Su PHD Thesis - 13 Chapter 6

CHAPTER SIX
“RESISTING JAPAN IS THE ONLY WAY”:

- LI ZONGREN’S IDEA OF “SCORCHED EARTH RESISTANCE”
In the 1930s, the traditional interests and status of the great Powers in Europe were
threatened by both Germany and Italy. Both countries were regarded by the Powers as the
forces dangerous to the western world. Taking the advantage of the fact that the Powers
were paying most of their attention to Europe, Japan speeded up its aggression in China. In
such circumstances, each party and faction in China had to answer a common question:
how would they respond to Japanese aggression? Undoubtedly, most of them claimed that
they would stand for resistance, at least it seemed to be so on the surface. But, a question
arising from that: how and when would China begin to resist Japan? Here, each party and
faction had a different answer, and these varying policies reflected the political attitudes of
the different parties and groups, and caused the political conflict among them. Within the
GMD, the Guangxi Clique and Jiang Jieshi were in bitter conflict over this issue. As stated
earlier, the establishment of the new triumvirate leadership and the formation of internal
cohesion within the Clique, as well as the common political ideology, contributed to the
consolidation of the Guangxi group’s base and revival of its forces. Consequently, the
Clique was able to renew expansion of its strength in the province and to catch the attention
of the country in the 1930s for its achievements both in reconstruction and mass
mobilization. All these achievements were based on its anti-Japanese policy which differed
from that of Jiang. More importantly, facing the critical national crisis with a strong anti-
Japanese policy provided Guangxi favourable conditions to develop and build upon
cooperative relationships with the neighbouring provincial factions and to strengthen its
185
own forces in opposition to the centralization of Jiang; on the other hand, it also enabled the
Clique to form a political outline - the Guangxi Reconstruction Program, a theoretical
foundation to guide its activities in the province and in national affairs in both mass
mobilization and preparation for fighting Japan, in contrast to Jiang’s policy of “rangwai
bixian annei” (domestic pacification before an external war). As a result, Guangxi under Li
Zongren gained wide acclaim as the “model province” through militia organization and
mass mobilization, and particularly effective anti-Japanese propaganda and nationalist anti-
Japanese education throughout the province. Noting this new and dynamic atmosphere, in
particular, the strong feelings for patriotic resistance throughout the province, Guangxi was
regarded by Sherwood Eddy, an American missionary who visited the province in 1934, as
the hope of China in achieving national restoration and liberation.1 Historians who have
studied modern Guangxi, such as Diana Lary, Eugene Levich and Chu Hongyuan, also set
high values on this reconstruction and mobilization of the 1930s.2 The aggressive
promotion of “fan-Jiang kangri” (opposing Jiang and resisting Japan) was a key factor
dominating the Clique’s actions in the 1930s. A discussion of this issue could enable us to
assess the roles played by the group in achieving internal unity within the GMD and in the
formation of the Anti-Japanese United National Front (AJNUF) later.
There is evidence that the policy behind Guangxi’s mass mobilization and
preparation for fighting Japan had always been centred on the anti-Japanese ideas of Li
Zongren and other Guangxi leaders. Levich and Chu have also noted that the Clique built
its theoretical foundation on simple, single minded pursuit of resistance.3 However, they
failed to discuss the following questions. What were Li’s seminal ideas in this regard?
What were the details of the policy of the Clique? When did the policy take form? How
did the policy serve the dual military and political character of the Clique? Was there any
1
Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, 7 January 1935
(printed by the author).
2
Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 163-92; Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way
in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993, pp. 65-
98; and Chu Hongyuan, “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian”,
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b (1988), pp. 307-353 (hereafter as “1930s”).
3
Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp. 63-98; and Chu Hongyuan, “1930s”, pp. 307-
353.
186
interrelationship between the policy and the “June 1 Movement” launched by the Clique in
1936? We have seen that the political tactics and ideas of Li and the Clique provided the
thrust of mass mobilization in Guangxi and drove the Clique to promote the formation of
the AJNUF. Also, they evolved to the point of transforming the anti-Jiang policy into one
of “bi-Jiang kangri” (forcing Jiang to resist Japan). Thus, as the result of subtle
modifications to the original anti-Japanese idea, the Clique was gradually changing its anti-
Jiang policy into that of anti-imperialism, and regarded that as the precondition for all its
actions. The growing anti-Japanese movement in Guangxi, in turn, pushed Li and the
Clique further to show their determination to advance their policy of resistance. As a result,
whatever their reservations about Jiang, their actions in response to the situation of China at
that time were helpful to reach internal unity within the GMD before the formation of the
AJNUF. Partly because of the Clique's effort, Jiang was also compelled to change his
policy of elimination of his opponents within the GMD, and to carry out a policy of
reconciliation with other factions and groups, including the Clique and the CCP and to
prepare for a national war against Japan.
This chapter will analyze the Clique’s anti-Japanese idea, focusing on the views of
Li Zongren, but including those of the other Guangxi leaders. It will also account for the
formation and change of the Clique’s policy towards Japanese aggression. It will explain
the relations of the Clique’s anti-Japanese policy with Guangxi’s preparation for war
through mass mobilization and national political unity.
The Background and Origin of “Jiaotu kangzhan” (Scorched Earth Resistance)
The conflict between Li and Jiang was fundamentally over policy towards Japanese
aggression in the 1930s. In the critical situation of the national crisis, Li and the Guangxi
leaders saw resistance as the cornerstone of the Clique’s policy towards Jiang and Japanese
aggression. This policy had gradually been transformed from “party protection and national
salvation” (hudang jiuguo) in 1929-1931 into “resisting Japan and opposing Jiang”. In
contrast to Jiang’s policy of “rangwai bixian annei”, the policy of the Clique was
eventually summed up by Li as the famous anti-Japanese idea - “jiaotu kangzhan”
(scorched earth resistance). This idea guided the Clique’s actions in the 1930s and became
part of the national policy in the Sino-Japanese War after the July 7 Incident in 1937.
187
According to Li himself, “scorched earth resistance” was the only way to save the
nation from subjugation and to ensure its survival. Li said,
We must base our resistance on the determination that we would rather make a
scorched earth all over the country than surrender without fighting, and to launch
the whole nation immediately into a national liberation war as our reply to the
invaders. Only in so doing can we show the great Chinese national ability and spirit
for standing on her own feet and subsisting by her own efforts. Only then could
China survive in the world.4
The term “scorched earth policy” originated from the Napoleon War in 1812. When the
French troops under the leadership of Napoleon invaded Russia they were defeated by just
such a policy of the Russian people, because it meant burning and destroying all property in
a given area before giving it up to an advancing enemy. Li himself and his subordinate
commanders had mostly obtained a sound military education and learned of the history of
the famous wars throughout the world. Also, most of his Brains Trust had gone to Moscow
for their education. They would undoubtedly have learned of actions taken by Russia
against the army of Napoleon in 1812 when Moscow was burned rather than allowing the
invader viable winter quarters. Of course, Li’s “jiaotu kangzhan” at least had the same
meaning of burning crops, and destroying buildings, etc that might be useful to enemy
forces occupying a district. For example, during the Sino-Japanese War, when the Guangxi
troops defended Guilin, they resorted to this measure.5 However, the notion of scorched
earth was basically a tactic, not a general policy of warfare; therefore, scorched earth was a
part of the strategy and tactics of Li’s anti-Japanese policy. Here, what Li emphasized was
the determination to resist, i.e. as the Chinese saying goes, “ningwei yusui, buwei waquan”
(rather be a shattered vessel of jade than an unbroken piece of pottery) - better to die in
glory than live in dishonour. This signified resistance until the end, including even the
scorching of all China’s earth.6 Li’s policy of scorched earth resistance was the result of
this philosophy.7 This policy was first officially announced in an article on 17 April 1936,8
4
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, SMZYYK, Vol. 7, No. 5 (1936), p. 145.
5
See Cao Wei and Huang Mengnian, “Guilin ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ qinli ji”, WSZLXJ, No.
40, pp. 181-190.
6
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu Kangzhan”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, Hong
Kong: Zhujiang ribaoshe, 1937, p. 116.
7
Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan de lilun yu shijian - Li Zongren
yanlun ji, Nanning: QMZZKS, 1938, p. 2 (hereafter as Lilun yu shijian).
188
and afterwards systemized by Li through a series of speeches and articles around 1936-
1937. Therefore, the article of 17 April was regarded as “the first Chinese voice explaining
systematically the scorched earth resistance policy”.9 Li himself was lauded as the
“zuzong” (forebear) of this policy.10 At the same time, his colleagues Bai Chongxi, Huang
Xuchu, and other members of the Clique, also contributed to the scorched earth resistance
theory.11 Of course, Guangxi became recognised as the source of this theory.12
The creation of the scorched earth resistance policy was due to the interaction of
internal and external factors. On the one hand, it was a product of the intensifying conflict
between Japan and China and the extremely serious national crisis going back several
decades.13 On the other hand, the policy was also an outcome of the continuity of the
Clique’s struggle with Jiang. Before 1931, the Clique had struggled with Jiang for years.
As stated earlier, their struggle was not only for central power but also for a say in what
measures should be carried out in internal and external affairs after the accomplishment of
the national unity under the GMD in 1928. As John King Fairbank pointed out, faced with
the national crisis, the main task of China’s struggle for national sovereignty “had to give
8
Ibid, p. 10. Also see SMZYYK, Vol. 7, No. 5 (1936), p. 145.
9
Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Lilun yu shijian, p. 1.
10
Huang Xuchu, “Guanche jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 65. In fact, after the “September 18 Incident”, Li and other Guangxi
leaders had already expressed the anti-Japanese idea through a series of speeches and
lectures. The term “jiaotu kangzhan” was adopted by them as a summation of these
speeches and lectures.
11
Bai Chongxi also expressed and explained the main ideas of this theory through a
series of speeches in the first half of the 1930s. See, for example, Bai Chongxi, “Kangri
jiuguo”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 42-61.
12
Cai Tingkai, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shixian xing”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu
kangzhan, p. 66.
13
For discussion of conflict between Japan and China since the 19th century and the
growth of the Chinese people’s consciousness of the need for resistance, see Zhou Kangxie,
Yang Jialuo, Wang Jianqiu, Shao Minghuang, Wu Jingping, Yang Kuisong, Zhu Yunxing,
Shen Qianfang, Qiu Qianmu, Lou Xiange, Tang Baolin, Roger, Jeans, and Zhongguo
shixuehui, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
189
way to China's patriotic resistance to the Japanese militarists’ effort to conquer China”.14
In other words, after 1931, any differences between various Chinese groups and parties
should be dissolved and all energies used to resist Japan and to save the nation from
extinction. In such circumstances, the policy that Jiang carried out - not to resist the
Japanese but to first strive for the elimination of his political and military opponents -
became a liability to him, and an advantage to Li and his Guangxi group. The national tide
was turning in Li’s favour, and his former anti-Jiang policy (party protection and national
salvation) in the earlier stage of the Clique’s struggle with Jiang was quickly transformed
into that of both anti-Japan and anti-Jiang.15
The Clique openly called for national resistance soon after the “September 18
Incident”.16 However, the Clique's anti-Japanese policy was more than lip service for
political gains, but was put into the action as well. Just two days after the partial resistance
war in Shanghai broke out on 28 January 1932, Li and other leaders of the southwest
organizations demanded that the central government in Nanjing send a large number of
troops to reinforce the 19th Route army, the Guangdong troops fighting the Japanese in
Shanghai. Next day, by joining with Sun Ke and other senior GMD leaders, Li again sent a
telegraph to General He Yingqin, the Minister of War of the Nanjing Government, urging
him to mobilize all troops and air force stationed around Nanjing to fight the Japanese on
the ground that “today China’s chance for existence could be decided by the war in
Shanghai”.17 Bai Chongxi, also, on behalf of the Guangxi troops, requested a battle
assignment to reinforce the 19th Route Army by leading the Guangxi troops.18 As a
professional soldier, Li himself had a guilty conscience, for he would not have an
14
John King Fairbank, China: A New History, Cambridge, Mass. and London, England:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 279.
15
See, for example, Kong Linggui, “Guonan qizhong qingnian yingyou de nuli”, JXXK,
No. 13 (1934), pp. 27-8; and Yu Yunlong, “Women de shiming”, JXXK, No. 17 (1934), pp.
14-5.
16
Nanning minguo ribao, 27 September 1931, p. 2.
17
Ta Kung Pao (Da Gong Bao), February 1, 1932. Also see Li Zongren, “Xi’nan tongzhi
yao fuqi jiuguo de zeren”, Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB,
1935, p. 102 (hereafter as Li zongsiling).
18
Quoted in Cao Guangzhe, “Shilun xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ de zhuzhang yu
shijian”, unpublished M. A. thesis, the Chinese People’s University, Beijing, 1988, p. 17.
190
opportunity to participate in the resistance war.19 In his place, over a thousand Guangxi
troops were shipped to Shanghai in support of the resisting force.20 Meanwhile, he also
attacked the practice of Jiang, who held back a large number of troops for civil war but not
for the reinforcement of the resisting force - the 19th Route Army, and condemned the fact
that Jiang had signed the Songhu Truce with Japan in May.21 The Japanese troops invaded
Rehe province and North China by crossing the Great Wall in the following year. In
response to this threat to national sovereignty, Li joined forces with Chen Jitang, leader of
the Guangdong Faction, and Cai Tingkai, Commander of the 19th Route Army that was
stationed in Fujian province after the resistance war in Shanghai. They sent a force
composed of volunteers recruited from the three provinces of Guangxi, Guangdong and
Fujian and commanded by Cai himself in order to reinforce the defence of North China in
May. These troops were ordered by the central government under Jiang to stop their march
at Hunan province and withdrew to their native provinces after Nanjing had signed the
Tanggu Truce to appease Japanese demands in the same month.22 Even so, two months
later Li contributed 100,000 yuan (Chinese dollars) to the “Christian General” Feng
Yuxiang, former leader of the Northwest troops and former Commander in Chief of the 2nd
Group Army of the NRA during the Expedition, in support of the latter’s attempts to
organize an Anti-Japanese People’s Army in Chahar province, the front of North China,
with the object of arousing a popular campaign against Japanese aggression and the
compromise policy embodied in the Tanggu Truce. According to Feng, the Clique was the
only group that gave him financial support for his campaign at that time.23 Feng’s
campaign soon failed under the combined attack of both the Japanese troops and Jiang’s
19
See Li Zongren’s inscription, in Mengyu shanguan zhuren (ed.), Zhonghua di shijiu
lujun xuezhan shi, Hong Kong, 1932.
20
Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982, p. 295.
21
Li Zongren, “Jiechu guonan yao kao ziji nuli”, Li zongsiling, pp. 137-41.
22
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo
qingnian junrenshe, 1934, pp. 573-4; Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, pp. 308-9. For
Nanjing’s appeasement of Japan in the war of Rehe and the Great Wall, and details of the
Tanggu Truce, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York: The McMillan Company,
1938, pp. 40-50.
23
Feng Yuxiang, Wosuo renshi de Jiang Jieshi, Hong Kong: Wenhua gongyingshe, 1949;
reprinted Hong Kong: Qishi niandai zazhishe, 1975, p. 37.
191
Central Army. But Li not only praised Feng’s patriotic action but also strongly condemned
Jiang for suppressing the anti-Japanese activities, and asked Nanjing to maintain this anti-
Japanese army, which now came under Generals Fang Zhenwu and Ji Hongchang, Feng’s
two senior subordinates in the Chahar resistance war.24
In addition to its resistance attitude towards Japanese aggression, the Clique had to
include opposition to the policies of Jiang. They regarded Jiang as a dictator and an
obstruction to effective resistance, and both were seen to be the common enemy of the
Chinese war of national liberation war.25 In this conflict, personal or group interests and
the national revolutionary commission were united in both anti-Japan and anti-Jiang
activities. Simultaneously, they pursued an anti-Communist policy as well. This anti-
Communist attitude had festered for years following their dissatisfaction with the CCP’s
pro-Russian policy particularly during the central east railway incident of 1929, as
mentioned in Chapter Four, which was regarded as a traitorous action. It was remembered
along with the CCP’s attempts to overthrow the Clique’s rule in Guangxi during 1929-
1931, the critical period when the Clique was confronting the combined attack of both the
CCP’s Red Army and Jiang’s Central Army which had joined forces with the troops of
Guangxi’s neighbouring provinces, such as Guangdong, Yunnan and Hunan as well.26
24
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, p. 616 and p. 646.
25
See Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Lilun yu shijian, pp. 79-102; “Wu Tiecheng’s
Confidential Correspondence”, the Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, Serial 2,
No. 5412; and Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou jiqi Hu-Jiang hejie”,
KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 101-140 (hereafter as “Hu Hanmin”).
26
For details of the Chinese Communists’ actions in Guangxi and their attempts to
overthrow the Clique’s rule and to establish its own regime based on the Soviet model in
the province, see Wu Xi, “Huiyi Longzhou qiyi he hong bajun jianli qianhou”, HQPP, No.
19 (1980), pp. 248-70; Diana Lary, “Communism and Ethnic Revolt: Notes on the Chuang
Peasant Movement in Kwangsi, 1921-31”, The China Quarterly, No. 49 (1972); Graham
Huchings, “The Troubled Life and After-life of a Guangxi Communist: Some Notes on Li
Mingrui and the Communists in Guangxi Province before 1949”, The China Quarterly, No.
104 (December 1985), pp. 700-8; Shi Hua (pseud.), “Guangxi gongchandang de guoqu ji
xianzai”, in Haitian chubanshe (ed.), Xiandai shiliao, Shanghai: Haitian chubanshe, 1934,
Vol. 2, pp. 316-322; Gong Chu, Wo yu hongjun, Hong Kong: Nanfang chubanshe, 1954;
Mo Wenhua, Huiyi hong qijun, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1979. For details of the Clique's
struggle for survival in Guangxi, see “Archives of the Editorial Committee for War History,
the Nationalist Government, Nanjing”, in The Second Historical Archives of China,
Nanjing.
192
With such historical background the policy in dealing with the internal and external affairs,
i.e. “goodwill and sincere unity with the neighbouring provinces internally and striving for
resistance against Japan and suppression of the Communists until the end externally”, was
determined by the Clique in the latter part of 1931 and the early months of 1932.27
The modification of the Clique’s policy began in 1935. The Clique gave up its anti-
Jiang policy on the surface,28 for Jiang successfully drove the Chinese Communists out of
their base in Jiangxi to the northwest area and tried to pursue a policy of reconciliation with
his opponents within the GMD, on the one hand; and it had by then consolidated its base
and was now urgently calling for full national resistance and intent on dissolving all
differences between various groups and parties as a precondition of resistance in opposition
to Jiang’s “rangwai bixian annei”, on the other. In other words, the Clique’s policy was
turning to forcing Jiang to resist Japan.
The scorched earth resistance was the product of interaction of all these forces. The
term “scorched earth”, in fact, first appeared in May 1933 when the Japanese invaded Rehe
and other provinces south of the Great Wall. Faced with a critical situation of imminent
Japanese occupation of Rehe and penetration into North China, a writer called for the
“jiaotu dikang” (scorched earth resistance) in the Beiping and Tianjin areas in an article
published in the Shijie ribao (The World Daily) of Beiping on 15 May 1933.29 However,
there is no corroborative evidence which indicates that such an idea was further expanded
by anyone else at that time. A possible explanation for this is that the article focused only
on resistance in the Beiping and Tianjin areas but not on the national mobilization to fight
Japan. Moreover, the Chinese troops in Rehe and Hebei along the Great Wall were soon
defeated by the Japanese, and Nanjing was compelled to sign the Tanggu Truce in the same
month. As part of this truce anti-Japanese activity was suppressed by Nanjing to appease
Japanese demands. Whatever the reason, the idea lapsed until the same term of “jiaotu
27
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiaogong, qinren shanling”, in Bai Chongxi, Bai fuzongsiling
yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 52 (hereafter as Bai fuzongsiling).
28
GWZB, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1/1/1934); and Zhongguo dashi ji, compiled and published by
Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D.
C., 1973, Vol. V, p. 199. Also see “Wu Tiecheng’s Secret Correspondence on 14
December 1933”, The Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing, Serial 2, No. 5417.
29
Also see Anonymous, “Buxi ‘jiaotu’ dikang”, GWZB, Vol. 10, No. 20 (22/5/1933).
193
kangzhan” was adopted and systematically explained by Li three years later, finally
becoming a famous national slogan in the War of Resistance.
Li Zongren’s Idea of “Jiaotu kangzhan”
According to Li and the Clique, the scorched earth resistance theory was applicable
in two areas: one was “the national policy towards Japan”, and the other “the strategy and
tactics of resisting Japan”.30 The former mainly sets forth general and specific policies
towards Japan, and among them it is emphasized as the key issue. The latter gives specific
directions on how the Chinese people and soldiers would carry out the policy in War of
Resistance.
1. The National Policy towards Japan - Scorched Earth Resistance
1.1. The Significance of Scorched Earth Resistance

