CHAPTER EIGHT

THE JUNE 1 MOVEMENT: COMPELLING JIANG TO RESIST JAPAN AND

THE CLIQUE’S ROLE IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

The previous chapter discussed the background to the launching of the anti-
Japanese movement, with its supposedly suspect motives, by the Guangxi Clique and the
Southwestern leaders. This chapter will analyze how the Clique put the “forcing Jiang to
resist Japan” policy into practice and examine the measures carried out by Jiang when
dealing with the June 1 Movement, its development and result. The issues of how the two
parties reached reconciliation and to what extent the Clique contributed to the AJNUF will
also be dealt with. Through the analysis of these issues, I will argue that the June 1
Movement was a test in the formation of the AJNUF and an important factor in the
reconciliation between the Clique and Jiang. I will also discuss the significance of the
movement for the important events which followed, in particular, the “Xi’an Incident”,
which took place three months later.

“Forcing Jiang to Resist Japan”

The June 1 Movement lasted three months until early September 1936. it can be
divided into two phases: the first from June 1 to July 18, in which Guangdong and Guangxi
were the main force, and the later phase when Guangxi proceeded its own. Guangxi was
the only participant of the June 1 Movement from beginning to end.
In the first phase, with Guangzhou as its centre and the Guangdong-Guangxi
alliance its main pillar, the activities of the movement included the military measures taken
by the Clique and Chen Jitang and the constant political pressure on Nanjing urging it to

268
declare war immediately against Japan, and, in response, Jiang’s various tactics to counter
this movement. In other words, the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy was carried out by a
combination of propaganda campaigns and military pressures. Along with the developing
and changing situation with the two Guangs, the movement eventually fixed on constant
appeals to Nanjing to promise to take the lead in national resistance on the lines that the
Southwest had propagandized. Of course, the real sponsors of the movement, according to
Joseph Stilwell, were Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi.1 For this reason, the discussion of the
main activities is focussed on the Clique.
The Southwest Political Council of the GMD and the Southwest Executive
Committee of the Nationalist Government at Guangzhou issued a circular telegram on May
26, only one day after the funeral of Hu Hanmin, urging Nanjing to protect the country
against the increase in the number of the Japanese troops in North China.2 According to
Liu Fei, Bai’s aide at that time, it aimed to express the Southwest’s anti-Japanese attitude
and determination to sway public opinion. Through openly publishing this telegram they
expected to attract people's sympathy for their stand and to arouse patriotic feelings against
Japanese aggression, on the one hand, and to incite people's discontent with Nanjing for its
impotence and non-resistance in its failure to deal with the further Japanese aggression in
both North and South China after 1935, on the other. Meanwhile, issuing such a circular
telegram was also an exploratory action of the Southwest in its preparation to implement
the forcing Jiang to resist Japan policy.3 Thus, this event seemed to be a prelude to the
official launching of the June 1 Movement.
On June 1, the Southwest Political Council and the Southwest Executive
Committee held an official meeting and moved to submit a petition to the Nanjing
Government and central party headquarters of the GMD calling on the Nationalist
Government to take the lead in resisting Japan. The petition stated that China was facing a

1
U. S. Military Intelligence Reports - China, 1911-1941, No. 9408 (June 19, 1936).
Hereafter as U. S. Military.
2
For details of the increase in Japanese military forces in North China in the first half of
1936, see “The Major Events of the Week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 25, 1936), p. 5;
and SMZYYK, Vol. 8, No. 1-2 (August 31, 1936), pp. 33-54.
3
Liu Fei, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian’, GXWSZL, No. 29 (1990), pp. 290-291 (hereafter
as “Liangguang”).

269
moment when the country's fate hung in the balance as Japan speeded up its aggression in
not only North but also South China. It emphasized that only resistance could ensure the
survival of the country, and that the nation had no way out except for the whole country to
rise together with force and spirit to fight a last-ditch battle against the enemy. In the
petition they pledged full support if Nanjing would resist with armed forces. The
concluding paragraph of the message, which was strongly worded throughout, stated that
“feeding the enemy with territory is like feeding fire with firewood and is national suicide.
We insist that not one more inch of Chinese territory be alienated.”4 Perhaps seeking to
exploit the occasion as propaganda, the two Guangs issued another circular telegram to the
entire nation, publishing the contents of the petition in full on June 2. In the telegram they
asked the Central Government to permit them to march northward to fight Japan and
recover the lost territories. The telegram also expected all parties and groups throughout
the nation to press Nanjing to pass a resolution to fight Japan.5 Two days later, scores of
army generals in the provinces of the two Guangs led by Chen Jitang and Li Zongren issued
another circular telegram of support for the earlier resolution of the Southwestern
authorities calling for resistance against Japan and pledging to lead their men “to avenge
the age-old humiliation of the country and strive to ensure the continued existence of the
nation.”6 This telegram was the manifesto of the Southwest, and it reflected their
consciousness of striving for national independence and liberation. Of course, it was a very
good platform from which the Southwest could launch the movement. Whatever the
motive, the message reflected a strong anti-Japanese feeling. As Bai emphasized on June 5,

4
U. S. Military, No. 9392 (June 5, 1936); and Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo lianhehui
(ed.), Guangxi kangri jiuguo zhongyao wendian huiji, Nanning, 1936, p. 103 (hereafter as
Huiji).
5
For details of the telegram, see Nanning minguo ribao, June 3, 1936. Also see Liu Fei,
“Liangguang”, p. 291; Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe,
1987, p. 88, and the same author, “Liangguang shibian”, GXWSZL, No. 22 (1985), pp. 48-
9; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi yu zhongyang nian yunian lai beihuan lihe yishu”, CQ, No. 127
(16/10/1962), p. 17 (hereafter as “Guangxi”); Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The
Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979, pp. 307-8; and Huiji,
pp. 102-4.
6
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, pp. 307-8; and Huiji, pp.
49-50, and p. 104.

270
they “would rather die free men than live as slaves under Japanese domination.”7
Meanwhile, as the advocate of “scorched earth resistance”, Li also called on military
leaders throughout the country to “shed their blood in the cause of anti-Japanese
salvation.”8 Soon the two Southwestern organizations accepted the request of these army
generals and reorganized the troops of the two Guangs as “kangri jiuguojun”, marching
northward under the flag of fighting Japan.9 The “bi-Jiang kangri” policy was in action.
These events marked the beginning of the June 1 Movement. The two provinces,
particularly Guangxi, carried out a general mobilization to meet the needs of anti-Japanese
activity. Thus, Guangxi, together with Guangdong, politically and militarily completed
preparation for “bi-Jiang kangri’.
At the same time, the Clique publicised in the province that the movement was a
patriotic action with the sole aim of fighting Japan. This policy was widely propagated by
the provincial authorities not only in the mass media but also to the people through its
militia system. The entire province of Guangxi was mobilized under the anti-Japanese flag.
Militia and army were reorganized. Various anti-Japanese mass organizations, such as, the
National Salvation Association of Guangxi Cultural Circles (Guangxi wenhuajie jiuguohui)
and the National Salvation Association of Guangxi Workers (Guangxi gongren jiuguohui),
were established throughout the province. Women, students, and workers, all joined the
movement.10 Students of tertiary and middle schools were more radical than others, but
their patriotic enthusiasm was well used and guided by the Clique. As a result, they were
organized as the Guangxi Student Army Corp.11 They were soon divided into many small
propaganda units and then sent to the countryside in order to mobilize the peasants and

7
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, China Today, Vol. 2, No. 10, p. 188.
8
Ibid.
9
Huiji, p. 104.
10
For details of these mobilizations, see Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.),
Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, Guilin, 1937; and Eugene Levich, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939, Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1993, chapters 4, 8,
and 14.
11
Shenbao, June 29, 1936, p. 3.

