CHAPTER SEVEN

BACKGROUND TO THE “JUNE 1 MOVEMENT”

As Hallett Abend pointed out, the Guangxi Clique was genuine in its anti-Japanism
in the 1930s.1 Indeed, the Clique not only insisted on resistance, but also tried to put this
policy into practice throughout the country. The “June 1 Movement” (liuyi yundong) in
1936 was an example. This was the name given to Guangxi’s mass mobilization and
activities in resistance against Japan. This to a great extent compelled Jiang Jieshi to
abandon the implementation of his policy of annei rangwai within the GMD, and to instead
compromise with other factions, particularly the Southwest regional factions with the
Clique as head, in order to reach unity within the Nationalists, which was, however, a
temporary and superficial one at best. This result was a promise from Jiang to fight Japan.
In the end, the movement at least achieved an apparent unity within the GMD with the
common target of resistance. This achievement also provided the Nationalists with a
favourable condition for reconciliation with all other groups and parties throughout the
country, mainly with the Communists, leading to the formation of the Anti-Japanese
National United Front (AJNUF).
Unfortunately, western scholars of modern Chinese history usually neglect the
significance of the June 1 Movement and its impact at the time. It is surprising that Eugene
Levich has not discussed this important event even though his study especially focuses on
the Guangxi’s preparation for the Sino-Japanese War.2 On the other hand, although she has

1
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943, p.
223.
2
For details see Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang China, 1931-1939,
Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993; Kui-kwong Shum, Chinese Communists’ Road to

239
touched on the issue of the movement in her study of Guangxi, Diana Lary also regards it to
a great extent as an action in the Clique’s struggle for power with Jiang rather than as a
factor in the conflicting policies towards Japanese aggression. In the end, the movement
did not escape the fate of defeat by Jiang.3 In evaluating this, Lary goes too far to assume
that the Clique’s defeat in the movement marked the end of the Clique as a faction within
the GMD.4 Her interpretation of the movement fails to explain the interaction of the
Clique’s anti-Japanese practice and policy as we have discussed it earlier, and its important
role in and contributions to the Sino-Japanese War in the following years, as discussed by
such observers and scholars as Evans Carlson and Eugene Levich.5
In fact, these different evaluations and views of the June 1 Movement stem from
different understandings of the historical backgrounds at that time, even though all writers
have recognized the importance, either within the GMD or throughout the nation, of unity
and resistance. As we have seen, the most urgent task of China in the 1930s was to resist
Japanese aggression and to strive for Chinese national liberation, which indicated that the
policies of each party had to be based on the imperatives of resistance. The problem is that
both scholars and observers have not used same criteria when they discussed the June 1
Movement. Based on the prerequisite to resistance, the criteria in this case should be as
follows: 1) Whether its program and policy coincided with the needs of the time; 2)
Whether its practice was guided by its program and policy; and 3) Whether its result
benefited or harmed development of a national anti-Japanese movement. Using different
criteria, one would of course have a different view of the movement.
This chapter will mainly analyse the background of the June 1 Movement and the
factors which affected the Clique’s practice of “forcing Jiang to resist Japan”. In this

Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London:
Oxford University Press, 1988; and Wu Tien-wei, The Si-an Incident: A Pivotal Point in
Modern Chinese History, Ann Arbor: Michigan University, 1976.
3
See Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-
1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, Chapter 7.
4
Ibid, p. 206.
5
Evans F. Carlson, The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency, New
York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, p. 31; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way, pp.
173-7.

240
analysis, we will explain why the Clique launched the movement and why Li Zongren and
Bai Chongxi persisted for three months until September when they reached a reconciliation
with Jiang to end their actions peacefully.

Origin of the “June 1 Movement” and Its Relations with the Japanese

The “June 1 Movement” was the wording used by the Clique. In a joint assembly
of the party, government and army held at Nanning on June 1, 1936, Bai, on behalf of Li
and the Clique, publicly declared that Guangxi, together with Guangdong, was initiating a
movement aimed at resisting Japan for national salvation (kangri jiuguo) from that day on.
The Guangxi troops were soon reorganized by both the Southwest Political Council of the
GMD and the Southwest Executive Committee of the Nationalist Government, i.e., the two
Southwest organizations (xi’nan liang jiguan) at Guangzhou, as the Nationalist
Revolutionary 4th Army Group of the kangri jiuguojun (the resisting Japan and national
salvation army). A couple of days later, the Guangxi troops, joining force with the
Guangdong troops which were renamed the Nationalist Revolutionary 1st Army Group of
the kangri jiuguojun under Chen Jitang, marched northward with the intention of fighting
Japan, according to the propaganda of the Southwest. Meanwhile, the Clique mobilized the
province politically, militarily and financially for the purpose its leaders had declared. The
movement continued for three months until September when the Guangxi leaders came to a
reconciliation with Jiang under certain conditions. They had succeeded in forcing Nanjing
to promise to start a war of resistance as soon as possible, and their action ended peacefully,
without a military clash between the two factions. The Clique named this movement by its
initial date, believing, from the top levels to the lower ranks, that this was the beginning of
effective resistance to Japan. According to Li, the movement referred to a crucial moment
in the national revolution and in anti-imperialism - Japanese imperialism, a purpose that the
Clique had pursued as the Guangxi Reconstruction Program stated.6 The June 1 Movement
was a practice or a “dress rehearsal” for the Clique’s “scorched earth resistance” policy.
However, in the view of some people outside Guangxi, the movement was called
“xi’nan shibian” (the Southwest Incident) or “liangguang shibian” (the Two Guangs

6
See Li Zongren, “Liuyi yundong yu Zhongguo minzu geming”, CYGL, Vol. 2, No. 8
(1937), p. 47.

241
Incident, or the Guangdong-Guangxi Incident), and “xi’nan yidong” (the Southwest
Rebellion) or “liangguang yidong” (the Two Guangs Rebellion, or the Guangdong-
Guangxi Rebellion). Speaking in the Chinese way, the different wording used to describe
the movement indicates a different view of its nature. Consequently, these different natures
result in different evaluations. On the one hand, the term “the Southwest rebellion”, or “the
two Guangs rebellion” at that time referred to a regional faction’s conflict with the main
faction in the central government for power and interests in both the region and the centre,
and a struggle against Jiang. In those views, particularly expressed by supporters of Jiang,
the Guangxi leaders, including Chen Jitang, sought to use the calls for resistance to conceal
their real aim of struggling for more power and the increase of self interests. This
movement was believed to be an action of the remnant warlords in an attempt to maintain
regional separation from the central government.7 On the other hand, as it occurred at a
time when the Japanese had speeded up their invasion and separated activities in both
North and South China, according to some “confidential documents” of Nanjing, the
actions of the two Guangs amounted to a regional separatist movement aimed at
maintaining selfish personal interests with the backing of the Japanese. The Clique was
suspected of collusion with Japan in order to separate the Southwest, i.e. Guangdong and
Guangxi provinces, from the titular control of the central government. There were
accusations that the movement harmed the nation in its collusion with Japan.8 Such a
critique provides a major source for many Chinese historians, both pro-Jiang and pro-
Communist, who wish to label the movement as a selfish action of the regional factions or
a case of collusion. This view had, in fact, spread throughout the country even at the
beginning of the movement, and, to a great extent, was directed by the mass media under

7
See GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24 (June 22, 1936); K. B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent
Canton Revolt and After, Canton: Mr K. B. Vaidya for National Publishers, Ltd., 1936, pp.
6-9, and pp. 41-5; Anonymous, Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun: Liangguang panluan neimu,
June 1936; and Anonymous, Dui xi’nan yidong xuanchuan yaodian: Dui liangguang
yidong zhi renshi, June 1936. The word “Confidential” appears on the cover of the latter
document. Both documents show neither publisher nor place. However, judged from the
contents of the documents, they seem to be compiled and published by the GMD
propaganda organizations under Chen Lifu, a powerful supporter of Jiang and a veteran of
the GMD, or by the Blue Shirts under General Dai Li, head of the secret police force in the
Nanjing Government.
8
See Anonymous, Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun: Liangguang panluan neimu; and
Anonymous, Dui xi’nan yidong xuanchuan yaodian: Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi.