As Li declared, he and the Guangxi leaders only insisted on scorched earth
resistance as the national policy after profound consideration of the future of their country
and nation.31 Three main factors had influenced them in coming to accept the necessity for
the policy.
First, “the national restoration could not be achieved until the War of Resistance
was launched.”32 This consideration was based on the situation of the conflict between
China and Japan. After 1931, Japan not only occupied the northeast, north, and southeast
areas of China in succession, but also robbed the resources of China and destroyed its
economy by smuggling a large quantity of Japanese goods via North China. All these
30
Lilun yu shijian, pp. 25-6; and Luo Ningfu, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shiji”, in Zhujiang
ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 105-7.
31
Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin xiansheng lun Guangxi jianshe yu fuxing Zhongguo,
Nanning: Jianshe shudian, 1938, p. 66 (hereafter as Li Delin).
32
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, p. 148.
194
further deepened the Chinese national crisis.33 Li declared that every patriotic Chinese
should make a positive response to this crisis, no matter which party or faction he or she
belonged to or what kind of idea or “ism” he or she believed in or supported. Japanese
aggression must be actively opposed. Although Guangxi was far from the front facing the
Japanese invasion, he and his colleagues could not sit idly by and remain indifferent to the
critical situation of China. They had realized that “Japanese aggression was to reach for a
yard after taking an inch and its aim of conquering China would be successful in the end”.
Therefore, Li felt that “only resistance could enable China to survive, while non-resistance
or surrender could cause her to rapidly collapse. In other words, in the situation of Japanese
aggression, the Chinese people have no room for any other course of action except resolute
resistance.”34
Secondly, “for the purposes of carrying forward our country’s existing culture and
creating an advanced one for the future, the only way forward is to launch the national war
of self-defence immediately.”35 According to Li, only a total war against foreign invaders
could enable the country to survive and regenerate from subjugation. This was a decision
imposed by the course of modern Chinese history. Li and the Clique believed that the
Chinese nation had been enslaved by imperialism, and the Chinese culture had been ruined
by foreign aggression after the Opium War in the 1840s.36 As a result, China was not only
unable to retain its independence in politics, but also unable to stand on her own feet
economically and unable to act on her own in diplomacy in the world as well. Li suggested
further that culture was the basis of existence for a nation. The judgement of a national
cultural value was mainly dependent on whether it could ensure the nation's existence and
progress. According to this, Li even thought that owing to imperialist aggression the
Chinese culture had already been brought to a standstill. Therefore, the first item of the
33
For details of the Japanese smuggling in North China, see Hallett Abend, My Years in
China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, 1943, pp. 207-11; and Junshi kexueyuan junshi
lishi yanjiubu, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi, Beijing: JFJCBS, 1991, Vol. 1, pp. 311-52.
34
Li Zongren, “Wode zhuzhang - jiaotu kangzhan”, in Lilun yu shijian, p. 2.
35
36
For detailed discussion and explanation of this history, refer to JXXK, No. 13, pp. 49-
55, and No. 18, pp. 7-10; and Guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu zong
zhengxunchu (ed.), Guangxi yu zhongguo geming, Nanning, 1936.
195
agenda of Chinese national salvation was to act on her own to change this state of inertia
into that of a developing one. To develop this culture, the most effective measure was the
national war of self-defence, for it alone would make the changes necessary in the morale
of the nation.37 This analysis partly explains why Li frequently called for the launching of a
national war against Japan after the “September 18 Incident” and insisted on resistance as
the only way for national and cultural survival.38 Moreover, according to Li, the national
war, particularly that of self-defence, had historically been a motive force for social
development and progress. He used the following examples to support his argument. The
Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period in ancient China, the Roman Empire,
and even the Europe of the nineteenth century all achieved great social progress because of
various defensive wars, according to Li. In contrast, there were signs that the cultures of
such nations as Egypt and India were disintegrating because they did not have the capability
of self-defence.39
Li’s assessment proved to be a correct reflection of the national situation. Nanjing
had not openly proclaimed a war to recover the lost territories but on the contrary had
suppressed the demands for resistance throughout the country in the 1930s. Although
Nanjing under Jiang was indeed preparing for resistance,40 the impression that it gave to the
people was one of abject concessions to Japan. As a result, an even more critical national
crisis than ever before seemed inevitable. Many Chinese believed that the fate of a slave
without a country was facing the Chinese people if China failed to fight a war of self-
defence.41 In this situation, the “sense of mission”, namely, saving the nation from
subjugation and ensuring its survival pushed Li and the Clique to call for immediate
37
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 9.
38
Li Zongren, “Dikang caishi weiyi de chulu”, in Wang Kuiyi et al, Yinian lai zhi
Guangxi, Nanning: Nanning minguo ribaoshe, 1933, n.p.
39
Li Zongren, “Weiyou kangzhan”, pp. 148-9.
40
For discussion of Jiang’s preparation for resistance against Japan, see Chen Qianping,
“Shilun kangzhan qian Guomindang zhengfu de guofang jianshe”, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987;
and Lu Dayue, “Jiuyiba shibian hou guomin zhengfu tiaozheng binggong shiye shulun”,
KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1993, pp. 56-68.
41
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe (ed.), Fan-Jiang yundong shi, pp. 705-6.
196
resistance and stimulated him to put forward his systematized plan - scorched earth
resistance.
Li believed that the Japanese wanted to conquer the whole of China. To that end,
Japan would use any means to split both Chinese territory and the people. Its tactics were
to seize new territories in sudden, terrorising raids, and then to offer periods of peace and
relief from terror in a truce to giving them time to consolidate for further incursions. The
Chinese people must be determined to fight the invaders. Here, Li condemned the Japanese
Government and militarists; but was reluctant to blame the Japanese people. He suggested
that the common people of Japan were also victims of the Japanese imperialists and were
also oppressed by their government. The common Japanese people would wish to pursue
peace, not war. For this reason, Li himself and the Chinese people maintained respect for
the Japanese people, expecting them to overthrow the domestic fascist rule and to strive for
their own national liberation and peace.42 This consciousness shows that Li was not
automatically opposed to everything foreign, nor harboured ideas of expansion beyond
China’s borders. His focus was solely on defence of Chinese territory and resistance to
aggression. He did, however, advance a stern moral view of the positive attitude each
Chinese should have in the national crisis. China’s resolute resistance might also help the
Japanese people to overthrow the reactionary Japanese Government, and replace it with one
that would really represent their interests and rights. Only in this way, the two countries
could establish a reasonable relationship under the principle of equal and mutual
assistance.43 This view clearly explains Li’s stand: only the nation that held the constantly
striving spirit and the determination to resist foreign aggression could have the possibility
and ability to establish an equal relationship with a foreign country.44 In fact, some
Western observers also shared this view. For example, during the 1930s, Hallett Abend, an
American correspondent in China, warned time after time “that only a small clique was
responsible for the policy of aggression, that there would be a revolution in Japan, or that
there existed in that empire a ‘liberal element’ which would eventually restrain Japanese
42
Li Zongren, “Wode zhuzhang”, p. 8.
43
44
Lilun yu shijian, pp. 137-51.
197
militarism.”45 Although the revolution which both Li and Abend expected in Japan did not
happen, this view reflected a common perception of internal conflict within Japan by
people at that time.
Li concluded that “the existence or death of China is dependent on whether the
nation herself could resist Japan”.46 In his view, the outcome of the war relied mainly on
whether Chinese spiritual force could be fully used, not in the comparison of Chinese
material force with that of the enemy and in terms of material superiority only. For him,
the rise or fall of China was almost entirely a question of morale: Could most soldiers and
people of the country become imbued with the “consciousness” of resistance? Could the
military and political authorities find the will to lead the country to total resistance? Could
the leadership and the rank and file be of one mind and one heart to accept the struggle and
face the sacrifices determinedly for a war of national liberation based on the spirit of
scorched earth resistance?47 In this way, Li had successfully transformed the Guangxi
people’s political consciousness from an identity with local and regional honour to one on
the national level. He had successfully put the Clique’s conflict with Jiang into a new
category, a difference over that of policies towards Japan while at the same time, providing
a framework to his explanation of policies and actions carried out by the Clique in the
1930s. According to Li himself:
After the “September 18 Incident”, we had firmly set ourselves two basic tasks.
One was to carry out positive reconstruction in the province; then to enhance the
reconstruction of national defence; and finally to train militia and carry out an
efficient conscription system in order to create the foundation of resistance. The
other was to stand for peace and unity on the issues of domestic politics on the one
hand, and, on the other, to move the Central Government by bringing our absolute
sincerity to it in order to strengthen its policy towards Japan and to enable it to
move towards the way of positively waging a war of resistance.48
Thus it is possible to say that, in an extremely serious national crisis, Li was
outstanding among leaders in correctly assessing the crisis, and explaining the significance
45
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 201.
46
Li Zongren, “Wode zhuzhang”, p. 8.
47
48
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 27-8.
198
of and necessity for immediate resistance. His loud, cogent appeal to the public to assist
positively to ensure the determination of a new, courageous national policy towards Japan
was backed by effective propaganda that explained and justified the practice of scorched
earth resistance in the first half of the 1930s.
1.2. Criticism of Non-resistance Policy