271
other masses for the patriotic cause of fighting Japan and saving the nation.12 It seemed
that a tide of anti-Japanese movement promoted and sponsored by the Clique had already
appeared in Guangxi.
In fact, the Southwest had already mobilized in both military preparation and
propaganda before June, even before the death of Hu Hanmin. Utilizing the alleged
menace of imminent Japanese invasion to impress the people with their patriotic
obligations, the authorities had enlisted the service of the newly organized National
Propaganda Commission to spread the doctrine of national defence and were enlisting
popular cooperation by various means for starting a war against Japan.13 This was a
response to the rising tide of national unity for resisting Japan since the end of 1935, which
many parties and groups had called for.14 Further evidence might also explain the
apparently spontaneous action in the two Guangs. In May, a special Guangdong
Commission made a tour of inspection in Guangxi, one of its main objects being to study
the provincial military system, particularly that of the militia.15 These might also be
considered as coincidental actions of the two provinces in preparation of mass mobilization
for action under the slogan of resistance.
To add fuel to the flame of the movement and to provide it with a just cause for the
action, the Guangxi leaders also frequently emphasized that their aim coincided with the
call of the Southwestern authorities. For example, when the Guangxi troops were on the
way northward, Li and Bai both repeatedly reiterated, through a series of orders and public
notices, that the movement was only for resisting Japan and national salvation, not for
opposing any individuals.16 For example, Bai clearly announced in his official declaration
at the launching of the movement and mass mobilization on June 1:

12
Guangxi daxue wenfa xueyuan zizhihui (ed.), Liuyi yundong jinian tekan, pp. 14-7, 50-
6.
13
U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936); Giu Guo Sh Bao, 25/6/1936; and Hu zhuxi
zhisang weiyuanhui ed., Hu xiansheng jinian zhuankan, Guangzhou, 1936 (hereafter Hu
xiansheng).
14
Giu Guo Sh Bao, January 4, 1936.
15
U. S. Military, No. 9369 (22/5/1936), p. 3. Also see “Guangxi of the Month”, CJYK,
Vol. 3, No. 9 (1936), p. 12.
16
Huiji, p. 61.

272
 When the entire nation has already reached the point of extinction, all existing
personal feelings of the past, gratitude or resentment between different groups and
parties, should be put-aside. From now on Chinese should not fight each other
anymore. Instead we Chinese should reunite and fight Japanese imperialism,
standing on one front.17
Indeed, these proclamations stated clearly that the Guangxi authorities were
building up a strong momentum which opposed civil war and regarded resistance as the
sole aim of the projected northern expedition. Obviously, it aimed, through mass
mobilization and wide propaganda, to put pressure on Jiang and Nanjing to make a
resolution for war against Japan.18 In so doing they renounced or concealed their personal
ambitions, if these really existed, which lay behind this movement from its inception. The
demands of national affairs came first, and they openly linked their ambitions with struggle
for national salvation. The CCP followed the same tactics at this time, or at least it seemed
to be so on the surface, possibly because they recognised that the tide of the time favoured
any groups and parties taking action against Japanese aggression; but certainly their
influence added to the anti-Japanese tide, regardless of what their motives were.19 As Bai
stated, the Guangxi group had issued many manifestos and petitions to Nanjing calling for a
war of resistance since 1931, now they found themselves no longer able to tolerate
Japanese aggression. Therefore, it was the time to put their anti-Japanese policy into
action, instead of enduring Nanjing’s continuing impotence.20
The Guangxi troops publicly declared their aim to the public in order to win popular
support. They strongly believed their action was for universal principles of nature and
society (gongli), and justice (zhengyi), for existence (shengcun) and self-defence (ziwei),
and for national conscience (liangxin) and moral personality (renge). This reflected a belief
that, as the Clique repeatedly emphasized, the people of the Pearl River valley should

17
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiuguo”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, Hong
Kong: Zhujiang ribaoshe, 1937, p. 58.
18
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
19
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
20
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiuguo”, in Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, p. 56.

273
shoulder more responsibility in fighting Japan.21 For this reason, they clearly declared their
aims as follows:
1) We insist that the national government immediately break off all relations
with Japan, and abolish all humiliating treaties and agreements with Japan.
2) We oppose any kind of civil war and oppose any policy which results in
Chinese and the Chinese troops fighting each other.
3) We invite all anti-Japanese forces, no matter which region or party and
which army or section of the masses they belong to, to join us in order to
form a national revolutionary front for resistance.
4) On marching northward, we will not attack any towns and individuals or
troops, but we will join forces with the national people and strenuously fight
any one or group who declare themselves to be Chinese traitors and
endeavour to impede our progress northward.22
There is evidence that the Guangxi troops marching northward at that time were
mobilized by the above policies. Even Joseph Stilwell did not deny this. He recognized
that the policies sounded good and that morale of the Guangxi people was high under the
influence of such political propaganda.23 To demonstrate more widely their declared
purpose, the Clique also distributed large numbers of propaganda leaflets with slogans such
as “Expand the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Movement”, “Japanese Is Our External
Enemy”, “Down with Japanese Imperialism”, “Down with Opponents of the Anti-Japanese
Movement”, “Down with All Sino-Japanese Treaties Signed Under Duress”, and so on.24
They expected a broad and positive response throughout the country to this call. Thus, they
completed preparation for influencing public opinion for “bi-Jiang kangri” through such
propaganda.
It can be seen that the Clique’s “bi-Jiang kangri” policy had already become
apparent. Its spearhead, at least outwardly, was directed against Japanese aggression, not
internal disputes. It sent Nanjing a message that resistance was the responsibility of every
Chinese. The message had a dual content. First, all of the people should rise to resist
Japan; and secondly, if some powerful people did not want to do this, then the Clique

21
Ibid, pp. 53-54.
22
Huiji, p. 48.
23
U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).
24
During the movement, the newspapers in Guangxi published anti-Japanese slogans
daily, among them Nanning minguo ribao was a best example. See Nanning minguo ribao,
June 1936. Also see Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”, p. 188.

274
would lead the Chinese people to do so without hesitation.25 The Clique thus tried to
convince the whole country that they were not only sincere themselves in wanting to resist
Japan but also willing to promote Nanjing in the movement of national liberation. In that
way, “bi-Jiang kangri” was put into effect. Meanwhile, the Pearl River Valley
Revolutionary theory, in which the people of the two Guangs were lauded as the main force
of the national revolution with the Clique as the leader, was closely linked with the anti-
Japanese movement they launched. Thus, personal purposes and ambitions, even if they
still existed, were increasingly weakened as the movement developed. Once Jiang’s policy
was changed, for example, he came to cooperate with other groups and parties for
resistance, and any ideas of anti-Jiang action were no longer relevant to the universal ideal.
In such circumstances, “fatong” (orthodox legitimacy) was widely endorsed. Li and other
Southwestern leaders consequently recognized, until the war was won, Nanjing as the sole
government of China, even though it was actually under the control of Jiang, whom they
distrusted and even opposed. Before even considering any chance of replacing Jiang, they
wanted to fight Japan to convince that their actions reflected the wishes of the majority of
the people.26 On the other hand, the differences between them, which were frequently
emphasized, were mostly concerned with policies towards Japanese aggression. They
never missed an opportunity to explain their different measures in dealing with Japan.27
That is to say, the situation forced the Clique to avoid, as much as it could, building up the
image of a region actually opposing the central government for power only; but they
fostered the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy because it could attract more public support and
legitimate its opposition to Jiang.28
Once the “bi-Jiang kangri” movement was initiated, the Clique had to follow this
direction; otherwise, their actions would make no sense. As the Chinese saying goes,
“water can either carry or destroy the boat”. The movement was the boat sailing in the
water of the masses who were imbued with patriotism. The Guangxi leaders of course

25
See “Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, Nanning, 1937, p. 266.
26
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
27
Ibid. Also see Hu Yugao, Gongfei xicuan ji, Guiyang: Yugao shudian, 1946, p. 110.
28
Huiji, pp. 107-110.