242
the control of the Jiang regime.9 The Nanjing Government carried out a strict censorship
policy throughout the country even though some provinces were not under Jiang's direct
control. The Jiang regime controlled the national mass media and blocked information and
opinions favourable to the Clique from wide dissemination.10 As a result, the propaganda
of Nanjing under Chen Lifu, a powerful follower of Jiang and a GMD veteran, undoubtedly
had an impact on the national mass media. Under these circumstances, the people did not
fully know the real aims of the Clique, and to a great extent, had to accept the propaganda
of Nanjing, believing the movement had some regional separatist colour, at least.11 Such a
view has also been adopted by some historians.12
Another reason for the regional separatist image of the June 1 Movement was a
result of the defection of Guangdong generals to Jiang in July 1936 because of their
discontent with Chen Jitang. As participants of the movement, it is understandable that
these generals, headed by Yu Hanmou, had to seek some excuses for their action. The best
excuse was to echo the Jiang regime’s criticism and denunciation of the movement as a
subversion of the cause of China’s unification which Jiang had been pursuing for so many
years.13
However, it seems that the criticism was more propaganda than truth in the light of
presently available sources. The reasons are as follows.
A main point of censure of the Clique in the movement was its collusion with
Japan. However, this was based mainly on the sources and information provided by

9
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, pp.
188-90; Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton”, ibid, pp. 196-7; and GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24
(June 22, 1936).
10
For example, Guangxi’s publications and periodicals were banned from distribution in
other provinces before 1936, as a Guangxi periodical stated. See CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 11
(August 1936), p. 76. I believe such a statement was to a great extent a real reflection of
the situation at that time, because I could rarely find these Guangxi periodicals in libraries
outside the province except in Guangdong, when I conducted my field work in preparation
for this thesis in China in 1992.
11
See, for example, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 23, No. 24, No. 25 and so on in 1936.
12
For example, Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei: Huadong chubanshe, 1977, p.
236.
13
See Zhu Zhensheng (ed.), Li Hanhun jiangjun riji, Hong Kong, Lianyi yinshua gongsi,
1975, pp. 7-12.

243
Japanese newspapers or agencies in China. These sources and information asserted that the
movement pretended resistance but in reality aimed to overthrow the Central Government,
after the Southwest acted in June 1936.14 At the same time, by exploiting the fact that the
movement occurred in the Southwest, the Japanese fomented and spread rumours, for
example, that they provided financial and military assistance to the Southwestern leaders
and were also directly involved in the activities carried out by the two Guangs.15 As a
result, such Japanese propaganda had a wide impact on the Chinese mass media. As
Guowen zhoubao (National News Weekly, or Guowen Weekly) pointed out, "the
atmosphere created by the Japanese caused simple and honest Chinese citizens to have an
absolute suspicion of the two Guangs’ matter."16 Reactions of western observers to the
movement were, to a great extent, affected by these sources and information as well, due to
the fact that their perception and knowledge of the movement were based largely on the
Japanese agencies. For example, according to Guowen zhoubao, a western writer named
“Sabotage” also shared the above Japanese view.17 Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, Military
Attache of the U. S. Embassy in China in the 1930s, also reported that the “most prominent
reports (on the movement) are by the Domei Agency, which is Japanese controlled.”18
Therefore, these Japanese sources and information were able to create a bad image; an
example is that “more evidence is coming to light to show that the Kwangsi leaders have
received financial and military assistance from Japan.”19 Except for the above Japanese
sources, however, I have found no corroborative evidence to confirm the existence of
collusion between the Guangxi Clique and Japan.

14
See “Yizhou jian dashi” (The Major Events of the Week), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p.
1.
15
For example, the “confidential documents” of Nanjing were also partly based on these
Japanese news reports. See Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, p. 13. Also see
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton”.
16
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 1.
17
“Foreign Views”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 1.
18
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936), p. 4.
19
Ibid, No. 9426 (June 13, 1936), p. 4.

244
 It is important to ask why these claims of collusion were released only when the
June 1 Movement began. If such a movement was really a part of “clever Japanese
conspiracies", as Jiang's followers claimed,20 why did the anti-Japanese propaganda and
policies as well as mass mobilization throughout the province win such great support from
the Guangxi people who “are proud of their province and believe that they are being led by
trained men under a new system, that the system is sound and big with promise for the
future”?21 As mentioned in the previous chapter, to achieve its end of conquering China, a
method frequently used by Japan was yihua miehua (use Chinese to eliminate Chinese).
Therefore, it is not surprising that Japan spread rumours to incite factions within the GMD
to struggle against each other in order to divert the attention of the Chinese people from
external aggression to internal strife. Meanwhile, some Japanese, particularly notorious
militarists, such as Doihara Kenji, had tried their best to associate suspicion of collusion
with Chinese who advocated resistance against Japan. The real aim of these Japanese
activities, according to a Japanese writer, was to create for these people a pro-Japanese
image in order to falsify their reputation.22 As the Japanese aim was so obvious, even the
above “confidential documents” of Nanjing in dealing with the movement had to express
their doubt on these Japanese sources.23 In a word, the Japanese sources and information
are highly suspect.
It is true that Guangxi purchased Japanese arms, a matter which was often referred
to as evidence of the Clique’s collusion with Japan. There were indications that the most
important purchase occurred when the Clique took over an order of airplanes which the
19th Route Army had sent to Japan. General Cai Tingkai, commander the 19th Route
Army in fighting against the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932, placed an order for Japanese

20
See, for example, Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, p. 12.
21
See Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, 7 January 1935,
printed by the author himself, p. 3. For details of anti-Japanese enthusiasm and positive
participation in the movement, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan (ed.), Liuyi yundong
jinian tekan, Guilin, June 1937. Western observers were also surprised by the morale of
the Guangxi people and their trust in the provincial authorities. For details of these
observations, see U. S. Military Intelligence Reports -China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5,
1936).
22
Yahara Kenkichi, Qianlu suibi, Hong Kong: Zhanggu yuekanshe, 1974, pp. 77-81.
23
See Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, p. 20.

245
airplanes and arms in 1933 to prepare for a revolt against both Jiang and the Japanese
aggression against China. However, after paying a large deposit on this purchase there was
no delivery of these goods, and his army was defeated by Jiang early in 1934. Although he
was in exile in Hong Kong, Cai still kept a close relationship with the Clique. A small unit
of the remnant of the 19th Route Army after 1934 was accepted by the Clique and
reorganized as a regiment of the Guangxi troops, but this unit received financial assistance
from Cai rather than the Guangxi authorities as it was still loyal to its former leader.24
Through the introduction of Cai and General Weng Zhaoyuan, a former Divisional
Commander (shizhang) of the 19th Route Army, Guangxi needed only to pay another one
third of the price to take delivery of these airplanes.25 Moreover, there is evidence that the
Clique bought heavy shipments of Japanese arms, particularly cannons and military
communication equipment.26 These facts indicated that Japan encouraged the Clique to
struggle against Jiang on the one hand and that the Clique played the “Japan card” in
Chinese political game on the other.27 However, in view of the fact that Jiang had, after the
Fujian rebellion in 1934, adopted a policy of encirclement of Guangdong and Guangxi by
placing Nanjing and Nanjing-controlled troops in the surrounding provinces of Guizhou,
Yunnan, Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian,28 it is not difficult to understand why the Clique would
purchase arms from the outside, and from any source, to defend and strengthen Guangxi.