To strengthen his stand for resistance, Li also criticized non-resistance, i.e. Jiang’s
policy of “rangwai bixian annei”. Li suggested that this policy was the source of the
current critical national crisis.49 Sun Yatsen, according to Li, once regarded the theory of
“zhiyi xingnan” (knowing is easy but doing is hard) as the obstruction of revolution. Li and
the Clique therefore also claimed non-resistance theory as the main obstruction to Chinese
national liberation. Under this theory, they pointed out, over one third of national territory
and sovereignty had been lost, and over one fifth of the Chinese people had fallen into the
hands of the Japanese. At the same time, the harm done by the policy to the Chinese
national spirit and national human dignity was uncountable. This policy was leading the
nation to total foreign subjugation. And the Chinese nation would not be liberated and
restored until the theory was fully abandoned.50 Li fiercely attacked those positions that
were derived from non-resistance. He supported his stand for scorched earth resistance
with the following arguments:
1). Analysis of the possibility of international intervention
Faced with Japanese aggression, some Chinese possessed a view that waited for the
mediation of the League of Nations and intervention by the United States of America and
the United Kingdom. Such a mentality, dependent on international intervention, became
their only policy towards Japan, which Li called the “dependent idea”. He pointed out that
the facts of the past five years (from 1931 to 1936) had suggested that the League of
Nations was impotent to settle any Sino-Japanese conflict. Furthermore, all the existing
international laws agreed upon for the purpose of keeping a balance of power among the
great Powers, such as the Washington Order, had been broken by the Japanese militarists.
Although China’s Central Government had appealed for the mediation of the great Powers,
49
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, DFZZ, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1937),
p. 17.
50
Quanmianzhan zhoukanshe (ed.), Lilun yu shijian, pp. 9-10.
199
there had been no response whatever. The facts above indicated that no international laws
were reliable. To save the nation, China could only rely on the forces of the Chinese people
themselves. In the situation of facing the desperate attack from the enemy, if China wished
to survive, the only way was self-defence, and to be more exact, to strive for her existence
with iron and blood.51
The above analysis and criticism of the role of the League of Nations made sense.
In his recollection several decades later, Gu Weijun (V. K. Wellington Koo), Minister of
Foreign Affairs in Nanjing at that time, also recognized that this international body was not
able to carry out any positive measure to stop Japanese aggression in China.52 Even the
Paper of the League of Nations Lytton Commission for investigation of the Sino-Japanese
conflict did not condemn Japanese aggression, but suggested that the reason for its
occupation of three provinces of northeast China by force was caused by the latter. This
Paper was of course criticized by the Chinese.53 It demonstrated that the League of Nations
was impotent on the issue of Japanese aggression, and had no authority to deal with the
Sino-Japanese conflict. In fact, early in 1932 when the League of Nations began to
investigate the conflict and the facts of Japanese aggression of China, Li and the Clique had
taken a sceptical and opposing attitude towards this action.54 After the Paper was released,
Li also attacked the fact that it boosted Japan’s aggressive arrogance. He suggested that the
Paper was a humiliation for the whole Chinese nation.55 That is to say, Li and other
Guangxi leaders were acutely aware that the impotent intervention of the League of Nations
was a consequence of a weak China lacking any power for independent diplomacy. Bai
51
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 21.
52
Gu Weijun, Gu Weijun huiyi lu, translated by Chinese Academy of Social Science.
Beijing: ZHSJ, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 56-70.
53
The main points of the Lytton paper of the League of Nations practically admitted the
justice of the Japanese claims to Manchuria, northeast China. See Tom Walsh, The Sino-
Japanese Conflict, Sydney and London: Angus and Robertson Ltd., 1939, pp. 79-80. For
detailed criticism of the paper given by the different groups and factions, see Zhonghua
quanguo guonan jiujihui (ed.), Guolian diaochatuan baogaoshu jiqi piping, n.d. (1933?),
n.p.
54
See Li zongsiling, p. 104, p. 110, and p. 120.
55
For details of Li’s opinion on the paper of the League of Nations, see Zhonghua
minguo guonan jiujihui (ed.), Guolian diaochatuan baogaoshu jiqi piping, pp. 151-2.
200
Chongxi repeatedly emphasized this over the years. According to Bai, a country’s
“gongping” (fairness) or “gongli” (universal principles of nature and society, national law)
in the world could only be obtained by depending on its strength. China could not maintain
her “gongping” and “gongli” in the world until she could fight for herself. In other words,
only by fighting foreign aggression could China maintain the rights and peace of the
country in the world.56 The Guangxi leaders’ perception of the actual situation of China
and the weak role of the League of Nations was used to change the dependent mentality of
the Chinese people and to encourage them to fight for national salvation on their own
behalf.
2). Refutation of the View of “tuirang qiuhe”
Li also criticized the view of “tuirang qiuhe” (making concessions and suing Japan
for peace). This view was based on the assumption that the Japanese sought localised
territorial gains and had no plans to occupy the whole of China. According to this
assumption, Japan, as a small country, was unable to annex the whole territory of China.
Japan’s invasion strategy in China was mainly to secure the latter’s frontier region and
other partial interests. Once all of Japan’s desires had been satisfied, the relationship
between China and Japan could be rearranged. To refute this view, Li argued that “Japan’s
desires for possession in China were endless”. The Japanese policy towards China was one
of total conquest.57 In this critical situation, China “could only survive in resistance,
otherwise it would fall in non-resistance”.58
History has shown that Li’s view clearly reflected the actual situation of China at
that time. As leader of a faction, Li naturally considered his group’s interests. But, as a
patriotic military leader, he was also seriously concerned with national affairs and gave
them a higher priority. In fairness, it must be said that this applied also to most of the
Nationalist and Communist leaders during those critical years when China was most
threatened. Li also possessed a capability for brilliant analysis and exposition of the
national situation and the prospects of China, according to some people who even
56
See Bai fuzongsiling. pp. 251-2. Li Zongren also possessed the same view. See Li
zongsiling. p. 177.
57
58
201
supported Jiang at that time.59 Like other farsighted military leaders, Li had a keen insight
into Japanese ambitions in China. These facts showed that Japan attempted to maintain
China in a state of disunity among separate governments so that it could easily manipulate
this divided country. As Li and the Clique pointed out, Japan's policy towards China and
its actions in this country showed that it aimed at not only regional and provincial interests
but at totally controlling and conquering, and then finally eliminating the whole Chinese
nation under total Japanese hegemony. The facts of Japanese aggression in North China in
the first half of the 1930s also proved its ambition.60 Anyone who believed Japan's actions
were limited to minor interests in China actually ignored the history of Japanese aggression
in China since 1894. As the leader of a faction with powerful military forces and a well-
organized structure in mass mobilization and political organization, in opposition to Jiang’s
policy of “rangwai bixian annei”, Li’s open declaration of resistance was welcomed by
many people who believed that, for them, Li “showed the firm will of the Chinese soldiers
to fight Japan”.61
In fact, Li’s criticism of the above view of “tuirang qiuhe” was also a reflection of
Guangxi’s preparations for war, particularly after the “September 18 Incident”, and the
outcome of mass mobilization in the province. For example, the core of Guangxi mass
mobilization was militia training. The main political teaching materials of militia training
were the history of imperialist aggression of China, particularly that from Japan and its
ambitions in China.62 The following Guangxi anti-Japanese song, used in militia training,
also expressed the Guangxi people’s perception of Japanese aggression and the
determination to resist.
The Japanese devils robbed our three provinces in the northeast,
Fellow compatriots should urgently wake up,
59
See “Li Zongren”, in Yuan Qingping (ed.), Dangdai dangguo mingren zhuan, Nanjing:
Junshi xinwenshe, 1936. Also see Chen Xiaowei’s comments in Tianwen Tai, 24 April
1938.
60
For details of Japanese aggression of North China, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in China,
pp. 40-109.
61
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu kangzhan”, pp. 115-6.
62
See Wei Renzhong, “Liuzhou qu tuan ganxundui gongzuo baogao”, CJYK, Vol. 2, No.
2 (December 1934). Also see Guangxi Wuzhou qu mintuan qikan, No. 1 (June 1934), pp.
11-3.
202
Be ready to die in recovery of the lost territories,
Fighting for the existence of our country;
We should undergo self-imposed hardships so as to strengthen our
resolve to wipe out the national humiliation,
Takes ten years to add production and build up forces (shinian shengju),
and takes ten years to educate and train the masses (shinian jiaoxun),
With sufficient strength,
To eliminate the Japanese.63
This song reveals a simple consciousness and is a concentrated expression of the Clique’s
policies in fighting Japan.
3). Condemnation of Delays in Preparations for War
According to one view, China did not have the national strength and capability to
fight Japan, so she should endure humiliation in exchange for peace, and this would give
her more time to prepare for war; otherwise, precipitate action would lead the country to
destruction. Li attacked this position, pointing out sharply that it was tantamount to letting
the nation perish slowly. In fact, the advocate of delay was Jiang. After 1931, Jiang openly
declared that “Japan would occupy all important areas of China and eliminate her only in
ten days, or even in three days, if she immediately offered resistance to Japan without
careful consideration”.64 Instead, China should prepare to strengthen national forces for the
chance to resist Japan.65 Here, we do not deny that Jiang adopted the position of fighting
Japan, but the means he employed were open to question. Song Meiling (Mayling Soong),
Madame Jiang, told an American journalist: “Of course we must fight Japan, but we won’t
try it until we are sure of at least being able to hurt our adversary seriously”.66 However,
such a policy could not stop the aggression of the enemy. On the contrary, the result was
that under this policy the enemy pressed forward steadily from the northeast to North China
while Jiang appeased them at every step. To refute this view, Li argued as follows.
63
Shiwujun niankan, 1933, p. 7.
64
Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong Jianggong quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue
zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, p. 878.
65
Qin Xiaoyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian - duiri kangzhan shiqi:
xubian [1], Taipei: Zhongguo GMD zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiuhui, 1981, p.
317.
66
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 224.
203
First, it was true that China lacked the national strength of Japan, and China must
prepare for war. However, given the traditional ambition of the Japanese to complete the
conquest of China, would the enemy not also speed up its aggression while China was
preparing to resist? Secondly, would the enemy's increased preparations not be as fast or
faster than those of China? Furthermore, would China's strength ever be enough to
compare with the enemy's superior industrial and economic base and the advanced
technology and scientific elites as well? Li argued that, under the formidable foe's
desperate attack, China’s territory was reducing, her population was being divided, her rich
national resources were being stolen, and her national sovereignty was being limited and
harmed. In this situation, China was more and more falling under Japan's control. If she
tried to maintain her integrated tariff, the enemy destroyed it through smuggling. If she
endeavoured to preserve a national spirit, the enemy suppressed it by using the excuse of
“eliminating the anti-Japanese idea”. If she tried to utilize foreign capital for national
reconstruction, the enemy obstructed it by taking various measures to oppose and disrupt
international assistance. If she strove to build up a complete national defence system, the
enemy limited it by using its ingenuity, demanding the establishment of a demilitarized
zone or a special zone, requiring more territory, and so on. In other words, all actions and
movements of China were now put under close surveillance and interference by the
superior and arrogant enemy. Consequently, China’s national economy was declining, and
the national spirit was ebbing away. Li further argued that, in such circumstances when
China was being destroyed, how could she find time or the opportunity for preparation for
resistance?67
In my opinion, the above refutations are all valid. Faced with Japanese invasion,
the Nationalist Government did not resist but, instead, signed a series of treaties or truces
with Japan, such as the Songhu Truce (May 1932), Tanggu Truce (May 31 1933), and He-
Umetsu Agreement (July 1935), each one making further concessions to the invaders.
China’s reward from these concessions was not that Japan slowed the pace of invasion, but
it further encouraged the enemy’s aggression. After each concession, Japan set more
demands on the Chinese government and speeded up its aggression.68 According to Li,
67
68
For details of Japanese aggression of China step by step after 1931, see T. A. Bisson,
Japan in China, pp. 40-109. Also see Tong Dong and Xie Xueshi, “Huabei shibian shi
204
Jiang’s view of preparation for war denied the Chinese nation a chance to employ her
patriotic morale in resistance against the foreign invader, i.e. that “not to be subdued by
force” (weiwu buneng qu), a part of Confucianism - the Chinese spiritual life. Here, the
spearhead of Li’s criticism went to Jiang and some scholars who preached the same
position.69 As these scholars were famous in the country, their speeches and ideas in
response to Japanese aggression favoured Jiang’s position and countered Li’s rallying cry
of resistance. Li called this “delay for preparation” view the position of hanjian (Chinese
traitor). He conceded that China might pay a high price for immediately launching
resistance. However, this was the only way to strive for victory over the invaders, “more
early more surely winning”.70 The reason for the final victory was that, according to a
writer named He Sijing, China would regenerate from the war against Japan as the
phoenix.71 This is a way of saying that Li’s criticism of the position of “delay for
preparation” and his stand for resistance inspired people and enhanced enthusiasm for
resistance. It was a “blood oath”, according to some, and an expression of the Chinese
nation’s unyielding spirit of resistance.72 Also, it embodied the pursuit of Li and his Clique
for the exclusion of the imperialist influences from China, one of the two purposes of the
Nationalist Revolution. In a word, China could be freed from the oppression of
imperialism through the national revolutionary war to strive for final national survival.73
jiuyiba shibian de jixu”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 86-100; and Qi Fulin, “Huabei fenzhi yu
sange Riben Zhongguotong”, KRZZYJ, No. 3, 1992, pp. 190-204.
69
An example is the journal entitled Duli pinglun (Independent Critique) which
published a number of articles on preparation of war against Japan written by many
scholars in the first half of 1930s. Among them was Hu Shi (Shizhi), a famous philosopher
who taught at the Beijing University at that time and was later the Ambassador to the USA
during the Sino-Japanese War. See Shao Minghuang, “Kangzhan qian beifang xueren yu
‘Duli pinglun’ (1932-1937)”, M. A. thesis, National Political University, Taipei, 1979. Hu
changed his position to resistance after July 1937. See Geng Yunzhi, “‘Qiqi shibian’ hou
Hu Shi duiri taidu de zhuanbian”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 186-198.
70
71
He Sijing, “Businiao zhi si yu sheng”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp.
69-84. He Sijing belonged to “Jiuguohui” (Federation of National Salvation Associations).
72
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 115.
73
Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo lianhehui (ed.), Guangxi kangri jiuguo zhongyao wendian
huiji, Nanning, 1936, p. 3.
205
4). Refutation of the View of “rangwai bixian annei”
According to the view of “rangwai bixian annei, tongyi caineng kangri”, China
could not fight Japan until the interior had been united and the Communist bandits had
been cleaned out. Consequently, China should pay great attention to pacifying the interior
before resistance against foreign aggression. Li pointed out that this view ran counter to the
necessity of fighting Japan. According to Li, China had been politically united after the
“September 18 Incident”. The reason for the so-called “disunity” of China, in fact, was
spiritual; or, to be more exact, the “disunity” meant only that China had still not formed a
nationwide policy towards Japan. As for the Communist problem, it was caused solely by
the decline of the national economy. That is to say, the Chinese Communists could use the
collapse of the national economy to reach its purpose of taking over national power.74
However, in a sense, the decline of the national economy and other social problems were
mostly caused by imperialist aggression.75 At present, Japan was the most dangerous
enemy of China and the biggest obstruction to China’s reconstruction and independence.
Unless she was freed from the exploitation and oppression of Japanese imperialism, China
could never have a healthy development of her national economy, and the growing strength
of Communism could not be countered. Li emphasized that, to achieve the actual and
spiritual revival and unity of the whole country, a nationwide resistance should be launched
immediately. To pacify the Communists, priority would be given to relief of the harmful
effects of Japanese damage to China’s national economy. However, in Li's view, resistance
would become the cornerstone of national unity, and this itself would provide a counter to
the Communists.76 The constantly repeated call of the Clique was, “only resistance against
foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification, and only resistance against Japan
could lead China to unity”.77
74
For details of the Clique’s discussion of the Communist issue caused by China’s
internal problems, such as the economic problem, see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9 (June 1936); and
JXXK, No. 13 (1934).
75
See Li Zongren, “Nuli zengjia shengchan chongshi minzhong liliang”, Li zongsiling.
76
77
She Yu, “Liji kangzhan ji kangzhan shijian zhong zhi zhu wenti”, CJYK, Vol. 3, No.
10 (August 1936).
206
This sums up the widespread criticism directed at Jiang’s policy of “domestic
pacification before external war”. Jiang had proclaimed it on the eve of the “September 18
Incident”, and it became the central thrust of his national policy towards both internal
affairs and Japanese aggression.78 Objectively speaking, such a policy might be considered
reasonable in ordinary times if free of an ongoing invasion. However, faced with Japanese
aggression within the country itself, holding to this policy at least indicated that Jiang did
not understand the current situation. On the one hand, Japan could conceivably conquer the
whole of China before Jiang achieved his purpose of domestic pacification. On the other
hand, he was equating the invasion by Japan with struggle and conflict between himself and
other factions and parties in China. The quarrels between groups were in fact those of
people holding differing political ideas and policies within a nation, but were never the
same as the savage conflicts which occur in war between nations. The Chinese have a
saying, “xiongdi xiyuqiang, waiyu qiwu” (brothers quarrelling at home join forces against
attacks from without). Under the threat of external invasion, clearly the most important
task of all parties and groups was to resist Japan, because all internal disputes would be
dissolved when the national crisis faced China.79 Surprisingly, the Clique, like the
Communists, realized and met (or we might say that it used) this tendency after the
“September 18 Incident”, no matter what kind of purpose it had. According to the intense
propaganda of the Clique, all disputes between various factions and parties should only be
solved in resistance.80 The Clique’s policy of “annei weiyou rangwai, tongyi weiyou
78
For details of the origin and development as well as failure of this policy, see Ishijima
Noriyuki, “Guomin zhengfu de ‘annei rangwai’ zhengce jiqi pochan”, in Ikeda Makoto
(ed.), Kangri zhanzheng yu zhongguo minzhong, Beijing: QSCBS, 1989, pp. 62-79. Also
see Gao Cunxin, “Zhang Xueliang he Jiang Jieshi zai ‘rangwai’ yu ‘annei’ wenti shang de
fenqi”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 44-51; Wu Tianwei, “Jiang Jieshi yu ‘Jiuyiba shibian’”,
KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1992, pp. 41-53; Xie Guoxing, “Suowei ‘He-Umetsu xieding’”, KRZZYJ,
No. 3, 1993, pp. 57-74; Yu Xinchun, “Jiuyiba shibian shiqi de Zhang Xueliang yu Jiang
Jieshi”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 42-63. One of the most important references is, Guan
Ning and Zhang Youkun (translated), Jianmo wushi yunian Zhang Xueliang kaikou
shuohua - Riben NHK jizhe zhuanfang lu, Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1992
(hereafter as Jianmo wushi).
79
Guo Tingyi also suggests that Jiang’s policy of “rangwai bixian annei” was not
logically attuned to the national tendency to offer resistance, in such a situation. See Guo
Tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1982, p. 623.
80
CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 10.
207
kangri” (only resistance against foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification and
only resistance against Japan could lead China to unity) was an obvious attempt to gain the
support of the public in order to oppose Jiang’s “rangwai bixian annei”, and was widely
recognised as an essential alternative to the latter.
It is obvious that Li’s analysis discussed above was to serve the Clique’s dual
purpose of achieving resistance and reducing the power of Jiang. However, whatever can
be seen to be the motivation behind the choice of policies, the final value judgement is
whether it was advantageous or harmful to the national interests and whether it met the
needs of the time. In response to external aggression, calling for immediate resistance was
at least a positive attitude, because it met the needs of defending the interests of the nation
and country. It is unnecessary to deny that Jiang also had the determination to resist Japan.
After all, he eventually led the national resistance for eight years (1937-1945) until the
final victory. The problem is that Jiang unwisely inverted the order of priority, placing
internal concerns ahead of external concerns at a crucial time in China’s history. In defence
of Jiang it needs to be said that national political unity, even the internal unity of the GMD,
was a most important task for China if Japan was to be successfully resisted. As Zou Lu, a
GMD veteran and a senior leader of the southwest organizations and Chancellor of
Zhongshan University at Guangzhou, addressing the Fifth National Guomindang Congress
on November 18, 1935, declared,
Kuomintang comrades, whether from the South or the North, have gathered here
with a firm belief in the necessity of internal cohesion. Such unity cannot be
achieved by means of force, but of a spontaneous common desire to stand together
and face the present crisis.81
Even in contemporary studies, some modern Chinese historians still suggest that Li
and the Clique were motivated only by personal gain in their struggle with Jiang, and
cynically exploited the anti-Japanese stance as a means of securing national power.82
Obviously, this view distorts the personal intentions of both Li and the Clique. It also can
be said that, in a sense, this view is the continuity of propaganda used by Jiang's followers
to attack Li and the Clique by any means in past conflicts. Scholars who continue to
81
Quoted in T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 92.
82
See, for example, Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong chubanshe,
1977, pp. 229-36; and Guo Xuyin (ed.), Guomindang paixi douzheng shi, Shanghai:
SHRMCBS, 1992, pp. 350-54.
208
question the Clique’s motives obviously obscure the demarcation between disunity over
territory and disputes of policies between different political groups in the 1930s. In fact, as
mentioned earlier, China was not disunited territorially before the War of Resistance,
except for that occupied by Japan. In politics also, there was only one National
Government at that time. However, it is understandable that there were widely different
positions here because so many problems and difficulties confronted the Nanjing
Government. In spite of all this, the differences within the GMD did not envisage a
separation of the nation, but centred on opposition to one individual - Jiang Jieshi - for his
ambitions towards dictatorship.83 It is correct to say, as some scholars point out, that what
was called disunity was a reflection of major disputes over policies and ideas for national
reconstruction and internal and foreign affairs.84 Pan Gongzhan, a follower of Jiang and a
senior GMD politician, in an article published in 1937, regarded these disputes as a
problem of political unity within the GMD, and this basically reflects the view of some
Nationalists regarding this issue.85
The examples and explanations above will serve to show that Li’s assessment that
“only resistance against foreign aggression could achieve domestic pacification and only
resistance against Japan could lead China to unity” represented a political position for the
settlement of internal disputes within the GMD, even the nation. In a sense, it met the
needs of active resistance. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 1937,
all factions and parties, whether within or outside the GMD, immediately sent their troops
to the fronts and all acted under the command of Jiang. This indicates that all internal
political problems of China could be resolved once the factions formed a common target,
i.e. the national policy towards Japan. In other words, it achieved an outward political unity
throughout the country in striving for national liberation. Although it was temporary, this
political unity throughout the country brought the Chinese nation into a period
83
See “Wu Tiecheng’s Confidential Correspondence”, Archives of the Nationalist
Government, Nanjing, Serial 2, No. 5412.
84
Zhang Jucheng, “Kangri zhanzheng qian Zhongguo shi butongyi de ma?”, KRZZYJ,
No. 2, 1993, pp. 33-5; and He Xincheng, “Lun jiuyiba shibian hou Zhongguo de tongyi
wenti”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1994, pp. 12-24.
85
See Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo wenhua
jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo, Shanghai, 1937; reprinted Hong
Kong: Longmen shudian, 1965, pp. 1-20.
209
characteristed by a common purpose - resistance and reconstruction of the nation (kangzhan
jianguo), which was the national policy towards Japan that Li had advocated in his
“scorched earth resistance” idea. This achievement of political unity was built on a
cooperation between all parties, although it could not be maintained after the victory over
Japan because the differences between parties, particularly those between the CCP and
GMD, were too great to allow unity to continue.
5). Criticism of the Opportunist View of “Waiting for the Possibility of the
International Situation Changing”
This opportunist view was based on predictions of the outbreak of the Second
World War was inevitable, because of increasing conflict in Europe between the main
imperialist countries there, and between Japan and Russia, the USA, and Britain. In this
situation, China should endure invasion and humiliation and wait for the world war which
was coming, and then China could recover all lost territories and national sovereignty with
the assistance of the Powers involved in fighting the war against Japan. Opposing this
opportunism of reliance, Li contended that chance was not reliable, as it was only an
external factor, not an internal one, even if it did occur. According to Li, although the
USA, Soviet Russia and Britain indeed were in conflict with Japan and dissatisfied with its
actions in east Asia, no one could state with certainty that their differences at the present
time could not be settled without a war against the latter.86 Li gave reasons for his
argument as follows:
First, the USA was quietly engrossing itself in domestic economic development and
engaging in armament expansion. It still maintained its initial “keeping silent” policy
towards the Far Eastern issue on the one hand, and had a closer economic relationship with
Japan than that with China on the other. It was unlikely to break off its relations with Japan
just because of the crisis facing China.
Second, British interests and overseas territories were indeed under threat from
Japan. However, in 1936 the fall of Ethiopia to Italian aggression, the extension of the
fascist-backed Spanish civil war, and the formation of a European fascist front by Germany
and Italy, had already weakened Britain's traditional status in the world. Britain would
require all its strength to deal with issues in relation to its interests and rights in Europe.
86
Lilun yu shijian, p. 12.
210
Therefore, when dealing with its policy towards Far Eastern issues, it had to accommodate
Japan and was content with Jiang's attempt to placate the Japanese in China. The above
facts suggested that Britain would not offend Japan only to protect its interests in China, as
its principal interests were in Europe.
Furthermore, as it was under threat from the Japanese-German Anti-Communist
alliance, and was faced with the rising strength of world fascism, the only option available
to Soviet Russia to defend itself was to continue its policy of peaceful diplomacy as it
strove for time to continue consolidation of national defence to assure socialist
reconstruction within the country. It was obvious that no country would be prepared to
launch a war against Japan in the immediate future.87
On the other hand, in Li’s analysis, Japan’s strategy at the present was to focus on
the conquest of China. To that end, Japan had to revise its policies towards Britain and the
USA. Its policy towards Russia was also to bluff and bluster only. It was obvious that
Japan did not feel confident of success in a direct challenge which might involve the USA,
Britain or Russia. In such circumstances, according to Li, if China could not resist
aggression with its own strength and merely waited for such uncertain international
assistance, the possible outcome was that China would become the total victim of Japanese
aggression before any international help did come.88
Later events were to show that Li’s analysis was virtually identical with the actual
international situation.89 As Edgar Snow pointed out, two years after the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese War, in July 1939,
87
Li Zongren, “Cong guoji douzheng shuodao women minzu de chulu”, Li zongsiling,
pp. 233-43.
88
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 18. In his serial speeches before
the scorched earth resistance, Li had repeatedly confirmed that China could not rely on the
outbreak of the conflict between the Powers and Japan. Even if the conflict broke out, Li
suggested, China would be the biggest victim for they would take China as the main
battlefield of the war between them, which Li called the war of imperialist struggle for
dividing China. See Li zongsiling, pp. 131-5, 137-41, and 233-44.
89
For detailed discussion of the west Powers’ attitude towards Japanese aggression of
China, particularly Britain’s attitude, see Sa Benren, “Taipingyang zhanzheng qian shinian
jian Yingguo dui Zhongri zhanzheng de taidu he zhengce”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1994, pp. 38-
50.
211
No more ironic than the fact that Japan still got more than half her imported war
materials from China's traditional best friend, Uncle Sam. Most of the Russian
munitions went into China either through Burma or Indo-China until in June, 1940,
Japan compelled the French to close the railway into Yunnan. When the British
complied with Japanese demands, and closed the Burma highway, China was left
with but one free route of supply - the desert road from Russian Turkistan.90
This confirms Li’s analysis of the great Powers’ attitude towards Japan. Indeed, the
forecast of the imminent outbreak of the Second World War was then a popular topic in
China. Li and the Clique also knew such a war was inevitable.91 They believed that 1936
was a possible year for the outbreak of world war.92 It was believed, however, that the war
would be motivated by demands for national liberation for the oppressed people in the
world. This was regarded as an advantageous chance for the Chinese nation to strive for
their own ultimate national independence and liberation, and according to Li, the best
measure to promote such a war for the Chinese people was to resist Japan. Resistance
would eventually ensure China’s final victory over the invaders.93
Certainly, like many other leaders of the Nationalists, Jiang also wanted to fight
Japan as that of the Clique.94 The problem is that the Clique and Jiang had different
responses to the possibility of the coming world war. The Clique proclaimed a positive
attitude towards the prediction, while Jiang held a negative one which was to wait for its
coming patiently, at least it seems to be so on the surface. These differences can partly
explain Li’s position that China should still rely on its own strength to strive for the final
victory of resistance, even if considerable foreign military assistance would become
available to it from other nations with the outbreak of a world war.95 This suggested a
resolute attitude towards resistance on the one hand, and a firm confidence that the Chinese
could fight a resistance war successfully, even alone, on the other.
90
Edgar Snow, Scorched Earth, London: Gollanez, 1941, p. 174.
91
See, for example, Li Zongren, “Fuxing zhonghua minzu shi women weiyi de renwu”,
Li zongsiling, pp. 203-12.
92
See CJYK, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1935); and JXXK, No. 13 (1934).
93
Ibid.
94
Zhang Qiyun (ed.), Xian zongtong Jianggong quanji, Taipei: Zhonghua wenhua daxue
zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1984, p. 877.
95
Li Zongren, “Jiechu guonan yaokao women ziji de nuli”, Li zongsiling, pp. 137-41.
212
Why did Li and the Clique always emphasize reliance on its own strength to launch
and conduct a war of resistance? A possible answer is that the Clique had few contacts
with imperialist countries, and little support from any Western Power though it was an
important military and political faction within the GMD.96 Perhaps because of this failure
to obtain any support from the western Powers, according to Tom Walsh, Li and the Clique
increased pressure on Jiang for resistance and began to stimulate hatred of the
“imperialists”.97 Whatever the case, this background enabled the Clique to maintain a
reputation for independence from Nanjing in dealing with internal and external issues.
Through aggressive criticism of all the varying forms of the non-resistance policy,
Li explained the reasons why China must fall if it did not resist Japan, and he emphasized
through analysis the consequences to the nation if China did not end Jiang's policies of
compromise and concession and accept a total “scorched earth resistance”.
1.3. Analysis of the Harmfulness of Non-resistance

