CHAPTER THREE

THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE GUANGXI CLIQUE

After his defeat in the struggle for the central power of the GMD, Li Zongren with
the Guangxi Clique were forced to return to the province in April 1929. Jiang Jieshi could
not, however, tolerate the idea of Li and the Clique holding a province in opposition to him.
Jiang employed a policy of “replacing one Clique with another” (yi-Gui zhi-Gui), sending
the main force of the 7th Army of NRA, which had defected from the Clique in Hubei and
was currently under the command of Generals Yu Zuobai and Li Mingrui, back to their
home province in order to use Guangxi natives to fight each other. Meanwhile, Jiang used
“silver bullets” to try to bribe Li Zongren’s subordinates who had remained in the province
during the Northern Expedition and encouraged them to defect from the Clique.1 Under
Jiang’s pressure, Li and other Guangxi leaders were finally forced into exile and left their
home province for Hong Kong and Vietnam two months later. However, Jiang
underestimated his rivals. In fact, they still had potential influence in Guangxi. Seizing the
opportunity in the complicated situation of the anti-Jiang wars initiated by the
Reorganization Faction under Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, particularly that of the

1
For details of the defection of Guangxi native generals headed by both Yu Zuobai and Li
Mingrui from the Clique in 1929, see Zhang Renmin, “Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe -
Yu Zuobai”, CQ, No. 112 (01/03/1962), and the same author, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi,
xianhua Guangxi neimu”, ibid, No. 308 (16/05/1970); Lai Gang, “Jiang Jieshi liyong Yu-Li
dao-Gui wowen”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 10, pp. 123-9; Lin Tinghua, “Jiang-Wang mimou dao-
Gui de qianyin houguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 8, pp. 43-9; Zhang Wenhong, “Li Mingrui dao-
Gui tou-Jiang he dao-Jiang shibai jingguo”, GXWSZL, No. 13, pp. 142-54; Zhongguo
qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe,
1934; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 1979,
Chapter 6.

61
anti-Jiang mutiny launched by General Zhang Fakui in September 1929,2 Li, Huang and
Bai returned to Guangxi in the fall of the year. They joined forces with the 4th Army of the
NRA, the famous “Ironside” under the command of Zhang, which entered Guangxi at the
end of 1929, and restored the Clique’s force. Through the anti-Jiang wars in 1929-1931,
Li’s group revived,3 becoming a powerful rival to Jiang in the struggles for both power and
policies in the 1930s, the latter mainly over the issue of how to deal with resistance against
Japanese aggression. How could the Clique have revived and developed political ideals
and formidable military strength within the GMD in the 1930s before the Sino-Japanese
War? There are indications that, aside from the reasons that Li successfully carried out
mass mobilization in Guangxi and strove for regional cooperation with other provinces, a
possible answer is that he also relied on political and military support from his group.
Unfortunately, previous studies of contemporary Guangxi history did not deal with this
issue. For this reason, before we deal with the political ideas and policies of Li and the
Clique in response to imperialist aggression, it is necessary to analyze and account for its
internal structure, and the impact of this on the political development of the Guangxi group
in the 1930s.

The Graduates of Baoding Military Academy (BMA) Group

The officers of the Clique were mainly military school graduates, as mentioned
earlier, but the nucleus actually came from the Baoding Military Academy (BMA). The
phenomenon of the BMA group in domination over the Clique can be attributed to the
historical background of its formation.

2
For details of the civil wars in 1929-30 - also called “Hudang jiuguo zhanzheng” (the
War of the Party Protection and National Salvation) - and the anti-Jiang war in Guangxi
during 1929-1931, see Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 75-95;
Disijun jishi bianzuan weiyuanhui (ed.), Disijun jishi, Guangzhou: Huaiyuan wenhua shiye
fuwushe, 1949; and Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Chapter 6.
3
For details of the survival and revival of Li Zongren and his Clique in Guangxi and
Zhang Fakui’s anti-Jiang mutiny organized by the Reorganization Faction, see Chen
Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, chapter 6; and memoirs of Li Zongren, Li Pinxian, Wei Yongcheng,
Cheng Siyuan, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, Bai Chongxi, Zhang Renmin, Xu Qiming,
Yu Shixi, and Chen Xiong in the Bibliography of this thesis. Also see “Archives of the
War History Compiled Committee, the Nationalist Government”, The Second Historical
Archives of China, Nanjing.

62
 The Clique was initially composed of two major parts: Li’s own troops from Yulin,
and the Guangxi Model Battalion (GMB) where most Guangxi native BMA graduates
started their military careers. For example, when the GMB was established in 1917, its
main officers were BMA graduates, such as Huang Shaohong, Bai Chongxi, Xia Wei, Xu
Qiming, Chen Xiong and so on; while Li built his own force in Yulin, BMA graduates,
such as Yin Chenggang, Yu Zuobai and others, who acted as senior commanders of Li’s
troops at that time, also played an important role.4 When it was reorganized in 1926, most
middle and high ranking officers of the 7th Army of the NRA were BMA graduates.5 In
fact, this phenomenon also occurred in other armies of the NRA, such as the 1st, 4th, and
8th armies at that time.6 Even the revival of Li's force in Guangxi after 1929 was
dependent on this group, because elements of the group actually controlled the remnant
troops of the Clique when Li was forced into exile in Hong Kong and Vietnam.7 Before the
War of Resistance, HMA (Huangpu Military Academy) graduates had already become the
leading officers at all levels of Jiang’s “zhongyang jun” (the Central Army). On the
contrary, the BMA Group in the Clique still occupied the most important positions in the
provincial government, the army, and the militia organizations as well.8
Another reason for the BMA Group’s domination in the Clique was that there were
no Guangxi native graduates from the Japanese Military School before the Expedition,
except Ma Xiaojun, founder of the GMB. However, Ma left the GMB for the Guangzhou
government one year after the war between Guangdong and Guangxi broke out in 1921.9
As a result, Huang Shaohong and Bai Chongxi replaced Ma as leaders of the GMB, which
had been expanded to a regiment during the war, and then joined Li in 1922. We know

4
See Appendix 1.1.
5
See Appendix 1.2.
6
For a discussion of the role played by the BMA graduates in the 1910s and 1920s, see
Lin Dezheng, “Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924)”, M. A. thesis, National
Political University, Taipei, 1980.
7
See Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, No. 308-9
(1-16/05/1970).
8
See Appendix 1.3 and 1.4.
9
See Ma Xiaojun, “Guangxi gemingjun fayuan zhilue”, GXWX, No. 63 (1994), pp. 8-10.

63
that, at the end of the late Qing Dynasty and in the early Republic, there were four
categories of the military school in ascending order: 1) the elementary military school; 2)
the army preparatory school; 3) the middle military school; and 4) the BMA. That is to say,
among them the BMA was on the top level with its current modern military education
system.10 In general, BMA graduates had longer and more systemized military training
(about six to seven years from the beginning until the highest level) than those from other
levels. Thus, not surprisingly, these BMA graduates from Guangxi provided the source of
officers for the new Guangxi armies after Lu Rongting was defeated by the Guangdong
armies in 1921, and became the main commanders of the Guangxi armies.11 Among them
were Huang and Bai. After the occupation of Wuzhou in 1923, Huang and Bai became
provincial militarists. They attracted numerous Guangxi BMA graduates to their troops to
strengthen the force. Their attitude towards BMA graduates also won the support of some
of these from other provinces who came to join them.12 For example, Wang Yinyu, a
BMA graduate of the 1st term (qi) and a native of Guangdong, became Chief of Staff of the
7th Army during the Northern Expedition; Hu Zongduo, a BMA graduate of the 4th term
and a native of Hubei province, with his fellow provincial, formed a sub-faction in the
Clique, which we will discuss later; and Zhang Dingfan, a native of Jiangxi province and a
BMA graduate of the 3rd term, was Mayor of Shanghai in 1927-28 and one of Bai’s trusted
subordinates. Through the efforts of both Huang and Bai, the BMA group dominated the
most important positions amongst middle and senior commanders in the new Guangxi
army under the command of Li. No doubt, this large number of BMA graduates helped to
ensure the Clique’s control over the province.

10
For details of curriculums in the Baoding Military Academy, see Lin Dezheng,
“Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjiu (1912-1924)”.
11
The old Guangxi armies under Lu Rongting belittled these younger well-trained
officers and limited their promotions in the army. This was the main reason for them
coming under the command of Li Zongren soon after the defeat of Lu Rongting by the
Guangdong army. See Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7;
and Li Pinxian, Li Pinxian huiyi lu, Taipei: Zhongwai tushu chuban gongsi, 1975, pp. 25-
30.
12
Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Guixi zhong de qiluo”, WSZLXJ, No. 52
(1964), p. 64.

64
 As for HMA graduates, they joined the Clique too late to occupy important
positions in both the Guangxi government and the army. When the HMA was set up in
1924, the BMA group was already entrenched in the principal positions in the Clique.
Even when some HMA graduates joined the Clique after 1925, their ranks and positions
were so minor that they could not play important roles before the Sino-Japanese War.
More importantly, after the reunification of Guangxi, the Clique set up its own military
school in Nanning as a branch of the HMA, with BMA graduates as instructors or teachers.
With this background, the graduates of this branch regarded themselves as coming from
the Guangxi Military School rather than from the HMA.13
The Guangxi army under the Clique had shown high combat effectiveness in wars
of the reunification of Guangxi and the Northern Expedition. Even in the War of
Resistance, “the Guangxi troops”, according to a Western observer, “are the best of the
provincial forces. These troops were organized and trained by Generals Li Tsung-jen and
Pai Chung-hsi, two of the best soldiers in China. The men receive excellent care, their
morale is high, and they have given a good account of themselves in battle”.14 Therefore,
they “have won high praise for their gallantry”.15 As John S. Service, an American
diplomat, pointed out early in 1945, the Guangxi army “had proved in earlier days that they
were good fighters - against the Northern warlords, against Chiang and against the
Communists. So they were given the honour of an important place in the front lines - but
north of the Yangtze and far from their home province. they fought well - and lost heavily -
at Taierchuang and Hsuchow”.16 The reason for its excellent performance is that, it to a
great extent, depended on the domination of the BMA group in the Guangxi troops. With
excellent military knowledge and fighting skills as well as experience of the BMA group

13
Liang Xueqian, “Guijun ganbu de yaolan - Nanning junxiao”, GXWX, No. 57 (1992),
pp. 13-8; and Liu Qianyi, “Guilin Lijiacun junxiao huiyi”, GXWX, No. 11 (1981), pp. 48-
50.
14
Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency,
New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31.
15
Li Po-Sheng, “How Kwangsi Trains Its Troops”, People’s Tribune, Vol. XXV, No. 3
(May 1938), p. 141.
16
Joseph W. Esherick (ed.), Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of
John Service, New York: Random House, 1974, p. 43.

