CHAPTER TWO

THE RISE OF LI ZONGREN AND THE GUANGXI CLIQUE

Previous studies relating to the Guangxi Clique in Republican China have discussed
to some degree the origins and intensity of the conflict between this group and Jiang Jieshi,
leader of the Nationalist Government.1 However, the conflict, in our view, not only
reflected the bitter power struggle between them, but also the differences in internal and
external policies between the two parties, something which these studies do not fully
discuss. The conflict had a great impact on the policies and practices of both parties in the
Nanjing decade. If the conflict was concerned with power struggle and policy-making, how
did the Clique come into conflict with the Jiang group? What was the background to the
conflict between them? And what was the impact of this conflict between Li and Jiang on

1
For details of these studies, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in
Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, chapters 6-8;
Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992, chapters 5-9; Mo
Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990, Vol. 1, chapters 6-
8; Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai: SHRMCBS, 1992, chapter
9; Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, Jiang Jieshi yu xi’nan difang shilipai, Zhengzhou:
HNRMCBS, 1990, chapters 5 and 10; Shi Quansheng, Gao Weiliang and Zhu Jian (eds.),
Nanjing guomin zhengfu de jianli, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1987, chapters 6-8; Gao
Weiliang, “1927 nian Guomindang zhongyang tebie weiyuanhui pouxi”, JDSYJ, No. 3,
1988; Lu Jiaxiang, “Lun Jiang-Gui zhanzheng zhong Li Mingrui de fange dao-Gui”,
HCSZXB, No. 2, 1988; Lu Yangyuan, “Luelun diyici Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”, MGDA, No. 1,
1986; Peng Jie, “1927 nian de Wang-Gui zhizheng: cong Guomindang Hankou tebieshi
dangbu de gengdie tankai qu”, JHLT, No. 1, 1991; Wang Xutian, “Luelun kangzhan shiqi
Jiang-Gui zhijian de maodun douzheng”, XSLT, No. 1, 1990; Xue Moucheng, “Lun Jiang-
Gui zhanzheng”, XMDXXB, No. 4, 1982, and “Li Zongren Tang Shengzhi zhizhan”, DSYJ,
No. 5, 1985; Yuan Jingxiong and Li Qixian, “Lun Jiang-Gui maodun de chansheng he
fazhan”, GXSFDXXB, No. 2, 1990; and Zheng Derong and Tian Keqin, “Guomindang
paixi de jiaozhu yu Nanjing zhengfu zai quanguo tongzhi de jianli”, ZGDSYJ, No. 5, 1988.

29
the policies and practice of the Clique in the 1930s? To answer these questions, we need to
trace the origins of the Clique, and examine the conflict with the Jiang group in some
detail. The purpose of this chapter is to pursue these issues. I will argue that the conflict
between Li and Jiang was based on their differences over political unity in both the GMD
and the nation, and over domestic and external affairs as well. This conflict led the Clique
to carry out its own policies of reconstruction and mass mobilization in Guangxi, and to
create a foundation of regional political unity before the Sino-Japanese War.

Historical Background of Guangxi

Guangxi is a province in southwest China, with Guangdong to its southeast, Hunan

its northeast, Guizhou its north, Yunnan its west, and Vietnam (the French Indochina
before the 1950s) its southwest. Historically, it was notoriously poverty stricken. A key
factor in that has been the geographic conditions in Guangxi: it is covered with vast areas of
barren mountains. As a result, the difficulty of communication isolated the province from
the political centre of China before the Republican era, which also caused its low
agricultural production. In the 1930s, Guangxi’s agricultural production capacity was
lower than the national average both in terms of yield per unit area (125kg per mu as
against the national average of 175kg per mu) and cultivable land (9.1% as against the
national average of 10.3%).2 The poverty was worsened by heavier land taxes. In the Qing
era, the tax levies on the province were higher than those of its neighbours such as
Guangdong.3 By the time of the Republic, land taxes were by no means reduced, but had in
fact increased. Consequently, farmers suffered cruel exploitation. “Various abuses, of
having land but without taxes, paying taxes but without land, less land but more taxes, and
more land but less taxes, permeated throughout Guangxi”.4 In addition, exploitation by the
practice of usury in Guangxi was worse than in other provinces. For example, it was

2
See Zhang Peigang, Guangxi liangshi wenti, Changsha: SWYSG, 1938, pp. 134-135.
mu, a unit of area = 0.0667 hectares.
3
”Tianfu”, No. 4, “Kao”, No. 7536, in Liu Jingzao (ed.), Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao,
Shanghai, n.d.
4
Xingzhengyuan nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui (ed.), Guangxi sheng nongcun diaocha,
Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935, p. 280.

30
reported in the late Qing period that the monthly rate of interest on loans was 16.6% in
Guilin fu (prefecture), but its annual rate in Liuzhou fu reached 300%.5
Poverty was always accompanied by chaotic social conditions in Chinese society.
Along with the various imperialist influences penetrating China after the 1850s and the
collapsing rural economy, the already large numbers of the unemployed vagrants (wuye
youmin) began to increase. As Guangxi had virtually no modern industry, the vagrants,
with no legal means of earning a livelihood, joined forces with the secret society (huidang),
banditry (lulin), and disbanded soldiers (youyong), who grew to large numbers in the late
Qing period. They fought the authorities and savagely harassed the people. They also
attacked foreign invaders from Vietnam (Annam, or French Indochina).6 Thus, public
order became a major problem in Guangxi. The saying “no mountain without caves and no
cave without bandits” was a true portrayal of the situation in that province at that time.
Guangxi is also inhabited by various minority groups apart from Han Chinese. The
long conflict between minorities and Han Chinese was aggravated by the large number of
Hakka migrants who had entered Guangxi since the Ming dynasty.7 They fought against
each other very often over land, water and other matters.8 This made the Guangxi people
well known for their militant character. This identity was also strengthened by continuing
rebellions of the Guangxi people, which had a far-reaching impact on the political
development of China from the Taiping Rebellion in the 1850s onwards, as the province
was the birthplace of the Taiping.9 Moreover, the significant achievement of the province

5
Zhang Youyi (ed.), Zhongguo jindai nongye shi ziliao, Beijing: SLSD, 1957, pp. 350-
351.
6
See Lin Baohang, “Guangxi de ‘youyong’”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 170-200. For more
details, see Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: GXMZCBS, 1987.
7
For detailed discussion of the immigration of Hakka moving from north to south China,
see Luo Xianglin, Kejia yuanliu kao, Beijing: Zhongguo huaqiao chuban gongsi, 1989.
8
Xu Qiming, a senior commander of the Clique, as well a descendant of Guangxi Hakka
in Yongfu county, recalled that the fighting between Hakka and natives occurred very often
during his childhood. See Xu Qiming, Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei:
ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1983, pp. 1-2.
9
For discussion of the Taiping Rebellion, see Franz Michael, The Taiping Rebellion,
Seattle, 1966; Ssu-yu Teng, New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. Also see Deng Zhicheng and Xie Xingyao (et al
eds.), Taiping tianguo shiliao, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1976.

31
in resistance against foreign aggression since the Sino-French War in the 1880s further
reinforced the identity of the Guangxi people. The Guangxi soldiers were well known for
defeating the French invaders on the border between Guangxi and Vietnam in 1884. This
victory earned the reputation for the Guangxi people for being unconquerable.10 As Leng
Guan (Hu Lin) has pointed out, “the Guangxi people have the character that they would
rather become bandits in the mountains than surrender to others”.11
Poverty and backwardness, chaos, constant rebellions, and personal courage and
militancy all combined to form the character of modern Guangxi, which took the form of a
regional characteristic. Once these characteristics were combined with a political
consciousness of regional self-government following the introduction of various popular
“isms” and ideas which spread in the late Qing and the early Republic, political
regionalism, or provincialism, emerged and developed.12 This reflected a growing political
and cultural cohesion of regional identity, which in turn provided a motive force for
regional cohesion. And this in turn became a component of modern nationalism, which
was emerging to become the main motive force in overthrowing the Qing Dynasty and
establishing a republic. This was further strengthened by the rising military force of the
regions. Political regionalism thus became a common phenomenon throughout China, this
was an indication of the weakening of central authority; but it was the first step towards the
ultimate political integration of the modern Chinese nation-state. It seems to have been a
necessary process, as the old society had broken down without any sign of its revival in the
new world of domestic trouble and external invasion of the early twentieth century.13

10
For details of the victory of the Qing army over the French army in 1884, see Lu
Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan; and Yang Jialuo (ed.), Zhongfa zhanzheng
wenxian huibian, Taipei: Dingwen shuju, 1973; as well as Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi
nian wenxian bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Zhonghua minguo kaiguo wushi nian wenxian,
diyi bian diwuce: lieqiang qinlue [2], Taipei: ZZSJ, 1970.
11
Leng Guan, “Yue-Gui xieying”, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,
1935, p. 10.
12
For detailed discussion of the rise of the political regionalism, see Li Jifeng, Shengqu
zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, unpublished PhD dissertation, Nanjing University,
1992.
13
For details of discussion related to regionalism, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation,
“Introduction”.