24
Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982, p. 443.
25
Feng Huang, “Wosuo zhidao xin Guixi goujie riben diguo zhuyi gaikuang”,
GXWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), p. 49. Hereafter as “Gaikuang”. Also see U. S. Military
Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
26
Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang ‘liuyi’
shibian jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961), pp. 91-2; and Anonymous, Dui liangguang
yidong zhi renshi, pp. 3-13.
27
Hallett Abend has the same explanation for the Clique’s purchase of Japanese
armaments. See Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 197-8. The current evidence
indicates that the purchase of Japanese arms was made by both Guangxi’s and Japanese
business agencies in Hong Kong but not by the Guangxi authority and the Japanese
government. It seems that this deal in purchasing arms, to a certain extent, was unofficial
rather than official. Certainly, more evidence about this matter still needs to be unearthed.
See Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian
jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1, pp. 91-2.
28
Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 13.

246
By this means the Clique gained extra advantage for a small amount of money in
comparison with other armament purchases.29 It is understandable that Li and Bai would
not miss this opportunity even though their action might compromise their chance for anti-
Japanese leadership and belief in their honesty.
Following delivery of these arms to Guangxi, some important Japanese officers,
such as Doihara Kenji, and a number of Japanese military instructors visited and came to
the province. This is not surprising. It was a common phenomenon for Japanese officers to
visit the central and regional authorities in China before the Sino-Japanese War. Through
these activities the Japanese hoped to put China into a state of continuing internal struggle
and division.30 Under these circumstances, all Chinese authorities from Nanjing to the
regions had to deal with the Japanese, however reluctantly. The key to the Clique’s contact
and deals with the Japanese is whether these involved military agreements between the
province and Japan and whether the Clique made any concessions to Japan when
purchasing its arms. If the answer is yes, then the actions of Guangxi could be denounced
as bringing harm to the nation. However, I have not found any corroborative evidence for
the claims of the Japanese sources. If the answer to the above questions is negative, why do
some writers still accept the claims of the Japanese sources as true? An answer probably is,
according to Liang Min-teh, “evidently the correspondent’s personal enthusiasm for the
generalissimo has overshadowed the interests (in acceptable evidence)”.31 In other words,
these pro-Jiang journalists created an atmosphere of support for Jiang and attacked his
opponents through the mass media or propaganda.
Such propaganda was at the same time assisted by “the strict censorship of Nanking
over all news sources other than (those of) the Japanese.”32 As a Western journalist stated:
Nanking has done its worse to make it appear that the Southwest is the paid agent of
Japan, and is starting a civil war at this time in order to make easier Japan’s
absorption of China.33

29
Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, pp. 49-50.
30
Hallett Abend describes a Japanese conspiracy in which the Japanese hoped to get
some leaders in Nanjing to sign an agreement favourable to Japan. This was an example of
such Japanese activities. See Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 212-5.
31
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton”, p. 197.
32
Ibid.

247
The censorship of Nanjing indeed had a great impact on the mass media. For example, in
regard to the death of Hu Hanmin, the spiritual leader of the Southwest, Guowen zhoubao,
a weekly with wide influence throughout the country and an organ of the Political Study
Faction (zhengxue xi) with the function of “little criticism but big help to the Nanjing
Government”, according to some sources,34 reported that the elimination of the
Communists was Hu’s deathbed call, but his other two calls were deliberately omitted by
this weekly and other newspapers and periodicals.35 In fact, according to his deathbed
calls, Hu put resistance against Japan (kangri) as the premier one - the most urgent task
facing the Chinese people at present, then the downfall of the politics of dictatorship (tuifan
ducai zhengzhi), i.e. Jiang’s rule, second, and the elimination of the Communist bandits
(suqing gongfei) as the third task. Hu also linked these three calls with Sun Yatsen’s
sanmin zhuyi (i.e. nationalism, democracy and the people’s livelihood).36 After Hu’s death
on May 12, the two Southwest organizations immediately reported his deathbed calls in full
to Nanjing by telegram. However, the newspapers and periodicals under Nanjing’s control
rarely made them known to the public.37 It is certain that the Jiang group did not allow
publication of them, because it knew how to prevent unfavourable news from appearing in
the newspapers and how to use the mass media to serve its own purpose.
Although present sources are not sufficient to prove the existence of a collusion
between the Clique and Japan, the question still remains: why did Li and Bai play such a
dangerous “Japan card” while they were loudly calling for nationwide resistance and

33
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 223.
34
Da Xiao (pseud.), “Guanyu Jiang Jieshi lingdao xia de Guomindang zhu paixi de
ruogan kaocha”, Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing, No. I1-118.
35
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 19 (18 May 1936), p. 2.
Other newspapers such as Zhongyang ribao (The Central Daily) also did not mention Hu’s
deathbed calls. For details of people’s comments and views on Hu’s death, See “Selected
Domestic and Overseas Opinions”, in Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (Chairman Hu Funeral
Committee) ed., Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, May 1936, pp. 1-53.
36
See Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.
37
Chaoran Bao (Detachment Post), the organ of the National Socialist Party, criticized
the Nanjing Government's blockade of Hu’s deathbed calls. See “Appendices - The Public
Opinion Relating to the June 1 Movement”, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (comp.), Liuyi
yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 261.

248
preparing for war against Japan? The following reasons might explain the actions of
Guangxi in purchasing Japanese arms and employing Japanese military instructors.
The Japanese instructors were mostly limited to the fields of teaching the operation
of cannons, military communications and airplanes.38 As Hu Shi pointed out after his visit
to the Southwest in 1934, although Guangxi had achieved a successful reconstruction in the
province, several difficulties still existed which limited its achievements. Among these was
a lack of qualified technicians.39 In fact, the Clique employed not only the Japanese
experts. Several British and American as well as Canadian instructors had accompanied an
earlier shipment of airplanes purchased from Britain. The Clique employed these Western
instructors to teach its pilots in the province, and some of them had even remained in
Guangxi until the eve of the Sino-Japanese War.40 Interestingly, another reason given for
the employment of Japanese flying instructors, according to General Feng Huang, Principal
of the Guangxi Air Force Academy in the 1930s, was that they were more skilled and
experienced than most Western instructors.41 In 1992, when I interviewed Feng, he told me
that the employment of Japanese instructors was based on the needs of the Clique for
technicians at that time and these were not available in the province.42 Bai Chongxi at that

38
Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, pp. 48-9.
39
Hu Shi, “Nanyou zayi”, DLPL, No. 164 (1935).
40
Feng Huang, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao gaikuang”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 35 (1992), p. 3;
and the same author, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961), p. 78.
41
Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, p. 51.
42
I think this statement reflects the real situation of Guangxi at that time, based on the
writer’s interview with Feng Huang, Nanning, Guangxi, October 1992. In comparison with
his earlier recollections (see Feng Huang, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao”, GXWSZLXJ, No.
5 [1963]), Feng’s interview of 1992 and the previous wording contradict each other. Feng
claimed that the Clique’s employment of Japanese aviation instructors was a part of the
evidence for the Guangxi group’s collusion with the Japanese in his earlier recollection.
However, Feng’s wording of the employment of the Japanese Instructors in his recollection
is the by-product of the time, when, i.e. the 1950s and 1960s, all people in China
condemned the old society (jiu shehui), i.e. the Guomindang regime, for whatever the thing
the previous authorities did. Under these circumstances, those former senior GMD
politicians and militarists, both from the Central Government and the regional authorities,
willingly or reluctantly, vied with each other in condemning the former authorities as much
as they could in order to vindicate their innocence of the events in which they had
participated, regardless of the motive behind the facts they accounted for in the past.
However, the statements or judgements of these authors on those events are open to