65
and other commanders who originated from other military schools, the Guangxi army
defeated the enemy in one battle after another. This army was in addition well-trained and
it always was conscious of its reputation as it carried forward the militant tradition of the
Guangxi people, the source from which its soldiers were recruited. There is no doubt that
the defeat of the Clique after the Expedition was the result of divisions in the BMA group
caused by Jiang, as mentioned in Chapter Two. However, the fighting skills of this group
and the militant tradition of the Guangxi people were once more to become a vital factor in
the revival of Li’s force in Guangxi from 1929 to 1931 and in building its reputation as a
courageous army in the Sino-Japanese War.
The most important element in the political cohesion between the BMA group and
the Clique was the shared aim of regional self-government (difang zizhi), which drove them
to acknowledge Li Zongren as their leader. First, they came mainly from rural families and
had the same educational background. Secondly, they were pushed into oblivion because
they failed to obtain the chance to be promoted to higher positions in the central
government and the army, though they had on their record significant military
achievements in the Expedition. Even those natives of Guangxi who served other
provinces or armies were not trusted by Jiang and other factions. As a result, those men,
such as Li Pinxian, Ye Qi, and Liao Lei, former senior commanders of Tang Shengzhi’s
troops, were forced to return to their native province - Guangxi. In this situation, the
ambitions of Li and the Clique to transform and reconstruct the province in the earlier stage
of the Clique’s rise were to be realized by these officers. Moreover, after the Expedition,
the GMD proclaimed that China had begun the political tutelage (xunzheng) period. How
could the policy be carried out? Different factions and groups had different ideas. For
example, in 1928 Feng Yuxiang proposed to settle problems of the livelihood of the people
as the first agenda of the Nationalist Government, but he failed to have the proposal passed
in both the party and the government.17 The fact that Li and the Clique were excluded from
Nanjing led them to the belief that Jiang aimed at building his own dictatorship over the
country, and would not implement democratic practice in politics. Here democracy was an
ideal which they believed demanded national power-sharing by all factions of the GMD
and the people including, of course, the Clique itself. More importantly, Guangxi had

17
For details see Cao Hongxin, Feng zai Nanjing, Shanghai: Zhengzhi yanjiushe, 1932.

66
experienced two years of the chaos of war because Jiang had commanded the Nanjing and
non-Nanjing troops to attack the province in order to eliminate the Clique from 1929 to
1931. Li and the Clique attributed this to Jiang’s attempt to establish his dictatorship and
they were forced to arouse political regionalism to defend their homeland.18 They
advocated regional self-government in order to consolidate their base and to emphasize
how their ideal differed from that of Jiang's policy which aimed to consolidate his rule first.
Furthermore, they insisted on regional self-government, which they considered an effective
weapon against the influence of the Communists on the rural society of Guangxi, even the
whole country.19 This mixture of political regionalism and regional self-government
provided a favourable foundation on which to build the BMA group's support for Li to
carry out the policies of the Clique in Guangxi.
That is not to say, however, that the BMA graduates were an absolutely
consolidated group and always made a great contribution to the Clique expanding its
influence in Chinese politics at all times. Actually, the defeat of the Clique in central China
by Jiang after the Expedition in 1929 was to a great extent caused by divisions within the
BMA group itself.
The first one who split from the Clique was Yu Zuobai. A native of Beiliu county
and a BMA graduate of the 3rd term, Yu had been one of the senior commanders of the
Clique since its rise in Yulin under the aegis of Li Zongren. With his brilliant military
achievements during the reunification of Guangxi, Yu became one of the secondary leaders
of the Clique. However, he was not satisfied with his position. He attempted to replace Li,
Huang and Bai as leader of this group. For this purpose he joined both Jiang Jieshi and
Wang Jingwei. In March 1929 Yu used the enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei
natives in the Clique and bought over the main force of the 7th Army, which was under the
direct command of General Li Mingrui, his former subordinate as well as his cousin - this
family relationship is important in understanding how this could happen. Yu’s action
directly led the Clique’s forces quickly to collapse in Hubei. However, he was unable to
control the Guangxi troops effectively because of his obstinate and unruly reputation and

18
For details of propaganda of Li Zongren and the other Guangxi leaders for defending
the province and opposing Jiang’s dictatorship over the country, see Hudang jiuguo ji, n.p.,
1931.
19
See DSZK, Nanning, No. 3 (1931), p. 13.

67
soured relations with other Guangxi native BMA graduates. The troops in the province,
who were mostly under the control of the elements of the BMA group, came back to Li
Zongren when he and other Guangxi leaders returned to the province in the fall of 1929.20
As a result, Yu followed in the previous footsteps of Li, Huang and Bai, and left Guangxi
for Hong Kong where he remained in exile until 1957, during which his former colleagues
refused to allow him to return to his home province. He died in Guangzhou in 1958 after
his return to the mainland.21
Following Yu was Lu Huanyan, a native of Rong county as well as a BMA graduate
of the 3rd term. Lu joined the Clique in 1923 when Huang Shaohong was expanding his
strength in Wuzhou. Lu’s defection from the Clique occurred in early 1930, when Guangxi
was under Jiang’s siege from the three provinces of Guangdong, Hunan and Yunnan and Li
was struggling to revive his shaky force. As a Divisional Commander in the Guangxi
armies at that time, Lu had low prestige in the Clique. Most elements of the BMA group
who were at present under his command soon abandoned him and went back to their
former leaders - Li, Huang, and Bai when they returned to the province. His split did not
cause serious trouble for the Clique but strengthened the impression that the defection
could not destroy this group which was of strong cohesion and regional identity. Lu was
assassinated by his bodyguard several months later.22
Another man who disengaged from the Guangxi group was Huang Shaohong, the
number two leader of the Clique. The departure of Huang was a mystery, but his departure
from the province for Nanjing occurred after discussion with both Li and Bai. In other
words, he separated from the Clique peacefully, which I will discuss later. Apart from Yu,
Lu and Huang, the most important blow to the cohesion of the Clique was that of a sub-
faction in this group - the so-called Hubei Faction (Hubei pai, or Hubei bang) under the

20
For details of the BMA group of the Clique, and their welcome of the return of their
former leaders Li, Huang and Bai to continue leading them and their abandonment of Yu
and Li Mingrui, see Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe
yishu”, CQ, No. 119, p. 12. Also see Zhang Renmin, Huiyi Lu, Hong Kong, 1987, pp. 95-
100.
21
For details of Yu Zuobai’s defection from the Guangxi Clique and his last years, see
Zhang Renmin, “Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai”, CQ, No. 112 (1/3/1962).
22
See Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 308-
9 (1, 16/05/1970).

68
leadership of Hu Zongduo. The rise and fall of this faction in the Clique provided the
Guangxi leaders with an experience which eventually strengthened internal unity and the
regional identity of the group.

The Hubei Faction

As the term suggests, it was composed of natives of Hubei province. This faction
once played an important role in the rapidly expanding influence of the Guangxi Clique
during the Northern Expedition. Hu Zongduo, leader of the faction, joined the Clique
around 1923 when Huang Shaohong occupied Wuzhou and was appointed Chief Adviser
(zong canyi) for Huang’s troops. Hu was rapidly promoted to secondary leadership of the
Clique, as a Brigadier of the 7th Army on the eve of the Expedition. During the
Expedition, Hu, who was promoted later to Commander of the 19th Army, had been one of
Li’s two senior subordinate commanders (the other was Xia Wei) commanding the
Guangxi troops advancing from the south to the Yangzi River Valley. Surprisingly, as a
native from a province outside Guangxi, his rise in the Clique was quicker than those of
Guangxi native BMA graduates. A reason was that Hu was favoured by both Huang and
Bai because they were all graduates of the BMA and were at that time advocating the
greater unity of BMA graduates within and outside the province. Hu served the old
Guangxi army under Lu Rongting for years before the formation of the Clique under Li.
His career in the Guangxi armies gave him a higher prestige than his fellow provincials,
particularly those who were Hubei native BMA graduates. By using Hu’s prestige, Huang
and Bai were able to attract numerous other Hubei native BMA graduates into the Clique,
strengthening its force.23 Hu’s achievements in the reunification of Guangxi were
considerable and the leaders of the Clique intended to let him play more important roles
when the Expedition was launched. Because one of the destinations of the Expedition was
the middle Yangzi River valley, in Hubei, Hu’s home province, he was more familiar with
this region, its personnel and geography, than anyone of the Clique.24

23
Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang”, HBWSZL, No. 18
(1987), p. 2.
24
Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi yu liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 95.

69
 As BMA graduates of the 4th term were nearly all natives of Hubei, Hu brought
many of his classmates and fellow provincials into the Clique as middle and lower ranking
officers, among these Tao Jun and Li Yixuan, who served in the reunification of Guangxi.
As his rank was higher than any of his fellow provincials, Hu promoted and appointed them
in his own unit in order to enhance his own position.25 In this way, he was naturally
accepted as leader of the Hubei natives in the Clique.
A good opportunity for Hu to form his own faction within the Clique came in
March 1927 when Li Zongren was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the 3rd Route Army
of the NRA marching to the east of China. The Wuhan Nationalist regime moved one
division and one brigade from the 15th Army, a Hubei body of troops which defected from
Wu Peifu’s armies and claimed loyalty to the NRA recently, to join Li’s action. To use
these troops more conveniently, Li put them under Hu’s command as the latter was a native
of Hubei. Seizing the opportunity, Hu put his friends among the Hubei natives, particularly
BMA graduates, into commands in these formations and a division of the 7th Army, which
was under his direct command. Both units later formed the 19th Army with Hu as
Commander, a subsidiary unit of the Clique.26 This was the starting point of direct control
of his own forces. At the end of 1927 Hu led the 19th Army, following with other Li’s
troops, i.e. the 7th Army, back to Hubei after the victory of the punitive expedition against
Tang Shengzhi, a militarist who was a mainstay of the Wuhan regime and opposed
Nanjing. Early in 1928, Li disarmed the old Hubei “zapai jun” (armies of inferior brands),
which was reorganized as a new army, i.e. the 18th Army, a subsidiary force of the Clique.
By taking advantage of Li’s advocacy of the policy “Hubei for the Hubei people”, Hu,
under the support of Bai Chongxi, persuaded Li to appoint Tao Jun, his classmate at the
BMA and an acting Divisional Commander of the 7th Army, as Commander of the 18th
Army. Thus, by creating both the 19th and 18th armies with Hubei natives, or to be more
exact, Hubei native BMA graduates in commands from low to high ranks, Hu actually
made himself leader of the Hubei Faction (Hubei pai) within the BMA group of the Clique

25
Li Chunchu, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei de tongzhi yu bengkui”, WHWSZL, No.
11 (1983), p. 17.
26
Yan Jing, “Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo”, HBWSZL, No. 18, p.
44-7.

70
in 1927-1929. Not surprisingly, Hubei native BMA graduates were the nucleus of the
Faction.27
There were two aspects of this development. First, the Hubei Faction expanded
considerably the influence of the Clique into Hubei, secondly, it also planted the seeds of a
split within the Clique - an internal enmity between both Guangxi and Hubei natives, which
was cleverly exploited by Jiang to defeat Li in 1929. As Hu was eager to build up his own
influence by putting all his fellow provincials into influential positions at each level of
government and party organizations as well as controlling the army in Hubei, he and his
followers rapidly became masters of the province.28 In so doing, they hurt the interests and
power of other factions in the province. On the other hand, as one of the secondary leaders
of the Clique, and, in the view of the outsiders, any of Hu’s actions was regarded as part of
the Clique’s. Hu’s actions made the Clique an objective to be attacked by other groups and
factions. These actions also hurt internal interests of the Clique, for Hu and his followers
discriminated against the other Guangxi troops in Hubei which they once served,
particularly in personnel, distribution of financial resources and promotions in the army.29
Although there is no evidence that Hu had already taken a firm decision to immediately “fly
his own colours” and to form his own independent influence,30 disunity did arise within the
Clique. Hu and his followers had come back to their home province with many distinctions
in war. They had earned the right to take a hand in any domestic issue of the province that
they desired, but began to exclude outsiders, including Guangxi natives who were their

27
See Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei de qingkuang”, HBWSZL, No.
18, p. 18; and Appendix 2.
28
For details of the Hubei Faction’s policies in handling provincial affairs, see HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 1-43; and WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 2-38.
29
See Yan Jing, “Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji qingxiang jingguo”, HBWSZL, No. 18,
pp. 4-7; Lan Tengjiao, “Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”, HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 29-43; Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ,
Nos. 308-9; and Tu Yuntan, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi
neibu maodun”, WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 28-38; Peng Boxun, “Zhang Zhiben shi zenyang
dangshang Hubei sheng zhuxi de”, HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 52-4.
30
According to Tu Yuntan, one of Hu’s trusted followers, soon after the defeat of the
Clique in Hubei, Hu told Tu that he had a mind to fly his own colours in the future, but not
at the present. See Tu Yuntan, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi
neibu maodun”, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 36.