32
 The rebellious and unlikely traits of the bulk of its citizens did not undermine
Guangxi’s interest and participation in significant political events and movements in China
before 1911 and after. On the contrary, Guangxi had a considerable role to play in
Republican China’s political development,14 and it had a close connection with the course
of modern Chinese history, despite the fact, as Lary says, that it “felt itself to be only on the
edge of the Chinese world”.15 Indeed, Guangxi was as backward economically and isolated
politically as were its unfavourable geographical circumstances.16 The backwardness and
isolation were further worsened by unequal development in the social and economic realms
in different regions of China after the 1840s. However, the military achievements of
Guangxi in the late Qing and the early Republic, and the active participation and
involvement in the political development of modern China, inspired its people and
influenced later generations,17 particularly the new military and political group in the
Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomindang), the so-called Guangxi Clique (Guixi) with Li
Zongren as its head. Because of the appalling poverty and backwardness as well chaos in
the province, these leaders were anxious to change Guangxi’s conditions, and sought to use
military force to achieve this, to advance regionalism, and to promote their role in national
affairs - a goal they pursued in Chinese politics and military affairs. The Guangxi Clique,
in order to unite the people behind them, attributed Guangxi's poverty to imperialist
aggression, against which they mobilized, organized, educated, trained and armed the
masses to awaken them to a new political consciousness. In this way, the militant character
of the Guangxi people was successfully combined with the Clique's policy of militarism, a
tool for its existence and development, and for reunification of the province. The anti-
imperialist tradition which had developed from the Taiping became a driving force to take
Guangxi to a strong position from which it could play an important role in Chinese politics.

14
For details of Guangxi’s role playing in Chinese politics before 1920, see Lu Juntian
and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan.
15
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 26-27.
16
For detailed discussion of the circumstances, see Ibid, pp. 21-33.
17
All memoirs and recollections written by members of the Guangxi Clique claim that
they had more or less been influenced by the achievements of their older generation from
the Taiping, the Sino-French War and the Black Flag Army (heiqi jun) under the command
of Liu Yongfu and so on. Whatever the reason, it reflects the fact that the people of
Guangxi possessed an identity reflecting their history and their geographical location.

33
The Rise of Li Zongren and the Formation of the Guangxi Clique

Li Zongren was born on 13 August 1891 into a straitened peasant family in Lingui
county, near Guilin, the then capital of Guangxi. In his childhood his ambition was only to
be a duck-keeper.18 However, China's political and social changes brought him out of the
rural lifestyle and into a new world. With a series of national crises taking place at the end
of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, one of the policies adopted by the
Qing government was to set up a modern military school in each province in order to help
maintain its rule. Ironically, the establishment of the military schools changed not only the
fate of China itself, i.e. destruction of the Qing Dynasty, but also the life and career of many
individuals, including Li Zongren. Like other militarists of the Republic, Li was attracted
by the new and dynamic atmosphere of the outside world created by this modern facility
and left the village for ever. He became a cadet of the Guangxi lujun xiaoxue, the Guangxi
Military Elementary School (GMES), in Guilin in 1909. As he worked hard and did very
well in military training, Li enjoyed a high reputation among his schoolmates, who gave
him a nickname “Fierce Kid Li”.19 He joined the Tongmenghui (the Revolutionary
Coalition, which was established by Sun Yatsen in Tokyo in 1905) in about 1910,20 and
completed his studies in this school in 1913.21
Inspired by patriotism, Li began his long military career in 1916 when he was
recruited into the National Protection Army (huguo jun) which was initiated by Generals
Cai E and Tang Jiyao - the so-called National Protection Movement (huguo yundong) - to
fight President Yuan Shikai who attempted to restore the monarchical system with himself

18
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979, p. 13.
19
Ibid, p. 21. Also see Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7,
p. 104 (Hereafter as “Jingguo”).
20
Te-kong Tang and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 23.
21
In 1912 the school was renamed the Guangxi lujun sucheng xuetang, i.e. the Guangxi
Intensive Military Training School (GIMTS). For details of this school, see Li Shucheng,
“Xinhai geming shiqi Guangxi de lujun ganbu xuetang he lujun xiaoxuetang”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 10, pp. 38-42.

34
as emperor. As an officer of the Constitution Protection Army (hufa jun), Li then
participated in the Constitution Protection War (hufa zhanzheng) in the following year,
which was launched by the Southern Military Government in Guangzhou. With his
distinguished performance in both the National Protection War (huguo zhanzheng) and
hufa zhanzheng he was soon promoted to a battalion commander in 1918, and a deputy
regimental commander in 1921. For his bravery and military ability he also was highly
praised by the young middle and lower ranking officers in the Guangxi armies; these
officers had mostly been his schoolmates at the military schools.22 This reputation placed
him in a favourable position to unite these young officers around him when he himself
became a provincial militarist and reunified Guangxi several years later.
The year 1921 gave Li an opportunity to rise as a provincial militarist during the
Guangdong army's invasion of Guangxi. Lu Rongting, then ruler of Guangxi, was defeated
and reluctantly announced his retirement, leaving the province in turmoil. Li resolutely
broke away from the old Guangxi army set up by Lu Rongting. In this complicated and
uncertain situation, Li carried out a policy of “examining the situation carefully and then
waiting for change” (jingguan daibian),23 and led his troops into the Sixty Thousand
Mountains (liuwan dashan) to maintain and develop his own strength. This action had a
great impact on the course of Guangxi's history. With his reputation as a middle-ranking
commander in the Guangxi armies, Li attracted a large number of military school graduates
to his side, and soon had a small but effective force of 2,000 men. In the fall of 1921, by
seizing an opportunity in the chaotic situation prevailing in the province, he occupied Yulin
fu, including seven counties in the West River Valley of Guangxi, the richest area of the
province.24 With this base secured and his troops well-trained and disciplined, Li rose
rapidly to embark on his political and military career in modern Chinese history.

22
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, p. 52; and Yin
Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 111-2.
23
Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 120-5.
24
For the details of Li's occupation of Yulin, see Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10, pp. 1-50.

35
 The rise of new provincial militarists was an outcome of the time, and a common
phenomenon in the Republic.25 Guangxi was no exception. The provincial turmoil and
civil war of Guangxi caused its economic and financial collapse. In these circumstances,
ending the chaos and reunifying the province became a common cause.26 However, there
could be no help from the central authority. The Beijing government and Sun Yatsen’s
Guangzhou government were involved in their own internal struggles for power and even
for their very survival,27 and had neither time nor strength to pay attention to regional
affairs, particularly Guangxi, a province remote from Beijing and a hostile neighbour of
Guangdong between the years 1920-1922.28 Under the circumstances, the chaos of
Guangxi was left to be solved by its own internal forces. In this situation, any faction
within the province which carried out an appropriate and determined policy could become
the new ruler of the entire province.
The rise of Li Zongren in Guangxi in the early 1920s depended to a great extent on
the unity of the young Guangxi army officers who graduated from military schools. This
unity led to the formation of what is commonly known as the Guangxi Clique, though its
members did not use that name, regarding it as an insulting term, which is the sense in
which it was used to refer to them by outsiders, particularly those rivals of the Guangxi
group, from about 1927. The turmoil in Guangxi after 1921 created a great chance for the
rapid rise of young army officers. By establishing his sphere of influence in Yulin and
pursuing a firm policy of “uniting graduates of military schools to strengthen his own

25
Tao Juyin and Tian Buyi provide plenty of examples of the rise of this sort of militarist
after the 1911 Revolution. For further details, see works by Tao Juyin and Tian Buyi in the
Bibliography of this thesis.
26
Li Jiaxian, “Zizhijun zhanling Nanning he Guangxi de jumian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, p.
154.
27
For details of the internal struggles of the two regimes in the North and South, see
Andrew J. Nathan, Beijing Politics: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism,
1918-1923, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974; and Mo Shixiang, Hufa
yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992.
28
For details of the hostility between Guangdong and Guangxi and the wars between the
two provinces, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921; and
Mo Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992.