First, the consequence of non-resistance was to encourage endless Japanese
aggression. According to Li, Japan habitually practised threatening and cheating tactics to
serve its principle of winning victory without war. In the initial stage, Japan might never
have launched a full scale war if it had not become convinced that an easy victory over all
of China was within its reach. Its unbridled aggression had resulted because Nanjing did
not resolutely resist the incursion with all her power right at the outset of hostilities.
Consequently, Japanese aggressive ambition was encouraged. The loss of territories in the
Northeast areas after 1931 was an outcome of non-resistance. Although some defensive
actions taken by Chinese troops occurred afterwards, such as in Shanghai (1932), Rehe and
96
Li and the Clique made a failed attempt to establish contact with the French Indochina
authority in order to obtain military support from France during the two years of 1936-37
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. This attempt was based on the quest for
arms to fight a war of resistance against Japan and not for opposition to Jiang. For details
of this contact, see T.G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic Memoirs, Lanham:
University Press of America, 1989, pp. 53-78, and 85-91. T. G. Li was the key figure , who
was on behalf of Guangxi leaders Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, involved in the deal with
the French Indochina authority at that time.
97
Tom Walsh, The Sino-Japanese Conflict, p. 81.
213
the Great Wall (1933), these all failed due to Nanjing’s non-resistance policy.98 Moreover,
not only did Nanjing not support these actions, it actually suppressed them. As a result, the
enemy obtained maximum benefits at minimum cost. Non-resistance was crippling China.
As Li pointed out, the problems facing China now, such as that of the Communist-defence,
the east Suiyuan crisis, the North China problem, and even the so-called Hirota’s Three
Principles, were caused by such non-resistance policy.99
Secondly, non-resistance had resulted in betrayal from both separatist movements
and subversion by Chinese traitors. According to Li, Japan used Chinese traitors
successfully in its conspiracy of “yihua miehua” (using Chinese to eliminate Chinese), the
clever and sinister means used by Japan in its attempts to conquer China. Manzhouguo (the
puppet government sponsored by the Japanese in Manchuria), the east Hebei autonomous
government, and the Inner Mongolian Independent Movement were separatist examples.100
Pu Yi (the last Emperor of the Qing Dynasty), Yin Rugeng, and Li Shouxin were all
notorious Chinese traitors.101 However, as Li Zongren pointed out, the non-resistance
policy had encouraged the creation of separatist movements and Chinese traitors.
Therefore, if Jiang's non-resistance policy was maintained, the separatist movements and
puppet authorities of Chinese traitors would not only occur in north China but spread
throughout the country. In the end, China would be impotent even if it finally attempted to
resist Japan, because China would be riddled with Japanese puppet authorities headed by
Chinese traitors.102 Indeed, there were so many Chinese traitors after the “September 18
98
For details of these partial resisting actions, see Yu Zidao, “Zhongguo jubu kangzhan
zonglun”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, pp. 64-85; and the same writer, “Lun Suiyuan kangzhan”,
KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-146.
99
Li Zongren, “Minzu fuxing yu jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 19. For details of Hirota’s Three
Principles, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 26.
100
T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, pp. 40-77. Also see Edwin Pak-wak Leung, “Regional
Autonomy Versus Central Authority: the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement and the
Chinese Response, 1925-1947”, Journal of Oriental Studies, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (1987), pp.
49-62; and Feng Hanzhang, “Shilun Riben ‘huabei fenzhi’ celue de xingcheng”, KRZZYJ,
No. 3, 1993, pp. 44-56.
101
For a short biography of Pu Yi, see Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. Howard
(eds.), Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971, Vol. 3, pp. 80-6. For details of Li Shouxin, see Liu Yingyuan, “Li Shouxin
toudi jingguo”, WSZLXJ, No. 63 (1979), pp. 53-61.
214
Incident” that they became accomplices of Japanese aggression. There is evidence that the
puppet troops of Chinese traitors were used by Japanese imperialism to attack Chinese
armies and people both before and during the war of resistance.103 Li’s anxiety were
certainly justified.
Furthermore, non-resistance would demoralize the national will to fight. In Li’s
view, the most important weapon of the oppressed nation in resistance to invaders did not
lie in airplanes and cannons only but in a strong national will to fight. The greatest
obstruction experienced by Japan during its attempted conquest of China was this strong
Chinese national will. However, in the circumstances of non-resistance, the national will
had been affected, resulting in the emergence of pro-Japanese Chinese traitors and puppet
authorities. Further, it had partly disarmed spiritually the Chinese national will to
resistance against foreign aggression.104
Finally, non-resistance gradually destroyed the material foundations of effective
national defence, Li emphasized. This included the development of the ordinary national
economy, the promotion of a military industry, food control and communication, and
population and labour distribution. No resistance would be possible once these capabilities
had declined beyond a certain standard. Many aspects of these essential elements were
either being destroyed or controlled by Japan. Japanese smuggling in North China and the
dumping of vast quantities of Japanese goods in the Chinese markets were threatening or
destroying China’s national economy. Japan controlled key railways in North China and
most of the mining industry. Over 80,000,000 of the Chinese population had been removed
by Japan from the main body of the Chinese nation to become Japan’s slaves, which almost
equalled the whole Japanese population. The above facts showed that China had already
lost much of her capacity for preparation of the material necessities of national defence.
The foundations of the national economy were growing weaker and weaker. Li concluded
102
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 16-7.
103
See Jiang Kefu (ed.), Minguo junshi shi luegao, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 88-9,
and p. 99.
104
215
that China would be in no condition to accomplish the material preparation of national
defence unless she reversed disaster by immediate resistance.105
In his advocacy of “scorched earth resistance”, Li listed four immediate tasks for the
Nationalist Government, the GMD. 1). China must counterattack with a war of national
liberation with iron and blood to break the imperialist chains which Japan had imposed on
the Chinese people. 2). It must appeal to Japanese people to stop the Japanese imperialist
aggressive ambition and establish a real and permanent peace between China and Japan.
3). It must prevent the activities of Chinese traitors, and consolidate the united front of
national salvation over the country. And 4). It must build up the spiritual and material
foundations of the nation and strengthen the national defence forces.106
1.4. The Prospect of Scorched Earth Resistance