249
time also gave the same explanation as Feng.43 Such an explanation is reasonable and
understandable, because it was becoming increasingly necessary to employ relevant
technicians when purchasing any advanced modern weapon or piece of military
equipment.44 Such employment was hardly evidence of collusion with Japan, but indicated
the technical deficiencies in Guangxi itself.
All activities of visitors to Guangxi in the 1930s were well controlled by the Clique.
A writer, who was a former subordinate of Wang Gongdu - Li Zongren’s adviser - recalls
that Guangxi’s secret police under Wang's command kept watch on all visitors, including
the Japanese.45 Even the Japanese flying instructors, according to Feng, were allowed to
stay only at Nanning and were not allowed to meet the British instructors in Liuzhou, the
base of the Guangxi air force.46 These facts indicate that the Clique was very careful when
they employed instructors from Japan - the assumed they were the enemy of the future.
This practice of employing Japanese instructors might reflect an opportunistic psychology
on the part of the Clique: it wanted to learn about Japanese weapons and technology on the

scrutiny because, as many know, they had to do this to gain favour with the Communist
authorities. But, today the authorities of China and more and more scholars there have
begun to reevaluate the policies of regional factions, even the main group in the Nanjing
Government, and have put a higher value on the some important events such as the Fujian
Rebellion and the “Xi’an Incident”. Under these circumstances, these figures, who
participated in these events in the Guomindang era and are still alive, have also started to
revise previous incorrect recollections. When I interviewed Feng in 1992, he was over
ninety years old, and he no longer held emotive attitudes towards those activities in which
he participated in the old society. Therefore, I believe that Feng’s account of the June 1
Movement and other events in the interview is, in general, reliable.
43
Quoted in Feng Huang, “Gaikuang”, p. 51.
44
In his memoirs, T. G. Li also tells a story about two French officers, employed by the
Clique just after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War (though they were soon recalled by
the French authorities), teaching the Guangxi troops how to use and maintain an anti-
aircraft heavy machine gun, because the Guangxi soldiers lacked modern industrial
knowledge. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic Memoirs, Lanham:
University Press of America, 1989, pp. 87-91.
45
Liang Boming, “Daonian Wang Gongdu, Xie Cangsheng xiansheng”, GXWX, No. 10
(1980), p. 44. Also see Liang Wenwei et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning:
GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, p. 210.
46
Feng Huang, “Guangxi hangkong xuexiao”, p. 77.

250
one hand and to promote combat effectiveness of the Guangxi troops on the other.47 It
seems to be typical pragmatism. Whatever their secret reasons, however, all these Japanese
instructors were dismissed and expelled from the province before the outbreak of the June 1
Movement.48 After that, no Japanese had been allowed to stay in or to enter Guangxi
again.49 Further, the fact that Cai Tingkai and his followers joined the movement in August
had already quashed the rumours about Guangxi’s collusion with Japan, as Cai and the
former 19th Route Army had already been lauded by many people for their resistance
against Japan since 1932.50 Jiang’s followers must have known these facts, yet their
“confidential documents” in relating measures aimed to suppress the June 1 Movement,
which was really engineered by the Clique,51 were distributed secretly with a limited
circulation only. They instructed units and organizations loyal to Jiang to keep or file these
documents secretly or immediately destroy them after reading.52 These instructions
indicate that the so-called Guangxi’s collusion with Japan in the June 1 Movement as part
of a pro-Japanese conspiracy was, to a great extent, a propagandizing ploy of the Jiang
group in order to destroy the reputation of the Clique, rather than the truth.53 Hallett Abend
makes a fair comment, as follows:

47
The writer’s interview with Feng Huang, 1992.
48
Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang ‘liuyi’
shibian jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961); and Huang Xuchu, “Sheng zhengfu Huang
zhuxi jinggao Guangxi quansheng minzong shu”, CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12 (September 1936).
49
Zhujiang ribao, May 28, 1937, p. 2.
50
Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, p. 444; and Jin Ming, “Cai Tingkai ru-Gui de
yingxiang”, CYGL, Vol. 1, No. 5 (August 20, 1936), pp. 13-5. Cai and other former leaders
of the former 19th Route army formed a new organization entitled “Zhonghua minzu
geming tongmeng” (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition) in Hong Kong in 1935,
with resistance to Japan and the overthrow of Jiang as its aim. See Giu Guo Sh Bao (Au
Secours de la Patrie), January 4, 1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi
guogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 40-3.
51
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).
52
For details of these instructions, see Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, and
Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi.
53
People at that time had already pointed out this aim pursued by the Jiang group. For
details of these discussions, see Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”; and
Liang Min-teh, “Nanjing vs Canton”.

251
 It is true that Kwangsi used Japanese military advisers, and has purchased arms,
munitions and airplanes from Japan, some purchases probably being made under
liberal credits. But there can be no question of the genuineness of the anti-Japanese
spirit of both the leaders and the people of Canton and Kwangsi.54

Reasons for Launching the June 1 Movement

As part of the “scorched earth resistance” policy, the June 1 Movement was a
reaction against Jiang’s annei rangwai policy. The Guangxi leaders had insisted that only
resistance could ensure real unity in both the GMD and the entire country. However, they
also opposed Jiang himself, or to be more exact, his dictatorship over the country. As a
result, some Western sources believed that the movement was a result of Guangxi's
resentment against Jiang only.55 According to these, Li and Bai were both ambitious men
and in order to fulfil their ambitions to replace Jiang and to avenge themselves of the insult
levelled at them by the latter in 1929, both of them, particularly Bai, were depicted as still
plotting in the solitude and the exclusiveness of Guangxi about ways and means of teaching
Jiang a lesson.56 Relying on these sources, some historians have also stated that the
movement was motivated by a desire to oppose Jiang.57 It would be a great mistake,
however, to view this conflict purely and simply as a personal issue between the Jiang
group and the Southwestern leaders, including those of Guangxi, because this view could
not answer the following questions. Why had all statements and telegrams issued by the
two Southwest organizations called for resistance against Japan only, and appealed to Jiang
himself to lead the nation in fighting Japan at the same time? Why did such a movement
enjoy the support of all political parties and groups all over the country which advocated
putting aside all disputes among them instead of uniting them for immediate resistance?
Why had the Clique remained in its base in the province, and at its normal strength even
after Jiang had to accept its demands on internal and external matters in the end? To

54
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 223.
55
See “Selected Domestic and Overseas Opinions”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24, p. 2; and K.
B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, pp. 6-9.
56
K. B. Vaidya, Reflections on the Recent Canton Revolt and After, p. 7.
57
Tang Degang, “Xi’an shibian liuyi shibian wushi zhounian”, ZJWX, Vol. 50, No. 2.