36
force”,29 Li soon built up his power base. Guangxi’s graduates of the military schools,
such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi and Huang Xuchu, together with some ambitious
military graduates from other provinces, such as Hu Zongduo and Tao Jun, natives of
Hubei province, all joined his troops. When Li made himself Commander-in-Chief of the
Guangxi 2nd Route Self-Governing Army (zizhijun) in 1922, for example, his subordinates
(above the rank of major) were nearly all these graduates. Even when his troops were
reorganized as the 7th Army of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) early in 1926,
thirty-two high-ranking officers of the army were of the same background.30 With his
successful political, military and financial practices in Yulin,31 Li expanded his troops to
number about 10,000 by early 1924, and extended his sphere of influence into Wuzhou and
Xunzhou (Guiping) - the other rich areas in the West River Valley of Guangxi. With his
highly qualified officers and well trained soldiers, Li was able to keep his own areas free of
turmoil, and he managed to maintain social stability in these areas during Guangxi's
chaos.32
Li's actions after 1921 made him a regional militarist. However, like many other
well-trained soldiers, neither he nor his colleagues were satisfied with the role they played.
They desired also to pursue a political objective and be motivated by political ideals. An
important decision was made to join the Guangzhou government under the leadership of
Sun Yatsen in 1923. Apart from geographic and cultural connections between the two
provinces of Guangxi and Guangdong, two factors were crucial. First, after the
establishment of his sphere of influence in Yulin and Wuzhou areas, Li and his colleagues
had an ambition to reunify Guangxi. To reach this goal, outside military and political
support was necessary. At the same time, the Guangzhou government was also seeking a

29
Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, p. 130.
30
Materials from the memoirs and reminiscences of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai
Chongxi, Yin Chenggang and other senior members of the Guangxi Clique. See Appendix
1.1 and Appendix 1.2.
31
For details of these practices, see Wen Guan, “Guangxi geju xia zhi caizheng
zhuangkuang”, NLZB, No. 40 (4 February 1923); Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 125-30;
and Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10, pp. 1-50.
32
Yin Chenggang, “Jingguo”, pp. 129-30; and Wen Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshi nian
Zhongguo junshi shi, reprinted Taipei, 1962, Vol. 1, p. 345.

37
pro-Guangzhou force from Guangxi to free western Guangdong from the threat of other
military groups such as Shen Hongying and Tang Jiyao, two major militarists in Guangxi
and Yunnan who had attempted to take over Guangzhou. If they accepted the leadership of
Guangzhou, Li and his colleagues would in turn receive material support to complete the
reunification of Guangxi and then to work towards transforming the province.33
Meanwhile, Guangxi public opinion expressed the view that "the figures with the
revolutionary spirit who were trusted by the [Guangzhou] Revolutionary Government
would rise to rule the province".34 Li and his group were thus in the right place at the right
time. This is because this group was a new force with revolutionary ideas,35 and also
because it was regarded as a force that could be trusted by both the Guangxi people and the
Guangzhou government too.36
Secondly, Sun Yatsen and his colleagues had earned a reputation in their struggle to
overthrow the Qing Dynasty and to promote the Republic in the past decades. Sun’s ideal,
which was expressed in his “Three Principles of the People” (sanmin zhuyi), also met the
needs of the current political climate which sought to enrich the state and strengthen the
military (fuguo qiangbing). This also affected the ideology and actions of many Chinese,
including these young army officers. As he needed wide support during the Guangzhou
Military Revolutionary Government in the early 1920s, Sun Yatsen opened the door of his
party (i.e. the Guomindang) to anyone and any faction promising this, whether that support
was substantial or just lip service. Joining the Guangzhou Military Revolutionary
Government would not only meet the ideal Li Zongren and his group pursued, but also
allow them to have a role in the party under Sun Yatsen, which might well have control
over the whole country in the future. Furthermore, Sun had future plans to launch the
Northern Expedition to reunify China under his leadership. Although at this time his

33
Yang Yitang, Deng Yanda, Guangzhou: GDRMCBS, 1986, pp. 5-6. Also see Li
Jiezhi, “Guanyu Li Jishen fuzhi xin Guixi qijia de pianduan huiyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 14,
pp. 33-43.
34
Qunyan (Your Say), Vol. 4, No. 1 (1925).
35
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, pp. 95-102; Huang
Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 56-7; and Huang Xuchu,
“Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, Nos. 170-173 (hereafter as “BGYWL”).
36
Yang Yitang, Deng Yanda, pp. 5-7; and Qunyan, Vol. 4, No. 1.

38
military strength was too weak to control the whole of Guangdong, Sun's ideas and
revolutionary banner would be useful weapons for Li and his colleagues to use in their own
plans to reunify Guangxi. Moreover, the Guangzhou government on its own initiative tried
to build a close cooperative relationship with the new and rising Guangxi Clique.37 In these
circumstances, Li Zongren and Huang Shaohong, another leader of the Guangxi group,
joined the Guangzhou government first and then the Guomindang (GMD), the Chinese
Nationalist Party reorganized by Sun in 1924.38
In the summer of 1924, Li and Huang dispatched their troops - “dinggui jun” and
“taozei jun” - separately from Yulin and Wuzhou to attack Nanning, capital of Guangxi.
They soon defeated the remnants of Lu Rongting, who then had 20,000 troops and
controlled south and west Guangxi, and captured Nanning in July. This victory led to the
formation of the Guangxi Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei
lianjun), with Li as Commander-in-Chief and Huang as Deputy Commander-in-Chief in
the same month,39 marking the official establishment of the Guangxi Clique. Sun Yatsen
on behalf of the Guangzhou Military Revolutionary Government appointed Li
Commissioner of the Guangxi Provincial Pacification Office (Guangxi quansheng
shuijinchu duban) and Huang Deputy Commissioner (huiban) on 24 November 1924,
which officially confirmed the two men’s leadership in the Clique. By the end of the year,
the Guangxi Clique had expanded its strength to over 20,000 men. However, the north and
northeast areas of Guangxi were still under the control of Shen Hongying, the biggest
militarist of the province who had an army of 30,000. To reunify the whole province, the

37
Li’s relations with the Guangzhou government (or Guangdong province) will be
discussed in Chapter Five.
38
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 79-80. According to a report, Li Zongren “had
decided to ally with Guangdong and he had sent a delegation to Guangzhou for discussion”.
See Shenbao, 17/10/1923. This indicates that Li's statement about his contact with Li
Jishen at the end of 1923 is reliable. See Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of
Li Tsung-jen, p. 104.
39
For details of the reunification of Guangxi by Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique, see
memoirs of Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xu Qiming, Huang Xuchu, Zhang
Renmin and other members of the Clique in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see
GXWSZLXJ, No. 29.

39
Clique launched a campaign and wiped out Shen’s troops in the first half of 1925.40 At the
same time, the Clique also annihilated the invasion force of Tang Jiyao, the biggest
Yunnan-based militarist in southwest China. An opportunity came for Tang when Sun
Yatsen was critically ill in Beijing at the end of 1924. Tang attempted to take over the
Guangzhou government to replace the leadership of Sun.41 To clear a way for occupation
of Guangdong, Tang attacked Guangxi with a crack force of 60,000, but his powerful
troops were fiercely resisted and finally defeated by the Clique in July 1925.42 The victory
over both Shen and Tang brought an end to Guangxi's chaos which had existed since 1921
and signalled the arrival of a powerful new force under the Nationalist government which
was just established in Guangzhou in the same month.
The rise of the Clique and the reunification of Guangxi were of great significance to
the political development of both the province and its neighbour - Guangdong. It helped
consolidate the Guangzhou government43 and supported the complete reunification of the

40
Yu Shixi, “Xin Guixi xiaomie Shen Hongying jituan jingguo”, GXWSZL, No. 29, pp.
119-24. Yu was then a subordinate commander of Shen Hongying.
41
Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, pp. 86-8; XDZB, No. 107 (1925), p. 898;
Shenbao, March 24, 1925. Sun Yatsen died in Beijing on March 12, 1925.
42
For details of the campaign, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li
Tsung-Jen, pp. 112-3; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 94-104; Bai Chongxi, Bai
Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1984, pp. 29-32; Zhang Renmin,
Huiyi lu, Hong Kong: printed by the author, 1988, pp. 43-9; and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi
yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 103 (16 October 1961), pp. 2-5
(hereafter as “Guangxi”).
43
The Clique’s extermination campaigns against Shen Hongying and Tang Jiyao, in the
first half of 1925, enabled the Guangzhou government to launch the Eastern Expedition
(dongzheng) against Chen Jiongming, a former subordinate of Sun Yatsen and a
Guangdong militarist, in Dong (East) River Valley of Guangdong, and to suppress
separately the troops under Liu Zhenhuan and Yang Ximin who were affiliated to the
Guangzhou government and were thought to be scheming to take over Guangzhou in the
same period. At the same time, Shen and Tang attempted to take over Guangzhou. The
Clique resisted Tang's offensives and eliminated Shen’s influence. This ensured the
consolidation of the Guangzhou government, and then the establishment of the Nationalist
Government in Guangzhou in July 1925. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.),
Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian, Nanjing: JSGJCBS, 1986, Vol. 4, pp. 887-
912. Hereafter as Huibian.