71
colleagues in the Clique, from the political and military operation of the province. The
practice began to assume a strong regionalist colour. The officers and soldiers of the 7th
Army not only distrusted Hu but bitterly resented the actions of the Hubei natives in
dropping their benefactor as soon as their help was no longer required. Many commanders
were jealous of the strength of Hu and his followers, their swift expansion of influence, and
of the unfair speedy promotions through the army ranks. A wave of discontent and enmity
spread between them. This resentment was deepened by the scramble for possession of
opium taxes.31 The income from opium taxes was an important financial resource of the
army at the time, particularly where it lacked normal financial support from the Central
government at Nanjing, for example in the 7th Army.32
The defeat of Li’s troops in Hubei was, to a great extent, due to the resentment of
Guangxi officers, headed by Li Mingrui, a Divisional Commander who became
Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Red Army in Guangxi later, against Hu Zongduo
and the Hubei Faction. At least all members of the Clique thought so.33 In their memoirs,
even some of Hu’s followers emphasized that the defeat of the Clique had resulted from
damage caused by the Hubei Faction which severely hurt Guangxi natives’ interests.34 Hu,
himself also recognized and acknowledged, several years later, after the defeat of Li’s
troops in Hubei, that his actions in the province, to some extent, had been disastrous to the

31
See Lan Tengjiao, “Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui zhanzheng”, HBWSZL,
No. 18, pp. 29-43.
32
During the Expedition, financial support of the 7th Army, except that from the Central
government for a short time in the first half of 1928, came mainly from the Guangxi
government, totalling 17,000,000 Yuan (Chinese dollars). See Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang
Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 307-9 and “Guanyu Guangxi de jingbu”,
CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 6 (20/03/1937), p. 3; Lu Weiqian, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun tongzhi Hubei
de qingkuang”, HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 10; Yan Jing, “Di shiba shijiu liangjun zujian ji
qingxiang jingguo”, HBWSZL, No. 18, p. 46; Li Chunchu, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun zai Hubei
de tongzhi yu bengkui”, WHWSZL, No. 11, p. 11.
33
See the memoirs of middle and high ranking officers of the Guangxi Clique, such as
Zhang Renmin, Zhang Wenhong, Yin Chenggang, even of the senior leaders of the Clique -
Li Zongren, Huang Shaohong, Huang Xuchu, and Bai Chongxi in the Bibliography of this
thesis.
34
For details see memoirs and collections of Yan Jing, Lan Tengjiao, Tu Yuntan, Lu
Weiqian, Lu Zhibing, Liu Minggao, and Huang Sufu in the Bibliography of this thesis.

72
Clique, in which he once rapidly rose as a provincial militarist.35 This resentment seems to
explain why Li Mingrui joined Jiang Jieshi when the Jiang-Gui War broke out in March
1929. For its negative impact on the Clique, this Hubei Faction was not again revived after
Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi were driven back to their home province by Jiang in that same
month.

In general, the BMA group was not an organized faction in Guangxi. They were
gathered together for the military purposes of reunifying Guangxi and making a career of
serving in the war of national unification; also, they enthusiastically shared Li’s idea of
regional self-government and other policies. They provided the main source of senior
officers for Li and the Clique and formed the secondary and lower-level leadership of this
group. Although some of its members left to follow Jiang, the elements of this group still
were the military mainstay of this body because they had already realized that their careers
were firmly linked with the fate of the Clique and nowhere else. The criticism and attacks
from other factions as well as outside temptation had not broken down the group, but
strengthened their regional identity. Furthermore, although the action of some elements of
the group such as the Hubei Faction caused the defeat of the Clique in central China, it
provided the Guangxi group with a lesson to prevent further internal division. To that end,
the Guangxi leaders strengthened the unity of the group and the formation of its political
aim, which were closely related to the structure of the Clique’s leadership and the discipline
of a secret political organization.

Leadership

Revival of the Clique after 1929 also depended on its leadership. Unlike other
factions of the GMD which all had only one leader, the Clique had a governing body of
three people. In other words, it was like a triumvirate, a unique characteristic of the Clique.
This might explain to some extent why the Clique retained the capacity for survival after

35
Tu Yuntan, “Hu Zongduo Tao Jun bachi Wuhan zhengju yu xin Guixi neibu maodun”,
WHWSZL, No. 11, pp. 36-7; and Lan Tengjiao, “Cong Gui-Tang zhanzheng dao Jiang-Gui
zhanzheng”, HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 42-3.

73
each defeat by Jiang, and why it was always regarded as a powerful political and military
rival by the latter.
In this triumvirate, also known as the Li (Zongren) - Huang (Shaohong) - Bai
(Chongxi) leadership, Li was always acknowledged to be the number one leader of the
Clique. This arrangement of the leadership can be traced back to the Clique’s initial
formation, as described in Chapter Two. As Huang and Bai were leaders of the Guangxi
Model Battalion (GMB), one of the two main component parts of the Clique, they of course
became its number two and number three leaders. Huang seized an opportunity to leave
Yulin for Wuzhou to expand his own strength independently in 1923, but he had
maintained a good relationship with Yulin and obtained support from Li.36 As the
expansion of his own strength at that time was made possible by support from Li, Huang, in
appearance at least, regarded the former as his superior. When the troops of both Li and
Huang, respectively from Yulin and Wuzhou, joined forces to form the Guangxi
Pacification and Bandit Suppression Joint Army (dinggui taozei lianjun) in Nanning in
1924 in order to reunify Guangxi, logically, Li became Commander-in-Chief, and Huang
Deputy Commander-in-Chief. By this arrangement, Huang voluntarily placed himself as
the second leader of the new rising Guangxi group.37
Apart from the fact that he was founder of the Clique in Yulin, the main reason for
Li to proclaim himself as the number one leader was his good personal moral character,
according to memoirs and recollections of most senior members of the Clique who trusted
him throughout his career, as well as some outside observers, both Chinese and foreign.38
A British intelligence report in 1934 stated that Li:
Gives an impression of great mental and physical vigour, and of being possessed of
moral and physical courage to an unusual degree. Wide views on the exterior and

36
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Colorado: Westview
Press, 1979, p. 99; and Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52, p. 16.
37
Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, Hangzhou: Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 84-5.
38
Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 104-45; also see
Yuan Qingping, “Li Zongren”, in Yuan Qingping (ed.), Dangdai dangguo mingren zhuan,
Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, 1936.

74
 interior problems of China. Very ambitious and visualizes himself as capable of
replacing Chiang Kai-shek at the helm of state. A fighter.39
Huang Shaohong’s memoirs several decades later also confirmed the importance of Li’s
character in the recognition of his right to the top leadership of the Clique.40 In addition,
the Clique had already realized that the Taiping Rebellion’s failure in the 1860s had
originated in its internal split. As the Clique considered itself to be the successor of the
Taiping, it always emphasized the importance of avoiding internal dissension of the
Taiping, the mistake that led to its final failure. It became an axiom to make secure the
leadership of Li and other persons in this Guangxi group.41 With the support from all his
followers and through political propaganda, Li’s leadership in the Clique was further
strengthened and undisputed.
As for Bai Chongxi, he had two favourable advantages which made him an ideal
candidate for the position of the number three leader in the Clique. First, he shared the
leadership of the GMB with Huang Shaohong. Secondly, he was a fellow townsman of Li
Zongren; both were natives of Lingui county. Culturally, they all belonged to the Guilin
guanhua dialect system (i.e. Guilin dialect, a dialect of “xi’nan guanhua” or Southwest
Mandarin, which includes Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou provinces and north Guangxi), one
of the two main dialect systems in Guangxi (the other being the baihua, i.e. Cantonese).
More importantly, they shared and pursued the same ideals in both the province and the
nation. This made their relations closer than with any others.42 When the troops from
Yulin and Wuzhou were combined in one force, Bai’s previous position in the GMB and
his close relationship with Li ensured that he would play a very important role in promoting
consolidation of this new and rising military group. For this reason, Bai was, after the

39
Great Britain, Foreign Office 371 (General Correspondence) /18153 /1783, “Report on
Kwangsi Province”, by Captain A. T. Wilson-Brand, Intelligence Section, General Staff,
June 1, 1934, p. 147 (quoted in Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang
China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, p. 7).
40
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 109.
41
See Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, compiled and published by General Political
Training Department of Headquarters of the 4th Group Army of the NRA, Nanning, 1935.
Also see Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36.
42
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.

75
formation of the Clique, usually authorized to command its troops. This position advanced
him naturally into the triumvirate.
This triumvirate contributed to the expansion of the Clique’s influence outside
Guangxi and its capacity to revive its forces in the province during and after the Expedition,
even during a series of civil wars between the GMD factions. During the Expedition, Li
and Bai were in the battlefield commanding the Guangxi troops in all battles against
Beiyang militarists in the northern sector. At the same time Huang firmly controlled
Guangxi. Relying on this base of the Clique, Huang was able to provide Guangxi troops
with manpower and armament expenditure when they fought in both central and south
China. This was necessary because the Nationalist Government virtually did not provide
any financial assistance to the 7th Army at the beginning stages of the Expedition.43 The
actions of Huang during these struggles for power of both the Nationalist government and
the GMD always coincided with those of Li and Bai in political and military matters. For
example, in the autumn of 1927 Huang supported the Nanjing Special Committee and the
Western Expedition against Tang Shengzhi, in which both Li and Bai played very
important roles.44 Even after Li and Bai were defeated in both Hubei and Hebei provinces
respectively and driven back to Guangxi, Huang still gave great support to both of his
colleagues. The three powerful men of Guangxi used the forces that Huang had kept in the
province to struggle for the fortunes of the Clique. In other words, this triumvirate
provided them with a foundation on which to base any struggle for expansion or revival of
the forces of the Clique.
Behind their cooperation was their common desire to expand the Clique’s influence
outside the province and to reconstruct Guangxi. They regarded Guangxi as an area for
experiment and testing of their policies in mass mobilization and regional self-government,

43
Except that he appropriated for the 7th Army a sum of money totalling 200,000 Yuan
for its reinforcement to Tang Shengzhi which was the prelude to the Expedition in May
1926 (See Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nian zhiqian de Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, reprinted
Hong Kong, 1962, Vol. 15, p. 76), Jiang and the Guangzhou Nationalist Government did
not give any financial support to the 7th Army before early in 1927. See Huang Shaohong,
Wushi huiyi, p. 127; and Zhang Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi
neimu”, CQ, No. 307.
44
For details of Huang’s activities in response to that of Li and Bai during the NSC
period, see Guangzhou Pingshe (ed.), Guangzhou shibian yu Shanghai huiyi, Guangzhou:
Pingshe, 1929; and Huang Shaohong, “1928 nian Yue-Gui zhanzheng”, WSZLXJ, No. 3.

