhibit 14 highlights the links between the proposed institutional vision,

17
Much as was the case initially for the USAID‐supported establishment of the Energy Wing, P&D Division, and PPIB.

mission statement, strategic objectives, critical success factors, and targets which are
discussed further below.
Exhibit 14: Proposed AEDB Strategic Roadmap
Strategic
Vision Mission CSFs KPIs/Targets
Objectives
• Set up planning unit
• Number plans & planning reviews
Promote the development of renewable energy technologies in Pakistan by encouraging
• Conduct inter-agency planning workshops

private sector participation and ensure financing to support RE implementation in an
• Understand activity interdependencies • Number workshops planned and

Develop national strategy, • Set up achievable and measurable goals delivered in a year
policies, and plans • Establish strong relationship with MoWP • Policy and program initiatives
Promote all alternative energy resources in Pakistan
• Conduct detailed RE economic evaluation undertaken

• Seek private and institutional
• Funding mobilized each year
funding/donors
• Define evaluation criteria

• Number of pilot projects in a year
• Define clear and auditable certification
efficient and transparent manner
Evaluate, monitor, and criteria • Time to finish evaluation of projects

certify RE projects • Define monitoring indicators and process • Number of certify projects
• Identify qualified resources to • Number of qualified staff in place
evaluate/monitor and certify RE projects
• Set up as one-window facility • % of electricity produced from RE
Facilitate power generation • Identify and promote RE project • # generation licences issued
through RE sources: opportunities • Cost/benefit of on-grid RE projects
• Conduct RES-E feasibility studies • 25 TWh/year RES-E by 2020
Ensure 10.3% of national • Manage OGREA funds and award off-grid • # villages electrified
power capacity from RE by concessions with provincial REAs
• # households electrified
2020 • Carry out technical and financial • Cost/benefit of off-grid RE
evaluations of on-grid proposals and off-
• Bankability of feasibility studies
grid authorization tenders
• # months taken for project
Electrify 1,968 villages in • Provide assistance in licensing and tariff implementation
through RE by 2014 petitions
• Coordinate activities with national • % of private sector involvement
agencies, provide policy inputs, and assist • # projects developed
Build up indigenous RE in RE FIT review • # beneficiaries from projects
industry with participation of • Set up RE demonstration projects and • # months project implementation
private sector awareness programs • # villages electrified
• Establish RE training through IRET • % RETs indigenized

Note: CSF: Critical success factor, KPI: Key performance indicator.
In our preceding diagnostic, we highlighted some of the roadmap components that were
missing at present in the AEDB’s current capabilities and plans. This is particularly
applicable to the critical success factors (CSFs) and associated key performance
indicators/targets (KPIs) with respect to overall RE deployment strategy, RET
prioritization, institutional planning, and project evaluation and pipeline development.
4.2 Overall Strategic and Planning Capability
Pakistan’s incremental electricity demand for the period 2008‐2020 is about 152 TWh,
and according to the consultants’ analysis, renewable technology penetration—taking
social costs into account—corresponds to 25 TWh per year by 2020 (see Working Paper
4). Under the social cost assessment, not only hydel and biomass plants, but also biogas
(sewage, landfills, etc.) and wind power plants would be required to replace CCGTs
running on both FO and natural gas. It is also important to note that some RES‐E
technologies, such as solar PV or solar thermal, are not economically feasible as on‐grid
solutions in current price/technology conditions. The penetration of waste‐to‐energy in
the medium term is considered very small as it is a very expensive technology, but could
be developed for its substantial other benefits (i.e., sanitation and health).

In order to achieve this penetration, it would be necessary to build around 1,738
renewable projects18 relying on a combination of different RE technologies during the
period 2008‐2020, assuming different construction times (Exhibit 15) for each
technology and that feasibility assessments in each case would add another year to the
project timeline.
Exhibit 15: Economically Feasible RES‐E Projects by Technology (2020)
RE Technology Estimated Number of Typical Construction

Projects Period
(Years)
Landfill Gas 11 0.5

Sewage Gas 3 0.5
Biogas 1,171 0.5
Biomass Conversion 57 0.5
Cogeneration 31 0.5
Waste-to-Energy 0 1.0
Wind 22 1.5
Small-scale Hydel 443 2.0
A high‐level indication of the annual penetration rates by RET for these projects is
presented in the chart in Exhibit 16 below and the indicative mix of RETs in overall RES‐S
supply in 2020 is shown in Exhibit 17.
Although at this stage the exact numbers are only indicative, based on the consultants’
preliminary determination of the optimum penetration of RES‐E under social cost
considerations derived from a limited data set, they represent the kind of more detailed
and refined technology‐ and project‐wise economic feasibility assessment and portfolio
development that the AEDB needs to undertake—and review on a continuous, annual
basis—on which to underpin its short‐, medium‐, and long‐term target‐setting and work
plan development.

18
Based on RET‐wise supply curves developed for Pakistan in Working Paper 4. Number presented only for
illustrative purposes; actual project identification would require more detailed feasibility and current cost
estimation.

Exhibit 16: Annual Future Deployment of Feasible RES‐E Projects in Pakistan
Technology /Years 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Hydel
45
45 Projects
Projects the
the first
first 33 years
years and
and 443
– Feasibility assessment projects
44
44 projects
projects the
the rest
rest ofof years
years
– EPCIC
Co-gen 33 Projects
Projects the
the first
first 99 years
years and
and 31
– EPCIC 22 projects
projects the
the rest
rest two
two years
years projects
Biomass
66 Projects
Projects the
the first
first 22 years
years and
and 57
– Feasibility assessment 55 projects
projects the
the rest
rest ofof years
years projects
– EPCIC
Wind
– Feasibility assessment 22 Projects
Projects every
every year
year 22
projects
– EPCIC
Biogas
107
107 Projects
Projects the
the first
first 55 years
years and
and
– Feasibility assessment 1171
106
106 projects
projects the
the rest
rest ofof years
years projects
– EPCIC
Landfill
11
– Feasibility assessment 11 project projects
project on
on year
year 77 and
and 22
– EPCIC projects
projects on
on the
the next
next years
years
Sew
3
– Feasibility assessment projects
11 Project
Project for
for in
in year
year 5,6
5,6 and
and 77
– EPCIC

Exhibit 17: Optimum Penetration of RES‐E to 2020 at Social Cost
RES-E Penetration (@ Social Cost)

(Tech; TWh/a; %)
SS Hydel
11.2 Landfill
44.3% 0.3
1.2%
Sew
Wind
0.1
2.8
0.2%
11.1%
Solar Th Biogas
0.0 2.2
0.0% Co-gen
8.5%
4.6
WTE 18.0%
PV
0.0 Biomass
0.0
0.2% 4.2
0.0%
16.5%

4.3 Human Resource and Technical Capability
As mentioned in the previous section, most of the main departmental functions are
already indicated in the AEDB´s current organizational structure (Exhibit 9). We would,
however, suggest a generally leaner and flatter organization, with more technical depth
and stronger management capability in order to support the AEDB´s future
development. In particular, there should be a clear demarcation between the
organization’s core activities and various support functions. Support functions should be
simplified by having clearly defined departments, such as IT, Finance, Admin, and HR.
New functions, such as Legal and Institutional Communications, have been regrouped
under Corporate Services. The Quality Assurance role, previously shown under Director
General, TMM/QA, is now shown reporting to the CEO. The key roles of the
organizational structure are shown in Exhibit 18.
Exhibit 18: Proposed AEDB Organization Chart
Board
Chairman
CEO
•Legal Corporate
Quality Assurance
•Communication Services
R&D RE Administration and

On-Grid Off-Grid IT HR Procurement
Finance
/Logistics
Technical Technical • Field testing of • Administration • Management of • Recruit, select • RFIs

renewable budgets ITC resources
•RES-E projects •RES-E projects technologies and train
• Train and • RFPs
•Develop •Project • Tax reports
• Development of support users • Promote career
feasibility studies supervision • Payroll • Supplier
prototype pilot development
• Project •Construction programs • Develop and selection for
management supervision • Accounting implement new • Support
records pilots
•Contract • Technical systems
research and employee
negotiation • Grant/subsidy • Data security training • Logistics for
business management
•Technical Commercial intelligence and protection pilots
evaluation of • Fund • Procurement
tenders •Policy and • Conduct • Coordinate • Tender,
management incidence activities
commercial workshops and evaluate, and
incentives training courses resolution
award off-grid
•Evaluate projects authorizations
•Manage licenses
Commercial •Tariff & regulation
assistance
• Policy and
commercial •Fund raising
• Management of •Relation with
licenses institutions and
• Tariff & donors Core Activities Support Functions
regulation •Demarcate off-
assistance grid electrification
• Manage CDM targets
projects

The On‐grid Technical Projects department would regroup thermal, solar, wind, biomass
and hydro technical competencies that are presently separately compartmentalized.
Particular emphasis should be given to this core department with regard to qualified
staff and training needs.

Based on the organizational structure proposed, detailed job descriptions at the Director
levels for each department, specifying the duties and responsibilities, qualifications, and
required experience have been developed (see Appendix B).
4.3.1 Staffing Levels
Appropriate personnel levels have been estimated under the new AEDB structure. It is
estimated that the AEDB would require approximately 80 FTEs to fulfill its RE mandate
based on working assumptions which we have detailed below.
The majority of the 80 FTEs would be assigned to on‐ and off‐grid projects. Exhibit 19
provides a break of staff by department.
Exhibit 19: Staff by Department
Department Full-time Employees

(FTEs)
Core
On-grid 37
Off-grid 12
R&D 7
Support
Admin & Finance 5
IT 3
Human Resources 4
Procurement/Logistics 5
Corporate Services 3
Quality Assurance 2
The associated proposed organizational structure (Exhibit 20) suggests a leaner

organization focused on the AEDB’s core capabilities in on‐ and off‐grid RE development.
The proposed staffing levels assume that all core activities will be performed in‐house;
however, some technical activities, such as feasibility studies, etc., should be
outsourced. The staff productivity ratios for the technical activities are based on the
number of projects to be developed every year to achieve the 2020 targets (on grid and
off grid) as estimated in Exhibit 16. Exhibit 21summarizes the number of annual on‐grid
RES‐E projects, split by technology, that the AEDB should target implementing to 2020
and the corresponding staffing requirements, while Exhibit 22 does the same for the
staff required for RES‐E based off‐grid village electrification.

Exhibit 20: Proposed AEDB Organizational Structure
Board
Chairman
CEO
Corporate Quality
services Assurance
Procurement/L
On-Grid Off-Grid R&D RE Administration &
IT Director HR Director ogistics
Director Director Director Finance Director
Director
Technical Commecial Technical Commecial Finance Procurement Logistics

Admin Deputy IT Deputy HR Deputy
Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy Deputy
Solar
Geothermal
Biomass &
Biogass
Professional Professional Professional Professional Wind
Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant Assistant
1
3 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
16 16 5 2 4
1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
18 1 18 7 1 4 10 2 3 2 5 4 2 1 2 80

Exhibit 21: On‐grid Technical Staff Estimate
RE Technology Annual Projects
Hydel 45
Biomass 6
Wind 2
Biogas 107
Sewage and Landfill Gas 1
Total 161
Staffing
Productivity Ratio 10
Total On-grid Technical FTEs 16
Exhibit 22: Off‐grid Technical Staff Estimate
Working Assumptions
No. of Villages to Electrify by 2020 7,874
No. of Remaining Years to 2020 12
No. of Villages To Be Electrified Annually 656
No. of Villages Electrified/FTE 130
Total Off-grid Technical FTEs 5
4.3.2 Salary Structures
For key technical roles, the AEDB needs to be able to offer competitive, market‐based
rates of staff remuneration and benefits, and therefore should be at liberty to deviate
from the standard GoP salary scales, which the AEDB Ordinance permits it to do.
4.3.3 Training
In addition to technical courses on key topics pertinent to the core functions, it is critical
that staff members are familiar with methods for determining project economics, as well
as being well‐versed in project management issues, in particular for evaluating and
implementing commercial‐scale projects and programs. Three types of courses are
therefore required:
• Technical training courses covering priority RETs, such as SS hydel, wind, solar PV
and thermal, and biomass conversion
• Economics and financial courses related to the development of RES‐E projects
• Project management/private & public project development

4.3.4 Technical Training Courses
For each type of technology, the technical training courses should cover at least the
following topics, suited to different tiers of the technical staff:
Solar Energy
• Types of solar technologies (both PV and thermal) and systems (distributed and
centralized) and comparative performance characteristics and applications
• Solar radiation, characteristics and measurement (propagation of solar radiation
in the atmosphere, solar constant, terrestrial radiation, radiation‐measuring
instruments, estimation of solar radiation on horizontal and inclined surfaces,
etc.)
• Basic heat transfer in solar collectors, selected surfaces, flat‐plate collectors (air
and water)
• Testing and standardization of solar thermal appliances and systems
• Market potential, costs, market and R&D trends, techno‐economic analysis of
solar PV and thermal utilization, barriers to technology diffusion, future
prospects, etc.
• Local assembly and manufacture and systems integration
Biomass Energy
• Characterization of biomass resources (determination of calorific value,
elementary analysis, determination of ash content, etc.)
• Thermo‐chemical conversion technologies and main design characteristics,
processes based on combustion (furnace for the combustion of biomass, power
generation, cogenerated heat)
• Biomass processes (biomass gasification, pyrolis, etc.)
• Economic aspects, present status and prospects in the near future, potential
markets, and technology indigenization
Wind Energy
• Wind resource assessment, measurement standards, and mapping
• Design and layout of wind farms, including wind harvest optimization
• Wind turbine technology and ancillary systems, costs, and indigenization
• Grid Integration of wind turbines, backup power requirements, quality issues
• Testing and certification of wind turbines
• O&M aspects of wind farms
• Environmental assessment of wind projects, externalities
• Economic and financial evaluation of wind IPPs

Hydel Energy
• World trends in hydropower development, advantages and disadvantages
• Hydropower technologies, turbine types
• On‐ and off‐grid SS hydel applications and markets
• Hydropower economics and financial evaluation
• Characteristics components of SS hydropower systems
• Tools for micro hydropower (MHP) system design
• Principle causes of MHP failures, and O&M requirements
• Community management of MHPs
Economics and Financial
• Recent trends shaping current and future international project finance
• Fundamentals of economic assessment (cash flows, inflation, time points and
periods, discount rates, cost of capital, present value, taxes, fixed charge rate,
financing, investor perspective, uncertainty and risk cover, selection criteria and
evaluation matrices, etc.)
• Tools for financial and economic analysis (net present value, life‐cycle cost,
revenue requirements, levelized cost of energy, annualized value, internal rate of
return, payback period, benefit‐to‐cost ratio, savings‐to‐investment ratio,
integrated, integrated resource planning, consumer/producer surplus,
comparative costs, avoided costs, marginal costs, etc.)
• Special issues in RE assessment (system boundaries, system sizing, plant factor,
externalities, government investments, backup and hybrid systems, storage
requirements, operation and maintenance, capacity and energy value, salvage
and decommissioning, unequal lifetimes, etc.)
• Project financial modeling and analysis, including techniques for designing and
using spreadsheet‐based project financing models
• Advanced techniques for risk modeling and quantification
• Design of project finance models for public sector comparison (PSCs) and value‐
for‐money (VFM) benefits of project financing proposals
• Financial modeling applied in the renegotiation of infrastructure concession
contracts and financial restructuring
Project Management and PrivatePublic Project (PPP) Development
• Designing policy priorities and objectives for PPP and efficient SERVICE Delivery
• PPP strategies and structuring options
• Planning for and feasibility of PPP projects (pre‐feasibility planning and analysis

• Feasibility study requirements: economic, financial, social, legal/regulatory, and

technical criteria
• Risk identification, mitigation, and allocation programming
• Procurement and contract monitoring
• Designing strategic frameworks for PPP, legal prerequisites for promoting
investment
• Developing the institutional framework for improved service delivery, promoting
improved service delivery through competition and contract compliance
4.4 Financing
This section provides high‐level budgetary indications for the development of the 2020
RES‐E targets for Pakistan. In particular we focus on two key funding requirements
relevant to RES‐E deployment in Pakistan:
• Expenditures for on‐grid RES‐E projects
• Expenditures for off‐grid RES‐E projects.
4.4.1 On grid Expenditures
For on‐grid deployment, RES‐E projects would be financed by private investors from the
feasibility stage through to commissioning and operation, in the independent power
producer (IPP) mode. The only exception to this is hydel (and possibly some biomass‐
based generation schemes) where we suggest that the AEDB finance initial feasibility
studies, given the small size of the projects involved and where this could help lower the
transaction costs for private developers, an also help identify, expedite, and facilitate
the overall investor application and project development process.
We estimate there are approximately 99 SS hydel projects to be developed between
now and 2020. A feasibility study for a SS hydel project costs to the order of USD 20,000
to 30,000. Therefore, the total budget for hydel feasibility development would be USD 3
million.
4.4.2 Offgrid Expenditures
Given the social dimension of off‐grid projects, these would be mostly funded either
through government grants/funds or via local, donors, and other private or civil society
(e.g., NGOs, etc.) sponsors. Based on the target put forward in Working Paper 6 for rural
electrification (i.e., 1,850 villages, or 25% of 7,400 off‐grid villages identified for RE‐
based electrification in the MTDF still remaining to be electrified at the end of the
Roshan Pakistan program’s first phase) during the medium‐term (to 2014), we anticipate
that approximately USD 519 million would be required for this purpose.
4.5 Business Processes
In the first instance, the current working procedures at the AEDB would need to be
properly documented. At a minimum these procedures should cover the following areas:

• Annual Planning and Budgeting: Based on project development plans, recurring
expense heads, capital investment requirements, expansion and upgrade needs,
training and HRD, other direct expenses (ODCs) and overheads (OHs).
• Employee and Office Management: Employee handbook, rules of business,
workplace policies and protocols, administrative procedures, etc.
• Financial Management: Accounting procedures, accounting and financial
reporting software, transaction handling, entries, approvals and verification, etc.
• Financial and Administrative Audits: Conformity with accepted accounting
practices, accounts documentation, independent chartered accountant audits,
internal and external administrative audits, etc.
• Project Management: Deployment of project management tools and
procedures, project tracking and monitoring, client interaction and coordination,
inter‐agency liaison, etc.
• Reporting and Communications: Internal monthly, quarterly and annual
reporting, report formats, lines of communication, internal information access
and control, external reporting, report directories and archiving, etc.
• Monitoring and Evaluation: M&E protocols, mid‐course evaluations, remediation
mechanisms, and feed‐back loops.
• Information Processing and Dissemination: RE resource data collection,
database development, and dissemination, public access mechanisms, technical
data repository and library implementation, external sourcing and subscriptions,
market intelligence, financial and costing information, investor and consumer
advisory services, establishment of directories and metadata links, etc.
• Document Control, Management, and Archiving: Physical document cataloguing
and archiving, electronic file storage and logging, online and physical search and
retrieval systems, duplication and backup provisions, content classification, etc.
• Public Relations: Annual public relations campaigns and awareness raising
programs, seminars, workshops and road shows, media‐based RE information
dissemination, educational and targeted events, investor liaison and facilitation
mechanisms, client and investor feedback response systems, etc.
• Investor Screening and Evaluation: Background and credit worthiness checks,
minimum information requirements, prioritization, terms of engagement, etc.
• Project feasibility assessment: Project and site identification, content
development, contracting, evaluation and due diligence, dissemination, etc.
• Tendering and Bid Evaluation: Tender design, procedures and terms for bid
acceptance, bid evaluation and ranking, contract design and award, contract
negotiations and management, contractor verification and job acceptance, etc.
• Procurement: Procurement Procedures, cost quotations, supplier criteria,
validation and acceptance, performance and quality guarantees, etc.

• Inventory Control: Inventory cataloguing and tagging, record maintenance and

updates, periodic audits, etc.
These working procedures would need to detail the step‐by‐step activities required to
perform each of the subtasks involved. In this respect, sample processes and procedures
from other relevant established organizations (e.g., PPIB, OGDC, etc.) could be used as a
basis by the AEDB, while some could be custom‐tailored or developed from scratch
following ‘work breakdown’ principles).
A second step would be a complete review/audit of the procedures by a qualified
auditor to assess (a) the validity of the procedures and (b) compliance level amongst
various AEDB departments and staff levels.
Ultimately, the AEDB could seek accreditation as a quality business entity by an
international agency (say, to ISO 9000 standard) in order to consolidate its position as a
center of excellence in RE and set an example for the industry at large.
4.6 Communication, Marketing, and Business Intelligence
At the national level, AEDB’s communication and marketing activities must be enhanced
in order to extend the renewable power knowledge base and to raise general awareness
about renewable energy sources amongst stakeholders and energy consumers. For this
purpose, a strong relationship with relevant institutional agencies (e.g., PCRET, NEPRA,
etc.) and sources of business information must be established.
A first step in this direction would be the development of an institutional business
intelligence plan, on which such capability could be gradually built up. This would
comprise of, at a minimum, the following main elements:
• Directories of local and international RE investors, manufacturers, equipment
vendors, consultants, service providers, institutions and implementing agencies
(government, private sector, NGO, CBO, ESCO, etc.), key individual contacts, and
financing institutions (commercial bank and leasing, IFI, carbon market, special‐
purpose funds, etc.).
• Updated information base of commercially viable RE technologies, applications
and markets, delivery mechanisms, promotional programs, implementation
experience, comparative costs, pricing and tariffs, etc.
• Listing of international information and networking resources (journals, web
sites, online databases, trade news services, industry associations, conferences,
equipment fairs, etc.), including membership, subscription, and participation
plans revised on an annual basis.
• Development, improvement and expansion of in‐house information
dissemination mechanisms for handling public queries and information requests,
investor needs, internal institutional knowledge requirements, compilation and
publication of RE resource data and promotional materials employing library and
document/digital archiving systems, computerized databases and metadata
catalogs, data‐rich website and web portals, newsletter and other periodicals,
and client feedback response systems.

These systems, once developed at the AEDB, can then be easily replicated or linked with
similar provincial level marketing capabilities at AEDB suboffices or relevant provincial
government agencies dealing with RE promotion. At the national and provincial level, an
annual schedule of promotional and informational workshops and seminars would also
need to be planned and conducted each year, to keep stakeholders abreast of RE market
trends, technologies, policy and regulatory issues, financing opportunities, and the
activities and facilities undertaken by the AEDB and other institutional service providers.
4.7 Institutional Linkages
Formal linkages of key institutions are required to encourage and develop a coordinated
approach to RE development. Exhibit 23 maps the major stakeholders which would need
to be considered.

Exhibit 23: RE Stakeholder Map
Consumers
Interest
Groups
AEDB Employees
Suppliers
Local Govts
PPIB Donors
Media WAPDA Auditor
NGOs
IPPs
AEDB
KESC
Investors MPs
MoWP
NEPRA
DISCOs
Unions
Lobbyists

4.8 AEDB´s Performance Evaluation
Institutional performance measurement and review at the AEDB should be carried out
on two distinct levels:

4.8.1 Institutional Evaluation
At the institutional program and project level, performance should be assessed against
relevant planned activities and timelines detailed in the AEDB’s annual workplans,
specific project plans, internal capacity development targets, and overall time‐bound
objectives quantified in AEDB’s strategic roadmap (e.g., installed RES‐E capacity,
technology indigenization, village electrification, etc.). Exhibit 24 highlights some of the
key performance indicators that could be used to monitor the agency´s institutional
performance.
Exhibit 24: Suggested AEDB Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and Targets
KPIs/Targets
• Number plans & planning reviews

• Number workshops planned and
delivered in a year
• Policy and program initiatives
undertaken
• Funding mobilized each year
• Number of pilot projects in a year

• Time to finish evaluation of projects
• Number of certify projects
• Number of qualified staff in place
• % of electricity produced from RE
• # generation licences issued
• Cost/benefit of on-grid RE projects
• 25 TWh/year RES-E by 2020
• # households electrified
• Cost/benefit of off-grid RE
• Bankability of feasibility studies
• # months taken for project
implementation
• % of private sector involvement
• # projects developed
• # beneficiaries from projects
• # months project implementation
• % RETs indigenized

4.8.2 Service Evaluation
At the end‐user level, performance should also be monitored to assess the ultimate
results of the AEDB’s efforts, i.e., the actual performance of RE implemented projects,
partner agencies, concession‐holders, service providers and contractors, etc., in terms of
product quality, service quality, commercial quality, and client satisfaction. ‘Product
quality’ includes, for instance, stability of RES‐E voltage relative to targeted levels and
stability of frequency relative to targeted levels. ‘Service quality’ includes targeted hours
of service, number and duration of interruptions, and safety of the system. ‘Commercial
quality’ includes connection, accuracy in meter reading (for customers whose service
requires meter reading), accuracy in billing, and response time to resolve customer

complaints. An important element of the AEDB’s annual institutional performance
review should be based on independent external stakeholder (e.g., RE investors, partner
agencies, donors, etc.) feedback and perceptions of the Board’s efficacy in meeting its
general RE facilitation, promotional, information dissemination, policy implementation,
and efficiency of its related business processes and procedures.
Whilst this evaluation role should, strictly speaking, be conducted by an independent
evaluator, it requires careful monitoring by the AEDB as well to assess and effectively
guide the long term impact of RE development in Pakistan.

Appendices

A AEDB Capacity Assessment Information Request
ADB Renewable Energy Policy Formulation and Capacity Development of AEDB
Data Request - August 2008
Version Control
Rev Author Description Date
1 Hagler Bailly / Data request issued to client 9/9/2005
Index
Sheet No Name Description Status
1 Instructions sheet Completed
2 Data request sheet Completed


Project
At the request of the Asian Development Bank, consultants have been retained to perform an institutional assessment of AEDB and identify improvement opportunities.
Objectives
Project
Our assessment is to be based on a series of meetings with stakeholders supplemented with various document requests.
Methodology
The tab "Data Request" list all AEDS-related documents which are required, broken down into eight sections:
Strategy and Planning
AEDS´s Business Process
HR and Training
Finance
Technical Project Information
Key Stakeholders
Communication and RE Business Intelligence
Information Systems
For each document request, could you please:

1. Fill in as appropriate columns E, F or G.
Instructions If data/document is available, please list document name and reference in column E.
If data/ document is under development, please list the document name and reference and the expected completion date in column F.
If data/document does not exist, please fill in the expected completion date in Column G or indicate if not under development.
2. Where the document exists OR is under development, please provide the documents preferably in electronic format or in paper copy.
Please provide the information by close of business Monday, 15th September 2008 to the contact address below.
Dr Jamil Masud
Contact 39, Street 3, E7
Islamabad 44000
Tel: +(92 51) 261 0200-07, Fax: +(92 51) 261 0208-09, Email: jmasud@haglerbailly.com.pk


Document Under Development

Doc No Data Request Document Available Document Not Developed
(Please list document reference and
(Please list document reference) (Expected availability date: mm/yy)
expected completion date: mm/yy)
Strategy and Planning

1 AEDB Ordnance and charter documents
2 AEDB service rules
3 Brief description of AEDB´s mission statement and key functions
4 Detailed annual/quarterly/monthly operational plans, targets, and milestones
AEDB´s Business Procedures
5
All existing business procedures (e.g., investor evaluation, internal auditing, project and administrative
management, escalation process for conflict resolution, staff appraisal, exterrnal appraisal, request
compliance, performance evaluation, document/inventory control, etc.) and rules (e.g., business rules,
employee handbook, client handling guidelines, communications protocols, contract and legal review,
etc.)
HR and Training
6 Number of AEDB offices and locations, and affiliated/counterpart provincial departments/agencies
7 Existing organisational charts, with departments and positions, for all AEDB offices
8 Roles and responsibility description for key positions (include stardardized job descriptions)
9 Existing staffing numbers, names and positions for each AEDB office
10 CVs of key staff members (defined in item 7)
11 Current recruitment plans
12 Annual staff attrition rate for the last three years
13 Training need analysis and requirements
14 Training budget for the last three years
15 Provide three filled in staff appraisals for the past three years in each case
Finance
16 Salary structure by position and level, along with benefits and contract terms
17 Audited fnancial statements for AEDB for the past three years
18 Sources and amount of AEDB funding/revenues (i.e., government, donors, etc.) by actual
disbursement for last three years
Technical Project Information
19
Detailed list of past and current technical/promotional demonstration projects, with selection
basis/criteria and precise long-term objective and follow-on provisions
20
Planned technical/promotional demonstration projects, with selection basis/criteria and precise long-
term objective and follow-on provisions
Key Stakeholders (Clients, GoP Agencies, Investors, Donors)

21 List of existing clients/investors and partner agencies
22 List of active donors and coordination process between and within donor-funded activities
23 Coordination process with provincial/local governments
24 Client/investor/key stakeholder feedback process and response mechanism/actions
25 No. of clients requests/contacts received over past three years, along with logging process, response
mechanism, and actions triggered
Communication and Business Intelligence
26 Current external communication, awareness raising, and promotional plans
27 Communications and promotional budget for the last three years
28 Please list attendance by AEDB personnel in RE conferences and trade events in 2007 (national and
international)
29 Please list memberships to national and international RE groups/forums/industry and trade associations
Information Systems
30 Existence of an investors and vendors database (please provide five outputs from data repository
illustrating data structure)
31 Existence of RE library and infromation service (please provide five outputs from data repository,
cataloging and access mechanism, and usage data)
32 Organization, ownership and dissemination mechanisms for RE resource and technical data (wind
data, solar maps, suppliers, prices, etc.)
33 Database/archive of project sites, feasibility studies, and project-specific information generation and
sharing mechanisms)
34 Planned IT and information dissemination investments


B Proposed AEDB Key Job Descriptions
C O MP ANY F UNC T IO NAL AR E A J O B T IT L E P O S IT IO NS
AE D B T echnical projects O n G rid D irector 1
DE S C R IP T IO N C HAR T
S ummary
O verall res pons ible for the O n‐G rid projects from the technical and commercial point of view.
Duties and R es pons ibilities
• P erform feas ibility s tudies

• D evelop requirements documents
• T echnical evaluation of tenders
• E ns ure s us tainability of all projects Board
• R is k management
• D evelops and implements methods and procedures for monitoring projects Chairman
• R ecommends and s ecures contractual agreements for technical s ervices and products

• Identifies project team training and tool needs CEO
• Mentors project team members
• D efines S L As for s uppliers
• R es pons ible for O &M Corporate
Services
Quality Assurance
• E valuate new projects
• Manage C D M P rojects
• C ommercial E valuation of tenders Technical Projects
Policy and R&D RE Administration and
IT HR
Logistics
Commercial Finance /Procurement
• Interface for licens es proces s
• T ariff & regulation As s is tance
• T racks and identifies new inves tment opportunities
• C ontract negotiation
B ac kground K PI
A c ademic E xperienc e

• C ertified E lectrical • T en years of experience • Number of feas ibility s tudies
E ngineer in utility cons truction completed in a year
• Mas ters D egree in projects • Number of technical tender
B us ines s Adminis tration • E xtens ive experience of as s es s ments in a year.
carrying out feas ibility • Number of commercial tender
s tudies as s es s ments in a year.
• E xtens ive experience in • Number of converted tenders into
R E technologies projects


AE D B T echnical projects O ff G rid D irector D irector 1
DE S C R IP T IO N C H AR T
S ummary
O verall res pons ible for the on O ff‐G rid projects from the technical and commercial point of view
• P rojects / pilot s upervis ion

• D evelop requirements documents
• T echnical evaluation of projects
• P rojects / pilot s upervis ion
• E ns ure s us tainability of all projects
Board
• R is k management
• F und allocation Chairman
• D evelops and implements methods and procedures for monitoring projects

• R ecommends and s ecures contractual agreements for technical s ervices and products CEO
• Identifies project team training and tool needs
• Mentors project team members Corporate
Quality Assurance
Services
• D efines S L As for s uppliers

• R es pons ible for O &M
• Manages relations hips with donor and multilateral ins titutions
• Interface for licens es proces s Technical Projects
Policy and
Commercial
Finance
IT HR
Logistics
/Procurement
B ac kground KPI

• C ertified E lectrical • T en years of experience • Number of villages electrified in a
E ngineer in utility cons truction year
• Mas ters D egree in projects • O n time delivery of pilot projects
B us ines s Adminis tration • E xtens ive experience in • Amount of money collected
R E technologies

R enewables R es earch and
AE D B R &D R E D irector 1
D evelopment
S ummary
D irects R &E res earch and related field applications and dis s eminates R &E information to the

wider community.
• F ield tes ting of renewable technology Board
• D evelopment of prototype pilot programmers
• T echnical R es earch and bus ines s intelligence Chairman
• C onduct works hops and dis s eminate R &D related information

• C oordinates res earch and development activities for renewable technologies . P lans and
CEO
formulates as pects of res earch and development propos als .
• R eviews and analyzes pilot projects to determine if benefits derived and pos s ible
applications jus tify expenditures . Corporate
Services
Quality Assurance
Policy and R&D RE Administration and Logistics

Technical Projects IT HR
B ac kground KPI Commercial Finance /Procurement

• Number of prototypes converted into
• P hD in E lectrical • E xtens ive experience in
pilot projects
E ngineering R &D renewable projects
• Number of publications in a year



AE D B Adminis tration and F inance Adminis tration and F inance D irector 1
S ummary
D evelops and implements effective accounting, treas ury and management procedures that

meet a high level of compliance with es tablis hed regulatory controls . P rovides information to
s upport efficient management decis ions and Q uality C os t Management and C ontrol.
R es pons ible for the co‐ordination and direction of all activities in the adminis tration and finance
D ivis ion. Board
• P lan and manage the C ompany's financial requirements and budgets . Chairman
• Undertake accounting activities and analyze the C ompany's as s ets , liabilities and equity.

• S et and monitor the F inance quality s tandards , indicators and goals . CEO
• S et and monitor C ompany ris ks s trategies and policies .

• F ormulate, enhance, integrate, document, communicate and implement finance s tandards , Corporate
Quality Assurance
policies , guidelines and procedures . Services
• F und cus tody and management
• P erform P roces s Management for accounting records , cas h flows , inves tments as s es s ment,
T axing and P ayroll. Technical Projects
Policy and R&D RE Administration and
IT HR
Logistics
B ac kground KPI
• E conomics G raduate • Minimum of 10 years of • B udget deviation

• Mas ters D egree in experience in • % of funds allocated to actual
E conomics Management at projects /pilots
corporate level

AEDB IT IT D irector 1
S ummary
D irects and manages computing and information technolog y s trategic plans , policies , programs
and s chedules for bus ines s and finance data proces s ing, computer s ervices , network
communications and management information s ervices .
• D evelop reliable data repos itory (s uppliers , vendors , potential inves tors ). Board
• S upport future IS /IT ‐related requirements of the company.

• P rovide and efficient us e of IS /IT res ources within the approved budget. Chairman
• Implement meas ures to improve IS /IT ‐related activities to meet end us ers s atis faction

• P erform C ontract Management of application s oftware and IS /IT profes s ional and contractual
CEO
s ervices .
• S et and monitor IS /IT quality s tandards , indicators and goals .
• F ormulate, enhance, integrate, document, communicate and implement IS s tandards , Corporate
Services
Quality Assurance
policies , guidelines and procedures .
B ac kground KPI Policy and R&D RE Administration and Logistics

Technical Projects IT HR

• R eliability level of IS /IT Infras tructure
• Mas ters D egree in • 10 years of experience in
• S L A O n‐T ime D elivery
Information T echnolog y a s enior‐level
• Application Availability
or C omputer S cience Information T echnolog y
• R es pons e T ime – All Applications
pos ition
• E nd us er s atis faction index

AE D B H uman R es ources H uman R es ources D irector 1
S ummary
D efines and promotes the introduction of policies , plans and procedures for the management

and development of the C ompany’s pers onnel. P lans human res ources requirements and
implements thos e plans which bes t allow the C ompany to recruit, retain and develop
employees .
• D raw up and propos e Human R es ources policies ; s upervis e their development.

• D evelop and manage in‐hous e communication plans s upporting changes to policies . Board
• D efine and introduce new means , channels and communication s ys tems within the C ompany

which allow for horizontal and vertical flow of information. Chairman
• D es ign all P ers onnel Management procedures and s ys tems that are required for: recruitment

and s creening, job placement, development of job des criptions , remuneration and s ocial
CEO
benefits , career and s ucces s ion plans , pers onnel training and development plans , evaluation

of pers onnel performance, and promotion of mobility.
• D efine and s ubmit the remuneration policy to the Management C ommittee and manage its Corporate
Services
Quality Assurance
implementation.
• P repare and up‐date the E mployee R ules .
• E ns ure compliance with health and s afety regulations . Approve, co‐ordinate and s upervis e all
Policy and R&D RE Administration and Logistics
actions to ens ure the phys ical s afety of pers onnel and facilities . Technical Projects
Commercial Finance
IT HR
/Procurement
• D raw up the neces s ary policies and procedures .

• D raw up the annual P ers onnel T raining and D evelopment plans , drafted jointly with the
different C ompany units .
B ac kground KPI
• T en years of experience • T otal L abor C os t
• Mas ters D egree in in a s enior‐level H uman • E mployee S atis faction Index
Human R es ources R es ource Management • T ime lines completion of trainings
Management pos ition and development plans .

AE D B P rocurement and L ogis tics P rocurement and L ogis tics D irector 1
S ummary
Meeting and verifying the procurement needs of the C ompany departments to ens ure timely,
adequate and cos t‐efficient purchas ing of goods and s ervices .
• Monitor, and co‐ordinate with the different areas of the C ompany, res ource needs . P rioritize

and initiate the acquis ition of equipment and s ervices .
• Analyze the prices and s ervices offered by s uppliers of equipment and s ervices . Board
• D evelop relations with s uppliers and negotiate appropriate price and contract conditions .

• D efine procurement and s upplies procedures (S tock Management, S tore of E quipments ,
Chairman
acquis ition, vendor accreditation and evaluation).
• Analyze the valuation of inventories and promote activities to optimize cos ts .
• S upervis e S tore Management, s olving any problem that may aris e. CEO
• Monitor the quality and fulfillment of the contractual conditions of the s ervices hired, taking

corrective meas ures as required. Corporate
Quality Assurance
Services
• Monitor delivery miles tones defined with s uppliers , taking corrective meas ures in cas e of

deviations .
• P erform activities and tas ks included in the E mergency P lans .
• E ns ure that ongoing corporate s ervices are procured efficiently Technical Projects
Policy and
Commercial
Finance
IT HR
Logistics
/Procurement
• P urchas e, control, dis tribute and replace office furniture and s upplies .