40
Guangdong province in the fall of 1925.44 However, it should be pointed out that, in
dealing with the reunification of Guangdong, many contemporary Chinese historians have
neglected the support and help from the Clique, and have usually attributed the event to the
contribution of the Huangpu Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao) under the leadership of
Jiang Jieshi and of the other forces in Guangdong, such as the united front between the
Nationalists and Communists.45 In fact, Guangdong was not successfully reunified until
the formation of the Guangxi Clique and the subsequent reunification of the province.
When the Nationalist government was set up in Guangzhou in July 1925, Guangxi was the
first province to come under its administration and to offer powerful support to reunify
Guangdong. The military and organizational skills of the Guangxi Clique were clearly
sought after by that body.46 The Clique also became one of the main forces behind the
Northern Expedition, playing a very important role in the military dimensions of the
Expedition.

Heading for the Northern Expedition

China was fragmented in the 1920s. Two national governments existed at the same
time, each demanding the loyalty of politicians, militarists and the common people.
Meanwhile, the imperialist powers, particularly Japan, speeded up their steps to exploit
China and conquer the Chinese people by taking advantage of China’s internal turmoil.
Hence, territorial reunification, i.e. the establishment of a united Chinese national
government and political unity of the country became an urgent need of the time. For the

44
For the contribution of the Guangxi Clique to the reunification of Guangdong in detail,
see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-Jen, pp. 124-6; Huang
Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 107; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 103, pp. 2-5; Bai
Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, p. 32; and Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, pp. 51-
2.
45
See, for example, Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, Taipei: Xueshu zhuzuo
jiangzhu weiyuanhui, 1966; Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong
chubanshe, 1977; and Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, Zhengzhou:
HNRMCBS, 1985.
46
On 6 August 1925, the Nationalist government placed Li and Huang in charge of
Guangxi’s military and political affairs. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, Huibian, p.
908.

41
Guangzhou government, the Northern Expedition to reunify the nation under the leadership
of the GMD was a firm policy, a goal Sun Yatsen had dreamed of since the Constitution
Protection Movement. Even members of the Beijing government such as Duan Qirui
wanted to reunify China by force. A war to reunify the country to create one national
government would naturally also provide opportunities for those militarists with advanced
military training and great ambitions to pursue their careers and serve the country at the
same times. When Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique decided to come under the
Guangzhou government, they became involved in the Northern Expedition, motivated by
several factors.
First, Guangxi was completely unified under the Nationalist government in early
1926.47 Although the Clique showed a strong regionalist feeling before 1925, as many
other militarists did at that time,48 this unification indicated that Li and his group had
already shifted their focus to beyond the province. They had an strong desire to participate
in national political and military affairs. Li and his colleagues supported the aim of the
Northern Expedition to reunify China, which, if successful, would give them an opportunity
to serve the national government.49
Secondly, as every member of the Clique was aware, Guangxi was the birthplace of
the Taiping Rebellion. Taiping heroism and military achievements had inspired the

47
For details of the process by which Guangxi was completely unified under the
Nationalist Government in politics, military, and finance, see Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi
xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 33-6; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 117-21; Te-kong
Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 138-42; and Zhongguo dier lishi
dangan guan, Huibian, pp. 910-2.
48
Before the reunification of Guangxi, for example, Li and Huang had implied a strong
regionalist colour with the chosen title of their troops, “Guangxi Pacification and Bandit
Suppression Army”, even though the appointment from the Nationalist government in 1925
placed them in charge of military and political affairs of the province only. It was, on the
one hand, a common process towards national affairs when regionalists were just rising to
power in their provinces. On the other hand, this showed an attempt by the Nationalist
government to secure power in the Centre and to limit the interests and power of the
regions. See Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, Huibian, pp. 906-8; and Diana Lary, Region
and Nation, pp. 43-63.
49
Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, p. 54; and Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu,
p. 34.

42
younger generations of the province to strive for a higher political and military goal.50
Since its foundation, the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the so-called Hong-
Yang (Taiping) Revolution. For them, the Northern Expedition was the continuation of the
Taiping.51 They were uneasy about the fact that, although Guangxi was now part of the
Nationalist government, it was belittled and discriminated against by some major factions
of the GMD, especially in terms of the army reorganization and financial support.52 The
Clique attempted to promote its position in both the GMD and the rest of the nation
through its performance in the Northern Expedition.53
Thirdly, there was a more pragmatic consideration. During the reunification of the
province, the Clique’s strength expanded rapidly. Its forces had grown to about 40,000
men by 1925. Li and other leaders of the Clique were concerned with maintaining the
internal unity they had achieved in their group. By joining the Expedition, Li could provide
opportunities for members of his group not only to get promotions but also to keep the
morale and fighting capacity of the troops at a high level, to maintain the internal cohesion

50
In their memoirs, leaders of Guangxi always claim the impact of the Taiping on their
actions. See, for example, Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen,
p. 3; and Xu Qiming, Xu Qiming xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 1-2.
51
See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by the Department of
General Political Training of the 4th Group Army, Nanning, 1936.
52
For example, in early 1926, leaders of the Nationalist government urgently needed
large numbers of troops, and they were rapidly expanding their own troops also, for the
coming Expedition. However, they limited the army reorganization of the Guangxi Clique
to one army (jun) only, even though the military strength of the Clique, with 40,000 men,
was enough to be reorganized into two armies. At the same time, these leaders of the
Nationalist Government offered the title of the army (jun) to other militarists who had a
small number of troops and even allowed them to expand their troops from a division (shi)
into an army. Financially, they used large amounts of money to buy over the militarists
who were then loyal to the Beiyang Government and to pay the salaries of their own
armies, but left the Clique to resolve its own financial problems in armament expenditures.
See Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 487-8; Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi,
pp. 118-21; Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, p. 52; Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen
jilu, p. 34; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, Huibian, pp. 1048-1051.
53
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 74-80 (hereafter as “The Clique”).

43
of his group and to enable the Clique to play its role in the achievement of the Nationalist
government as well.54
These factors drove Li and the Clique to play an important role in promoting the
Expedition. Li advocated an immediate launching. He first persuaded Tang Shengzhi, a
powerful militarist and Commander of the 4th Division of the Hunan Army stationed at
south Hunan, to join the Nationalist government. An ambitious man, Tang had good
relations with Wu Peifu, a bigger militarist in central and north China with an ambition to
reunify the country by force. He also wanted to get support from the Clique.55 Li and the
Guangxi leaders had kept close connections with Tang and his subordinates through
General Ye Qi, a Brigadier of the Hunan army and a native of Guangxi as well as a
graduate of both GMES and BMA.56 During the winter of 1925-26, Ye visited his home
province as Tang’s representative. Li initiated a move to cooperate with Tang,57 thus
causing the split between Tang and Wu and having Tang on the side of the Clique and the
Guangzhou Government. This action freed Guangxi from the direct threat of Wu’s
influence.58 On the one hand, it also created for the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou
favourable conditions to launch the Expedition, for Tang’s actions brought about the
downfall of Zhao Hengti (governor of the Hunan Province and a supporter of Wu Peifu) in
the province in the spring of 1926; and, on the other, it weakened Wu’s influence in Hunan
to some extent.
When Tang conspired to expel Zhao from Hunan and prepared to join Guangzhou
early in 1926, Li promised to reinforce him by sending troops to Hunan.59 In March 1926
Tang successfully compelled Zhao to retire by force and soon occupied Changsha, capital

54
See Yin Chenggang, “Diqijun tiqian ru-Xiang jiqi zai beifa zhong de jige zhongda
zhanyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3 (hereafter as “7th Army”), p. 1.
55
Zhang Renmin, Huiyi lu, pp. 51-4; and Shenbao, 7 February 1926.
56
Shenbao, 7 February 1926; and Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li
Tsung-jen, p. 133.
57
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 133-8; and Zhang
Renmin, Huiyi lu, pp. 51-5.
58
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 133-6.
59
Bai Chongxi, Bai Chongxi xiansheng fangwen jilu, pp. 796-8; and Te-kong Tang and
Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 143-4.