252
answer these questions, it is necessary to examine the factors which acted on the
movement.
It is true that the Clique had had a bad relationship with Jiang from 1929. But its
resentment against Jiang was eventually focused on the latter's internal and external
policies, especially on his policy of non-resistance after 1931, which we have discussed in
the previous chapter. As we have seen, Jiang’s appeasement of Japanese aggression and
military suppression of his opposition at home after 1931 were the main reasons for the two
Southwest organizations existing in Guangzhou as powerful critics of his policy. Yang
Tianshi, a Chinese historian, has stated that opposition to Jiang’s annei rangwai policy lay
behind the secret activities of Hu Hanmin who planned to overthrow Jiang, with the
assistance of the Clique.58 Many people believed Jiang’s “domestic pacification” was
directed against not only the Communists and other parties and groups but also the Clique,
although ostensibly it was a tactic of Jiang’s unification of China.59 A main aim of annei
rangwai, according to Ma Junwu, a GMD veteran and Chancellor of Guangxi University in
the 1930s, was to eliminate the influence of Guangxi and Guangdong, and then to make a
compromise with Japan.60 Such an opinion, although it was biased, was so widespread that
any action taken by Jiang in dealing with domestic affairs was suspected of being motivated
against the Clique and the Southwest.61 Indeed, Jiang's actions at that time were open to
suspicion. For this reason, in 1936 a writer criticized Jiang for ignoring Japanese
aggression in North China, while concentrating a large number of the Nanjing troops in
South China to suppress his opponents. That writer argued that,

58
Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”, KRZZYJ,
No. 1, 1991, pp. 101-140.
59
For details of the suppression of parties and groups in opposition to Jiang, see Roger
Jeans, “Third Force: Zhang Junmai (Carsun Chang) and the National Socialist Party of
China, 1932-1937”, Republican China, Vol. XIX, Issue 1 (November 1993), pp. 113-45;
Qiu Qianmu, “Lun Zhongguo qingniandang de kangri jiuguo zhuzhang”, KRZZYJ, No. 4,
1992, pp. 35-50. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, p. 108.
60
Guangxi daxue zhoukan (Guangxi University Weekly), Vol. 2, No. 1 (February 26,
1932).
61
For example, many believed that the real aim of Jiang’s pursuit of, and attacks on the
Red Army westward was to wipe out his opposition in the Southwest. See Hu Yugao,
Gongfei xicuan ji, pp. 79-80, and pp. 108-110.

253
 Instead of unifying the North, Chiang Kai-shek chooses to unify the South; instead
of driving out the Japanese invaders from Hobei, Chahar, and the four Northeastern
provinces, he prefers to settle an account with General Chen Chitang in Kwangtung,
and General Pai Chung-hsi in Kwangsi; instead of sending an expeditionary force to
subdue the autonomous government in East Hobei under the open traitor Yin Ju-
keng, he has long since disposed large bodies of troops in Fukien, southern Kiangsi,
Kweichow, and Hunan Provinces to get ready to attack the Southwestern troops.62
Judging from the above, it is not difficult to understand why the Clique simultaneously
insisted on the policy of opposition to Jiang and resistance against Japan for a couple of
years after the “September 18 Incident”.
But the Clique began eventually to change the above policy into that of forcing
Jiang or supporting him to resist Japan after 1935, as discussed in Chapter Six. In fact, this
change coincided with Jiang’s gesture to peacefully settle the differences between the two
parties. Two reasons led Jiang to extend the olive branch to the Clique, including Hu
Hanmin. On the one hand, Jiang had eventually consolidated his rule in Central China after
he had successfully driven out the Communists to the Northwest from its base in Jiangxi,
and he realized that he could no longer refuse the demand for resistance. Instead he slowly
adjusted policy towards Japan and secretly prepared for a war of resistance.63 According to
Huang Shaohong, faced with Japanese aggression, Jiang had started to have concerns for
opinions from other sides within the GMD. Of course, Jiang's attitude was based on the
condition that his leadership was widely recognized.64 This was the background to the
Second Plenum of the GMD’s 4th National Congress held at the end of 1934 with the
declared policy of peaceful unity within the party as the main principle which Nanjing
would pursue. At the same time, Japanese aggression in North China, and the so-called
“North China autonomy movement” engineered by the Japanese in order to separate this
territory from the control of Nanjing, further deepened the national crisis, and threatened

62
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth”, p. 196.
63
For discussion of Jiang’s preparation for resistance and readjustment of his policy
towards Japan, see Chen Qianping, “Shilun kangzhan qian Guomindang zhengfu de
guofang jianshe”, NJDXXB, No. 1, 1987; and Meng Guanghan (ed.), Kangzhan shiqi
guogong hezuo jishi, Vol. 2, pp. 810-866.
64
See “Huang Shaohong to Li Zongren and Others, August 31, 1936”, in Chongqing shi
dangan guan (ed.), “Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren deng laiwang
handian”, LSDA, No. 4, 1987, p. 76.

254
Jiang's rule. Under these circumstances, Jiang began to secretly contact both the CCP,65
and his opponents within the GMD, mainly Hu Hanmin and the Guangxi Clique, seeking to
solve the differences between them. This was why Hu headed overseas in the summer of
1935 to observe and consider Jiang’s sincerity in embracing unity with other groups and
factions.66
At the same time, General Long Yun, ruler of Yunnan province, tried to play the
role of intermediary between the Guangxi and Jiang, which I have discussed in Chapter
Five. Furthermore, there is evidence that the Clique tried on its own initiative to negotiate
with Jiang for mutual cooperation with the common aim of resistance, attempting to leave
all disputes aside in favour of a resistance policy for national salvation. This contact
between the two parties also had the backing of Huang Shaohong, the former second-in-
command of the Clique and now Chairman of the Provincial Government of Zhejiang.
Huang Xuchu, the third-in-command of the Clique and Chairman of the Provincial
Government (sheng zhuxi) of Guangxi, and General Ye Qi, Chief of General Staff (zong
canmouzhang) of the 4th Army Group, i.e. the Guangxi troops, were the key figures of the
Clique involved in negotiation with Jiang Jieshi in order to solve the disputes between the
two parties. In the summer of 1935, Ye flew to Chengdu, capital of Sichuan, and met
Jiang, who was then commanding the central army and the Sichuan army in pursuit of the
Red Army which was then undertaking its historic “long march”. Also, at this time, Huang
Shaohong visited his home province to discuss cooperation between the Clique and Jiang
with his former colleagues.67 Along with these contacts, Huang Xuchu was present in
November, during the GMD’s 5th National Congress, and negotiated with Jiang in
Nanjing. In the end they reached a draft agreement. The Clique would recognize Jiang’s
leadership in the nation and support him if he took the lead in resisting Japan and promoted
the positions of the Guangxi leaders in the central government, looking after their interests

65
Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Vol. 2, pp. 695-725,
and pp. 810-34.
66
For details of Hu’s negotiations with Jiang for mutual cooperation in the anti-Japanese
issue, see Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”.
67
See “The Major Events of the Weeks”, GWZB, Vol. 12, No. 35 (9/9/1935), p. 1.

255
in both the regions and the centre as well.68 It seemed that the two parties had reached the
point of joining forces to resist Japan through this agreement.
However, Jiang at that time failed to keep his promise to the Clique.69 Instead he
took measures to put pressure on the province by cutting off the opium route via Guangxi.
As a result, Guangxi lost its most important financial source. Moreover, Jiang concentrated
large numbers of Nanjing troops in Guangxi’s neighbouring provinces to threaten the
Clique’s existence. This was the motive force pushing the Clique to join forces with
Guangdong in launching the anti-Japanese movement in response. This proved to be a
powerful method of dealing with Jiang’s pressure on the Southwest. After his return to
China early in 1936, Hu Hanmin, also acting on behalf of the Clique, put forward a “plan to
save the nation” to Nanjing in order to deal with the escalating national crisis, but no reply
came from Jiang and Nanjing.70 The reason for Hu’s advocacy of immediate resistance
against Japan is that he (including the Clique) shared Jiang's ambition to control the whole
country at that time; but they differed in response to the national crisis faced China. This
was one of the reasons why Hu remained in Guangzhou after his return to China in 1936,
instead of keeping his promise to Nanjing to cooperate with Jiang. Unfortunately, Hu never
lived to experience the eventual reconciliation. His last words before his death, “things go
contrary to my wishes (shiyu yuanwei),”71 in fact, indicate a heartbreaking disappointment.
Hu’s disappointment reflected the further Japanese aggression in North and South
China, a national crisis for which Jiang had failed to take sufficient measures. In Chapter
Six, I have discussed the Japanese ambition to conquer China and its strategy of dividing
the Chinese nation, and subduing each region separately. Li Zongren’s impassioned
declaration of his famous “scorched earth resistance” came as the new national crisis forced
all Chinese to consider the way out for their country. Since 1935, the Japanese had

