Analysis
November 16, 2010
Summary: Estrangement in
Turkey-EU relations has, unfortu-
nately, become a fact. Although
overdramatized by the media, the
question of whether Turkey will
eventually decide to go it alone
in world affairs is real. The recent
European Commission progress
report, however, makes only
scattered references to either
issue. Although the EC is right in
its overall judgment, the political
dimension of what has trans-
pired in Turkey this year is largely
missing from its report. Turkey’s
EU aspirations will remain unful-
filled until there is at least some
broad alignment between what
is done in the accession process
and what is discussed in interna-
tional capitals. Two issues may
help to provide a better grasp of
the problem: the recent reform
of the Turkish Constitution and
the evolution of Turkish foreign
policy.
Offices
Washington, DC • Berlin • Bratislava • Paris
Brussels • Belgrade • Ankara • Bucharest
The European Commission’s 2010
“Progress Report” and Real Progress in
Turkey-EU Relations
by Emiliano Alessandri
As it had done every year since 1998,
the European Commission (EC) on
November 9 published its “prog-
ress report” on Turkey, a document
describing the state of the relationship
between Turkey and the European
Union (EU) and indicating remaining
obstacles towards the goal of Turkey’s
EU membership. More so than in
past years, the latest progress report
bore only a pale resemblance to the
lively debates on Turkey in the media
and within international elite circles.
Estrangement in Turkey-EU rela-
tions has, unfortunately, become a
fact. Although overdramatized by the
media, the question of whether Turkey
will eventually decide to go it alone
in world affairs is real. The progress
report, however, makes only scattered
references to either issue.
To a certain extent, this is not
surprising. The EC manages the acces-
sion process, the highly codified path
to membership. Aspiring countries
are asked to adopt reforms to meet the
EU’s political and economic standards
while harmonizing their laws with
those of the European Union. As part
of this process, the EC avoids entering
controversies whose resolutions are
expected to be addressed by individual
states. As a stakeholder in the enlarge-
ment policy, the EC also has a vested
interest in focusing on what is working
rather than what is not.
What is troubling in the specific case
of Turkey-EU relations, however, is
the existence of two parallel levels
of discussion, whose gap has only
widened since negotiations started in
2005. On one hand, there is the tech-
nical and ritualized discussion taking
place in the context of the accession
process. On the other, there is the ever
more heated international debate on
Turkey and its course. This schizo-
phrenia is arguably a problem in itself
and requires honest discussion. What
is certain is that Turkey’s EU aspira-
tions will remain unfulfilled until
there is at least some broad alignment
between what is done in the accession
process and what is discussed in inter-
national capitals.
Overlooking the Political Dimension
Two issues may help to provide a
better grasp of the problem: the recent
reform of the Turkish Constitution
and the evolution of Turkish foreign
policy. The EC praised the recently-
approved amendments to the 1982
Turkish Constitution as a step in the
right direction. The EC report actu-
Analysis
Turkey’s EU aspirations will remain
unfulfilled until there is at least
some broad alignment between
what is done in the accession
process and what is discussed in
international capitals.
ally points to constitutional reform as the main reason to
conclude that progress was achieved in 2010, otherwise a
lean year for Turkey-EU relations (only one “chapter” of
negotiations has been opened so far). The report argues
that constitutional amendments address priorities that are
critical to Turkey’s EU prospects, such as a more compre-
hensive human rights regime; stronger guarantees for
Turkish workers; and more balanced civil-military relations.
The progress report also praises the reform of the judiciary,
which witnessed the reorganization in particular of the
composition and selection of Turkey’s highest courts. The
only real criticism raised is about process: reform should
have seen broader participation from Turkish parties and
civil society, which would have been a guarantee for shared
ownership of the new provisions. The ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP) was instead the sole promoter
of the constitutional amendments among Turkey’s main
political parties.