44
of Hunan. Wu Peifu launched an offensive against Tang and forced the latter to withdraw
to south Hunan. Li immediately sent a brigade of troops to Hunan in late April as Tang
requested before the action of the latter in Hunan, which was one month earlier than that of
the 4th Army of the NRA from Guangdong, followed by the entire 7th Army under his own
command. This action saved Tang from the verge of defeat.60 Meanwhile, Li also sent an
emergency telegram to Guangzhou reporting the latest developments in Hunan and the
Clique’s military reactions, which he intended to present to the Expedition as an
accomplished fact.61 The contribution of Li and the Clique to the launching of the
Expedition at the right moment should therefore be fully recognized.62
Furthermore, after the mobilization of the Guangxi armies to reinforce Tang’s
action in Hunan, Li went to Guangzhou personally for a discussion of the Northern
Expedition with Nationalist leaders. Li’s stay in Guangzhou from May 10 to June 18 to a
considerable extent promoted the launching of the Expedition. According to the media
reports, “after Li’s arrival at Guangzhou, the appeal of the Northern Expedition or for
moving troops into Hunan to reinforce Tang (Shengzhi) and to send a punitive expedition
against Wu (Peifu) suddenly ran high”.63 Meanwhile, some Guangzhou leaders, such as
Tan Yankai and Cheng Qian, who were not prepared to send reinforcements to Tang
because of their previous resentment with the latter, did not change their mind until Li's

60
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 145-6; and Yin
Chenggang, “7th Army”, pp. 3-4.
61
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 144-5; and Huang
Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 104 (01/11/1961), p. 5.
62
In his telegram to the Central Military Affairs Committee of the Nationalist
Government on June 3, 1926, Tang Shengzhi praised the fact that “the great battle against
the army under Ye (Kaixin) had been fiercely fought for over three days since starting on
29 May”, “in which Zhong (Zupei) Brigade of the 7th Army participated. Zhong Brigade’s
officers and soldiers all were very brave, and made great contribution to the victory over
Ye’s army. According to this fact, I would like to ask the Government to cite them for their
meritorious service”. See Shenbao, June 15, 1926. The same newspaper also made a
comment on 12 June 1926 that the Guangxi Army’s advanced force “was quite efficient in
reinforcing Tang (Shengzhi) in Hunan”. This indicates the foresight and determination as
well as courage of the Guangxi Clique before the official launching of the Northern
Expedition.
63
Guangzhou minguo ribao, May 13, 1926.

45
arrival and his discussions with them.64 Thus, the GMD Central Military Affairs
Committee (CMAC) authorized on May 29 the appropriation of a sum for armament
expenditures for the Guangxi army to finance the dispatch of their reinforcements to
Hunan.65 The GMD Centre adopted formally the motion of dispatching troops for the
Northern Expedition on 4 June.66 Even more crucially, Li also played an important role in
supporting the appointment of Jiang Jieshi as Commander-in-Chief of the NRA for the
Expedition at the Central Military Affairs Committee meeting held on the same day.67
The above actions reflected an urgent desire of Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique
to participate in national affairs. Li and his troops, the famous 7th Army, a powerful main
force of the NRA, participated in all significant campaigns in the Northern Expedition.
With its strong fighting capability, the 7th Army won titles of “feijun” (the flying army) and
“gangjun” (the steel army).68 Following the expansion of military strength and the
promotion of reputation, Li became more and more involved in the internal struggle of the
GMD, particularly with Jiang Jieshi, and played a more important role in both the GMD
and the Nationalist government. However, Li’s strength in the central government did not
last long after the accomplishment of the Expedition. Soon after the capture of Beijing in
June 1928 Li was under the pressure of the Jiang group from many sides. Even in the
summer of the year, rumours of a civil war fermenting in the middle Yangzi River Valley
swept over the country, in which it was suggested that Li’s troops, its main forces then

64
Shenbao, May 25, 1926.
65
Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, Shanghai, 1936;
reprinted by Longmen shudian, Hong Kong, 1965, Vol. 15. p. 76. This is the only record I
know of that the Guangxi Clique received financial assistance from the Nationalist
Government before the establishment of the Wuhan regime early in 1927.
66
Archives of the Central Executive Committee of GMD, in The Second Historical
Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, p.
256.
67
Shenbao, June 18, 1926.
68
For details of the performance of the 7th Army in the Northern Expedition, see Wen
Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshi nian zhongguo junshi shi, reprinted Taipei, 1962, Vol. 2; and
Shanghai minguo ribao (Shanghai Republican Daily), 13/6/1928. Also see Hu Puyu (ed.),
Beifa zhanshi, Taipei: Congwu chubanshe, 1974; and Luo Jialun (ed.), Geming wenxian,
Taipei, 1953-, Vol. 16 (hereafter as GMWX).

46
concentrating in Hubei, were in preparation for a war against Jiang’s troops in both Anhui
and Jiangsu provinces.69 Although the rumours proved to be without foundation, the tense
relationship between Li and Jiang never relaxed after that. Along with a series of debates
on the nation’s reconstruction and troop disbandment within the GMD, Li and the Clique
became the major target which Jiang intended to eliminate. In March 1929 the conflict
between Li and Jiang broke out into an internal war within the GMD, i.e. the so-called
Jiang-Gui War,70 followed by a series of civil wars throughout the country during the next
two years, in which nearly all factions of the GMD were involved.71 As a result of the war,
the Clique was soon defeated by Jiang in central China and was forced to return to its base
in Guangxi, and to become a rival to Jiang for many years thereafter.

Reasons for the Clique’s Conflict with Jiang and Its Return to Guangxi

Although the Guangxi Clique was credited with outstanding achievements in the
Northern Expedition, it was accused of aiming at territorial expansion. Was one of the
Clique’s aims in joining the Expedition to control a much larger region, or was it “a desire
for the expansion of the Kwangsi empire”?72 Judging from the complicated political
situation in the Expedition, the image of the Clique as a territorial expansionist to a great
extent seems to be a product of the widespread propaganda of its political opponents.
However, the Clique did have legitimate differences, in policies of national reconstruction
and in response to imperialist aggression, with other factions, particularly the Jiang group.

69
Guo Tingyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shishi rizhi, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1979, Vol.
2. p. 380 (hereafter as ZHMGSSRZ).
70
Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao changbian,
Nanjing: The Nanjing University Press, 1993, Vol. 27 (hereafter as ZHMGSSLCB). Also
see Archives of War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government. The
Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing.
71
For details of civil wars in 1929-30, see Zhang Tongxin, Guomindang xin junfa
hunzhan shilue, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1981; Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.),
ZHMGSSLCB, Vols. 28-30; and Jiang Kefu, Minguo junshi shi luegao, Beijing: ZHSJ,
1991, Vol. 2. pp. 1-63.
72
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 64, and pp. 115-28, specifically p. 121.