• C arry out maintenance, outfitting and improvement works .
B ac kground KPI

• Materials & S upplies Inventory
• E conomics G raduate • Minimum of 10 years of • % procurement s avings
experience in • % goods and s ervices dis counts
Management at
corporate level


ADB TA 4881-PAK:
Renewable Energy Policy Model
Madrid - London - Moscow - New Delhi
Tables Figures
Input Data Total Conv + RES Bagasse-based Landfill Gas Small S. Hydel WTE
Tech References Total Conv Biogas Photovoltaic Solar Thermal
Results Total RES Biomass Sewage Wind

Home
CO2 Assumptions Model Assumptions
Emissions Factors (g/kWh) Discount rate (pre-tax) 12.0%
Fuel 500 Inv. Recovery Period (RES-E) 20 years (blank maintains technical lifetime)
Gas 370 Inv. Recovery Period (Conv) 30 years
Coal 900
Average 590 Cost Drivers Percentile
Emissions Price (€/tCO2) Investment Cost 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.9
Value 30 Load Factor 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.9
Fuel 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.9
Run Model
Home
Electricity price ($/MWh) Investment Cost ($/kW) Self Fuel cost ($/MWh) Efficiency (%) Lifetime Load Factor (%) Capacity Generation
Category Specification min max min max O&M Cons min max min max (years) min max avg Potential (MW) Potential (MWh)
Landfill 47.71 73.40 1,430.0 1,840.0 7.0% 8.0% 0.0 0.0 32% 36% 25 60% 80% 70% 48 295,011
Biogas Sewage 78.16 134.24 2,300.0 3,400.0 7.0% 8.0% 0.0 0.0 28% 32% 25 60% 80% 70% 20 122,111
Agricultural biogas plant 61.12 117.53 886.5 2,350.0 7.0% 8.0% 27.6 27.6 25 60% 80% 70% 466 2,856,252
Biomass 64.49 86.11 1,062.6 1,249.5 4.0% 10.0% 33.4 35.1 26% 30% 30 50% 80% 65% 817 4,653,239
Biomass
Cogeneration 61.42 84.83 823.0 1,280.0 3.0% 10.0% 26.5 35.6 22% 27% 30 50% 80% 65% 888 5,056,983
Waste WTE 65.54 216.83 2,000.0 5,800.0 3.7% 8.0% 0.0 0.0 18% 22% 30 50% 80% 65% 91 516,768
Photovoltaics PV plant 343.45 430.50 5,080.0 5,930.0 1.0% - 0.0 0.0 - - 25 22% 25% 24% 2,177 4,482,362
Solar Thermal Solar Thermal 272.26 427.41 2,880.0 4,465.0 6.0% - 0.0 0.0 33% 38% 30 22% 25% 24% 414 853,235
Good 108.15 126.96 1,800.0 2,200.0 3.5% - 0.0 0.0 - - 25 33% 33% 33% 4,862 13,971,272
Wind Onshore Excelent 102.32 120.12 1,890.0 2,310.0 3.5% - 0.0 0.0 - - 25 36% 36% 36% 3,264 10,408,654
Outstanding 94.46 110.89 1,984.5 2,425.5 3.5% - 0.0 0.0 - - 25 41% 41% 41% 112 407,603
Hydel SS Hydel 42.97 405.73
Curve 1 - Conventional Private Curve
Private Cost Generation Cum Generation

Code ($/MWh) (GWh) (GWh)
Nuke 50.4 11,937 11,937
LSH 54.8 69,180 81,117
Coal 55.6 28,539 109,656
Gas 66.7 25,047 134,703
Fuel 133.8 17,110 151,813
Home
References:
Coal Coal Power Plant
Fuel Fuel Oil Power Plant
Gas CCGT Natural Gas
LSH Large Scale Hydel
Nuke Nuclear Power Plant
SSH Small Scale Hydel
bag Bagasse-based Cogeneration
biom Biomass Power Plant
biog Biogas Power Plant
sew Sewage Power Plant
LFG Landfill gas Power Plant
WTE Waste-to-Energy Power Plant
PV Photovoltaic Power Plant
ST Solar Thermal Power Plant
WD Wind Generation Park
50.4 0
50.4 11,937
54.8 11,937
54.8 81,117
55.6 81,117
55.6 109,656
66.7 109,656
66.7 134,703
133.8 134,703
133.8 151,813
Curve 2 - Conventional Social Curve
Social Cost Generation Cum

Code ($/MWh) (GWh) Generation
Nuke 50.4 11,937 11,937
LSH 54.8 69,180 81,117
Coal 86.9 28,539 109,656
Gas 102.6 25,047 134,703
Fuel 178.2 17,110 151,813
50.4 0
50.4 11,937
54.8 11,937
54.8 81,117
86.9 81,117
86.9 109,656
102.6 109,656
102.6 134,703
178.2 134,703
178.2 151,813
Curve 3 - RES Curve (social)
Cost Generation Cum

SSH 43.0 45 45
SSH 43.0 42 87
SSH 43.0 35 122
SSH 43.0 35 157
SSH 43.0 169 326
SSH 43.0 185 511
SSH 43.0 84 595
SSH 43.0 224 819
SSH 45.0 80 900
SSH 45.2 107 1,007
SSH 45.2 77 1,083
SSH 45.6 186 1,269
SSH 46.2 57 1,326
SSH 47.2 196 1,522
LFG 47.7 5 1,528
LFG 47.7 5 1,533
LFG 47.7 5 1,538
LFG 47.7 5 1,543
SSH 49.1 29 1,572
SSH 49.1 22 1,594
SSH 49.1 17 1,611
SSH 49.1 12 1,623
SSH 49.1 34 1,656
SSH 49.1 31 1,688
SSH 49.1 5 1,693
SSH 49.1 25 1,717
SSH 49.1 25 1,742
SSH 49.1 15 1,757
SSH 49.1 7 1,764
SSH 49.1 22 1,786
SSH 49.1 20 1,807
SSH 49.1 34 1,840
SSH 49.1 15 1,855
SSH 49.1 14 1,869
SSH 49.1 14 1,883
SSH 49.1 14 1,897
SSH 49.1 6 1,902
SSH 49.1 4 1,906
SSH 49.1 5 1,911
SSH 49.1 12 1,923
SSH 49.1 12 1,935
SSH 49.1 11 1,946
SSH 49.1 11 1,956
SSH 49.1 10 1,967
SSH 49.1 5 1,972
SSH 49.1 12 1,984
SSH 49.1 4 1,988
SSH 49.1 10 1,997
SSH 49.1 8 2,005
SSH 49.1 8 2,013
SSH 49.1 8 2,020
SSH 49.1 8 2,028
SSH 49.1 7 2,034
SSH 49.1 6 2,041
SSH 49.1 34 2,075
SSH 49.1 4 2,078
SSH 49.1 2 2,081
SSH 50.1 7 2,087
SSH 50.1 59 2,146
SSH 50.5 5 2,151
SSH 50.9 4 2,154
SSH 50.9 7 2,161
SSH 51.3 42 2,203
SSH 51.4 6 2,209
SSH 51.4 17 2,226
SSH 51.5 66 2,292
SSH 51.6 58 2,350
SSH 51.7 18 2,368
LFG 51.7 5 2,372
LFG 51.7 5 2,377
LFG 51.7 5 2,382
LFG 51.7 5 2,387
LFG 51.7 5 2,392
LFG 51.7 5 2,397
LFG 51.7 5 2,402
LFG 51.7 5 2,407
SSH 51.7 17 2,424
SSH 51.8 17 2,441
SSH 51.8 17 2,457
SSH 52.0 4 2,461
SSH 52.1 5 2,467
SSH 52.2 29 2,495
SSH 52.2 11 2,506
SSH 52.2 12 2,518
SSH 52.2 5 2,522
SSH 52.2 6 2,529
SSH 52.2 16 2,545
SSH 52.3 19 2,564
SSH 52.3 6 2,570
SSH 52.3 9 2,579
SSH 52.3 7 2,586
SSH 52.4 3 2,589
SSH 52.4 17 2,605
SSH 52.5 16 2,622
SSH 52.5 16 2,637
SSH 52.6 15 2,653
SSH 52.8 18 2,671
SSH 52.9 14 2,685
SSH 52.9 26 2,711
SSH 52.9 16 2,726
SSH 53.1 18 2,744
SSH 53.2 16 2,760
SSH 53.2 11 2,771
SSH 53.2 15 2,786
SSH 53.3 16 2,802
SSH 53.3 7 2,809
SSH 53.3 227 3,035
SSH 53.4 20 3,055
SSH 53.4 15 3,070
SSH 53.5 18 3,088
SSH 53.6 143 3,231
SSH 53.6 135 3,366
SSH 53.8 20 3,386
SSH 53.8 20 3,407
SSH 53.8 20 3,427
SSH 53.8 15 3,442
SSH 53.8 15 3,456
SSH 53.9 20 3,477
SSH 53.9 15 3,492
SSH 53.9 83 3,575
SSH 53.9 15 3,589
SSH 53.9 4 3,593
SSH 54.0 21 3,614
SSH 54.1 100 3,714
SSH 54.1 6 3,720
SSH 54.1 19 3,739
SSH 54.2 111 3,850
SSH 54.2 22 3,872
SSH 54.2 14 3,887
SSH 54.2 8 3,895
SSH 54.3 7 3,901
SSH 54.3 94 3,995
LFG 54.4 5 4,000
LFG 54.4 5 4,005
LFG 54.4 5 4,011
LFG 54.4 5 4,016
SSH 54.5 14 4,030
SSH 54.6 23 4,053
SSH 54.6 95 4,148
SSH 54.6 252 4,401
SSH 54.6 3 4,404
SSH 54.7 4 4,408
LFG 54.7 4 4,412
LFG 54.7 4 4,417
LFG 54.7 4 4,421
LFG 54.7 4 4,426
SSH 54.8 13 4,439
SSH 54.9 23 4,462
SSH 54.9 8 4,470
SSH 54.9 24 4,494
SSH 54.9 13 4,506
SSH 55.0 25 4,531
SSH 55.0 25 4,557
SSH 55.0 25 4,582
SSH 55.2 9 4,591
SSH 55.3 26 4,617
SSH 55.3 26 4,643
SSH 55.3 9 4,652
SSH 55.4 8 4,660
SSH 55.5 14 4,674
SSH 55.6 14 4,688
SSH 55.7 78 4,765
SSH 55.8 76 4,841
SSH 55.9 6 4,847
SSH 55.9 75 4,923
SSH 56.0 280 5,203
SSH 56.0 54 5,257
SSH 56.0 74 5,330
SSH 56.0 126 5,457
SSH 56.0 3 5,460
LFG 56.0 5 5,465
LFG 56.0 5 5,469
LFG 56.0 5 5,474
LFG 56.0 5 5,479
SSH 56.1 56 5,535
SSH 56.4 5 5,540
SSH 56.5 51 5,591
SSH 56.7 28 5,619
SSH 56.9 8 5,628
SSH 57.0 13 5,640
SSH 57.0 13 5,653
SSH 57.0 17 5,669
SSH 57.0 28 5,698
SSH 57.1 29 5,726
SSH 57.2 315 6,042
SSH 57.3 42 6,084
SSH 57.4 56 6,140
SSH 57.5 42 6,182
SSH 57.7 3 6,184
SSH 57.7 29 6,213
SSH 57.8 18 6,231
SSH 57.8 5 6,236
SSH 57.9 29 6,265
SSH 58.0 15 6,280
SSH 58.0 28 6,309
SSH 58.0 126 6,435
SSH 58.0 12 6,447
SSH 58.0 13 6,459
LFG 58.3 5 6,464
LFG 58.3 5 6,469
LFG 58.3 5 6,475
LFG 58.3 5 6,480
SSH 58.4 9 6,489
SSH 58.6 12 6,501
SSH 58.8 7 6,507
LFG 58.9 5 6,512
LFG 58.9 5 6,517
LFG 58.9 5 6,522
LFG 58.9 5 6,526
SSH 58.9 11 6,537
SSH 58.9 8 6,545
SSH 59.1 52 6,597
SSH 59.1 3 6,600
SSH 59.1 10 6,609
SSH 59.2 11 6,621
LFG 59.3 4 6,625
LFG 59.3 4 6,630
LFG 59.3 4 6,634
LFG 59.3 4 6,639
SSH 59.5 11 6,650
SSH 59.6 11 6,661
SSH 59.6 5 6,666
SSH 59.8 10 6,675
SSH 59.9 6 6,682
SSH 60.0 32 6,713
LFG 60.0 4 6,718
LFG 60.0 4 6,722
LFG 60.0 4 6,726
LFG 60.0 4 6,730
SSH 60.3 11 6,740
SSH 60.3 23 6,764
SSH 60.4 13 6,777
SSH 60.4 21 6,798
SSH 60.4 24 6,823
SSH 60.5 8 6,830
SSH 60.6 10 6,840
SSH 60.7 52 6,892
SSH 60.7 18 6,910
SSH 60.7 7 6,917
SSH 60.8 34 6,951
SSH 60.8 22 6,973
SSH 60.8 10 6,983
SSH 60.9 41 7,024
SSH 61.0 16 7,039
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Biog 61.1 46 7,131
Biog 61.1 46 7,177
Biog 61.1 46 7,222
SSH 61.4 39 7,262
Bag 61.4 84 7,346
SSH 61.5 33 7,379
SSH 61.5 10 7,388
SSH 61.7 210 7,599
SSH 61.8 29 7,628
SSH 61.8 10 7,638
SSH 61.9 9 7,647
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SSH 62.0 9 7,731
SSH 62.1 18 7,749
SSH 62.2 9 7,758
LFG 62.4 4 7,762
LFG 62.4 4 7,767
LFG 62.4 4 7,771
LFG 62.4 4 7,776
SSH 62.4 9 7,785
SSH 62.4 34 7,819
SSH 62.4 36 7,855
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SSH 62.4 5 7,928
SSH 62.5 24 7,952
SSH 62.7 4 7,957
SSH 62.8 38 7,995
SSH 63.0 9 8,004
SSH 63.0 9 8,013
SSH 63.1 58 8,071
LFG 63.2 5 8,075
LFG 63.2 5 8,080
LFG 63.2 5 8,085
LFG 63.2 5 8,089
Bag 63.2 58 8,147
SSH 63.5 9 8,156
SSH 63.7 9 8,165
SSH 63.8 58 8,223
Biog 63.9 42 8,265
Biog 63.9 42 8,308
Biog 63.9 42 8,350
Biog 63.9 42 8,392
SSH 64.0 5 8,397
SSH 64.0 256 8,653
SSH 64.1 49 8,703
Bag 64.2 84 8,787
SSH 64.2 10 8,797
SSH 64.3 8 8,805
SSH 64.5 4 8,809
SSH 64.5 252 9,062
Biom 64.5 78 9,139
SSH 64.5 7 9,146
SSH 64.6 96 9,242
SSH 64.7 8 9,250
Bag 64.7 74 9,324
SSH 64.8 9 9,333
SSH 64.9 9 9,342
SSH 64.9 8 9,350
SSH 64.9 5 9,355
SSH 64.9 22 9,377
SSH 64.9 8 9,386
SSH 64.9 8 9,394
SSH 65.0 8 9,402
Biom 65.0 78 9,479
LFG 65.0 4 9,483
LFG 65.0 4 9,488
LFG 65.0 4 9,492
LFG 65.0 4 9,496
Bag 65.1 68 9,564
Bag 65.1 84 9,648
SSH 65.2 35 9,683
SSH 65.2 158 9,841
SSH 65.2 127 9,968
SSH 65.3 55 10,023
Biom 65.3 78 10,101
SSH 65.5 7 10,107
SSH 65.5 8 10,115
SSH 65.5 4 10,119
SSH 65.5 8 10,127
WTE 65.5 10 10,136
WTE 65.5 10 10,146
WTE 65.5 10 10,156
WTE 65.5 10 10,165
SSH 65.6 8 10,173
SSH 65.6 8 10,181
SSH 65.7 5 10,186
SSH 65.7 27 10,213
Biom 65.9 78 10,291
SSH 65.9 105 10,396
Bag 65.9 58 10,454
Bag 66.0 84 10,538
SSH 66.0 8 10,546
Biog 66.0 40 10,585
Biog 66.0 40 10,625
Biog 66.0 40 10,665
Biog 66.0 40 10,705
Biom 66.1 78 10,783
Bag 66.1 74 10,857
SSH 66.3 68 10,925
Bag 66.5 74 10,999
Biom 66.6 78 11,077
LFG 66.9 4 11,081
LFG 66.9 4 11,086
LFG 66.9 4 11,090
LFG 66.9 4 11,094
Bag 66.9 68 11,162
Biom 67.0 78 11,240
Bag 67.0 68 11,308
SSH 67.2 8 11,315
SSH 67.2 8 11,323
SSH 67.2 8 11,331
SSH 67.2 8 11,339
SSH 67.2 8 11,346
SSH 67.2 8 11,354
SSH 67.2 4 11,358
Biom 67.2 78 11,435
Biom 67.5 78 11,513
SSH 67.6 8 11,521
Bag 67.6 84 11,605
SSH 67.6 8 11,612
Biom 67.7 78 11,690
SSH 67.8 68 11,758
Bag 67.8 58 11,816
Bag 67.9 84 11,900
SSH 67.9 7 11,907
Biom 68.0 78 11,985
SSH 68.1 7 11,992
SSH 68.1 7 11,999
SSH 68.2 7 12,006
LFG 68.4 4 12,010
LFG 68.4 4 12,014
LFG 68.4 4 12,018
LFG 68.4 4 12,022
Biom 68.5 78 12,099
SSH 68.6 7 12,106
Biom 68.6 68 12,175
Bag 68.6 58 12,233
SSH 68.6 3 12,236
Bag 68.7 84 12,320
Biom 68.8 78 12,397
SSH 68.8 7 12,404
SSH 68.8 13 12,417
SSH 68.9 7 12,424
Bag 68.9 74 12,499
SSH 68.9 7 12,505
Bag 68.9 74 12,580
Biom 69.1 68 12,648
Bag 69.2 74 12,723
Biom 69.3 78 12,800
Biom 69.4 68 12,869
Biom 69.6 78 12,946
Bag 69.7 68 13,014
SSH 69.7 6 13,020
Bag 69.7 84 13,104
SSH 69.7 3 13,107
Bag 69.7 68 13,175
Biog 69.8 36 13,211
Biog 69.8 36 13,248
Biog 69.8 36 13,284
Biog 69.8 36 13,321
Biom 70.0 68 13,389
Bag 70.0 68 13,457
SSH 70.1 6 13,463
SSH 70.1 20 13,483
Biom 70.1 78 13,561
SSH 70.2 10 13,570
Bag 70.3 84 13,655
Biom 70.4 68 13,723
Bag 70.5 58 13,781
SSH 70.5 16 13,797
SSH 70.6 6 13,803
SSH 70.7 196 13,999
Bag 70.7 74 14,074
SSH 70.8 6 14,080
Biom 70.9 68 14,148
SSH 71.0 6 14,154
SSH 71.2 6 14,161
Biom 71.3 68 14,229
Bag 71.3 84 14,313
Bag 71.3 58 14,371
Bag 71.5 68 14,439
SSH 71.5 29 14,468
Biom 71.6 68 14,536
Bag 71.7 74 14,611
Biom 71.8 68 14,679
SSH 71.8 6 14,685
Biom 72.0 62 14,748
SSH 72.1 5 14,752
Biom 72.1 68 14,821
Bag 72.1 84 14,905
Bag 72.2 58 14,963
SSH 72.4 6 14,969
Bag 72.4 84 15,053
SSH 72.4 6 15,059
Biom 72.5 68 15,127
Biom 72.5 62 15,190
Bag 72.8 68 15,257
Biom 72.8 62 15,320
SSH 72.9 6 15,325
Biom 73.0 68 15,394
SSH 73.1 3 15,397
Bag 73.1 74 15,471
SSH 73.1 6 15,477
SSH 73.1 39 15,515
Bag 73.1 58 15,573
SSH 73.2 3 15,576
SSH 73.2 64 15,640
SSH 73.2 5 15,646
SSH 73.2 5 15,651
SSH 73.3 3 15,654
Biom 73.4 62 15,716
LFG 73.4 4 15,720
LFG 73.4 4 15,725
LFG 73.4 4 15,729
LFG 73.4 4 15,733
Bag 73.4 74 15,807
Biom 73.4 68 15,876
Bag 73.5 74 15,950
SSH 73.7 14 15,964
SSH 73.7 5 15,969
SSH 73.7 5 15,975
Biom 74.0 68 16,043
Biom 74.0 62 16,105
Bag 74.0 84 16,190
SSH 74.1 14 16,203
WTE 74.2 8 16,212
WTE 74.2 8 16,220
WTE 74.2 8 16,229
WTE 74.2 8 16,237
Bag 74.3 68 16,305
Biom 74.3 68 16,373
SSH 74.3 5 16,379
Biom 74.5 62 16,441
SSH 74.6 5 16,446
Bag 74.6 68 16,514
Bag 74.6 68 16,582
Biom 74.8 68 16,650
Biom 74.8 62 16,713
SSH 74.9 5 16,718
Bag 74.9 84 16,802
Bag 74.9 58 16,860
SSH 75.0 5 16,865
SSH 75.2 40 16,904
SSH 75.2 42 16,946
SSH 75.2 4 16,950
Biom 75.3 62 17,012
Biom 75.4 62 17,075
Biog 75.4 46 17,121
Biog 75.4 46 17,166
Biog 75.4 46 17,212
Biog 75.4 46 17,258
SSH 75.4 3 17,261
SSH 75.4 4 17,265
SSH 75.4 5 17,270
SSH 75.4 5 17,275
SSH 75.6 3 17,278
SSH 75.8 5 17,283
SSH 75.8 5 17,288
Biom 75.8 62 17,350
Bag 75.8 84 17,434
Bag 75.9 74 17,509
Bag 75.9 58 17,567
SSH 76.0 5 17,571
Biom 76.2 62 17,634
Bag 76.2 74 17,708
SSH 76.3 7 17,715
SSH 76.4 8 17,723
SSH 76.4 5 17,727
SSH 76.6 5 17,732
Biom 76.7 62 17,794
Bag 76.7 58 17,852
SSH 77.2 4 17,857
Biom 77.3 62 17,919
Bag 77.3 68 17,987
Bag 77.4 68 18,055
Bag 77.6 58 18,113
SSH 77.6 4 18,117
Bag 77.7 74 18,191
Biom 77.8 62 18,254
Biom 78.2 62 18,316
Sew 78.2 2 18,318
Sew 78.2 2 18,320
Sew 78.2 2 18,323
Sew 78.2 2 18,325
SSH 78.2 79 18,404
SSH 78.2 4 18,408
SSH 78.3 4 18,412
SSH 78.5 4 18,417
Biom 78.5 53 18,470
SSH 78.5 4 18,474
Bag 78.6 84 18,558
Biom 78.7 62 18,621
SSH 78.7 4 18,625
Biom 79.0 53 18,678
SSH 79.1 4 18,682
Bag 79.2 68 18,750
SSH 79.2 4 18,754
Biog 79.3 42 18,796
Biog 79.3 42 18,838
Biog 79.3 42 18,880
Biog 79.3 42 18,923
Biom 79.4 53 18,976
Bag 79.5 58 19,034
SSH 79.8 4 19,038
Biom 79.9 53 19,091
Bag 80.3 58 19,149
SSH 80.3 2 19,152
SSH 80.3 4 19,155
SSH 80.4 4 19,159
Bag 80.4 74 19,233
SSH 80.5 4 19,237
SSH 80.7 85 19,322
Biom 80.8 53 19,376
SSH 81.2 4 19,379
Biom 81.4 53 19,433
WTE 81.4 8 19,440
WTE 81.4 8 19,448
WTE 81.4 8 19,456
WTE 81.4 8 19,463
SSH 81.5 4 19,467
SSH 81.5 4 19,471
Biom 81.7 53 19,524
SSH 81.8 26 19,550
Bag 81.9 68 19,618
SSH 82.1 3 19,621
Bag 82.1 58 19,679
Biom 82.2 53 19,732
Biog 82.4 40 19,772
Biog 82.4 40 19,812
Biog 82.4 40 19,852
Biog 82.4 40 19,892
Biom 82.4 53 19,945
SSH 82.4 4 19,949
SSH 82.5 3 19,952
SSH 82.8 3 19,956
SSH 82.8 238 20,194
Biom 82.9 53 20,247
SSH 83.0 3 20,251
Biom 83.3 53 20,304
Biom 83.8 53 20,357
SSH 83.8 3 20,360
SSH 84.2 3 20,363
SSH 84.2 98 20,461
SSH 84.2 3 20,464
SSH 84.3 2 20,466
SSH 84.6 32 20,498
Sew 84.7 2 20,500
Sew 84.7 2 20,502
Sew 84.7 2 20,504
Sew 84.7 2 20,506
Biom 84.7 53 20,559
Bag 84.8 58 20,617
Biog 84.9 46 20,663
Biog 84.9 46 20,709
Biog 84.9 46 20,755
Biog 84.9 46 20,800
Biom 85.3 53 20,854
SSH 85.5 3 20,857
Biom 85.6 53 20,910
SSH 85.7 3 20,913
SSH 85.9 3 20,916
SSH 86.0 15 20,931
Biom 86.1 53 20,984
SSH 86.7 3 20,987
SSH 86.8 4 20,990
SSH 87.2 3 20,993
SSH 87.2 97 21,090
SSH 87.4 3 21,093
SSH 87.4 2 21,095
Biog 87.7 36 21,131
Biog 87.7 36 21,168
Biog 87.7 36 21,204
Biog 87.7 36 21,240
SSH 87.7 5 21,245
SSH 87.9 3 21,248
SSH 88.1 3 21,251
SSH 88.6 4 21,255
SSH 88.7 3 21,258
SSH 88.8 3 21,260
Sew 88.9 2 21,262
Sew 88.9 2 21,264
Sew 88.9 2 21,267
Sew 88.9 2 21,269
SSH 88.9 3 21,271
SSH 89.0 3 21,274
SSH 89.2 12 21,286
SSH 89.4 2 21,288
SSH 89.6 2 21,291
Biog 89.6 42 21,333
Biog 89.6 42 21,375
Biog 89.6 42 21,417
Biog 89.6 42 21,460
Sew 89.7 2 21,461
Sew 89.7 2 21,463
Sew 89.7 2 21,465
Sew 89.7 2 21,467
SSH 89.9 5 21,472
SSH 90.0 2 21,475
SSH 90.0 2 21,477
SSH 90.1 3 21,480
SSH 90.5 4 21,484
SSH 91.1 2 21,486
SSH 91.2 2 21,488
SSH 91.2 2 21,491
SSH 91.5 2 21,493
SSH 91.9 13 21,506
SSH 91.9 2 21,508
SSH 92.0 2 21,510
SSH 92.2 2 21,512
SSH 92.5 2 21,515
SSH 92.6 2 21,517
SSH 92.8 2 21,519
SSH 92.9 3 21,522
Biog 93.3 40 21,561
Biog 93.3 40 21,601
Biog 93.3 40 21,641
Biog 93.3 40 21,681
SSH 93.3 3 21,684
SSH 93.6 2 21,686
SSH 93.7 2 21,688
SSH 93.7 2 21,690
SSH 93.7 3 21,693
SSH 93.8 3 21,696
SSH 93.9 3 21,698
WD 94.5 6 21,705
WD 94.5 6 21,711
WD 94.5 6 21,717
WD 94.5 6 21,724
WD 94.5 6 21,730
WD 94.5 6 21,737
WD 94.5 6 21,743
WD 94.5 6 21,749
WD 94.5 6 21,756
WD 94.5 6 21,762
WD 94.5 6 21,768
WD 94.5 6 21,775
WD 94.5 6 21,781
WD 94.5 6 21,788
WD 94.5 6 21,794
WD 94.5 6 21,800
SSH 94.8 2 21,802
SSH 95.1 2 21,804
WTE 95.2 7 21,811
WTE 95.2 7 21,818
WTE 95.2 7 21,824
WTE 95.2 7 21,831
SSH 95.2 2 21,833
SSH 95.4 2 21,835
SSH 95.7 2 21,837
SSH 95.9 2 21,839
SSH 95.9 2 21,841
Sew 96.0 2 21,843
Sew 96.0 2 21,845
Sew 96.0 2 21,847
Sew 96.0 2 21,849
SSH 96.1 2 21,851
Sew 96.3 2 21,853
Sew 96.3 2 21,855
Sew 96.3 2 21,857
Sew 96.3 2 21,859
SSH 96.5 2 21,861
SSH 96.7 273 22,134
WTE 96.9 10 22,143
WTE 96.9 10 22,153
WTE 96.9 10 22,162
WTE 96.9 10 22,172
SSH 97.4 2 22,174
SSH 97.6 2 22,176
SSH 97.6 2 22,178
SSH 97.8 2 22,180
SSH 97.8 3 22,183
SSH 98.1 2 22,185
SSH 98.2 3 22,187
SSH 98.3 2 22,189
SSH 98.3 2 22,191
Sew 98.3 2 22,193
Sew 98.3 2 22,194
Sew 98.3 2 22,196
Sew 98.3 2 22,198
SSH 98.8 6 22,203
Biog 99.1 46 22,249
Biog 99.1 46 22,295
Biog 99.1 46 22,340
Biog 99.1 46 22,386
SSH 99.1 2 22,388
SSH 99.2 2 22,390
SSH 99.3 3 22,393
SSH 99.4 2 22,395
SSH 99.4 2 22,396
SSH 99.6 2 22,398
Biog 99.6 36 22,435
Biog 99.6 36 22,471
Biog 99.6 36 22,508
Biog 99.6 36 22,544
SSH 99.7 2 22,546
SSH 100.5 2 22,547
SSH 100.5 49 22,596
WD 100.6 6 22,602
WD 100.6 6 22,609
WD 100.6 6 22,615
WD 100.6 6 22,621
WD 100.6 6 22,628
WD 100.6 6 22,634
WD 100.6 6 22,641
WD 100.6 6 22,647
WD 100.6 6 22,653
WD 100.6 6 22,660
WD 100.6 6 22,666
WD 100.6 6 22,672
WD 100.6 6 22,679
WD 100.6 6 22,685
WD 100.6 6 22,691
WD 100.6 6 22,698
SSH 101.0 105 22,803
SSH 101.1 25 22,828
SSH 101.8 2 22,829
SSH 101.9 2 22,831
Sew 101.9 2 22,833
Sew 101.9 2 22,835
Sew 101.9 2 22,836
Sew 101.9 2 22,838
SSH 102.1 3 22,841
SSH 102.2 2 22,843
SSH 102.3 2 22,844
WD 102.3 163 23,007
WD 102.3 163 23,170
WD 102.3 163 23,332
WD 102.3 163 23,495
WD 102.3 163 23,657
WD 102.3 163 23,820
WD 102.3 163 23,983
WD 102.3 163 24,145
WD 102.3 163 24,308
WD 102.3 163 24,471
WD 102.3 163 24,633
WD 102.3 163 24,796
WD 102.3 163 24,959
WD 102.3 163 25,121
WD 102.3 163 25,284
WD 102.3 163 25,446
SSH 102.4 2 25,448
SSH 102.6 6 25,454
SSH 103.3 2 25,455
SSH 103.8 2 25,457
Sew 104.0 2 25,459
Sew 104.0 2 25,461
Sew 104.0 2 25,463
Sew 104.0 2 25,465
SSH 104.1 3 25,468
SSH 104.4 3 25,470
SSH 104.5 1 25,472
SSH 104.6 2 25,474
SSH 104.6 1 25,475
WD 104.7 6 25,482
WD 104.7 6 25,488
WD 104.7 6 25,494
WD 104.7 6 25,501
WD 104.7 6 25,507
WD 104.7 6 25,514
WD 104.7 6 25,520
WD 104.7 6 25,526
WD 104.7 6 25,533
WD 104.7 6 25,539
WD 104.7 6 25,545
WD 104.7 6 25,552
WD 104.7 6 25,558
WD 104.7 6 25,565
WD 104.7 6 25,571
WD 104.7 6 25,577
SSH 104.9 1 25,579
SSH 105.0 43 25,622
Biog 105.0 42 25,664
Biog 105.0 42 25,706
Biog 105.0 42 25,749
Biog 105.0 42 25,791
SSH 105.4 1 25,792
SSH 105.6 1 25,794
SSH 105.7 1 25,795
SSH 105.7 3 25,798
SSH 106.6 1 25,800
Sew 106.7 2 25,802
Sew 106.7 2 25,804
Sew 106.7 2 25,806
Sew 106.7 2 25,808
SSH 106.9 1 25,810
SSH 107.0 1 25,811
SSH 107.9 1 25,812
WD 108.1 218 26,031
WD 108.1 218 26,249
WD 108.1 218 26,467
WD 108.1 218 26,686
WD 108.1 218 26,904
WD 108.1 218 27,122
WD 108.1 218 27,340
WD 108.1 218 27,559
WD 108.1 218 27,777
WD 108.1 218 27,995
WD 108.1 218 28,214
WD 108.1 218 28,432
WD 108.1 218 28,650
WD 108.1 218 28,869
WD 108.1 218 29,087
WD 108.1 218 29,305
SSH 108.6 3 29,308
SSH 108.6 1 29,310
WD 109.0 163 29,472
WD 109.0 163 29,635
WD 109.0 163 29,797
WD 109.0 163 29,960
WD 109.0 163 30,123
WD 109.0 163 30,285
WD 109.0 163 30,448
WD 109.0 163 30,611
WD 109.0 163 30,773
WD 109.0 163 30,936
WD 109.0 163 31,099
WD 109.0 163 31,261
WD 109.0 163 31,424
WD 109.0 163 31,586
WD 109.0 163 31,749
WD 109.0 163 31,912
SSH 109.2 6 31,917
SSH 109.2 1 31,919
SSH 109.2 1 31,920
SSH 109.4 1 31,921
Biog 109.6 40 31,961
Biog 109.6 40 32,001
Biog 109.6 40 32,041
Biog 109.6 40 32,080
SSH 109.7 1 32,082
WTE 109.8 8 32,090
WTE 109.8 8 32,099
WTE 109.8 8 32,107
WTE 109.8 8 32,115
SSH 109.9 1 32,117
SSH 109.9 1 32,118
SSH 110.0 3 32,121
Sew 110.1 2 32,123
Sew 110.1 2 32,124
Sew 110.1 2 32,126
Sew 110.1 2 32,128
SSH 110.5 1 32,129
SSH 110.7 1 32,130
SSH 110.9 1 32,131
WD 110.9 6 32,138
WD 110.9 6 32,144
WD 110.9 6 32,151
WD 110.9 6 32,157
WD 110.9 6 32,163
WD 110.9 6 32,170
WD 110.9 6 32,176
WD 110.9 6 32,182
WD 110.9 6 32,189
WD 110.9 6 32,195
WD 110.9 6 32,202
WD 110.9 6 32,208
WD 110.9 6 32,214
WD 110.9 6 32,221
WD 110.9 6 32,227
WD 110.9 6 32,233
SSH 111.4 2 32,236
Sew 111.8 2 32,237
Sew 111.8 2 32,239
Sew 111.8 2 32,241
Sew 111.8 2 32,242
SSH 112.3 1 32,243
SSH 112.7 1 32,244
SSH 112.8 2 32,247
SSH 113.1 1 32,248
WD 113.4 163 32,410
WD 113.4 163 32,573
WD 113.4 163 32,736
WD 113.4 163 32,898
WD 113.4 163 33,061
WD 113.4 163 33,224
WD 113.4 163 33,386
WD 113.4 163 33,549
WD 113.4 163 33,711
WD 113.4 163 33,874
WD 113.4 163 34,037
WD 113.4 163 34,199
WD 113.4 163 34,362
WD 113.4 163 34,525
WD 113.4 163 34,687
WD 113.4 163 34,850
SSH 115.2 6 34,856
WD 115.2 218 35,074
WD 115.2 218 35,292
WD 115.2 218 35,511
WD 115.2 218 35,729
WD 115.2 218 35,947
WD 115.2 218 36,166
WD 115.2 218 36,384
WD 115.2 218 36,602
WD 115.2 218 36,821
WD 115.2 218 37,039
WD 115.2 218 37,257
WD 115.2 218 37,475
WD 115.2 218 37,694
WD 115.2 218 37,912
WD 115.2 218 38,130
WD 115.2 218 38,349
Sew 115.6 2 38,351
Sew 115.6 2 38,353
Sew 115.6 2 38,355
Sew 115.6 2 38,357
SSH 115.6 1 38,358
SSH 115.7 4 38,362
SSH 116.2 2 38,364
SSH 116.4 1 38,365
SSH 117.1 1 38,366
SSH 117.3 3 38,369
Biog 117.5 36 38,405
Biog 117.5 36 38,442
Biog 117.5 36 38,478
Biog 117.5 36 38,514
WTE 117.9 10 38,524
WTE 117.9 10 38,534
WTE 117.9 10 38,543
WTE 117.9 10 38,553
SSH 118.7 1 38,554
SSH 118.9 1 38,555
SSH 118.9 1 38,555
SSH 119.5 6 38,561
SSH 119.6 5 38,567
WD 119.9 218 38,785
WD 119.9 218 39,003
WD 119.9 218 39,221
WD 119.9 218 39,440
WD 119.9 218 39,658
WD 119.9 218 39,876
WD 119.9 218 40,095
WD 119.9 218 40,313
WD 119.9 218 40,531
WD 119.9 218 40,750
WD 119.9 218 40,968
WD 119.9 218 41,186
WD 119.9 218 41,405
WD 119.9 218 41,623
WD 119.9 218 41,841
WD 119.9 218 42,059
WD 120.1 163 42,222
WD 120.1 163 42,385
WD 120.1 163 42,547
WD 120.1 163 42,710
WD 120.1 163 42,873
WD 120.1 163 43,035
WD 120.1 163 43,198
WD 120.1 163 43,360
WD 120.1 163 43,523
WD 120.1 163 43,686
WD 120.1 163 43,848
WD 120.1 163 44,011
WD 120.1 163 44,174
WD 120.1 163 44,336
WD 120.1 163 44,499
WD 120.1 163 44,662
WTE 120.4 8 44,669
WTE 120.4 8 44,677
WTE 120.4 8 44,685
WTE 120.4 8 44,692
SSH 120.6 1 44,693
SSH 120.6 1 44,694
SSH 120.6 1 44,695
Sew 120.8 2 44,697
Sew 120.8 2 44,698
Sew 120.8 2 44,700
Sew 120.8 2 44,702
SSH 120.8 4 44,706
SSH 120.9 2 44,708
SSH 121.6 1 44,708
SSH 121.8 126 44,834
Sew 122.4 2 44,836
Sew 122.4 2 44,838
Sew 122.4 2 44,840
Sew 122.4 2 44,842
SSH 122.9 2 44,844
SSH 124.8 1 44,844
SSH 125.4 3 44,847
SSH 126.6 1 44,848
WD 127.0 218 45,066
WD 127.0 218 45,285
WD 127.0 218 45,503
WD 127.0 218 45,721
WD 127.0 218 45,940
WD 127.0 218 46,158
WD 127.0 218 46,376
WD 127.0 218 46,594
WD 127.0 218 46,813
WD 127.0 218 47,031
WD 127.0 218 47,249
WD 127.0 218 47,468
WD 127.0 218 47,686
WD 127.0 218 47,904
WD 127.0 218 48,123
WD 127.0 218 48,341
SSH 127.2 1 48,342
SSH 127.8 1 48,342
SSH 128.1 1 48,343
SSH 128.3 5 48,349
SSH 130.7 1 48,350
SSH 131.1 1 48,350
SSH 131.1 0 48,351
SSH 131.5 0 48,351
SSH 131.8 1 48,352
SSH 133.2 0 48,353
WTE 133.5 8 48,361
WTE 133.5 8 48,370
WTE 133.5 8 48,378
WTE 133.5 8 48,386
SSH 134.0 1 48,388
Sew 134.2 2 48,390
Sew 134.2 2 48,391
Sew 134.2 2 48,393
Sew 134.2 2 48,395
SSH 134.5 0 48,395
SSH 135.6 0 48,396
SSH 135.8 1 48,397
SSH 136.6 1 48,398
SSH 136.8 2 48,400
SSH 138.8 0 48,400
WTE 140.8 7 48,407
WTE 140.8 7 48,413
WTE 140.8 7 48,420
WTE 140.8 7 48,426
SSH 140.9 0 48,427
SSH 141.3 1 48,428
SSH 141.4 0 48,429
SSH 143.1 0 48,429
SSH 145.9 1 48,430
SSH 146.0 0 48,431
WTE 146.4 8 48,438
WTE 146.4 8 48,446
WTE 146.4 8 48,454
WTE 146.4 8 48,461
SSH 149.0 0 48,462
SSH 149.1 1 48,463
WTE 149.2 10 48,472
WTE 149.2 10 48,482
WTE 149.2 10 48,491
WTE 149.2 10 48,501
SSH 149.5 0 48,501
SSH 152.7 0 48,502
SSH 153.4 0 48,502
SSH 153.9 1 48,503
SSH 154.3 0 48,503
SSH 155.5 0 48,503
SSH 155.9 1 48,505
SSH 156.3 12 48,517
SSH 157.0 1 48,518
SSH 157.7 0 48,518
SSH 160.2 3 48,521
SSH 161.8 0 48,521
SSH 163.5 0 48,521
SSH 164.6 1 48,522
SSH 167.2 1 48,523
WTE 169.0 8 48,531
WTE 169.0 8 48,540
WTE 169.0 8 48,548
WTE 169.0 8 48,557
WTE 171.2 7 48,563
WTE 171.2 7 48,570
WTE 171.2 7 48,576
WTE 171.2 7 48,583
SSH 172.9 0 48,583
SSH 175.0 0 48,583
SSH 176.0 0 48,584
SSH 177.7 2 48,585
SSH 178.6 1 48,586
SSH 179.6 1 48,587
SSH 181.3 1 48,588
SSH 184.0 0 48,588
WTE 185.4 8 48,596
WTE 185.4 8 48,604
WTE 185.4 8 48,611
WTE 185.4 8 48,619
SSH 190.8 0 48,619
SSH 198.0 2 48,622
SSH 199.9 1 48,622
SSH 200.2 1 48,623
SSH 203.9 1 48,624
SSH 203.9 1 48,625
SSH 204.8 0 48,625
SSH 205.1 1 48,626
SSH 210.8 1 48,627
SSH 211.2 0 48,627
SSH 211.5 1 48,628
SSH 213.3 1 48,629
SSH 215.7 1 48,631
SSH 215.8 1 48,631
WTE 216.8 7 48,638
WTE 216.8 7 48,644
WTE 216.8 7 48,651
WTE 216.8 7 48,657
SSH 219.8 0 48,658
SSH 222.3 1 48,659
SSH 224.1 1 48,660
SSH 226.4 0 48,660
SSH 232.4 1 48,660
SSH 238.1 0 48,661
SSH 238.1 0 48,661
SSH 245.0 0 48,661
SSH 252.9 5 48,665
ST 272.3 14 48,679
ST 272.3 14 48,693
ST 272.3 14 48,707
ST 272.3 14 48,722
ST 282.6 14 48,735
ST 282.6 14 48,749
ST 282.6 14 48,762
ST 282.6 14 48,776
ST 289.9 13 48,789
ST 289.9 13 48,802
ST 289.9 13 48,815
ST 289.9 13 48,828
ST 301.6 13 48,841
ST 301.6 13 48,853
ST 301.6 13 48,866
ST 301.6 13 48,879
ST 314.9 14 48,893
ST 314.9 14 48,907
ST 314.9 14 48,921
ST 314.9 14 48,935
SSH 317.7 4 48,939
ST 326.8 14 48,953
ST 326.8 14 48,966
ST 326.8 14 48,980
ST 326.8 14 48,993
ST 335.2 13 49,006
ST 335.2 13 49,019
ST 335.2 13 49,033
ST 335.2 13 49,046
ST 343.3 14 49,060
ST 343.3 14 49,074
ST 343.3 14 49,088
ST 343.3 14 49,102
PV 343.5 74 49,175
PV 343.5 74 49,249
PV 343.5 74 49,323
PV 343.5 74 49,396
ST 348.8 13 49,409
ST 348.8 13 49,422
ST 348.8 13 49,434
ST 348.8 13 49,447
ST 356.3 14 49,460
ST 356.3 14 49,474
ST 356.3 14 49,487
ST 356.3 14 49,501
PV 356.4 71 49,572
PV 356.4 71 49,643
PV 356.4 71 49,714
PV 356.4 71 49,785
PV 360.4 74 49,858
PV 360.4 74 49,932
PV 360.4 74 50,005
PV 360.4 74 50,079
ST 365.5 13 50,092
ST 365.5 13 50,105
ST 365.5 13 50,119
ST 365.5 13 50,132
PV 365.7 69 50,201
PV 365.7 69 50,270
PV 365.7 69 50,339
PV 365.7 69 50,408
PV 371.7 74 50,482
PV 371.7 74 50,555
PV 371.7 74 50,629
PV 371.7 74 50,703
PV 374.0 71 50,774
PV 374.0 71 50,845
PV 374.0 71 50,916
PV 374.0 71 50,986
ST 380.2 13 50,999
ST 380.2 13 51,012
ST 380.2 13 51,024
ST 380.2 13 51,037
PV 380.4 66 51,104
PV 380.4 66 51,170
PV 380.4 66 51,236
PV 380.4 66 51,303
PV 383.7 69 51,372
PV 383.7 69 51,441
PV 383.7 69 51,510
PV 383.7 69 51,579
PV 385.8 71 51,650
PV 385.8 71 51,721
PV 385.8 71 51,792
PV 385.8 71 51,863
ST 385.9 14 51,877
ST 385.9 14 51,891
ST 385.9 14 51,905
ST 385.9 14 51,919
PV 388.7 74 51,993
PV 388.7 74 52,066
PV 388.7 74 52,140
PV 388.7 74 52,214
PV 395.7 69 52,283
PV 395.7 69 52,352
PV 395.7 69 52,421
PV 395.7 69 52,490
PV 399.2 66 52,557
PV 399.2 66 52,623
PV 399.2 66 52,690
PV 399.2 66 52,756
ST 400.5 14 52,770
ST 400.5 14 52,783
ST 400.5 14 52,797
ST 400.5 14 52,810
PV 403.4 71 52,881
PV 403.4 71 52,952
PV 403.4 71 53,023
PV 403.4 71 53,094
SSH 405.7 33 53,127
ST 410.8 13 53,140
ST 410.8 13 53,153
ST 410.8 13 53,166
ST 410.8 13 53,179
PV 411.7 66 53,246
PV 411.7 66 53,312
PV 411.7 66 53,379
PV 411.7 66 53,445
PV 413.8 69 53,514
PV 413.8 69 53,583
PV 413.8 69 53,653
PV 413.8 69 53,722
ST 427.4 13 53,734
ST 427.4 13 53,747
ST 427.4 13 53,760
ST 427.4 13 53,772
PV 430.5 66 53,839
PV 430.5 66 53,905
PV 430.5 66 53,972
PV 430.5 66 54,038
Curve 4 - Electricity Curve (Private)
Private Cost Generation Cum

