JMM Promotions vs.
NLRC in effect nullify Section 6 as a superfluity but we do
FACTS:
The respondent cited the second paragraph of
Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended, providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment
appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC, as amended, reading as follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor
Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by
the employer shall be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award.
they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of
the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000 but
also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of
P50,000,
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the
sum of P200,000 with the Philippine National Bank in
compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same
Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of
recruited workers as a result of recruitment violations or
money claims."
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The
appeal shall be filed within the reglementary
period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall
be under oath with proof of payment of the
required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or
surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon
and the arguments in support thereof; the relief
prayed for; and a statement of the date when the
appellant received the appealed decision and/or
award and proof of service on the other party of
such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with
the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the
Administration involves a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer shall be perfected only
upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award. (Emphasis supplied)
Held:
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in
interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof
be given effect, on the theory that it was enacted
as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-
podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's
interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section
6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be
disregarded because of the earlier bonds and
escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would
not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we
find that Section 6 complements Section 4 and
Section 17. The rule is that a construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be
avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent
provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious
whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the
monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the
POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to
post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a
condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision
of the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in
favor of the working class, conformably to the
mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather
than annulling the appeal bond as a further
protection to the claimant employee, this Court
affirms once again its commitment to the interest
of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with
costs against the petitioner.
Casela vs. CA
From December 17, 1956 when the decision in question
became final and executory, to December 11, 1963, the date
when Magsaysay's motion for execution was filed, a period
of six years, eleven months and twenty-four days elapsed.
From this period must be subtracted the time during which
the writs of execution could not be served, or a period of
three years, nine months and twenty-five days.
Consequently, only three years, one month and twenty-nine
days can be charged against the five-year reglementary
period. Undoubtedly, therefore, Magsaysay's motion for
execution of December 11, 1963 was filed well within the
five-year reglementary period.
Conscience and equity should always be considered in the
construction of statutes. The courts are not to be hedged in
by the literal meaning of the language of the statute; the
spirit and intendment thereof must prevail over its letter. This
rule of construction is especially applicable where adherence
to the letter of the statute would result in absurdity and
injustice.
Meridian Assurance Corporation vs. Dayrit
On September 16, 1981, Meridian Assurance Corporation
(hereafter, simply Meridian) wrote to the judgment creditor,
First Western Bank & Trust Co. (hereafter, simply First
Western), offering to pay the amount of the judgment with
6% interest per annum and the approved costs of P237.00.
The offer was rejected by First Western, in its letter of
September 21, 1981, its view being that the rate of interest
should be 12% per annum, in accordance with Central Bank
Circular No. 416 dated July 29, 1974. Another exchange of
letters ensued in which the parties stood firm on the views
set out in their first communications.
Meridian then filed with the Trial Court a motion dated
September 30, 1981, manifesting its deposit with the Court
of the amount of P170,061.03
The question posed in Reformina was whether or not
Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank of the Philippines 6 —
amending Section 1 of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655) by
prescribing twelve percent (12%) per annum as the "rate of
interest for the loan, or forbearance of any money, goods, or
credits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of
express contract as to such rate of interest" . . — applied to
"all kinds of monetary judgment." Reformina held that the
"judgments spoken of and referred to are (only) judgments in
litigations involving loans or forbearance of any money,
goods or credits." It declared 7 that —
. . Any other kind of monetary judgment which has
nothing to do with, nor involving loans or
forbearance of any money, goods of credits does
not fall within the coverage of the said law (P.D.
No. 116) for it is not within the ambit of the
authority granted to the Central Bank. The
Monetary Board may not tread on forbidden
grounds. It cannot rewrite other laws. That function
is vested solely with the legislative authority. It is
axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that statutes
should be construed as a whole and not as series
of disconnected articles and phrases. In the
absence of a clear contrary intention, words and
phrases in statutes should not be interpreted in
isolation from one another. A word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases and its meaning may thus be
modified of restricted by the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The Orders
promulgated on October 15, 1981 and December 2, 1981
are ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The petitioner's deposit
with the Trial Court of the amount of P170,061.03 is declared
to constitute full satisfaction of the judgment against it, and
the Trial Court is DIRECTED to cause entry of said full
satisfaction of judgment, and declare the case closed and
terminated as far as the petitioner is concerned. No Costs.
Socorro Ramirez vs. Hon. Court of Appeals
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or
absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any
person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication
or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized
by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under
this provision of R.A. 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken
together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view
held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include
verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications
of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of
the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms
"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note
Globe Mackay Cable vs. NLRC
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner
company placed private respondent Salazar under
preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October
9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which to,
explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations
three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private
respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal
suspension, which she subsequently amended to include
illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th
month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered
dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and disprove
these findings. 2
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time his compensation was withheld from him up to the
time of his actual reinstatement. 6
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of
reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former,
to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she
lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word
"reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione positions etc.
from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to
give her back the income lost during the period of
unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would
perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been
thwarted when reinstatement has not been forthcoming and
the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside
looking in.
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private
respondent. In the first place the wording of the Labor Code
is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . .
and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the principlesof
statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning
rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid
presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. 26 The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use
of such words as are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should
be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of any
qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a
ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited
provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when
the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
strained relations between the employer and the employee.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated December 29,
1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to
REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay
her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two
(2) years only.
Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary
Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as
security for a loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial
foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to Act No. 3135, was
instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the
mortgage and the property was sold at a public auction held
on February 27, 1981. The private respondent, William
Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public
auction and as a result thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was
issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's
Final Deed" was executed in favor of the private respondent.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in
full:

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired
No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of under the free patent or homestead provisions,
compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period
a judgment of acquittal." 1 The claim was filed with the Board of five years from the date of the conveyance.
of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was
denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the
At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of
scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty
the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of the latter. As such, and even
beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was
on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase.
bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a
This must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act,
land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his
in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no distinction. Ubi lex non
son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
guilty."

Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and

It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . .
the mortgaged property sold at a public auction to the private
unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a)
respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's Final
of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an individual who was wrongly
Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the
accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not commit,
petitioners to repurchase the first on November 17, 1983,
thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the
and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both
instant case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be
made within the prescribed five-year period.
deemed such a victim since a reading of the decision of his
acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based on his
innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, The Court directed the private respondent to
reconvey the subject property and to execute the
corresponding deed of reconveyance therefor in favor of the
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused,
petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the
convicted [and] imprisoned." The fact that his conviction is
purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or
reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that
taxes he paid plus interest of one (1%) per centum per
the previous conviction was "unjust."
month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.

The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as

"knowingly rendering an unjust judgment" in art. 204 of the
Revised Penal Code.

We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent

Secretary of Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit
a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's
claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

Salenillas vs. CA

The coverage and application of Section 119 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise
as the Public Land Act.

It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H.

Enciso whose title, OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August
9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute sale on February 28,
1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses Elena
Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to
repurchase the property provided for in Section 119 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended could have already
started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should have been
dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to
child for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance"
contemplated by the law. We will rule on the issue raised by
the petitioners. 4

On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property

now covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of
Daet, Inc. The mortgage was subsequently released on
November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of
P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners
again mortgaged the property, this time in favor of the