275
knew how to use the masses, particularly the popular tide they had set in train and they
emphasized the importance of the masses and mass mobilization, which later could also
become a powerful force used by the Clique in opposition to Nanjing.29 As Liu Fei pointed
out, the only thing that the Clique could do was to elevate the banner of resisting Japan at a
time when the movement for that purpose was already on the way. This was also the way
to avoid any suggestion of a regional image which might cause unfavourable criticism of
them.30
Resistance against Japan became the basis of Guangxi reconstruction and
mobilization, and this was recognized within and outside the province. Visitors, whether
from overseas or from other provinces, commented favourably on Guangxi and lauded it
with the title of “model province”,31 for the Clique imbued the population generally with
enthusiasm for its policies of both reconstruction and mass mobilization (dealt with in
Chapter Four). The enthusiasm of the masses was of course channelled by the Clique into
self-defence, which could effectively serve both the national and provincial levels.
Recognising the powerful force created by the mobilization of the masses in the province,
Sherwood Eddy said, “I see in Guangxi a hope of the new China”.32 Of course, Li and Bai
paid great attention to these comments, which were regarded as a clear indication that their
pursuit of correct policies had been recognized by the people.33 However, these

29
Bai Chongxi, “Kangri jiuguo”, Zhujiang ribaoshe (ed.), Jiaotu kangzhan, pp. 54-6; and
Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 157-65, and pp.
203-12.
30
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 293.
31
For details of those people’s comments on Guangxi reconstruction and mass
mobilization such as speeches and articles of Chen Baoyin, Chen Lijiang, George
Sherwood Eddy, Huang Tianshi, Jiang Kanghu, Hou Zhenqiu and Wang Heng, see Leng
Guan et al, Guangxi jianshe jiping, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; Liang Wenwei
et al, Guangxi yinxiang ji, Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935; and Guomin gemingjun
disi jituanjun zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Li-Gui zhongwai mingren yanjiang ji, Shanghai:
ZHSJ, 1936; Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? Shanghai, January 7,
1935, printed by the author himself; and U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
32
Sherwood Eddy, Is There A Model Province in China? p. 2.
33
See Li zongsiling zuijin yanjiang ji, pp. 259-65; Bai fu zongsiling yanjiang ji, Nanning:
GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1935, pp. 19-24; and Bai Chongxi xiansheng zuijin yanlun ji,
Nanning: GMGMJDSJTJZSLB, 1936, pp. 14-6.

276
appreciations were often the result of encouragement or pressure from the Clique itself. To
defend further their reputation as the leading figures in resistance, they had ultimately to
succeed with the policy of forcing Jiang to resist Japan.
In fact this latter stance as a central pillar of the Clique’s policy represented a subtle
change in emphasis. Before his death, Hu had repeatedly emphasized “downfall of
dictatorship as a prerequisite to resisting Japan”.34 According to Xiao Focheng, a GMD
veteran and a senior leader in the Southwest, although the Southwest still insisted that it
must carry out Hu’s three deathbed calls, as mentioned in Chapter Seven, at present
resistance was more important and urgent than the others.35 This, of course, still left the
Clique with excellent reasons to take action against Jiang’s “non-resistance”; and their
propaganda took this into account.
Another factor affecting the actions of the Clique was the tactics of the Communists
and the Red Army in their Eastern Expedition which ended just before the June 1
Movement began. The Eastern Expedition of the Red Army took place between February
and May 1936; the army marched eastward, passing through Shanxi province towards
Hebei province under the flag of fighting the Japanese. After fighting with both Yan
Xishan’s troops and Jiang's Central Army which rushed to Shanxi province as a
reinforcement for Yan, the Red Army withdrew to their base in northern Shaanxi with the
stated purpose of avoiding further civil war with Jiang and other regional troops.36
Whatever reasons might be given to account for this action, during the expedition the Red
Army widely propagandized their position on stopping civil war in the cause of unity for

34
For details of Hu’s ideas on “downfall of dictatorship, resistance against Japan and
suppression of Communism”, see Hu Hanmin xiansheng wenji, Taipei: Guomindang
zhongyang dangshihui, 1978; Hu zhuxi zhisang weiyuanhui (ed.), Hu xiansheng; and
Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou:, 1934, pp. 1-2. For
more details of these, see Hu Hanmin (ed.), Sanmin zhuyi yuekan (SMZYYK), Guangzhou,
1933-36.
35
Huiji, p. 117.
36
For details of the Red Army’s Eastern Expedition, see Jiang Shunxing and Li Liangyu,
Shanxi wang Yan Xishan, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1989, pp. 141-4; Zhonggong
zhongyang dangxiao (ed.), Yan Xishan pingzhuan, Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang
dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, pp. 256-61; Jiang Kefu (ed.), Minguo junshi shi luegao,
Beijing: ZHSJ, 1991, Vol. 2, pp. 435-9; and Donald Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi-shan in
Shansi Province 1911-1949, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967.

277
resisting Japan,37 which to a great extent coincided with the mood of the growing tide of
national resistance. It was a clever political tactic of the Communists and the Red Army,
and their propaganda was used to real purpose, and helped to expand their strength. The
Clique was aware of the positions and tactics of the Red Army because Li and Bai sent
their representative to contact the Communists and the latter also sent their agents to
Guangxi before and after the June 1 Movement.38 Under these circumstances, the Clique
learned a lot from the experience of the Communists.
However, the Clique was regarded at that time as having been the most important
opponent of Jiang since 1931, which was another reason for careful planning to implement
the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy. Indeed, each time Nanjing yielded to Japanese demands or
carried out some suspect policies and measures under Japanese pressure, Li and Bai always
stood in opposition. It was a vulnerable position because the supporters of Jiang found
excuses to criticize them as remnant warlords.39 For example, after the June 1 Movement
was launched, a newspaper suggested it to be a case of giving vent to personal spite.40 Li
and Bai must have anticipated this,41 for even before the movement, they had foreseen the
many difficulties ahead. As Li himself pointed out, when the movement really began, they
had mounted a tiger and could not get off.42 The situation, however, propelled them
forward and, once committed, they had no choice but to follow wherever it led.

37
Zhongyang tongzhanpu and Zhongyang dangan guan (eds.), Zhonggong zhongyang
kangri tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1985, Vol. 2, pp. 108-41
(hereafter as Wenjian xuanbian).
38
Liu Zongrong, “Xi’an shibian de huiyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 49-56 (hereafter as
“Xi’an”); and the same author, “Huiyi wo zai Guixi gongzuo shi de jijianshi”, WSZLXJ,
No. 73 (1981), pp. 29-36. Also see Chen Dunde, Guigen - Li Zongren he Mao Zedong he
Zhou Enlai woshou, Beijing: JFJCBS, 1990, pp. 23-45.
39
See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, n.p., 1936; and
Anonymous, Liangguang panluan neimu, n. p., 1936.
40
Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p.3.
41
Huiji, pp. 4-8; and pp. 53-66.
42
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 307.

278
 The development of the movement indicated that the purpose of “bi-Jiang kangri”
was not easy to achieve. It quickly became apparent that the Clique and Chen Jitang had
underestimated the strength of the measures Jiang would take.
While the two Guang troops marched northward into Hunan, Jiang published a
series of telegrams and speeches in response. On the one hand, Jiang expressed his
sympathy with the anti-Japanese action of the Southwest; on the other, he emphasized such
action should be taken only in unity, that is, he declared that the Southwest should take
action only after Nanjing had made a firm decision to deal with the new Japanese
aggression.43 In this way, he hinted that the Southwest was doing what suited itself. In
addition, he sent some representatives to negotiate with the Southwest on future mutual
cooperative action against Japan.44 It seemed that Jiang was successful, because, under the
cover of these statements, he secretly and rapidly moved large numbers of the Central
troops to the borders of the two Guangs and its neighbouring provinces, and, as a result,
blocked the way of the two Guang troops marching northward.45
As stated earlier, before launching the movement, the Clique believed there would
be a positive response from people all over the nation once their action took place. Now
that the flag had been raised, however, the expected patriotic reaction did not appear, and
this was particularly evident in Hunan, the passageway through which the two Guang
troops would march. To enlist the sympathy and support of Hunan, the Clique, in fact,
even while the movement was being prepared, sent General Liu Fei to Changsha calling on
He Jian, ruler of Hunan province. He Jian expressed his support for this movement and
promised to join once the Guangxi troops arrived at Changsha. But this was merely an
empty promise. In fact, He Jian proved to be a double agent. He secretly reported to Jiang

43
For details of Jiang’s telegrams and speeches, see Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong
zhi renshi, pp. 29-36; and Jizhe, “Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24
(June 22, 1936). Also see “Fragments of newspaper cuttings in 1936”, Archives of the
Nationalist Government, Vol. 787, serial No. 919, in The Second History Archives of
China, Nanjing.
44
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 25, 1936.
45
Luo Ziwen, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian zhong He Jian wanlong liangmian shoufa”,
HNWSZLXJ, No. 5 (1963), pp. 185-91 (hereafter as ‘“He Jian”).