68
For details of negotiation between the Clique and Jiang, see Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi
yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 126 (1/10/1962), pp. 13-16
(hereafter “Guangxi”); and Huang Shaohong, “Wo yu Jiang Jieshi he Guixi de guanxi”,
WSZLXJ, No. 7. Also see GWZB, Vol. 12, No. 35 (9/9/1935).
69
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 126, p. 16.
70
Wan Renyuan and Fang Qingqiu (eds.), Zhonghua minguo shi shiliao changbian,
Nanjing: The Nanjing University, 1993, Vol. 38, p. 316.
71
See Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu Xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.

256
engineered the “autonomy movement”, not only in North China but also in other areas.
Under these circumstances, a traitorous regime - “East Hebei Autonomous Government”,
headed by Yin Rugeng and sponsored by the Japanese, was established late in 1935. North
China looked certain to lose a second piece of territory; Manzhouguo in northeast China, a
puppet government established after Japan completely occupied three provinces of this
area, had already appeared in 1932. Moreover, starting from 1936, the Japanese military
continuously massed troops in North China. By May, over twenty thousand Japanese
troops had been sent to this area and they frequently provoked the Chinese troops. There
were indications that North China was becoming a new Japanese colony.72
Meanwhile, Japanese smuggling in North China was more and more rampant.
These activities not only threatened China’s national economy and destroyed local
commerce and industries but also hurt the interests of the Powers in this area.73 In just one
week from 4th to 10th May, for example, China lost taxes of over 1.8 million yuan
(Chinese dollars), as Japanese smuggled goods including large shipments of weapons
through East Hebei flooding Tianjin and other areas in the North.74 There are indications
that, from August 1, 1935 to May 10, 1936, China lost taxes amounting to 30 million
yuan.75 Japanese smuggling activities seriously harmed China’s national economy.
According to Hallett Abend,
Nanking’s customs houses at Tientsin and Shanhaikwan, which normally collected
about $40,000,000 a year, collected a little less than $8,000,000 during the first
twelve months that the flood of Japanese goods came through Yin Ju-keng’s
ports.76
While North China was under the threat of the enemy, South China was also in a
dangerous situation. Doihara Kenji, the most active and powerful head of Japanese military

72
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20, p. 5; Giu Guo Sh Bao,
April 25, 1936; Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 194-211; and Quanguo zhengxie
wenshi ziliao yanjiu weiyuanhui et al (eds.), Qiqi shibian - yuan Guomindang jiangling
kangzhan qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1986.
73
For details of impact of the Japanese smuggled goods on the markets of Western
Powers in North China, see Shenbao, May 11, 1936, p. 3.
74
See “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20 (5/5/1936), pp. 3-5.
75
Ibid.
76
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 208.

257
intelligence in China, and other Japanese militarists, engineered not only the “Hua'nan
guo” (South China Nation) in Shantou, Guangdong, but also the “Fujian guo” (Fujian
Nation) in Xiamen (Amoy), Fujian.77 Encouraged by the success of their military and
economic activities in North China, the Japanese began smuggling on a grand scale from
Taiwan to South China. In one year, 1935-1936, legal imports of kerosene dropped from
1,852,000 cases to 310,000 cases. Legal sugar imports declined in the same period of time,
from 18,004,000 pounds to only 2,503,000 pounds. The price of sugar dropped from $22
to $15 a picul78 - a measure of 133 pounds. China's import duty on sugar at that time was
$14.50 per picul.79 The loss of customs from imported sugar alone indicates the harm
caused by Japanese smuggling in South China and this aroused strong anti-Japanese
feeling. As Liang Min-teh pointed out at that time,
Smuggling is just as widespread in the South as it is in the North. It alone is enough
to fan up anti-Japanese feeling among the traders. Just consider the sugar trade, for
example. Through Hobei and Shangtung the Japanese sugar smugglers are
dumping enormous quantities of cheap sugar into the entire Yangtze valley, and
have brought down the price to less than $14 silver per picul of 133 pounds. The
sugar from the Southwest on the Shanghai market had to drop its price within a few
months from $21 to $19 and then to what is considered its minimum profit basis of
$17 per picul. As it still cannot stand the competition of the Japanese, the factory
production in Kwangtung has to be cut down drastically, and shipping and banking
of this trade have to stop altogether. Kwangtung lost its general market in the
Northeast after the Japanese occupation in 1931; now it is losing its large market in
the Yangtze region. The Kwangtung merchants can scarcely be blamed, therefore,
for their high anti-Japanese feelings. They have no sympathy with a pro-Japanese
government under Chiang Kai-shek, but they are willing to support any government
which posts an anti-Japanese slogan.80
Moreover, in early 1936, the Japanese frequently provoked local authorities in
Shantou, Guangdong, and made lots of trouble in the entire area. Japanese warships were
also sent to the South China Sea with the excuse of protecting their people in South China.
These warships and the Japanese traders, legal and illegal alike, gathered military

77
Giu Guo Sh Bao, 25/4/1936. Also see Xia Chao, “Lun liuyi shibian”, JDSYJ, No. 3,
1986, p. 195.
78
Picul, a Chinese weight measure equal to about 60-64 kg (the maximum load a man
could carry).
79
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 210.
80
Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs Canton: Press vs Truth”, p. 197.

258
intelligence in China everywhere they could. South China came under the direct threat of
the aggressive Japanese influence.81
Although Nanjing failed to take action in response to increasing Japanese military
and economic aggression, the new national crises after 1935 further aroused strong Chinese
response, urging a new and more large-scale movement of resistance.82 Even those people
from the higher levels of the Nanjing Government realized the inevitability of resistance.
For example, Song Ziwen (i.e. T. V. Soong), Minister of Finance in the Nanjing
Government, had already stated that, “it is a great mistake to try to negotiate with Japan
about anything”.83 Hu Hanmin and the Clique found much fertile ground for their pleas for
resistance and their claims to leadership. There are indications that Hu, after his return to
Guangzhou, frequently convened secret meetings with Li Zongren, Chen Jitang and other
senior leaders of the two Southwest organizations in his house. People believed the
Southwestern leaders should have reached some political and military solutions to the
future of China and made some practical plans or policies that the people of the Southwest
could follow. Strangely, the exact plans are unknown,84 but there are indications that Hu
and the Clique still had the plan to launch a national resistance in opposition to Jiang's non-
resistance, and the June 1 Movement was to put the scorched earth resistance policy into
practice.
First, as stated earlier, Li’s “scorched earth resistance” policy called for immediate
resistance. Before publishing it, Li sent it to Hu Hanmin and discussed it with him. Hu
agreed with his views.85 Second, after his return to Guangzhou, Hu insisted on promoting
nationalist education and propaganda to meet the needs of resisting Japan and national

81
See Zhu Zhengsheng (ed.), Li Hanhun jiangjun riji, Vol. 1, pp. 43-4.
82
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, pp. 210-1; and Liang Min-teh, “Nanking vs
Canton”.
83
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 215.
84
See Zhongguo dashi ji, compiled and published by Center for Chinese Research
Materials Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D. C., 1973, Vol. V, pp. 354-9.
85
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1979, p. 316. Li’s article was also published in Sanmin zhuyi yuekan, Vol.
7, No. 5 (May 15, 1936).