76
and for the achievement of their goal to modernize Guangxi.45 The achievements of
Guangxi during the Expedition demonstrated the correctness of the Clique’s aspirations in
provincial reconstruction and mass education.46 After being excluded from Nanjing, they
were anxious to regain control of Guangxi, to prepare for revenge, and to resume the
implementation of their own policies in the province. However, at a critical point, when
they were striving to revive their force in Guangxi, Huang Shaohong suddenly left his
colleagues and the Clique for Nanjing at the end of 1930, where he joined the Political
Studies Faction (zhengxue xi), an influential and potentially powerful group in the
Nationalists and a powerful support of Jiang. Huang soon became Minister of Interior of
the Nanjing Government and later Chairman of Zhejiang, Jiang’s home province; he also
continued to enjoy his high position in the government. Thus, the triumvirate seemed to
have disintegrated. The Clique was in crisis.
The real reason for the departure of Huang is still unknown. Perhaps Huang felt
himself responsible for the military reverses of the Clique within and outside Guangxi as
the forces under his command made serious mistakes in several decisive campaigns against
Jiang. For these reverses, his reputation among members of Guangxi fell to a point he
could no longer tolerate.47 Perhaps he had realized that his chances for a future career in a
strong military atmosphere were irreparably ruined. Also, in a typically Chinese way, the
existence of a tougher political and military group in opposition to Jiang, in which he once
was a leader, was a weapon that Huang could use to bargain with the former to obtain a
high position in the central government under the leadership of Jiang.48 It has even been
suggested that his departure was a tactic of the Clique to ease Jiang’s siege of Guangxi.49 It

45
See DSZK, No. 3, pp. 12-13.
46
For details of Guangxi's achievements under Huang Shaohong, see serial articles of
Zhu (Chu) Hongyuan and Huang Zongyan in the Bibliography of this thesis.
47
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, pp. 25-47;
Chen Liangzuo, “Xin Guixi cong qingchao ru-Xiang dao huishi quzhu dianjun chujing”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 45-50; Zhang Dihai, “Zhang-Guijun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji
Hengyang zhanyi”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 157-62; Huang Mengnian, “Xin Guixi
qingchao ru-Xiang ceying Feng-Yan fan-Jiang zhanzheng”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 35-44;
Disijun jishi; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 197-212.
48
Huang Shaohong, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 75.
49
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, p. 214.

77
also was, according to Huang himself, due to the fact that he gave up the anti-Jiang attitude
held by Li and Bai, who would continue opposing Jiang.50 Whatever the reason, Huang’s
departure did not irreparably harm the Clique. In short, he left peacefully on his own,
without taking any force of the Clique with him. It is safe to say that he left not because of
pressure from his colleagues but for a multiplicity of reasons, perhaps even some which
were purely personal.
Although Huang did not take any forces with him at the time of his departure, the
action effected the army’s morale; in particular, those officers of the Clique in military and
civic administration of the province, who had remained at Guangxi with Huang while Li
and Bai were expanding the Clique’s influence outside the province, were shocked. To
strengthen and reconstruct the leadership, Li successfully developed a secret organization to
establish and monitor the common political goal of the Clique, which was to consolidate
the Guangxi group internally. Also, early in 1931, after Bai moved up to take the previous
position of Huang Shaohong, Li promoted Huang Xuchu into the triumvirate, as number
three leader of the Clique. The new Li-Bai-Huang (Xuchu) leadership replaced that of Li-
Huang (Shaohong)-Bai. The formation of the new leadership retained the power balance of
the Clique and sought to carry on as usual.
A classmate of Li at the GMITS and a graduate of Military Staff College (MSC) in
Beijing, Huang Xuchu was once Ma Xiaojun’s aide in the Guangxi Model Battalion and
later Li’s Chief of Staff in Yulin. During the formation of the Guangxi Clique, he had
already seemed to be the most important aide to Li in Yulin.51 As assistant to Huang
Shaohong during the Expedition, the position of Huang Xuchu in the province was only
slightly less important than that of the former. An important reason was that both men
were fellow townsmen of Rong county, an area within the baihua dialect system of the
province. In this circumstance, the officers from the baihua system held a nearly complete
sway on all fronts of the province at this time. At the crucial moment that Huang Shaohong
left Guangxi, Huang Xuchu demonstrated his continuing loyalty to Li and Bai even though

50
Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 212-3, and the same author, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he
Guixi de guanxi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 75-6.
51
Huang Xuchu, “Ba-Gui yiwang lu”, CQ, Nos. 168-70. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li
Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 92-3.

78
he still maintained a good relationship with the former.52 This was very important because
his remaining in the Clique helped to reassure and retain the loyalty of the officers from the
baihua system. More importantly, as a practitioner of policies and a good civic
administrator rather than a policy-maker, he had a strong capability for handling provincial
administration. By promoting Huang Xuchu, Li and Bai were able to restore the
confidence of the province in the Clique’s revival, after it had been shaken by Huang
Shaohong’s departure, and to strengthen control over the province in both the military and
civil administrations. On the other hand, the promotion of Huang Xuchu enabled the
Clique to retain the status of the triumvirate. The three men worked well together after that
and the Clique finally took control of the province again, because, as Joseph Stilwell
pointed out, “the friendship that exists between these men, and their common antipathy
towards Nanking augurs well for the success of their plans”.53 Guangxi enjoyed a
reputation as the “model province” under their leadership for its achievements in
reconstruction and mass mobilization.
Once the new triumvirate was re-formed in 1931, it was never again broken.
Certainly the senior leaders of the Clique themselves did not want to alter the current
structure of leadership, because they needed each other. During the period of 1931-1936,
except when he shared the work with Bai in determining policies for Guangxi, Li paid great
attention to cooperation with other factions of the GMD, particularly those of Guangxi’s
neighbourhood, such as Guangdong, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Sichuan. Bai concentrated on
provincial mobilization with the dual purpose of defending Guangxi and preparing for
resistance against Japan, a process in which the masses' political consciousness in the
regional and national identity was aroused to join the mainstream consciousness of
nationalism. At the same time, Huang devoted himself to the reconstruction of Guangxi.
Perhaps, as has been suggested, they did not attempt to overthrow Li or others, because they
feared senior subordinates of the Clique who might follow. In so doing, they would be the
victims of a “domino” effect.54 On the other hand, some senior officers, such as Yu
Zuobai, Li Mingrui and Lu Huanyan, defected from the Clique and attempted to replace Li,

52
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, p. 118.
53
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
54
Su Mingde, “Bai Jiangong wannian yishi”, GXWX, No. 60 (1993), p. 53.

79
Huang and Bai and to make themselves leaders of this group, but they all failed to shake the
triumvirate for they were utterly isolated by their colleagues of the Clique and distrusted by
this Guangxi group’s rivals - Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei, or even executed by the CCP
though they joined this party, such as Li Mingrui.55 The fate of these defectors of course
was a warning to other senior officers of the Clique.
This Li-Bai-Huang leadership coincided with the needs of the Clique of the 1930s
in domestic reconstruction and mobilization of the province and in external relations with
other factions, including the Jiang group. As Leng Guan (Hu Lin), editor of Dagong Bao
(Ta Kung Pao, or Ta Kung Daily) in Tianjin, pointed out in 1935, Li had won the position
of top leader and was able to control the whole Clique because of his superior moral
characteristics and his charismatic ability; Bai had distinguished himself in military strategy
and tactics; and Huang was the best possible civil administrator to implement the Clique’s
policies which were made by both of the former. In other words, to draw a parallel with
ranks in the army, Li was Commander-in-Chief, Bai Frontline Commander-in-Chief and
Chief of Staff, and Huang served as Commander of the rear base.56 In a sense, this
triumvirate was seen as a whole, particularly within the Clique. Li and Bai were, in the
view of those observing from the outside, even treated as one person, named Li-Bai. Li
also recognized this without reservation in his memoirs.57 The adjustment to the leadership

55
Li Mingrui later joined the CCP and became Commander of the 7th Army of the Red
Army. But he was executed by the CCP in October 1931 after the remnants of the 7th Red
Army from Guangxi under his command joined forces with the Central Red Army under
the leadership of Zhu De and Mao Zedong in Jiangxi. See Gong Chu, Wo yu hongjun,
Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe, 1954; Zhonggong Guangxi quwei dangshi ziliao zhengji
weiyuanhui (ed.), Zuo-You jiang geming gengjudi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 492-7;
Lu Qunhe and Li Yingfen, Li Mingrui, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1992; and articles and
memoirs of Wu Xi, Huang Songjian, Lu Xiuxuan, Lin Qing in the Bibliography of this
thesis. Also see Zhang Renmin, “Jiang-Li zuida lieheng zhizhaozhe - Yu Zuobai”, CQ, No.
112 (1 March 1962), and “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 308-
9 (1-16 May 1970); Diana Lary, “Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Notes on the Chuang
Peasant Movement in Kwangsi, 1921-31”, China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972); and Graham
Hutchings, “The Troubled Life and After-life of a Guangxi Communist: Some Notes on Li
Mingrui and the Communists in Guangxi Province Before 1949”, China Quarterly, No.
104 (December 1985), pp. 700-708.
56
Leng Guan, “Yue-Gui xieying”, in Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning,
1935, p. 7. Also see Lu Yi, “Guangxi san jutou yinxiang ji”, Nanning minguo ribao, 23
February 1936.
57
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 100.

80
plus the common political goal designed by the secret organization, along with changes in
the political situation, made the Clique more secure than all others, and lasted until the fall
of the GMD on the mainland in 1949.

The Secret Political Organization

Of course, the stabilization of the Li-Bai-Huang leadership after 1931 was also
benefited by the work of an efficient secret political organization within the Guangxi
Clique.
As stated above, military school graduates were able to achieve spectacular
successes for the Clique militarily. But the Clique had clearly been out-manoeuvred
politically by Jiang. The reverses of Guangxi troops in Hubei and departure of Huang
Shaohong indicated the necessity for strengthening political unity within the Clique. A
possible measure to meet the necessity was that after 1930 the Clique set up a secret
organization as a politically cohesive force by setting a political goal which they would all
strive for. This was a common political consciousness which emerged in the senior ranks
of the Clique, first, after their failure in the struggle with Jiang to achieve power sharing
and for freedom in carrying out different domestic and external policies, and second, after
the shock of the departure of several senior members from this Guangxi group. The Clique
believed that the departure of these members was the result of failing to provide them with
a clear and firm political goal. Of course, the fact of a secret organization in a faction
working to tie their internal relations to the leaders and to unite policies and define goal was
also a common phenomenon in the GMD.58 It worked to deflect the different political
demands and discordant policies within the Nationalists, and also, to some extent
reconciled the different consciousness of the factions within the GMD to achieve political
unity of the party and nation. The GMD under Jiang’s control had successfully subverted
the forces of the Clique in subduing Guangxi, but the Clique leaders learned fast and
formed their own organization in their revival.

58
For example, Jiang Jieshi had a secret organization - the Blue Shirts. See Lloyd E.
Eastman, Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule 1927-1937, Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 31-84. For details of Jiang Jieshi's secret
organization in the GMD, see Chai Fu (ed.), C. C. neimu, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1988.

81
 The secret organization of the Clique, named “Zhongguo Guomindang hudang
jiuguo qingnian juntuan” (the Party Protection and National Salvation Young Army Corp
of the Chinese Nationalist Party),59 was formed in September 1930. Because of its internal
division, to which Jiang partly contributed, this was a critical time for Li Zongren and the
Guangxi Clique. At the same time, Jiang also ordered the neighbouring provincial troops
of Guangxi to invade the Clique’s base in an attempt to destroy its strength completely in
the province. These all brought crisis to the Clique. These events also provided two urgent
reasons for Li to set up the secret organization. First, to survive in the province and to
prevent further internal wavering, Li had realized the necessity for building up a political
organization to transform the Clique from a single military group into one with a dual
nature, both military and political. A firm political standpoint and a united political group
would bring strength to Li in his continuing struggle with Jiang, to back up a tough army
which he had always had. Another reason for a secret political body was that Li wanted to
maintain the Zhang Fakui group (i.e. the “Ironside”) in Guangxi for continuing anti-Jiang
activity, because the latter and the Clique had fought together against Jiang after it followed
the Reorganization Faction in opposing Nanjing and entered Guangxi to join forces with
the Guangxi group at the end of 1929.60 Thus, the aim of the “Young Army Corp” was to
oppose Jiang and eventually to overthrow his dictatorship in the cause of national salvation.
This central aim was based on the assumption that China was coming under Jiang’s
dictatorship, and the perceived need for democratic politics throughout the country, by

59
For details of this organization, see Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi
zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 136-50. But, according to the memoirs of Yu Shixi, a
member of the secret body and a senior commander of the 7th Army at that time, the name
of this secret body was “Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan” (The
Revolutionary Young Army Corp of the Chinese Nationalist Party). See Yu Shixi, “Xin
Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi - Zhongguo Guomindang geming qingnian juntuan”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58. It should be noted here, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japan
War in 1937 when Li and Bai left Guangxi leading the Guangxi troops to the battlefront in
east and central China, they dismissed this secret body and destroyed all confidential
documents relating to the body obeying the orders of Li and Bai in order to demonstrate
their sincere intention of cooperation with Jiang and upholding internal unity of the GMD
(see Feng Huang, “Gengzheng”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 6, p. 202). For this reason, this secret
body in the Clique was not known by the public. Of course, details on this body rely only
on the memoirs of the relevant persons who were once its members as its original
documents are all not available at this time.
60
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 70.