47
These have usually been ignored by previous studies. To respond to the issue of
expansionist ambition, it is necessary to discuss the background at the time.
Li Zongren’s return to Guangxi after the Expedition was in fact the outcome of the
GMD’s internal struggle for power. Because of their short history in the GMD, Li and his
colleagues were at a political disadvantage in this struggle in comparison with those long-
term GMD members originating from the Guangzhou government. The Clique had some
difficulties to claim power in both the party and government though it had shown its
military strength during the reunification of both Guangxi and Guangdong. In a sense, the
Northern Expedition was a process of the distribution of power and territorial interests
among the GMD factions in the party and later in the country along with the continuing
victories of the campaign against the militarists who were loyal to the Beijing government.
The principal competitors for power within the GMD were the factions under the
leaderships of Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin and Jiang Jieshi respectively before the
Expedition, while the Guangxi Clique, having recently joined the GMD, had none of its
leaders holding a significant position in the GMD and its government until a year after the
launching of the Expedition. After this, Li and the Clique were rapidly promoted to the
GMD’s top leadership and played an important role in both the Party and the Government,
simply because of their military accomplishments in the campaign. However, the GMD
was a group which emphasized its members’ qualifications and record of service in the
party. In the eyes of some GMD leaders, particularly that of Jiang Jieshi, the Guangxi
Clique was only an opportunist group to be exploited by more experienced politicians.73 In
other words, Jiang was convinced that the Clique joined the Expedition in an obvious
attempt to seize the top leadership of the GMD and its government by force.74 In Jiang’s
view, anyone who opposed him was considered to be acting against the best interests of the

73
Jiang zongtong yanlun bubian (Supplement of President Jiang’s Speeches and
Writings), 10:50 (quoted in J. K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983, Vol. 12, pp. 133-4).
74
See Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), ZHMGSSLCB, Vols. 29-30; GMWX, Vols.
17-18. Also see Jiang Jieshi’s speech, in Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong Jianggong
quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, pp. 577-80. And see
“Taofa Guixi xuanchuan dagang”, 1929 and “Taofa Guixi junfa wengao”, 1929, Archives
of the Editorial Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, Nanjing.

48
nation.75 During the confrontation between Wuhan and Nanjing regimes under Wang
Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi separately in the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927, the
Guangxi Clique played a strong role as a mediator to bring the two regimes together.76 The
problem was that the Clique’s independent actions hurt the interests of both Wang and
Jiang, and frightened both.77 Wang instigated a debate on “Party Legitimism or
Orthodoxy” (dangtong) to arouse the fears of other factions against the Clique, which was
supposed to have controlled the Nanjing Government, i.e. the so-called Nanjing Special
Committee (NSC), after the Wuhan regime was merged into the Nationalist Government at
Nanjing in September 1927.78 In order to return to the top leadership of both the party and
the government, Jiang created obstacles to the NSC in many ways to embarrass that body,
on the one hand,79 and used large amounts of money to bribe the Clique’s rivals to oppose

75
Zheng Houan (et al) trans, Zhongguo dageming Wuhan shiqi jianwen lu, Beijing:
ZGSHKXCBS, 1985, p. 90.
76
For details of the roles of Li Zongren and other Guangxi leaders in acting as mediator
between Wuhan and Nanjing, see Zou Lu, Huigu lu, Chongqing, 1943, pp. 199-214; Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1979, Chapter 8;
Guangzhou pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou: Pingshe,
1928; and GWZB, Vol. 4, from July to September 1927.
77
As a compromise, Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei retired before and after the
combination of the two regimes in August and September 1927. For details of the
retirement of Jiang and Wang before and after the combination of Wuhan and Nanjing, and
conjectures of the Clique’s compelling Jiang to retire, see GWZB, August to October 1927;
and Mi Xi, “Wo zai Jiang Jieshi shenbian de shihou”, Zhejiang wenshi ziliao, No. 23
(1985), pp. 1-41.
78
For details see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, pp. 141-73; Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou
shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, 1928; and Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 756-
806.
79
For example, when Jiang left Nanjing for his retirement in August 1927, he brought all
moneys, which were provided for military expenditures of the NRA, with him. On the
other hand, he engineered incidents in Nanjing to excuse attacks on the NSC. See GWZB,
Vol. 4, No. 33; and Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai:
SHRMCBS, 1992, pp. 29-32.

49
it and to split that group, on the other.80 By these means Jiang successfully isolated the
Guangxi leaders as a prelude to the outbreak of the Jiang-Gui War in 1929.
Moreover, Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi joined forces to destroy the Guangxi
Clique’s influence even though at the time both were locked in a bitter struggle against
each other for the GMD leadership. From the moment of their promotion to the GMD
leadership the Clique was under hostile pressure from the left and right wing Nationalists
because of its supposed direct threat to their positions in the GMD. There is evidence that
Wang and Jiang joined together to subvert the efforts of the Clique in both the “Zhang-
Huang Incident” in November 1927 and the Western Expedition (xizheng) which occurred
in the autumn of the same year by using money and their personal potential influence
among both the party and the troops.81 Even before the 3rd GMD National Congress was
held in Nanjing in March 1929, Wang, assisting Jiang, colluded with Tang Shengzhi, who
retired after he was defeated by the Clique in the Western Expedition, and Yu Zuobai, a
Guangxi general who aspired to leadership of the Clique, and finally engineered a large-
scale defection of Li’s troops both in Hebei province under Bai Chongxi, and those in
Hubei province under the command of Generals Hu Zongduo and Xia Wei, two of Li’s
senior subordinates.82 The result was that the hard fighting Guangxi troops were impotent
to defend themselves when Jiang suddenly launched a campaign against them with both
military action and large amounts of money in March and April 1929.
The GMD’s propaganda (mass media) organs, including the Propaganda (Public
Affairs) Department of the GMD Central Committee and its branches, newspapers and
periodicals, were overwhelmingly controlled by either the Wang or Jiang groups. This
proved to be an extremely powerful weapon in action against other factions within the
GMD. For example, the Western Hill Clique, the key member of the NSC, was forced to

80
Liu Xing, “Huiyi guomin gemingjun dibajun”, HNWSZLXJ, No. 6, pp. 92-97; Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter six; and Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, “1927 nian Jiang
Jieshi deng lian-Wang zhi-Gui handian xuan”, LSDA, No. 1, 1984.
81
Ibid. Also see Tang Shengzhi, “Guanyu beifa qianhou jijianshi de huiyi”, HNWSZLXJ,
No. 6, pp. 108-10.
82
For details of the defection of the Guangxi Clique’s troops in both Hebei and Hubei
provinces, see LSDA, No. 2, 1984; HBWSZLXJ, No. 18; WHWSZLXJ, No. 11; and Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter six.

50
resign from Nanjing under the propaganda attack of the Jiang and Wang groups.83 In
dealing with the Guangxi Clique, Jiang and Wang employed the term “xin Guixi” (the New
Guangxi Clique) to attack. The term “xin Guixi” meant that the Clique was constantly
described as the remnant of the “jiu Guixi” (the old Guangxi Clique) under Lu Rongting.
Because Lu’s group occupied Guangdong and was the rival of Sun Yatsen in the
Constitution Protection Movement, the term “Guixi” labelled Lu both as a regionalist who
intended to expand territory beyond Guangxi and as a leader in opposition to Sun. In the
views of the GMD, and in the popular belief, anyone who opposed Sun was thereby a
counter-revolutionary, and a warlord if he controlled troops at the same time.84 Such an
attack by ideological propaganda had already created an unfavourable image for the Clique
in its struggle with Jiang and Wang.
As a result of this propaganda the Clique was widely seen to be expansionist, and a
target to be attacked by many factions.85 This view is also shared by Western and Chinese
scholars in their studies of contemporary Guangxi. The widespread assumption that the
Clique was primarily occupied with territorial expansion was based on the fact that after the
Northern Expedition Li Zongren controlled Hunan and Hubei, while Bai Chongxi, another
leader of the Clique, was stationed at Hebei after 1928, and Huang Shaohong governed
Guangxi, their base. Li Jishen, leader of Guangdong and a native of Guangxi as well, was
also included in this Guangxi group.86 In fact, Li Zongren’s troops had not stayed in Hunan
except while participating in the campaign in the province. Li Jishen was not a leader of

83
For details see Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, pp. 29-31; Zou Lu,
Huigu lu, pp. 198-214; and Guangzhou Pingshe, Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi,
1928.
84
For details of Lu Rongting’s struggle with Sun Yatsen, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue
zhi youlai jiqi jingguo; and Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan, Lu Rongting zhuan.
85
See “Taofa Guixi xuanchuan dagang”, 1929, The Second Historical Archives of China,
Nanjing.
86
For example, Zhang Xianwen (ed.), Zhonghua minguo shigang, p. 341; J. K. Fairbank,
The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, p. 125; Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 117;
and Guo Tingyi, Jindai zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press,
1982, p. 595.