279
the action the Southwest would take.46 After the movement began and the Guangxi troops
entered Hunan on their northward march, the Clique sent General Li Pinxian, former
colleague of He Jian and now Chief of General Staff of the Guangxi troops, to Changsha to
discuss the same matter. Again, He Jian played the same trick. The Guangxi troops wasted
time on the Hunan border waiting for the promised action from He Jian but it did not
eventuate. Li Pinxian’s mission to Hunan failed.47 Instead, a large number of the Central
troops led by General Chen Cheng, the most trusted follower of Jiang, flooded into Hunan
and occupied Hengyang, the very important city and strategic point in southern Hunan. He
Jian soon joined Jiang to oppose the Southwest. Jiang had taken advantage of this
situation, at least in military terms. Under these circumstances, the Guangxi troops stopped
marching northward and were ordered to withdraw to the border of their home province to
show their sincerity in avoiding a fight with other Chinese troops as they had promised in
all their propaganda, because they did not want to provoke a civil war against Jiang.48
In fact, the delay had ruined a favourable chance for the Clique and Chen Jitang to
defeat Jiang if they had exploited the advantage they had. When the June 1 Movement was
launched, a good chance existed for the Southwestern leaders to gain an initial advantage
quickly by a swift move into Hunan. If, when they showed their hands and marched into
Hunan, they had gone in wholeheartedly and vigorously attacked Hengyang, they could
probably have taken it at once, as they had in 1930.49 Then a rapid advance on Changsha

46
Liu Tingfang, “Wo shuofu Jiang Jieshi xiansheng huajie yichang neizhan weiji - ji
liangguang shibian weiceng gongkai de yiduan neimu”, HNWSZL, No. 29 (1988), pp. 199-
206 (hereafter as “neimu”); and Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 289. Also see Shenbao,
15/6/1936, p. 9.
47
For details see Luo Ziwen, “He Jian”. Also see “The Major Events of the Week”, and
Jizhe, “Yue-Gui wenti zhi zhankai”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 24; Cheng Siyuan, “Wo suo
zhidao de Bai Chongxi”, XSLT, No. 4, 1987, p. 81, and Cheng Siyuan, Bai Chongxi zhuan,
Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1989, p. 187.
48
U. S. Military, No. 9408, (June 19, 1936). Also see “Li Zongren’s speeches on the
days of June 8, 13, 29”, and “Telegrams of Li Zongren and others on June 18 and 21”,
Huiji, pp. 1-9, and pp. 50-4.
49
For details of the occupation of Hengyang by the joint forces of the Clique and Zhang
Fakui’s “Ironside” in 1930, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-
jen, pp. 278-9; Zhang Dihai, “Zhang-Gui jun fan-Jiang zhong de Beiliu ji Hengyang
zhanyi”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 19, pp. 45-8; and Huang Shaohong, Wushi huiyi, Hangzhou:
Fengyun chubanshe, 1945, pp. 206-7.

280
would have given them an even chance of overrunning Hunan and perhaps drawing He Jian
into the camp of the Southwest. The possibility of success would have attracted to their
side all the many elements that were always ready in a Chinese civil war to rush to the aid
of the victor, and the action of He Jian later joining Jiang was just an example. With
Hunan in their possession, other provinces in Southwest and Northwest, particularly those
factions under the leadership of generals such as Liu Xiang of Sichuan province, Zhang
Xueliang and Yang Hucheng, leaders of both the Dongbeijun (the Northeast Troops) and
the Xibeijun (the Northwest Troops) now stationed in Shaanxi province, could have been
counted on,50 and Jiangxi province, which was under the firm control of Jiang, directly
threatened. Such a situation could have made their chances of success rosy, for Jiang could
not have counted on any help from the provinces of Shandong, Hebei and Shaanxi, where
the Clique also had sent representatives and asked them to join and support its side. These
factions also had made positive response to the movement, although secretly.51 But,
instead of pushing ahead and putting it to the test, as soon as they crossed the Hunan border
earlier in June, the Guangxi troops sat down in expectation of He Jian’s participation in the
movement and later in dismay as their concern grew about a civil war when Jiang’s troops
rushed into Hunan. The Southwest undoubtedly made two serious miscalculations, i.e. it
overestimated the active response of other groups and parties to its policies and it
underestimated the speed and force of Jiang's measures against the movement. Although
Zhang and Yang as well as Liu Xiang had made certain plans which coincided with the
action of the Southwest, they could not carry out these plans once the troops of the two
Guangs remained their northward march and stayed at their home borders.52 Immediately
the two Guang armies stopped, Hunan at once began to fill up with Jiang’s troops. The

50
For details of Liu Xiang’s active response to the June 1 Movement and his coincidental
action with the Clique, see Chapter Five of the thesis; also see Qiao Cheng and Yang
Xuyun, Liu Xiang, Beijing: HXCBS, 1987, pp. 193-6. The detailed actions of Yang and
Zhang will be accounted for in the following section.
51
See Huiji, p. 29; and Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang yu Xi’an shibian, Beijing: ZHSJ,
1980, p. 75 (hereafter as Zhang Xueliang).
52
For details of these actions, see Liu Zongrong, “Xi’an”. The reasons for the failure of
implementation of these plans worked out by Yang Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang will be
further discussed in the following section.

281
chance had been lost, and the tide at once turned against them.53 The result was contrary to
their expectations, and by hesitating, they had put themselves in a dangerous situation and
were forced to expend a great deal of energy to escape and recover lost ground.
Would the Southwestern leaders, particularly Li and Bai who were always
considered to be the best Chinese militarists and commanders, not have known the chance
which they were missing? I think they would have known. One reason for missing this
chance might be that, according to Joseph Stilwell early in 1936, they did not want civil
war, but if war came they would take every chance it offered to protect and improve the
position of the Southwest provinces.54 In my opinion, another possible answer was the
positive response from the Red Army.55 Although there is no corroborative evidence to
indicate that a practically cooperative action existed between the Clique and the Red Army,
the tactics carried out by the latter during their Eastern Expedition, such as the use of the
political propaganda of resistance to serve their march eastward through Shanxi, averting a
crucial military clash with the strong Central Army, might have influenced the Clique to
take similar action.56 Moreover, the statement and manifesto of the CCP coinciding with
the action of the Southwest might have encouraged the Clique in their hope that a wide
positive response to their action would soon spread throughout the country. The Clique
also contacted the Communist branches in both Hong Kong and Tianjin before and after the
launching of the movement.57 However, regardless of their possible hopes, it was wise of
the Clique to make the decision to withdraw the troops to the border of Guangxi in order to
avoid a civil war. Under these circumstances, the Clique’s action indicated that it insisted

53
Joseph Stilwell also had the same opinion when the Southwest authorities ordered the
two Guang troops to stop on the Hunan border, failing to take advantage of the chance to
defeat Jiang’s troops. See U. S. Military, No. 9446 (July 31, 1936).
54
U. S. Military, No. 9271 (January 13, 1936).
55
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 161-164.
56
Ibid, pp. 108-41.
57
Ibid, pp. 161-4. For details of the Clique’s contact with the CCP, see Yun Guangying,
“‘Liuyi yundong’ qianhou wodang zai Nanning huodong de pianduan”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9,
pp. 45-8 (hereafter as “Liuyi”); Chen Dunde, Guigen, pp. 9-10, and pp. 23-48; and
Zhonggong Guangxi Zhuangzu zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi ziliao zhengji weiyuanhui
(ed.), Zhonggong Guangxi dangshi dashiji, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1989, pp. 98-100
(hereafter as Dashiji).