259
salvation.86 The purpose was to prepare public opinion for the coming war. Furthermore,
although he still insisted that jiaogong (suppression of the Communists) and tuifan ducai
(overthrow of dictatorship) were part of the policies which should guide the Southwest, or
even the whole country if possible, Hu believed, “it is better to come under the rule of the
Communists than to be eliminated by Japan.”87 This indicated his determination to resist
Japan and why he nominated the anti-Japanese war as the most urgent task. According to
correspondence from Guangzhou on 24 May, the Southwest had been preparing to launch a
national war against Japan before Hu’s death, and afterwards did not stop this action, but
speeded up preparations.88 The slogans and other propaganda of the Southwest after Hu’s
death were all directed towards this aim.89 Nanning Minguo Ribao (Nanning Republican
Daily), official organ of the Clique, became even more determined in its call for immediate
resistance just after Hu’s death.90 In fact, Li and Chen had already called and prepared for a
war against Japan early in 1936. According to Joseph Stilwell’s report, Chen and Li also
stated they, once the war broke out, would immediately put 70,000 and 50,000 troops,
respectively, into the field, though they finally failed to do so, as Jiang could not be moved
to go to war yet.91
There can be no doubt that the Clique was keen to put its policy of resistance into
practice. That is to say, the movement seemed to be the most positive response to the
further aggression and Japan’s smuggling activities in 1936 and disappointment at Jiang’s
failure to ward off the Japanese threats. Hallett Abend’s comments were very much to the
point:
The Southwest are sincere in their anti-Japanism and in their belief that if Chiang
Kai-shek continues in power China will be “given away to Japan, bit by bit”, while
General Chiang husbands his military and cash reserves to sustain his own domestic
position against domestic adversaries. The Southwest sincerely wants to reorganize

86
Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p. 1.
87
Giu Guo Sh Bao, March 20, 1936.
88
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
89
For details see Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, p.
14.
90
Nanning minguo ribao, 13 May 1936.
91
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).

260
 the Central Government, and then arouse the patriotism of the Chinese people in
order to make an effort to regain North China and Manchuria.92
Therefore, the Southwest would not wait any longer, but decided to take action in
opposition to Jiang’s impotence in dealing with the Japanese. After they had dealt with
Hu’s funeral, the two Southwest organizations telegraphed to Nanjing its intention of
moving its troops to North China against Japan, and both Guangdong and Guangxi were
soon mobilized, which began the June 1 Movement.
Jiang's decision to settle his differences with the Southwest by force also spurred
the two Guangs into launching the movement. It is possible that Jiang had adopted three
principles in dealing with the two Guangs' semi-independence from Nanjing about May
1936. According to Li’s memoirs, these were as follows: 1) The thorough elimination of
the power of Li and Bai in Guangxi, with the central government helping Guangdong in
their use of troops for the purpose; 2) The expulsion from Guangdong of anti-Jiang
veterans such as Xiao Focheng; and 3) The maintenance of the status quo in Guangdong.93
These principles indicated that Jiang would attempt to wipe out the Clique as a top priority.
However, if Guangxi was defeated by Jiang, Guangdong could not maintain its position.
Both Chen and Li of course knew it was Jiang’s tactic of “killing two birds with one stone”
(yishi erniao) in order to split the powerful Guangdong-Guangxi alliance, a force ever
threatening to Jiang's rule over China. In their own positions and interests, Guangdong and
Guangxi had to take measures in response to Jiang’s principles; and the best justification
for taking such measures was of course that which would be accepted by many Chinese,
that of fighting Japan. The death of Hu Hanmin provided Jiang with an opportunity to
speed up his settlement of the two Guangs matter. Soon after Jiang had sent five senior
members of Nanjing to Guangzhou to pay a condolence call after Hu's death in mid-May,
rumours about Jiang’s more concrete intentions of eliminating the two Southwest
organizations spread throughout the country. According to some sources, these principles
included:
1) The abolition of the Southwest Executive Committee of the Nationalist
Government and the Southwest Political Council of the GMD;
2) Reorganization of the Guangdong provincial government;

92
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, 1926-1941, p. 223.
93
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 303.

261
 3) Retirement of all senior leaders of the two Southwest organizations and
reappointment of their positions by Nanjing;
4) The change of Chen Jitang's position from Commander-in-Chief of the 1st
Army Group to Field Commander of the 4th Route Army (Guangdong
troops), and the reappointment of all commanders of this army by Nanjing;
and
5) The unification of Guangdong currency into the central system.94
If these principles really existed and were carried out, Chen would no longer be able
to maintain his power in Guangdong. But Jiang, in a speech on June 8, 1936, denied the
existence of such principles.95 I also have not found corroborative evidence to prove their
existence. However, Jiang often used the tactic of allying himself with nearby forces to use
them in subduing opposition in an area, and he had already concentrated large numbers of
troops to encircle the two Guangs. It was not unreasonable to assume that Jiang would
carry out these policies to eliminate the Clique, his largest opponent within the GMD.96
The same tactics had served him well in 1929, during the Wuhan Incident (dealt with in
Chapter Two) when Jiang successfully eliminated the influence of the Clique in Central
China for almost a decade.

The Motive Force Behind the Launching of the June 1 Movement

It was also understandable that the Clique and Chen Jitang would launch their anti-
Japanese movement as a counter measure. First, in so doing, the two Guangs could not
only be maintained as a powerful political force within the GMD as usual but could also

94
Cheng Siyuan, “Liangguang shibian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 22, pp. 47-56; Liu Fei,
“Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian”, WSZLXJ, No. 3; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),
Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, p. 373.
95
See Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, p. 30.
96
Some sources show that senior leaders of Nanjing, such as Ju Zheng, Sun Ke and Li
Wenfan, did take advantage of Hu’s funeral ceremony in Guangzhou to discuss the issue of
“unity” between Nanjing and the Southwest (i.e. the two Guangs), but the details of the
negotiations and the results are unknown. See Zhongguo dashi ji, Vol. V, p. 374. Other
evidence is the recollection of Jiang’s intelligence officer who was in Guangzhou at that
time. In this recollection, the writer acknowledges Jiang’s ambitious plan to eliminate the
Southwest and his mission in Guangdong was to coincide with Jiang’s purpose in the
Southwest. See Shi Xin (pseud.), “Liangguang shibian qianhou de huiyi zhiyi”, CQ, No.
172 (1/9/1964), p. 14.