SSH 43.0 45 45
SSH 43.0 42 87
SSH 43.0 35 122
SSH 43.0 35 157
SSH 43.0 169 326
SSH 43.0 185 511
SSH 43.0 84 595
SSH 43.0 224 819
SSH 45.0 80 900
SSH 45.2 107 1,007
SSH 45.2 77 1,083
SSH 45.6 186 1,269
SSH 46.2 57 1,326
SSH 47.2 196 1,522
LFG 47.7 5 1,528
LFG 47.7 5 1,533
LFG 47.7 5 1,538
LFG 47.7 5 1,543
SSH 49.1 29 1,572
SSH 49.1 22 1,594
SSH 49.1 17 1,611
SSH 49.1 12 1,623
SSH 49.1 34 1,656
SSH 49.1 31 1,688
SSH 49.1 5 1,693
SSH 49.1 25 1,717
SSH 49.1 25 1,742
SSH 49.1 15 1,757
SSH 49.1 7 1,764
SSH 49.1 22 1,786
SSH 49.1 20 1,807
SSH 49.1 34 1,840
SSH 49.1 15 1,855
SSH 49.1 14 1,869
SSH 49.1 14 1,883
SSH 49.1 14 1,897
SSH 49.1 6 1,902
SSH 49.1 4 1,906
SSH 49.1 5 1,911
SSH 49.1 12 1,923
SSH 49.1 12 1,935
SSH 49.1 11 1,946
SSH 49.1 11 1,956
SSH 49.1 10 1,967
SSH 49.1 5 1,972
SSH 49.1 12 1,984
SSH 49.1 4 1,988
SSH 49.1 10 1,997
SSH 49.1 8 2,005
SSH 49.1 8 2,013
SSH 49.1 8 2,020
SSH 49.1 8 2,028
SSH 49.1 7 2,034
SSH 49.1 6 2,041
SSH 49.1 34 2,075
SSH 49.1 4 2,078
SSH 49.1 2 2,081
SSH 50.1 7 2,087
SSH 50.1 59 2,146
Nuke 50.4 11,937 14,083
SSH 50.5 5 14,087
Bag 50.9 84 14,172
SSH 50.9 4 14,175
SSH 50.9 7 14,182
SSH 51.3 42 14,224
SSH 51.4 6 14,230
SSH 51.4 17 14,247
SSH 51.5 66 14,313
SSH 51.6 58 14,371
SSH 51.7 18 14,389
LFG 51.7 5 14,393
LFG 51.7 5 14,398
LFG 51.7 5 14,403
LFG 51.7 5 14,408
LFG 51.7 5 14,413
LFG 51.7 5 14,418
LFG 51.7 5 14,423
LFG 51.7 5 14,428
SSH 51.7 17 14,445
SSH 51.8 17 14,462
SSH 51.8 17 14,478
SSH 52.0 4 14,482
SSH 52.1 5 14,488
SSH 52.2 29 14,516
SSH 52.2 11 14,527
SSH 52.2 12 14,539
SSH 52.2 5 14,543
SSH 52.2 6 14,550
SSH 52.2 16 14,566
SSH 52.3 19 14,585
SSH 52.3 6 14,591
SSH 52.3 9 14,600
SSH 52.3 7 14,607
SSH 52.4 3 14,610
SSH 52.4 17 14,626
SSH 52.5 16 14,643
SSH 52.5 16 14,658
SSH 52.6 15 14,674
SSH 52.8 18 14,692
SSH 52.9 14 14,706
SSH 52.9 26 14,732
SSH 52.9 16 14,747
SSH 53.1 18 14,765
SSH 53.2 16 14,781
SSH 53.2 11 14,792
SSH 53.2 15 14,807
SSH 53.3 16 14,823
SSH 53.3 7 14,829
SSH 53.3 227 15,056
SSH 53.4 20 15,076
SSH 53.4 15 15,091
SSH 53.5 18 15,109
SSH 53.6 143 15,252
SSH 53.6 135 15,387
Bag 53.6 84 15,471
SSH 53.8 20 15,491
SSH 53.8 20 15,512
SSH 53.8 20 15,532
SSH 53.8 15 15,547
SSH 53.8 15 15,562
SSH 53.9 20 15,582
SSH 53.9 15 15,597
SSH 53.9 83 15,680
SSH 53.9 15 15,694
SSH 53.9 4 15,698
SSH 54.0 21 15,719
Bag 54.0 74 15,794
SSH 54.1 100 15,894
SSH 54.1 6 15,900
SSH 54.1 19 15,919
SSH 54.2 111 16,030
SSH 54.2 22 16,052
SSH 54.2 14 16,066
SSH 54.2 8 16,074
SSH 54.3 7 16,081
SSH 54.3 94 16,175
LFG 54.4 5 16,180
LFG 54.4 5 16,185
LFG 54.4 5 16,190
LFG 54.4 5 16,195
SSH 54.5 14 16,210
SSH 54.6 23 16,232
SSH 54.6 95 16,328
Bag 54.6 84 16,412
SSH 54.6 252 16,664
SSH 54.6 3 16,668
SSH 54.7 4 16,672
LFG 54.7 4 16,676
LFG 54.7 4 16,681
LFG 54.7 4 16,685
LFG 54.7 4 16,690
SSH 54.8 13 16,703
LSH 54.8 69,180 85,883
SSH 54.9 23 85,906
SSH 54.9 8 85,914
SSH 54.9 24 85,938
SSH 54.9 13 85,950
SSH 55.0 25 85,975
SSH 55.0 25 86,000
SSH 55.0 25 86,026
SSH 55.2 9 86,035
SSH 55.3 26 86,061
SSH 55.3 26 86,087
SSH 55.3 9 86,096
SSH 55.4 8 86,104
Bag 55.5 84 86,188
SSH 55.5 14 86,202
Coal 55.6 28,539 114,741
SSH 55.6 14 114,755
SSH 55.7 78 114,833
SSH 55.8 76 114,909
SSH 55.9 6 114,915
SSH 55.9 75 114,990
SSH 56.0 280 115,271
SSH 56.0 54 115,325
SSH 56.0 74 115,398
SSH 56.0 126 115,524
SSH 56.0 3 115,527
LFG 56.0 5 115,532
LFG 56.0 5 115,537
LFG 56.0 5 115,542
LFG 56.0 5 115,546
SSH 56.1 56 115,603
SSH 56.4 5 115,608
SSH 56.5 51 115,659
Bag 56.6 68 115,727
SSH 56.7 28 115,755
Bag 56.7 74 115,829
SSH 56.9 8 115,837
SSH 57.0 13 115,850
SSH 57.0 13 115,863
SSH 57.0 17 115,879
SSH 57.0 28 115,908
SSH 57.1 29 115,936
Bag 57.1 84 116,020
SSH 57.2 315 116,336
SSH 57.3 42 116,378
Bag 57.3 84 116,462
SSH 57.4 56 116,518
SSH 57.5 42 116,560
SSH 57.7 3 116,563
SSH 57.7 29 116,592
SSH 57.8 18 116,609
SSH 57.8 5 116,614
SSH 57.9 29 116,643
SSH 58.0 15 116,659
SSH 58.0 28 116,687
SSH 58.0 126 116,813
SSH 58.0 12 116,825
SSH 58.0 13 116,837
Bag 58.2 84 116,922
Bag 58.2 74 116,996
LFG 58.3 5 117,001
LFG 58.3 5 117,006
LFG 58.3 5 117,012
LFG 58.3 5 117,017
SSH 58.4 9 117,026
Bag 58.6 74 117,100
SSH 58.6 12 117,112
SSH 58.8 7 117,119
LFG 58.9 5 117,123
LFG 58.9 5 117,128
LFG 58.9 5 117,133
LFG 58.9 5 117,138
SSH 58.9 11 117,148
SSH 58.9 8 117,156
SSH 59.1 52 117,208
SSH 59.1 3 117,211
SSH 59.1 10 117,221
Bag 59.2 84 117,305
SSH 59.2 11 117,316
LFG 59.3 4 117,321
LFG 59.3 4 117,325
LFG 59.3 4 117,330
LFG 59.3 4 117,334
Bag 59.3 68 117,402
SSH 59.5 11 117,413
SSH 59.6 11 117,424
SSH 59.6 5 117,429
Bag 59.8 84 117,513
SSH 59.8 10 117,523
SSH 59.9 6 117,529
SSH 60.0 32 117,561
LFG 60.0 4 117,565
LFG 60.0 4 117,569
LFG 60.0 4 117,573
LFG 60.0 4 117,577
SSH 60.3 11 117,588
SSH 60.3 23 117,611
SSH 60.4 13 117,624
SSH 60.4 21 117,646
SSH 60.4 24 117,670
SSH 60.5 8 117,678
SSH 60.6 10 117,688
SSH 60.7 52 117,740
SSH 60.7 18 117,758
SSH 60.7 7 117,765
Bag 60.8 84 117,849
SSH 60.8 34 117,883
SSH 60.8 22 117,905
SSH 60.8 10 117,915
SSH 60.9 41 117,956
Bag 60.9 74 118,030
SSH 61.0 16 118,046
Bag 61.0 74 118,120
Biog 61.1 46 118,166
Biog 61.1 46 118,212
Biog 61.1 46 118,257
Biog 61.1 46 118,303
Bag 61.1 68 118,371
Bag 61.2 68 118,439
Bag 61.3 74 118,513
SSH 61.4 39 118,552
SSH 61.5 33 118,585
SSH 61.5 10 118,595
Bag 61.5 58 118,653
Bag 61.6 84 118,737
SSH 61.7 210 118,947
SSH 61.8 29 118,977
SSH 61.8 10 118,986
Bag 61.9 84 119,071
SSH 61.9 9 119,080
SSH 62.0 9 119,089
SSH 62.1 18 119,107
SSH 62.2 9 119,117
LFG 62.4 4 119,121
LFG 62.4 4 119,125
LFG 62.4 4 119,130
LFG 62.4 4 119,134
SSH 62.4 9 119,143
SSH 62.4 34 119,178
SSH 62.4 36 119,214
SSH 62.4 5 119,219
SSH 62.5 24 119,243
SSH 62.7 4 119,248
Bag 62.7 74 119,322
SSH 62.8 38 119,360
SSH 63.0 9 119,369
SSH 63.0 9 119,378
SSH 63.1 58 119,436
LFG 63.2 5 119,440
LFG 63.2 5 119,445
LFG 63.2 5 119,450
LFG 63.2 5 119,455
SSH 63.5 9 119,464
Bag 63.5 84 119,548
SSH 63.7 9 119,557
Bag 63.7 74 119,631
SSH 63.8 58 119,689
Bag 63.9 68 119,757
Bag 63.9 68 119,825
Biog 63.9 42 119,867
Biog 63.9 42 119,909
Biog 63.9 42 119,951
Biog 63.9 42 119,993
SSH 64.0 5 119,998
SSH 64.0 256 120,255
SSH 64.1 49 120,304
SSH 64.2 10 120,314
Bag 64.2 68 120,382
Bag 64.3 58 120,440
SSH 64.3 8 120,448
Bag 64.3 84 120,532
SSH 64.5 4 120,537
SSH 64.5 252 120,789
Biom 64.5 78 120,866
SSH 64.5 7 120,873
SSH 64.6 96 120,969
SSH 64.7 8 120,977
SSH 64.8 9 120,986
SSH 64.9 9 120,995
SSH 64.9 8 121,003
SSH 64.9 5 121,008
SSH 64.9 22 121,030
SSH 64.9 8 121,038
SSH 64.9 8 121,047
SSH 65.0 8 121,055
Biom 65.0 78 121,132
LFG 65.0 4 121,136
LFG 65.0 4 121,140
LFG 65.0 4 121,145
LFG 65.0 4 121,149
Bag 65.2 74 121,223
SSH 65.2 35 121,258
SSH 65.2 158 121,416
SSH 65.2 127 121,543
SSH 65.3 55 121,598
Bag 65.3 84 121,683
Biom 65.3 78 121,760
SSH 65.5 7 121,767
SSH 65.5 8 121,774
Bag 65.5 74 121,849
SSH 65.5 4 121,853
SSH 65.5 8 121,861
WTE 65.5 10 121,870
WTE 65.5 10 121,880
WTE 65.5 10 121,889
WTE 65.5 10 121,899
Bag 65.5 74 121,973
SSH 65.6 8 121,981
SSH 65.6 8 121,989
SSH 65.7 5 121,994
SSH 65.7 27 122,021
Bag 65.7 68 122,089
Biom 65.9 78 122,167
SSH 65.9 105 122,272
SSH 66.0 8 122,279
Biog 66.0 40 122,319
Biog 66.0 40 122,359
Biog 66.0 40 122,399
Biog 66.0 40 122,439
Bag 66.1 58 122,497
Biom 66.1 78 122,574
SSH 66.3 68 122,642
Biom 66.6 78 122,720
Gas 66.7 25,047 147,767
Bag 66.9 58 147,825
LFG 66.9 4 147,829
LFG 66.9 4 147,834
LFG 66.9 4 147,838
LFG 66.9 4 147,843
Biom 67.0 78 147,920
Bag 67.0 68 147,988
SSH 67.2 8 147,996
SSH 67.2 8 148,004
SSH 67.2 8 148,011
SSH 67.2 8 148,019
SSH 67.2 8 148,027
SSH 67.2 8 148,034
SSH 67.2 4 148,038
Biom 67.2 78 148,116
Biom 67.5 78 148,193
SSH 67.6 8 148,201
SSH 67.6 8 148,208
Biom 67.7 78 148,286
SSH 67.8 68 148,354
SSH 67.9 7 148,361
Bag 67.9 74 148,435
Biom 68.0 78 148,513
Bag 68.0 84 148,597
SSH 68.1 7 148,604
SSH 68.1 7 148,611
SSH 68.2 7 148,618
Bag 68.3 74 148,693
LFG 68.4 4 148,697
LFG 68.4 4 148,701
LFG 68.4 4 148,705
LFG 68.4 4 148,709
Bag 68.4 68 148,777
Biom 68.5 78 148,854
SSH 68.6 7 148,861
Biom 68.6 68 148,930
SSH 68.6 3 148,933
Biom 68.8 78 149,010
SSH 68.8 7 149,017
Bag 68.8 68 149,085
Bag 68.8 58 149,143
SSH 68.8 13 149,156
Bag 68.8 68 149,224
SSH 68.9 7 149,230
SSH 68.9 7 149,237
Biom 69.1 68 149,306
Biom 69.3 78 149,383
Biom 69.4 68 149,452
Bag 69.6 58 149,510
Biom 69.6 78 149,587
SSH 69.7 6 149,593
SSH 69.7 3 149,596
Bag 69.7 74 149,671
Biog 69.8 36 149,707
Biog 69.8 36 149,743
Biog 69.8 36 149,780
Biog 69.8 36 149,816
Biom 70.0 68 149,885
SSH 70.1 6 149,891
SSH 70.1 20 149,911
Biom 70.1 78 149,988
SSH 70.2 10 149,998
Biom 70.4 68 150,066
Bag 70.5 58 150,124
SSH 70.5 16 150,140
SSH 70.6 6 150,147
SSH 70.7 196 150,343
SSH 70.8 6 150,349
Biom 70.9 68 150,417
SSH 71.0 6 150,424
SSH 71.2 6 150,430
Biom 71.3 68 150,498
Bag 71.4 58 150,556
Bag 71.5 68 150,624
SSH 71.5 29 150,653
Bag 71.6 68 150,720
Biom 71.6 68 150,789
Biom 71.8 68 150,857
SSH 71.8 6 150,863
Biom 72.0 62 150,926
SSH 72.1 5 150,931
Biom 72.1 68 150,999
SSH 72.4 6 151,005
SSH 72.4 6 151,010
Bag 72.5 74 151,085
Biom 72.5 68 151,153
Biom 72.5 62 151,216
Biom 72.8 62 151,278
SSH 72.9 6 151,284
Biom 73.0 68 151,352
SSH 73.1 3 151,355
SSH 73.1 6 151,360
SSH 73.1 39 151,399
SSH 73.2 3 151,402
SSH 73.2 64 151,466
SSH 73.2 5 151,472
SSH 73.2 5 151,477
Bag 73.2 58 151,535
SSH 73.3 3 151,538
Biom 73.4 62 151,600
Bag 73.4 68 151,668
LFG 73.4 4 151,672
LFG 73.4 4 151,676
LFG 73.4 4 151,680
LFG 73.4 4 151,685
Biom 73.4 68 151,753
SSH 73.7 14 151,767
SSH 73.7 5 151,772
SSH 73.7 5 151,778
Biom 74.0 68 151,846
Biom 74.0 62 151,908
SSH 74.1 14 151,922
Bag 74.2 58 151,980
WTE 74.2 8 151,989
WTE 74.2 8 151,997
WTE 74.2 8 152,005
WTE 74.2 8 152,014
Biom 74.3 68 152,082
SSH 74.3 5 152,087
Biom 74.5 62 152,150
SSH 74.6 5 152,155
Biom 74.8 68 152,224
Biom 74.8 62 152,286
SSH 74.9 5 152,291
SSH 75.0 5 152,296
Bag 75.0 58 152,354
SSH 75.2 40 152,393
SSH 75.2 42 152,435
SSH 75.2 4 152,439
Biom 75.3 62 152,501
Biom 75.4 62 152,564
Biog 75.4 46 152,610
Biog 75.4 46 152,655
Biog 75.4 46 152,701
Biog 75.4 46 152,747
SSH 75.4 3 152,750
SSH 75.4 4 152,754
SSH 75.4 5 152,759
SSH 75.4 5 152,764
SSH 75.6 3 152,767
SSH 75.8 5 152,772
SSH 75.8 5 152,777
Biom 75.8 62 152,839
Bag 75.9 58 152,897
SSH 76.0 5 152,902
Bag 76.1 68 152,969
Biom 76.2 62 153,032
SSH 76.3 7 153,039
SSH 76.4 8 153,046
SSH 76.4 5 153,051
SSH 76.6 5 153,056
Biom 76.7 62 153,118
SSH 77.2 4 153,122
Biom 77.3 62 153,185
SSH 77.6 4 153,189
Bag 77.8 58 153,247
Biom 77.8 62 153,310
Biom 78.2 62 153,372
Sew 78.2 2 153,374
Sew 78.2 2 153,376
Sew 78.2 2 153,378
Sew 78.2 2 153,380
SSH 78.2 79 153,460
SSH 78.2 4 153,464
SSH 78.3 4 153,468
SSH 78.5 4 153,472
Biom 78.5 53 153,526
SSH 78.5 4 153,530
Bag 78.6 58 153,588
Biom 78.7 62 153,650
SSH 78.7 4 153,654
Biom 79.0 53 153,708
SSH 79.1 4 153,711
SSH 79.2 4 153,715
Biog 79.3 42 153,758
Biog 79.3 42 153,800
Biog 79.3 42 153,842
Biog 79.3 42 153,884
Biom 79.4 53 153,938
SSH 79.8 4 153,942
Biom 79.9 53 153,995
SSH 80.3 2 153,997
SSH 80.3 4 154,001
SSH 80.4 4 154,005
Bag 80.4 58 154,063
SSH 80.5 4 154,066
SSH 80.7 85 154,152
Biom 80.8 53 154,205
SSH 81.2 4 154,209
Biom 81.4 53 154,262
WTE 81.4 8 154,270
WTE 81.4 8 154,277
WTE 81.4 8 154,285
WTE 81.4 8 154,293
SSH 81.5 4 154,296
SSH 81.5 4 154,300
Biom 81.7 53 154,353
SSH 81.8 26 154,379
SSH 82.1 3 154,382
Biom 82.2 53 154,436
Biog 82.4 40 154,476
Biog 82.4 40 154,516
Biog 82.4 40 154,555
Biog 82.4 40 154,595
Biom 82.4 53 154,649
SSH 82.4 4 154,653
SSH 82.5 3 154,656
SSH 82.8 3 154,659
SSH 82.8 238 154,898
Biom 82.9 53 154,951
SSH 83.0 3 154,954
Bag 83.1 58 155,012
Biom 83.3 53 155,065
Biom 83.8 53 155,119
SSH 83.8 3 155,122
SSH 84.2 3 155,124
SSH 84.2 98 155,222
SSH 84.2 3 155,225
SSH 84.3 2 155,228
SSH 84.6 32 155,260
Sew 84.7 2 155,262
Sew 84.7 2 155,264
Sew 84.7 2 155,266
Sew 84.7 2 155,268
Biom 84.7 53 155,321
Biog 84.9 46 155,367
Biog 84.9 46 155,412
Biog 84.9 46 155,458
Biog 84.9 46 155,504
Biom 85.3 53 155,557
SSH 85.5 3 155,560
Biom 85.6 53 155,614
SSH 85.7 3 155,616
SSH 85.9 3 155,619
SSH 86.0 15 155,634
Biom 86.1 53 155,687
SSH 86.7 3 155,690
SSH 86.8 4 155,694
SSH 87.2 3 155,696
SSH 87.2 97 155,793
SSH 87.4 3 155,796
SSH 87.4 2 155,798
Biog 87.7 36 155,835
Biog 87.7 36 155,871
Biog 87.7 36 155,907
Biog 87.7 36 155,944
SSH 87.7 5 155,949
SSH 87.9 3 155,952
SSH 88.1 3 155,954
SSH 88.6 4 155,958
SSH 88.7 3 155,961
SSH 88.8 3 155,964
Sew 88.9 2 155,966
Sew 88.9 2 155,968
Sew 88.9 2 155,970
Sew 88.9 2 155,972
SSH 88.9 3 155,975
SSH 89.0 3 155,977
SSH 89.2 12 155,989
SSH 89.4 2 155,992
SSH 89.6 2 155,994
Biog 89.6 42 156,036
Biog 89.6 42 156,079
Biog 89.6 42 156,121
Biog 89.6 42 156,163
Sew 89.7 2 156,165
Sew 89.7 2 156,167
Sew 89.7 2 156,169
Sew 89.7 2 156,170
SSH 89.9 5 156,176
SSH 90.0 2 156,178
SSH 90.0 2 156,181
SSH 90.1 3 156,183
SSH 90.5 4 156,187
SSH 91.1 2 156,189
SSH 91.2 2 156,192
SSH 91.2 2 156,194
SSH 91.5 2 156,196
SSH 91.9 13 156,209
SSH 91.9 2 156,211
SSH 92.0 2 156,214
SSH 92.2 2 156,216
SSH 92.5 2 156,218
SSH 92.6 2 156,220
SSH 92.8 2 156,222
SSH 92.9 3 156,225
Biog 93.3 40 156,265
Biog 93.3 40 156,305
Biog 93.3 40 156,345
Biog 93.3 40 156,385
SSH 93.3 3 156,387
SSH 93.6 2 156,389
SSH 93.7 2 156,391
SSH 93.7 2 156,393
SSH 93.7 3 156,396
SSH 93.8 3 156,399
SSH 93.9 3 156,402
WD 94.5 6 156,408
WD 94.5 6 156,415
WD 94.5 6 156,421
WD 94.5 6 156,427
WD 94.5 6 156,434
WD 94.5 6 156,440
WD 94.5 6 156,446
WD 94.5 6 156,453
WD 94.5 6 156,459
WD 94.5 6 156,466
WD 94.5 6 156,472
WD 94.5 6 156,478
WD 94.5 6 156,485
WD 94.5 6 156,491
WD 94.5 6 156,497
WD 94.5 6 156,504
SSH 94.8 2 156,506
SSH 95.1 2 156,508
WTE 95.2 7 156,514
WTE 95.2 7 156,521
WTE 95.2 7 156,528
WTE 95.2 7 156,534
SSH 95.2 2 156,536
SSH 95.4 2 156,538
SSH 95.7 2 156,540
SSH 95.9 2 156,542
SSH 95.9 2 156,544
Sew 96.0 2 156,546
Sew 96.0 2 156,548
Sew 96.0 2 156,550
Sew 96.0 2 156,553
SSH 96.1 2 156,555
Sew 96.3 2 156,557
Sew 96.3 2 156,559
Sew 96.3 2 156,560
Sew 96.3 2 156,562
SSH 96.5 2 156,564
SSH 96.7 273 156,837
WTE 96.9 10 156,847
WTE 96.9 10 156,856
WTE 96.9 10 156,866
WTE 96.9 10 156,875
SSH 97.4 2 156,877
SSH 97.6 2 156,880
SSH 97.6 2 156,881
SSH 97.8 2 156,883
SSH 97.8 3 156,886
SSH 98.1 2 156,888
SSH 98.2 3 156,891
SSH 98.3 2 156,893
SSH 98.3 2 156,894
Sew 98.3 2 156,896
Sew 98.3 2 156,898
Sew 98.3 2 156,899
Sew 98.3 2 156,901
SSH 98.8 6 156,907
Biog 99.1 46 156,952
Biog 99.1 46 156,998
Biog 99.1 46 157,044
Biog 99.1 46 157,090
SSH 99.1 2 157,091
SSH 99.2 2 157,093
SSH 99.3 3 157,096
SSH 99.4 2 157,098
SSH 99.4 2 157,100
SSH 99.6 2 157,102
Biog 99.6 36 157,138
Biog 99.6 36 157,175
Biog 99.6 36 157,211
Biog 99.6 36 157,247
SSH 99.7 2 157,249
SSH 100.5 2 157,251
SSH 100.5 49 157,299
WD 100.6 6 157,306
WD 100.6 6 157,312
WD 100.6 6 157,319
WD 100.6 6 157,325
WD 100.6 6 157,331
WD 100.6 6 157,338
WD 100.6 6 157,344
WD 100.6 6 157,350
WD 100.6 6 157,357
WD 100.6 6 157,363
WD 100.6 6 157,369
WD 100.6 6 157,376
WD 100.6 6 157,382
WD 100.6 6 157,389
WD 100.6 6 157,395
WD 100.6 6 157,401
SSH 101.0 105 157,506
SSH 101.1 25 157,531
SSH 101.8 2 157,533
SSH 101.9 2 157,534
Sew 101.9 2 157,536
Sew 101.9 2 157,538
Sew 101.9 2 157,540
Sew 101.9 2 157,542
SSH 102.1 3 157,545
SSH 102.2 2 157,546
SSH 102.3 2 157,548
WD 102.3 163 157,710
WD 102.3 163 157,873
WD 102.3 163 158,036
WD 102.3 163 158,198
WD 102.3 163 158,361
WD 102.3 163 158,524
WD 102.3 163 158,686
WD 102.3 163 158,849
WD 102.3 163 159,012
WD 102.3 163 159,174
WD 102.3 163 159,337
WD 102.3 163 159,499
WD 102.3 163 159,662
WD 102.3 163 159,825
WD 102.3 163 159,987
WD 102.3 163 160,150
SSH 102.4 2 160,152
SSH 102.6 6 160,157
SSH 103.3 2 160,159
SSH 103.8 2 160,160
Sew 104.0 2 160,162
Sew 104.0 2 160,164
Sew 104.0 2 160,166
Sew 104.0 2 160,168
SSH 104.1 3 160,171
SSH 104.4 3 160,174
SSH 104.5 1 160,175
SSH 104.6 2 160,177
SSH 104.6 1 160,179
WD 104.7 6 160,185
WD 104.7 6 160,192
WD 104.7 6 160,198
WD 104.7 6 160,204
WD 104.7 6 160,211
WD 104.7 6 160,217
WD 104.7 6 160,223
WD 104.7 6 160,230
WD 104.7 6 160,236
WD 104.7 6 160,242
WD 104.7 6 160,249
WD 104.7 6 160,255
WD 104.7 6 160,262
WD 104.7 6 160,268
WD 104.7 6 160,274
WD 104.7 6 160,281
SSH 104.9 1 160,282
SSH 105.0 43 160,325
Biog 105.0 42 160,368
Biog 105.0 42 160,410
Biog 105.0 42 160,452
Biog 105.0 42 160,494
SSH 105.4 1 160,496
SSH 105.6 1 160,497
SSH 105.7 1 160,499
SSH 105.7 3 160,502
SSH 106.6 1 160,503
Sew 106.7 2 160,505
Sew 106.7 2 160,507
Sew 106.7 2 160,510
Sew 106.7 2 160,512
SSH 106.9 1 160,513
SSH 107.0 1 160,514
SSH 107.9 1 160,516
WD 108.1 218 160,734
WD 108.1 218 160,952
WD 108.1 218 161,171
WD 108.1 218 161,389
WD 108.1 218 161,607
WD 108.1 218 161,826
WD 108.1 218 162,044
WD 108.1 218 162,262
WD 108.1 218 162,480
WD 108.1 218 162,699
WD 108.1 218 162,917
WD 108.1 218 163,135
WD 108.1 218 163,354
WD 108.1 218 163,572
WD 108.1 218 163,790
WD 108.1 218 164,009
SSH 108.6 3 164,012
SSH 108.6 1 164,013
WD 109.0 163 164,176
WD 109.0 163 164,338
WD 109.0 163 164,501
WD 109.0 163 164,664
WD 109.0 163 164,826
WD 109.0 163 164,989
WD 109.0 163 165,151
WD 109.0 163 165,314
WD 109.0 163 165,477
WD 109.0 163 165,639
WD 109.0 163 165,802
WD 109.0 163 165,965
WD 109.0 163 166,127
WD 109.0 163 166,290
WD 109.0 163 166,453
WD 109.0 163 166,615
SSH 109.2 6 166,621
SSH 109.2 1 166,622
SSH 109.2 1 166,623
SSH 109.4 1 166,624
Biog 109.6 40 166,664
Biog 109.6 40 166,704
Biog 109.6 40 166,744
Biog 109.6 40 166,784
SSH 109.7 1 166,785
WTE 109.8 8 166,794
WTE 109.8 8 166,802
WTE 109.8 8 166,810
WTE 109.8 8 166,819
SSH 109.9 1 166,820
SSH 109.9 1 166,821
SSH 110.0 3 166,824
Sew 110.1 2 166,826
Sew 110.1 2 166,828
Sew 110.1 2 166,830
Sew 110.1 2 166,832
SSH 110.5 1 166,833
SSH 110.7 1 166,834
SSH 110.9 1 166,835
WD 110.9 6 166,841
WD 110.9 6 166,848
WD 110.9 6 166,854
WD 110.9 6 166,860
WD 110.9 6 166,867
WD 110.9 6 166,873
WD 110.9 6 166,880
WD 110.9 6 166,886
WD 110.9 6 166,892
WD 110.9 6 166,899
WD 110.9 6 166,905
WD 110.9 6 166,911
WD 110.9 6 166,918
WD 110.9 6 166,924
WD 110.9 6 166,930
WD 110.9 6 166,937
SSH 111.4 2 166,939
Sew 111.8 2 166,941
Sew 111.8 2 166,942
Sew 111.8 2 166,944
Sew 111.8 2 166,946
SSH 112.3 1 166,947
SSH 112.7 1 166,948
SSH 112.8 2 166,950
SSH 113.1 1 166,951
WD 113.4 163 167,114
WD 113.4 163 167,276
WD 113.4 163 167,439
WD 113.4 163 167,602
WD 113.4 163 167,764
WD 113.4 163 167,927
WD 113.4 163 168,090
WD 113.4 163 168,252
WD 113.4 163 168,415
WD 113.4 163 168,578
WD 113.4 163 168,740
WD 113.4 163 168,903
WD 113.4 163 169,065
WD 113.4 163 169,228
WD 113.4 163 169,391
WD 113.4 163 169,553
SSH 115.2 6 169,559
WD 115.2 218 169,778
WD 115.2 218 169,996
WD 115.2 218 170,214
WD 115.2 218 170,433
WD 115.2 218 170,651
WD 115.2 218 170,869
WD 115.2 218 171,087
WD 115.2 218 171,306
WD 115.2 218 171,524
WD 115.2 218 171,742
WD 115.2 218 171,961
WD 115.2 218 172,179
WD 115.2 218 172,397
WD 115.2 218 172,616
WD 115.2 218 172,834
WD 115.2 218 173,052
Sew 115.6 2 173,054
Sew 115.6 2 173,056
Sew 115.6 2 173,058
Sew 115.6 2 173,060
SSH 115.6 1 173,061
SSH 115.7 4 173,065
SSH 116.2 2 173,067
SSH 116.4 1 173,068
SSH 117.1 1 173,069
SSH 117.3 3 173,072
Biog 117.5 36 173,109
Biog 117.5 36 173,145
Biog 117.5 36 173,182
Biog 117.5 36 173,218
WTE 117.9 10 173,227
WTE 117.9 10 173,237
WTE 117.9 10 173,247
WTE 117.9 10 173,256
SSH 118.7 1 173,257
SSH 118.9 1 173,258
SSH 118.9 1 173,259
SSH 119.5 6 173,265
SSH 119.6 5 173,270
WD 119.9 218 173,488
WD 119.9 218 173,707
WD 119.9 218 173,925
WD 119.9 218 174,143
WD 119.9 218 174,362
WD 119.9 218 174,580
WD 119.9 218 174,798
WD 119.9 218 175,016
WD 119.9 218 175,235
WD 119.9 218 175,453
WD 119.9 218 175,671
WD 119.9 218 175,890
WD 119.9 218 176,108
WD 119.9 218 176,326
WD 119.9 218 176,545
WD 119.9 218 176,763
WD 120.1 163 176,926
WD 120.1 163 177,088
WD 120.1 163 177,251
WD 120.1 163 177,413
WD 120.1 163 177,576
WD 120.1 163 177,739
WD 120.1 163 177,901
WD 120.1 163 178,064
WD 120.1 163 178,227
WD 120.1 163 178,389
WD 120.1 163 178,552
WD 120.1 163 178,714
WD 120.1 163 178,877
WD 120.1 163 179,040
WD 120.1 163 179,202
WD 120.1 163 179,365
WTE 120.4 8 179,373
WTE 120.4 8 179,380
WTE 120.4 8 179,388
WTE 120.4 8 179,396
SSH 120.6 1 179,397
SSH 120.6 1 179,397
SSH 120.6 1 179,398
Sew 120.8 2 179,400
Sew 120.8 2 179,402
Sew 120.8 2 179,403
Sew 120.8 2 179,405
SSH 120.8 4 179,409
SSH 120.9 2 179,411
SSH 121.6 1 179,412
SSH 121.8 126 179,538
Sew 122.4 2 179,540
Sew 122.4 2 179,542
Sew 122.4 2 179,543
Sew 122.4 2 179,545
SSH 122.9 2 179,547
SSH 124.8 1 179,548
SSH 125.4 3 179,551
SSH 126.6 1 179,552
WD 127.0 218 179,770
WD 127.0 218 179,988
WD 127.0 218 180,206
WD 127.0 218 180,425
WD 127.0 218 180,643
WD 127.0 218 180,861
WD 127.0 218 181,080
WD 127.0 218 181,298
WD 127.0 218 181,516
WD 127.0 218 181,735
WD 127.0 218 181,953
WD 127.0 218 182,171
WD 127.0 218 182,389
WD 127.0 218 182,608
WD 127.0 218 182,826
WD 127.0 218 183,044
SSH 127.2 1 183,045
SSH 127.8 1 183,046
SSH 128.1 1 183,047
SSH 128.3 5 183,052
SSH 130.7 1 183,053
SSH 131.1 1 183,054
SSH 131.1 0 183,054
SSH 131.5 0 183,055
SSH 131.8 1 183,056
SSH 133.2 0 183,056
WTE 133.5 8 183,065
WTE 133.5 8 183,073
WTE 133.5 8 183,082
WTE 133.5 8 183,090
Fuel 133.8 17,110 200,200
SSH 134.0 1 200,201
Sew 134.2 2 200,203
Sew 134.2 2 200,205
Sew 134.2 2 200,206
Sew 134.2 2 200,208
SSH 134.5 0 200,208
SSH 135.6 0 200,209
SSH 135.8 1 200,210
SSH 136.6 1 200,211
SSH 136.8 2 200,213
SSH 138.8 0 200,213
WTE 140.8 7 200,220
WTE 140.8 7 200,227
WTE 140.8 7 200,233
WTE 140.8 7 200,240
SSH 140.9 0 200,240
SSH 141.3 1 200,242
SSH 141.4 0 200,242
SSH 143.1 0 200,242
SSH 145.9 1 200,244
SSH 146.0 0 200,244
WTE 146.4 8 200,252
WTE 146.4 8 200,259
WTE 146.4 8 200,267
WTE 146.4 8 200,275
SSH 149.0 0 200,275
SSH 149.1 1 200,276
WTE 149.2 10 200,285
WTE 149.2 10 200,295
WTE 149.2 10 200,305
WTE 149.2 10 200,314
SSH 149.5 0 200,314
SSH 152.7 0 200,315
SSH 153.4 0 200,315
SSH 153.9 1 200,316
SSH 154.3 0 200,316
SSH 155.5 0 200,316
SSH 155.9 1 200,318
SSH 156.3 12 200,330
SSH 157.0 1 200,331
SSH 157.7 0 200,331
SSH 160.2 3 200,334
SSH 161.8 0 200,334
SSH 163.5 0 200,334
SSH 164.6 1 200,335
SSH 167.2 1 200,336
WTE 169.0 8 200,345
WTE 169.0 8 200,353
WTE 169.0 8 200,362
WTE 169.0 8 200,370
WTE 171.2 7 200,377
WTE 171.2 7 200,383
WTE 171.2 7 200,390
WTE 171.2 7 200,396
SSH 172.9 0 200,397
SSH 175.0 0 200,397
SSH 176.0 0 200,397
SSH 177.7 2 200,399
SSH 178.6 1 200,399
SSH 179.6 1 200,401
SSH 181.3 1 200,401
SSH 184.0 0 200,402
WTE 185.4 8 200,409
WTE 185.4 8 200,417
WTE 185.4 8 200,425
WTE 185.4 8 200,432
SSH 190.8 0 200,433
SSH 198.0 2 200,435
SSH 199.9 1 200,436
SSH 200.2 1 200,436
SSH 203.9 1 200,437
SSH 203.9 1 200,438
SSH 204.8 0 200,438
SSH 205.1 1 200,440
SSH 210.8 1 200,440
SSH 211.2 0 200,440
SSH 211.5 1 200,442
SSH 213.3 1 200,443
SSH 215.7 1 200,444
SSH 215.8 1 200,444
WTE 216.8 7 200,451
WTE 216.8 7 200,458
WTE 216.8 7 200,464
WTE 216.8 7 200,471
SSH 219.8 0 200,471
SSH 222.3 1 200,472
SSH 224.1 1 200,473
SSH 226.4 0 200,473
SSH 232.4 1 200,474
SSH 238.1 0 200,474
SSH 238.1 0 200,474
SSH 245.0 0 200,474
SSH 252.9 5 200,479
ST 272.3 14 200,493
ST 272.3 14 200,507
ST 272.3 14 200,521
ST 272.3 14 200,535
ST 282.6 14 200,548
ST 282.6 14 200,562
ST 282.6 14 200,575
ST 282.6 14 200,589
ST 289.9 13 200,602
ST 289.9 13 200,615
ST 289.9 13 200,628
ST 289.9 13 200,641
ST 301.6 13 200,654
ST 301.6 13 200,667
ST 301.6 13 200,679
ST 301.6 13 200,692
ST 314.9 14 200,706
ST 314.9 14 200,720
ST 314.9 14 200,734
ST 314.9 14 200,748
SSH 317.7 4 200,752
ST 326.8 14 200,766
ST 326.8 14 200,779
ST 326.8 14 200,793
ST 326.8 14 200,806
ST 335.2 13 200,820
ST 335.2 13 200,833
ST 335.2 13 200,846
ST 335.2 13 200,859
ST 343.3 14 200,873
ST 343.3 14 200,887
ST 343.3 14 200,901
ST 343.3 14 200,915
PV 343.5 74 200,989
PV 343.5 74 201,062
PV 343.5 74 201,136
PV 343.5 74 201,210
ST 348.8 13 201,222
ST 348.8 13 201,235
ST 348.8 13 201,247
ST 348.8 13 201,260
ST 356.3 14 201,274
ST 356.3 14 201,287
ST 356.3 14 201,301
ST 356.3 14 201,314
PV 356.4 71 201,385
PV 356.4 71 201,456
PV 356.4 71 201,527
PV 356.4 71 201,598
PV 360.4 74 201,671
PV 360.4 74 201,745
PV 360.4 74 201,819
PV 360.4 74 201,892
ST 365.5 13 201,905
ST 365.5 13 201,919
ST 365.5 13 201,932
ST 365.5 13 201,945
PV 365.7 69 202,014
PV 365.7 69 202,083
PV 365.7 69 202,152
PV 365.7 69 202,222
PV 371.7 74 202,295
PV 371.7 74 202,369
PV 371.7 74 202,442
PV 371.7 74 202,516
PV 374.0 71 202,587
PV 374.0 71 202,658
PV 374.0 71 202,729
PV 374.0 71 202,800
ST 380.2 13 202,812
ST 380.2 13 202,825
ST 380.2 13 202,838
ST 380.2 13 202,850
PV 380.4 66 202,917
PV 380.4 66 202,983
PV 380.4 66 203,050
PV 380.4 66 203,116
PV 383.7 69 203,185
PV 383.7 69 203,254
PV 383.7 69 203,324
PV 383.7 69 203,393
PV 385.8 71 203,464
PV 385.8 71 203,535
PV 385.8 71 203,606
PV 385.8 71 203,676
ST 385.9 14 203,690
ST 385.9 14 203,704
ST 385.9 14 203,718
ST 385.9 14 203,732
PV 388.7 74 203,806
PV 388.7 74 203,880
PV 388.7 74 203,953
PV 388.7 74 204,027
PV 395.7 69 204,096
PV 395.7 69 204,165
PV 395.7 69 204,234
PV 395.7 69 204,304
PV 399.2 66 204,370
PV 399.2 66 204,436
PV 399.2 66 204,503
PV 399.2 66 204,569
ST 400.5 14 204,583
ST 400.5 14 204,596
ST 400.5 14 204,610
ST 400.5 14 204,623
PV 403.4 71 204,694
PV 403.4 71 204,765
PV 403.4 71 204,836
PV 403.4 71 204,907
SSH 405.7 33 204,940
ST 410.8 13 204,953
ST 410.8 13 204,966
ST 410.8 13 204,979
ST 410.8 13 204,993
PV 411.7 66 205,059
PV 411.7 66 205,125
PV 411.7 66 205,192
PV 411.7 66 205,258
PV 413.8 69 205,328
PV 413.8 69 205,397
PV 413.8 69 205,466
PV 413.8 69 205,535
ST 427.4 13 205,548
ST 427.4 13 205,560
ST 427.4 13 205,573
ST 427.4 13 205,586
PV 430.5 66 205,652
PV 430.5 66 205,718
PV 430.5 66 205,785
PV 430.5 66 205,851
Curve 5 - Electricity Curve (Social)
Cost Generation Cum