282
on the policy of “bi-Jiang kangri” rather than that of overthrowing Jiang only. The
withdrawal also clearly indicated their purpose focused more on Japanese aggression than
on fighting Jiang, for there is no evidence to suggest the Guangxi troops were engaged in a
battle.
The Clique seems to have badly underestimated the impact of the power of
censorship by Nanjing, as a result of which their voice hardly spread outside the Southwest.
While it is true that the policies of the Southwest appeared to be sound and to meet the
needs of the time, theirs was a “difang” (regional) voice, which worked to the detriment of
both Guangxi and Guangdong. The Jiang group could freely use the mass media they
controlled to condemn the whole movement as part of a Japanese conspiracy, and as a
regional rebellion against the central government backed by the Japanese; it moreover
banned all newspapers in their territory from printing the opinions of the Clique and the
Southwest (as discussed earlier). They criticized the movement as a disruptive element
hindering the plan of the Central Government in preparing for resistance.58 Further, Jiang
organised all his subordinate generals and other factions and associations to issue circular
telegrams in opposition to the Southwest. Through this, a campaign of fear and distrust
against the Southwest, particularly the Clique, was influential in forming public opinion.59
The Southwest was placed in a negative position.60 In this way, Jiang cleverly guided
public opinion, and successfully transformed the Southwest's demands for resistance into a
regional quarrel with Nanjing, that is to say, a regional revolt against the centre.61
Moreover, Jiang was able to manipulate the mass media to convert this quarrel between the
Centre and the region into one of contradictions between region only, i.e. between
Guangdong and Guangxi, or even one of internal dissension within Guangdong itself

58
See, for example, Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong de renshi; and Anonymous,
Liangguang panluan neimu. In fact, the Nanjing Government did carry out some measures
in preparing for resistance against Japan. For details see Le Jiaqing and Jiang Tianying,
“Ping kangzhan qianxi Guomindang Nanjing zhengfu de kangri zhunbei”, FDXB, No. 5,
1987.
59
Huiji, pp. 28-9; and “‘Liuyi’ yulun yiban”, Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi
yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 268-71. Also see “1936 nian jianbao shanpian”,
Archives of the Nationalist Government, Nanjing.
60
See “1936 nian jianbao shanpian”.
61
See Anonymous, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi, pp. 29-34.

283
only.62 Jiang no doubt realized that he could not overtly deny the demands of the
Southwest for resistance; he could not overtly suppress their actions, as these demands and
actions were ultimately justified by events and were an expression of a good deal of
Chinese public opinion. Instead of a military clash with the Southwest, he therefore elected
to use the mass media, by condemning the suspect contacts of the Clique with the Japanese
to create the image of a treasonable and devious Southwest leadership.63 Following the
apparent initial success of the above measures, Jiang announced that the Second Plenum of
the 5th Central Executive and Supervisory Committees of the GMD was scheduled to be
held in Nanjing in July. He stated that vital decisions would be made at that session.
Through this tactic, he won time to complete his plans to deal with the movement, while
leaving the Clique and the Southwest in limbo.
Faced with this unfavourable situation, the Southwest was placed in a passive
position. Under the pressure of Jiang's counter-measure, the Southwest was obliged to
explain their aim as one of asking Nanjing and Jiang Jieshi to take the lead in resistance,
and the Clique had to fall back on the policy of “bi-Jiang kangri” and to disclaim their
personal purpose of achieving Jiang's downfall.64 Their original scheme having led them
into the trap that Jiang had set for them, the only thing that the Southwest could do to
escape from this was to continue to express the need to resist Japan and force Jiang to
commence the war against Japan. Thus, the policy of “bi-Jiang kangri” gained emphasis as
a result of the developing situation.
First, the Clique and Chen Jitang worked energetically to break the blockade of
Jiang’s censorship and to refute the criticism from Nanjing,65 then to draw sympathy for

62
Giu Guo Sh Bao, October 8, 1936.
63
In fact, Dui liangguang yidong zhi renshi and Liangguang panluan neimu, two
confidential documents of Nanjing published in June 1936, have clearly indicated this
purpose and the measures used against the movement.
64
For details of propaganda used in the Guangxi Clique’s policies towards Japanese
aggression and urging Nanjing to take the leadership of fighting Japan, see Huiji, pp. 49-66.
65
See Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 291-2. Also see “‘Liuyi’ yulun yiban”, in Nanning
Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.

284
their anti-Japanese stand through increased numbers of circular telegrams as well.66 For
example, Chen Jitang further stated the aim of their action to the mass media in mid-June:
We have also requested Chiang Kai-shek to assume the leadership of our armies
and to lead the way across the Yellow River. But our wire (telegram) has not been
answered. We do not care through what provinces the route lies. Any way that will
lead northward will be agreeable.67
At the same time, Li and Bai continually and frequently telegraphed to Jiang urging him to
lead the resistance. No doubt, all of these were published through the propaganda organs of
the Clique and those which supported it.68 For example, in a circular telegram to Jiang on
June 29, Bai said that he would personally command the Guangxi troops in the field to
follow the former in fighting Japan if Jiang would resolutely lead a national resistance;
furthermore, Bai claimed he would like to be a fighter or a “maqian xiaozu” (cat’s paw) of
Jiang at the front.69 Here the Guangxi leaders clearly sent a message to Jiang, i.e. if he
cared to fight Japan, his leadership would be recognized by his most important rival. This
was an expression of the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy. Moreover, in their telegrams to other
Nanjing leaders, Li and Bai as well as Chen Jitang repeatedly asked them to push Jiang to
proclaim immediately a war against Japan to save the nation.70 Meanwhile, they warned
Jiang that he would shoulder the responsibility of civil war if it really occurred, as he had
not used the Central Army which was stationed in the front line of the provinces close to
North China to resist Japan but had moved them down to South China in order to wipe out
the forces whose one desire was to fight Japan. They gave Jiang dubious praise by
claiming he was “brave in civil war but nervous in resisting foreign aggression”.71 In fact,
it became a “telegram war” between the two sides. This term enunciates a characteristic of
the June 1 Movement. In this way, each side attempted to justify its actions with good
excuses.

66
For details of these telegrams, see Huiji, pp. 49-101.
67
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”
68
For details of these telegrams, see Huiji. Also see Guangxi gejie kangri jiuguo
lianhehui (ed.), Duiri kangzhan de qiantu, Nanning, July 1936.
69
Huiji, p. 57.
70
Ibid, pp. 60-6.
71
Ibid, p. 52.

285
 The Clique also used their regional mass media and organized political propaganda
teams to go to the countryside to enlist the support of the people of Guangxi and to inspire
patriotism for national salvation and resentment against Nanjing's non-resistance.72 In the
local region this was quite successful. For example, Zhao Biyun, a girl student of the
middle school at that time, in explanation of her reasons for joining the Student Army
Corp, stated that her motives came from the long-term patriotic education in resisting Japan
and national salvation that she had had since her primary school, and from her discontent
with Jiang's non-resistance against foreign aggression but military suppression of anti-
Japanese forces at home.73 Even in the small villages, a journalist found such propaganda
slogans as “Down with Japanese Imperialism” and “We Will Be Slaves Without A Nation
If (Jiang Jieshi, or Nanjing) Still Maintains Non-Resistance”.74 At the same time, the
Clique used other mass media sponsored by some minority groups and parties located in
Hong Kong and the Shanghai Concession to support their policy and action.75 They also
sent several senior members of the Southwest authorities to Nanjing to attend the Second
Plenum in July. To strengthen their propaganda campaign, they submitted to the Plenum
five proposals relating to the resistance. These proposals included: 1) immediate
declaration of breaking off relations with Japan; 2) the abrogation of all Sino-Japanese
treaties signed under duress after the “September 18 Incident”; 3) immediate prevention of
the increase of the Japanese troops in North China by military force; 4) the guarantee and
support of the freedom of the people's patriotic speech and movement; and 5) the national
general mobilization for resistance against Japan under the leadership of the Central

72
For details of the Clique’s practice in propaganda, see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12
(September 1936); and Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”. Also, Nanning
minguo ribao published many articles and reports during the June 1 Movement.
73
Zhao Biyun, “Wo de juexin” (My Determination), CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
74
Zhujiang ribao, 9 June 1937.
75
Zhonghua minguo guomin geming kangri jiuguojun disi jituanjun zongsilingbu
zongzhengxunchu (ed.), Xi’nan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, August
1936; and “Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 255-279.