82
which it meant power sharing of the nation and regional self-government, according to the
political program of this body.61 To achieve these ends, it claimed Sun Yatsen’s the Three
Principles of the People as its guiding ideology even though this was never more concrete
than a mere outline of ideas. This is understandable because all of the factions within the
GMD claimed to be faithful followers of the Three Principles of the People in the
Nationalist era. Li and his colleagues were no exception. Of course, this body had to be a
secret one because Li and other Guangxi leaders still waved the GMD flag and attempted to
avoid both attack from the Nationalists and adverse public opinion. Through a secret
organization, they also expected to promote and strengthen the prestige of the triumvirate.62
For this reason, the body was well-organized in its organizational structure, with Li, Bai,
and Zhang Fakui as the top leaders. They then established branches in both the Guangxi
armies and the “Ironside” under the command of Zhang which joined forces with the
Clique and fought in Guangxi against Jiang, with middle and high ranking officers (i.e.
military school graduates) as members.63
Through a two year struggle, Li revived his forces in Guangxi, to which this secret
body made a considerable contribution. There was additional assistance also from the
Guangdong Faction, which had once supported Jiang Jieshi in his attempts to eliminate the
Clique. This faction abandoned its hostilities and resumed the cooperation between the two
parties after the “Hu Hanmin Incident” which occurred in March 1931.64 With two years’
experience, Li had already realized important results from his secret organization because it
played an extremely important role in helping the Clique to overcome its crisis. During that
time, it had consolidated internal unity, formed the ideal of the anti-Jiang and regional self-
government that the Clique would pursue, and strengthened the union with the “Ironside”.

61
See Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 139-
41, and the same author, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 42-3; and Yi Shixi, “Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de
mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 48-51.
62
Song Houren, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Yu
Shixi, “Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 47-58.
63
Yu Shixi, “Xin Guixi yu gaizupai de mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 49-50.
64
For details of the “Hu Hanmin Incident”, see Lau-cheung Yee, Hu Han-min: A
Scholar-Revolutionary in Contemporary China, unpublished PhD dissertation, University
of California, Santa Barbara, 1986. Also see Hu Hanmin, “Hu Hanmin zizhuan”, JDSZL,
No. 2, 1981, and No. 2, 1983.

83
Furthermore, a semi-independent organization from Nanjing was set up in Guangzhou,
with Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as its mainstay, after the “Hu Hanmin Incident”.
With this new political situation appearing in the GMD, and with Guangxi freed from the
military pressure of encirclement by the neighbouring provincial troops, particularly that of
Guangdong, the whole situation was clearly changed. The “Ironside” then left Guangxi in
early 1932 for Nanjing because Wang Jingwei, its spiritual leader, joined Jiang and formed
a cooperative government between the two groups under their leadership. “The Young
Army Corp”, which was formed with the “Ironside”, was to be reorganized as part of the
latter. Meanwhile, after the “September 18 Incident” in 1931, along with the further
Japanese invasion of China, resistance to imperialism, or to be more exact, resistance
against Japan, which was the mission of the Nationalist Revolution, became an urgent
political demand throughout the country. To strengthen control of the province and to
synchronize the activities of the Clique with the needs of this new political development in
internal and external situations, Li now reorganized this secret body and renamed it
“sanmin zhuyi geming tongzhihui” (the Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the
Three Principles of the People) early in 1932 instead of “the Young Army Corp” in order to
make it really become a nucleus body of the Clique to strengthen its internal unity in the
province.65
The political program of “the Revolutionary Association of Comrades” after its
reorganization was as follows: 1) It affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the leading ideology of the
Chinese revolution and would fight with others to reach this goal. 2) It stated that the
nature of the Chinese revolution at the present was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal
Nationalist Revolution, while the central mission of the revolution was to struggle for
national liberation. The national struggle for independence was the prerequisite for
carrying out measures for developing people's rights and enriching people's livelihood. 3) It
stated Jiang Jieshi as the primary enemy of the Chinese revolution, while all patriotic
parties and groups were in alliance with this organization. 4) It would unite all forces

65
See Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 144-
5. The name of this body, according to Wei Yongcheng, was “Kangri geming tongzhihui”
(The Revolutionary Comrade Association of Resistance against Japan). See Wei
Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.

84
which could be united (to achieve its goal) and avoid making enemies as much as possible
while pointing others towards the real enemy.66
This political program indicated the political attitude of the Clique in the first half
of the 1930s. The main theme of the program was its anti-Jiang sentiment and anti-
Japanese attitude. It is true that the anti-Jiang bias was based on the resentment of the
Clique against Jiang himself. However, the anti-Jiang policy of the Clique had a dual
purpose: revenge for Jiang’s attempts to eliminate other factions with which he had
differences; and opposition to Jiang’s dictatorship throughout the country resulting from his
policy of “rangwai bixian annei” (domestic pacification before an external war). After
1931, although the Clique had escaped the fate of total destruction by Jiang, it was still
excluded from the central power structure. In other words, the gap between Li and Jiang
had not been eliminated but actually enlarged, because the latter still wanted to wipe out all
his rivals, among whom the Clique was the principal one, before starting a war of national
resistance against Japanese aggression. Li and his group remained opposed to Jiang,
waiting for a chance to restore their previous force, and to consolidate their base - Guangxi.
They also wanted to reestablish their reputation because Li and the Clique had been
regarded by Jiang and his followers as the representative of feudal regionalism since
1929.67 Such resentment against Jiang also had a wider social basis within the GMD.
Sharp internal factional struggles had divided that body after the launching of the Northern
Expedition and this provided fertile soil for the Clique to continue holding up its anti-Jiang
banner, as it could derive a lot of allies and sympathy as a result. This is because all of
those factions of the GMD, which were either defeated or were being threatened by Jiang,
were seeking to restore their own forces and to overthrow his rule.68

66
Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 71.
67
See “Taofa Guixi junfa wengao”, 1929, Nationalist Government Archives, The Second
Historical Archives of China, Nanjing. Also see Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de Zhongguo
tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo,
first printed in 1937; reprinted Hong Kong, 1965, pp. 1-20.
68
For example, Hu Hanmin had contacts on all sides, with influential and potential
figures in the Nationalists such as Cheng Qian, Zhang Xueliang, Song Zheyuan, Feng
Yuxiang, Han Fuju and militarists in the Southwest in order to form a wide united front
designed to overthrow Jiang Jieshi and carry out their policy towards the Japanese invasion.
See Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou yu Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ,
First Issue (September 1991), pp. 101-40.

85
 There also was a political basis. The two political organizations of the Southwest
existed as a semi-independent organization from Nanjing, the Clique being one of the two
mainstays in these organizations. Both the organizations and the Clique aimed to share
power in the Nanjing government and the party. Their aim was, according to Hu Hanmin, a
GMD veteran and spiritual leader of the organizations, to reach the “minquan tongzhi” (the
rule by civic rights) instead of Jiang’s “junquan tongzhi” (the rule by military force).69 To
some extent, this minquan tongzhi was the idea of regional self-government held by the
Clique. It emphasized power sharing by all factions and groups, of course, mainly
including the Clique and others, as against Jiang’s dictatorship. Both social and political
bases were linked by the above political program of the secret body under the Clique.
The Revolutionary Association of Comrades was further renamed “Zhongguo
Guomindang geming tongzhihui” (The Revolutionary Association of Comrades of the
Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1934.70 The further reorganization of this body was
correlated with the current situation. To draw more people into the Clique and strengthen
it, a firm political group with discipline and the capacity for the pursuit of political aims
was necessary. Moreover, Hu Hanmin was secretly reorganizing a political party, i.e. the
new Guomindang, in an attempt to replace that of Nanjing. Hu attempted to use both
Guangdong and Guangxi provinces as the base of this new Guomindang. However, Chen
Jitang, ruler of Guangdong, refused to cooperate with Hu in his plan. Hu then turned to
Guangxi. He sent Huang Jilu, one of his trusted followers and a GMD veteran, into the
province in 1934, with many details of his organization’s plans for a new Guomindang. Li
had not fully adopted this plan, but used the idea in reorganizing his secret political body
and renamed it with the above title.71 This perhaps was the first step taken by Li and Bai in
their attempt to form their own political party instead of supporting the GMD under Jiang’s
control. According to Song Houreng, a member of the secret body, during that period, Li
and the Clique still nursed the humiliation of their earlier defeat and planned for another

69
Ibid, p. 133.
70
Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 146-9;
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and He
Zuobai, “Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui neimu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 35-
46.
71
Cheng Siyuan, “Tantan Guixi mimi zhengzhi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, p. 147.

86
day. But this was only part of their motivation. They firmly believed it was necessary to
form a new political party to replace Jiang for both political and military reasons in order to
lead the nation to resist Japan and save the country, because they were convinced that
Jiang’s policy of “rangwai bixian annei” would not lead to national salvation but would
destroy China. At least their aim was to restore the GMD, a good reason which denied any
suggestion of self-aggrandizement.72 If so, they naturally claimed themselves to be national
leaders.
During this period, Li and Bai had always held that Jiang betrayed the Revolution,
and had used the GMD as a tool for advancing his own interests, breaking all of Sun
Yatsen's promises to the peasants and common people. Jiang and his followers had done
their best to represent the Clique as the chief criminal element, destroying the reunification
of the nation, and forming an obstacle to prosecution of the external war at this time in
order to make easier Japan's absorption of China.73 In order to rebut this claim and to
preserve its existence and expansion, the secret body of the Clique linked its purposes
firmly with those of Chinese nationalism. The leaders of the Clique used the resentment
against Jiang which existed among the Guangxi people as they suffered in straitened
circumstances in 1929-1931. They attributed the chaos of 1929-1931 to the invasion of
Guangxi by the neighbouring provincial troops in order to impose Jiang's dictatorship. Li
and the Clique gained willing support when they encouraged the Guangxi people to fight
together with them against the invasion. At the same time, the existence and expansion of
the Clique were largely enhanced by the national political situation, in which the most
important event was the “September 18 Incident” in 1931 engineered by the Japanese in an
offensive designed to conquer the whole of China. In response to this event, Jiang merely
continued to concentrate his troops for the purpose of eliminating domestic adversaries,
both the CCP and rivals within the GMD, including the Guangxi Clique, instead of
immediately resisting the latest burst of Japanese aggression. Seizing this opportunity, the
political program of the secret body put forward anti-Japanism, national independence,

72
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 138-31.
73
See, for example, “Taofa Guixi junfa wengao, 1929”, Archives of the Editorial
Committee for War History, the Nationalist Government, The Second Historical Archives
of China, Nanjing; Anonymous, Dui Liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and
Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, n.p., 1936.