51
the Clique but a supporter.87 The Guangxi troops (i.e. the 15th Army, which was
reorganized by the rest of the 7th Army in 1927 which did not participate in the Expedition
and was stationed at the province as the garrison force of Guangxi) had not been retained in
strength at Guangdong except when Li Jishen ordered them to reinforce the province
against the threat of the ally of Generals Ye Ting and He Long, military leaders of the
Communists in the Nanchang Uprising in the autumn of 1927. After this they only
obtained financial support from Li Jishen in return. As Guangxi was under the rule of the
Guangzhou Branch of the GMD Central Political Conference during the Northern
Expedition, the order from Li Jishen, Chairman of the Branch, was reasonable and
understandable since he could not gain any assistance and support from any other provinces
and factions except the Clique, a military and political group from his native province.
Bai’s stay in Hebei was in response to an order by Jiang Jieshi. With the completion of the
last battle of the Expedition, Bai asked Jiang for permission to return to south China,88 but
was refused, presumably because Jiang had already resolved to wipe out the Clique by
military and financial blockades.89
The focus was on the occupation of Hubei. It is true that Li Zongren occupied
Hubei late in 1927, but this action occurred after the NSC decided to launch the Western
Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, a powerful militarist supporter of the former Wuhan
regime. Some were of the view that the Guangxi Clique as a powerful key member of the
NSC could use that body to reach its goal of acquiring more territories. Those who held
that view must explain why Li and the Clique gave up the rich lower Yangzi River Valley,
mainly Jiangsu, in which annual tax incomes were higher than other provinces, and
Shanghai, the financial and commercial centre of China - just to take the province of Hubei.
Guangxi troops were stationed right around Nanjing, capital of the Nationalist government,
and in Shanghai, both of which Tang Shengzhi attempted to take over before the Western

87
Huang Shaohong repeatedly emphasizes that Li Jishen was not member of the New
Guangxi Clique. See Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52 (1964), p.
1.
88
See GMWX, Vol. 18; and Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, Hong Kong: Nanyue
chubanshe, 1989, p. 116.
89
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, pp. 182-4.

52
Expedition.90 To be leader of the Nationalists, to control the capital of the Nationalist
government and Shanghai with a powerful force should have been the ideal opportunity the
Clique sought, yet these prizes were all foregone after the cooperation of both the Wuhan
and Nanjing regimes. The prizes must have been tempting, because Wang and Jiang, the
two rival leaders of the Nationalists, were absent from the GMD leadership at that time.
Jiang’s safe return to the leadership of the GMD and the NRA at the end of 1927 and in the
early 1928 also relied on the loyalty of the troops which were stationed around the above
region by taking over the position which the Clique left after the Western Expedition.91 If
we ignore this obvious demonstration of honest purpose on the part of the Clique, the only
explanation is that the Clique was too stupid to exploit the advantage they held at the time.
Such a conclusion is fallacious. It must therefore be concluded that the ambition of the
Clique was to achieve a more important political role in both the GMD and the Nationalist
government, but not to occupy more territory.
In addition, it may be said that the Western Expedition and the occupation of Hubei
by Li Zongren’s troops reflected the plans of the Guangxi Clique for territorial expansion.
However, there is no evidence that the decision to launch the Western Expedition was
made under pressure from the Clique only. Even according to memoirs of relevant persons
in opposition to the Clique at that time, the Western Expedition was actually initiated by
Tan Yankai and Cheng Qian, both natives of Hunan and former leaders of the Wuhan
regime. In fact, when Wuhan leaders decided to cooperate with Nanjing in late August,
Tan and other leaders had already conspired to launch a campaign against Tang Shengzhi
as the latter wanted to control not only Wuhan but also Nanjing.92 Cheng Qian was also

90
Zheng Houan et al (trans.), Zhongguo dageming Wuhan shiqi jianwen lu, p. 111. In
1926, the annual incomes of the provinces the Nationalist Revolutionary Army’s
occupation were as follows: Guangdong, 100,000,000 yuan (Chinese dollars) approx;
Guangxi, 11,000,000 yuan; Jiangxi, 18,000,000 yuan; Hunan, 12,000,000 yuan; Hubei,
24,000,000 yuan; Jiangsu, 4-60,000,000 yuan; Zhejiang, 30,000,000 yuan approx; and
Fujian, 12,000,000 yuan. Also see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 129.
91
After the Western Expedition (xizheng), Nanjing was garrisoned by the troops under
He Yingqin’s direct control. See Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), ZHMGSSLCB,
Vol. 25.
92
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 157; T’ang Leang-li, The Inner History of the Chinese
Revolution, London, 1930, p. 307; Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, p. 779; and
Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu gongsi, 1975, p. 97.

53
more determined than others to destroy Tang’s strength because of the former’s attempt to
return to Hunan with himself as provincial ruler.93 In the light of the above factors, even Li
Yunhan, an expert on GMD history, has also pointed out that the most important reason for
the NSC to launch the campaign against Tang was the ambition of the latter to take over
Nanjing and his collusion with Sun Chuanfang, Commander in Chief of ally of five
provinces (wusheng lianjun zongsiling), the most dangerous enemy directly threatening the
safety of Nanjing at that time.94 It seems that the so-called territorial expansion plans of the
Clique for the Western Expedition were to a great extent the result of intense propaganda
by its political rivals during the internal conflict of the GMD in an attempt to discredit Li’s
influence and reputation and that of his fellow Clique members in both the Nanjing
government and the GMD centre. Therefore, the territorial expansion of the Clique in the
Northern Expedition was at least exaggerated.
The problem was complicated by the stationing of Guangxi troops at Hubei, a
product of the Western Expedition, because the Guangxi Clique’s strength was expanded at
this time. More important was the fact that Li Zongren supported the demand of “Hubei for
the Hubei people”. The demand by provincial people for a share in the affairs of their
native province was not uncommon throughout China at that time. In general, except when
the region on the Asian frontier attempted to separate from China, this emotion did not hurt
nationalism but stressed the native people's newly aroused political interest and reflected
the struggle for power in their own province. The problem was that Sun Yatsen in his
sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People) also emphasized regional self-
government (difang zizhi), an idea which could be explained in many ways by his followers
as well as his enemies. In other words, this was a political ideal which had not been tested
before in China. Anyone could endorse it to serve his or her purpose. Perhaps Li picked up
this idea as an excuse both to benefit the natives of Hubei and to maintain his power in the
province for the purpose of opposing the centralization of Jiang Jieshi.95 Whatever the

93
Tang Shengzhi, “Guanyu beifa qianhou jijianshi de huiyi”, p. 108; Liu Xing, “Huiyi
guomin gemingjun dibajun”, p. 95; Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, p. 97; and Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 140.
94
Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, pp. 778-9.
95
Li Zongren, “Duiyu difang zizhi jige yidian de poushi”, DSZK, No. 3 (1 December
1931), pp. 7-14.

54
reason, this proposition was further practised by Li in Guangxi during the first half of the
1930s when he led the province to become a semi-independent body from Nanjing in his
struggle against Jiang. However, the emotion of self-government, such as that in Hubei,
sometimes went beyond control. Hu Zongduo, a native of Hubei and Commander of the
19th Army which was affiliated to the Guangxi Clique, made himself master of Hubei after
the Western Expedition and appointed provincial government members at his own
direction. Relying on support from Li, Hu disarmed all of the "zapai jun" (inferior brand
armies) in the province and strengthened his own force. Most of these appointees, both in
the government and in charge of troops, were natives of Hubei, graduates of the BMA and
supporters of Hu. These actions threatened the power and interests of other factions inside
and outside the province. As Hu and his followers were all under the wing of the Clique,96
the latter became a target of other factions in the GMD. This is the source of accusations of
the Clique’s “territorial expansion” in Hubei. In other words, this was a result of Li's troops
being stationed at Hubei at a time when regionalist sentiment ran high, particularly in that
province. However, it was not a case of Li and the Clique conspiring to occupy territory,
because such a province was too small to meet the needs of the Clique, as stated earlier.
The defeat of the Guangxi Clique in central China also was a result of conflict
between Li and Jiang in different policies towards domestic and external affairs after the
Northern Expedition. In domestic affairs, except for regional self-government, Li
advocated the policies of transformation of soldiers into workers to settle national army
disbandment, and unity within the GMD party to solve internal struggles for power. In
other words, each faction of the GMD should have the rights to share power in both the
party and central government.97 This reflected the policy of the Clique within the national
structure, in contrast to Jiang’s desire to centralize his power within the whole nation. It is
not surprising that all proposals for national reconstruction that Li Zongren and Bai
Chongxi presented were refused by the Central Government under Jiang’s control. In
responding to imperialist aggression, particularly after the “Jinan Massacre” engineered by
the Japanese on May 3, 1928, Li advocated a firm policy for mass mobilization and

96
A detailed discussion of the origins of Hu Zongduo from the Guangxi Clique and his
actions in Hubei will appear in the next chapter.
97
See Zhongyang zhengzhi huiyi Wuhan fenhui yuebao, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 1928), pp.
117.