286
Government.76 In a word, they wanted to use all legal forms in furthering the policy of
forcing Nanjing to fight Japan.
To a considerable extent, this propaganda helped the Clique to consolidate its image
as a firm anti-Japanese group, and won sympathy and support of all other parties and
groups which themselves had insisted on resistance.77 One hundred and fifty-six Huangpu
officers headed by Generals Li Xinjun and Lai Gang lodged a petition with Jiang urging
their “xiaozhang” (principal) to fight Japan instead of suppressing the anti-Japanese
forces.78 Most of these officers later joined Guangxi.79 Even some units of the Central
Army, such as the 51st Division and 77th Division at that time stationed in Hunan and
Jiangxi separately, turned to support the Southwest in June, as they were discontented with
Jiang’s policy of suppressing the anti-Japanese forces, even though these rebels were soon
put down and disarmed by Jiang after their uprising.80
Furthermore, the Clique worked to strengthen the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance.
Only the existence of this alliance could force Jiang to be conciliatory with them and
eventually accept their demands. The two Guang troops allied themselves with Cheng
Jitang as Commander in Chief and Li Zongren as Deputy in late June.81 To maintain the

76
Huiji, pp. 110-115.
77
See comments of Ma Xiangbo, in Nanning minguo ribao, May 1936; and U. S.
Military, No. 9423 (July 3, 1936); and Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai zizhuan, Harbin:
HLJRMCBS, 1982, pp. 443-4. In his memoirs, T. G. Li also states that the reason for his
heading to Guangxi from Paris in the summer of 1936 for participation of the anti-Japanese
movement was that he “was enthusiastic about joining them in China’s coming struggle
against the Japanese invader”. See T. G. Li, A China Past: Military and Diplomatic
Memoirs, Lanham: University Press of America, 1989, p. 46.
78
CYGL, No. 2 (July 5, 1936), p. 1. Huangpu officers refer to those who graduated from
the Huangpu Military Academy and held posts in different levels of the Central Army
under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi. Jiang had been Principal of the Huangpu Military
Academy since its establishment in 1924.
79
Lai Huipeng, “‘Liuyi’ shibian jieshu qianhou xin Guixi anpai fashe de liangzhi
lengjian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 152-60. Lai himself was one of these officers, including
Li Xinjun and Lai Gang, defected from Jiang Jieshi.
80
Giu Guo Sh Bao, June 30, 1936; and Huiji, p. 42.
81
Guangzhou minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936; and Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.),
Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, Guangzhou: Guangdong Provincial Archives, 1985, pp. 366-74;
Nanning minguo ribao, July 16, 17, 1936.

287
confidence of Chen in the action, the Clique even planned to send large numbers of
Guangxi troops to Guangdong to strengthen defence of the province and to prevent any
possible attack from Jiang's troops.82
The counter-measures of the Southwest seemed to have little effect on Jiang,
however, although he refused the proposals of the Southwest, he made a statement on
foreign policy at the Second Plenum on July 13, in which he explained his attitude towards
resistance:
To protect China’s sovereign and territorial integrity is the basic principle of the
Central Government in handling its diplomatic affairs. Any infringement upon
China’s sovereign and territorial integrity by any foreign nation will drive her to the
last extremity, and then she will make the inevitable sacrifice. To be more plain, if
any foreign power should compel us to sign an agreement for the recognition of
"Manzhouguo", the time will then have come when we will not suffer any longer
and when we will make our last sacrifice.83
Although this statement might be an effort to save face for his past impotence in restraining
Japanese aggression, and although it still did not answer the question “when will China
fight?”, as Joseph Stilwell comments,84 it provided a clear explanation of the term “last
sacrifice” which Jiang had used at the 5th Guomindang Congress held the previous
November.85 The Clique and Chen Jitang had at least compelled him to go to the stage of
proclaiming resistance, even if Jiang was still only at the point of paying lip service to it.
Nevertheless, the Guangdong-Guangxi alliance collapsed in mid-July, partly as
Jiang took his customary efficient measures to destroy it by using the successful “silver
bullets policy” to buy Guangdong generals to defect from Chen Jitang. In addition he
rapidly concentrated about fifteen divisions in Hunan, twelve in Jiangxi, seven in Fujian
and eight in Guizhou, a force considerably superior to that of the two Guangs. The first
sign of an impending break-up was the desertion of several fliers of the Guangdong air

82
Chen Siyuan, “Wo suo zhidao de Bai Chongxi”, XSLT, No. 4, 1987, p. 82, and p. 84;
and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 17.
83
Qin Xiaoyi (ed.), Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian - duiri kangzhan shiqi:
xubian (III), Taipei: Guomindang zhongyang weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiuhui, 1981, pp. 666-
7.
84
U. S. Military, No. 9439 (July 17, 1936), p. 4.
85
GMWX, Vol. 76, p. 25.

288
force,86 and then General Yu Hanmou, Commander of the 1st Guangdong Army and a
leader of less importance than Chen Jitang in the Guangdong army, declared himself
against the whole movement. From then on defections increased by leaps and bounds, and
every lukewarm element hastened to leave the sinking ship. The result was that all
Guangdong troops, including air force and navy, betrayed Chen Jitang and changed their
loyalty to Jiang after the latter had spent several million dollars.87 Chen reluctantly left
Guangdong on July 18 and headed overseas for a “study of foreign affairs”, an excuse for
saving his face. Guangdong was finally taken over by Jiang’s troops. Li returned to
Guangxi on the same day. Encouraged by this success, Jiang tried to take advantage of the
occasion to wipe out the Clique and move his rivals, both Li and Bai, away from the
province. As a result, the centre of the movement was transferred into Guangxi.
There is little doubt that the Clique put its anti-Japanese policy into practice in the
June 1 Movement, with “bi-Jiang kangri” as its concrete form, and that the movement
reflected the common demand of most people. As was pointed out at that time, “in making
the demand on Nanking to resist Japan, Canton (i.e. the Southwest) is not only speaking for
itself, but is actually expressing the sentiment of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese

86
See Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, Hong Kong: ZCCBS, 1966, pp. 75-80; and
Guangdong sheng dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, p. 419.
87
The defection of the Guangdong officers was not only caused by Jiang’s silver bullet
policy but also the result that Chen Jitang distrusted his subordinate commanders,
according to Li Jiezhi, a senior commander of the Guangdong troops. Li claims that at that
time they did not believe that Chen could lead them to defeat Jiang’s army which was
marching to Guangdong and besieged this province from Hunan, Jiangxi and Fujian. They
also suffered heavily from rumours throughout Guangdong and even outside of the
province that Chen had made some secret deals with the Japanese when he joined forces
with the Guangxi Clique to launch the June 1 Movement. Li Jiezhi adds, they deeply
believed that the movement served the Guangxi Clique’s own purposes only. As a result,
in their view, Guangdong would be a scapegoat of the Clique. See Guangdong sheng
dangan guan (ed.), Chen Jitang yanjiu ziliao, pp. 414-20. Certainly, some evidences from
materials mentioned above may support all these claims. In fact, reasons for the defection
of these Guangdong generals are various. Namely, it was a result of the mixture of
personal, economic, political reasons and so on. For details of the defection of the
Guangdong generals in the Movement, see Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs
of Li Tsung-jen, p. 308; Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, pp. 75-80; and Lin Hu, “Xi’an shibian
shi Jiang Jieshi xiang liyong wo dao Chen Jitang de yimu”, GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 164-8;
Cheng Siyuan, “Liangguang shibian”, GXWSZL, No. 22; Chen Cheng, “Liangguang liuyi
shibian chuli jingguo”, ZJWX, Vol. 53, No. 3; Kan Zonghua, “Chen Jitang, Li Zongren,
Bai Chongxi fadong liangguang liuyi shibian jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1.