SSH 43.0 45 45
SSH 43.0 42 87
SSH 43.0 35 122
SSH 43.0 35 157
SSH 43.0 169 326
SSH 43.0 185 511
SSH 43.0 84 595
SSH 43.0 224 819
SSH 45.0 80 900
SSH 45.2 107 1,007
SSH 45.2 77 1,083
SSH 45.6 186 1,269
SSH 46.2 57 1,326
SSH 47.2 196 1,522
LFG 47.7 5 1,528
LFG 47.7 5 1,533
LFG 47.7 5 1,538
LFG 47.7 5 1,543
SSH 49.1 29 1,572
SSH 49.1 22 1,594
SSH 49.1 17 1,611
SSH 49.1 12 1,623
SSH 49.1 34 1,656
SSH 49.1 31 1,688
SSH 49.1 5 1,693
SSH 49.1 25 1,717
SSH 49.1 25 1,742
SSH 49.1 15 1,757
SSH 49.1 7 1,764
SSH 49.1 22 1,786
SSH 49.1 20 1,807
SSH 49.1 34 1,840
SSH 49.1 15 1,855
SSH 49.1 14 1,869
SSH 49.1 14 1,883
SSH 49.1 14 1,897
SSH 49.1 6 1,902
SSH 49.1 4 1,906
SSH 49.1 5 1,911
SSH 49.1 12 1,923
SSH 49.1 12 1,935
SSH 49.1 11 1,946
SSH 49.1 11 1,956
SSH 49.1 10 1,967
SSH 49.1 5 1,972
SSH 49.1 12 1,984
SSH 49.1 4 1,988
SSH 49.1 10 1,997
SSH 49.1 8 2,005
SSH 49.1 8 2,013
SSH 49.1 8 2,020
SSH 49.1 8 2,028
SSH 49.1 7 2,034
SSH 49.1 6 2,041
SSH 49.1 34 2,075
SSH 49.1 4 2,078
SSH 49.1 2 2,081
SSH 50.1 7 2,087
SSH 50.1 59 2,146
Nuke 50.4 11,937 14,083
SSH 50.5 5 14,087
SSH 50.9 4 14,091
SSH 50.9 7 14,098
SSH 51.3 42 14,140
SSH 51.4 6 14,146
SSH 51.4 17 14,163
SSH 51.5 66 14,229
SSH 51.6 58 14,287
SSH 51.7 18 14,304
LFG 51.7 5 14,309
LFG 51.7 5 14,314
LFG 51.7 5 14,319
LFG 51.7 5 14,323
LFG 51.7 5 14,329
LFG 51.7 5 14,334
LFG 51.7 5 14,339
LFG 51.7 5 14,344
SSH 51.7 17 14,361
SSH 51.8 17 14,378
SSH 51.8 17 14,394
SSH 52.0 4 14,398
SSH 52.1 5 14,403
SSH 52.2 29 14,432
SSH 52.2 11 14,443
SSH 52.2 12 14,455
SSH 52.2 5 14,459
SSH 52.2 6 14,465
SSH 52.2 16 14,482
SSH 52.3 19 14,501
SSH 52.3 6 14,507
SSH 52.3 9 14,516
SSH 52.3 7 14,523
SSH 52.4 3 14,525
SSH 52.4 17 14,542
SSH 52.5 16 14,558
SSH 52.5 16 14,574
SSH 52.6 15 14,590
SSH 52.8 18 14,608
SSH 52.9 14 14,621
SSH 52.9 26 14,647
SSH 52.9 16 14,663
SSH 53.1 18 14,681
SSH 53.2 16 14,696
SSH 53.2 11 14,708
SSH 53.2 15 14,723
SSH 53.3 16 14,739
SSH 53.3 7 14,745
SSH 53.3 227 14,972
SSH 53.4 20 14,992
SSH 53.4 15 15,007
SSH 53.5 18 15,025
SSH 53.6 143 15,168
SSH 53.6 135 15,303
SSH 53.8 20 15,323
SSH 53.8 20 15,343
SSH 53.8 20 15,364
SSH 53.8 15 15,378
SSH 53.8 15 15,393
SSH 53.9 20 15,414
SSH 53.9 15 15,428
SSH 53.9 83 15,511
SSH 53.9 15 15,526
SSH 53.9 4 15,530
SSH 54.0 21 15,551
SSH 54.1 100 15,651
SSH 54.1 6 15,657
SSH 54.1 19 15,676
SSH 54.2 111 15,787
SSH 54.2 22 15,809
SSH 54.2 14 15,823
SSH 54.2 8 15,832
SSH 54.3 7 15,838
SSH 54.3 94 15,932
LFG 54.4 5 15,937
LFG 54.4 5 15,942
LFG 54.4 5 15,947
LFG 54.4 5 15,952
SSH 54.5 14 15,967
SSH 54.6 23 15,989
SSH 54.6 95 16,085
SSH 54.6 252 16,337
SSH 54.6 3 16,341
SSH 54.7 4 16,345
LFG 54.7 4 16,349
LFG 54.7 4 16,354
LFG 54.7 4 16,358
LFG 54.7 4 16,363
SSH 54.8 13 16,376
LSH 54.8 69,180 85,556
SSH 54.9 23 85,579
SSH 54.9 8 85,587
SSH 54.9 24 85,611
SSH 54.9 13 85,623
SSH 55.0 25 85,648
SSH 55.0 25 85,673
SSH 55.0 25 85,699
SSH 55.2 9 85,708
SSH 55.3 26 85,733
SSH 55.3 26 85,760
SSH 55.3 9 85,769
SSH 55.4 8 85,777
SSH 55.5 14 85,790
SSH 55.6 14 85,804
SSH 55.7 78 85,882
SSH 55.8 76 85,958
SSH 55.9 6 85,964
SSH 55.9 75 86,039
SSH 56.0 280 86,320
SSH 56.0 54 86,374
SSH 56.0 74 86,447
SSH 56.0 126 86,573
SSH 56.0 3 86,577
LFG 56.0 5 86,581
LFG 56.0 5 86,586
LFG 56.0 5 86,591
LFG 56.0 5 86,596
SSH 56.1 56 86,652
SSH 56.4 5 86,657
SSH 56.5 51 86,708
SSH 56.7 28 86,736
SSH 56.9 8 86,744
SSH 57.0 13 86,757
SSH 57.0 13 86,770
SSH 57.0 17 86,786
SSH 57.0 28 86,814
SSH 57.1 29 86,843
SSH 57.2 315 87,158
SSH 57.3 42 87,201
SSH 57.4 56 87,257
SSH 57.5 42 87,298
SSH 57.7 3 87,301
SSH 57.7 29 87,330
SSH 57.8 18 87,348
SSH 57.8 5 87,352
SSH 57.9 29 87,382
SSH 58.0 15 87,397
SSH 58.0 28 87,425
SSH 58.0 126 87,552
SSH 58.0 12 87,563
SSH 58.0 13 87,576
LFG 58.3 5 87,581
LFG 58.3 5 87,586
LFG 58.3 5 87,591
LFG 58.3 5 87,596
SSH 58.4 9 87,606
SSH 58.6 12 87,617
SSH 58.8 7 87,624
LFG 58.9 5 87,629
LFG 58.9 5 87,634
LFG 58.9 5 87,638
LFG 58.9 5 87,643
SSH 58.9 11 87,654
SSH 58.9 8 87,662
SSH 59.1 52 87,714
SSH 59.1 3 87,716
SSH 59.1 10 87,726
SSH 59.2 11 87,737
LFG 59.3 4 87,742
LFG 59.3 4 87,746
LFG 59.3 4 87,751
LFG 59.3 4 87,755
SSH 59.5 11 87,767
SSH 59.6 11 87,777
SSH 59.6 5 87,782
SSH 59.8 10 87,792
SSH 59.9 6 87,799
SSH 60.0 32 87,830
LFG 60.0 4 87,834
LFG 60.0 4 87,838
LFG 60.0 4 87,842
LFG 60.0 4 87,847
SSH 60.3 11 87,857
SSH 60.3 23 87,881
SSH 60.4 13 87,893
SSH 60.4 21 87,915
SSH 60.4 24 87,939
SSH 60.5 8 87,947
SSH 60.6 10 87,957
SSH 60.7 52 88,009
SSH 60.7 18 88,027
SSH 60.7 7 88,034
SSH 60.8 34 88,068
SSH 60.8 22 88,090
SSH 60.8 10 88,100
SSH 60.9 41 88,140
SSH 61.0 16 88,156
Biog 61.1 46 88,202
Biog 61.1 46 88,248
Biog 61.1 46 88,293
Biog 61.1 46 88,339
SSH 61.4 39 88,378
Bag 61.4 84 88,463
SSH 61.5 33 88,495
SSH 61.5 10 88,505
SSH 61.7 210 88,715
SSH 61.8 29 88,745
SSH 61.8 10 88,754
SSH 61.9 9 88,764
Bag 62.0 74 88,838
SSH 62.0 9 88,847
SSH 62.1 18 88,866
SSH 62.2 9 88,875
LFG 62.4 4 88,879
LFG 62.4 4 88,884
LFG 62.4 4 88,888
LFG 62.4 4 88,893
SSH 62.4 9 88,901
SSH 62.4 34 88,936
SSH 62.4 36 88,972
Bag 62.4 68 89,040
SSH 62.4 5 89,045
SSH 62.5 24 89,069
SSH 62.7 4 89,074
SSH 62.8 38 89,111
SSH 63.0 9 89,121
SSH 63.0 9 89,130
SSH 63.1 58 89,187
LFG 63.2 5 89,192
LFG 63.2 5 89,197
LFG 63.2 5 89,202
LFG 63.2 5 89,206
Bag 63.2 58 89,264
SSH 63.5 9 89,273
SSH 63.7 9 89,282
SSH 63.8 58 89,340
Biog 63.9 42 89,382
Biog 63.9 42 89,424
Biog 63.9 42 89,467
Biog 63.9 42 89,509
SSH 64.0 5 89,514
SSH 64.0 256 89,770
SSH 64.1 49 89,819
Bag 64.2 84 89,904
SSH 64.2 10 89,914
SSH 64.3 8 89,922
SSH 64.5 4 89,926
SSH 64.5 252 90,178
Biom 64.5 78 90,256
SSH 64.5 7 90,263
SSH 64.6 96 90,359
SSH 64.7 8 90,367
Bag 64.7 74 90,441
SSH 64.8 9 90,450
SSH 64.9 9 90,459
SSH 64.9 8 90,467
SSH 64.9 5 90,472
SSH 64.9 22 90,494
SSH 64.9 8 90,502
SSH 64.9 8 90,510
SSH 65.0 8 90,519
Biom 65.0 78 90,596
LFG 65.0 4 90,600
LFG 65.0 4 90,604
LFG 65.0 4 90,608
LFG 65.0 4 90,612
Bag 65.1 68 90,680
Bag 65.1 84 90,765
SSH 65.2 35 90,800
SSH 65.2 158 90,957
SSH 65.2 127 91,085
SSH 65.3 55 91,140
Biom 65.3 78 91,217
SSH 65.5 7 91,224
SSH 65.5 8 91,232
SSH 65.5 4 91,236
SSH 65.5 8 91,244
WTE 65.5 10 91,253
WTE 65.5 10 91,263
WTE 65.5 10 91,272
WTE 65.5 10 91,282
SSH 65.6 8 91,290
SSH 65.6 8 91,298
SSH 65.7 5 91,303
SSH 65.7 27 91,330
Biom 65.9 78 91,407
SSH 65.9 105 91,512
Bag 65.9 58 91,570
Bag 66.0 84 91,655
SSH 66.0 8 91,662
Biog 66.0 40 91,702
Biog 66.0 40 91,742
Biog 66.0 40 91,782
Biog 66.0 40 91,822
Biom 66.1 78 91,899
Bag 66.1 74 91,974
SSH 66.3 68 92,041
Bag 66.5 74 92,116
Biom 66.6 78 92,193
LFG 66.9 4 92,198
LFG 66.9 4 92,202
LFG 66.9 4 92,207
LFG 66.9 4 92,211
Bag 66.9 68 92,279
Biom 67.0 78 92,357
Bag 67.0 68 92,424
SSH 67.2 8 92,432
SSH 67.2 8 92,440
SSH 67.2 8 92,448
SSH 67.2 8 92,455
SSH 67.2 8 92,463
SSH 67.2 8 92,471
SSH 67.2 4 92,475
Biom 67.2 78 92,552
Biom 67.5 78 92,630
SSH 67.6 8 92,637
Bag 67.6 84 92,722
SSH 67.6 8 92,729
Biom 67.7 78 92,807
SSH 67.8 68 92,875
Bag 67.8 58 92,933
Bag 67.9 84 93,017
SSH 67.9 7 93,024
Biom 68.0 78 93,101
SSH 68.1 7 93,108
SSH 68.1 7 93,115
SSH 68.2 7 93,122
LFG 68.4 4 93,126
LFG 68.4 4 93,131
LFG 68.4 4 93,135
LFG 68.4 4 93,139
Biom 68.5 78 93,216
SSH 68.6 7 93,223
Biom 68.6 68 93,292
Bag 68.6 58 93,350
SSH 68.6 3 93,352
Bag 68.7 84 93,437
Biom 68.8 78 93,514
SSH 68.8 7 93,521
SSH 68.8 13 93,534
SSH 68.9 7 93,541
Bag 68.9 74 93,615
SSH 68.9 7 93,622
Bag 68.9 74 93,697
Biom 69.1 68 93,765
Bag 69.2 74 93,839
Biom 69.3 78 93,917
Biom 69.4 68 93,985
Biom 69.6 78 94,063
Bag 69.7 68 94,131
SSH 69.7 6 94,137
Bag 69.7 84 94,221
SSH 69.7 3 94,224
Bag 69.7 68 94,292
Biog 69.8 36 94,328
Biog 69.8 36 94,365
Biog 69.8 36 94,401
Biog 69.8 36 94,437
Biom 70.0 68 94,506
Bag 70.0 68 94,574
SSH 70.1 6 94,580
SSH 70.1 20 94,600
Biom 70.1 78 94,677
SSH 70.2 10 94,687
Bag 70.3 84 94,771
Biom 70.4 68 94,840
Bag 70.5 58 94,898
SSH 70.5 16 94,913
SSH 70.6 6 94,920
SSH 70.7 196 95,116
Bag 70.7 74 95,190
SSH 70.8 6 95,197
Biom 70.9 68 95,265
SSH 71.0 6 95,271
SSH 71.2 6 95,277
Biom 71.3 68 95,346
Bag 71.3 84 95,430
Bag 71.3 58 95,488
Bag 71.5 68 95,556
SSH 71.5 29 95,585
Biom 71.6 68 95,653
Bag 71.7 74 95,727
Biom 71.8 68 95,796
SSH 71.8 6 95,802
Biom 72.0 62 95,864
SSH 72.1 5 95,869
Biom 72.1 68 95,937
Bag 72.1 84 96,022
Bag 72.2 58 96,080
SSH 72.4 6 96,086
Bag 72.4 84 96,170
SSH 72.4 6 96,175
Biom 72.5 68 96,244
Biom 72.5 62 96,306
Bag 72.8 68 96,374
Biom 72.8 62 96,437
SSH 72.9 6 96,442
Biom 73.0 68 96,511
SSH 73.1 3 96,513
Bag 73.1 74 96,588
SSH 73.1 6 96,593
SSH 73.1 39 96,632
Bag 73.1 58 96,690
SSH 73.2 3 96,693
SSH 73.2 64 96,757
SSH 73.2 5 96,763
SSH 73.2 5 96,768
SSH 73.3 3 96,771
Biom 73.4 62 96,833
LFG 73.4 4 96,837
LFG 73.4 4 96,841
LFG 73.4 4 96,845
LFG 73.4 4 96,850
Bag 73.4 74 96,924
Biom 73.4 68 96,992
Bag 73.5 74 97,067
SSH 73.7 14 97,081
SSH 73.7 5 97,086
SSH 73.7 5 97,091
Biom 74.0 68 97,160
Biom 74.0 62 97,222
Bag 74.0 84 97,306
SSH 74.1 14 97,320
WTE 74.2 8 97,329
WTE 74.2 8 97,337
WTE 74.2 8 97,345
WTE 74.2 8 97,354
Bag 74.3 68 97,422
Biom 74.3 68 97,490
SSH 74.3 5 97,495
Biom 74.5 62 97,558
SSH 74.6 5 97,563
Bag 74.6 68 97,631
Bag 74.6 68 97,699
Biom 74.8 68 97,767
Biom 74.8 62 97,830
SSH 74.9 5 97,835
Bag 74.9 84 97,919
Bag 74.9 58 97,977
SSH 75.0 5 97,982
SSH 75.2 40 98,021
SSH 75.2 42 98,063
SSH 75.2 4 98,067
Biom 75.3 62 98,129
Biom 75.4 62 98,192
Biog 75.4 46 98,237
Biog 75.4 46 98,283
Biog 75.4 46 98,329
Biog 75.4 46 98,375
SSH 75.4 3 98,378
SSH 75.4 4 98,382
SSH 75.4 5 98,387
SSH 75.4 5 98,391
SSH 75.6 3 98,395
SSH 75.8 5 98,400
SSH 75.8 5 98,404
Biom 75.8 62 98,467
Bag 75.8 84 98,551
Bag 75.9 74 98,625
Bag 75.9 58 98,683
SSH 76.0 5 98,688
Biom 76.2 62 98,750
Bag 76.2 74 98,825
SSH 76.3 7 98,832
SSH 76.4 8 98,839
SSH 76.4 5 98,844
SSH 76.6 5 98,849
Biom 76.7 62 98,911
Bag 76.7 58 98,969
SSH 77.2 4 98,973
Biom 77.3 62 99,036
Bag 77.3 68 99,104
Bag 77.4 68 99,171
Bag 77.6 58 99,229
SSH 77.6 4 99,234
Bag 77.7 74 99,308
Biom 77.8 62 99,371
Biom 78.2 62 99,433
Sew 78.2 2 99,435
Sew 78.2 2 99,437
Sew 78.2 2 99,439
Sew 78.2 2 99,441
SSH 78.2 79 99,521
SSH 78.2 4 99,525
SSH 78.3 4 99,529
SSH 78.5 4 99,533
Biom 78.5 53 99,587
SSH 78.5 4 99,591
Bag 78.6 84 99,675
Biom 78.7 62 99,737
SSH 78.7 4 99,741
Biom 79.0 53 99,795
SSH 79.1 4 99,799
Bag 79.2 68 99,867
SSH 79.2 4 99,871
Biog 79.3 42 99,913
Biog 79.3 42 99,955
Biog 79.3 42 99,997
Biog 79.3 42 100,039
Biom 79.4 53 100,093
Bag 79.5 58 100,151
SSH 79.8 4 100,155
Biom 79.9 53 100,208
Bag 80.3 58 100,266
SSH 80.3 2 100,268
SSH 80.3 4 100,272
SSH 80.4 4 100,276
Bag 80.4 74 100,350
SSH 80.5 4 100,354
SSH 80.7 85 100,439
Biom 80.8 53 100,493
SSH 81.2 4 100,496
Biom 81.4 53 100,549
WTE 81.4 8 100,557
WTE 81.4 8 100,565
WTE 81.4 8 100,573
WTE 81.4 8 100,580
SSH 81.5 4 100,584
SSH 81.5 4 100,587
Biom 81.7 53 100,641
SSH 81.8 26 100,666
Bag 81.9 68 100,734
SSH 82.1 3 100,738
Bag 82.1 58 100,796
Biom 82.2 53 100,849
Biog 82.4 40 100,889
Biog 82.4 40 100,929
Biog 82.4 40 100,969
Biog 82.4 40 101,009
Biom 82.4 53 101,062
SSH 82.4 4 101,066
SSH 82.5 3 101,069
SSH 82.8 3 101,073
SSH 82.8 238 101,311
Biom 82.9 53 101,364
SSH 83.0 3 101,367
Biom 83.3 53 101,421
Biom 83.8 53 101,474
SSH 83.8 3 101,477
SSH 84.2 3 101,480
SSH 84.2 98 101,578
SSH 84.2 3 101,581
SSH 84.3 2 101,583
SSH 84.6 32 101,615
Sew 84.7 2 101,617
Sew 84.7 2 101,619
Sew 84.7 2 101,621
Sew 84.7 2 101,623
Biom 84.7 53 101,676
Bag 84.8 58 101,734
Biog 84.9 46 101,780
Biog 84.9 46 101,826
Biog 84.9 46 101,872
Biog 84.9 46 101,917
Biom 85.3 53 101,971
SSH 85.5 3 101,973
Biom 85.6 53 102,027
SSH 85.7 3 102,030
SSH 85.9 3 102,033
SSH 86.0 15 102,047
Biom 86.1 53 102,101
SSH 86.7 3 102,104
SSH 86.8 4 102,107
Coal 86.9 28,539 130,647
SSH 87.2 3 130,649
SSH 87.2 97 130,746
SSH 87.4 3 130,749
SSH 87.4 2 130,751
Biog 87.7 36 130,787
Biog 87.7 36 130,824
Biog 87.7 36 130,860
Biog 87.7 36 130,896
SSH 87.7 5 130,902
SSH 87.9 3 130,904
SSH 88.1 3 130,907
SSH 88.6 4 130,911
SSH 88.7 3 130,914
SSH 88.8 3 130,916
Sew 88.9 2 130,919
Sew 88.9 2 130,921
Sew 88.9 2 130,923
Sew 88.9 2 130,925
SSH 88.9 3 130,928
SSH 89.0 3 130,930
SSH 89.2 12 130,942
SSH 89.4 2 130,944
SSH 89.6 2 130,947
Biog 89.6 42 130,989
Biog 89.6 42 131,031
Biog 89.6 42 131,074
Biog 89.6 42 131,116
Sew 89.7 2 131,118
Sew 89.7 2 131,120
Sew 89.7 2 131,121
Sew 89.7 2 131,123
SSH 89.9 5 131,129
SSH 90.0 2 131,131
SSH 90.0 2 131,133
SSH 90.1 3 131,136
SSH 90.5 4 131,140
SSH 91.1 2 131,142
SSH 91.2 2 131,145
SSH 91.2 2 131,147
SSH 91.5 2 131,149
SSH 91.9 13 131,162
SSH 91.9 2 131,164
SSH 92.0 2 131,166
SSH 92.2 2 131,169
SSH 92.5 2 131,171
SSH 92.6 2 131,173
SSH 92.8 2 131,175
SSH 92.9 3 131,178
Biog 93.3 40 131,218
Biog 93.3 40 131,258
Biog 93.3 40 131,297
Biog 93.3 40 131,337
SSH 93.3 3 131,340
SSH 93.6 2 131,342
SSH 93.7 2 131,344
SSH 93.7 2 131,346
SSH 93.7 3 131,349
SSH 93.8 3 131,352
SSH 93.9 3 131,355
WD 94.5 6 131,361
WD 94.5 6 131,367
WD 94.5 6 131,374
WD 94.5 6 131,380
WD 94.5 6 131,386
WD 94.5 6 131,393
WD 94.5 6 131,399
WD 94.5 6 131,406
WD 94.5 6 131,412
WD 94.5 6 131,418
WD 94.5 6 131,425
WD 94.5 6 131,431
WD 94.5 6 131,437
WD 94.5 6 131,444
WD 94.5 6 131,450
WD 94.5 6 131,457
SSH 94.8 2 131,459
SSH 95.1 2 131,461
WTE 95.2 7 131,467
WTE 95.2 7 131,474
WTE 95.2 7 131,480
WTE 95.2 7 131,487
SSH 95.2 2 131,489
SSH 95.4 2 131,491
SSH 95.7 2 131,493
SSH 95.9 2 131,495
SSH 95.9 2 131,497
Sew 96.0 2 131,499
Sew 96.0 2 131,501
Sew 96.0 2 131,503
Sew 96.0 2 131,505
SSH 96.1 2 131,507
Sew 96.3 2 131,509
Sew 96.3 2 131,511
Sew 96.3 2 131,513
Sew 96.3 2 131,515
SSH 96.5 2 131,517
SSH 96.7 273 131,790
WTE 96.9 10 131,799
WTE 96.9 10 131,809
WTE 96.9 10 131,818
WTE 96.9 10 131,828
SSH 97.4 2 131,830
SSH 97.6 2 131,832
SSH 97.6 2 131,834
SSH 97.8 2 131,836
SSH 97.8 3 131,839
SSH 98.1 2 131,841
SSH 98.2 3 131,844
SSH 98.3 2 131,845
SSH 98.3 2 131,847
Sew 98.3 2 131,849
Sew 98.3 2 131,851
Sew 98.3 2 131,852
Sew 98.3 2 131,854
SSH 98.8 6 131,859
Biog 99.1 46 131,905
Biog 99.1 46 131,951
Biog 99.1 46 131,997
Biog 99.1 46 132,042
SSH 99.1 2 132,044
SSH 99.2 2 132,046
SSH 99.3 3 132,049
SSH 99.4 2 132,051
SSH 99.4 2 132,053
SSH 99.6 2 132,055
Biog 99.6 36 132,091
Biog 99.6 36 132,127
Biog 99.6 36 132,164
Biog 99.6 36 132,200
SSH 99.7 2 132,202
SSH 100.5 2 132,204
SSH 100.5 49 132,252
WD 100.6 6 132,259
WD 100.6 6 132,265
WD 100.6 6 132,271
WD 100.6 6 132,278
WD 100.6 6 132,284
WD 100.6 6 132,290
WD 100.6 6 132,297
WD 100.6 6 132,303
WD 100.6 6 132,310
WD 100.6 6 132,316
WD 100.6 6 132,322
WD 100.6 6 132,329
WD 100.6 6 132,335
WD 100.6 6 132,341
WD 100.6 6 132,348
WD 100.6 6 132,354
SSH 101.0 105 132,459
SSH 101.1 25 132,484
SSH 101.8 2 132,485
SSH 101.9 2 132,487
Sew 101.9 2 132,489
Sew 101.9 2 132,491
Sew 101.9 2 132,493
Sew 101.9 2 132,495
SSH 102.1 3 132,497
SSH 102.2 2 132,499
SSH 102.3 2 132,501
WD 102.3 163 132,663
WD 102.3 163 132,826
WD 102.3 163 132,988
WD 102.3 163 133,151
WD 102.3 163 133,314
WD 102.3 163 133,476
WD 102.3 163 133,639
WD 102.3 163 133,802
WD 102.3 163 133,964
WD 102.3 163 134,127
WD 102.3 163 134,290
WD 102.3 163 134,452
WD 102.3 163 134,615
WD 102.3 163 134,777
WD 102.3 163 134,940
WD 102.3 163 135,103
SSH 102.4 2 135,104
SSH 102.6 6 135,110
Gas 102.6 25,047 160,157
SSH 103.3 2 160,159
SSH 103.8 2 160,160
Sew 104.0 2 160,162
Sew 104.0 2 160,164
Sew 104.0 2 160,166
Sew 104.0 2 160,168
SSH 104.1 3 160,171
SSH 104.4 3 160,174
SSH 104.5 1 160,175
SSH 104.6 2 160,177
SSH 104.6 1 160,179
WD 104.7 6 160,185
WD 104.7 6 160,192
WD 104.7 6 160,198
WD 104.7 6 160,204
WD 104.7 6 160,211
WD 104.7 6 160,217
WD 104.7 6 160,223
WD 104.7 6 160,230
WD 104.7 6 160,236
WD 104.7 6 160,242
WD 104.7 6 160,249
WD 104.7 6 160,255
WD 104.7 6 160,262
WD 104.7 6 160,268
WD 104.7 6 160,274
WD 104.7 6 160,281
SSH 104.9 1 160,282
SSH 105.0 43 160,325
Biog 105.0 42 160,368
Biog 105.0 42 160,410
Biog 105.0 42 160,452
Biog 105.0 42 160,494
SSH 105.4 1 160,496
SSH 105.6 1 160,497
SSH 105.7 1 160,499
SSH 105.7 3 160,502
SSH 106.6 1 160,503
Sew 106.7 2 160,505
Sew 106.7 2 160,507
Sew 106.7 2 160,510
Sew 106.7 2 160,512
SSH 106.9 1 160,513
SSH 107.0 1 160,514
SSH 107.9 1 160,516
WD 108.1 218 160,734
WD 108.1 218 160,952
WD 108.1 218 161,171
WD 108.1 218 161,389
WD 108.1 218 161,607
WD 108.1 218 161,826
WD 108.1 218 162,044
WD 108.1 218 162,262
WD 108.1 218 162,480
WD 108.1 218 162,699
WD 108.1 218 162,917
WD 108.1 218 163,135
WD 108.1 218 163,354
WD 108.1 218 163,572
WD 108.1 218 163,790
WD 108.1 218 164,009
SSH 108.6 3 164,012
SSH 108.6 1 164,013
WD 109.0 163 164,176
WD 109.0 163 164,338
WD 109.0 163 164,501
WD 109.0 163 164,664
WD 109.0 163 164,826
WD 109.0 163 164,989
WD 109.0 163 165,151
WD 109.0 163 165,314
WD 109.0 163 165,477
WD 109.0 163 165,639
WD 109.0 163 165,802
WD 109.0 163 165,965
WD 109.0 163 166,127
WD 109.0 163 166,290
WD 109.0 163 166,453
WD 109.0 163 166,615
SSH 109.2 6 166,621
SSH 109.2 1 166,622
SSH 109.2 1 166,623
SSH 109.4 1 166,624
Biog 109.6 40 166,664
Biog 109.6 40 166,704
Biog 109.6 40 166,744
Biog 109.6 40 166,784
SSH 109.7 1 166,785
WTE 109.8 8 166,794
WTE 109.8 8 166,802
WTE 109.8 8 166,810
WTE 109.8 8 166,819
SSH 109.9 1 166,820
SSH 109.9 1 166,821
SSH 110.0 3 166,824
Sew 110.1 2 166,826
Sew 110.1 2 166,828
Sew 110.1 2 166,830
Sew 110.1 2 166,832
SSH 110.5 1 166,833
SSH 110.7 1 166,834
SSH 110.9 1 166,835
WD 110.9 6 166,841
WD 110.9 6 166,848
WD 110.9 6 166,854
WD 110.9 6 166,860
WD 110.9 6 166,867
WD 110.9 6 166,873
WD 110.9 6 166,880
WD 110.9 6 166,886
WD 110.9 6 166,892
WD 110.9 6 166,899
WD 110.9 6 166,905
WD 110.9 6 166,911
WD 110.9 6 166,918
WD 110.9 6 166,924
WD 110.9 6 166,930
WD 110.9 6 166,937
SSH 111.4 2 166,939
Sew 111.8 2 166,941
Sew 111.8 2 166,942
Sew 111.8 2 166,944
Sew 111.8 2 166,946
SSH 112.3 1 166,947
SSH 112.7 1 166,948
SSH 112.8 2 166,950
SSH 113.1 1 166,951
WD 113.4 163 167,114
WD 113.4 163 167,276
WD 113.4 163 167,439
WD 113.4 163 167,602
WD 113.4 163 167,764
WD 113.4 163 167,927
WD 113.4 163 168,090
WD 113.4 163 168,252
WD 113.4 163 168,415
WD 113.4 163 168,578
WD 113.4 163 168,740
WD 113.4 163 168,903
WD 113.4 163 169,065
WD 113.4 163 169,228
WD 113.4 163 169,391
WD 113.4 163 169,553
SSH 115.2 6 169,559
WD 115.2 218 169,778
WD 115.2 218 169,996
WD 115.2 218 170,214
WD 115.2 218 170,433
WD 115.2 218 170,651
WD 115.2 218 170,869
WD 115.2 218 171,087
WD 115.2 218 171,306
WD 115.2 218 171,524
WD 115.2 218 171,742
WD 115.2 218 171,961
WD 115.2 218 172,179
WD 115.2 218 172,397
WD 115.2 218 172,616
WD 115.2 218 172,834
WD 115.2 218 173,052
Sew 115.6 2 173,054
Sew 115.6 2 173,056
Sew 115.6 2 173,058
Sew 115.6 2 173,060
SSH 115.6 1 173,061
SSH 115.7 4 173,065
SSH 116.2 2 173,067
SSH 116.4 1 173,068
SSH 117.1 1 173,069
SSH 117.3 3 173,072
Biog 117.5 36 173,109
Biog 117.5 36 173,145
Biog 117.5 36 173,182
Biog 117.5 36 173,218
WTE 117.9 10 173,227
WTE 117.9 10 173,237
WTE 117.9 10 173,247
WTE 117.9 10 173,256
SSH 118.7 1 173,257
SSH 118.9 1 173,258
SSH 118.9 1 173,259
SSH 119.5 6 173,265
SSH 119.6 5 173,270
WD 119.9 218 173,488
WD 119.9 218 173,707
WD 119.9 218 173,925
WD 119.9 218 174,143
WD 119.9 218 174,362
WD 119.9 218 174,580
WD 119.9 218 174,798
WD 119.9 218 175,016
WD 119.9 218 175,235
WD 119.9 218 175,453
WD 119.9 218 175,671
WD 119.9 218 175,890
WD 119.9 218 176,108
WD 119.9 218 176,326
WD 119.9 218 176,545
WD 119.9 218 176,763
WD 120.1 163 176,926
WD 120.1 163 177,088
WD 120.1 163 177,251
WD 120.1 163 177,413
WD 120.1 163 177,576
WD 120.1 163 177,739
WD 120.1 163 177,901
WD 120.1 163 178,064
WD 120.1 163 178,227
WD 120.1 163 178,389
WD 120.1 163 178,552
WD 120.1 163 178,714
WD 120.1 163 178,877
WD 120.1 163 179,040
WD 120.1 163 179,202
WD 120.1 163 179,365
WTE 120.4 8 179,373
WTE 120.4 8 179,380
WTE 120.4 8 179,388
WTE 120.4 8 179,396
SSH 120.6 1 179,397
SSH 120.6 1 179,397
SSH 120.6 1 179,398
Sew 120.8 2 179,400
Sew 120.8 2 179,402
Sew 120.8 2 179,403
Sew 120.8 2 179,405
SSH 120.8 4 179,409
SSH 120.9 2 179,411
SSH 121.6 1 179,412
SSH 121.8 126 179,538
Sew 122.4 2 179,540
Sew 122.4 2 179,542
Sew 122.4 2 179,543
Sew 122.4 2 179,545
SSH 122.9 2 179,547
SSH 124.8 1 179,548
SSH 125.4 3 179,551
SSH 126.6 1 179,552
WD 127.0 218 179,770
WD 127.0 218 179,988
WD 127.0 218 180,206
WD 127.0 218 180,425
WD 127.0 218 180,643
WD 127.0 218 180,861
WD 127.0 218 181,080
WD 127.0 218 181,298
WD 127.0 218 181,516
WD 127.0 218 181,735
WD 127.0 218 181,953
WD 127.0 218 182,171
WD 127.0 218 182,389
WD 127.0 218 182,608
WD 127.0 218 182,826
WD 127.0 218 183,044
SSH 127.2 1 183,045
SSH 127.8 1 183,046
SSH 128.1 1 183,047
SSH 128.3 5 183,052
SSH 130.7 1 183,053
SSH 131.1 1 183,054
SSH 131.1 0 183,054
SSH 131.5 0 183,055
SSH 131.8 1 183,056
SSH 133.2 0 183,056
WTE 133.5 8 183,065
WTE 133.5 8 183,073
WTE 133.5 8 183,082
WTE 133.5 8 183,090
SSH 134.0 1 183,091
Sew 134.2 2 183,093
Sew 134.2 2 183,095
Sew 134.2 2 183,096
Sew 134.2 2 183,098
SSH 134.5 0 183,099
SSH 135.6 0 183,099
SSH 135.8 1 183,100
SSH 136.6 1 183,102
SSH 136.8 2 183,103
SSH 138.8 0 183,104
WTE 140.8 7 183,110
WTE 140.8 7 183,117
WTE 140.8 7 183,123
WTE 140.8 7 183,130
SSH 140.9 0 183,130
SSH 141.3 1 183,132
SSH 141.4 0 183,132
SSH 143.1 0 183,133
SSH 145.9 1 183,134
SSH 146.0 0 183,134
WTE 146.4 8 183,142
WTE 146.4 8 183,150
WTE 146.4 8 183,157
WTE 146.4 8 183,165
SSH 149.0 0 183,165
SSH 149.1 1 183,166
WTE 149.2 10 183,176
WTE 149.2 10 183,185
WTE 149.2 10 183,195
WTE 149.2 10 183,204
SSH 149.5 0 183,205
SSH 152.7 0 183,205
SSH 153.4 0 183,205
SSH 153.9 1 183,206
SSH 154.3 0 183,206
SSH 155.5 0 183,207
SSH 155.9 1 183,208
SSH 156.3 12 183,220
SSH 157.0 1 183,221
SSH 157.7 0 183,221
SSH 160.2 3 183,224
SSH 161.8 0 183,224
SSH 163.5 0 183,225
SSH 164.6 1 183,226
SSH 167.2 1 183,226
WTE 169.0 8 183,235
WTE 169.0 8 183,243
WTE 169.0 8 183,252
WTE 169.0 8 183,260
WTE 171.2 7 183,267
WTE 171.2 7 183,273
WTE 171.2 7 183,280
WTE 171.2 7 183,287
SSH 172.9 0 183,287
SSH 175.0 0 183,287
SSH 176.0 0 183,287
SSH 177.7 2 183,289
Fuel 178.2 17,110 200,399
SSH 178.6 1 200,399
SSH 179.6 1 200,401
SSH 181.3 1 200,401
SSH 184.0 0 200,402
WTE 185.4 8 200,409
WTE 185.4 8 200,417
WTE 185.4 8 200,425
WTE 185.4 8 200,432
SSH 190.8 0 200,433
SSH 198.0 2 200,435
SSH 199.9 1 200,436
SSH 200.2 1 200,436
SSH 203.9 1 200,437
SSH 203.9 1 200,438
SSH 204.8 0 200,438
SSH 205.1 1 200,440
SSH 210.8 1 200,440
SSH 211.2 0 200,440
SSH 211.5 1 200,442
SSH 213.3 1 200,443
SSH 215.7 1 200,444
SSH 215.8 1 200,444
WTE 216.8 7 200,451
WTE 216.8 7 200,458
WTE 216.8 7 200,464
WTE 216.8 7 200,471
SSH 219.8 0 200,471
SSH 222.3 1 200,472
SSH 224.1 1 200,473
SSH 226.4 0 200,473
SSH 232.4 1 200,474
SSH 238.1 0 200,474
SSH 238.1 0 200,474
SSH 245.0 0 200,474
SSH 252.9 5 200,479
ST 272.3 14 200,493
ST 272.3 14 200,507
ST 272.3 14 200,521
ST 272.3 14 200,535
ST 282.6 14 200,548
ST 282.6 14 200,562
ST 282.6 14 200,575
ST 282.6 14 200,589
ST 289.9 13 200,602
ST 289.9 13 200,615
ST 289.9 13 200,628
ST 289.9 13 200,641
ST 301.6 13 200,654
ST 301.6 13 200,667
ST 301.6 13 200,679
ST 301.6 13 200,692
ST 314.9 14 200,706
ST 314.9 14 200,720
ST 314.9 14 200,734
ST 314.9 14 200,748
SSH 317.7 4 200,752
ST 326.8 14 200,766
ST 326.8 14 200,779
ST 326.8 14 200,793
ST 326.8 14 200,806
ST 335.2 13 200,820
ST 335.2 13 200,833
ST 335.2 13 200,846
ST 335.2 13 200,859
ST 343.3 14 200,873
ST 343.3 14 200,887
ST 343.3 14 200,901
ST 343.3 14 200,915
PV 343.5 74 200,989
PV 343.5 74 201,062
PV 343.5 74 201,136
PV 343.5 74 201,210
ST 348.8 13 201,222
ST 348.8 13 201,235
ST 348.8 13 201,247
ST 348.8 13 201,260
ST 356.3 14 201,274
ST 356.3 14 201,287
ST 356.3 14 201,301
ST 356.3 14 201,314
PV 356.4 71 201,385
PV 356.4 71 201,456
PV 356.4 71 201,527
PV 356.4 71 201,598
PV 360.4 74 201,671
PV 360.4 74 201,745
PV 360.4 74 201,819
PV 360.4 74 201,892
ST 365.5 13 201,905
ST 365.5 13 201,919
ST 365.5 13 201,932
ST 365.5 13 201,945
PV 365.7 69 202,014
PV 365.7 69 202,083
PV 365.7 69 202,152
PV 365.7 69 202,222
PV 371.7 74 202,295
PV 371.7 74 202,369
PV 371.7 74 202,442
PV 371.7 74 202,516
PV 374.0 71 202,587
PV 374.0 71 202,658
PV 374.0 71 202,729
PV 374.0 71 202,800
ST 380.2 13 202,812
ST 380.2 13 202,825
ST 380.2 13 202,838
ST 380.2 13 202,850
PV 380.4 66 202,917
PV 380.4 66 202,983
PV 380.4 66 203,050
PV 380.4 66 203,116
PV 383.7 69 203,185
PV 383.7 69 203,254
PV 383.7 69 203,324
PV 383.7 69 203,393
PV 385.8 71 203,464
PV 385.8 71 203,535
PV 385.8 71 203,606
PV 385.8 71 203,676
ST 385.9 14 203,690
ST 385.9 14 203,704
ST 385.9 14 203,718
ST 385.9 14 203,732
PV 388.7 74 203,806
PV 388.7 74 203,880
PV 388.7 74 203,953
PV 388.7 74 204,027
PV 395.7 69 204,096
PV 395.7 69 204,165
PV 395.7 69 204,234
PV 395.7 69 204,304
PV 399.2 66 204,370
PV 399.2 66 204,436
PV 399.2 66 204,503
PV 399.2 66 204,569
ST 400.5 14 204,583
ST 400.5 14 204,596
ST 400.5 14 204,610
ST 400.5 14 204,623
PV 403.4 71 204,694
PV 403.4 71 204,765
PV 403.4 71 204,836
PV 403.4 71 204,907
SSH 405.7 33 204,940
ST 410.8 13 204,953
ST 410.8 13 204,966
ST 410.8 13 204,979
ST 410.8 13 204,993
PV 411.7 66 205,059
PV 411.7 66 205,125
PV 411.7 66 205,192
PV 411.7 66 205,258
PV 413.8 69 205,328
PV 413.8 69 205,397
PV 413.8 69 205,466
PV 413.8 69 205,535
ST 427.4 13 205,548
ST 427.4 13 205,560
ST 427.4 13 205,573
ST 427.4 13 205,586
PV 430.5 66 205,652
PV 430.5 66 205,718
PV 430.5 66 205,785
PV 430.5 66 205,851
Curve 6 - RES-E Curve (Private)
Cost Generation Cum