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win a commanding reputation in the anti-Japanese movement.97 The Clique expected the
War of Resistance to be most effective in North China and the Yangzi valley and these
areas were far from their home base. The earlier resistance began, the more likely it would
be that the enemy would not be able to reach provinces like Guangxi. Also, success in the
North would bring prestige and a much better chance of returning to the central government
control of or a share in the leadership of resistance to Japan; it would also reinforce its rule
of the whole country.98
Second, the successful launching of resistance would efficiently frustrate Jiang's
plan of eliminating the two Guangs, and if Jiang refused to take the lead in fighting Japan,
it would provide them with a good reason to argue for his replacement. It is self-evident
that ideally they wished to replace Jiang and to assume leadership of the country in resisting
Japan through the movement.99 This might be an important motive force behind the
movement. In fact, Joseph Stilwell had already sensed this earlier in 1936. In a
confidential report, he pointed out that the Southwest believed Jiang did not want to go to
war with Japan because of his desire to maintain his own supremacy in China; as this
American officer saw it, war meant the certain downfall of Jiang at the hands either of the
Southwest and Japan. For this reason, Joseph Stilwell believed that:
Chen and Li, once in the lower Yangtze, and in superior military force might very
well issue an impassioned plea to the nation to rally and save that great region under
Canton auspices. In case of the success of such a plea the supreme national power
would fall like a ripe plum into the laps of Chen and Li, who would be not loath to
receive it.100
Finally, it was the most propitious time and the most convincing reason for the
Clique and Chen Jitang to take action by carrying out Hu’s rhetorical unfinished tasks on
the one hand and promoting their reputation as the logical replacements for Jiang on the
other. These based their decision on their judgement of the growing anti-Japanese

97
Liu Fei, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian”.
98
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
99
In fact, in the first half of 1936, Chuanjin yuekan and Nanning Minguo Ribao, official
organs of the Clique, frequently advocated a war of resistance and urged Li and Bai to lead
resistance if Jiang failed to do so. See Chuanjin yuekan, Vol. 3, No. 8 (May 1936) and No.
9 (June 1936); and Nanning Minguo Ribao, April 26, 1936, p. 2.
100
U. S. Intelligence Military Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).

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sentiment around the country. According to their judgement, the year 1936 was a critical
time in which the world war could well break out (for reasons discussed earlier). It also
was the year of resisting Japan for national salvation as well.101 Once they initiated the
war, they believed that the whole country would rally to their call for resistance; if Jiang did
not respond to the wishes of the people, his prestige would collapse.102 Launching such a
movement had in fact been well planned by the Southwestern leaders before and after Hu’s
death, and they had widely contacted other minority parties and groups and discussed the
possibility of war against Japan. The suggestion of General Chen Mingshu, former leader
of the Fujian Rebellion, in a telegram to Zou Lu, a GMD veteran and a senior leader of the
Southwest, on May 21, is an example of the major responses. Chen said,
What the Southwestern leaders can do at present is to unite together and insist on a
total struggle of resistance against Japan, and to establish a certain scale of anti-
Japanese unity in the Southwest, as well as to strike relentless blows at the Japanese
pirates’ aggression. In so doing, once the Southwest is rising to the call for fighting
Japan, the whole country will give a positive response. At present the feeling that
the national people bitterly hate the Japanese pirates has already become white-hot.
Such a will held by the 400 million people must become a powerful backup force
of yours. Thus these people who fawn on foreign powers and beg to preserve their
own wealth and rank will destroy themselves before the angry people if they do not
follow you and participate in the war against Japan. This is not only the best self-
defensive way of the Southwest but also that of the whole nation.103
In short, the interaction of these internal motive forces and the external factors
favourable to the Southwest pushed the Guangxi leaders, also including Chen Jitang, to
launch the June 1 Movement in 1936.

Conclusion

It can be seen from the foregoing analysis that the June 1 Movement was a natural
continuation of the Guangxi Clique’s scorched earth resistance policy and its practice. The
allegations of collusion with Japan came mostly from the propaganda of Nanjing, using
Japanese sources with scant facts. Although there is evidence to indicate that the Clique

101
Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.
102
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 305.
103
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 20, 1936.

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had some contacts with Japan in order to purchase arms and that these contacts indeed
aroused suspicions among many people, there is no corroborative evidence to show that the
Clique was in collusion with Japan when the movement was launched. In addition to
protection of their own territory and countering military pressure from Jiang, the real
motive force was the need for nation-wide resistance, because the Southwest had already
realized, as a newspaper said, that this was the year of national salvation for the Chinese
people.104 They also realized that such a movement could coincide with the anti-Japanese
positions of many, and gain wide support from the Chinese people,105 including some
Nationalist leaders such as Feng Yuxiang.106 The call for immediately launching a war of
resistance even had its echo in the Nanjing government. For example, after the Japanese
had forced China to sign an agreement on demands in North China late in 1935, Song
Ziwen (T. V. Soong) declared heatedly:
This is a time for fighting. If we do not resist now, our chance may be lost for good
and all. Even a defeat, after all, is something. It is better to fight and to lose, than
to give up everything without a struggle.107
When Nanjing withdrew 140,000 troops of the Central Army, and later another 40,000
more troops, from North China at the end of the same year, T. V. Soong said further, “it
would have meant thousands of people killed, but even street fighting is better than not
fighting at all."108 It indicates that the call for immediate military resistance brought wide
and favourable reactions from many groups, even including some in the Nanjing
Government. According to Western sources, the Guangxi leaders were also backed by a
clique at Nanjing. In other words, their anti-Japanese action was echoed by some leaders of

104
She Lun (Editorial), “1936 - Kangri jiuguo nian”, Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936, p.
1.
105
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 127
(October 16, 1962), p. 17; and also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9, p. 12.
106
Giu Guo Sh Bao, May 20, 1936.
107
Hallett Abend, My Years in China, p. 215.
108
Ibid.

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Nanjing.109 As Hansu Chan pointed out, launching a movement for resistance against
Japan had already become “a matter of life and death for the Chinese nation.”110
There is enough evidence to show the existence of personal ambitions as one
motive behind the movement and opposition to Jiang, but the prerequisite to anti-Jiang
activity was opposition to his non-resistance policy. That is to say, the purpose of the
movement was to urge Jiang to lead a nationwide resistance. Only when Jiang still refused
the appeal for this leadership, and even responded by military threats against both Guangxi
and Guangdong, did the Southwestern leaders act by instigating the June 1 Movement. In
such a way, the Southwestern leaders combined the national interest and personal
ambitions.
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that the June 1 Movement met the needs of the time.
As James Bertram, a British correspondent in China in the 1930s, pointed out after the
movement,
The motives behind this movement were somewhat suspect, but it is noteworthy
that it could command mass support only on a programme of more active resistance
to the inroads of Japan.111
Statements and telegrams from the Southwest during the movement indicate also
that all actions were, indeed, designed to urge Jiang to wage an immediate resistance, even
though we can accept that there were suspect motives behind it. Just based on these, some
writers believe that the movement was both anti-Jiang and resisting Japan.112 This is
correct because it basically reflects the complicated motives behind the movement.

109
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9499 (December 10,
1936). Also see Giu Guo Sh Bao, May 20, 1936.
110
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, p. 188.
111
James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, New York: Viking
Press, 1938, p. xiv.
112
For details of relevant studies, see Cao Yuwen, “Lun kangzhan qianxi xin Guixi de
‘qiqiang zhengzhi’”, XSLT, No. 1, 1991, pp. 100-5; Xia Chao, “Shilun ‘liangguang
shibian’”, JDSYJ, No. 3, 1986, pp. 194-215; Guo Xiaohe and Luo Jianing, “‘Liangguang
shibian’ qianhou xin Guixi zhengzhi taidu de bianhua”, GXDXXB, No. 1, 1985, pp. 90-4;
Li Jingzhi, “‘Liangguang shibian’ de xingzhi chutan”, LSDA, No. 1, 1986, pp. 100-4;
Zhang Guangchuan, “‘Liangguang shibian’ xinyi”, Zhengming (Discussion), No. 2, 1991,
pp. 36-9; and Zhang Meiling, “Li Zongren bi Jiang kangri de lishi diwei yingyu chongfen
kending”, Tansuo, No. 4, 1987, pp. 31-6.

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However, those writers still use a static and undynamic view to examine the movement,
including its development and resolution, thus, neglecting the factors and circumstances
affecting the Clique’s policies and practice in the movement. In fact, these factors and
circumstances interacted with the Clique’s policy and impelled the Guangxi leaders to
readjust their purposes to coincide with the demands of the time. These will be the main
subject of the next chapter.

267