A reason for supporting Li's call for immediate resistance was that he firmly
believed in the inevitability of the Chinese nation’s final victory over the Japanese invaders.
This confidence was not merely in morale, but was based on his analyses of China’s
military, economic, political and international potential in comparison with that of Japan.
1). Militarily
China’s military armaments were weaker than those of Japan, and the latter had
more advanced military equipment than that of the former. However, Li emphasized there
were many examples in Chinese history where a weaker group finally defeated a stronger
enemy in war, for example, the Qing Dynasty which was overthrown by Sun Yatsen and his
revolutionary colleagues, the GMD’s victory in the Northern Expedition, and the 19th
Route Army’s victory over the Japanese troops in the early stage of the Shanghai resistance
in 1932.107 Even recently the Ethiopian resistance against Italian aggression, which had
started in 1935, had lasted over eight months, using poor weapons against modern well-
equipped and well-armed Italian troops. Therefore, the main condition of victory in the
105
106
107
For details of the 19th Route Army's resistance in Shanghai, see Mengyu shanguan
zhuren (ed.), Zhonghua Shijiu lujun xuezhan shi.
216
revolutionary war was the resolutely sacrificial spirit of the oppressed group or nation.108
In the coming war against the Japanese, the Chinese nation, as an oppressed nation, would
strive for national liberation with one heart and one mind. On the contrary, as the
battlefield was in China, Japan could not put its whole population into the war, only its
limited number of troops.109
Even in the military sense, China had certain advantages, according to Li. First,
China had resources in troop manpower ten times greater than Japan. Secondly, many of
the Chinese troops had a long history of war experiences and could bear hardships and
stand hard work. At least Li himself and his troops were in this category. As Evans
Fordyce Carlson commented in early 1938 when he visited Li at the war front at
Taierzhuang, “in his simple manner of living he more really approached the standards of
the Eighth Route Army than any other Central Government leader I had met”.110 The
Guangxi troops were also praised by Chinese and foreign observers for their ability to
withstand hardships and constant hard work.111 Furthermore, Li believed that once war
against Japan broke out, the only option available to the enemy was that it must fight
harried battles to try to force a quick decision. China’s countermeasures were to bottle up
the enemy with protracted warfare. The Japanese advantage showed in decisive battles by
the main forces. In response to this China fought with guerrilla warfare in order to
consume it gradually. Another Japanese advantage lay in its occupation of China’s main
coastal cities. China, however, as Li emphasized, could use the vast inland to strengthen
the defence and to clear all fields to cause suffering among Japanese troops. These were
108
Li Zongren, “Jingshen zhansheng wuzhi”, Li zongsiling. pp. 153-64.
109
110
Evans Fordyce Carlson, Twin Stars of China: A Behind-the-Scenes Story of China's
Valiant Struggle for Existence by A U. S. Marine Who Lived and Moved with the People,
New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1940; reprinted Hyperion Press, Inc., Westport,
Connecticut, 1975, p. 137.
111
See, for example, Lu Keng, Guangxi jun yuanzheng ji, Hankou: Xinsheng chubanshe,
1938; and Feng Jupei, Kangzhan zhong de diwu lujun, Hankou: Jianguo shudian, 1938;
Edgar Snow, The Battle for Asia, Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1942, p. 184; Evans Fordyce Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and
Military Efficiency, New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31; and Olga Lang,
“The Good Iron of the New Chinese Army”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. XII, No. 1 (March 1939),
p. 20.
217
China's strategic and tactical advantages over those of Japan. Finally, the facts of poor
transport and communication facilities and the undeveloped economic resources as well as
the decentralized economy of China were to cause many problems and difficulties for Japan
in a protracted war. As a result, Li was confident that the weakness of the enemy would be
gradually exposed in the war. In the end, the fate that would wait Japanese imperialism
must be defeat.112
2). Economically
Although Japan temporarily had a strong economic foundation, it mainly relied on
supplies of overseas raw material, particularly from China. However, the expanding
military budget and over 700-800 million dollars of financial deficit as well as over 10
billion dollars of national debt had already brought Japan into an economic crisis. Li
believed that once Japan was involved in the war with China, this economic burden would
deepen, because China would close all markets to it and cut off the raw material supply
line. Japanese goods would be discriminated against by the Western Powers through their
sympathy for the Chinese. As for China, its economy was not only centred on the coastal
cities but also spread inland. Even if the Japanese troops occupied all coastal cities, China
could reconstruct her national economy and other industries in the inland and had a
virtually inexhaustible supply of manpower. Moreover, China was mainly an agricultural
society with a self-sufficient economy. It could support a national war against foreign
aggression, because Chinese soldiers could bear poor living standards and work hard.
Japan would be unable to win the war quickly, and in time, would face the problem of an
insufficient economy and short supplies as the war protracted. These were the
unfavourable factors which would lead Japan to final defeat.113
3). Politically
In Li’s view, Japan’s developed capitalism and desperate external aggression were
resulting in falling living standards for its common people. The potential crisis stimulated
the rise of fascism. Japan could plunge into political crisis due to the collapse of
112
113
218
democratic politics and conflict between various factions.114 If China rose in self-defence,
it would strike the Japanese invasion force and support the domestic revolutionary force of
Japan in demanding reforms in that country. It might also encourage the national
revolution forces in Korea and Taiwan, the two Japanese colonies. On the other hand,
Chinese resistance was self-defence. With the common target of striving for the survival of
national existence and national liberation, all Chinese forces and parties would unite and
consolidate to form a united front over the whole country. Except for a small group of
Chinese traitors, all Chinese citizens, including all factions and groups, would fight the
Japanese invaders until the final triumph. This was the advantage that China could finally
bring to bear in order to defeat Japan.115
4). Internationally
As stated above, the three Powers, i.e. the USA, Soviet Russia and Britain, were
not, at present, prepared to fight Japan. However, all activities of the expanding Japanese
influence in east Asia would cause intense conflict with the Powers. At the same time,
Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, broke the Washington Order that ensured a
balance of influence among the Powers in the world, and entered into an alliance with
Germany and Italy. These actions seriously threatened the interests of the three Powers in
both Asia and Europe. In other words, Li believed that Japan was gradually becoming the
common enemy of the three Powers and other countries in the world which were at war
with Japan's new partners, the Axis Powers. This would be a favourable development that
China could exploit. Naturally, in defence of their interests in East Asia these countries
would give support, in materials and public opinion, to the Asian nations such as China
which resisted Japan. Of course, for the oppressed nation, a precondition for obtaining
international support was that it was able to fight with force and spirit against the enemy.
For Li, the only way to obtain international support was that China should resist the enemy
with all her own strength.116
114
For details and discussion of this political crisis of Japan, see T. A. Bisson, Japan in
China, pp. 192-235; and Richard Yungdeh Chu, “Dui jindai Riben junguo zhuyi fazhan
beijing de pouxi yu sikao”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 13-25.
115
116
219
Based on the above analyses of comparative strengths and weaknesses between
China and Japan, Li pointed out that China could resist Japan and fight until eventual
victory. In the war, the inferiority of the enemy would be exposed day by day, while the
superiority of China would gradually grow into full play. Consequently, “material
superiority of the Japanese troops would not be able to be put to good use, while the
superiority of our country, even the inferiority, would provide us with a base for the final
winning of the war”.117 So long as the Chinese nation could unite with one heart and one
mind and resist the aggression, Japanese imperialism would be not only unable to conquer
China, but also find itself tightly encircled in the ocean of the Chinese national liberation
war. He concluded that the extreme crisis of the Chinese nation was not the unceasing
Japanese incursions, but the Chinese government's endless concessions to the invaders.
Therefore, the first step towards national restoration was to abandon the existing concession
and non-resistance policies.118 “China must be able to triumph over the enemy”, Li
emphasized. “Meanwhile, the determination to resist and gain the final victory would
inspire the Chinese nation on to make a leap, thus accomplishing the great historical
mission of national restoration”.119
Li’s analysis of the possibilities of successful resistance was basically sound. The
historical events after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, such as the war being at a
stalemate in 1939 when the Japanese dream of fighting harried battles to try to force a quick
decision had been broken, and the great Powers joining forces to fight Japan after 1941,
indicated that the possibilities did exist. Assured of these possibilities, Li remained
optimistic about the prospect of resisting Japan and China’s final triumph. After the
outbreak of the nationwide War of Resistance, he further pointed out that China already
possessed the three essential conditions for final victory. The first one was “the national
consciousness and internal unity of the nation”. This was, in fact, a target that the Clique
had pursued in recent years, in the Clique’s collaboration with the southwest regional
factions, even reconciliation with the Communists and later with Jiang. The second
117
118
119
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 31.
220
condition was “to hold a minimum self-defence capability”. This was also a policy
summation of Guangxi’s militia training and mass mobilization as well as provincial
reconstruction. The system of “bingmin heyi” (union of soldiers and people) with a
common target, i.e. resistance against Japan, and the promotion of Chinese nationalism,
also became strong weapons with which to fight the invaders. There is evidence that the
Clique soon mobilized over 300,000 troops and sent them to various fronts during the
Shanghai campaign in 1937.120 The third essential condition was “to obtain sufficient
international support”.121 The fact that some nations gave support to China after the
“Marco Polo Bridge Incident”, suggested that the Chinese national liberation war had won
a certain sympathy in the world, including those major countries already in potential
conflict with Japan in east Asia, such as Soviet Russia and U. S. A., even though there were
some special reasons for their aid to the Nationalist Government and such support was very
limited. Anyway, with these justifications of the correctness of his policies, Li remained
firmly convinced that China could win complete victory over Japan.
2. Strategy and Tactics of Scorched Earth Resistance
As mentioned earlier, scorched earth resistance, as “the national policy towards