289
people.”88 Although Jiang put enormous pressure on his opponents, his action provided
them with a motive for practicing the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy more positively and clearly.
When the movement suffered heavy setbacks such as the fall of Chen Jitang in
Guangdong, how did the Clique deal with this crisis and would Li and Bai continue the
course which they had pursued in their propaganda?

The Attempt to Establish A Broad-Based Anti-Japanese National United Front

There were two options available to the Clique after Chen’s collapse in the
movement. One was to abandon their action and surrender to Jiang without preconditions.
But, in so doing, the result would justify the image promoted by the Jiang group that the
movement was selfish. This was what the Clique strove to avoid.89 Another option was to
continue the movement, even if they failed in the end, so that the nature of the movement
they engaged in would be confirmed as that of determined resistance against Japan, not for
themselves, but in terms of their policy and their demands.90 If so, the result would be
beneficial to the reputation of the Clique, to the saving of face and to the maintenance of
their notable history in the GMD. Their resistance could still make them heroes, as Cai
Tingkai and his 19th Route Army had become in Shanghai in 1932. Obviously, the second
option coincided with the policies of the Clique and was more easily accepted by it. Under
these circumstances, Nanning, capital of Guangxi, became the centre of practising the “bi-
Jiang kangri” policy, which brought the June 1 Movement into the second phase.
If Jiang had now kept his promise made to Huang Xuchu in the previous year, he
would have reached reconciliation and cooperation with the Clique in July 1936 instead of
September, in order to unite other groups within the GMD earlier and to concentrate more
energy on dealing with Japanese aggression. If this had happened, the movement would
have been already completed. Such an opportunity actually existed at that time.91 Before
he drove Chen out of Guangdong, Jiang stated at the Second Plenum that he and the

88
Hansu Chan, “Civil Strife or Anti-Japanese War?”
89
Wei Yongcheng, “Zaitan ‘liuyi yundong’”, ZJWX, Vol. 37, No. 1, p. 56.
90
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 293-4.
91
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 309.

290
Nanjing Government would maintain the status quo of Guangxi. However, perhaps the fall
of Chen added to Jiang's confidence and determination to eliminate the Clique and also
provided more excuses to the Jiang group to criticize this most dangerous political rival
within the GMD. Perhaps Jiang adopted the suggestion of his political adviser Xiong
Shihui (Chairman of the Provincial Government of Jiangxi at that time) that this was the
right time to finally settle scores with Li and Bai in Guangxi.92 At the same time, his
subordinate generals, particularly those young officers originating from the Huangpu
Military Academy (Huangpu junxiao), were even more radical and keen to “teach a lesson”
to this opponent.93 Therefore, Jiang altered his original decision and ordered Li to Nanjing
as a member of the Standing Committee of the Military Affairs Council and Bai to
Zhejiang as governor of the provincial government. These were high positions, but actually
without any power. To force both Li and Bai to leave Guangxi, Jiang even strengthened his
forces in the encirclement of the province with over 400,000 troops, including those of
Guangxi’s former ally - the Guangdong troops now under the command of General Yu
Hanmou. In addition, Jiang tried to divide the Clique with the same tactics employed to
subvert Chen Jitang. There is evidence that along with his successful occupation of
Guangdong, Jiang sent millions of dollars in “silver bullets” over the Guangxi border.94
However, Jiang’s efforts were in vain. He also underestimated the power and the
internal consolidation of his rival. All of his efforts in both military blockade and his
“silver bullets” campaign failed. On the contrary, these inspired the Clique and the people
in Guangxi to greater efforts for consolidation of themselves and insistence on their
previous demands and policy. Within a few days the provincial defence force had
expanded from fourteen to forty-four regiments and the militia was reorganized, ready to

92
Ibid. Other sources show that the idea came from Yang Yongtai, Chairman of the
Hubei Provincial Government, and senior member of the Political Studies Faction of
Nanjing. See Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 294; and Cheng Siyuan, “Liangguang shibian”, p.
54. Xiong was also a senior member of the “Political Studies Faction”.
93
For details see Luo Ziwen, “He Jian”. Also see Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No.
126 (October 1, 1962), p. 14.
94
U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).

291
engage in battle with Jiang’s troops.95 In the judgement of Joseph Stilwell, “at a
conservative estimate Kwangsi could put 1,000,000 men in the field, - poorly armed and
equipped, it is true, but fairly good soldiers as Chinese go.”96 Only the militia of Guangxi
was an inestimable force. Stilwell emphasized in a report,
Aside from her regular troops, Kwangsi depends for defence upon a large well
drilled militia which is spread over the entire province and difficult to estimate, but
it is believed that more than 100,000 could be mobilized and equipped without
great difficulty.97
It seemed that the people of Guangxi became deeply involved in support of their
leaders and the Clique, because they commonly regarded Jiang and his government as a
more fierce and dangerous opponent and they were determined not to allow Jiang’s
influence to enter Guangxi.98 Indeed, according to Stilwell, “there is an air of great
enthusiasm all over the province. No objection could be heard anywhere to the policies
which are being followed by the provincial authorities.”99 The Guangxi people made an
anti-Japanese pledge to support their leaders and urged the Clique to continue with its
policy. There were even many examples of taking an oath in public meetings to follow the
pledge throughout the entire province.100 Such a consolidation welded the province into a
force which could counter an attack by Jiang’s troops. Under these circumstances, Jiang
had to modify his projected measures against the movement.
In continuing the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy and countering possible attacks by Jiang
at this stage, the Clique also sought to maintain and strengthen its contacts with other
parties and groups who were willing to fight Japan. That is to say, they had put the AJNUF
into action during the movement. Its theoretical foundation derived from the scorched earth
resistance policy (as discussed earlier). In their view, once the movement for resisting

95
The Guangxi forces were expanded to 200,000 soldiers and reorganized in twenty-one
divisions, which was a powerful force Jiang Jieshi could not underestimate. For details of
the systems and organization of the Guangxi troops during the movement, see Appendix 4.
96
U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
97
Ibid, No. 9426 (July 3, 1936).
98
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 310.
99
U. S. Military, No. 9348 (May 5, 1936).
100
Nanning minguo ribao, September 2, 1936, p. 1.

292
Japan was launched, all parties and groups throughout the country, whatever differences in
political belief held, had a duty to China to form a firm united front to strive for national
liberation. Nanning minguo ribao repeatedly discussed this issue and loudly called for it
during the movement.101 They believed such a movement should obtain broad support.102
There were several steps taken by the Clique in the formation of a wide anti-
Japanese united front. First, Guangxi protected freedoms of speech and the press in
contrast to Nanjing’s restriction of speech and movement that was anti-Japanese. Aside
from the areas under the control of the CCP, Guangxi might claim to be the only place
where anti-Japanese propaganda and mass demonstrations were not interferred by the
government under the flag of the GMD before 1936.103 For example, Chuangjin yuekan
(Pioneer Monthly), organ of the Guangxi troops, even published some speeches and theses
of Karl Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and other popular international Communist politicians, whose
names often appeared in publications of the CCP.104 The Clique used them to serve their
own propaganda, or, perhaps these came from its Brains Trust who were familiar with the
Communist doctrine (as dealt with earlier), as this journal in 1936 was calling for the
formation of the AJNUF to fight Japan. Whatever the underlying reason, there was
projected a generous attitude towards the mass media on the part of the Clique. Shen
Junru, a well-known figure throughout the country at that time, and his organization, i.e. the
Federation of the National Salvation Associations (quanguo gejie jiuguohui), expressed
appreciation of this practice,105 which was perhaps the reason for the participation of his

101
For example, see Nanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, August 16, 1936, October 14,
1936. Also see CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
102
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127 (Oct. 16, 1962), p. 16.
103
See “Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai
Chongxi de yanlun, p. 269; Jiuwang qingbao (Newsletter of National Salvation), July 26,
1936; and Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan shiqi guogong hezuo jishi, Chongqing:
Chongqing chubanshe, 1992, Vol. 1, pp. 104-5 (hereafter as Kangzhan).
104
CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 9 (June 1936), pp. 1-5.
105
Meng Guanghan et al (eds.), Kangzhan, Vol. 1, pp. 98-109; and “Liuyi yulun yiban”,
in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi de yanlun, pp. 274-
279.