Although the EC is right in its overall judgment — the
recent reform does “create the conditions for progress in
a number of areas” — the political dimension of what has
transpired in Turkey this year is largely missing from its
report. Turkey’s political parties fought a battle over judicial
reform that had less to do with EU aspirations than with
power. As observers across the political spectrum have
noted, the fight over the judiciary was part of a broader
struggle for influence among rival segments of the Turkish
state and establishment. The outcome is likely a system
that is further deprived of checks and balances, the power
resting preponderantly with the executive and its majority
in the parliament. For the ruling party, the goal of a better
2
functioning judiciary (indeed a commendable goal given
the traditional deficiencies of Turkey’s justice system) was
hardly separable from a second aim: its further “hegemoni-
zation” of the Turkish state.
These developments should worry Europeans as they
engage Turkey. The EU has been right to look at the ascent
of the AKP as a positive factor for democratization. The
AKP represents the rise of Turkey’s “peripheries” (in a
political, economic, as well as cultural sense) and has helped
dismantle the nondemocratic system of privileges that had
been the monopoly of the secular, largely urban “Kemalist
elite” since 1923. What the EU has been apparently unable
to control, however, is the possibility of a transition from
one type of tutelary regime to another. The AKP has been
clever in using its relationship with the EU as an instru-
ment for its internal and international legitimization. It has
accomplished as much European integration as is needed
to keep the accession process going while working to create
the conditions for its long-lasting hegemony.
Turkey’s political parties fought a
battle over judicial reform that had
less to do with EU aspirations than
with power.
The Turkish opposition, until now reluctant to embrace
the challenge of democratization, is undoubtedly the first
to blame. Under pressure from recent defeats, the Repub-
lican People’s Party (CHP) seems now more serious about
reaching out to the EU. Fully committing to the goal of
Turkey’s EU membership would help the CHP expose
the limits of the European and democracy agendas of the
current government, regaining its credibility as a modern-
izing force. But the EU bears its share of responsibility in
the current situation and it should do more. In order to
stem authoritarian tendencies, the EC should insist on
adequate checks and balances. This should not be about
endorsing one party over the other, something that would
be unacceptable and would immediately discredit the EU’s
engagement with Turkey. It should instead involve asking all
parties to make greater, and more tangible, efforts towards
Analysis
democratization through, for instance, the lowering of
the ten percent threshold for representation in parliament
(which would allow for greater pluralism in the system) and
a compromise on a full overhaul of the constitution (which
would test the Turkish parties’ ability to agree on a system
based on the division, as opposed to the concentration, of
power).
Fully committing to the goal
of Turkey’s EU membership
would help the CHP expose
the limits of the European and
democracy agendas of the current
government.
Other actors should become more involved along with the
EC. The European Parliament (EP) — recently empowered
by the Lisbon Treaty — should assume greater responsi-
bility for monitoring Turkey’s domestic developments, and
fully address in its own debates those issues that the EC,
because of its circumscribed mandate, cannot adequately
discuss. Parties represented in the EP have dialogues with
their Turkish counterparts. European Christian Democrats
should engage the AKP on the issue of democracy, stressing
that different religious orientations are never a source of
division as long as they are cultivated within a democratic
system that protects pluralism. European Socialists — the
CHP’s main interlocutors in the EU — should confront
their Turkish colleagues with hard questions. They should
manifest the expectation that a party that belongs to the
camp of European progressives will plan a comeback to
power based not on the unrealistic restoration of nondemo-
cratic prerogatives but on an unreserved commitment to
democracy.
Turkey’s Foreign Policy Evolution
Turkey’s international relations also need closer scrutiny.
Turkish foreign policy has seen a significant evolution in
3
recent years, spurring a debate on whether its new activism
reinforces traditional engagement with Europe and the
West or signals a more independent course. The EC report
acknowledges that on issues as central to Western security
as Iran, Turkey has chosen to go it alone. It is also noted
that Turkish-Israeli relations have frayed. However, the EC
argues that Turkey’s foreign engagement is overall an asset
for the EU as it contributes to expanded peace and stability
in the EU’s neighborhood. While this may be the position of
several EU members — notably the U.K., Spain, and Italy —
it is far from a common European position. In the United
States there is talk of Turkey’s “de-alignment,” but European
countries like France have welcomed Turkey’s efforts in the
Middle East, but only because it reinforces the argument
that Ankara is a useful Middle Eastern ally of the EU, not a
future EU member.