87
together with the anti-Jiang movement. In China, it was customary to emphasize “shichu
youming” (dispatch troops with just cause) when a campaign or a movement was initiated.
So “anti-Jiang and anti-Japan” slogan became the foundation for the existence and
expansion of the Clique within and outside Guangxi. The secret body served those
purposes well. In other words, Li and the Clique used propaganda against Jiang's weak
policy towards the Japanese invasion of China to serve their own ends. However, there
could be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese spirit of both the leaders and
the people of Guangxi. As Hallett Abend pointed out in the 1930s, Guangxi was sincere in
their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if Jiang continued to be in power, China would
be “given away to Japan, bit by bit”, while Jiang husbanded his military and cash reserves
to sustain his own domestic position against domestic adversaries. Guangxi sincerely
wanted to reorganize the central government, and then to arouse the national patriotism of
all the Chinese people in order to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria,
which were occupied and threatened by the Japanese army.74
Why did the secret body claim itself to belong to the GMD and operate publicly
under the GMD banner? First, the Clique opposed Jiang and his group, but not the GMD
itself. Secondly, the current ideology of the GMD provided the most useful tool for the
secret body. All people within the GMD had claimed themselves to be the followers of
Sun’s sanmin zhuyi, regardless of whether or not ordinary people could be said to be clear
about the implications of those principles. Li and his followers were of course no
exception. Once the secret body of the Clique affirmed sanmin zhuyi as the guiding
ideology, it could clear the doubt from the minds of its members on the one hand, and could
easily obtain the political belief of its members on the other, as well as inviting people
opposed to Jiang to join. Furthermore, with the banner of the GMD, it had a justifiable
excuse to defend itself from any attack under a flag well known to the Chinese people and
the rest of the country, and could also easily avoid public criticisms.
All policies and activities of the Clique had always centred on a theme - linking its
own existence and expansion to the tide of the time - by insisting on resistance against
Japan during the 1930s. The secret body of the Clique embodied the theme of carrying out
mass mobilization and reconstruction in the province. This was well-organized with

74
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.
223.

88
rigorous discipline and clear anti-Jiang and anti-Japanese political goals, and played a very
important role in the reconstruction and mobilization of Guangxi. The internal unity of
Guangxi during the June 1 Movement in 1936, when Jiang encircled the province from
three provinces with superior forces, showed the success of the secret body in political
organization and discipline. Because none of the Clique’s members defected from the
Guangxi group, except several pilots who were natives of Guangdong and who left
Guangxi for their native province, Jiang failed to buy over Guangxi members as he
successfully did in Guangdong. Li’s secret body continued its work until the outbreak of
the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937 when Jiang officially called for national resistance. To
show the determination of political unity within the GMD and to offer resistance to the
Japanese in full force, Li and the Clique officially disbanded “the Revolutionary
Association of Comrades” and destroyed all relevant documents in September 1937.75
After that, Bai left Guangxi for Nanjing to become Jiang’s Deputy Chief of Staff, and Li
went to the Fifth War Zone as Commander-in-Chief and led several hundred thousand
Guangxi soldiers to resist Japan in central and east China.

Brains Trust

75
According to Huang Qihan, Bai’s confidential secretary in the late 1930s, after the
outbreak of nationwide resistance against Japan occurred in August 1937, the Clique and
Jiang reached an agreement to dismiss all secret political organizations. The Clique did so.
But Jiang had, in fact, not kept his word. Both Li and Bai privately swore to Jiang’s
betrayal. For the organization of the so-called “Guangxi jianshe yanjiuhui” (Guangxi
Reconstruction Studies Association) which was openly established by Li in Guilin in
October 1937, someone might claim that it was the reproduction or continuation of the
“Zhongguo Guomindang geming tongzhihui” (see Chen Shaoxian, “Guangxi jianshe
yanjiuhui de chengli he jieshu”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 73-846). In fact, the association
was not a secret political organization but was a liaison unit of the Clique with the aim of
maintaining and enlarging its contact with all forces the Clique could influence. Of course,
this association also had a dual mission to provide the Clique with the political organization
and officers once Jiang could not continue to resist Japan. But such a proposal never had a
chance to be put into practice. For details of the association, see recollections of Li Wei,
Chen Shaoxian, Li Renren, Wan Zhongwen and Cheng Siyuan in the Bibliography. In the
Autumn of 1947, Bai, then Minister of Defence in Nanjing, once proposed restoring the
previous secret political body. The exact result of this proposal is unknown. See Huang
Qihan, “Guixi jiqi fandong de zhengzhi zuzhi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 128-129.

89
 The formation and development of a secret political body in the Clique depended
on its Brains Trust, a group of political advisers. This group was composed of two parts:
figures from other provinces and factions who had opposed Jiang, and the Guangxi students
returned from Russia. The willingness of the former to join Guangxi showed that the
Clique’s anti-Jiang policy had a certain support and sympathy. These people included Pan
Yizhi, Qiu Changwei, Zhu Foding, Liu Shiheng, the former elements of the Reorganization
Faction and the Third Party under Deng Yanda as well as elements who gave up the
Communist memberships, and so on, a mixture of politicians and political scholars.
However, the important contribution came from the latter, who made great contributions to
the consolidation of the “Revolutionary Association of Comrades” and provided a
theoretical basis for its political program. These returned students from Russia became an
important force in the Clique during the 1930s.
Wang Gongdu was head of the returned students. A native of Yongfu county (in
the guanhua dialect system), Wang was sent by Li to Russia in 1926 to study at Sun Yatsen
University, Moscow, an institution set up for the benefit of both Chinese Nationalists and
Communists.76 According to Wei Yongcheng, a senior officer of the Clique and Wang’s
classmate in Russia, this background provided Wang with an opportunity to learn the
Russian leader Stalin’s methods of organization in the party. Wang had realized the
enormous possibilities of political organization, particularly a secret one, and viewed this as
a prerequisite to defeat domestic adversaries in internal struggles in the party. The fact that
Stalin successfully defeated Trotsky, another leader of Russian Communists, was one good
example. This perception of Russian political organization had strongly influenced Wang’s
subsequent actions in Guangxi.77 He came back to China in 1928 to serve as secretary to Li
in Wuhan.
Li’s defeat in the following year provided Wang with an opportunity to play an
important role in the revival and consolidation of the Clique’s internal unity. Owing to
military defeat, Li had already been conscious that it was not sufficient to rely solely on the
power of a single military group. What his rival Jiang possessed was not only a central
government but also a national party with a political ideal, even if the ideal was only given

76
Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 3, p. 97.
77
Ibid, Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 116.

90
in lip service and without real substance. Wang became Li’s political adviser in this critical
circumstance. He suggested Li to form a secret political organization within the Clique in
accordance with that of Russia as a preparation for forming a political party. This would
make the Clique a main force in the Chinese Revolution. “The Young Army Corp”, and
then “the Revolutionary Association of Comrades”, were established in accordance with
what Wang suggested.78 Since 1931, Wang had been Chief of the propaganda and
organization field of the Clique. Meanwhile, Wang drew numerous returned students from
Russia into the Clique. They held all important positions of propaganda work in Guangxi,
and became an influential Brains Trust.
This group set all propaganda machines in motion serving the needs of the Clique,
particularly that of the secret organization. They loudly advocated the political program of
“the Revolutionary Association of Comrades”, the theoretical foundation of the Clique
which will be discussed in the next chapter. Once the appropriate political policy (i.e. that
of anti-Jiang and anti-Japan, for the Clique) was determined, officers were a decisive factor
for a political organization. When the secret body was formed, Wang and his colleagues
devoted their major efforts to training political and military officers. On the one hand, they
imbued the officers with the ideas that the Clique was the leading force of the Chinese
Revolution and Li and Bai were its real leaders.79 On the other hand, they set up many
small-size secret clubs or societies in the army and schools as well as the provincial
government, which became peripheral organizations of the secret political body.80 Through
their efforts, the low and middle ranking officers of the Clique fostered belief in their group
and leaders. Although Wang was executed by Li and Bai in September 1937,81 his ideals

78
See Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36;
and Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 115-6.
79
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-8; He
Zuobai, “Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49;, and
the same author, “Zhongguo Guomindang Guangxi dangzheng yanjiusuo”, GXWSZLXJ,
No. 15, pp. 40-4.
80
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Ni
Zhongtao, “Wang Gongdu zai junxiao de mimi zuzhi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13, pp. 178-82;
and He Zuobai, “Wang Gongdu de mimi zuzhi huodong”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 137-49.
81
The execution of Wang in September 1937 remains a mystery to this day. There are
several theories about Wang’s death. One is that Wang was the victim of an internal
struggle of the Clique. As Wang had influence on the lower and middle ranking officers of

91
still influenced the activities of these people. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War,
Jiang’s trusted followers failed to draw these low and middle ranking officers of the Clique
over to Jiang’s side, even though they tried in many ways.82
The success of the Brains Trust in propaganda work was correlated with their
perception of the nature of Chinese society. Their perception was based on their similar
political backgrounds. Members of the Brains Trust, including those students returned
from Russia and other politicians and scholars who had joined the CCP before such as Zhu
Foding,83 were mostly influenced by Marxism-Leninism. They realized that the nature of
Chinese society was semi-feudal and semi-colonial, and as stated above, influenced by
borrowing from the theory of imperialism. Against the CCP’s theory that the working class
was the leading force of the Chinese revolution, they emphasized that the productive
masses were the basis and main force of the Chinese revolution linked with reconstruction
and mobilization.84 Their perception contributed to the formation of a firm political goal
by the Clique on the one hand, and coincided with the needs of awakening the masses to
the political consciousness of the current situation that China faced on the other. With their
perception of the nature of Chinese society, the Clique created a theory of the Pearl River

the Clique, those veterans and senior officers of Guangxi were jealous of the promotion of
his power so quickly. They concocted a false charge against him. As a result, Li and Bai
had to put Wang to death in accordance with the excuse that he attempted to overthrow the
rule of the Clique in Guangxi. See Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 111-5; Song
Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 115-36; and Jian Mo,
“Guanyu chujue Wang Gongdu an”, GXSHKX, No. 2, 1982, pp. 68-73, and p. 28. Some
argue that the execution of Wang resulted from his small-size secret societies. These
activities had not coincided with the needs of the Clique in the new political situation of
national resistance against Japan. See Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 32,
No. 1, p. 116; and Hou Kuangshi, “Li-Bai junfa jituan neibu paixi andou ji Wang Gongdu
zhi beisha”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 150-60. However, according to the writer’s interview
with Feng Huang (Nanning, Guangxi, 15/10/ 1992), the execution of Wang was a an
unjust verdict, because Li and Bai had fallen for the stratagem of sowing distrust or discord
among the Clique designed by the Jiang Group. Also see Xie Fengnian, “Wo suo zhidao de
youguan Wang Gongdu si de jijianshi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 13, pp. 174-7.
82
Yuan Yansha, “Jiang-Gui zai wuzhanqu zhenggong fangmian de mingzheng andou”,
HBWSZL, No. 18, pp. 98-101.
83
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 128.
84
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 126-30. The
details of the Clique’s perception of the Chinese Revolution will be discussed next chapter.

92
Valley Revolution, which will be discussed in the next chapter. This theory became a
motive force to imbue the Guangxi people with nationalism, to facilitate the purpose of
cooperation with other factions of the GMD, and to compromise with Jiang to facilitate
vigorous resistance against Japan.

Regional Identity and Its Relations with the Guangxi Clique

A motive driving the Clique to be a powerful rival of Jiang in the GMD during the
Nanjing decade to a great extent correlated with its strong “xiangtu yishi”, or “xiangtu
guannian” (provincialism, or, regional identity).
Regional identity, or provincialism, refers to the individual’s attachment to his or
her region or province and its customs, rather than his or her country. As province in China
traditionally has been not only the administrative unit but also the cultural one, here the
region usually refers to province. The emergence of provincialism or regional identity
closely correlated with “xiangtu wenhua” (provincial, or regional culture), which refers to
the forms of substance and spirit emerging and existing in a certain region or area with the
regional or district characteristics created by the people who live there. It includes regional
or provincial product, cultural consciousness, and cultural spirit, etc. In this sense,
provincialism or regional identity means that the individual in a certain region or province
identifies strongly with and accepts the provincial or regional culture. It includes the
individual’s identity, affirmation and acceptance of the economic life of the region, spiritual
value, sense of consciousness, and standard of ethics within the limits of the region or
province where he or she lives or belongs. It also includes the regional dialect, customs and
psychological patterns of inherent thought that the individual has cultivated. The form of
expression of provincialism or regional identity is regional feeling. Such an identity with
region or province is also called regionalism, in the sense of culture, as discussed in the
"Introduction".
Provincialism or regional identity has four special features as follows.