Japan”, was also “the national policy of resistance against Japan”. According to Li, the
scorched earth resistance policy included three main strategies, i.e. full-scale warfare,
offensive warfare, and protracted warfare. In other words, after the national policy towards
Japan was affirmed, the strategy and tactics of resistance had to be defined as follows:
2.1. Full-scale Warfare

“Full-scale warfare” referred to war in which the whole nation was involved, a war
in which all able-bodied Chinese nationals would participate.122 It was to include four
tactical principles.
120
Li Po-sheng, “How Kwangsi Trains Its Troops”, People’s Tribune, Vol. XXV, No. 3
(May 1938), p. 141; and Kang Zhenhua, Dongyuan erbai wan, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938, p.
7; and Ren Shaoxi, Guangxi de dongyuan sheshi he nengli, Nanning: MTZKS, 1938, p. 4.
121
Li Zongren, “Kangzhan shengli de biran xing”, in Qian Shifu (ed), Li Delin, pp. 77-81.
122
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, p. 32.
221
1). It was a war demanding action along all fronts, not merely in chosen areas. As
Li pointed out earlier, the strategy of Japanese conquest of China was to use superior forces
at selected points of attack. If China only resisted the Japanese attack in these areas chosen
by the enemy, it would fall into the trap of doing what the Japanese troops hoped for. The
enemy could concentrate its superior military equipment and forces to eliminate China's
effective strength in a series of set-piece battles. By this strategy the enemy could maintain
the pressure wherever it chose, preserving its forces. In this way, China would be forced to
retreat at every step until drained of all self-defence capability. This analysis was actually a
criticism of the failure of all partial wars of resistance that occurred after the “September 18
Incident”, such as Ma Zhanshan’s resistance at Nenjiang (Heilongjiang province) in 1931,
the 19th Route Army’s resistance at Shanghai in 1932, and the Great Wall resistance in
1933. It was also the summation of experience and lessons learned from the partial wars of
resistance. Based on this, Li and Bai suggested that China should resist the Japanese troops
on all fronts at once in one fluid and flexible envelopment which used the whole Chinese
territory as the battlefield. In so doing, Japan would not be able to employ its strategy of
mounting attacks in succession. Also, Japan would have difficulty in time and space
reinforcing its troops to counter continual harassment. China, on the other hand, would be
able to change her passive position in the beginning stage into that of constant initiative
until the complete victory over Japan.123
2). Resistance was a war of the whole people, so it would not rely on troops only.
Although China had a large number of armies, its fighting capacity was weaker than that of
Japan because of poor armaments and weapons. It was not enough to rely only on the
Chinese army to resist Japan, a well-armed invader, but it must rely on all forces of the
whole nation and people.124 In short, the masses were the sources of resistance and the
main force of their support. As Li pointed out,
Only strengthening mass organization and carrying out mobilization of the whole
nation as well as enabling 400 million Chinese people to rise with the force and
spirit to fight the Japanese bandits can form a new and firm Great Wall. This is the
123
Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin, pp. 69-70.
124
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun ji, Guilin: GXJSYJH, 1941, pp. 4-6.
222
line of defence that the enemy cannot break through, no matter how cruel and
ferocious, fierce and brutal it is.125
In fact, Guangxi militia training and mass mobilization had also been guided by this
concept. After the Shanghai campaign in August to October 1937, Li again gave these
instructions to both Guangxi and the 5th War Zone, where he was Commander-in-Chief:
Now one of the most important and urgent tasks was “to arouse the masses to participate in
the war of resistance”.126
3). Full-scale warfare also referred to a comprehensive resistance with military,
political, economical and cultural cooperation, but not a purely military resistance.127
According to both Li and Bai, the Sino-Japanese War was not only a decisive engagement
between the military forces of the two countries, but also a competition between them in
which manpower, financial resources and material resources were the fighting counters. In
other words, it was a contest between all forces of the two countries. Therefore, the form of
this war was not a unilateral military action. All political, economical and cultural forces
could be used as powerful weapons of the war.128
4). Full-scale warfare also meant national resistance by uniting all parties and
troops that stood for fighting Japan, for it could not become a war of resistance joined by
one party or faction only.129 Here the Clique clearly showed its support for the anti-
Japanese national united front, which had for years been a foundation stone of the Clique’s
policies.
2.2. Offensive Warfare
125
Li Zongren, “Dangqian women yingyou de nuli”, Li Delin xiansheng yanlun ji, Guilin:
GXJSYJH, 1941.
126
Li Zongren, “Jinhou de zhanju”, Li Delin xiansheng yanlun ji.
127
Li Zongren, “Fuxing zhonghua minzu shi women weiyi de renwu”, Li zongsiling, pp.
203-12.
128
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun ji, p. 9. For detailed discussion of this idea, see Cao
Guangzhe, “Xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ lun shuping”, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1987, pp. 133-
147; and Zeng Chenggui, “Lun Li Zongren de kangzhan sixiang”, HBSHKX, No. 8, 1987,
pp. 53-9.
129
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 23.
223
The War of Resistance should be an offensive war, not a defensive one. Li
regarded defensive warfare as passive and inactive. If the Chinese troops only engaged the
enemy when attacked, or if the Chinese troops did not continue action when the enemy
gave up the attack, China could hardly take the initiative from Japan and maintain closely
concerted and continuous action between all war zones. Instead, China must always take
the initiative in warfare and replace defence with the offensive spirit. Li suggested that
offensive warfare was now the way to defeat the enemy and to lead the country to final
victory.130 The two campaigns of the Chinese Army in the early stage of the Sino-Japanese
War might explain the efficiency of offensive warfare. The Shanghai campaign, lasting
from August to November 1937, was conducted under the principle of defensive warfare,
and the Chinese troops lost the initiative in each defence line.131 By carrying out offensive
warfare, China could maintain the initiative in the Taierzhuang campaign in the spring of
1938 and won a great victory in the battle.132 As a professional soldier, Li’s military skills
were highly appreciated by both his countrymen and foreign observers. Commenting on
the war, Captain Evans Fordyce Carlson, who was a foreign observer from the Chinese side
during the Taierzhuang campaign, put Li at the top of the list of the best field commanders
of China.133 In this sense, Li’s principle of offensive warfare was a valuable tactic.
2.3. Protracted Warfare