SSH 43.0 45 45
SSH 43.0 42 87
SSH 43.0 35 122
SSH 43.0 35 157
SSH 43.0 169 326
SSH 43.0 185 511
SSH 43.0 84 595
SSH 43.0 224 819
SSH 45.0 80 900
SSH 45.2 107 1,007
SSH 45.2 77 1,083
SSH 45.6 186 1,269
SSH 46.2 57 1,326
SSH 47.2 196 1,522
LFG 47.7 5 1,528
LFG 47.7 5 1,533
LFG 47.7 5 1,538
LFG 47.7 5 1,543
SSH 49.1 29 1,572
SSH 49.1 22 1,594
SSH 49.1 17 1,611
SSH 49.1 12 1,623
SSH 49.1 34 1,656
SSH 49.1 31 1,688
SSH 49.1 5 1,693
SSH 49.1 25 1,717
SSH 49.1 25 1,742
SSH 49.1 15 1,757
SSH 49.1 7 1,764
SSH 49.1 22 1,786
SSH 49.1 20 1,807
SSH 49.1 34 1,840
SSH 49.1 15 1,855
SSH 49.1 14 1,869
SSH 49.1 14 1,883
SSH 49.1 14 1,897
SSH 49.1 6 1,902
SSH 49.1 4 1,906
SSH 49.1 5 1,911
SSH 49.1 12 1,923
SSH 49.1 12 1,935
SSH 49.1 11 1,946
SSH 49.1 11 1,956
SSH 49.1 10 1,967
SSH 49.1 5 1,972
SSH 49.1 12 1,984
SSH 49.1 4 1,988
SSH 49.1 10 1,997
SSH 49.1 8 2,005
SSH 49.1 8 2,013
SSH 49.1 8 2,020
SSH 49.1 8 2,028
SSH 49.1 7 2,034
SSH 49.1 6 2,041
SSH 49.1 34 2,075
SSH 49.1 4 2,078
SSH 49.1 2 2,081
SSH 50.1 7 2,087
SSH 50.1 59 2,146
SSH 50.5 5 2,151
Bag 50.9 84 2,235
SSH 50.9 4 2,239
SSH 50.9 7 2,246
SSH 51.3 42 2,287
SSH 51.4 6 2,293
SSH 51.4 17 2,311
SSH 51.5 66 2,376
SSH 51.6 58 2,434
SSH 51.7 18 2,452
LFG 51.7 5 2,457
LFG 51.7 5 2,461
LFG 51.7 5 2,466
LFG 51.7 5 2,471
LFG 51.7 5 2,476
LFG 51.7 5 2,481
LFG 51.7 5 2,486
LFG 51.7 5 2,491
SSH 51.7 17 2,508
SSH 51.8 17 2,525
SSH 51.8 17 2,542
SSH 52.0 4 2,546
SSH 52.1 5 2,551
SSH 52.2 29 2,580
SSH 52.2 11 2,590
SSH 52.2 12 2,602
SSH 52.2 5 2,607
SSH 52.2 6 2,613
SSH 52.2 16 2,629
SSH 52.3 19 2,649
SSH 52.3 6 2,654
SSH 52.3 9 2,663
SSH 52.3 7 2,670
SSH 52.4 3 2,673
SSH 52.4 17 2,689
SSH 52.5 16 2,706
SSH 52.5 16 2,722
SSH 52.6 15 2,737
SSH 52.8 18 2,755
SSH 52.9 14 2,769
SSH 52.9 26 2,795
SSH 52.9 16 2,810
SSH 53.1 18 2,828
SSH 53.2 16 2,844
SSH 53.2 11 2,855
SSH 53.2 15 2,871
SSH 53.3 16 2,886
SSH 53.3 7 2,893
SSH 53.3 227 3,119
SSH 53.4 20 3,139
SSH 53.4 15 3,155
SSH 53.5 18 3,172
SSH 53.6 143 3,315
SSH 53.6 135 3,450
Bag 53.6 84 3,534
SSH 53.8 20 3,555
SSH 53.8 20 3,575
SSH 53.8 20 3,595
SSH 53.8 15 3,610
SSH 53.8 15 3,625
SSH 53.9 20 3,645
SSH 53.9 15 3,660
SSH 53.9 83 3,743
SSH 53.9 15 3,758
SSH 53.9 4 3,762
SSH 54.0 21 3,782
Bag 54.0 74 3,857
SSH 54.1 100 3,957
SSH 54.1 6 3,963
SSH 54.1 19 3,982
SSH 54.2 111 4,093
SSH 54.2 22 4,115
SSH 54.2 14 4,130
SSH 54.2 8 4,138
SSH 54.3 7 4,144
SSH 54.3 94 4,238
LFG 54.4 5 4,243
LFG 54.4 5 4,248
LFG 54.4 5 4,253
LFG 54.4 5 4,259
SSH 54.5 14 4,273
SSH 54.6 23 4,296
SSH 54.6 95 4,391
Bag 54.6 84 4,475
SSH 54.6 252 4,728
SSH 54.6 3 4,731
SSH 54.7 4 4,735
LFG 54.7 4 4,740
LFG 54.7 4 4,744
LFG 54.7 4 4,749
LFG 54.7 4 4,753
SSH 54.8 13 4,766
SSH 54.9 23 4,790
SSH 54.9 8 4,797
SSH 54.9 24 4,821
SSH 54.9 13 4,834
SSH 55.0 25 4,859
SSH 55.0 25 4,884
SSH 55.0 25 4,909
SSH 55.2 9 4,918
SSH 55.3 26 4,944
SSH 55.3 26 4,970
SSH 55.3 9 4,979
SSH 55.4 8 4,987
Bag 55.5 84 5,071
SSH 55.5 14 5,085
SSH 55.6 14 5,099
SSH 55.7 78 5,177
SSH 55.8 76 5,253
SSH 55.9 6 5,259
SSH 55.9 75 5,334
SSH 56.0 280 5,614
SSH 56.0 54 5,668
SSH 56.0 74 5,742
SSH 56.0 126 5,868
SSH 56.0 3 5,871
LFG 56.0 5 5,876
LFG 56.0 5 5,881
LFG 56.0 5 5,885
LFG 56.0 5 5,890
SSH 56.1 56 5,947
SSH 56.4 5 5,952
SSH 56.5 51 6,003
Bag 56.6 68 6,071
SSH 56.7 28 6,098
Bag 56.7 74 6,173
SSH 56.9 8 6,181
SSH 57.0 13 6,194
SSH 57.0 13 6,206
SSH 57.0 17 6,223
SSH 57.0 28 6,251
SSH 57.1 29 6,280
Bag 57.1 84 6,364
SSH 57.2 315 6,680
SSH 57.3 42 6,722
Bag 57.3 84 6,806
SSH 57.4 56 6,862
SSH 57.5 42 6,904
SSH 57.7 3 6,906
SSH 57.7 29 6,935
SSH 57.8 18 6,953
SSH 57.8 5 6,958
SSH 57.9 29 6,987
SSH 58.0 15 7,002
SSH 58.0 28 7,031
SSH 58.0 126 7,157
SSH 58.0 12 7,169
SSH 58.0 13 7,181
Bag 58.2 84 7,265
Bag 58.2 74 7,340
LFG 58.3 5 7,345
LFG 58.3 5 7,350
LFG 58.3 5 7,355
LFG 58.3 5 7,360
SSH 58.4 9 7,370
Bag 58.6 74 7,444
SSH 58.6 12 7,456
SSH 58.8 7 7,462
LFG 58.9 5 7,467
LFG 58.9 5 7,472
LFG 58.9 5 7,477
LFG 58.9 5 7,481
SSH 58.9 11 7,492
SSH 58.9 8 7,500
SSH 59.1 52 7,552
SSH 59.1 3 7,555
SSH 59.1 10 7,565
Bag 59.2 84 7,649
SSH 59.2 11 7,660
LFG 59.3 4 7,664
LFG 59.3 4 7,669
LFG 59.3 4 7,673
LFG 59.3 4 7,678
Bag 59.3 68 7,746
SSH 59.5 11 7,757
SSH 59.6 11 7,768
SSH 59.6 5 7,773
Bag 59.8 84 7,857
SSH 59.8 10 7,867
SSH 59.9 6 7,873
SSH 60.0 32 7,905
LFG 60.0 4 7,909
LFG 60.0 4 7,913
LFG 60.0 4 7,917
LFG 60.0 4 7,921
SSH 60.3 11 7,932
SSH 60.3 23 7,955
SSH 60.4 13 7,968
SSH 60.4 21 7,990
SSH 60.4 24 8,014
SSH 60.5 8 8,022
SSH 60.6 10 8,032
SSH 60.7 52 8,084
SSH 60.7 18 8,102
SSH 60.7 7 8,109
Bag 60.8 84 8,193
SSH 60.8 34 8,227
SSH 60.8 22 8,249
SSH 60.8 10 8,259
SSH 60.9 41 8,299
Bag 60.9 74 8,374
SSH 61.0 16 8,389
Bag 61.0 74 8,464
Biog 61.1 46 8,510
Biog 61.1 46 8,555
Biog 61.1 46 8,601
Biog 61.1 46 8,647
Bag 61.1 68 8,715
Bag 61.2 68 8,782
Bag 61.3 74 8,857
SSH 61.4 39 8,896
SSH 61.5 33 8,929
SSH 61.5 10 8,939
Bag 61.5 58 8,997
Bag 61.6 84 9,081
SSH 61.7 210 9,291
SSH 61.8 29 9,320
SSH 61.8 10 9,330
Bag 61.9 84 9,414
SSH 61.9 9 9,424
SSH 62.0 9 9,433
SSH 62.1 18 9,451
SSH 62.2 9 9,460
LFG 62.4 4 9,465
LFG 62.4 4 9,469
LFG 62.4 4 9,474
LFG 62.4 4 9,478
SSH 62.4 9 9,487
SSH 62.4 34 9,521
SSH 62.4 36 9,558
SSH 62.4 5 9,562
SSH 62.5 24 9,587
SSH 62.7 4 9,591
Bag 62.7 74 9,666
SSH 62.8 38 9,704
SSH 63.0 9 9,713
SSH 63.0 9 9,722
SSH 63.1 58 9,779
LFG 63.2 5 9,784
LFG 63.2 5 9,789
LFG 63.2 5 9,794
LFG 63.2 5 9,798
SSH 63.5 9 9,807
Bag 63.5 84 9,892
SSH 63.7 9 9,901
Bag 63.7 74 9,975
SSH 63.8 58 10,033
Bag 63.9 68 10,100
Bag 63.9 68 10,168
Biog 63.9 42 10,211
Biog 63.9 42 10,253
Biog 63.9 42 10,295
Biog 63.9 42 10,337
SSH 64.0 5 10,342
SSH 64.0 256 10,599
SSH 64.1 49 10,648
SSH 64.2 10 10,658
Bag 64.2 68 10,726
Bag 64.3 58 10,784
SSH 64.3 8 10,792
Bag 64.3 84 10,876
SSH 64.5 4 10,880
SSH 64.5 252 11,133
Biom 64.5 78 11,210
SSH 64.5 7 11,217
SSH 64.6 96 11,313
SSH 64.7 8 11,321
SSH 64.8 9 11,330
SSH 64.9 9 11,338
SSH 64.9 8 11,347
SSH 64.9 5 11,352
SSH 64.9 22 11,374
SSH 64.9 8 11,382
SSH 64.9 8 11,390
SSH 65.0 8 11,399
Biom 65.0 78 11,476
LFG 65.0 4 11,480
LFG 65.0 4 11,484
LFG 65.0 4 11,488
LFG 65.0 4 11,492
Bag 65.2 74 11,567
SSH 65.2 35 11,602
SSH 65.2 158 11,760
SSH 65.2 127 11,887
SSH 65.3 55 11,942
Bag 65.3 84 12,026
Biom 65.3 78 12,104
SSH 65.5 7 12,110
SSH 65.5 8 12,118
Bag 65.5 74 12,192
SSH 65.5 4 12,197
SSH 65.5 8 12,204
WTE 65.5 10 12,214
WTE 65.5 10 12,224
WTE 65.5 10 12,233
WTE 65.5 10 12,243
Bag 65.5 74 12,317
SSH 65.6 8 12,325
SSH 65.6 8 12,333
SSH 65.7 5 12,338
SSH 65.7 27 12,365
Bag 65.7 68 12,433
Biom 65.9 78 12,510
SSH 65.9 105 12,616
SSH 66.0 8 12,623
Biog 66.0 40 12,663
Biog 66.0 40 12,703
Biog 66.0 40 12,743
Biog 66.0 40 12,783
Bag 66.1 58 12,841
Biom 66.1 78 12,918
SSH 66.3 68 12,986
Biom 66.6 78 13,063
Bag 66.9 58 13,121
LFG 66.9 4 13,126
LFG 66.9 4 13,130
LFG 66.9 4 13,135
LFG 66.9 4 13,139
Biom 67.0 78 13,217
Bag 67.0 68 13,285
SSH 67.2 8 13,292
SSH 67.2 8 13,300
SSH 67.2 8 13,308
SSH 67.2 8 13,315
SSH 67.2 8 13,323
SSH 67.2 8 13,331
SSH 67.2 4 13,335
Biom 67.2 78 13,412
Biom 67.5 78 13,490
SSH 67.6 8 13,497
SSH 67.6 8 13,505
Biom 67.7 78 13,583
SSH 67.8 68 13,651
SSH 67.9 7 13,658
Bag 67.9 74 13,732
Biom 68.0 78 13,809
Bag 68.0 84 13,894
SSH 68.1 7 13,901
SSH 68.1 7 13,908
SSH 68.2 7 13,915
Bag 68.3 74 13,989
LFG 68.4 4 13,993
LFG 68.4 4 13,997
LFG 68.4 4 14,001
LFG 68.4 4 14,005
Bag 68.4 68 14,073
Biom 68.5 78 14,151
SSH 68.6 7 14,158
Biom 68.6 68 14,226
SSH 68.6 3 14,229
Biom 68.8 78 14,307
SSH 68.8 7 14,313
Bag 68.8 68 14,381
Bag 68.8 58 14,439
SSH 68.8 13 14,452
Bag 68.8 68 14,520
SSH 68.9 7 14,527
SSH 68.9 7 14,534
Biom 69.1 68 14,602
Biom 69.3 78 14,680
Biom 69.4 68 14,748
Bag 69.6 58 14,806
Biom 69.6 78 14,884
SSH 69.7 6 14,890
SSH 69.7 3 14,893
Bag 69.7 74 14,967
Biog 69.8 36 15,004
Biog 69.8 36 15,040
Biog 69.8 36 15,076
Biog 69.8 36 15,113
Biom 70.0 68 15,181
SSH 70.1 6 15,188
SSH 70.1 20 15,207
Biom 70.1 78 15,285
SSH 70.2 10 15,295
Biom 70.4 68 15,363
Bag 70.5 58 15,421
SSH 70.5 16 15,437
SSH 70.6 6 15,443
SSH 70.7 196 15,639
SSH 70.8 6 15,646
Biom 70.9 68 15,714
SSH 71.0 6 15,720
SSH 71.2 6 15,726
Biom 71.3 68 15,795
Bag 71.4 58 15,853
Bag 71.5 68 15,920
SSH 71.5 29 15,949
Bag 71.6 68 16,017
Biom 71.6 68 16,085
Biom 71.8 68 16,154
SSH 71.8 6 16,160
Biom 72.0 62 16,222
SSH 72.1 5 16,227
Biom 72.1 68 16,295
SSH 72.4 6 16,301
SSH 72.4 6 16,307
Bag 72.5 74 16,381
Biom 72.5 68 16,450
Biom 72.5 62 16,512
Biom 72.8 62 16,575
SSH 72.9 6 16,580
Biom 73.0 68 16,649
SSH 73.1 3 16,652
SSH 73.1 6 16,657
SSH 73.1 39 16,696
SSH 73.2 3 16,699
SSH 73.2 64 16,763
SSH 73.2 5 16,768
SSH 73.2 5 16,774
Bag 73.2 58 16,832
SSH 73.3 3 16,834
Biom 73.4 62 16,897
Bag 73.4 68 16,965
LFG 73.4 4 16,969
LFG 73.4 4 16,973
LFG 73.4 4 16,977
LFG 73.4 4 16,981
Biom 73.4 68 17,050
SSH 73.7 14 17,063
SSH 73.7 5 17,069
SSH 73.7 5 17,074
Biom 74.0 68 17,143
Biom 74.0 62 17,205
SSH 74.1 14 17,219
Bag 74.2 58 17,277
WTE 74.2 8 17,285
WTE 74.2 8 17,293
WTE 74.2 8 17,302
WTE 74.2 8 17,310
Biom 74.3 68 17,379
SSH 74.3 5 17,384
Biom 74.5 62 17,446
SSH 74.6 5 17,452
Biom 74.8 68 17,520
Biom 74.8 62 17,582
SSH 74.9 5 17,587
SSH 75.0 5 17,592
Bag 75.0 58 17,650
SSH 75.2 40 17,690
SSH 75.2 42 17,732
SSH 75.2 4 17,736
Biom 75.3 62 17,798
Biom 75.4 62 17,860
Biog 75.4 46 17,906
Biog 75.4 46 17,952
Biog 75.4 46 17,998
Biog 75.4 46 18,043
SSH 75.4 3 18,047
SSH 75.4 4 18,051
SSH 75.4 5 18,055
SSH 75.4 5 18,060
SSH 75.6 3 18,064
SSH 75.8 5 18,068
SSH 75.8 5 18,073
Biom 75.8 62 18,135
Bag 75.9 58 18,193
SSH 76.0 5 18,198
Bag 76.1 68 18,266
Biom 76.2 62 18,328
SSH 76.3 7 18,335
SSH 76.4 8 18,343
SSH 76.4 5 18,348
SSH 76.6 5 18,352
Biom 76.7 62 18,415
SSH 77.2 4 18,419
Biom 77.3 62 18,481
SSH 77.6 4 18,486
Bag 77.8 58 18,544
Biom 77.8 62 18,606
Biom 78.2 62 18,668
Sew 78.2 2 18,671
Sew 78.2 2 18,673
Sew 78.2 2 18,675
Sew 78.2 2 18,677
SSH 78.2 79 18,756
SSH 78.2 4 18,760
SSH 78.3 4 18,765
SSH 78.5 4 18,769
Biom 78.5 53 18,822
SSH 78.5 4 18,826
Bag 78.6 58 18,884
Biom 78.7 62 18,947
SSH 78.7 4 18,951
Biom 79.0 53 19,004
SSH 79.1 4 19,008
SSH 79.2 4 19,012
Biog 79.3 42 19,054
Biog 79.3 42 19,096
Biog 79.3 42 19,139
Biog 79.3 42 19,181
Biom 79.4 53 19,234
SSH 79.8 4 19,238
Biom 79.9 53 19,292
SSH 80.3 2 19,294
SSH 80.3 4 19,298
SSH 80.4 4 19,301
Bag 80.4 58 19,359
SSH 80.5 4 19,363
SSH 80.7 85 19,448
Biom 80.8 53 19,502
SSH 81.2 4 19,505
Biom 81.4 53 19,558
WTE 81.4 8 19,566
WTE 81.4 8 19,574
WTE 81.4 8 19,582
WTE 81.4 8 19,589
SSH 81.5 4 19,593
SSH 81.5 4 19,596
Biom 81.7 53 19,650
SSH 81.8 26 19,676
SSH 82.1 3 19,679
Biom 82.2 53 19,732
Biog 82.4 40 19,772
Biog 82.4 40 19,812
Biog 82.4 40 19,852
Biog 82.4 40 19,892
Biom 82.4 53 19,945
SSH 82.4 4 19,949
SSH 82.5 3 19,952
SSH 82.8 3 19,956
SSH 82.8 238 20,194
Biom 82.9 53 20,247
SSH 83.0 3 20,251
Bag 83.1 58 20,309
Biom 83.3 53 20,362
Biom 83.8 53 20,415
SSH 83.8 3 20,418
SSH 84.2 3 20,421
SSH 84.2 98 20,519
SSH 84.2 3 20,522
SSH 84.3 2 20,524
SSH 84.6 32 20,556
Sew 84.7 2 20,558
Sew 84.7 2 20,560
Sew 84.7 2 20,562
Sew 84.7 2 20,564
Biom 84.7 53 20,617
Biog 84.9 46 20,663
Biog 84.9 46 20,709
Biog 84.9 46 20,755
Biog 84.9 46 20,800
Biom 85.3 53 20,854
SSH 85.5 3 20,857
Biom 85.6 53 20,910
SSH 85.7 3 20,913
SSH 85.9 3 20,916
SSH 86.0 15 20,931
Biom 86.1 53 20,984
SSH 86.7 3 20,987
SSH 86.8 4 20,990
SSH 87.2 3 20,993
SSH 87.2 97 21,090
SSH 87.4 3 21,093
SSH 87.4 2 21,095
Biog 87.7 36 21,131
Biog 87.7 36 21,168
Biog 87.7 36 21,204
Biog 87.7 36 21,240
SSH 87.7 5 21,245
SSH 87.9 3 21,248
SSH 88.1 3 21,251
SSH 88.6 4 21,255
SSH 88.7 3 21,258
SSH 88.8 3 21,260
Sew 88.9 2 21,262
Sew 88.9 2 21,264
Sew 88.9 2 21,267
Sew 88.9 2 21,269
SSH 88.9 3 21,271
SSH 89.0 3 21,274
SSH 89.2 12 21,286
SSH 89.4 2 21,288
SSH 89.6 2 21,291
Biog 89.6 42 21,333
Biog 89.6 42 21,375
Biog 89.6 42 21,417
Biog 89.6 42 21,460
Sew 89.7 2 21,461
Sew 89.7 2 21,463
Sew 89.7 2 21,465
Sew 89.7 2 21,467
SSH 89.9 5 21,472
SSH 90.0 2 21,475
SSH 90.0 2 21,477
SSH 90.1 3 21,480
SSH 90.5 4 21,484
SSH 91.1 2 21,486
SSH 91.2 2 21,488
SSH 91.2 2 21,491
SSH 91.5 2 21,493
SSH 91.9 13 21,506
SSH 91.9 2 21,508
SSH 92.0 2 21,510
SSH 92.2 2 21,512
SSH 92.5 2 21,515
SSH 92.6 2 21,517
SSH 92.8 2 21,519
SSH 92.9 3 21,522
Biog 93.3 40 21,561
Biog 93.3 40 21,601
Biog 93.3 40 21,641
Biog 93.3 40 21,681
SSH 93.3 3 21,684
SSH 93.6 2 21,686
SSH 93.7 2 21,688
SSH 93.7 2 21,690
SSH 93.7 3 21,693
SSH 93.8 3 21,696
SSH 93.9 3 21,698
WD 94.5 6 21,705
WD 94.5 6 21,711
WD 94.5 6 21,717
WD 94.5 6 21,724
WD 94.5 6 21,730
WD 94.5 6 21,737
WD 94.5 6 21,743
WD 94.5 6 21,749
WD 94.5 6 21,756
WD 94.5 6 21,762
WD 94.5 6 21,768
WD 94.5 6 21,775
WD 94.5 6 21,781
WD 94.5 6 21,788
WD 94.5 6 21,794
WD 94.5 6 21,800
SSH 94.8 2 21,802
SSH 95.1 2 21,804
WTE 95.2 7 21,811
WTE 95.2 7 21,818
WTE 95.2 7 21,824
WTE 95.2 7 21,831
SSH 95.2 2 21,833
SSH 95.4 2 21,835
SSH 95.7 2 21,837
SSH 95.9 2 21,839
SSH 95.9 2 21,841
Sew 96.0 2 21,843
Sew 96.0 2 21,845
Sew 96.0 2 21,847
Sew 96.0 2 21,849
SSH 96.1 2 21,851
Sew 96.3 2 21,853
Sew 96.3 2 21,855
Sew 96.3 2 21,857
Sew 96.3 2 21,859
SSH 96.5 2 21,861
SSH 96.7 273 22,134
WTE 96.9 10 22,143
WTE 96.9 10 22,153
WTE 96.9 10 22,162
WTE 96.9 10 22,172
SSH 97.4 2 22,174
SSH 97.6 2 22,176
SSH 97.6 2 22,178
SSH 97.8 2 22,180
SSH 97.8 3 22,183
SSH 98.1 2 22,185
SSH 98.2 3 22,187
SSH 98.3 2 22,189
SSH 98.3 2 22,191
Sew 98.3 2 22,193
Sew 98.3 2 22,194
Sew 98.3 2 22,196
Sew 98.3 2 22,198
SSH 98.8 6 22,203
Biog 99.1 46 22,249
Biog 99.1 46 22,295
Biog 99.1 46 22,340
Biog 99.1 46 22,386
SSH 99.1 2 22,388
SSH 99.2 2 22,390
SSH 99.3 3 22,393
SSH 99.4 2 22,395
SSH 99.4 2 22,396
SSH 99.6 2 22,398
Biog 99.6 36 22,435
Biog 99.6 36 22,471
Biog 99.6 36 22,508
Biog 99.6 36 22,544
SSH 99.7 2 22,546
SSH 100.5 2 22,547
SSH 100.5 49 22,596
WD 100.6 6 22,602
WD 100.6 6 22,609
WD 100.6 6 22,615
WD 100.6 6 22,621
WD 100.6 6 22,628
WD 100.6 6 22,634
WD 100.6 6 22,641
WD 100.6 6 22,647
WD 100.6 6 22,653
WD 100.6 6 22,660
WD 100.6 6 22,666
WD 100.6 6 22,672
WD 100.6 6 22,679
WD 100.6 6 22,685
WD 100.6 6 22,691
WD 100.6 6 22,698
SSH 101.0 105 22,803
SSH 101.1 25 22,828
SSH 101.8 2 22,829
SSH 101.9 2 22,831
Sew 101.9 2 22,833
Sew 101.9 2 22,835
Sew 101.9 2 22,836
Sew 101.9 2 22,838
SSH 102.1 3 22,841
SSH 102.2 2 22,843
SSH 102.3 2 22,844
WD 102.3 163 23,007
WD 102.3 163 23,170
WD 102.3 163 23,332
WD 102.3 163 23,495
WD 102.3 163 23,657
WD 102.3 163 23,820
WD 102.3 163 23,983
WD 102.3 163 24,145
WD 102.3 163 24,308
WD 102.3 163 24,471
WD 102.3 163 24,633
WD 102.3 163 24,796
WD 102.3 163 24,959
WD 102.3 163 25,121
WD 102.3 163 25,284
WD 102.3 163 25,446
SSH 102.4 2 25,448
SSH 102.6 6 25,454
SSH 103.3 2 25,455
SSH 103.8 2 25,457
Sew 104.0 2 25,459
Sew 104.0 2 25,461
Sew 104.0 2 25,463
Sew 104.0 2 25,465
SSH 104.1 3 25,468
SSH 104.4 3 25,470
SSH 104.5 1 25,472
SSH 104.6 2 25,474
SSH 104.6 1 25,475
WD 104.7 6 25,482
WD 104.7 6 25,488
WD 104.7 6 25,494
WD 104.7 6 25,501
WD 104.7 6 25,507
WD 104.7 6 25,514
WD 104.7 6 25,520
WD 104.7 6 25,526
WD 104.7 6 25,533
WD 104.7 6 25,539
WD 104.7 6 25,545
WD 104.7 6 25,552
WD 104.7 6 25,558
WD 104.7 6 25,565
WD 104.7 6 25,571
WD 104.7 6 25,577
SSH 104.9 1 25,579
SSH 105.0 43 25,622
Biog 105.0 42 25,664
Biog 105.0 42 25,706
Biog 105.0 42 25,749
Biog 105.0 42 25,791
SSH 105.4 1 25,792
SSH 105.6 1 25,794
SSH 105.7 1 25,795
SSH 105.7 3 25,798
SSH 106.6 1 25,800
Sew 106.7 2 25,802
Sew 106.7 2 25,804
Sew 106.7 2 25,806
Sew 106.7 2 25,808
SSH 106.9 1 25,810
SSH 107.0 1 25,811
SSH 107.9 1 25,812
WD 108.1 218 26,031
WD 108.1 218 26,249
WD 108.1 218 26,467
WD 108.1 218 26,686
WD 108.1 218 26,904
WD 108.1 218 27,122
WD 108.1 218 27,340
WD 108.1 218 27,559
WD 108.1 218 27,777
WD 108.1 218 27,995
WD 108.1 218 28,214
WD 108.1 218 28,432
WD 108.1 218 28,650
WD 108.1 218 28,869
WD 108.1 218 29,087
WD 108.1 218 29,305
SSH 108.6 3 29,308
SSH 108.6 1 29,310
WD 109.0 163 29,472
WD 109.0 163 29,635
WD 109.0 163 29,797
WD 109.0 163 29,960
WD 109.0 163 30,123
WD 109.0 163 30,285
WD 109.0 163 30,448
WD 109.0 163 30,611
WD 109.0 163 30,773
WD 109.0 163 30,936
WD 109.0 163 31,099
WD 109.0 163 31,261
WD 109.0 163 31,424
WD 109.0 163 31,586
WD 109.0 163 31,749
WD 109.0 163 31,912
SSH 109.2 6 31,917
SSH 109.2 1 31,919
SSH 109.2 1 31,920
SSH 109.4 1 31,921
Biog 109.6 40 31,961
Biog 109.6 40 32,001
Biog 109.6 40 32,041
Biog 109.6 40 32,080
SSH 109.7 1 32,082
WTE 109.8 8 32,090
WTE 109.8 8 32,099
WTE 109.8 8 32,107
WTE 109.8 8 32,115
SSH 109.9 1 32,117
SSH 109.9 1 32,118
SSH 110.0 3 32,121
Sew 110.1 2 32,123
Sew 110.1 2 32,124
Sew 110.1 2 32,126
Sew 110.1 2 32,128
SSH 110.5 1 32,129
SSH 110.7 1 32,130
SSH 110.9 1 32,131
WD 110.9 6 32,138
WD 110.9 6 32,144
WD 110.9 6 32,151
WD 110.9 6 32,157
WD 110.9 6 32,163
WD 110.9 6 32,170
WD 110.9 6 32,176
WD 110.9 6 32,182
WD 110.9 6 32,189
WD 110.9 6 32,195
WD 110.9 6 32,202
WD 110.9 6 32,208
WD 110.9 6 32,214
WD 110.9 6 32,221
WD 110.9 6 32,227
WD 110.9 6 32,233
SSH 111.4 2 32,236
Sew 111.8 2 32,237
Sew 111.8 2 32,239
Sew 111.8 2 32,241
Sew 111.8 2 32,242
SSH 112.3 1 32,243
SSH 112.7 1 32,244
SSH 112.8 2 32,247
SSH 113.1 1 32,248
WD 113.4 163 32,410
WD 113.4 163 32,573
WD 113.4 163 32,736
WD 113.4 163 32,898
WD 113.4 163 33,061
WD 113.4 163 33,224
WD 113.4 163 33,386
WD 113.4 163 33,549
WD 113.4 163 33,711
WD 113.4 163 33,874
WD 113.4 163 34,037
WD 113.4 163 34,199
WD 113.4 163 34,362
WD 113.4 163 34,525
WD 113.4 163 34,687
WD 113.4 163 34,850
SSH 115.2 6 34,856
WD 115.2 218 35,074
WD 115.2 218 35,292
WD 115.2 218 35,511
WD 115.2 218 35,729
WD 115.2 218 35,947
WD 115.2 218 36,166
WD 115.2 218 36,384
WD 115.2 218 36,602
WD 115.2 218 36,821
WD 115.2 218 37,039
WD 115.2 218 37,257
WD 115.2 218 37,475
WD 115.2 218 37,694
WD 115.2 218 37,912
WD 115.2 218 38,130
WD 115.2 218 38,349
Sew 115.6 2 38,351
Sew 115.6 2 38,353
Sew 115.6 2 38,355
Sew 115.6 2 38,357
SSH 115.6 1 38,358
SSH 115.7 4 38,362
SSH 116.2 2 38,364
SSH 116.4 1 38,365
SSH 117.1 1 38,366
SSH 117.3 3 38,369
Biog 117.5 36 38,405
Biog 117.5 36 38,442
Biog 117.5 36 38,478
Biog 117.5 36 38,514
WTE 117.9 10 38,524
WTE 117.9 10 38,534
WTE 117.9 10 38,543
WTE 117.9 10 38,553
SSH 118.7 1 38,554
SSH 118.9 1 38,555
SSH 118.9 1 38,555
SSH 119.5 6 38,561
SSH 119.6 5 38,567
WD 119.9 218 38,785
WD 119.9 218 39,003
WD 119.9 218 39,221
WD 119.9 218 39,440
WD 119.9 218 39,658
WD 119.9 218 39,876
WD 119.9 218 40,095
WD 119.9 218 40,313
WD 119.9 218 40,531
WD 119.9 218 40,750
WD 119.9 218 40,968
WD 119.9 218 41,186
WD 119.9 218 41,405
WD 119.9 218 41,623
WD 119.9 218 41,841
WD 119.9 218 42,059
WD 120.1 163 42,222
WD 120.1 163 42,385
WD 120.1 163 42,547
WD 120.1 163 42,710
WD 120.1 163 42,873
WD 120.1 163 43,035
WD 120.1 163 43,198
WD 120.1 163 43,360
WD 120.1 163 43,523
WD 120.1 163 43,686
WD 120.1 163 43,848
WD 120.1 163 44,011
WD 120.1 163 44,174
WD 120.1 163 44,336
WD 120.1 163 44,499
WD 120.1 163 44,662
WTE 120.4 8 44,669
WTE 120.4 8 44,677
WTE 120.4 8 44,685
WTE 120.4 8 44,692
SSH 120.6 1 44,693
SSH 120.6 1 44,694
SSH 120.6 1 44,695
Sew 120.8 2 44,697
Sew 120.8 2 44,698
Sew 120.8 2 44,700
Sew 120.8 2 44,702
SSH 120.8 4 44,706
SSH 120.9 2 44,708
SSH 121.6 1 44,708
SSH 121.8 126 44,834
Sew 122.4 2 44,836
Sew 122.4 2 44,838
Sew 122.4 2 44,840
Sew 122.4 2 44,842
SSH 122.9 2 44,844
SSH 124.8 1 44,844
SSH 125.4 3 44,847
SSH 126.6 1 44,848
WD 127.0 218 45,066
WD 127.0 218 45,285
WD 127.0 218 45,503
WD 127.0 218 45,721
WD 127.0 218 45,940
WD 127.0 218 46,158
WD 127.0 218 46,376
WD 127.0 218 46,594
WD 127.0 218 46,813
WD 127.0 218 47,031
WD 127.0 218 47,249
WD 127.0 218 47,468
WD 127.0 218 47,686
WD 127.0 218 47,904
WD 127.0 218 48,123
WD 127.0 218 48,341
SSH 127.2 1 48,342
SSH 127.8 1 48,342
SSH 128.1 1 48,343
SSH 128.3 5 48,349
SSH 130.7 1 48,350
SSH 131.1 1 48,350
SSH 131.1 0 48,351
SSH 131.5 0 48,351
SSH 131.8 1 48,352
SSH 133.2 0 48,353
WTE 133.5 8 48,361
WTE 133.5 8 48,370
WTE 133.5 8 48,378
WTE 133.5 8 48,386
SSH 134.0 1 48,388
Sew 134.2 2 48,390
Sew 134.2 2 48,391
Sew 134.2 2 48,393
Sew 134.2 2 48,395
SSH 134.5 0 48,395
SSH 135.6 0 48,396
SSH 135.8 1 48,397
SSH 136.6 1 48,398
SSH 136.8 2 48,400
SSH 138.8 0 48,400
WTE 140.8 7 48,407
WTE 140.8 7 48,413
WTE 140.8 7 48,420
WTE 140.8 7 48,426
SSH 140.9 0 48,427
SSH 141.3 1 48,428
SSH 141.4 0 48,429
SSH 143.1 0 48,429
SSH 145.9 1 48,430
SSH 146.0 0 48,431
WTE 146.4 8 48,438
WTE 146.4 8 48,446
WTE 146.4 8 48,454
WTE 146.4 8 48,461
SSH 149.0 0 48,462
SSH 149.1 1 48,463
WTE 149.2 10 48,472
WTE 149.2 10 48,482
WTE 149.2 10 48,491
WTE 149.2 10 48,501
SSH 149.5 0 48,501
SSH 152.7 0 48,502
SSH 153.4 0 48,502
SSH 153.9 1 48,503
SSH 154.3 0 48,503
SSH 155.5 0 48,503
SSH 155.9 1 48,505
SSH 156.3 12 48,517
SSH 157.0 1 48,518
SSH 157.7 0 48,518
SSH 160.2 3 48,521
SSH 161.8 0 48,521
SSH 163.5 0 48,521
SSH 164.6 1 48,522
SSH 167.2 1 48,523
WTE 169.0 8 48,531
WTE 169.0 8 48,540
WTE 169.0 8 48,548
WTE 169.0 8 48,557
WTE 171.2 7 48,563
WTE 171.2 7 48,570
WTE 171.2 7 48,576
WTE 171.2 7 48,583
SSH 172.9 0 48,583
SSH 175.0 0 48,583
SSH 176.0 0 48,584
SSH 177.7 2 48,585
SSH 178.6 1 48,586
SSH 179.6 1 48,587
SSH 181.3 1 48,588
SSH 184.0 0 48,588
WTE 185.4 8 48,596
WTE 185.4 8 48,604
WTE 185.4 8 48,611
WTE 185.4 8 48,619
SSH 190.8 0 48,619
SSH 198.0 2 48,622
SSH 199.9 1 48,622
SSH 200.2 1 48,623
SSH 203.9 1 48,624
SSH 203.9 1 48,625
SSH 204.8 0 48,625
SSH 205.1 1 48,626
SSH 210.8 1 48,627
SSH 211.2 0 48,627
SSH 211.5 1 48,628
SSH 213.3 1 48,629
SSH 215.7 1 48,631
SSH 215.8 1 48,631
WTE 216.8 7 48,638
WTE 216.8 7 48,644
WTE 216.8 7 48,651
WTE 216.8 7 48,657
SSH 219.8 0 48,658
SSH 222.3 1 48,659
SSH 224.1 1 48,660
SSH 226.4 0 48,660
SSH 232.4 1 48,660
SSH 238.1 0 48,661
SSH 238.1 0 48,661
SSH 245.0 0 48,661
SSH 252.9 5 48,665
ST 272.3 14 48,679
ST 272.3 14 48,693
ST 272.3 14 48,707
ST 272.3 14 48,722
ST 282.6 14 48,735
ST 282.6 14 48,749
ST 282.6 14 48,762
ST 282.6 14 48,776
ST 289.9 13 48,789
ST 289.9 13 48,802
ST 289.9 13 48,815
ST 289.9 13 48,828
ST 301.6 13 48,841
ST 301.6 13 48,853
ST 301.6 13 48,866
ST 301.6 13 48,879
ST 314.9 14 48,893
ST 314.9 14 48,907
ST 314.9 14 48,921
ST 314.9 14 48,935
SSH 317.7 4 48,939
ST 326.8 14 48,953
ST 326.8 14 48,966
ST 326.8 14 48,980
ST 326.8 14 48,993
ST 335.2 13 49,006
ST 335.2 13 49,019
ST 335.2 13 49,033
ST 335.2 13 49,046
ST 343.3 14 49,060
ST 343.3 14 49,074
ST 343.3 14 49,088
ST 343.3 14 49,102
PV 343.5 74 49,175
PV 343.5 74 49,249
PV 343.5 74 49,323
PV 343.5 74 49,396
ST 348.8 13 49,409
ST 348.8 13 49,422
ST 348.8 13 49,434
ST 348.8 13 49,447
ST 356.3 14 49,460
ST 356.3 14 49,474
ST 356.3 14 49,487
ST 356.3 14 49,501
PV 356.4 71 49,572
PV 356.4 71 49,643
PV 356.4 71 49,714
PV 356.4 71 49,785
PV 360.4 74 49,858
PV 360.4 74 49,932
PV 360.4 74 50,005
PV 360.4 74 50,079
ST 365.5 13 50,092
ST 365.5 13 50,105
ST 365.5 13 50,119
ST 365.5 13 50,132
PV 365.7 69 50,201
PV 365.7 69 50,270
PV 365.7 69 50,339
PV 365.7 69 50,408
PV 371.7 74 50,482
PV 371.7 74 50,555
PV 371.7 74 50,629
PV 371.7 74 50,703
PV 374.0 71 50,774
PV 374.0 71 50,845
PV 374.0 71 50,916
PV 374.0 71 50,986
ST 380.2 13 50,999
ST 380.2 13 51,012
ST 380.2 13 51,024
ST 380.2 13 51,037
PV 380.4 66 51,104
PV 380.4 66 51,170
PV 380.4 66 51,236
PV 380.4 66 51,303
PV 383.7 69 51,372
PV 383.7 69 51,441
PV 383.7 69 51,510
PV 383.7 69 51,579
PV 385.8 71 51,650
PV 385.8 71 51,721
PV 385.8 71 51,792
PV 385.8 71 51,863
ST 385.9 14 51,877
ST 385.9 14 51,891
ST 385.9 14 51,905
ST 385.9 14 51,919
PV 388.7 74 51,993
PV 388.7 74 52,066
PV 388.7 74 52,140
PV 388.7 74 52,214
PV 395.7 69 52,283
PV 395.7 69 52,352
PV 395.7 69 52,421
PV 395.7 69 52,490
PV 399.2 66 52,557
PV 399.2 66 52,623
PV 399.2 66 52,690
PV 399.2 66 52,756
ST 400.5 14 52,770
ST 400.5 14 52,783
ST 400.5 14 52,797
ST 400.5 14 52,810
PV 403.4 71 52,881
PV 403.4 71 52,952
PV 403.4 71 53,023
PV 403.4 71 53,094
SSH 405.7 33 53,127
ST 410.8 13 53,140
ST 410.8 13 53,153
ST 410.8 13 53,166
ST 410.8 13 53,179
PV 411.7 66 53,246
PV 411.7 66 53,312
PV 411.7 66 53,379
PV 411.7 66 53,445
PV 413.8 69 53,514
PV 413.8 69 53,583
PV 413.8 69 53,653
PV 413.8 69 53,722
ST 427.4 13 53,734
ST 427.4 13 53,747
ST 427.4 13 53,760
ST 427.4 13 53,772
PV 430.5 66 53,839
PV 430.5 66 53,905
PV 430.5 66 53,972
PV 430.5 66 54,038
Curve 7 - Small Scale Hydel
Cost Generation Cum