93
 1) Each provincialism has a particularity of standard of value. In other words, each
provincialism is an independent ideology, and it is easy to be recognised by signs such as
the Cantonese and Shanghai dialects.
2) The identity’s structure is ordered on different levels which is the same as that of
“chaxu geju” (Chinese social structure), a theory of Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong (Fei
Hsiao Tung).85 Such an identity successively expands from native or regional emotion
(jiaxiang guan, or xiangtu qing), consciousness of return to his or her homeland (guigeng),
consciousness of being attached to his or her native land and unwilling to leave it (antu
zhongqian), to dialect, customs, etc, according to its importance. The degrees and feelings
of the individual’s identity of region to some extent are the same as the function of the
Doppler Effect.
3) It has a closed or semi-closed nature. After the individual in a certain regional
culture has created his or her own provincialism or regional identity, such consciousness
exists and develops as an independent system with strongly closed or semi-closed nature in
his or her mind. Once the consciousness is invaded or harassed by outside cultures, its
outer elements such as customs are first affected or destroyed, but its inner elements such as
the feeling attaching to the region still resist tenaciously; and finally, it might accept these
outside cultures, or allow them to coexist with its original regional identity. The emergence
of the Chinese consciousness of “the second homeland” (dier guxiang), whether in other
provinces or overseas, is the best example for this nature.
4) Those individuals who possess the same kind of regional identity can attract each
other. In China, there are big or small different circles of regional culture which are usually

85
This theory refers to a social structure of traditional China. According to Fei Xiaotong,
each individual in rural society of China lives in a certain circle of “regional culture” in
which the family is the basic unit. As the individual is tightly bound to earth, his or her
connection with the society and the outside world is limited to a certain circle or district,
usually defined through family or clan and village. Naturally, the progressive decrease in
the individual’s loyalty, identity and responsibility to family or clan, village, district, region,
province, until state is accompanied by a decrease in his or her connection with the society
in order from the strong to the weak. This structure is just the same as the response after a
stone is thrown into the water, or, the Doppler Effect. For details of “chaxu geju” theory,
see Fei Xiaotong, Xiangtu Zhongguo (Earth Bound China), Shanghai: Zhongguo
guanchashe, 1947; and Fei Hsiao Tung (Fei Xiaotong), “An Interpretation of Chinese
Social Structure and Its Changes”, in Fei Hsiao Tung, Chinese Village Close-up. Beijing:
New World Press, 1983, pp. 124-57.

94
divided by provinces. As they all have the same identity, those individuals who come from
the same regional culture with the same provincialism can easily be on intimate terms with
each other, but repel one another with other circles of regional culture. In the same way, if
we follow the model of Fei Xiaotong’s “chaxu geju” and extend its meanings a little bit
further, even individuals who come from the neighbouring or similar circles of regional
culture (here it means province), although different from their native one, can more easily
become friends than those from others. For example, people from Yunnan, Guizhou and
Sichuan provinces can easily be on intimate terms with each more readily than they can
make friends with people from the provinces of Henan and Shanxi.
The combination of the above features forms the general characteristic of
provincialism or regional identity - stronger stabilization and cohesion.86 In other words,
provincialism or regional identity has a function to cohere the individuals from the same
circle of regional culture, a motive force to unite people, and a link between those people
with the same cultural background. In the case of the Guangxi Clique, provincialism or
regional identity had a great influence on its rise and development.
Diana Lary has pointed out in her studies of the Clique that the Guangxi
reconstruction movement in the 1930s depended for much of its popular support on the
highly-developed provincial particularism of the province. In fact, such a provincial
particularism was the regional identity of Guangxi, for which her comments are very much
to the point. She writes,
The moving force of the Movement was “Greater Kwangsi-ism” (Ta Kuang-hsi
chu-i) or “local patriotism” (l’amour de la petite patrie). This was a force which
the Kwangsi leaders did not have to create; it existed already, an intangible but
potentially powerful force for mobilisation.87
From my point of view, such a “local patriotism”, i.e. regionalism, in fact, also was
a source which the Clique employed to organize and educate the masses by taking the ideas
of both resistance against Japanese aggression and opposition to Jiang. In this way, the
Clique drove the people of the province to promote their regionalism to the level of

86
For concept of “provincialism or regional identity” and its features, see Hu Fengqing,
“‘Xiangtu yishi’ yu xin Guixi”, JXDXXB, No. 3, 1990, pp. 53-7. It should be pointed out
here that the discussion of this section employs some views of Hu Fengqing and is to some
extent inspired by Hu Fengqing’s study in this field.
87
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 167.

95
nationalism. Here, the function of provincialism which was guided by the Clique was the
same as that of the “chaxu geju” theory. That is to say, the Clique employed regional
cohesion of the province and its peculiar virtues - militancy, discipline, energy, adaptability
- to reconstruct their homeland and defend it from any attack by Jiang. It was also the base
of the Guangxi leaders advocating regional self-government and carrying out the semi-
independent policy from Nanjing at that time.88 On the other hand, such regional identity,
particularly consciousness of heroes and the glorious history which had already existed in
the province since the Taiping Rebellion, was easily guided by the Clique to transfer into a
sense of responsibility to the nation - to defend the nation.89 In short, it provided the
Guangxi leaders with the base on which to carry out their anti-Japanese and Anti-Jiang
policy. Moreover, it was the source of the so-called “Pearl River Valley Revolutionary
Theory”, which was created in order to claim for themselves the leadership of the Chinese
revolution and to inspire feelings more akin to nationalism than regionalism.90
Provincialism also provided the leadership of the Clique with stability and
solidarity. We have pointed out earlier that the leadership of the Clique was a group rather
than an individual like most other factions. The top leadership in the Clique was the Li -
Huang - Bai system, later the Li-Bai-Huang (Xuchu), then in proper order the BMA group,
and level by level down to the bottom. This was the so-called “tuanti” (the group) of the
Clique. In this group, the individual interests were usually concealed by the whole. For
example, the three powerful leaders, although Li was dominant, always conferred together
before they made decisions for the Clique. Li always trusted his colleagues; in return, other
leaders supported and consolidated his top leadership in the Clique. As someone
suggested, it was as if their different personalities were mutually supplementary.91 But the
driving force behind the mutual trust between them was, to a great extent, a remarkable

88
See Li Zongren, “Duiyu difang zizhi jige yinan wenti de poushi”, DSZK, No. 3, 1931.
89
See Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Guangxi
yu Zhongguo geming, Nanning, 1936; and Li Zongren, “Huifu women de huangjin shidai”,
Li-Bai liang zhongyang weiyuan zuijin yanlun sanji, Guilin, 1937, pp. 5-9. Also see Li
Zongren, “Fahui women minzu duli de jingshen”, Zhinanzhen (Yulin), Nos. 47-9 (1934).
90
A further discussion of the “Pearl River Valley Revolutionary Theory” is in Chapter
Five.
91
Lu Yi, “Guangxi sanjutou yinxiang ji”, Nanning minguo ribao, 23/02/1936.

96
unanimity towards consistent local and national interests.92 Even when individual interests
prevailed over the whole, as in the case of the departure of Huang Shaohong in 1930, he
still retained his feeling toward the “tuanti” - the Clique. Before he left Guangxi, Huang
openly explained the two principles which would guide his actions in the future. The first
was that he would not continue to harass national unification by Jiang, who was trying to
bring the nation by force into the unification under his direct control. The second was that
Huang would never betray the Clique even after he left Guangxi.93 This is a typical dual
interest view. But it precisely reflects the cohesion of regional identity which still
influenced Huang in his actions. Indeed, regional identity provided the Guangxi group with
a stable and harmonious atmosphere which could not be destroyed by outside forces. As
the Clique originated from the circle of Guangxi native culture, it had done its best to draw
all individuals who belonged to the circle of the province into the group.94 It naturally
provided all members with interests which they should have. But, the actions by each
member in achieving his or her interests had to coincide with certain principles. The most
important principle was that the individual must not harm and interfere with the interests of
others which might cause internal conflict to destroy the entity of the Clique. If this
principle was breached, the individual involved in the case would be abandoned by other
members of the group. Yu Zuobai, Li Mingrui, and Lu Huanyan were examples. Even the
execution of Wang Gongdu was also based on the principle of maintaining internal unity of
the Clique.95 That is to say, regional identity contributed to consolidation of the Clique’s
leadership and its internal hierarchical structure was easily understood and accepted by all
classes.
The regional identity to a great extent provided the Clique with a motive force for
its rise and even for its revival after the group was broken. As stated earlier, the formation
of the Clique depended basically on these young soldiers who had similar education

92
See reminiscences of Chen Liangzuo, Chen Xiong, Yin Chenggang and other senior
members of the Guangxi Clique in the Bibliography of this thesis.
93
Huang Shaohong, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi”, WSZLXJ, No. 7.
94
Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 7, pp. 104-35. Also see
Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10.
95
For details of discussion of this problem, see Hu Fengqing, “‘Xiangtu yishi’ yu xin
Guixi”, JXDXXB, No. 3, 1990, pp. 53-7.

97
background and shared the common aim of uniting and reconstructing Guangxi during the
chaos of the province in the early of the 1920s.96 The rise of the Guangxi “zizhi jun” (Self-
Governing Army) throughout the province against the invaded Guangdong Army and other
“kejun” (the guest troops) from neighbouring provinces during 1921-1924 was a reflection
of this consciousness.97 Li wisely used this situation and the local interests on which he
depended in Yulin, the place where he rose to the top in the province.98 Here we can see
the influence of regional identity on the Clique from the titles of the two armies under the
command of Li and Huang separately in 1923-1924.99 The circle telegraphy against Lu
Rongting issued by Li and Huang in 1924 also speaks in strong regional tones.100 Even the
revival of the Clique after its defeat by Jiang in 1929, to a great extent, relied on the force
of regional identity. The fact that senior officers of Guangxi willingly accepted and
welcomed their former leaders back to the leadership during the period of the Clique’s
revival in the province might explain such an influence.101
The regional identity also contributed to the stability and unity of the Guangxi
troops. Such consciousness depended on the historical glory of heroes created in the
province and used in frequent propaganda by the Clique, which strengthened their identity
of Guangxi and the group. Even the defection of both Li Mingrui and Yu Zuobai in Hubei

96
Qunyan (Your Say), Vol. 4, No. 1 (1925).
97
For details of the Guangxi Self-Governing Army, see Li Jiaxian, “Zizhijun zhanling
Nanning he Guangxi de jumian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3; and Yu Shixi, “Guidong diqu
zizhijun huodong zhuangkuang ji difang fenluan qingxing”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 161-
168.
98
See Yulin shi wenshi ziliao, No. 10; and Yin Chenggang, “Li Zongren qijia jingguo”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 7; Chen Xiong, “Xin Guixi junfa xingcheng shiqi qinli yishu”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, pp. 11-68; and Chen Xiong, Yin Chenggang and Lai Huipeng, “Xin
Guixi de jueqi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 1-34.
99
For detailed discussion of this regional colour, see Diana Lary, Region and Nation,
Chapter 3. Also see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 107.
100
See Tang Degang and Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyi lu (The Memoirs of Li Tsung-
jen), Chinese version. Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 137.
101
See Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, pp. 201-4; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang
nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 119 (16/6/1962), pp. 13-6; and Zhang
Renmin, “Yin Liang Chaoji zhisi, xianhua Guangxi neimu”, CQ, Nos. 307-9 (April-May
1970).