Protracted warfare referred to long and continuous war against Japan at any cost
until China reached the moment of triumph.134 Li chose this strategy for the following
reasons.
130
Qian Shifu (ed.), Li Delin, p. 70.
131
For details of the campaign, see Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui
(ed.), Bayisan Songhu kangzhan: yuan Guomindang jiangling kangri zhanzheng qinli ji,
Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1987.
132
For details of the Taierzhuang Campaign, see Junshi weiyuanhui junlingbu diyiting
disichu (ed.), Taierzhuang jianmia zhan, Archives of the Editorial Committee for War
History, the Nationalist Government, Nanjing. Also see U. S. Military Intelligence Reports
- China, 1911-1941, No. 9661 (May 5, 1938).
133
Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, p. 28.
134
Lilun yu shijian, p. 30.
224
First, although it had a well developed economy, Japan was faced with problems of
a shortage of natural resources, a narrow and small land area, and a much smaller
population than China. Also, there was the powerful enemy (i.e. the western Powers)
against Japan. All these ruled out the possibility that Japan could fight a protracted war,
and it was forced into the strategy of fighting a quick campaign, to make a quick victory.
On the contrary, China had vast territory and abundant resources. This would enable her to
protract the war strategically. To break the Japanese dream of fighting a quick campaign to
make a quick victory, China must practise protracted warfare.135
Secondly, Japan had first class arms and equipment. Therefore, China could not
take the risk of large scale, sudden, decisive engagements with the enemy. Instead, China
could use the strategy of protracted warfare to force Japan to expend its manpower and
other resources in thousands of small engagements which left its troops in a state of
exhaustion. Then China could make the counterattack to win the war.136
Also, the Chinese national economy was based on agriculture. Li suggested that
this was an advantageous condition to support this strategy. The great numbers of the
Chinese population and the vast territory were also of help to the defender. On the one
hand, in a long and protracted war, Japan's manpower would be consumed. On the other
hand, if Japan occupied large territories, its limited troops would be dispersed and forced
into more complex and exhausting defence. Consequently, China, with her overwhelming
superiority in numbers, if not in equipment, could concentrate large forces anywhere to
strike at her enemy.137
Finally, Li believed that international conflict between Japan and the allied Powers
would become more certain as the Sino-Japanese war became prolonged. In the end, the
international circumstances would be more favourable to China.138
135
136
Bai Chongxi, “Zili gengsheng yu chijiu kangzhan”, Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun
ji, pp. 288-290.
137
Li zongsiling, pp. 245-9. Also see Bai Chongxi, Kangzhan liangnian de huigu yu
qianzhan, Hong Kong: Tianwen Tai, 1939, pp. 12-4.
138
Li Zongren, “Jiaotu kangzhan de zhuzhang yu shijian”, pp. 38-9. For discussion of
reasons for carrying out the protracted warfare, also see Cao Guangzhe, “Shilun xin Guixi
‘jiaotu kangzhan’ de zhuzhang yu shijian”, pp. 12-14; and Zeng Chenggui, “Zailun Li
Zongren de kangzhan sixiang”, XSLT, No. 4, 1988, pp. 88-92.
225
The main features of protracted warfare focused, tactically, on a combination of
“zhendi zhan” (positional warfare) with “yundong zhan” (mobile warfare) and “youji zhan”
(guerrilla warfare). These three types formed the “quanmian zhanshu” (full-scale tactic).
This full-scale tactic included not only the combination of the military, political,
economical, and cultural forces, but also a dialectical unity of time and space.139 Thus, in
the use of space, China’s forces could use the whole country as a battlefield, with no
distinction between front, back, left and right, and no distinction between east, west, south
or north. In the matter of time, China could practise mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare
in wide-ranging small strikes without time restrictions. These could be combined with
positional warfare to protract the war until all favourable factors were changed to suit the
Chinese troops. In employing these tactics, according to Bai, China could “trade space for
time, and add up many small victories to a big one to wear down the enemy’s effective
strength”. He also emphasized in March 1938 that this full-scale tactic was a elastic
protracted warfare well applying in the war.140
In general, the Clique emphasized, mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare were the
two main tactics of protracted warfare strategy.141 Both tactics were interdependent. In
other words, mobile warfare stressed “trading space for time”, while guerrilla warfare
emphasized “adding up many small victories to a big one”.142 For Bai, protracted warfare
was the main principle of the resistance strategy.143 The two main tactics were also
extensively adopted by the National Government and the Chinese troops.144
139
Bai Jiansheng xiansheng yanlun ji, pp. 9-12.
140
Bai Chongxi, “Junshi kangzhan yu zhengzhi kangzhan”, Bai Chongxi jiangjun zuijin
yanlun xuanji, Wuhan, 1938, pp. 26-7.
141
Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 21. Also see Luo Ningfu, “Jiaotu
kangzhan de shiji”, ibid, pp. 105-7. Li and Bai also emphasized the combination of both
mobile and guerrilla warfare in the war. The Taierzhuang campaign in the Spring of 1938
was just such a successful practice. For details see Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan (ed.),
“Taierzhuang zhanyi qijian Li Zongren midian xuan”, LSDA, No. 3, 1984.
142
Bai Chongxi, “Junshi kangzhan yu zhengzhi kangzhan”, pp. 26-7.
143
Ibid.
144
Chen Dunde, Guigen - Li Zongren yu Mao Zedong he Zhou Enlai woshou, Beijing:
JFJWYCBS, 1990. pp. 89-96. Also see Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong:
226
The above suggests that scorched earth resistance met the needs of the time. Its
value became affirmed through experience of success in the war. Not that it had ever
lacked support. From the moment Li officially promulgated and explained his doctrine, all
forces that stood for resistance gave it a positive response. They set high value on this new
approach, for it was, according to Cai Tingkai, “not only the voice of the Guangxi people
but also that of the whole of the people throughout the country.”145 The policy was "the top
target of the national revolution”,146 “the last chance for the life of the Chinese nation”,147
and “the most determined spiritual demonstration of the liberation war”.148 The strategy
and tactics of scorched earth resistance were “the strategy to guarantee victory”,149 and “the
raging flames of the national salvation”.150 It was even said that
Its every word is brimming with vigour and the Chinese national spirit. It is the
‘blood oath’ - the blood oath of launching the war for national existence. It can
break all ideas of non-resistance and lead all hesitant minds to determine that
‘honour permits no turning back’ for the final sacrifice.151
General Fu Zuoyi, Commander in Suiyuan province in 1936, also was convinced that
carrying out scorched earth resistance could defeat the enemy, based on his experience in
the resistance.152 The above emotional valuations might exaggerate the importance and
role of the policy, but the fact that scorched earth resistance created a widespread impact on
the promotion of resistance among various parties and factions is not open to doubt. Even
Nanyue chubanshe, 1987, p. 134; and the writer’s interview with Mr Xie Hegeng, Beijing,
29 October 1992.
145
Cai Tingkai, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shijian xing”, p. 67.
146
Zhang Bojun, “Cong Guangxi jiaotu kangzhan shuoqi”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.),
Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 88.
147
Cai Tingkai, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shixian xing”, p. 67.
148
He Sijing, “The Death and Birth of Phoenix”, p. 79.
149
Luo Ningfu, “Jiaotu kangzhan de shiji”, p. 105.
150
He Shan, “Duiyu jiaotu kangzhan de guancha”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu
kangzhan, p. 125.
151
Ren Biming, “Jiaotu kangzhan”, p. 115.
152
Fu Zuoyi, “Yong xianxue lai zhengqu minzu fuxing”, Zhujiang ribao, 1 June 1937.
227
the CCP and its leader Mao Zedong openly expressed "welcome of the anti-Japanese
position of Mr Li Zongren, one of your party’s leaders”, in a letter of June 20, 1936 to the
GMD Central Committee.153 After the “Xi’an Incident” of December 1936, the Guangxi
Branch of the CCP Central Committee also called for provincial mobilization in
accordance with Commander-in-Chief Li Zongren’s scorched earth resistance idea to start
the war against Japan.154 These strategies and tactics were afterwards practiced throughout
the war.155 All these suggest that the contributions of Li and the Clique to resistance and
national unity were fully acknowledged by all parties and factions that insisted on
immediately resisting Japan at that time.
However, Li’s policy has not received enough attention from modern Chinese
historians. Even “protracted warfare”, the main strategy of scorched earth resistance, is
ignored by some Chinese historians in their studies of the War of the Resistance. Of
course, it is understood that many people at that time also advocated similar policies and
strategies to those of Li, but his advocacy of a determined resistance policy and a special
kind of warfare offered a complete analysis and explanation of the necessity, prospect of
resistance and strategy and tactics for fighting the war. Moreover, Li was earlier and more
systematic in declaring such a policy with strategy and tactics better worked out than those
who also possessed similar ideas at that time. His ideas had also the authority of the leader
of a faction with powerful military strength and well-organized support within the GMD.
Some historians have attributed the strategy to the innovation of the CCP in the war. For
example, according to scholars of the Military Science Academy of China, during the war,
the CCP was credited with the general strategical principle of the War of Resistance - the
political line of the whole national resistance and the protracted warfare.156 It is in fact an
incorrect view. The CCP’s principle was openly declared in June 1938. The declaration
was marketed by the publication of Mao Zedong’s article “On Protracted War”.
153
Zhongyang tongzhanbu and Zhongyang dangan guan (eds.), Zhonggong zhongyang
kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1985, Vol. 2, p. 168.
154
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashi ji, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, p. 106.
155
For details see Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jinpu xian zhanji, Guilin, May 1938.
156
Junshi kexueyuan junshi lishi yanjiubu, Zhongguo kangri zhanzheng shi, p. 5.
228
Unfortunately, this was two years later than that of Li’s. Undoubtedly, these ideas have
been available for many years and in earlier wars, but they provided motivation and
direction at a critical moment in China’s time of crisis. Mao’s idea was, indeed, a more
systematized one than that of the Clique, as some commentator suggest;157 however, Mao
had already become familiar with Li’s ideas by 1936 after the latter had detailed his plan for
scorched earth resistance and sent a liaison man to Northern Shaanxi to establish
relationship between the Clique and the Reds. In his letter to Li and Bai on September 22,
1936, Mao seems to have agreed with both their policy towards Japan and plan of
establishing a united front.158
Some confusion also exists over Bai Chongxi’s famous tactics of “trading space for
time, and adding up many small victories to a big one”, a summation based on the scorched
earth resistance. According to Cheng Siyuan, Bai’s tactics were derived from Mao’s “On
Protracted War”.159 In fact, this is not the case. Bai officially proposed the plan to use
these tactics on March 18, 1938.160 But Mao’s article mentioned above was collected from
a series of his speeches in Kangda (The Anti-Japanese Military and Political University) at
the end of May and in early June. Thus, the publication of Mao’s work had to occur some
time after June. Cheng appears to have forgotten that Bai’s tactics were promulgated at
least two or three months earlier than Mao’s work. In fact, Bai’s tactics also became the
top strategic principle for all troops under the national government and were soon
157
Cao Guangzhe, “Xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ lun shuping”, GXSHKX, No. 3, 1987,
pp. 145-6; and Cao Guangzhe, “Shilun xin Guixi ‘jiaotu kangzhan’ de zhuzhang yu
shijian”, p. 47.
158
Mao Zedong shuxin xuanji, Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p. 70.
159
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, p. 134. Cheng was a senior member of the Clique,
and a trusted follower of both Li and Bai. In 1938, he worked for Bai in Wuhan.
160
Bai Chongxi, “Junshi kangzhan yu zhengzhi kangzhan”, pp. 26-7. According also to
Xie Hegeng, Confidential Secretary to Bai in 1937-39, Bai’s tactics were put forward in the
early part of 1938. For details of the promulgation of these tactics, see Chen Dunde,
Guigen, pp. 89-96. This argument is also based on the writer’s interview with Xie in
Beijing on 29 October 1992. According to these facts, it is obvious that Cheng’s account is
untrue. As a trusted follower of both Li and Bai, and a staff worked for Bai in 1938, Cheng
should not have made such a mistake in his memoirs. Of course, the real reasons for this
mistake are unknown.
229
distributed to fighting units throughout the country. They owed much more to Li; indeed
they were part of the Clique’s tactical plans.
Other Theories for Resistance: Yan Xishan’s “Shoutu kangzhan”
As Japanese aggression grew because of non-resistance, other popular anti-Japanese