SSH 43.0 45 45
SSH 43.0 42 87
SSH 43.0 35 122
SSH 43.0 35 157
SSH 43.0 169 326
SSH 43.0 185 511
SSH 43.0 84 595
SSH 43.0 224 819
SSH 45.0 80 900
SSH 45.2 107 1,007
SSH 45.2 77 1,083
SSH 45.6 186 1,269
SSH 46.2 57 1,326
SSH 47.2 196 1,522
SSH 49.1 29 1,552
SSH 49.1 22 1,574
SSH 49.1 17 1,590
SSH 49.1 12 1,602
SSH 49.1 34 1,636
SSH 49.1 31 1,667
SSH 49.1 5 1,672
SSH 49.1 25 1,697
SSH 49.1 25 1,721
SSH 49.1 15 1,737
SSH 49.1 7 1,744
SSH 49.1 22 1,766
SSH 49.1 20 1,786
SSH 49.1 34 1,820
SSH 49.1 15 1,834
SSH 49.1 14 1,849
SSH 49.1 14 1,863
SSH 49.1 14 1,876
SSH 49.1 6 1,882
SSH 49.1 4 1,885
SSH 49.1 5 1,890
SSH 49.1 12 1,902
SSH 49.1 12 1,914
SSH 49.1 11 1,925
SSH 49.1 11 1,936
SSH 49.1 10 1,946
SSH 49.1 5 1,951
SSH 49.1 12 1,963
SSH 49.1 4 1,967
SSH 49.1 10 1,977
SSH 49.1 8 1,984
SSH 49.1 8 1,992
SSH 49.1 8 2,000
SSH 49.1 8 2,007
SSH 49.1 7 2,014
SSH 49.1 6 2,020
SSH 49.1 34 2,054
SSH 49.1 4 2,058
SSH 49.1 2 2,060
SSH 50.1 7 2,067
SSH 50.1 59 2,125
SSH 50.5 5 2,130
SSH 50.9 4 2,134
SSH 50.9 7 2,141
SSH 51.3 42 2,182
SSH 51.4 6 2,188
SSH 51.4 17 2,206
SSH 51.5 66 2,271
SSH 51.6 58 2,330
SSH 51.7 18 2,347
SSH 51.7 17 2,364
SSH 51.8 17 2,381
SSH 51.8 17 2,397
SSH 52.0 4 2,401
SSH 52.1 5 2,407
SSH 52.2 29 2,435
SSH 52.2 11 2,446
SSH 52.2 12 2,458
SSH 52.2 5 2,462
SSH 52.2 6 2,469
SSH 52.2 16 2,485
SSH 52.3 19 2,504
SSH 52.3 6 2,510
SSH 52.3 9 2,519
SSH 52.3 7 2,526
SSH 52.4 3 2,529
SSH 52.4 17 2,545
SSH 52.5 16 2,562
SSH 52.5 16 2,577
SSH 52.6 15 2,593
SSH 52.8 18 2,611
SSH 52.9 14 2,625
SSH 52.9 26 2,651
SSH 52.9 16 2,666
SSH 53.1 18 2,684
SSH 53.2 16 2,700
SSH 53.2 11 2,711
SSH 53.2 15 2,726
SSH 53.3 16 2,742
SSH 53.3 7 2,748
SSH 53.3 227 2,975
SSH 53.4 20 2,995
SSH 53.4 15 3,010
SSH 53.5 18 3,028
SSH 53.6 143 3,171
SSH 53.6 135 3,306
SSH 53.8 20 3,326
SSH 53.8 20 3,346
SSH 53.8 20 3,367
SSH 53.8 15 3,382
SSH 53.8 15 3,396
SSH 53.9 20 3,417
SSH 53.9 15 3,432
SSH 53.9 83 3,515
SSH 53.9 15 3,529
SSH 53.9 4 3,533
SSH 54.0 21 3,554
SSH 54.1 100 3,654
SSH 54.1 6 3,660
SSH 54.1 19 3,679
SSH 54.2 111 3,790
SSH 54.2 22 3,812
SSH 54.2 14 3,827
SSH 54.2 8 3,835
SSH 54.3 7 3,841
SSH 54.3 94 3,935
SSH 54.5 14 3,949
SSH 54.6 23 3,972
SSH 54.6 95 4,068
SSH 54.6 252 4,320
SSH 54.6 3 4,323
SSH 54.7 4 4,327
SSH 54.8 13 4,341
SSH 54.9 23 4,364
SSH 54.9 8 4,372
SSH 54.9 24 4,395
SSH 54.9 13 4,408
SSH 55.0 25 4,433
SSH 55.0 25 4,458
SSH 55.0 25 4,483
SSH 55.2 9 4,493
SSH 55.3 26 4,518
SSH 55.3 26 4,545
SSH 55.3 9 4,553
SSH 55.4 8 4,561
SSH 55.5 14 4,575
SSH 55.6 14 4,589
SSH 55.7 78 4,667
SSH 55.8 76 4,743
SSH 55.9 6 4,749
SSH 55.9 75 4,824
SSH 56.0 280 5,104
SSH 56.0 54 5,158
SSH 56.0 74 5,232
SSH 56.0 126 5,358
SSH 56.0 3 5,361
SSH 56.1 56 5,418
SSH 56.4 5 5,423
SSH 56.5 51 5,474
SSH 56.7 28 5,502
SSH 56.9 8 5,510
SSH 57.0 13 5,523
SSH 57.0 13 5,535
SSH 57.0 17 5,552
SSH 57.0 28 5,580
SSH 57.1 29 5,609
SSH 57.2 315 5,924
SSH 57.3 42 5,966
SSH 57.4 56 6,022
SSH 57.5 42 6,064
SSH 57.7 3 6,067
SSH 57.7 29 6,096
SSH 57.8 18 6,114
SSH 57.8 5 6,118
SSH 57.9 29 6,147
SSH 58.0 15 6,163
SSH 58.0 28 6,191
SSH 58.0 126 6,317
SSH 58.0 12 6,329
SSH 58.0 13 6,342
SSH 58.4 9 6,351
SSH 58.6 12 6,363
SSH 58.8 7 6,369
SSH 58.9 11 6,380
SSH 58.9 8 6,388
SSH 59.1 52 6,440
SSH 59.1 3 6,443
SSH 59.1 10 6,452
SSH 59.2 11 6,464
SSH 59.5 11 6,475
SSH 59.6 11 6,486
SSH 59.6 5 6,491
SSH 59.8 10 6,501
SSH 59.9 6 6,507
SSH 60.0 32 6,539
SSH 60.3 11 6,549
SSH 60.3 23 6,573
SSH 60.4 13 6,585
SSH 60.4 21 6,607
SSH 60.4 24 6,631
SSH 60.5 8 6,639
SSH 60.6 10 6,649
SSH 60.7 52 6,701
SSH 60.7 18 6,719
SSH 60.7 7 6,726
SSH 60.8 34 6,760
SSH 60.8 22 6,782
SSH 60.8 10 6,792
SSH 60.9 41 6,832
SSH 61.0 16 6,848
SSH 61.4 39 6,887
SSH 61.5 33 6,920
SSH 61.5 10 6,930
SSH 61.7 210 7,140
SSH 61.8 29 7,169
SSH 61.8 10 7,179
SSH 61.9 9 7,188
SSH 62.0 9 7,198
SSH 62.1 18 7,216
SSH 62.2 9 7,225
SSH 62.4 9 7,234
SSH 62.4 34 7,268
SSH 62.4 36 7,304
SSH 62.4 5 7,309
SSH 62.5 24 7,334
SSH 62.7 4 7,338
SSH 62.8 38 7,376
SSH 63.0 9 7,385
SSH 63.0 9 7,394
SSH 63.1 58 7,452
SSH 63.5 9 7,461
SSH 63.7 9 7,470
SSH 63.8 58 7,527
SSH 64.0 5 7,532
SSH 64.0 256 7,789
SSH 64.1 49 7,838
SSH 64.2 10 7,848
SSH 64.3 8 7,856
SSH 64.5 4 7,861
SSH 64.5 252 8,113
SSH 64.5 7 8,120
SSH 64.6 96 8,216
SSH 64.7 8 8,224
SSH 64.8 9 8,232
SSH 64.9 9 8,241
SSH 64.9 8 8,249
SSH 64.9 5 8,255
SSH 64.9 22 8,277
SSH 64.9 8 8,285
SSH 64.9 8 8,293
SSH 65.0 8 8,301
SSH 65.2 35 8,336
SSH 65.2 158 8,494
SSH 65.2 127 8,621
SSH 65.3 55 8,677
SSH 65.5 7 8,683
SSH 65.5 8 8,691
SSH 65.5 4 8,695
SSH 65.5 8 8,703
SSH 65.6 8 8,711
SSH 65.6 8 8,718
SSH 65.7 5 8,723
SSH 65.7 27 8,751
SSH 65.9 105 8,856
SSH 66.0 8 8,863
SSH 66.3 68 8,931
SSH 67.2 8 8,939
SSH 67.2 8 8,947
SSH 67.2 8 8,954
SSH 67.2 8 8,962
SSH 67.2 8 8,970
SSH 67.2 8 8,977
SSH 67.2 4 8,981
SSH 67.6 8 8,989
SSH 67.6 8 8,996
SSH 67.8 68 9,064
SSH 67.9 7 9,071
SSH 68.1 7 9,078
SSH 68.1 7 9,085
SSH 68.2 7 9,092
SSH 68.6 7 9,099
SSH 68.6 3 9,102
SSH 68.8 7 9,109
SSH 68.8 13 9,122
SSH 68.9 7 9,129
SSH 68.9 7 9,136
SSH 69.7 6 9,142
SSH 69.7 3 9,145
SSH 70.1 6 9,151
SSH 70.1 20 9,171
SSH 70.2 10 9,181
SSH 70.5 16 9,196
SSH 70.6 6 9,203
SSH 70.7 196 9,399
SSH 70.8 6 9,405
SSH 71.0 6 9,411
SSH 71.2 6 9,418
SSH 71.5 29 9,446
SSH 71.8 6 9,452
SSH 72.1 5 9,457
SSH 72.4 6 9,463
SSH 72.4 6 9,469
SSH 72.9 6 9,474
SSH 73.1 3 9,477
SSH 73.1 6 9,482
SSH 73.1 39 9,521
SSH 73.2 3 9,524
SSH 73.2 64 9,588
SSH 73.2 5 9,594
SSH 73.2 5 9,599
SSH 73.3 3 9,602
SSH 73.7 14 9,616
SSH 73.7 5 9,621
SSH 73.7 5 9,626
SSH 74.1 14 9,640
SSH 74.3 5 9,645
SSH 74.6 5 9,650
SSH 74.9 5 9,655
SSH 75.0 5 9,660
SSH 75.2 40 9,700
SSH 75.2 42 9,742
SSH 75.2 4 9,746
SSH 75.4 3 9,749
SSH 75.4 4 9,753
SSH 75.4 5 9,757
SSH 75.4 5 9,762
SSH 75.6 3 9,766
SSH 75.8 5 9,770
SSH 75.8 5 9,775
SSH 76.0 5 9,780
SSH 76.3 7 9,787
SSH 76.4 8 9,794
SSH 76.4 5 9,799
SSH 76.6 5 9,804
SSH 77.2 4 9,808
SSH 77.6 4 9,812
SSH 78.2 79 9,892
SSH 78.2 4 9,896
SSH 78.3 4 9,900
SSH 78.5 4 9,904
SSH 78.5 4 9,908
SSH 78.7 4 9,912
SSH 79.1 4 9,916
SSH 79.2 4 9,920
SSH 79.8 4 9,924
SSH 80.3 2 9,926
SSH 80.3 4 9,930
SSH 80.4 4 9,934
SSH 80.5 4 9,937
SSH 80.7 85 10,023
SSH 81.2 4 10,026
SSH 81.5 4 10,030
SSH 81.5 4 10,034
SSH 81.8 26 10,059
SSH 82.1 3 10,063
SSH 82.4 4 10,067
SSH 82.5 3 10,070
SSH 82.8 3 10,073
SSH 82.8 238 10,312
SSH 83.0 3 10,315
SSH 83.8 3 10,318
SSH 84.2 3 10,320
SSH 84.2 98 10,418
SSH 84.2 3 10,421
SSH 84.3 2 10,424
SSH 84.6 32 10,456
SSH 85.5 3 10,459
SSH 85.7 3 10,461
SSH 85.9 3 10,464
SSH 86.0 15 10,479
SSH 86.7 3 10,482
SSH 86.8 4 10,486
SSH 87.2 3 10,488
SSH 87.2 97 10,585
SSH 87.4 3 10,588
SSH 87.4 2 10,590
SSH 87.7 5 10,595
SSH 87.9 3 10,598
SSH 88.1 3 10,601
SSH 88.6 4 10,605
SSH 88.7 3 10,607
SSH 88.8 3 10,610
SSH 88.9 3 10,612
SSH 89.0 3 10,615
SSH 89.2 12 10,627
SSH 89.4 2 10,629
SSH 89.6 2 10,632
SSH 89.9 5 10,637
SSH 90.0 2 10,640
SSH 90.0 2 10,642
SSH 90.1 3 10,645
SSH 90.5 4 10,648
SSH 91.1 2 10,651
SSH 91.2 2 10,653
SSH 91.2 2 10,655
SSH 91.5 2 10,658
SSH 91.9 13 10,671
SSH 91.9 2 10,673
SSH 92.0 2 10,675
SSH 92.2 2 10,677
SSH 92.5 2 10,679
SSH 92.6 2 10,682
SSH 92.8 2 10,684
SSH 92.9 3 10,686
SSH 93.3 3 10,689
SSH 93.6 2 10,691
SSH 93.7 2 10,693
SSH 93.7 2 10,695
SSH 93.7 3 10,698
SSH 93.8 3 10,701
SSH 93.9 3 10,704
SSH 94.8 2 10,706
SSH 95.1 2 10,708
SSH 95.2 2 10,710
SSH 95.4 2 10,712
SSH 95.7 2 10,714
SSH 95.9 2 10,716
SSH 95.9 2 10,718
SSH 96.1 2 10,720
SSH 96.5 2 10,722
SSH 96.7 273 10,994
SSH 97.4 2 10,996
SSH 97.6 2 10,999
SSH 97.6 2 11,000
SSH 97.8 2 11,002
SSH 97.8 3 11,005
SSH 98.1 2 11,007
SSH 98.2 3 11,010
SSH 98.3 2 11,012
SSH 98.3 2 11,013
SSH 98.8 6 11,019
SSH 99.1 2 11,021
SSH 99.2 2 11,022
SSH 99.3 3 11,026
SSH 99.4 2 11,027
SSH 99.4 2 11,029
SSH 99.6 2 11,031
SSH 99.7 2 11,033
SSH 100.5 2 11,035
SSH 100.5 49 11,083
SSH 101.0 105 11,188
SSH 101.1 25 11,213
SSH 101.8 2 11,215
SSH 101.9 2 11,216
SSH 102.1 3 11,219
SSH 102.2 2 11,221
SSH 102.3 2 11,222
SSH 102.4 2 11,224
SSH 102.6 6 11,230
SSH 103.3 2 11,231
SSH 103.8 2 11,233
SSH 104.1 3 11,236
SSH 104.4 3 11,238
SSH 104.5 1 11,240
SSH 104.6 2 11,242
SSH 104.6 1 11,243
SSH 104.9 1 11,245
SSH 105.0 43 11,288
SSH 105.4 1 11,289
SSH 105.6 1 11,291
SSH 105.7 1 11,292
SSH 105.7 3 11,295
SSH 106.6 1 11,297
SSH 106.9 1 11,298
SSH 107.0 1 11,300
SSH 107.9 1 11,301
SSH 108.6 3 11,304
SSH 108.6 1 11,305
SSH 109.2 6 11,311
SSH 109.2 1 11,312
SSH 109.2 1 11,313
SSH 109.4 1 11,315
SSH 109.7 1 11,316
SSH 109.9 1 11,317
SSH 109.9 1 11,318
SSH 110.0 3 11,321
SSH 110.5 1 11,322
SSH 110.7 1 11,323
SSH 110.9 1 11,324
SSH 111.4 2 11,326
SSH 112.3 1 11,328
SSH 112.7 1 11,329
SSH 112.8 2 11,331
SSH 113.1 1 11,332
SSH 115.2 6 11,338
SSH 115.6 1 11,339
SSH 115.7 4 11,343
SSH 116.2 2 11,345
SSH 116.4 1 11,346
SSH 117.1 1 11,347
SSH 117.3 3 11,350
SSH 118.7 1 11,351
SSH 118.9 1 11,352
SSH 118.9 1 11,353
SSH 119.5 6 11,359
SSH 119.6 5 11,364
SSH 120.6 1 11,365
SSH 120.6 1 11,366
SSH 120.6 1 11,367
SSH 120.8 4 11,371
SSH 120.9 2 11,373
SSH 121.6 1 11,373
SSH 121.8 126 11,499
SSH 122.9 2 11,501
SSH 124.8 1 11,502
SSH 125.4 3 11,505
SSH 126.6 1 11,506
SSH 127.2 1 11,506
SSH 127.8 1 11,507
SSH 128.1 1 11,508
SSH 128.3 5 11,514
SSH 130.7 1 11,515
SSH 131.1 1 11,515
SSH 131.1 0 11,516
SSH 131.5 0 11,516
SSH 131.8 1 11,517
SSH 133.2 0 11,518
SSH 134.0 1 11,519
SSH 134.5 0 11,519
SSH 135.6 0 11,520
SSH 135.8 1 11,521
SSH 136.6 1 11,522
SSH 136.8 2 11,524
SSH 138.8 0 11,524
SSH 140.9 0 11,525
SSH 141.3 1 11,526
SSH 141.4 0 11,527
SSH 143.1 0 11,527
SSH 145.9 1 11,528
SSH 146.0 0 11,529
SSH 149.0 0 11,529
SSH 149.1 1 11,530
SSH 149.5 0 11,530
SSH 152.7 0 11,530
SSH 153.4 0 11,531
SSH 153.9 1 11,532
SSH 154.3 0 11,532
SSH 155.5 0 11,532
SSH 155.9 1 11,534
SSH 156.3 12 11,546
SSH 157.0 1 11,547
SSH 157.7 0 11,547
SSH 160.2 3 11,549
SSH 161.8 0 11,550
SSH 163.5 0 11,550
SSH 164.6 1 11,551
SSH 167.2 1 11,552
SSH 172.9 0 11,552
SSH 175.0 0 11,552
SSH 176.0 0 11,552
SSH 177.7 2 11,554
SSH 178.6 1 11,555
SSH 179.6 1 11,556
SSH 181.3 1 11,557
SSH 184.0 0 11,557
SSH 190.8 0 11,557
SSH 198.0 2 11,560
SSH 199.9 1 11,560
SSH 200.2 1 11,561
SSH 203.9 1 11,562
SSH 203.9 1 11,563
SSH 204.8 0 11,563
SSH 205.1 1 11,564
SSH 210.8 1 11,565
SSH 211.2 0 11,565
SSH 211.5 1 11,566
SSH 213.3 1 11,567
SSH 215.7 1 11,569
SSH 215.8 1 11,569
SSH 219.8 0 11,569
SSH 222.3 1 11,570
SSH 224.1 1 11,571
SSH 226.4 0 11,571
SSH 232.4 1 11,572
SSH 238.1 0 11,572
SSH 238.1 0 11,572
SSH 245.0 0 11,572
SSH 252.9 5 11,577
SSH 317.7 4 11,581
SSH 405.7 33 11,614
Curve 8 - Bagasse-based Cogeneration (social)
Cost Generation Cum

Bag 61.4 84 84
Bag 62.0 74 159
Bag 62.4 68 226
Bag 63.2 58 284
Bag 64.2 84 369
Bag 64.7 74 443
Bag 65.1 68 511
Bag 65.1 84 595
Bag 65.9 58 653
Bag 66.0 84 737
Bag 66.1 74 812
Bag 66.5 74 886
Bag 66.9 68 954
Bag 67.0 68 1,022
Bag 67.6 84 1,106
Bag 67.8 58 1,164
Bag 67.9 84 1,248
Bag 68.6 58 1,306
Bag 68.7 84 1,391
Bag 68.9 74 1,465
Bag 68.9 74 1,539
Bag 69.2 74 1,614
Bag 69.7 68 1,682
Bag 69.7 84 1,766
Bag 69.7 68 1,834
Bag 70.0 68 1,901
Bag 70.3 84 1,986
Bag 70.5 58 2,044
Bag 70.7 74 2,118
Bag 71.3 84 2,202
Bag 71.3 58 2,260
Bag 71.5 68 2,328
Bag 71.7 74 2,403
Bag 72.1 84 2,487
Bag 72.2 58 2,545
Bag 72.4 84 2,629
Bag 72.8 68 2,697
Bag 73.1 74 2,771
Bag 73.1 58 2,829
Bag 73.4 74 2,904
Bag 73.5 74 2,978
Bag 74.0 84 3,062
Bag 74.3 68 3,130
Bag 74.6 68 3,198
Bag 74.6 68 3,266
Bag 74.9 84 3,350
Bag 74.9 58 3,408
Bag 75.8 84 3,492
Bag 75.9 74 3,567
Bag 75.9 58 3,625
Bag 76.2 74 3,699
Bag 76.7 58 3,757
Bag 77.3 68 3,825
Bag 77.4 68 3,893
Bag 77.6 58 3,951
Bag 77.7 74 4,025
Bag 78.6 84 4,109
Bag 79.2 68 4,177
Bag 79.5 58 4,235
Bag 80.3 58 4,293
Bag 80.4 74 4,367
Curve 8 - Bagasse-based Cogeneration (social)
Bag 81.9 68 4,435
Bag 82.1 58 4,493
Bag 84.8 58 4,551
Curve 9 - Biomass
Cost Generation Cum

Biom 53.4 78 78
Biom 53.4 78 155
Biom 53.4 78 233
Biom 53.4 78 310
Biom 53.4 78 388
Biom 53.4 78 465
Biom 53.4 78 543
Biom 53.4 78 620
Biom 53.4 78 698
Biom 53.4 78 775
Biom 53.4 78 853
Biom 53.4 78 930
Biom 53.4 68 999
Biom 53.4 78 1,076
Biom 53.4 68 1,145
Biom 53.4 78 1,222
Biom 62.4 68 1,291
Biom 62.4 78 1,368
Biom 62.4 68 1,437
Biom 62.4 78 1,514
Biom 62.4 68 1,583
Biom 62.4 68 1,651
Biom 62.4 68 1,719
Biom 62.4 68 1,788
Biom 62.4 68 1,856
Biom 62.4 62 1,919
Biom 62.4 68 1,987
Biom 62.4 68 2,056
Biom 62.4 62 2,118
Biom 62.4 62 2,181
Biom 62.4 68 2,249
Biom 62.4 62 2,311
Biom 68.5 68 2,380
Biom 68.5 68 2,448
Biom 68.5 62 2,511
Biom 68.5 68 2,579
Biom 68.5 62 2,642
Biom 68.5 68 2,710
Biom 68.5 62 2,772
Biom 68.5 62 2,835
Biom 68.5 62 2,897
Biom 68.5 62 2,960
Biom 68.5 62 3,022
Biom 68.5 62 3,085
Biom 68.5 62 3,147
Biom 68.5 62 3,209
Biom 68.5 62 3,272
Biom 68.5 53 3,325
Biom 77.5 62 3,388
Biom 77.5 53 3,441
Biom 77.5 53 3,494
Biom 77.5 53 3,548
Biom 77.5 53 3,601
Biom 77.5 53 3,654
Biom 77.5 53 3,708
Biom 77.5 53 3,761
Biom 77.5 53 3,814
Biom 77.5 53 3,868
Biom 77.5 53 3,921
Biom 77.5 53 3,974
Biom 77.5 53 4,028
Curve 9 - Biomass
Biom 77.5 53 4,081
Biom 77.5 53 4,135
Biom 77.5 53 4,188
Curve 10 - Biogas
Cost Generation Cum

Biog 61.1 46 46
Biog 61.1 46 92
Biog 61.1 46 137
Biog 61.1 46 183
Biog 63.9 42 225
Biog 63.9 42 267
Biog 63.9 42 310
Biog 63.9 42 352
Biog 66.0 40 392
Biog 66.0 40 432
Biog 66.0 40 472
Biog 66.0 40 511
Biog 69.8 36 548
Biog 69.8 36 584
Biog 69.8 36 621
Biog 69.8 36 657
Biog 75.4 46 703
Biog 75.4 46 748
Biog 75.4 46 794
Biog 75.4 46 840
Biog 79.3 42 882
Biog 79.3 42 924
Biog 79.3 42 967
Biog 79.3 42 1,009
Biog 82.4 40 1,049
Biog 82.4 40 1,089
Biog 82.4 40 1,129
Biog 82.4 40 1,168
Biog 84.9 46 1,214
Biog 84.9 46 1,260
Biog 84.9 46 1,306
Biog 84.9 46 1,351
Biog 87.7 36 1,388
Biog 87.7 36 1,424
Biog 87.7 36 1,461
Biog 87.7 36 1,497
Biog 89.6 42 1,539
Biog 89.6 42 1,581
Biog 89.6 42 1,624
Biog 89.6 42 1,666
Biog 93.3 40 1,706
Biog 93.3 40 1,746
Biog 93.3 40 1,785
Biog 93.3 40 1,825
Biog 99.1 46 1,871
Biog 99.1 46 1,917
Biog 99.1 46 1,963
Biog 99.1 46 2,008
Biog 99.6 36 2,045
Biog 99.6 36 2,081
Biog 99.6 36 2,117
Biog 99.6 36 2,154
Biog 105.0 42 2,196
Biog 105.0 42 2,238
Biog 105.0 42 2,281
Biog 105.0 42 2,323
Biog 109.6 40 2,363
Biog 109.6 40 2,403
Biog 109.6 40 2,442
Biog 109.6 40 2,482
Biog 117.5 36 2,519
Curve 10 - Biogas
Biog 117.5 36 2,555
Biog 117.5 36 2,591
Biog 117.5 36 2,628
Curve 10 - Sewage
Cost Generation Cum

Sew 78.2 2 2
Sew 78.2 2 4
Sew 78.2 2 6
Sew 78.2 2 9
Sew 84.7 2 10
Sew 84.7 2 12
Sew 84.7 2 14
Sew 84.7 2 16
Sew 88.9 2 18
Sew 88.9 2 21
Sew 88.9 2 23
Sew 88.9 2 25
Sew 89.7 2 27
Sew 89.7 2 29
Sew 89.7 2 30
Sew 89.7 2 32
Sew 96.0 2 34
Sew 96.0 2 37
Sew 96.0 2 39
Sew 96.0 2 41
Sew 96.3 2 43
Sew 96.3 2 45
Sew 96.3 2 47
Sew 96.3 2 49
Sew 98.3 2 50
Sew 98.3 2 52
Sew 98.3 2 54
Sew 98.3 2 55
Sew 101.9 2 57
Sew 101.9 2 59
Sew 101.9 2 61
Sew 101.9 2 63
Sew 104.0 2 65
Sew 104.0 2 67
Sew 104.0 2 69
Sew 104.0 2 71
Sew 106.7 2 73
Sew 106.7 2 75
Sew 106.7 2 77
Sew 106.7 2 79
Sew 110.1 2 81
Sew 110.1 2 83
Sew 110.1 2 85
Sew 110.1 2 87
Sew 111.8 2 88
Sew 111.8 2 90
Sew 111.8 2 92
Sew 111.8 2 93
Sew 115.6 2 95
Sew 115.6 2 97
Sew 115.6 2 99
Sew 115.6 2 101
Sew 120.8 2 103
Sew 120.8 2 105
Sew 120.8 2 106
Sew 120.8 2 108
Sew 122.4 2 110
Sew 122.4 2 112
Sew 122.4 2 113
Sew 122.4 2 115
Sew 134.2 2 117
Curve 10 - Sewage
Sew 134.2 2 119
Sew 134.2 2 120
Sew 134.2 2 122
Curve 11 - Landfill gas
Cost Generation Cum

LFG 47.7 5 5
LFG 47.7 5 10
LFG 47.7 5 15
LFG 47.7 5 21
LFG 51.7 5 25
LFG 51.7 5 30
LFG 51.7 5 35
LFG 51.7 5 40
LFG 51.7 5 45
LFG 51.7 5 50
LFG 51.7 5 55
LFG 51.7 5 60
LFG 54.4 5 65
LFG 54.4 5 70
LFG 54.4 5 75
LFG 54.4 5 81
LFG 54.7 4 85
LFG 54.7 4 90
LFG 54.7 4 94
LFG 54.7 4 99
LFG 56.0 5 103
LFG 56.0 5 108
LFG 56.0 5 113
LFG 56.0 5 117
LFG 58.3 5 123
LFG 58.3 5 128
LFG 58.3 5 133
LFG 58.3 5 138
LFG 58.9 5 143
LFG 58.9 5 148
LFG 58.9 5 152
LFG 58.9 5 157
LFG 59.3 4 161
LFG 59.3 4 166
LFG 59.3 4 170
LFG 59.3 4 175
LFG 60.0 4 179
LFG 60.0 4 183
LFG 60.0 4 187
LFG 60.0 4 191
LFG 62.4 4 196
LFG 62.4 4 200
LFG 62.4 4 205
LFG 62.4 4 209
LFG 63.2 5 214
LFG 63.2 5 219
LFG 63.2 5 223
LFG 63.2 5 228
LFG 65.0 4 232
LFG 65.0 4 236
LFG 65.0 4 240
LFG 65.0 4 244
LFG 66.9 4 249
LFG 66.9 4 253
LFG 66.9 4 258
LFG 66.9 4 262
LFG 68.4 4 266
LFG 68.4 4 271
LFG 68.4 4 275
LFG 68.4 4 279
LFG 73.4 4 283
Curve 11 - Landfill gas
LFG 73.4 4 287
LFG 73.4 4 291
LFG 73.4 4 295
Curve 12 - Waste-to-Energy
Cost Generation Cum

WTE 65.5 10 10
WTE 65.5 10 19
WTE 65.5 10 29
WTE 65.5 10 38
WTE 74.2 8 47
WTE 74.2 8 55
WTE 74.2 8 64
WTE 74.2 8 72
WTE 81.4 8 80
WTE 81.4 8 87
WTE 81.4 8 95
WTE 81.4 8 103
WTE 95.2 7 109
WTE 95.2 7 116
WTE 95.2 7 123
WTE 95.2 7 129
WTE 96.9 10 139
WTE 96.9 10 148
WTE 96.9 10 158
WTE 96.9 10 167
WTE 109.8 8 176
WTE 109.8 8 184
WTE 109.8 8 193
WTE 109.8 8 201
WTE 117.9 10 211
WTE 117.9 10 220
WTE 117.9 10 230
WTE 117.9 10 240
WTE 120.4 8 247
WTE 120.4 8 255
WTE 120.4 8 263
WTE 120.4 8 270
WTE 133.5 8 279
WTE 133.5 8 287
WTE 133.5 8 296
WTE 133.5 8 304
WTE 140.8 7 311
WTE 140.8 7 317
WTE 140.8 7 324
WTE 140.8 7 330
WTE 146.4 8 338
WTE 146.4 8 346
WTE 146.4 8 354
WTE 146.4 8 361
WTE 149.2 10 371
WTE 149.2 10 380
WTE 149.2 10 390
WTE 149.2 10 400
WTE 169.0 8 408
WTE 169.0 8 416
WTE 169.0 8 425
WTE 169.0 8 433
WTE 171.2 7 440
WTE 171.2 7 446
WTE 171.2 7 453
WTE 171.2 7 460
WTE 185.4 8 467
WTE 185.4 8 475
WTE 185.4 8 483
WTE 185.4 8 490
WTE 216.8 7 497
Curve 12 - Waste-to-Energy
WTE 216.8 7 504
WTE 216.8 7 510
WTE 216.8 7 517
Curve 13 - Photovoltaic
Cost Generation Cum

PV 343.5 74 74
PV 343.5 74 147
PV 343.5 74 221
PV 343.5 74 294
PV 356.4 71 365
PV 356.4 71 436
PV 356.4 71 507
PV 356.4 71 578
PV 360.4 74 652
PV 360.4 74 725
PV 360.4 74 799
PV 360.4 74 873
PV 365.7 69 942
PV 365.7 69 1,011
PV 365.7 69 1,080
PV 365.7 69 1,149
PV 371.7 74 1,223
PV 371.7 74 1,296
PV 371.7 74 1,370
PV 371.7 74 1,444
PV 374.0 71 1,515
PV 374.0 71 1,586
PV 374.0 71 1,656
PV 374.0 71 1,727
PV 380.4 66 1,794
PV 380.4 66 1,860
PV 380.4 66 1,927
PV 380.4 66 1,993
PV 383.7 69 2,062
PV 383.7 69 2,132
PV 383.7 69 2,201
PV 383.7 69 2,270
PV 385.8 71 2,341
PV 385.8 71 2,412
PV 385.8 71 2,483
PV 385.8 71 2,554
PV 388.7 74 2,627
PV 388.7 74 2,701
PV 388.7 74 2,774
PV 388.7 74 2,848
PV 395.7 69 2,917
PV 395.7 69 2,986
PV 395.7 69 3,055
PV 395.7 69 3,125
PV 399.2 66 3,191
PV 399.2 66 3,257
PV 399.2 66 3,324
PV 399.2 66 3,390
PV 403.4 71 3,461
PV 403.4 71 3,532
PV 403.4 71 3,603
PV 403.4 71 3,674
PV 411.7 66 3,741
PV 411.7 66 3,807
PV 411.7 66 3,873
PV 411.7 66 3,940
PV 413.8 69 4,009
PV 413.8 69 4,078
PV 413.8 69 4,147
PV 413.8 69 4,217
PV 430.5 66 4,283
Curve 13 - Photovoltaic
PV 430.5 66 4,349
PV 430.5 66 4,416
PV 430.5 66 4,482
Curve 14 - Solar Thermal
Cost Generation Cum

ST 272.3 14 14
ST 272.3 14 28
ST 272.3 14 42
ST 272.3 14 56
ST 282.6 14 70
ST 282.6 14 83
ST 282.6 14 97
ST 282.6 14 110
ST 289.9 13 123
ST 289.9 13 136
ST 289.9 13 150
ST 289.9 13 163
ST 301.6 13 175
ST 301.6 13 188
ST 301.6 13 201
ST 301.6 13 213
ST 314.9 14 227
ST 314.9 14 241
ST 314.9 14 255
ST 314.9 14 269
ST 326.8 14 283
ST 326.8 14 296
ST 326.8 14 310
ST 326.8 14 323
ST 335.2 13 337
ST 335.2 13 350
ST 335.2 13 363
ST 335.2 13 376
ST 343.3 14 390
ST 343.3 14 404
ST 343.3 14 418
ST 343.3 14 432
ST 348.8 13 445
ST 348.8 13 457
ST 348.8 13 470
ST 348.8 13 483
ST 356.3 14 496
ST 356.3 14 510
ST 356.3 14 523
ST 356.3 14 537
ST 365.5 13 550
ST 365.5 13 563
ST 365.5 13 576
ST 365.5 13 589
ST 380.2 13 602
ST 380.2 13 615
ST 380.2 13 627
ST 380.2 13 640
ST 385.9 14 654
ST 385.9 14 668
ST 385.9 14 682
ST 385.9 14 696
ST 400.5 14 709
ST 400.5 14 723
ST 400.5 14 736
ST 400.5 14 750
ST 410.8 13 763
ST 410.8 13 776
ST 410.8 13 789
ST 410.8 13 803
ST 427.4 13 815
Curve 14 - Solar Thermal
ST 427.4 13 828
ST 427.4 13 841
ST 427.4 13 853
Curve 15 - Wind
Cost Generation Cum