98
arose from regional consciousness. As Li Zongren advocated “Hubei for the Hubei
people”, Hu Zongduo and his followers used the slogan to discriminate against their
colleagues - Guangxi natives in Hubei. A resentment rising between the people from the
two provinces - two different native cultures led to the conflict of the two different cultures
and regional identities. There is evidence that Li Mingrui defected from the Clique because
of that.102 Ironically, Li Mingrui and his cousin Yu Zuobai were abandoned by his native
fellows for their disloyalty to the group.103 That is to say, the Clique itself was also harmed
by regional identity. Naturally, as the action of the Hubei Faction under Hu had damaged
the interests of the Clique, it could not expect any further favours in the Clique after 1929
although some members of this sub-faction of the group such as Generals Cheng Shufen
and Lan Tengjiao still worked in Guangxi. Furthermore, during the two year struggle for
survival, this regional identity even was a motive force to support the Clique for its struggle
with Jiang and for its consolidation of the base in Guangxi to a great extent. There is
evidence that Li Zongren frequently claimed to have freed Guangxi from the suppression
from Jiang.104 As Bai emphasized when Huang Shaohong decided to depart Guangxi for
Nanjing, the Guangxi people never surrendered to Jiang, not only then but also in the future
when they faced more difficult circumstances. Bai said, “the so-called striving for the
group that took place under the principle of non-surrender increased its strength, made it
more powerful, and more consolidated than ever”.105 Such strong regional consciousness
exerted its influence of stability so that the Clique possessed the force to struggle for its
existence and expansion. Even in the War of Resistance, the Clique strengthened its force
in Anhui, consolidating its group consciousness and consciousness of its interests.

102
See Zhang Wenhong, “Li Mingrui dao-Gui tou-Jiang he dao-Jiang shibai jingguo”,
WSZLXJ, No. 52.
103
Ibid.
104
See Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xuexiao diyi fenxiao
zhengxunchu (ed.), Li zongsiling zai-Liu xunhua ji, Liuzhou: Liuzhou minguo ribaoshe,
1931; and Tao-Jiang wendian ji chubian, Guangzhou, 1931; and Tao-Jiang yanlun ji
chubian, Guangzhou, 1931.
105
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 45.

99
 The fact that the Clique developed and strengthened the cooperation with other
factions in the Southwest such as Guangdong and Guizhou worked in the same way. This
issue will be further discussed in Chapter Five.
Given that regional identity had such a great influence on the Clique, one wonders
whether it contributed to or undermine nationalism or unity of the nation?106 Regional
identity is not a phenomenon peculiar to the Chinese Republic. It has existed in ancient and
modern times and in all countries. Only when regional identity develops into a political
consciousness, i.e. political regionalism, can it influence nationalism, positively or
negatively. A positive regional identity promotes nationalism; and a negative regional
identity harms nationalism and even goes too far to control, so that it separates from the
nation when such a form of regionalism is developed and expands strongly enough to
confront nationalism. Although China had a problem of unification, as Chen Gongbo
pointed out at that time,107 we believe that it applied to internal and external policies rather
than to territory,108 because, as we know, after the GMD’s 4th National Congress at the end
of 1931 China was on the surface reunited under the Nanjing Government with Jiang Jieshi
and Wang Jingwei as heads, apart from the territory occupied by the Japanese in the
Northeast. However, such a national government neither positively dealt with Japanese
aggression nor implemented efficient policies and plans to carry out reconstruction in the
nation,109 the nation-building process, as Paul K. T. Sih suggested.110 In circumstances
where the authorities of the central government at Nanjing were so weak, it is not surprising

106
Diana Lary suggests that the Guangxi Clique’ persistence with regionalism undercut
nationalism, the nationalism of national unity. See Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 212.
107
Chen Gongbo, Sinian congzheng lu, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1936, p. 7.
108
The question of China’s unification in the 1930s, including the view of the Clique
itself, will be further discussed in Chapter Six.
109
Based on his experience of four years as Minister of Industry of the Nanjing
Government in 1932-1935, Chen Gongbo records a lot of difficulties facing China which
made Nanjing impotent to carry out reconstruction, the only basis for real unification of
China, he believed. For details of these difficulties, see Chen Gongbo, Sinian congzheng
lu, 1936, p. 2.
110
For discussion of China’s nation-building efforts in the Nanjing decade, see Paul K. T.
Sih (ed.), The Strenuous Decade: China's Nation-Building Efforts, 1927-1937, New York:
St. John's University Press, 1970.

100
that some factions, particularly those possessed of certain strength in the region such as the
Clique, carried out its own policies and plans for the reconstruction and strengthening of
military forces at the level of the province in response to the issues of the time, an issue
which I will discuss further in Chapter Five. In this sense, these policies and practices were
tinged with provincialism, but this was a form of regionalism which did not undercut
nationalism. It was a time “for interesting experimentation”111 within the GMD, as the
interests of region and nation frequently coalesced.
On the other hand, the Clique’s practice of using regional identity to serve mass
mobilization for national salvation provides us with another angle from which to explain
the positive relationship between regionalism and nationalism. As we know, peasants have
been and continue to be the main body of the masses in China. They were very much
affected by the patriarchal clan system for a long time. As they were tightly bound to the
earth, their connection with society and the nation in fact was a “chaxu geju”, as Fei
Xiaotong suggests; therefore, their loyalty and responsibility to family, clan and village
were more than that to the society and the nation. Such a social structure was of course not
compatible with the needs of modern nation-building. Since the western influences
invaded China in the 1840s, one of the themes of national salvation was to awaken the
masses’ political consciousness of modern nationalism. According to Li Hsiao-t’i,
enlightenment started in the first two decades of this century amongst the lower levels of
society.112 Naturally the peasantry was the main component of this. In a sense, the
enlightenment of peasants meant education designed to transfer their regional identity and
loyalty to family and traditional society into modern nationalism, which was the basis of
modern nation-building. Both the Communists and Nationalists were aware of this. The
experiments of rural revolution by the CCP in Jiangxi province during the Nanjing decade
can be perceived in this light. The political propaganda of the Nationalists in Guangdong
before the Expedition, as discussed by John Fitzgerald in his Guangdong studies, also had a

111
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 213.
112
Li Hsiao-t’i, Qingmo xiaceng shehui qimeng yundong, Taipei: ZYYJYJDSYJS, 1992,
p. 5.

101
similar objective.113 From this point of view, the fact that the Clique used the regional
identity of the province, which existed amongst the masses, to educate and train them, was
in fact a work of enlightenment, whether undertaken willingly or unwillingly. To achieve
the purpose of awakening and mobilizing the masses, the Clique used provincial
particularism in full to strengthen or create a sense of identity towards the region and then
moved this on to the nation, for example, by using the propaganda of Guangxi’s relations
with the Chinese revolution and the Pearl River Valley Revolutionary Theory. At the same
time, the Clique trained and sent a large number of young intellectuals and officers to the
countryside to organize, educate, and train the masses. For example, in only two years
1933-1935, the Clique trained about 10,000 heads of villages and towns, who aged between
20-40.114 Under the Three-in-One policy, these officers played very important roles in
management, education and training of the masses.115 Through these measures and their
efforts, the authorities effectively controlled the message passed on to the masses of the
province. In return, the peasants strengthened their connections with the authorities at all
levels.116 Although the Guangxi leaders were never precise about what they meant by
nationalism, as Diana Lary suggests,117 without doubt, the achievements of Guangxi
reconstruction and mass mobilization indicated that they were trying to change the structure
of “chaxu geju”, and to transfer the masses' loyalty from the traditional society to the level

113
See John Fitzgerald, Hollow Words: Guomindang Propaganda and the Formation of
Popular Attitudes Toward the National Revolution in Guangdong Province, 1919 to 1926,
unpublished PhD dissertation, Australian National University, Canberra, 1983.
114
Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b (1988), p. 326.
115
This policy referred to that in which each officer of Guangxi in the basic unit of rural
society was head of village or town, captain of militia, and master of primary school at the
same time. For details of this policy and its relations with mass mobilization of Guangxi,
see booklets written by Liang Shangyan, Kang Zhenhua, Feng Huang, Xi Ming, Ren
Shaoxi, Zhen Hua, Pan Jingjia, Huang Xuchu, Chen Liangzuo, Qiu Changwei, Jiang Hui
and Sun Zhigong and published by Mintuan zhoukanshe (Militia Weekly Press) and
Jianshe shudian (Reconstruction Bookshop) in Nanning about 1938-1939, in the
Bibliography of this thesis.
116
For detailed discussion of practice and achievements of the Clique’s mass
mobilization, see Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b; and Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way, 1993.
117
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 212.

102
of a modern nation.118 In other words, the regional culture of Guangxi provided the Clique
with the thought motives to awaken the masses and to organize and train militia in the
province. The Clique was overwhelmingly supported by the people of the province during
the June 1 Movement and might well claim its success was due to the earlier transformation
of regionalism, which was based on regional identity, into nationalism, which I will discuss
further in the last two chapters. In this way, we cannot deny the progressive significance of
regional identity, at least in the case of Guangxi during the 1930s.

Conclusion

Before 1929, the Guangxi Clique was basically a military group. Military
achievements brought it onto the stage of the national political struggle and it played a very
important role in national affairs. During the period from the rise of the Clique to the
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, a group of military school graduates, particularly that
of the BMA, were the mainstay of this group, even though it was shocked by the departure
of several senior members and serious internal divisions caused by Jiang in the Jiang-Gui
War. Of course, expansion and survival of the Clique depended on its triumvirate
leadership which retained a fine balance in the power structure of this group. The three
leaders of the Clique shared the work and cooperated with one another. This was an
important factor in finally ensuring that the leadership and the rank and file in Guangxi
were generally in complete unity. However, the most important factor eventually became
the existence of a secret political body in the Clique. With its political goals and policies
concentrating on anti-Jiang and anti-Japanese attitudes, the Clique devoted itself to great
efforts in domestic reconstruction and mobilization in the province on the one hand, and on
the other hand became a major rival to Jiang in national affairs, particularly in that of
resistance against Japan. In other words, the Clique became a group with a dual political
and military nature within the GMD during the 1930s. The Brains Trust played a very

118
For details of Guangxi’s achievements in reconstruction and mass mobilization in the
years before the war of resistance against Japan, see speeches of Sherwood Eddy, Jiang
Kanghu and Liang Shuming, in Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.),
Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji, Nanning, 1936. Also see U. S. Military Intelligence
Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936); Leng Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe
jiping, 1935; and Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning, 1935.

103
important role in providing the theoretical basis of the policies of the Clique, and in
conducting the propaganda for those policies (for which the details of theoretical
foundations and perception of the Chinese revolution by the Clique will be discussed in the
following chapter). Both the BMA group and the secret political organization became
mainstays of the Clique with the Brains Trust as the spirit and heart of the latter.
Distribution of the resources of the Clique, i.e. benefits and promotions, began to depend
more and more on loyalty to the secret organization which set political goals for the
Guangxi people to strive towards. The Brains Trust afforded the Clique the basic
conditions on which to form a political party in political program, organization, leadership,
officers and so on. According to Wang Gongdu, “a well-organized political party should be
an advanced political party. It should lead revolution to victory, and wield national
power.”119 The policies of the Clique in the first half of the 1930s had departed from this
point, and had both achieved much and suffered heavily as a result.
The rise and development of the Clique correlated with regional identity. The
achievements of Guangxi in reconstruction and mass mobilization during the 1930s and the
title of “model province” that they won further strengthened this identity of the people in
the province. In some sense, this strong regionalism which the group created in Chinese
politics might affect Jiang’s efforts of national unification by force. However, the conflict
between the Clique and Jiang was the reflection of their different perceptions of the
Chinese revolution and different internal and external policies, and later centred on the
issue of how and when China would resist Japan after the “September 18 Incident”. This
was the departure point of the Clique in the years before the War of Resistance to take
different policies from Nanjing and finally to reach reconciliation with Jiang for the
common aim of resisting Japan.

119
Song Houreng, “Wang Gongdu yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 12, p. 127.

104