positions, stimulated by the fervent Chinese patriotism of the time, were formed. Among
them was “shoutu kangzhan” (defence and resistance) initiated by Yan Xishan, leader of
the Shanxi Faction - a regional group unpopular in the eyes of Jiang and his followers.
Yan’s policy of “defence and resistance” was formally created around the summer and
autumn of 1936.161 In the two decades from the end of the 1920s to the 1940s, Li and Yan
were both regarded as representatives of the regional factions within the GMD. They each
put forward an anti-Japanese plan at approximately the same time and called for immediate
resistance though they were distrusted by Jiang’s people who controlled the Central
Government. The appearance of Yan’s policy, coinciding with that of Li's, reflected the
many common interests they shared. Therefore, a brief comparison may help us to
understand the situation of the time and the roles they played in the promotion of resistance.
According to Yan himself, his idea was based on a resistance policy which did not
concern itself with success or failure in battles but with the “significance” of resistance
against foreign aggression. Resistance was the responsibility of the entire population and
should be continuous and without hesitation. In other words, faced with Japanese
aggression, China’s existence demanded resolution and determination and a willingness for
sacrifice regardless of gains or losses, but only in defending the present territory and even
though China’s available manpower and material forces were not equal to those of
Japan.162 Obviously, like Li’s scorched earth resistance, Yan’s position of defence and
resistance ultimately relied on the spirit of the Chinese people. It indicated that the Shanxi
Faction at least demanded defence of its own territory, a front of Japanese aggression from
North China.
161
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, Beijing: ZGZYDXCBS,
1991, p. 271; and Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949,
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 243 (hereafter as Warlord Yen
Hsi-shan).
162
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, p. 271.
230
Yan’s and Li’s ideas were similar in several aspects. First, both put forward the
need for immediate national mass mobilization to defend the country. In consideration of
its own interests, Shanxi was the more urgent in need of protection in 1936. In that year
Japan speeded up its step-by-step invasion of Suiyuan province, which was part of Yan’s
territory and a front facing the Japanese sponsored Manzhouguo. This aroused Yan to meet
the sudden threat by mobilizing the masses.163 Based on his idea for defence of sovereignty
and resistance against aggression, Yan directed General Fu Zuoyi, his subordinate and
Chairman of Suiyuan, to launch a campaign to drive the Japanese invaders out of the
province by the end of the same year.164
Secondly, both plans were the products of dissatisfaction with Jiang’s continued
appeasement of Japan, and both leaders attacked Jiang's policy of “domestic pacification
before an external war”. Faced with the combined attack of the Japanese and the Inner
Mongolian puppet army sponsored by Japan, Yan put forward the idea of “defence and
resistance” and to counterattack the opposition to defend his own territory - both Shanxi
and Suiyuan.165
Furthermore, both Li and Yan rejected the position that Japan could not be resisted
until China had time for sufficient preparation. Yan argued that this was to place the effect
before the cause. He emphasized that resistance was for defending the territory, for not
surrendering any more provinces, while building resources for an eventual offensive, and
warned that if Suiyuan under his control was lost to Japan, it would be a national
disgrace.166
Finally, both Li and Yan were mobilizing, organizing, educating and arming the
masses. The Clique used militia training as a motive force, while Yan organized the
163
Shanxi sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Yan Xishan tongzhi
Shanxi shishi, Taiyuan: SXRMCBS, 1981, p. 198.
164
For details of resistance war in Suiyuan under Yan’s sponsor, see Quanguo zhengxie
wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Fu Zuoyi shengping, pp. 160-205; and Yu Zidao,
“Suiyuan kangzhan shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-48.
165
Shanxi sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Yan Xishan tongzhi
Shanxi shishi, p. 196; Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, pp. 273-4;
and Yu Zidao, “Suiyuan kangzhan shulun”, KRZZYJ, No. 4, 1993, pp. 129-46.
166
231
Sacrifice League (Ximenghui) and other groups to conduct the war.167 It goes without
saying that Yan’s dissatisfaction with Jiang was a primary reason for him to organize his
own masses to resist aggression.168
However, there were some differences between Li and Yan. First, “defence and
resistance” was to a great extent a product of consolidation of Yan's own rule in both
Shanxi and Suiyuan. Yan was believed to have held a pro-Japanese attitude before the
1930s. He went to Japan for military education before the revolution of 1911. After he
was defeated by Jiang in 1930, he fled Shanxi into exile in Dalian, the port of Manchuria
which had been in the Japanese hands since 1905 when Japan defeated Russia and
occupied this port. Yan was well protected by the Japanese Kwantung Army stationed in
Manchuria. Under the arrangement of the Japanese he sneaked back to his base - Shanxi,
just before the outbreak of the “September 18 Incident”.169 Only when his existence in
Shanxi and Suiyuan was directly threatened under the Japanese attacks after 1935 did Yan
become increasingly antagonistic. According to Gillin, Japanese economic aggression
against China destroyed the local market for the textile and mining industries in Shanxi,
and caused Yan to realize that Japan menaced the well-being of his regime. The Japanese
occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and invasion of Chahar and Suiyuan after 1933 for the
avowed purpose of freeing Mongols there from the domination of the Chinese, the
engineering of North China “autonomy” from the central government in 1935, all
threatened Yan's dream of bringing all of northwestern China under his control.170
Rumours circulated to the effect that after taking Suiyuan the Japanese would attack Shanxi
and overthrow his rule.171 The Japanese undoubtedly wanted Shanxi as well as Inner
Mongolia for the rich natural resources in these areas.172 Yan was under considerable
167
For details of Yan’s mobilization for war, see Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan,
pp. 228-56.
168
Jack Belden, China Shakes the World, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, p. 51.
169
Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu, Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS,
1989, pp. 110-1.
170
Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 210-4.
171
Ibid, p. 230.
172
Ibid, p. 214.
232
popular pressure to resist Japan and he did not want to lose the support of his youthful
followers who were imbued with patriotic enthusiasm and anti-Japanese feeling.
Meanwhile, like the Guangxi Clique, Yan also competed with Jiang for regional power. By
driving the Communists from Jiangxi into the northwestern areas, particularly the Northern
Shaanxi, neighbour of Shanxi, Jiang undoubtedly hoped to establish his own authority in
Shanxi after 1935.173 Yan had good reason to appeal for the establishment of the national
united front and to turn to the Communists for assistance. He feared that Jiang was
preparing to sacrifice Shanxi and the rest of North China to appease Japan without a
struggle.174 He also needed help from other groups throughout the country, even the
Communists, to defend Suiyuan and maybe Shanxi as well.175
However, the territory of Guangxi, in southwest China and bordering French
Indochina, did not come under the direct threat of Japan at that time. Although Jiang’s
attempts to eliminate all his domestic opponents confronted both the Clique and Yan so
that they took anti-Japanese resistance as a cause to struggle with the former, Li’s initiative
was far more driven by genuine patriotism than that of Yan. Both had different attitudes
towards internal and external affairs. Yan regained control of Shanxi in 1932 after
conciliating with Jiang. Around the need for power, Yan could oppose or support Jiang. In
the same way, he had been pro-Japanese at times and resisted the Japanese threat at
others.176 For Li and the Clique, their anti-Jiang stance was based on their perception of
what Chinese society and Chinese revolution should be, as stated in Chapter Four. As the
Clique had always considered itself as a more revolutionary force than Jiang, the crucial
difference from the latter was its more radical policy towards Japan.177
173
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, pp. 266-70; and Donald
Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, p. 228.
174
Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, p. 218, and p. 233.
175
Ibid, pp. 228-41.
176
177
See Li Zongren, “Xi’nan tongzhi yao fuqi jiuguo de zeren”, Li zongsiling, pp. 99-102;
and Guangxi yu Zhongguo geming, Nanning, 1936.
233
On the other hand, Yan’s “defence and resistance” idea was, according to himself,
limited to the scope of “zicun” (self-existence) and “zigu” (self-strength).178 In other
words, Yan’s activities were to be limited to fighting in the areas under his direct rule. In
contrast to Yan, the Clique’s philosophy was born out of concern not only for the region
but the dream of a united China, and up to the national level. This could perhaps explain
why Yan had held to his base in Shanxi during eight years of war against Japan, while both
Li and Bai led several hundred thousand Guangxi troops fighting in central China and left
Guangxi behind them even though their base was eventually twice invaded and ruined by
the Japanese. It was perhaps a reflection of Yan’s philosophy of everything for the
existence of his own status and his group’s interests, according to some Chinese
historians.179 That is why Yan rebuked the call of immediate resistance to regain China’s
lost territories as indulging in “irresponsible heroics” and warned that trying to regain
China’s lost territories before China was better prepared would be suicidal. In this way, it
is not difficult to understand what Yan declared at that time, i.e. “We must fight rather than
surrender more territory”, “but until we are stronger we cannot retake what already is
lost.”180 This was in contradiction with his stated intention of sacrificing all of his strength
and resources to resist Japan to the end.181 There is an indication here that Yan’s concern
and hesitation in launching the nationwide war of resistance were not dissimilar to Jiang’s.
In spite of all this, the ideas of both Li and Yan were the products of the interaction
of the internal dynamic forces impelling China forward and external forces stimulating her
to struggle for national salvation and independence. They mixed their interests in regional
affairs with those of the nation. Both had historical significance in urging the War of
Resistance. As regional forces, Li and Yan were already conscious of the inevitability of
both the national war for independence and liberation of the Chinese nation and the
national united front to dissolve all differences among all groups and parties for resistance
178
Quoted in Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu, Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, p. 146.
179
180
Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, p. 243.
181
Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, Yan Xishan pingzhuan, pp. 265-6.
234
war. Both separately formed a united front with other groups including the Communists.182
These factions which appeared within the GMD finally compelled Jiang to meet the
national need for unity, particularly in spiritual unity, and for the common task of fighting
Japan.
Conclusion
The Clique’s blueprint for resisting Japanese invasion indicates its perception of the
continuity of the Chinese revolution. Given a systemized analysis of the internal and
external factors, the “jiaotu kangzhan” idea explained the necessity of and prospects for
scorched earth resistance. Meanwhile, it also set out the strategy and tactics for a
successful outcome of the war for national liberation and independence. Under the
circumstances of intensifying Japanese aggression in North China and intensifying calls for
a patriotic resistance movement, the appearance of the scorched earth resistance policy met
the needs of China after 1935. After the “September 18 Incident”, the Guangxi leaders had
begun to organize for resistance. They instituted militia training, and began anti-Japanese
propaganda throughout Guangxi, integrating policies with adjoining provinces, rallying
support based on regional identity with the glorious history of the Pearl River Valley in
modern China and the Clique’s “sense of mission” in the Chinese revolution, as dealt with
in Chapter Four. The leadership and the rank and file of Guangxi were determined to resist
Japan.183 In the following years Li refined the strategy and tactics for scorched earth
resistance. At the same time the movement for national salvation and unity was growing
182
For details of Yan’s cooperation with other parties and groups, particularly the CCP,
see Donald Gillin, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan, pp. 228-41; and for details of the Clique’s
practice in formation of a united front with other groups and parties in this year, see the
next chapter.
183
For example, all periodicals in Guangxi of the 1930s freely published anti-Japanese
articles, such as JXXK, ZLYK, CJYK, and GXDXZK, and the anti-Japanese movement in
Guangxi were all sponsored by the government and army. The anti-Japanese feeling was
also very strong among the Guangxi people, particularly officers and soldiers. See, for
example, Qin Lianfang, “Yao butouxiang buqufu caineng jiuguo”, in Junshi xinwenshe
(ed.), Dangdai dangguo mingren yanjiang ji, diyi ji, Nanjing: Junshi xinwenshe, June
1935, Vol. 1, pp. 73-7.
235
rapidly throughout China, especially after the “December 9 Movement”.184 Guangxi
naturally could not keep silent.185 Li Thus put forward the “jiaotu kangzhan” idea and
called for immediate total war against Japan. In so doing, this idea linked with the
“Guangxi Reconstruction Program”, and further pushed regional identity of the Guangxi
people to the level of national affairs, at least at a theoretical level. This idea was
undoubtedly premised on a theoretical foundation for fomenting an anti-Japanese
movement in Guangxi and mobilization of the masses to resist Japan. There is evidence
that Guangxi was the only province at the that time where anti-Japanese propaganda and
demonstrations could not only be freely engaged in but which were sponsored by the
authorities.186 In contrast to this, the anti-Japanese feeling and activities were suppressed in
the provinces under Jiang’s control, particularly after the “December 9 Movement”.187
Another motive force behind Li’s anti-Japanese policy was that he hoped to be considered
as the leader of the national revolution for fighting Japan and to replace Jiang, who believed
China incapable of effective war against Japan and insisted that national unity must be
achieved before resistance.188
The idea of a scorched earth resistance policy had a great impact on both Guangxi
policy and national politics. First, under that policy, the Clique insisted that “only
resistance could achieve domestic pacification”. This opposed Jiang’s policy of “domestic
pacification before an external war”. This provided a framework for the Clique’s
transformation of its “opposing Jiang and resisting Japan” policy into that of “forcing Jiang
184
The movement is regarded as one that represented the awakening of Chinese
nationalism. The movement was launched by students and young intellectuals at Beiping
(Beijing) and soon spread to most of the important cities throughout the country. For
details of the “December 9 Movement”, see John Israel, Student Nationalism in China:
1927-1937, Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace, by Stanford University Press,
Stanford, California, 1966; and T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, pp. 110-53.
185
Huang Zongyan, “Zhanqian Guangxi de kangri jiuwang yundong”, Guangxi ribao,
7/11/1985; and Zheng Shaodong, “‘Yierjiu’ yundong zai Guangxi”, ibid, 9/12/1984.
186
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth”, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10
(July 1936), pp. 196-7; Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, Ibid, pp. 188-
90; and Xia Chao, “Shilun ‘liangguang shibian’”, JDSYJ, No. 3, 1986.
187
George E. Taylor, “The Powers and the Unity of China”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. IX, No.
4 (December 1936), p. 538; and T. A. Bisson, Japan in China, pp. 110-53.
188
JXXK, No. 17, pp. 7-10.
236
to resist Japan” on the basis of joining forces to resist the invaders. Secondly, this idea was
linked with Guangxi reconstruction and mass mobilization to serve the Clique’s dual
character in both military and politics. Meanwhile, the idea of scorched earth resistance
elevated Chinese patriotism from the regional level to that of a national consciousness. It
also provided the new basis for the cohesion of the secret political organization within the
Clique, and for propaganda of Guangxi using the existing theory of the Pearl River Valley
Revolution which Li and the Clique put forward, as accounted earlier, in which the Clique
was presented as the main and heroic force in both the Nationalist Revolution and the
future war of resistance against Japan.
Furthermore, the active and immediate resistance policy was not merely lip service
on the part of the Clique, but was actually put into practice. It guided Guangxi’s anti-
Japanese movement in the events to come, on the one hand; and the Clique called for a
national united front for resistance and strove for unity and cooperation with all other
groups and parties, naturally including Jiang, because this idea provided the best reason for
reconciliation with him in forming the united front within the GMD before achieving the
national united front, on the other. The implementation of the policy by the Clique is the
subject of the following chapters.
237

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CHAPTER SIX

“RESISTING JAPAN IS THE ONLY WAY”:

The Background and Origin of “Jiaotu kangzhan” (Scorched Earth Resistance)

Li Zongren’s Idea of “Jiaotu kangzhan”

1. The National Policy towards Japan - Scorched Earth Resistance

1.1. The Significance of Scorched Earth Resistance

1.2. Criticism of Non-resistance Policy

1.3. Analysis of the Harmfulness of Non-resistance

1.4. The Prospect of Scorched Earth Resistance

2. Strategy and Tactics of Scorched Earth Resistance

As mentioned earlier, scorched earth resistance, as “the national policy towards

2.1. Full-scale Warfare

2.2. Offensive Warfare

2.3. Protracted Warfare

Other Theories for Resistance: Yan Xishan’s “Shoutu kangzhan”

As Japanese aggression grew because of non-resistance, other popular anti-Japanese

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