55
education and training of the masses.98 For this purpose, Li even favoured restoration of
Confucian worship as a national ideology in order to achieve national political unity in this
way,99 because China needed to rebuild its social values and ideology against national
ideological confusion with various “isms” imported from the western countries at that
time.100 Of course, he was unable to carry out his policies in the national structure because
of opposition from Jiang. But Li practised them, not that of Confucian worship, but the
political ideology for the masses developed by the Clique itself, in Guangxi later in the
1930s.
The Clique’s defeat had been a top priority in Jiang Jieshi’s agenda from the first
differences between the GMD factions in internal and external affairs after the unification
of China in 1928. The capture of Beijing by the NRA in June 1928 marked the beginning
of national reconstruction. This was a period of transition towards nationhood in a new era
under the leadership of the GMD, and Jiang meant to direct its policies, ie. political tutelage
(xunzheng) by the GMD. Of a series of domestic problems which the Nationalists faced,
the most important one was that the country had five agglomerations of military groups -
Jiang Jieshi's group proclaiming itself the orthodox representative of the Nationalist
government itself, the Guangxi Clique, Feng Yuxiang’s “National People’s Army or the
Northwest Army” (Guominjun), the Yan Xishan Faction in Shanxi province, and Zhang
Xueliang’s “Northeast Army” (Dongbeijun). How the power at national and regional levels
was to be redistributed between these groups became an urgent problem to be settled.
Troop disbandment seemed to be a key factor in settling the problem and a precondition for
all efforts at national reconstruction. However, the leaders of these groups did not trust

98
See Li’s proposal for training the masses and party members in 1928, in Wu Chuming
et al (eds.), Dangguo mingren zhongyao shudu, Shanghai: Huiwentang shuju, 1929, pp.
191-211.
99
See the proposal of Li Zongren in 1928, in Shijie shuguang zhi zhonghua wenhua, No.
1 (October 1928), pp. 68-81.
100
See Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, Kaifang zhong de bianqian: zailun Zhongguo
shehui chao wending jiegou, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993, pp. 269-74.
In this work, Mr and Mrs Jin point out a new ideology was a great force in the
transformation of the nation. But, the sanmin zhuyi (the Three Principles of the People),
the new ideology of the GMD, could be explained in any way by different parties and
groups because of its excessive mixture of the many popular “isms” at that time. It is
against this background that Li favoured restoration of Confucian worship.

56
each other. Each wanted to seize more power in the nation and the regions. Among them,
anyone who put forward a proposal for disbandment (such as that of Bai Chongxi and Li
Zongren) was opposed by others.101 Differences were further complicated by the power
struggle of the Nationalists themselves. The GMD, which was actually a loose alliance,
was riven by factionalism. Each faction wished to use the potential influence of those
liberal-minded and conservative leaders who were earlier driven out of the party and who
now were asked to return to guide and advise in the party and government. It made the
internal struggle of the GMD more complicated than ever before.
Externally, according to Martin Wilbur, “although Great Britain and the United
States were moving towards negotiating the return of China’s ‘lost rights’ step by step, a
more determined imperialist power, Japan, was acting forcefully to protect and enhance its
economic dominance of Manchuria.”102 Furthermore, Japan speeded up invasion of China
following the “May 3 Jinan Massacre” in Shandong province in 1928.103 How should
China deal with this foreign aggression, and how should it accomplish the Nationalist
Revolution with its anti-imperialist purpose? This fueled the debate both inside and outside
the GMD on whether the Nationalist Revolution was successful or had failed.104 Other
factions of the GMD also demonstrated their differences with the dominant faction in
response to the Jinan Massacre.105 Such differences were deepened by the “September 18

101
For the proposals of both Bai and Li, see Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, pp. 109-
13; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 253-61; GWZB,
Vol. 5, No. 25; and Wu Chuming et al (eds.), Dangguo mingren zhongyao shudu, pp. 60-
63, and pp. 110-112.
102
J. K. Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 12, p. 719.
103
This Massacre was engineered by the Japanese army in order to protect its interests
and influence in Shandong and to obstruct the victory of the Northern Expedition. The
Japanese army committed an atrocity of unparalleled savagery and large numbers of the
Chinese people in Jinan were massacred. For details of the Incident, see GMWX, Vol. 18.
104
For details of the debate, see Edmund S. K. Fung, “Anti-Imperialism and the Left
Guomintang”, Modern China, Vol. 11 (1985), No. 1, pp. 39-76.
105
For example, the Reorganization Faction. For details of its criticism of, and
statements on the Incident, see Geming Pinglun (The Revolutionary Review) edited by
Chen Gongbo, leader of the Faction, and published in Shanghai in 1928.

57
Incident” three years later.106 In these circumstances, seizing his advantage in ruling the
faction which enjoyed domination of the GMD, Jiang intended to suppress all of his
political rivals by using his superior military forces to centralize the government of the
country under his own control, before he went on to deal with Japanese aggression. It was
not surprising that the Clique became the first target which Jiang attempted to wipe out as it
was his major rival in the GMD.
Although the Guangxi Clique became more and more involved in a struggle for
power with Jiang and argued over differences on policy with him in the GMD, Li Zongren
and his followers did not prepare for war against Jiang’s forces. Even Li wanted a peaceful
compromise with Jiang, but his efforts failed.107 This might explain why none of the
leaders, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong, were in Wuhan when Jiang led his
forces personally in a surprise attack to wipe out the Clique’s troops in Hubei. This
surprise defeat by Jiang humiliated Li and his colleagues who from that moment always
looked for a chance to seek revenge. This power struggle with Jiang, combined with policy
differences over mass mobilization and Japanese aggression, caused Li to develop his own
strong policies in Guangxi after his return to that province in the 1930s.

Conclusion

Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique rose to power in a province characterizedly

political regionalism, a product of geography and history, when the country was in a state of
chaos and instability in the 1920s. In general, such regionalism was never intended to
separate the province from national Chinese politics, but was a reflection of the desire to
strengthen the country. When Li and his colleagues established a Guangxi with a strong
regionalist flavour, they believed that provincial reunification and strengthening could be

106
For details of the Incident and the ambitions of the Japanese invasion of China, see Li
Yunhan (ed.), Jiuyiba shibian shiliao, Taipei: ZZSJ, 1977, 1977; and Zhongyang Dangan
guan, Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan, and Jilin sheng shehui kexueyuan (eds.), Riben
diguo zhuyi qinhua dangan xuanbian -”jiuyiba” shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1988.
107
Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan, pp. 118-9.

58
the first step towards the rebuilding of the nation. Such a perception led them to participate
in the campaign for national reunification.
However, Li and his group were involved in the GMD’s factional struggles after the
confrontation of the two Nationalist regimes in Wuhan and Nanjing - a situation entirely
familiar in the Chinese setting - which combined with their differences over domestic and
external affairs, besides power in both regional and central structures. The subsequent
conflict between Li and Jiang finally led to a civil war in 1929-1930. The Nationalist
Revolution was an ideal pursued by all GMD factions, but each viewed the ideal differently
and adopted its own method to reach it. Once the goal of national reunification was
reached, all factions of the GMD soon split and fought for their own interests. Therefore,
the political unity of the country, particularly in relation to policies on internal and external
affairs, presented greater difficulties than territorial unification; the conflict between these
factions was transformed into civil war, and was manifested in their separate policies of
how to commence national reconstruction and complete political unification.
As a result of the conflict, Li and the Clique were forced to return to their home
province, Guangxi, in 1929, and to commence a process of regional reconstruction and
cooperation, a process which lasted until their compromise with Jiang in the face of a
common need for internal unity to save the country from Japanese aggression. This was a
key element in achieving political unity for the country.
In the next chapter, I will analyse the internal structure of the Clique and its
relations with regional identity. I argue that the consolidated internal structure contributed
to the Clique’s survival and restrengthening itself in the province after its defeat by Jiang in
central China, and allowed the Guangxi group to carry out provincial reconstruction and
mass mobilization at every level of society. I also argue that regional identity was
employed by the Clique to arouse the nationalism of the people, for this would serve its
power struggle with Jiang and as well meet the national common demands of that time for
resistance against Japanese aggression.

59