WD 94.5 6 6
WD 94.5 6 13
WD 94.5 6 19
WD 94.5 6 25
WD 94.5 6 32
WD 94.5 6 38
WD 94.5 6 45
WD 94.5 6 51
WD 94.5 6 57
WD 94.5 6 64
WD 94.5 6 70
WD 94.5 6 76
WD 94.5 6 83
WD 94.5 6 89
WD 94.5 6 96
WD 94.5 6 102
WD 100.6 6 108
WD 100.6 6 115
WD 100.6 6 121
WD 100.6 6 127
WD 100.6 6 134
WD 100.6 6 140
WD 100.6 6 146
WD 100.6 6 153
WD 100.6 6 159
WD 100.6 6 166
WD 100.6 6 172
WD 100.6 6 178
WD 100.6 6 185
WD 100.6 6 191
WD 100.6 6 197
WD 100.6 6 204
WD 102.3 163 366
WD 102.3 163 529
WD 102.3 163 692
WD 102.3 163 854
WD 102.3 163 1,017
WD 102.3 163 1,180
WD 102.3 163 1,342
WD 102.3 163 1,505
WD 102.3 163 1,668
WD 102.3 163 1,830
WD 102.3 163 1,993
WD 102.3 163 2,155
WD 102.3 163 2,318
WD 102.3 163 2,481
WD 102.3 163 2,643
WD 102.3 163 2,806
WD 104.7 6 2,812
WD 104.7 6 2,819
WD 104.7 6 2,825
WD 104.7 6 2,831
WD 104.7 6 2,838
WD 104.7 6 2,844
WD 104.7 6 2,851
WD 104.7 6 2,857
WD 104.7 6 2,863
WD 104.7 6 2,870
WD 104.7 6 2,876
WD 104.7 6 2,882
WD 104.7 6 2,889
Curve 15 - Wind
WD 104.7 6 2,895
WD 104.7 6 2,901
WD 104.7 6 2,908
WD 108.1 218 3,126
WD 108.1 218 3,344
WD 108.1 218 3,563
WD 108.1 218 3,781
WD 108.1 218 3,999
WD 108.1 218 4,218
WD 108.1 218 4,436
WD 108.1 218 4,654
WD 108.1 218 4,873
WD 108.1 218 5,091
WD 108.1 218 5,309
WD 108.1 218 5,527
WD 108.1 218 5,746
WD 108.1 218 5,964
WD 108.1 218 6,182
WD 108.1 218 6,401
WD 109.0 163 6,563
WD 109.0 163 6,726
WD 109.0 163 6,889
WD 109.0 163 7,051
WD 109.0 163 7,214
WD 109.0 163 7,376
WD 109.0 163 7,539
WD 109.0 163 7,702
WD 109.0 163 7,864
WD 109.0 163 8,027
WD 109.0 163 8,190
WD 109.0 163 8,352
WD 109.0 163 8,515
WD 109.0 163 8,678
WD 109.0 163 8,840
WD 109.0 163 9,003
WD 110.9 6 9,009
WD 110.9 6 9,016
WD 110.9 6 9,022
WD 110.9 6 9,028
WD 110.9 6 9,035
WD 110.9 6 9,041
WD 110.9 6 9,047
WD 110.9 6 9,054
WD 110.9 6 9,060
WD 110.9 6 9,067
WD 110.9 6 9,073
WD 110.9 6 9,079
WD 110.9 6 9,086
WD 110.9 6 9,092
WD 110.9 6 9,098
WD 110.9 6 9,105
WD 113.4 163 9,267
WD 113.4 163 9,430
WD 113.4 163 9,593
WD 113.4 163 9,755
WD 113.4 163 9,918
WD 113.4 163 10,081
WD 113.4 163 10,243
WD 113.4 163 10,406
WD 113.4 163 10,568
WD 113.4 163 10,731
WD 113.4 163 10,894
WD 113.4 163 11,056
WD 113.4 163 11,219
Curve 15 - Wind
WD 113.4 163 11,382
WD 113.4 163 11,544
WD 113.4 163 11,707
WD 115.2 218 11,925
WD 115.2 218 12,144
WD 115.2 218 12,362
WD 115.2 218 12,580
WD 115.2 218 12,798
WD 115.2 218 13,017
WD 115.2 218 13,235
WD 115.2 218 13,453
WD 115.2 218 13,672
WD 115.2 218 13,890
WD 115.2 218 14,108
WD 115.2 218 14,327
WD 115.2 218 14,545
WD 115.2 218 14,763
WD 115.2 218 14,981
WD 115.2 218 15,200
WD 119.9 218 15,418
WD 119.9 218 15,636
WD 119.9 218 15,855
WD 119.9 218 16,073
WD 119.9 218 16,291
WD 119.9 218 16,510
WD 119.9 218 16,728
WD 119.9 218 16,946
WD 119.9 218 17,164
WD 119.9 218 17,383
WD 119.9 218 17,601
WD 119.9 218 17,819
WD 119.9 218 18,038
WD 119.9 218 18,256
WD 119.9 218 18,474
WD 119.9 218 18,693
WD 120.1 163 18,855
WD 120.1 163 19,018
WD 120.1 163 19,180
WD 120.1 163 19,343
WD 120.1 163 19,506
WD 120.1 163 19,668
WD 120.1 163 19,831
WD 120.1 163 19,994
WD 120.1 163 20,156
WD 120.1 163 20,319
WD 120.1 163 20,482
WD 120.1 163 20,644
WD 120.1 163 20,807
WD 120.1 163 20,969
WD 120.1 163 21,132
WD 120.1 163 21,295
WD 127.0 218 21,513
WD 127.0 218 21,731
WD 127.0 218 21,950
WD 127.0 218 22,168
WD 127.0 218 22,386
WD 127.0 218 22,605
WD 127.0 218 22,823
WD 127.0 218 23,041
WD 127.0 218 23,259
WD 127.0 218 23,478
WD 127.0 218 23,696
WD 127.0 218 23,914
WD 127.0 218 24,133
Curve 15 - Wind
WD 127.0 218 24,351
WD 127.0 218 24,569
WD 127.0 218 24,788
Curve 16 - Bagasse-based Cogeneration (private)
Cost Generation Cum

bag 50.9 84 84
bag 53.6 84 168
bag 54.0 74 243
bag 54.6 84 327
bag 55.5 84 411
bag 56.6 68 479
bag 56.7 74 554
bag 57.1 84 638
bag 57.3 84 722
bag 58.2 84 806
bag 58.2 74 881
bag 58.6 74 955
bag 59.2 84 1,039
bag 59.3 68 1,107
bag 59.8 84 1,191
bag 60.8 84 1,276
bag 60.9 74 1,350
bag 61.0 74 1,424
bag 61.1 68 1,492
bag 61.2 68 1,560
bag 61.3 74 1,635
bag 61.5 58 1,693
bag 61.6 84 1,777
bag 61.9 84 1,861
bag 62.7 74 1,935
bag 63.5 84 2,020
bag 63.7 74 2,094
bag 63.9 68 2,162
bag 63.9 68 2,230
bag 64.2 68 2,298
bag 64.3 58 2,356
bag 64.3 84 2,440
bag 65.2 74 2,514
bag 65.3 84 2,598
bag 65.5 74 2,673
bag 65.5 74 2,747
bag 65.7 68 2,815
bag 66.1 58 2,873
bag 66.9 58 2,931
bag 67.0 68 2,999
bag 67.9 74 3,073
bag 68.0 84 3,157
bag 68.3 74 3,232
bag 68.4 68 3,300
bag 68.8 68 3,368
bag 68.8 58 3,425
bag 68.8 68 3,493
bag 69.6 58 3,551
bag 69.7 74 3,626
bag 70.5 58 3,684
bag 71.4 58 3,742
bag 71.5 68 3,810
bag 71.6 68 3,877
bag 72.5 74 3,952
bag 73.2 58 4,010
bag 73.4 68 4,078
bag 74.2 58 4,136
bag 75.0 58 4,194
bag 75.9 58 4,252
bag 76.1 68 4,319
bag 77.8 58 4,377
Curve 16 - Bagasse-based Cogeneration (private)
bag 78.6 58 4,435
bag 80.4 58 4,493
bag 83.1 58 4,551
Home
Total Electricity Supply Curve
(mid-tem incremental potential)
500
Electricity Supply Curve (Private)
450
Electricity Supply Curve (Social)
400
350
300
$/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 50 100 150 200 250
GWh
Home
Total RES-E Supply Curve
(mid-term incremental potential)
450
400
350
300
$/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
TWh/a
Home
160
140
120
100
$/MWh
80
60
40
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
GWh/a
Sewage
Home
80
70
60
50
$/MWh
40
30
20
10
0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
GWh/a
Landfill
Home
140
120
100
80
$/MWh
60
40
20
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
GWh/a
Biogas
Home
90
80
70
60
$/MWh
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500
GWh/a
Biomass
Home
90
80
70
60
$/MWh
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
GWh/a
Co-gen (social) Co-gen (Private)

Home
250
200
150
$/MWh
100
50
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
GWh/a
WTE
Home
500
450
400
350
300
$/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
GWh/a
PV
Home
450
400
350
300
$/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900
GWh/a
Solar Th
Home
140
120
100
80
$/MWh
60
40
20
0
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000
GWh/a
Wind
Home
450
400
350
300
$/MWh
250
200
150
100
50
0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000
GWh/a
SS hydel
Home
Conventional Electricity Supply Curve
(mid-term incremental)
200
180
160
140
120
$/MWh
100
80
60
40
20
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
TWh/a
Conventional Private Curve Conventional Social Curve

Home
Cost Load Gen Cum Gen
Plant
$/MWh Inv Costs Factor Fuel Lifetime GWh GWh
W1 1 1 108.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 218.30 218.3
W1 2 2 108.15 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 218.30 436.6
W1 3 3 108.15 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 218.30 654.9
W1 4 4 108.15 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 218.30 873.2
W1 5 5 108.15 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 218.30 1,091.5
W1 6 6 108.15 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 218.30 1,309.8
W1 7 7 108.15 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 218.30 1,528.1
W1 8 8 108.15 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 218.30 1,746.4
W1 9 9 108.15 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 218.30 1,964.7
W1 10 10 108.15 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 218.30 2,183.0
W1 11 11 108.15 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 218.30 2,401.3
W1 12 12 108.15 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 218.30 2,619.6
W1 13 13 108.15 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 218.30 2,837.9
W1 14 14 108.15 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 218.30 3,056.2
W1 15 15 108.15 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 218.30 3,274.5
W1 16 16 108.15 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 218.30 3,492.8
W1 17 17 115.20 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 218.30 3,711.1
W1 18 18 115.20 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 218.30 3,929.4
W1 19 19 115.20 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 218.30 4,147.7
W1 20 20 115.20 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 218.30 4,366.0
W1 21 21 115.20 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 218.30 4,584.3
W1 22 22 115.20 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 218.30 4,802.6
W1 23 23 115.20 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 218.30 5,020.9
W1 24 24 115.20 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 218.30 5,239.2
W1 25 25 115.20 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 218.30 5,457.5
W1 26 26 115.20 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 218.30 5,675.8
W1 27 27 115.20 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 218.30 5,894.1
W1 28 28 115.20 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 218.30 6,112.4
W1 29 29 115.20 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 218.30 6,330.7
W1 30 30 115.20 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 218.30 6,549.0
W1 31 31 115.20 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 218.30 6,767.3
W1 32 32 115.20 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 218.30 6,985.6
W1 33 33 119.90 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 218.30 7,203.9
W1 34 34 119.90 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 218.30 7,422.2
W1 35 35 119.90 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 218.30 7,640.5
W1 36 36 119.90 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 218.30 7,858.8
W1 37 37 119.90 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 218.30 8,077.1
W1 38 38 119.90 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 218.30 8,295.4
W1 39 39 119.90 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 218.30 8,513.7
W1 40 40 119.90 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 218.30 8,732.0
W1 41 41 119.90 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 218.30 8,950.3
W1 42 42 119.90 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 218.30 9,168.6
W1 43 43 119.90 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 218.30 9,386.9
W1 44 44 119.90 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 218.30 9,605.2
W1 45 45 119.90 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 218.30 9,823.6
W1 46 46 119.90 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 218.30 10,041.9
W1 47 47 119.90 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 218.30 10,260.2
W1 48 48 119.90 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 218.30 10,478.5
W1 49 49 126.96 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 218.30 10,696.8
W1 50 50 126.96 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 218.30 10,915.1
W1 51 51 126.96 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 218.30 11,133.4
W1 52 52 126.96 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 218.30 11,351.7
W1 53 53 126.96 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 218.30 11,570.0
W1 54 54 126.96 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 218.30 11,788.3
W1 55 55 126.96 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 218.30 12,006.6
W1 56 56 126.96 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 218.30 12,224.9
W1 57 57 126.96 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 218.30 12,443.2
W1 58 58 126.96 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 218.30 12,661.5
W1 59 59 126.96 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 218.30 12,879.8
W1 60 60 126.96 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 218.30 13,098.1
W1 61 61 126.96 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 218.30 13,316.4
W1 62 62 126.96 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 218.30 13,534.7
W1 63 63 126.96 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 218.30 13,753.0
W1 64 64 126.96 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 218.30 13,971.3
Home
Plant
W2 1 1 102.32 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 162.64 162.6
W2 2 2 102.32 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 162.64 325.3
W2 3 3 102.32 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 162.64 487.9
W2 4 4 102.32 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 162.64 650.5
W2 5 5 102.32 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 162.64 813.2
W2 6 6 102.32 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 162.64 975.8
W2 7 7 102.32 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 162.64 1,138.4
W2 8 8 102.32 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 162.64 1,301.1
W2 9 9 102.32 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 162.64 1,463.7
W2 10 10 102.32 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 162.64 1,626.4
W2 11 11 102.32 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 162.64 1,789.0
W2 12 12 102.32 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 162.64 1,951.6
W2 13 13 102.32 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 162.64 2,114.3
W2 14 14 102.32 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 162.64 2,276.9
W2 15 15 102.32 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 162.64 2,439.5
W2 16 16 102.32 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 162.64 2,602.2
W2 17 17 109.00 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 162.64 2,764.8
W2 18 18 109.00 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 162.64 2,927.4
W2 19 19 109.00 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 162.64 3,090.1
W2 20 20 109.00 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 162.64 3,252.7
W2 21 21 109.00 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 162.64 3,415.3
W2 22 22 109.00 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 162.64 3,578.0
W2 23 23 109.00 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 162.64 3,740.6
W2 24 24 109.00 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 162.64 3,903.2
W2 25 25 109.00 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 162.64 4,065.9
W2 26 26 109.00 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 162.64 4,228.5
W2 27 27 109.00 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 162.64 4,391.2
W2 28 28 109.00 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 162.64 4,553.8
W2 29 29 109.00 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 162.64 4,716.4
W2 30 30 109.00 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 162.64 4,879.1
W2 31 31 109.00 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 162.64 5,041.7
W2 32 32 109.00 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 162.64 5,204.3
W2 33 33 113.45 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 162.64 5,367.0
W2 34 34 113.45 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 162.64 5,529.6
W2 35 35 113.45 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 162.64 5,692.2
W2 36 36 113.45 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 162.64 5,854.9
W2 37 37 113.45 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 162.64 6,017.5
W2 38 38 113.45 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 162.64 6,180.1
W2 39 39 113.45 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 162.64 6,342.8
W2 40 40 113.45 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 162.64 6,505.4
W2 41 41 113.45 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 162.64 6,668.0
W2 42 42 113.45 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 162.64 6,830.7
W2 43 43 113.45 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 162.64 6,993.3
W2 44 44 113.45 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 162.64 7,155.9
W2 45 45 113.45 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 162.64 7,318.6
W2 46 46 113.45 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 162.64 7,481.2
W2 47 47 113.45 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 162.64 7,643.9
W2 48 48 113.45 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 162.64 7,806.5
W2 49 49 120.12 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 162.64 7,969.1
W2 50 50 120.12 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 162.64 8,131.8
W2 51 51 120.12 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 162.64 8,294.4
W2 52 52 120.12 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 162.64 8,457.0
W2 53 53 120.12 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 162.64 8,619.7
W2 54 54 120.12 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 162.64 8,782.3
W2 55 55 120.12 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 162.64 8,944.9
W2 56 56 120.12 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 162.64 9,107.6
W2 57 57 120.12 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 162.64 9,270.2
W2 58 58 120.12 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 162.64 9,432.8
W2 59 59 120.12 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 162.64 9,595.5
W2 60 60 120.12 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 162.64 9,758.1
W2 61 61 120.12 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 162.64 9,920.7
W2 62 62 120.12 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 162.64 10,083.4
W2 63 63 120.12 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 162.64 10,246.0
W2 64 64 120.12 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 162.64 10,408.7
Home
Plant
W3 1 1 94.46 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 6.37 6.4
W3 2 2 94.46 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 6.37 12.7
W3 3 3 94.46 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 6.37 19.1
W3 4 4 94.46 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 6.37 25.5
W3 5 5 94.46 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 6.37 31.8
W3 6 6 94.46 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 6.37 38.2
W3 7 7 94.46 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 6.37 44.6
W3 8 8 94.46 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 6.37 51.0
W3 9 9 94.46 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 6.37 57.3
W3 10 10 94.46 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 6.37 63.7
W3 11 11 94.46 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 6.37 70.1
W3 12 12 94.46 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 6.37 76.4
W3 13 13 94.46 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 6.37 82.8
W3 14 14 94.46 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 6.37 89.2
W3 15 15 94.46 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 6.37 95.5
W3 16 16 94.46 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 6.37 101.9
W3 17 17 100.62 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 6.37 108.3
W3 18 18 100.62 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 6.37 114.6
W3 19 19 100.62 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 6.37 121.0
W3 20 20 100.62 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 6.37 127.4
W3 21 21 100.62 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 6.37 133.7
W3 22 22 100.62 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 6.37 140.1
W3 23 23 100.62 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 6.37 146.5
W3 24 24 100.62 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 6.37 152.9
W3 25 25 100.62 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 6.37 159.2
W3 26 26 100.62 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 6.37 165.6
W3 27 27 100.62 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 6.37 172.0
W3 28 28 100.62 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 6.37 178.3
W3 29 29 100.62 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 6.37 184.7
W3 30 30 100.62 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 6.37 191.1
W3 31 31 100.62 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 6.37 197.4
W3 32 32 100.62 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 6.37 203.8
W3 33 33 104.73 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 6.37 210.2
W3 34 34 104.73 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 6.37 216.5
W3 35 35 104.73 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 6.37 222.9
W3 36 36 104.73 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 6.37 229.3
W3 37 37 104.73 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 6.37 235.6
W3 38 38 104.73 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 6.37 242.0
W3 39 39 104.73 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 6.37 248.4
W3 40 40 104.73 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 6.37 254.8
W3 41 41 104.73 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 6.37 261.1
W3 42 42 104.73 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 6.37 267.5
W3 43 43 104.73 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 6.37 273.9
W3 44 44 104.73 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 6.37 280.2
W3 45 45 104.73 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 6.37 286.6
W3 46 46 104.73 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 6.37 293.0
W3 47 47 104.73 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 6.37 299.3
W3 48 48 104.73 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 6.37 305.7
W3 49 49 110.89 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 6.37 312.1
W3 50 50 110.89 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 6.37 318.4
W3 51 51 110.89 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 6.37 324.8
W3 52 52 110.89 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 6.37 331.2
W3 53 53 110.89 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 6.37 337.5
W3 54 54 110.89 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 6.37 343.9
W3 55 55 110.89 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 6.37 350.3
W3 56 56 110.89 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 6.37 356.7
W3 57 57 110.89 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 6.37 363.0
W3 58 58 110.89 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 6.37 369.4
W3 59 59 110.89 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 6.37 375.8
W3 60 60 110.89 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 6.37 382.1
W3 61 61 110.89 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 6.37 388.5
W3 62 62 110.89 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 6.37 394.9
W3 63 63 110.89 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 6.37 401.2
W3 64 64 110.89 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 6.37 407.6
Home
Plant
ST 1 1 301.56 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 12.65 12.7
ST 2 2 301.56 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 12.65 25.3
ST 3 3 301.56 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 12.65 38.0
ST 4 4 301.56 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 12.65 50.6
ST 5 5 289.87 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 13.16 63.8
ST 6 6 289.87 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 13.16 76.9
ST 7 7 289.87 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 13.16 90.1
ST 8 8 289.87 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 13.16 103.3
ST 9 9 282.56 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 13.50 116.8
ST 10 10 282.56 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 13.50 130.3
ST 11 11 282.56 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 13.50 143.8
ST 12 12 282.56 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 13.50 157.3
ST 13 13 272.26 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 14.01 171.3
ST 14 14 272.26 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 14.01 185.3
ST 15 15 272.26 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 14.01 199.3
ST 16 16 272.26 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 14.01 213.3
ST 17 17 348.76 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 12.65 226.0
ST 18 18 348.76 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 12.65 238.6
ST 19 19 348.76 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 12.65 251.3
ST 20 20 348.76 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 12.65 263.9
ST 21 21 335.23 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 13.16 277.1
ST 22 22 335.23 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 13.16 290.2
ST 23 23 335.23 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 13.16 303.4
ST 24 24 335.23 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 13.16 316.6
ST 25 25 326.78 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 13.50 330.1
ST 26 26 326.78 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 13.50 343.6
ST 27 27 326.78 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 13.50 357.1
ST 28 28 326.78 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 13.50 370.6
ST 29 29 314.87 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 14.01 384.6
ST 30 30 314.87 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 14.01 398.6
ST 31 31 314.87 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 14.01 412.6
ST 32 32 314.87 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 14.01 426.6
ST 33 33 380.22 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 12.65 439.3
ST 34 34 380.22 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 12.65 451.9
ST 35 35 380.22 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 12.65 464.6
ST 36 36 380.22 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 12.65 477.2
ST 37 37 365.47 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 13.16 490.4
ST 38 38 365.47 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 13.16 503.5
ST 39 39 365.47 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 13.16 516.7
ST 40 40 365.47 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 13.16 529.9
ST 41 41 356.26 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 13.50 543.4
ST 42 42 356.26 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 13.50 556.9
ST 43 43 356.26 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 13.50 570.4
ST 44 44 356.26 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 13.50 583.9
ST 45 45 343.27 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 14.01 597.9
ST 46 46 343.27 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 14.01 611.9
ST 47 47 343.27 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 14.01 625.9
ST 48 48 343.27 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 14.01 639.9
ST 49 49 427.41 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 12.65 652.6
ST 50 50 427.41 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 12.65 665.2
ST 51 51 427.41 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 12.65 677.9
ST 52 52 427.41 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 12.65 690.5
ST 53 53 410.83 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 13.16 703.7
ST 54 54 410.83 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 13.16 716.9
ST 55 55 410.83 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 13.16 730.0
ST 56 56 410.83 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 13.16 743.2
ST 57 57 400.47 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 13.50 756.7
ST 58 58 400.47 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 13.50 770.2
ST 59 59 400.47 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 13.50 783.7
ST 60 60 400.47 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 13.50 797.2
ST 61 61 385.88 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 14.01 811.2
ST 62 62 385.88 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 14.01 825.2
ST 63 63 385.88 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 14.01 839.2
ST 64 64 385.88 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 14.01 853.2
Home
Plant
PV 1 1 380.42 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 66.46 66.5
PV 2 2 380.42 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 66.46 132.9
PV 3 3 380.42 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 66.46 199.4
PV 4 4 380.42 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 66.46 265.8
PV 5 5 365.66 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 69.14 335.0
PV 6 6 365.66 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 69.14 404.1
PV 7 7 365.66 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 69.14 473.3
PV 8 8 365.66 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 69.14 542.4
PV 9 9 356.44 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 70.93 613.3
PV 10 10 356.44 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 70.93 684.3
PV 11 11 356.44 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 70.93 755.2
PV 12 12 356.44 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 70.93 826.1
PV 13 13 343.45 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 73.61 899.8
PV 14 14 343.45 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 73.61 973.4
PV 15 15 343.45 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 73.61 1,047.0
PV 16 16 343.45 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 73.61 1,120.6
PV 17 17 399.20 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 66.46 1,187.1
PV 18 18 399.20 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 66.46 1,253.5
PV 19 19 399.20 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 66.46 1,320.0
PV 20 20 399.20 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 66.46 1,386.4
PV 21 21 383.71 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 69.14 1,455.6
PV 22 22 383.71 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 69.14 1,524.7
PV 23 23 383.71 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 69.14 1,593.9
PV 24 24 383.71 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 69.14 1,663.0
PV 25 25 374.04 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 70.93 1,733.9
PV 26 26 374.04 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 70.93 1,804.9
PV 27 27 374.04 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 70.93 1,875.8
PV 28 28 374.04 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 70.93 1,946.7
PV 29 29 360.41 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 73.61 2,020.3
PV 30 30 360.41 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 73.61 2,094.0
PV 31 31 360.41 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 73.61 2,167.6
PV 32 32 360.41 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 73.61 2,241.2
PV 33 33 411.72 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 66.46 2,307.6
PV 34 34 411.72 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 66.46 2,374.1
PV 35 35 411.72 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 66.46 2,440.6
PV 36 36 411.72 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 66.46 2,507.0
PV 37 37 395.75 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 69.14 2,576.2
PV 38 38 395.75 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 69.14 2,645.3
PV 39 39 395.75 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 69.14 2,714.5
PV 40 40 395.75 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 69.14 2,783.6
PV 41 41 385.77 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 70.93 2,854.5
PV 42 42 385.77 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 70.93 2,925.5
PV 43 43 385.77 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 70.93 2,996.4
PV 44 44 385.77 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 70.93 3,067.3
PV 45 45 371.71 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 73.61 3,140.9
PV 46 46 371.71 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 73.61 3,214.5
PV 47 47 371.71 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 73.61 3,288.2
PV 48 48 371.71 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 73.61 3,361.8
PV 49 49 430.50 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 66.46 3,428.2
PV 50 50 430.50 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 66.46 3,494.7
PV 51 51 430.50 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 66.46 3,561.2
PV 52 52 430.50 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 66.46 3,627.6
PV 53 53 413.80 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 69.14 3,696.8
PV 54 54 413.80 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 69.14 3,765.9
PV 55 55 413.80 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 69.14 3,835.0
PV 56 56 413.80 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 69.14 3,904.2
PV 57 57 403.37 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 70.93 3,975.1
PV 58 58 403.37 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 70.93 4,046.0
PV 59 59 403.37 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 70.93 4,117.0
PV 60 60 403.37 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 70.93 4,187.9
PV 61 61 388.67 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 73.61 4,261.5
PV 62 62 388.67 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 73.61 4,335.1
PV 63 63 388.67 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 73.61 4,408.7
PV 64 64 388.67 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 73.61 4,482.4
Home
Plant
WTE 1 1 95.21 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 6.58 6.6
WTE 2 2 95.21 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 6.58 13.2
WTE 3 3 95.21 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 6.58 19.8
WTE 4 4 95.21 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 6.58 26.3
WTE 5 5 81.39 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 7.70 34.0
WTE 6 6 81.39 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 7.70 41.7
WTE 7 7 81.39 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 7.70 49.4
WTE 8 8 81.39 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 7.70 57.1
WTE 9 9 74.21 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 8.45 65.6
WTE 10 10 74.21 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 8.45 74.0
WTE 11 11 74.21 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 8.45 82.5
WTE 12 12 74.21 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 8.45 90.9
WTE 13 13 65.54 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 9.57 100.5
WTE 14 14 65.54 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 9.57 110.1
WTE 15 15 65.54 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 9.57 119.6
WTE 16 16 65.54 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 9.57 129.2
WTE 17 17 140.82 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 6.58 135.8
WTE 18 18 140.82 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 6.58 142.4
WTE 19 19 140.82 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 6.58 148.9
WTE 20 20 140.82 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 6.58 155.5
WTE 21 21 120.38 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 7.70 163.2
WTE 22 22 120.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 7.70 170.9
WTE 23 23 120.38 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 7.70 178.6
WTE 24 24 120.38 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 7.70 186.3
WTE 25 25 109.76 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 8.45 194.8
WTE 26 26 109.76 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 8.45 203.2
WTE 27 27 109.76 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 8.45 211.7
WTE 28 28 109.76 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 8.45 220.1
WTE 29 29 96.93 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 9.57 229.7
WTE 30 30 96.93 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 9.57 239.3
WTE 31 31 96.93 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 9.57 248.8
WTE 32 32 96.93 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 9.57 258.4
WTE 33 33 171.22 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 6.58 265.0
WTE 34 34 171.22 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 6.58 271.6
WTE 35 35 171.22 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 6.58 278.1
WTE 36 36 171.22 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 6.58 284.7
WTE 37 37 146.37 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 7.70 292.4
WTE 38 38 146.37 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 7.70 300.1
WTE 39 39 146.37 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 7.70 307.8
WTE 40 40 146.37 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 7.70 315.5
WTE 41 41 133.45 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 8.45 324.0
WTE 42 42 133.45 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 8.45 332.4
WTE 43 43 133.45 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 8.45 340.9
WTE 44 44 133.45 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 8.45 349.3
WTE 45 45 117.86 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 9.57 358.9
WTE 46 46 117.86 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 9.57 368.4
WTE 47 47 117.86 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 9.57 378.0
WTE 48 48 117.86 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 9.57 387.6
WTE 49 49 216.83 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 6.58 394.2
WTE 50 50 216.83 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 6.58 400.7
WTE 51 51 216.83 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 6.58 407.3
WTE 52 52 216.83 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 6.58 413.9
WTE 53 53 185.35 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 7.70 421.6
WTE 54 54 185.35 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 7.70 429.3
WTE 55 55 185.35 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 7.70 437.0
WTE 56 56 185.35 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 7.70 444.7
WTE 57 57 169.00 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 8.45 453.2
WTE 58 58 169.00 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 8.45 461.6
WTE 59 59 169.00 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 8.45 470.1
WTE 60 60 169.00 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 8.45 478.5
WTE 61 61 149.25 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 9.57 488.1
WTE 62 62 149.25 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 9.57 497.6
WTE 63 63 149.25 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 9.57 507.2
WTE 64 64 149.25 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 9.57 516.8
Home
Plant
Land 1 1 60.02 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 4.08 4.1
Land 2 2 60.02 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 4.08 8.2
Land 3 3 60.02 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 4.08 12.2
Land 4 4 60.02 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 4.08 16.3
Land 5 5 54.72 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 4.48 20.8
Land 6 6 54.72 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 4.48 25.3
Land 7 7 54.72 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 4.48 29.8
Land 8 8 54.72 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 4.48 34.2
Land 9 9 51.68 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 4.74 39.0
Land 10 10 51.68 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 4.74 43.7
Land 11 11 51.68 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 4.74 48.5
Land 12 12 51.68 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 4.74 53.2
Land 13 13 47.71 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 5.14 58.3
Land 14 14 47.71 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 5.14 63.5
Land 15 15 47.71 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 5.14 68.6
Land 16 16 47.71 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 5.14 73.8
Land 17 17 65.04 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 4.08 77.8
Land 18 18 65.04 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 4.08 81.9
Land 19 19 65.04 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 4.08 86.0
Land 20 20 65.04 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 4.08 90.1
Land 21 21 59.30 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 4.48 94.6
Land 22 22 59.30 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 4.48 99.0
Land 23 23 59.30 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 4.48 103.5
Land 24 24 59.30 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 4.48 108.0
Land 25 25 56.01 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 4.74 112.7
Land 26 26 56.01 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 4.74 117.5
Land 27 27 56.01 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 4.74 122.2
Land 28 28 56.01 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 4.74 127.0
Land 29 29 51.70 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 5.14 132.1
Land 30 30 51.70 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 5.14 137.2
Land 31 31 51.70 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 5.14 142.4
Land 32 32 51.70 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 5.14 147.5
Land 33 33 68.39 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 4.08 151.6
Land 34 34 68.39 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 4.08 155.7
Land 35 35 68.39 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 4.08 159.8
Land 36 36 68.39 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 4.08 163.8
Land 37 37 62.35 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 4.48 168.3
Land 38 38 62.35 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 4.48 172.8
Land 39 39 62.35 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 4.48 177.3
Land 40 40 62.35 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 4.48 181.7
Land 41 41 58.89 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 4.74 186.5
Land 42 42 58.89 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 4.74 191.2
Land 43 43 58.89 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 4.74 196.0
Land 44 44 58.89 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 4.74 200.7
Land 45 45 54.36 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 5.14 205.8
Land 46 46 54.36 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 5.14 211.0
Land 47 47 54.36 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 5.14 216.1
Land 48 48 54.36 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 5.14 221.3
Land 49 49 73.40 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 4.08 225.3
Land 50 50 73.40 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 4.08 229.4
Land 51 51 73.40 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 4.08 233.5
Land 52 52 73.40 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 4.08 237.6
Land 53 53 66.93 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 4.48 242.1
Land 54 54 66.93 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 4.48 246.5
Land 55 55 66.93 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 4.48 251.0
Land 56 56 66.93 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 4.48 255.5
Land 57 57 63.21 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 4.74 260.2
Land 58 58 63.21 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 4.74 265.0
Land 59 59 63.21 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 4.74 269.7
Land 60 60 63.21 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 4.74 274.5
Land 61 61 58.35 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 5.14 279.6
Land 62 62 58.35 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 5.14 284.7
Land 63 63 58.35 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 5.14 289.9
Land 64 64 58.35 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 5.14 295.0
Home
Plant
Sew 1 1 98.33 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 1.69 1.7
Sew 2 2 98.33 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 1.69 3.4
Sew 3 3 98.33 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 1.69 5.1
Sew 4 4 98.33 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 1.69 6.8
Sew 5 5 89.66 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 1.85 8.6
Sew 6 6 89.66 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 1.85 10.5
Sew 7 7 89.66 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 1.85 12.3
Sew 8 8 89.66 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 1.85 14.2
Sew 9 9 84.68 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 1.96 16.1
Sew 10 10 84.68 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 1.96 18.1
Sew 11 11 84.68 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 1.96 20.1
Sew 12 12 84.68 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 1.96 22.0
Sew 13 13 78.16 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 2.13 24.1
Sew 14 14 78.16 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 2.13 26.3
Sew 15 15 78.16 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 2.13 28.4
Sew 16 16 78.16 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 2.13 30.5
Sew 17 17 111.80 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 1.69 32.2
Sew 18 18 111.80 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 1.69 33.9
Sew 19 19 111.80 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 1.69 35.6
Sew 20 20 111.80 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 1.69 37.3
Sew 21 21 101.93 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 1.85 39.1
Sew 22 22 101.93 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 1.85 41.0
Sew 23 23 101.93 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 1.85 42.8
Sew 24 24 101.93 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 1.85 44.7
Sew 25 25 96.27 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 1.96 46.7
Sew 26 26 96.27 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 1.96 48.6
Sew 27 27 96.27 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 1.96 50.6
Sew 28 28 96.27 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 1.96 52.6
Sew 29 29 88.87 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 2.13 54.7
Sew 30 30 88.87 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 2.13 56.8
Sew 31 31 88.87 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 2.13 58.9
Sew 32 32 88.87 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 2.13 61.1
Sew 33 33 120.78 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 1.69 62.7
Sew 34 34 120.78 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 1.69 64.4
Sew 35 35 120.78 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 1.69 66.1
Sew 36 36 120.78 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 1.69 67.8
Sew 37 37 110.12 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 1.85 69.7
Sew 38 38 110.12 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 1.85 71.5
Sew 39 39 110.12 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 1.85 73.4
Sew 40 40 110.12 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 1.85 75.2
Sew 41 41 104.00 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 1.96 77.2
Sew 42 42 104.00 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 1.96 79.2
Sew 43 43 104.00 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 1.96 81.1
Sew 44 44 104.00 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 1.96 83.1
Sew 45 45 96.00 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 2.13 85.2
Sew 46 46 96.00 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 2.13 87.3
Sew 47 47 96.00 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 2.13 89.5
Sew 48 48 96.00 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 2.13 91.6
Sew 49 49 134.24 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 1.69 93.3
Sew 50 50 134.24 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 1.69 95.0
Sew 51 51 134.24 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 1.69 96.7
Sew 52 52 134.24 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 1.69 98.3
Sew 53 53 122.40 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 1.85 100.2
Sew 54 54 122.40 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 1.85 102.0
Sew 55 55 122.40 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 1.85 103.9
Sew 56 56 122.40 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 1.85 105.8
Sew 57 57 115.60 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 1.96 107.7
Sew 58 58 115.60 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 1.96 109.7
Sew 59 59 115.60 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 1.96 111.6
Sew 60 60 115.60 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 1.96 113.6
Sew 61 61 106.70 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 2.13 115.7
Sew 62 62 106.70 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 2.13 117.9
Sew 63 63 106.70 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 2.13 120.0
Sew 64 64 106.70 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 2.13 122.1
Home
Plant
Biogas 1 1 69.76 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 36.37 36.4
Biogas 2 2 69.76 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 36.37 72.7
Biogas 3 3 69.76 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 36.37 109.1
Biogas 4 4 69.76 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 36.37 145.5
Biogas 5 5 66.04 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 39.89 185.4
Biogas 6 6 66.04 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 39.89 225.2
Biogas 7 7 66.04 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 39.89 265.1
Biogas 8 8 66.04 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 39.89 305.0
Biogas 9 9 63.91 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 42.23 347.2
Biogas 10 10 63.91 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 42.23 389.5
Biogas 11 11 63.91 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 42.23 431.7
Biogas 12 12 63.91 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 42.23 473.9
Biogas 13 13 61.12 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 45.75 519.7
Biogas 14 14 61.12 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 45.75 565.4
Biogas 15 15 61.12 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 45.75 611.2
Biogas 16 16 61.12 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 45.75 656.9
Biogas 17 17 87.68 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 36.37 693.3
Biogas 18 18 87.68 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 36.37 729.7
Biogas 19 19 87.68 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 36.37 766.0
Biogas 20 20 87.68 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 36.37 802.4
Biogas 21 21 82.38 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 39.89 842.3
Biogas 22 22 82.38 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 39.89 882.2
Biogas 23 23 82.38 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 39.89 922.1
Biogas 24 24 82.38 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 39.89 961.9
Biogas 25 25 79.34 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 42.23 1,004.2
Biogas 26 26 79.34 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 42.23 1,046.4
Biogas 27 27 79.34 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 42.23 1,088.6
Biogas 28 28 79.34 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 42.23 1,130.9
Biogas 29 29 75.36 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 45.75 1,176.6
Biogas 30 30 75.36 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 45.75 1,222.4
Biogas 31 31 75.36 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 45.75 1,268.1
Biogas 32 32 75.36 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 45.75 1,313.9
Biogas 33 33 99.62 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 36.37 1,350.2
Biogas 34 34 99.62 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 36.37 1,386.6
Biogas 35 35 99.62 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 36.37 1,423.0
Biogas 36 36 99.62 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 36.37 1,459.3
Biogas 37 37 93.27 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 39.89 1,499.2
Biogas 38 38 93.27 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 39.89 1,539.1
Biogas 39 39 93.27 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 39.89 1,579.0
Biogas 40 40 93.27 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 39.89 1,618.9
Biogas 41 41 89.62 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 42.23 1,661.1
Biogas 42 42 89.62 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 42.23 1,703.3
Biogas 43 43 89.62 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 42.23 1,745.6
Biogas 44 44 89.62 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 42.23 1,787.8
Biogas 45 45 84.85 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 45.75 1,833.6
Biogas 46 46 84.85 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 45.75 1,879.3
Biogas 47 47 84.85 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 45.75 1,925.1
Biogas 48 48 84.85 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 45.75 1,970.8
Biogas 49 49 117.53 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 36.37 2,007.2
Biogas 50 50 117.53 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 36.37 2,043.5
Biogas 51 51 117.53 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 36.37 2,079.9
Biogas 52 52 117.53 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 36.37 2,116.3
Biogas 53 53 109.60 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 39.89 2,156.2
Biogas 54 54 109.60 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 39.89 2,196.0
Biogas 55 55 109.60 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 39.89 2,235.9
Biogas 56 56 109.60 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 39.89 2,275.8
Biogas 57 57 105.05 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 42.23 2,318.1
Biogas 58 58 105.05 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 42.23 2,360.3
Biogas 59 59 105.05 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 42.23 2,402.5
Biogas 60 60 105.05 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 42.23 2,444.7
Biogas 61 61 99.09 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 45.75 2,490.5
Biogas 62 62 99.09 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 45.75 2,536.2
Biogas 63 63 99.09 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 45.75 2,582.0
Biogas 64 64 99.09 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 45.75 2,627.8
Home
Plant
Biomass 1 1 78.52 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 53.36 53.4
Biomass 2 2 79.03 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 53.36 106.7
Biomass 3 3 79.37 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 53.36 160.1
Biomass 4 4 79.89 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 53.36 213.4
Biomass 5 5 71.99 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 62.42 275.8
Biomass 6 6 72.50 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 62.42 338.3
Biomass 7 7 72.84 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 62.42 400.7
Biomass 8 8 73.36 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 62.42 463.1
Biomass 9 9 68.59 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 68.46 531.5
Biomass 10 10 69.11 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 68.46 600.0
Biomass 11 11 69.45 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 68.46 668.5
Biomass 12 12 69.96 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 68.46 736.9
Biomass 13 13 64.49 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 77.52 814.4
Biomass 14 14 65.01 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 77.52 891.9
Biomass 15 15 65.35 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 77.52 969.5
Biomass 16 16 65.86 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 77.52 1,047.0
Biomass 17 17 80.85 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 53.36 1,100.3
Biomass 18 18 81.36 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 53.36 1,153.7
Biomass 19 19 81.71 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 53.36 1,207.0
Biomass 20 20 82.22 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 53.36 1,260.4
Biomass 21 21 73.98 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 62.42 1,322.8
Biomass 22 22 74.49 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 62.42 1,385.2
Biomass 23 23 74.84 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 62.42 1,447.6
Biomass 24 24 75.35 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 62.42 1,510.1
Biomass 25 25 70.41 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 68.46 1,578.5
Biomass 26 26 70.92 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 68.46 1,647.0
Biomass 27 27 71.27 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 68.46 1,715.4
Biomass 28 28 71.78 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 68.46 1,783.9
Biomass 29 29 66.10 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 77.52 1,861.4
Biomass 30 30 66.61 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 77.52 1,938.9
Biomass 31 31 66.95 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 77.52 2,016.4
Biomass 32 32 67.47 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 77.52 2,094.0
Biomass 33 33 82.41 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 53.36 2,147.3
Biomass 34 34 82.92 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 53.36 2,200.7
Biomass 35 35 83.26 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 53.36 2,254.0
Biomass 36 36 83.78 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 53.36 2,307.4
Biomass 37 37 75.31 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 62.42 2,369.8
Biomass 38 38 75.82 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 62.42 2,432.2
Biomass 39 39 76.17 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 62.42 2,494.6
Biomass 40 40 76.68 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 62.42 2,557.0
Biomass 41 41 71.62 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 68.46 2,625.5
Biomass 42 42 72.14 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 68.46 2,694.0
Biomass 43 43 72.48 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 68.46 2,762.4
Biomass 44 44 72.99 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 68.46 2,830.9
Biomass 45 45 67.17 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 77.52 2,908.4
Biomass 46 46 67.68 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 77.52 2,985.9
Biomass 47 47 68.03 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 77.52 3,063.4
Biomass 48 48 68.54 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 77.52 3,140.9
Biomass 49 49 84.74 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 53.36 3,194.3
Biomass 50 50 85.25 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 53.36 3,247.6
Biomass 51 51 85.60 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 53.36 3,301.0
Biomass 52 52 86.11 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 53.36 3,354.4
Biomass 53 53 77.30 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 62.42 3,416.8
Biomass 54 54 77.82 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 62.42 3,479.2
Biomass 55 55 78.16 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 62.42 3,541.6
Biomass 56 56 78.67 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 62.42 3,604.0
Biomass 57 57 73.44 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 68.46 3,672.5
Biomass 58 58 73.95 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 68.46 3,740.9
Biomass 59 59 74.30 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 68.46 3,809.4
Biomass 60 60 74.81 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 68.46 3,877.8
Biomass 61 61 68.77 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 77.52 3,955.4
Biomass 62 62 69.29 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 77.52 4,032.9
Biomass 63 63 69.63 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 77.52 4,110.4
Biomass 64 64 70.15 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 77.52 4,187.9
Home
Cost Load Gen Cum Gen CO2 emissions Cum CO2 Emissions Private Cost
Plant
$/MWh Inv Costs Factor Fuel Lifetime GWh GWh tn tn $/MWh
Co-gen 1 1 63.22 0.10 0.10 0.10 20 57.99 58.0 3,282 3,282 61.52
Co-gen 2 2 65.95 0.10 0.10 0.40 20 57.99 116.0 3,282 6,564 64.25
Co-gen 3 3 67.77 0.10 0.10 0.60 20 57.99 174.0 3,282 9,847 66.07
Co-gen 4 4 70.50 0.10 0.10 0.90 20 57.99 231.9 3,282 13,129 68.80
Co-gen 5 5 62.39 0.10 0.40 0.10 20 67.83 299.8 13,129 26,257 56.58
Co-gen 6 6 65.11 0.10 0.40 0.40 20 67.83 367.6 13,129 39,386 59.31
Co-gen 7 7 66.93 0.10 0.40 0.60 20 67.83 435.4 13,129 52,515 61.12
Co-gen 8 8 69.66 0.10 0.40 0.90 20 67.83 503.3 13,129 65,644 63.85
Co-gen 9 9 61.95 0.10 0.60 0.10 20 74.40 577.7 19,693 85,337 54.01
Co-gen 10 10 64.68 0.10 0.60 0.40 20 74.40 652.1 19,693 105,030 56.74
Co-gen 11 11 66.50 0.10 0.60 0.60 20 74.40 726.5 19,693 124,723 58.55
Co-gen 12 12 69.22 0.10 0.60 0.90 20 74.40 800.9 19,693 144,416 61.28
Co-gen 13 13 61.42 0.10 0.90 0.10 20 84.24 885.1 29,540 173,955 50.91
Co-gen 14 14 64.15 0.10 0.90 0.40 20 84.24 969.3 29,540 203,495 53.63
Co-gen 15 15 65.97 0.10 0.90 0.60 20 84.24 1,053.6 29,540 233,035 55.45
Co-gen 16 16 68.70 0.10 0.90 0.90 20 84.24 1,137.8 29,540 262,574 58.18
Co-gen 17 17 68.60 0.40 0.10 0.10 20 57.99 1,195.8 3,282 265,856 66.90
Co-gen 18 18 71.33 0.40 0.10 0.40 20 57.99 1,253.8 3,282 269,138 69.63
Co-gen 19 19 73.14 0.40 0.10 0.60 20 57.99 1,311.8 3,282 272,421 71.45
Co-gen 20 20 75.87 0.40 0.10 0.90 20 57.99 1,369.8 3,282 275,703 74.17
Co-gen 21 21 66.98 0.40 0.40 0.10 20 67.83 1,437.6 13,129 288,832 61.18
Co-gen 22 22 69.71 0.40 0.40 0.40 20 67.83 1,505.4 13,129 301,960 63.90
Co-gen 23 23 71.53 0.40 0.40 0.60 20 67.83 1,573.3 13,129 315,089 65.72
Co-gen 24 24 74.25 0.40 0.40 0.90 20 67.83 1,641.1 13,129 328,218 68.45
Co-gen 25 25 66.14 0.40 0.60 0.10 20 74.40 1,715.5 19,693 347,911 58.20
Co-gen 26 26 68.87 0.40 0.60 0.40 20 74.40 1,789.9 19,693 367,604 60.93
Co-gen 27 27 70.69 0.40 0.60 0.60 20 74.40 1,864.3 19,693 387,297 62.75
Co-gen 28 28 73.41 0.40 0.60 0.90 20 74.40 1,938.7 19,693 406,990 65.47
Co-gen 29 29 65.13 0.40 0.90 0.10 20 84.24 2,022.9 29,540 436,530 54.61
Co-gen 30 30 67.85 0.40 0.90 0.40 20 84.24 2,107.2 29,540 466,069 57.33
Co-gen 31 31 69.67 0.40 0.90 0.60 20 84.24 2,191.4 29,540 495,609 59.15
Co-gen 32 32 72.40 0.40 0.90 0.90 20 84.24 2,275.6 29,540 525,148 61.88
Co-gen 33 33 72.18 0.60 0.10 0.10 20 57.99 2,333.6 3,282 528,430 70.49
Co-gen 34 34 74.91 0.60 0.10 0.40 20 57.99 2,391.6 3,282 531,713 73.21
Co-gen 35 35 76.73 0.60 0.10 0.60 20 57.99 2,449.6 3,282 534,995 75.03
Co-gen 36 36 79.46 0.60 0.10 0.90 20 57.99 2,507.6 3,282 538,277 77.76
Co-gen 37 37 70.05 0.60 0.40 0.10 20 67.83 2,575.4 13,129 551,406 64.24
Co-gen 38 38 72.77 0.60 0.40 0.40 20 67.83 2,643.2 13,129 564,534 66.97
Co-gen 39 39 74.59 0.60 0.40 0.60 20 67.83 2,711.1 13,129 577,663 68.78
Co-gen 40 40 77.32 0.60 0.40 0.90 20 67.83 2,778.9 13,129 590,792 71.51
Co-gen 41 41 68.93 0.60 0.60 0.10 20 74.40 2,853.3 19,693 610,485 60.99
Co-gen 42 42 71.66 0.60 0.60 0.40 20 74.40 2,927.7 19,693 630,178 63.72
Co-gen 43 43 73.48 0.60 0.60 0.60 20 74.40 3,002.1 19,693 649,871 65.54
Co-gen 44 44 76.21 0.60 0.60 0.90 20 74.40 3,076.5 19,693 669,564 68.27
Co-gen 45 45 67.59 0.60 0.90 0.10 20 84.24 3,160.7 29,540 699,104 57.07
Co-gen 46 46 70.32 0.60 0.90 0.40 20 84.24 3,245.0 29,540 728,643 59.80
Co-gen 47 47 72.14 0.60 0.90 0.60 20 84.24 3,329.2 29,540 758,183 61.62
Co-gen 48 48 74.87 0.60 0.90 0.90 20 84.24 3,413.5 29,540 787,722 64.35
Co-gen 49 49 77.56 0.90 0.10 0.10 20 57.99 3,471.4 3,282 791,005 75.86
Co-gen 50 50 80.29 0.90 0.10 0.40 20 57.99 3,529.4 3,282 794,287 78.59
Co-gen 51 51 82.11 0.90 0.10 0.60 20 57.99 3,587.4 3,282 797,569 80.41
Co-gen 52 52 84.83 0.90 0.10 0.90 20 57.99 3,645.4 3,282 800,851 83.14
Co-gen 53 53 74.64 0.90 0.40 0.10 20 67.83 3,713.2 13,129 813,980 68.84
Co-gen 54 54 77.37 0.90 0.40 0.40 20 67.83 3,781.1 13,129 827,109 71.56
Co-gen 55 55 79.19 0.90 0.40 0.60 20 67.83 3,848.9 13,129 840,237 73.38
Co-gen 56 56 81.92 0.90 0.40 0.90 20 67.83 3,916.7 13,129 853,366 76.11
Co-gen 57 57 73.13 0.90 0.60 0.10 20 74.40 3,991.1 19,693 873,059 65.18
Co-gen 58 58 75.85 0.90 0.60 0.40 20 74.40 4,065.5 19,693 892,752 67.91
Co-gen 59 59 77.67 0.90 0.60 0.60 20 74.40 4,139.9 19,693 912,445 69.73
Co-gen 60 60 80.40 0.90 0.60 0.90 20 74.40 4,214.3 19,693 932,138 72.46
Co-gen 61 61 71.29 0.90 0.90 0.10 20 84.24 4,298.6 29,540 961,678 60.77
Co-gen 62 62 74.02 0.90 0.90 0.40 20 84.24 4,382.8 29,540 991,217 63.50
Co-gen 63 63 75.84 0.90 0.90 0.60 20 84.24 4,467.0 29,540 1,020,757 65.32
Co-gen 64 64 78.57 0.90 0.90 0.90 20 84.24 4,551.3 29,540 1,050,297 68.05
Home
Cost Load Cum Gen