The EC and other EU institutions, such as the High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs (HR), should address these
issues head on, clearly explaining why Turkey would be a
strategic asset as a member as opposed to a mere partner of
the EU. Recent divergences in Western and Turkish policies
and the deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations should
also prompt demands on the future of the much publicized
“zero-problems-with-neighbors” policy: are not, in fact,
the EU and Israel Turkey’s neighbors, too, alongside Pales-
tinians, Syrians, and Iranians? Instead of focusing on the
misleading debate on Turkey’s “drift” towards the Middle
East or Turkey’s “Islamization,” the EU and its leaders
should not shy away from engaging Ankara in a serious
political debate on Turkey’s strategic ambitions. After the
publication of the EC report, Ankara strongly reiterated
its commitment to the goal of EU membership — defined
by President Abdullah Gul as “strategic.” But as Turkey
emphasizes its role as an emerging power with global
The European Parliament (EP) —
recently empowered by the Lisbon
Treaty — should assume greater
responsibility for monitoring
Turkey’s domestic developments.
Analysis
aspirations, it should also be able to clearly detail how this
project remains consistent with accepting the responsibili-
ties and constraints that would come with EU membership.
As a prospective member, Turkey should also more clearly
spell out what its vision of the EU and its international role
is, thus addressing concerns about the impact of Turkey’s
membership on the coherence of the EU as an organization
and a political community.
Instead of focusing on the
misleading debate on Turkey’s
“drift” towards the Middle East
or Turkey’s “Islamization,” the EU
and its leaders should not shy
away from engaging Ankara in a
serious political debate on Turkey’s
strategic ambitions.
In the meantime, the “accession process” should not be
dismissed as irrelevant. What is needed to revitalize it,
however, is greater political realism and sincere efforts to
bridge the different levels of discussion concerning Turkey’s
political evolution. The existing schizophrenic approach
reflects the significant changes over just a few years ago,
and the difficulty of coming to terms with new realities.
Facing these realities honestly does not mean ensuring the
goal of Turkey’s EU membership, but it is the only way to
provide new strong foundations for what has become a very
uncertain relationship. Until then, no matter what is written
in the annual report, real progress will not be attained in
Turkey-EU relations.
Emiliano Alessandri, Transatlantic Fellow, The German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
Emiliano Alessandri develops GMF’s work on the Mediterranean, Turk-
ish, and wider-Atlantic security issues. Prior to joining GMF,
Dr. Alessandri was a visiting fellow at the Center on the U.S. and Europe
(CUSE) of Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. where he conduct-
ed research on European security issues and Turkey. He has held several
positions in leading foreign-policy think tanks and academic institutions
in Italy, the U.K., and the United States. Dr. Alessandri is an associate fel-
low at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and serves on the
board of the IAI-based The International Spectator. Dr. Alessandri was
educated at the University of Bologna, the School of Advanced Interna-
tional Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins University, and Princeton
University, and received his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge.
About GMF
GMF is a non-partisan American public policy and grantmaking institu-
tion dedicated to promoting better understanding and cooperation
between North America and Europe on transatlantic and global issues.
GMF does this by supporting individuals and institutions working in
the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy
and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on
transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster
renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded
in 1972 through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial to
Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides
of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF
has six offices in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, and
Bucharest. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin,
and Stockholm.
About the On Turkey Series
GMF’s On Turkey is an ongoing series of analysis briefs about Turkey’s
current political situation and its future. GMF provides regular analysis
briefs by leading Turkish, European, and American writers and intellec-
tuals, with a focus on dispatches from on-the-ground Turkish observers.
To access the latest briefs, please visit our web site at www.gmfus.org/
turkey or subscribe to our mailing list at http://database.gmfus.org/
reaction.