Plant
$/MWh Inv Costs Factor Lifetime Gen GWh
Northen Areas Tormic Phase II 67.76 1,838 51% 20 68.00 68
Northen Areas Harpo Phase II 66.34 1,838 52% 20 67.64 136
Northwest Frontier Baral Darra 100.51 3,471 65% 20 48.67 184
Northen Areas Chhantir 73.14 1,838 47% 20 38.70 223
Sindh Sukkur 65.19 1,838 53% 20 35.11 258
Punjab Chenab/Marala 62.84 2,687 80% 20 37.84 296
Northwest Frontier Ushiri 84.65 3,008 66% 20 32.03 328
Northen Areas Sai Phase I 64.14 1,838 54% 20 49.29 377
Northen Areas Phandar-Chhashi Alt II 63.80 1,838 54% 20 57.58 435
Northen Areas Phandar-Chhashi Alt I 63.11 1,838 54% 20 57.74 493
Northwest Frontier Karora New 81.85 1,838 42% 20 25.75 518
Northen Areas Baru 62.38 1,838 55% 20 34.30 553
Northwest Frontier Rosh Gol, Alt 2 62.38 1,838 55% 20 36.21 589
Northwest Frontier Batal Khwar 57.29 1,838 60% 20 42.05 631
Northwest Frontier Bhimbal 61.42 1,838 56% 20 39.22 670
Northwest Frontier Mastuj River 2 60.85 1,838 56% 20 40.63 711
Northwest Frontier Barum Gol 75.22 1,838 46% 20 39.63 784
Northen Areas Sai Phase 59.05 1,838 58% 20 52.01 836
Northwest Frontier Chokel Khwar 75.22 1,838 46% 20 42.03 878
AJ & Kashmir Madar Butdara 51.61 1,838 67% 20 58.34 1,001
Punjab Chenab/Marala 60.02 1,838 57% 20 31.65 1,032
Punjab Chenab/Panjnad 156.25 1,838 22% 20 12.12 1,044
Northwest Frontier Lutkho River 405.73 12,903 59% 20 32.78 1,077
AJ & Kashmir Naghdar 51.45 1,838 67% 20 65.55 1,143
Northwest Frontier Y.I.A Golen 78.17 3,343 80% 20 79.19 1,222
Northwest Frontier Kedam Khwar 42.97 1,838 80% 20 44.85 1,267
Punjab Main Line Lower (Upper 105.04 4,492 80% 20 43.15 1,310
Northwest Frontier Turkho River, Alt 2 56.48 1,838 61% 20 51.18 1,361
Northwest Frontier Rosh Gol, Alt 1 42.97 1,838 80% 20 42.05 1,403
Punjab Indus/Chasma 87.24 3,731 80% 20 97.06 1,630
Northwest Frontier Bimbal 55.90 1,838 61% 20 75.42 1,706
AJ & Kashmir Doarian 55.81 1,838 62% 20 76.08 1,782
Northen Areas Naltar Phase III 62.50 1,838 55% 20 24.38 1,884
Northwest Frontier Damtour 65.87 2,817 80% 20 105.12 1,989
Northwest Frontier Balkanai 42.97 1,838 80% 20 35.04 2,024
Northwest Frontier Gande Gar 42.97 1,838 80% 20 35.04 2,059
Northwest Frontier Gomal Zam 64.59 2,172 63% 20 95.90 2,155
Northen Areas Parishing Phase III 61.75 2,077 63% 20 29.21 2,184
Northen Areas Skardu Phase-IV, AIt.II 60.72 2,042 63% 20 51.81 2,236
Northen Areas Naltar Phase V 54.56 1,838 63% 20 95.48 2,331
AJ & Kashmir Shontar 54.16 1,838 63% 20 111.21 2,443
Northen Areas Naltar IlI 54.09 1,838 64% 20 100.21 2,543
Northwest Frontier Ranolia 45.23 1,838 76% 20 76.56 2,619
Northwest Frontier Arkari Gol (Alt 1) 53.60 1,838 64% 20 134.83 2,754
AJ & Kashmir Luat 42.97 1,838 80% 20 168.89 2,923
Northwest Frontier Tank Zam 53.59 1,838 64% 20 143.30 3,066
Northwest Frontier Owir Gol 60.99 2,100 64% 20 15.63 3,082
Northwest Frontier Dadar 60.81 2,100 65% 20 22.07 3,104
Punjab Sutlej/Sulemanki 49.11 2,100 80% 20 29.43 3,152
Punjab Ravi/ Balloki 49.11 2,100 80% 20 21.72 3,173
Punjab Indus/Taunsa 60.28 2,100 65% 20 23.41 3,197
Punjab Lower bari doab 60.44 2,100 65% 20 24.48 3,221
Punjab Chenab/Trimmu 49.11 2,100 80% 20 16.82 3,238
Northwest Frontier Biar 59.15 2,100 66% 20 9.89 3,248
Northen Areas Rumboka 62.36 2,100 63% 20 8.83 3,267
Northen Areas Ishkuman 58.94 2,100 67% 20 10.51 3,277
Northen Areas Kar Gah Phase XI 85.97 2,100 46% 20 14.81 3,300
Punjab Chenab/Khanki 49.11 2,100 80% 20 11.56 3,319
Northen Areas Gulmiti 58.42 2,100 67% 20 9.43 3,328
Northwest Frontier Ayun 57.87 2,100 68% 20 29.46 3,373
AJ & Kashmir Taobat 57.70 2,100 68% 20 29.22 3,403
Northen Areas Skardu Phase IV, AIt.I 57.06 2,100 69% 20 28.65 3,465
AJ & Kashmir Battar 57.04 2,100 69% 20 28.23 3,510
Northwest Frontier Garbral River 58.01 2,140 69% 20 28.24 3,538
Northen Areas Kar Gah Phase X 56.88 2,100 69% 20 8.47 3,546
Northen Areas Manthoka (Upgrade) 49.11 2,100 80% 20 5.26 3,628
Northwest Frontier Anakar gol 57.77 2,100 68% 20 4.53 3,633
Northen Areas Asambar 55.43 2,100 71% 20 8.07 3,641
Punjab Ravi/ Sidhuni 55.34 2,100 71% 20 26.34 3,667
Punjab Indus/Jinnah 55.34 2,100 71% 20 8.71 3,676
Northen Areas Basho Phase III 55.27 2,100 71% 20 25.57 3,702
Punjab Jhelum/Mangla 55.19 2,100 71% 20 9.35 3,711
Northen Areas Phultukish 72.07 2,100 55% 20 4.73 3,716
Punjab Chenab/Qadirabad 55.05 2,100 71% 20 25.27 3,741
Northen Areas Dichil 55.03 2,100 71% 20 25.01 3,766
Northwest Frontier Khghan (Alt 1) 54.97 2,100 71% 20 25.04 3,791
Northen Areas Jaglot Alt I 54.87 2,100 72% 20 23.77 3,815
Northen Areas Tangir Phase III 60.40 2,131 66% 20 21.39 3,836
Northen Areas Lupghar 54.69 2,100 72% 20 3.96 3,863
Northen Areas Nolti (NAPWD) 54.56 2,100 72% 20 22.72 3,886
Punjab Main line lower UCC 54.17 2,100 73% 20 21.95 3,957
Punjab Main line lower UCC 53.96 2,100 73% 20 20.79 3,993
Northen Areas Bahushtaro Gol 49.11 2,100 80% 20 6.94 4,000
Northen Areas Basho Phase II 70.55 2,100 56% 20 15.61 4,016
Punjab Pakpattan Canal Upper 53.85 2,100 73% 20 20.45 4,036
Northwest Frontier Laspur River 53.78 2,100 73% 20 20.48 4,057
AJ & Kashmir Dakhari 53.78 2,100 73% 20 20.34 4,077
AJ & Kashmir Chamm Fall 53.76 2,100 73% 20 20.16 4,097
AJ & Kashmir Shahrian 49.11 2,100 80% 20 22.03 4,119
Punjab Sutlej/Islam 53.42 2,100 74% 20 19.97 4,161
Northen Areas Parishing Phase IV 49.11 2,100 80% 20 20.32 4,182
Northen Areas Sher Qila Phase II 53.26 2,100 74% 20 6.59 4,204
Northen Areas Boldas Phase II 53.08 2,100 74% 20 18.03 4,222
Northwest Frontier Chokel Khwawar 69.66 2,904 78% 20 6.08 4,228
Northwest Frontier Naran 52.80 2,100 74% 20 17.99 4,285
Northwest Frontier Dardabahm Gol, Alt 3 52.43 2,100 75% 20 2.63 4,288
AJ & Kashmir Riali-II 49.11 2,100 80% 20 33.56 4,322
Northwest Frontier Rehmat Shah Sind 52.31 2,100 75% 20 5.66 4,327
Northen Areas Kar Gah Phase VIII 52.31 2,100 75% 20 9.21 4,336
Punjab Jhelum/Rasul 52.31 2,100 75% 20 6.97 4,343
Northen Areas Dahimal 52.26 2,100 75% 20 19.10 4,362
Northwest Frontier Arkari Gol (Alt 2) 42.97 1,838 80% 20 185.01 4,599
Northwest Frontier Turkho River, Alt 1 50.14 2,021 75% 20 58.78 4,657
Northen Areas Bashu 45.60 1,849 76% 20 186.06 4,843
Northwest Frontier Machi Branch 47.24 2,020 80% 20 196.22 5,040
Northwest Frontier Rich Gol 68.83 2,100 57% 20 13.01 5,070
Northwest Frontier Tirich Gol, Alt 2 A 44.97 1,838 76% 20 80.35 5,168
Punjab Head Main Line Upper C 51.25 2,095 76% 20 41.53 5,209
Northwest Frontier Harban Gah, Harban 51.35 2,100 77% 20 6.03 5,215
Northen Areas Nomal 53.47 2,287 80% 20 17.52 5,233
Northwest Frontier Khelian Khwar 51.72 2,126 77% 20 16.84 5,250
Northen Areas Hispar Phase II 51.84 2,134 77% 20 16.87 5,267
AJ & Kashmir Dudainal 61.67 2,637 80% 20 210.24 5,477
Northwest Frontier Tirich Gol, Alt 1 A 42.97 1,838 80% 20 84.10 5,561
Northwest Frontier Chaudwan 51.84 2,134 77% 20 16.52 5,578
Northen Areas Gavis 52.23 2,161 77% 20 4.61 5,582
Northwest Frontier Chakosh Gol, Alt 1 52.23 2,161 77% 20 6.30 5,588
AJ & Kashmir Hotreri 52.45 2,175 78% 20 16.51 5,621
Punjab Lower Bari Doab 52.52 2,180 78% 20 16.32 5,638
Northen Areas Gainji 52.52 2,180 78% 20 15.92 5,654
Northwest Frontier DongaiGah 42.97 1,838 80% 20 224.26 5,878
Northen Areas Shushkati 50.52 2,100 78% 20 4.70 5,883
Northwest Frontier Swat River 52.65 2,188 78% 20 15.48 5,898
AJ & Kashmir Hajira 52.90 2,205 78% 20 15.51 5,914
Punjab Upper Gugera Br. 53.20 2,226 78% 20 15.55 5,929
Northen Areas Harpo Phase II 53.30 2,232 78% 20 226.50 6,182
Northwest Frontier Kaghozi Gol (Alt 2) 53.43 2,241 78% 20 15.27 6,198
Northen Areas Talu 46.21 1,976 80% 20 56.76 6,254
Northwest Frontier Bhimbal 53.81 2,266 79% 20 14.79 6,269
Northen Areas Naltar Phase IV 53.90 2,272 79% 20 14.68 6,299
Northwest Frontier Tirich Gol, Alt 3A 53.93 2,275 79% 20 82.96 6,382
Northwest Frontier Jashil Gah, G1 54.11 2,287 79% 20 18.70 6,430
Northwest Frontier Serai, Karora 54.29 2,299 79% 20 93.70 6,538
Northen Areas Sermik Phase II 54.53 2,316 79% 20 14.24 6,567
Northen Areas Doyian 54.63 2,323 80% 20 252.40 6,819
Northwest Frontier Birzin 54.64 2,323 80% 20 3.48 6,823
Northen Areas Chhichi 54.86 2,338 80% 20 7.68 6,857
Northwest Frontier Ushiri (Alt 2) 54.10 2,311 80% 20 6.30 6,864
Northen Areas Sermik Phase III 55.64 2,379 80% 20 13.88 6,892
AJ & Kashmir Sharda 49.11 2,100 80% 20 13.68 6,905
Punjab Ravi/Balloki 57.43 2,456 80% 20 56.06 6,961
Northwest Frontier Kaghozi Gol (Alt 1) 49.11 2,100 80% 20 13.59 6,975
Northen Areas Hassanabad Phase VI 54.93 2,349 80% 20 12.61 6,988
AJ & Kashmir Gumot Nar 55.95 2,393 80% 20 280.32 7,268
Northwest Frontier Karora 55.95 2,393 80% 20 53.96 7,322
Northwest Frontier Kao Gol, Alt 1 91.86 3,928 80% 20 12.85 7,348
Northen Areas Birgal 49.11 2,100 80% 20 5.61 7,353
Northen Areas Darel Phase IV 56.97 2,436 80% 20 12.61 7,366
Northwest Frontier Bumburet 57.01 2,438 80% 20 12.61 7,378
AJ & Kashmir Jagran-Il 57.21 2,446 80% 20 315.36 7,694
Northen Areas Dango Das 49.11 2,100 80% 20 3.50 7,697
Northen Areas Naltar Phase II 52.13 2,229 80% 20 5.26 7,703
Northwest Frontier Seo Khwar 49.11 2,100 80% 20 4.98 7,749
Northen Areas Kar Gah Phase IX 49.11 2,100 80% 20 11.91 7,761
Northen Areas Tolti 49.11 2,100 80% 20 11.88 7,773
Northwest Frontier Koto 58.04 2,482 80% 20 126.14 7,899
Northwest Frontier Ushiri (Alt 1) 58.57 2,504 80% 20 11.56 7,935
Northen Areas Hasis 59.10 2,527 80% 20 2.80 7,938
Northwest Frontier Murdan 49.11 2,100 80% 20 11.21 7,949
AJ & Kashmir Riali-I 59.21 2,532 80% 20 11.21 7,960
AJ & Kashmir Samani 59.46 2,543 80% 20 11.21 7,972
AJ & Kashmir Riali-I 59.61 2,549 80% 20 10.89 7,983
Northen Areas Sermik Phase III 59.93 2,563 80% 20 6.38 7,989
Northen Areas Darel Phase III 49.11 2,100 80% 20 10.51 8,010
AJ & Kashmir Dghanwan 49.11 2,100 80% 20 10.37 8,020
Northwest Frontier Bangroan Khwar, Barigo 64.19 2,745 80% 20 10.29 8,031
Northen Areas Chilas Phase III 49.11 2,100 80% 20 4.91 8,036
Northen Areas Darmodar I 49.11 2,100 80% 20 12.05 8,075
Northen Areas Masholan Gol 61.51 2,630 80% 20 9.81 8,118
Northen Areas Balti 2 61.80 2,643 80% 20 9.74 8,128
Northen Areas Kustang 49.11 2,100 80% 20 3.99 8,132
Northwest Frontier Jashil Gah, Badakk 49.11 2,100 80% 20 9.63 8,141
Northwest Frontier Thal 61.90 2,647 80% 20 9.31 8,151
Northen Areas Bahach Handrap HPP 62.10 2,655 80% 20 18.22 8,178
Northen Areas Gulmiti Alt I 62.98 2,693 80% 20 9.11 8,196
Northen Areas Naz Bar 62.98 2,693 80% 20 9.06 8,205
Northen Areas Damot 64.03 2,738 80% 20 4.91 8,228
Northwest Frontier Daral Khwar 64.05 2,739 80% 20 256.49 8,485
Northen Areas Bubind Phase II 64.25 2,748 80% 20 7.71 8,493
Northen Areas Aitit HPP 64.48 2,757 80% 20 252.29 8,745
Northwest Frontier Kaghan (Alt 2) 64.82 2,772 80% 20 8.62 8,753
Northen Areas Singal Phase II 59.82 2,558 80% 20 9.81 8,805
Northen Areas Hashopi Phase II 62.72 2,682 80% 20 4.49 8,818
Sindh Sukkur 65.20 2,788 80% 20 157.75 8,975
Sindh Sukkur 65.20 2,788 80% 20 127.20 9,102
Northwest Frontier Jabori 65.29 2,792 80% 20 55.29 9,158
Northen Areas Chumar Khan Phase I 65.46 2,799 80% 20 6.59 9,172
Northwest Frontier Soyal Khwar (Alt 2) 65.52 2,802 80% 20 7.85 9,188
Northwest Frontier Sheringal 65.69 2,809 80% 20 4.98 9,208
Northwest Frontier Gandegah 65.71 2,810 80% 20 27.33 9,236
Northen Areas Darel Phase V 67.16 2,872 80% 20 7.71 9,267
Northen Areas Roshan Alt.2 67.16 2,872 80% 20 7.71 9,275
Northen Areas Darmodar-2 67.16 2,872 80% 20 7.67 9,282
Northwest Frontier Patrak 67.16 2,872 80% 20 7.61 9,290
Northen Areas Chilas Phase IV 67.16 2,872 80% 20 4.20 9,302
Northen Areas Tangir Phase IV 80.75 3,453 80% 20 85.50 9,425
Northwest Frontier Chitral 67.91 2,904 80% 20 7.01 9,432
AJ & Kashmir Jari 68.10 2,912 80% 20 7.01 9,439
AJ & Kashmir Sarhota 68.15 2,914 80% 20 7.01 9,446
AJ & Kashmir Rerah 68.17 2,915 80% 20 7.01 9,453
AJ & Kashmir Pothi 64.52 2,759 80% 20 7.01 9,460
AJ & Kashmir Kotli Ban 68.58 2,933 80% 20 7.01 9,467
AJ & Kashmir Barar 50.92 2,178 80% 20 7.01 9,474
Northen Areas Ghoro 69.68 2,980 80% 20 3.08 9,524
Northwest Frontier Bela 70.13 2,999 80% 20 19.62 9,550
AJ & Kashmir Jing 101.10 4,324 80% 20 24.63 9,588
Northwest Frontier Summer Gah 70.67 3,022 80% 20 196.22 9,802
Northen Areas Daintar 71.54 3,059 80% 20 28.73 9,831
Northen Areas Shigar Phase III 55.86 2,389 80% 20 5.75 9,843
AJ & Kashmir Jana Wai 49.11 2,100 80% 20 33.64 9,906
Northen Areas Narh 73.35 3,137 80% 20 2.87 9,925
Northwest Frontier Dongai Gah, Jalkot Nalla 128.33 5,488 80% 20 5.33 9,930
Northen Areas Gulmiti Alt II 49.11 2,100 80% 20 3.50 9,934
Northen Areas Kachura Phase V 55.98 2,394 80% 20 126.14 10,060
Northwest Frontier Kapar Banda Gah 74.31 3,178 80% 20 5.19 10,094
AJ & Kashmir Sarswah 62.44 2,670 80% 20 4.91 10,125
Northen Areas Chalt Phase III 75.23 3,217 80% 20 3.57 10,133
Northen Areas Kiris AIt.2- Phase II 51.95 2,222 80% 20 3.99 10,137
Northen Areas Serbal Gol 50.91 2,177 80% 20 3.57 10,150
Northen Areas Karapchu 76.34 3,265 80% 20 6.94 10,176
Northwest Frontier Soyal Khwar (Alt 1) 76.41 3,268 80% 20 4.63 10,180
Northen Areas Nasirabad HPP 45.21 1,933 80% 20 107.22 10,301
Northen Areas Roshan AIt.1 77.56 3,317 80% 20 4.27 10,310
Northen Areas Damiodar (HEPO) 78.50 3,357 80% 20 4.20 10,322
Northen Areas Chumar Khan Phase II 84.17 3,599 80% 20 2.59 10,337
Northen Areas Sai Phase II 60.74 2,597 80% 20 6.80 10,356
Northen Areas Bulashbar 80.46 3,441 80% 20 3.50 10,378
Northen Areas Gupis 81.23 3,474 80% 20 3.57 10,381
Northen Areas Sosat 82.09 3,510 80% 20 3.43 10,392
Northwest Frontier Kumrat 82.43 3,525 80% 20 4.13 10,396
Northen Areas Thali Alt I 82.78 3,540 80% 20 238.27 10,644
Northen Areas Balti-1 82.50 3,528 80% 20 3.08 10,657
Northen Areas Thang 53.94 2,307 80% 20 3.92 10,661
Northen Areas Harchu 83.82 3,584 80% 20 2.80 10,664
Northen Areas Hamuchal HPP 84.19 3,600 80% 20 98.11 10,762
Northen Areas Niaslo 84.30 3,605 80% 20 2.38 10,767
Northen Areas Nero Phase II 85.48 3,655 80% 20 2.87 10,779
Northen Areas Daltar HPP 87.73 3,752 80% 20 5.19 10,804
Northen Areas Thagas 88.63 3,790 80% 20 3.99 10,816
Northen Areas Olding Phase II 93.74 4,009 80% 20 2.80 10,859
Northen Areas Burzil Alt II 90.12 3,854 80% 20 2.73 10,869
Northen Areas Mngio HPP 108.55 4,642 80% 20 3.08 10,872
Northen Areas Muduli 91.54 3,914 80% 20 2.24 10,886
Northen Areas Buniyal 92.00 3,934 80% 20 2.24 10,890
Northen Areas Hoh 92.89 3,972 80% 20 2.73 10,902
Northen Areas Hassanabad Phase VII 93.89 4,015 80% 20 2.80 10,913
Northen Areas Thali Alt II 96.72 4,136 80% 20 272.61 11,206
Northen Areas Derdi 119.49 5,110 80% 20 5.96 11,214
Northwest Frontier Dir Alt No.1 97.82 4,183 80% 20 3.15 11,221
Northen Areas Brodas 98.75 4,223 80% 20 5.54 11,232
Northen Areas Aspai Alt-II 99.29 4,246 80% 20 3.22 11,239
Northen Areas Mian HPP 99.62 4,260 80% 20 2.17 11,244
Northen Areas Henzal HPP 100.98 4,318 80% 20 105.12 11,353
Northen Areas Sumayar Phase II 104.35 4,462 80% 20 2.66 11,368
Northen Areas Zhojat Gol 105.73 4,521 80% 20 3.22 11,383
AJ & Kashmir Patni 106.59 4,558 80% 20 1.40 11,386
Northen Areas Kilik 160.18 6,850 80% 20 2.59 11,394
Northwest Frontier Lower Thal 109.21 4,670 80% 20 5.61 11,401
Northen Areas Hayul (Chatorkhand) 111.41 4,764 80% 20 2.10 11,413
Northen Areas Shirting Phase II 115.67 4,946 80% 20 4.42 11,422
Northen Areas Rama Phase II 116.24 4,971 80% 20 1.82 11,424
Northen Areas Mehdiabad 117.31 5,017 80% 20 3.22 11,431
Northen Areas Gidiaksdo 119.60 5,114 80% 20 5.26 11,440
Northwest Frontier Pehur 121.83 5,210 80% 20 126.14 11,571
Northwest Frontier Kolandai 122.87 5,254 80% 20 1.68 11,573
Northen Areas Nero Phase I 215.72 9,225 80% 20 1.19 11,575
Northen Areas Minapin Phase III 136.80 5,850 80% 20 1.61 11,577
Northen Areas Amni 124.80 5,337 80% 20 0.98 11,578
Northen Areas Khaiber Phase II 128.12 5,479 80% 20 1.19 11,582
Northen Areas Burzil Alt I 130.67 5,588 80% 20 0.98 11,584
Northen Areas Rattu Phase II 131.84 5,638 80% 20 1.05 11,587
Northen Areas Phakor 141.30 6,042 80% 20 1.47 11,591
Northwest Frontier Sundraul 155.86 6,665 80% 20 1.47 11,595
Northen Areas Doko 156.97 6,713 80% 20 0.91 11,596
Northen Areas Gurikot 164.59 7,038 80% 20 0.98 11,598
Northen Areas Ghakuch 167.24 7,152 80% 20 0.91 11,599
Northwest Frontier Baraul Bandai 177.70 7,599 80% 20 1.68 11,601
Northen Areas Gozer/ Gulo 178.59 7,637 80% 20 0.84 11,602
Northen Areas Aspai Alt-I 197.95 8,465 80% 20 2.31 11,605
Northen Areas Abgarch 203.90 8,719 80% 20 0.98 11,606
Northwest Frontier Dir Alt. No.2 203.90 8,719 80% 20 0.84 11,606
Northen Areas Rathok 211.47 9,043 80% 20 1.12 11,608
Northwest Frontier Booni 219.76 9,398 80% 20 0.14 11,608
Northen Areas Franshat 222.30 9,506 80% 20 1.05 11,609
Home
Private Technology-wise Cost of Power Generation in Pakistan for the Year 2007
New CCGT New CCGT New CCGT Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Hydel RoR Nuclear
Generation Options
Natural Gas Fuel Oil LNG Thar Coal Imported Coal
Project Installed Capex ($/KW) 882 812 882 1,400 1,400 1,547 2,000 Technology-wise Incremental Energy Generation (GWh)
Project Life (Years) 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 GAS CCGT FO CCGT Coal Hydro Nuclear Total
Real IRR pre-tax 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 608 608 - 622 4,091 5,928
Annualized Capex ($/KW/Yr) 110 101 110 174 174 192 248 321 300 - 1,927 - 2,547
Fixed O&M ($/KW/Yr) 30 32 30 29 30 31 30 3,831 3,352 - 432 - 7,614
Load Factor 70% 70% 70% 80% 80% 75% 85% 4,784 3,914 - 689 - 9,387
Operation Hours 6,132 6,132 6,132 7,008 7,008 6,570 7,446 651 498 1,861 6,530 - 9,540
Variable O&M (US c/kWh) 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 1,581 1,129 4,963 5,166 - 12,840
0.4892 0.5184 0.4892 0.4109 0.4244 0.4709 0.3995 (79) (53) 3,102 4,070 4,091 11,132
Fuel Cost 2,491 1,549 - 8,386 - 12,426
Thermal Efficiency (%) 50% 43% 50% 38% 38% 4,764 2,758 3,723 928 (335) 11,838
Heat Rates (Btu/kWh) 6,824 7,935 6,824 8,979 8,979 973 524 - 12,438 - 13,934
Fuel Cost ($/MMBtu) 6.29 13.77 10.21 2.75 2.70 4,120 2,060 3,723 8,921 - 18,823
Fuel cost (US c/kWh) 4.29 10.92 6.96 2.47 2.42 1.07 1,183 548 - 9,536 4,091 15,358
Variable Costs (US c/kWh) 4.39 11.22 7.06 2.67 2.62 - 1.31 (180) (77) 11,168 9,536 - 20,446
25,047 17,110 28,539 69,180 11,937 151,813
All Costs Cents/kWh
Capital Cost 1.79 1.64 1.79 2.48 2.48 5.01 3.33
O&M Cost 0.59 0.81 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.63
Fuel Cost 4.29 10.92 6.96 2.47 2.42 - 1.07
Total Generation Costs 6.67 13.38 9.34 5.56 5.53 5.48 5.04
Social Technology-wise Cost of Power Generation in Pakistan for the Year 2007
New CCGT New CCGT New CCGT Steam Turbine Steam Turbine Hydel RoR Nuclear
Generation Options
Natural Gas Fuel Oil LNG Thar Coal Imported Coal
Private generation cost (Usc/kWh) 6.67 13.38 9.34 5.56 5.53 5.48 5.04
CO2 price (USD/tnCO2) 30 30 30 30 30
Average emission rate (tnCO2/MWh) 0.37 0.5 0.37 0.9 0.9
C02 Ext. Cost (Usc/kWh) 1.11 1.5 1.11 2.7 2.7
SO2, NOX, partic., etc Investmnet
cost to avoid (USD/KW-installed) 100 100 85
Real IRR pre-tax 12% 12% 12% 12% 12%
Annualized Capex ($/KW/Yr) 12.41 € 12.41 € 10.55 €
Operation Hours 6,132 6,132 6,132 7,008 7,008
O&M SO2, NOX, Part. (Usc/kWh) 0.25 0.25 0.25
Local Pollut. Ext. Cost (Usc/kWh) - 0.45 - 0.43 0.40
Prob. Oil jump 20% 20% 20%
Effect on GDP loss (USDMM) 3,664.00 3,664.00 3,664.00
% Oil & Gas imported to power sector 20% 20% 20%
Security of supply. Ext. Cost (Usc/kW 2.48 2.48 2.48
Total Generation Costs 10.26 17.82 12.93 8.69 8.63 5.48 5.04
- -
Notes:
1 Capital and O&M costs are based on US$ 2007 prices.
2 Capital and O&M costs for CCGT plants were taken from latest NEPRA determinations made for upcoming IPPs in the country.
3 Capital and O&M costs for coal based plants were taken from a latest study conducted for ADB to develop Thar coal.
4 Capital and O&M costs for run-of-river (RoR) hydro electric power plants are based on an average cost of a basket of hydroelectric projects for which feasibility studies have been conducted.
5 The costs for nuclear power plants are indicative and used by NTDC for planning comparisons.
6 Price of gas has been taken at parity with the price of gas imported from Iran in accordance with IPI pricing formula.
7 Fuel oil and LNG costs are based on 90 US $/barrel crude oil.
8 Imported coal price is based on import price of US $ 75/tonne.

ADB Technical Assistance Consultant's Report For PAK ARE

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ADB Technical Assistance Consultant's Report For PAK ARE

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Technical Assistance Consultant’s Report

Project Number: 34339-02 (TA 4881)

Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Renewable Energy

Prepared by Hagler Bailly Pakistan and Mercados EMI, Spain

For Alternative Energy Development Board

Ref: L9164PRP April 3, 2009

Subject: ADB TA 4881-PAK: Final Project Reports

Hagler Bailly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.

1. Dr Parvez Butt, Member (Energy), Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan,

Hagler Bailly Pakistan

Mercados EMI, Spain

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

• Investors, taking advantage of asymmetries in project‐related information

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

• Bioenergy, resulting from anaerobic biogas digestors, pyrolytic biomass

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

State-owned Soft loans

IFIs and Financial and technical

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

• Permission for power generation companies to issue corporate registered

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Project 56 0.9 152.1 92.5 20

Hagler Bailly Pakistan | Mercados EMI

Determination of the Avoided Cost

140 RE Supply Curve

120 Avoided Cost

60 Conventional Supply Curve