293
comrades and this popular organization in support of the June 1 Movement.106 Even
Western observers also recognized that freedom of speech and movement which was anti-
Japanese existed in Guangxi.107 In so doing, according to the Clique itself, it attempted to
achieve a united front in public opinion.108
As freedom of speech was a major concern of those other groups and parties at that
time, the practice of the Clique attracted much support in those sections of the dissident
media and propaganda organs which had suffered heavily under Jiang’s iron censorship.
All bodies concerned with the anti-Japanese cause were moved to assist the Clique in
countering the Jiang group’s criticism.109 Meanwhile, personalities and representatives of
all patriotic parties and groups rushed to Guangxi from all directions. In a short period
Guangxi became a medley of voices from various figures with different interests, speaking
for resistance or advocating opposition to Jiang, even seeking positions or ranks in both the
army and the government if an opposition government to Nanjing was to be set up there.110
Indeed, as the Fujian Rebellion before, these people were prepared to form a united
government to carry out their own policy of resistance against Japan, and to oppose Jiang as
well, if he still attempted to suppress the movement. A dangerous anti-Jiang atmosphere

106
For details of the relationship between the Guangxi Clique and the Federation of the
National Salvation Associations, see Chen Dawen, “Guixi yu jiuguohui de guanxi”,
NNWSZL, No. 5 (1988).
107
A. Bisson, Japan in China, New York: The Macmillam Company, 1938, p. 140.
108
Nanning minguo ribao, May 26, 1936, p. 3.
109
These organs included Dazhong ribao, Chaoran bao, Jiuwang qingbao, Yongsheng
Weekly, Giu Guo Sh Bao, and others published in the foreign concessions, Hong Kong, and
overseas. For details see Zhonghua minguo guomin gemingjun disi jituanjun zong silingbu
zong zhengxunchu (ed.), Xi’nan fadong kangri hou gefang zhi yulun, Nanning, 1936; and
“Liuyi yulun yiban”, in Nanning Gengsheng baoshe (ed.), Liuyi yundong hou Bai Chongxi
de yanlun.
110
These people were representatives of the following parties and groups: the Hu Hanmin
Faction, the Reorganization Faction, the Li Jishen Faction, the Federation of National
Salvation Associations and its branches in many provinces, the CCP, the former 19th Route
Army, Zhonghua minzu geming tongmeng (the Chinese National Revolutionary Coalition),
Shengchan renmindang (the Productive People’s Party), the Third Party, Zhonghua zhiye
jiaoyushe (the Chinese Professional Education Association), the Rural Reconstruction
Faction, the Chinese Youth Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and other public figures
without party affiliation. For details see Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, p. 295.

294
existed in Guangxi. Li and Bai were, of course, willing to encourage this even if they did
not expect it to culminate in a military clash with Jiang and his Central troops. According
to Liu Fei, who later became the person who carried the messages between the Guangxi
leaders and Jiang for a peaceful settlement of their differences in the movement, this was all
a tactic of Li and Bai to counter the pressure from Jiang.111 Whatever the reason, it
indicated that such a broad united front formed in Guangxi, at least partially, from aversion
to Jiang's high pressure policy against the Clique.
At the same time, the Clique strengthened its contact with the CCP in the
movement, to counter Jiang’s pressure and to plan for possible joint resistance. Apart from
frequent meetings between their representatives, there were permanent contacts both within
and outside the province.112 The most important result was a draft agreement worked out
with the CCP in forming an alliance for resistance and for forcing Jiang to resist Japan as
well.113 Although there is no corroborative evidence at present to show the detailed
contents of the entire agreement, the event itself indicated that the Clique paid great
attention to the CCP in their search for partners in concerted action. Here the CCP and the
Red Army were believed by the Guangxi leaders to be the most important force in
compelling Jiang to give up his plan of eliminating the Clique, but to accept the demands of
the latter. Furthermore, the former were regarded as a balanced force between the Clique
and Jiang, as Bai once foretold in 1934 when the Guangxi troops were ordered to check the
Red Army passing through the Guangxi border from Jiangxi for the Long March:114 “only

111
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 293-4.
112
See Yun Guangying, “Liuyi”; and the same writer, “Teshu shiming”, GMSZL, No. 10.
Yun was the representative of the Red Army under the CCP and came from northern
Shaanxi. Before the movement, the Clique sent its representative Liu Zongrong to Tianjin
to establish contact with the CCP. See Liu Zongrong, “Huiyi wo zai guixi gongzuo shi de
jijianshi”, WSZLXJ, No. 73.
113
See Wenjian xuanbian, pp. 278-9. For details of discussion of the agreement, see
Chapter Five of this thesis.
114
For details of the Guangxi troops' checking the Red Army coming from Jiangxi by
passing through the Guangxi border for Guizhou and then northward, see Zhonggong
Guilin diwei (ed.), Hongjun changzheng guo Guangxi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1986; Mo
Wenhua, Huiyi hongqijun, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1979; Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao
yanjiu weiyuanhui (ed.), Weizhui dujie hongjun changzheng qinli ji: yuan Guomindang
jiangling de huiyi, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1990; and recollections of Tang Yao and Yan
Daogang in the Bibliography of this thesis.

295
the existence of the CCP and the Red Army could guarantee our survival”.115 It is safe to
say that the establishment of close contact with the CCP undoubtedly added confidence to
the Clique in confronting Jiang, and was an important factor in reaching a final conciliation
with Jiang Jieshi and joint forces between them for resistance against Japan.
Furthermore, reorganization of the 19th Route Army in the province to form an
alliance with the Clique was another important counter-measure against Jiang.116 The
reputation of the 19th Route Army, won in fighting Japan in 1932, was legendary, and the
alliance between this army and the Guangxi troops indicated determination to resist further
invasion. This expanded strength added confidence to the Guangxi people, and was a
convincing warning to Jiang against military action.
While the Clique speeded up the formation of the AJNUF, a rumour spread
throughout the entire country that Li and Bai would unite with other parties and groups
which opposed Nanjing, and form a military government in Guangxi with the aim of
resistance against both Japan and Jiang.117 The choice of persons in the planning of such a
government, including Li Jishen and former leaders of the Fujian Rebellion, had in fact
been already prepared for.118 If Jiang pushed his Central troops further into the province of
Guangxi, the Clique would immediately declare the establishment of this new government
in Nanning. Of course, this was a tactic of the Clique. Once irrevocably committed to the
policy of calling for resistance, the Clique had to declare its intention to meet a real or

115
Tang Yao, “Hongjun changzheng zhong Bai Chongxi ‘kaifang’ Xiang-Gui bianjing de
neimu”, GXWSZL, No. 17, p. 162.
116
For details of the reorganization of the 19th Route Army, see Cai Tingkai, Cai Tingkai
zizhuan, pp. 441-6; and Lin Yiyuan, “Liangguang ‘liuyi’ shibian zhong shijiu lujun yidu
zai-Gui huifu de jingguo”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 3 (1961), pp. 150-5. This army was disarmed
by Jiang Jieshi after he defeated the Fujian Rebellion early in 1934. For details see Wang
Shunsheng et al, Fujian Shibian, Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1982; Xue Moucheng
and Zheng Quanbei (eds.), Fujian shibian ziliao xuanbian, Nanchang: Jiangxi renmin
chubanshe, 1983; Cai Tingkai, “Huiyi shijiu lujun zai-Min fan-Jiang shibai jingguo”,
WSZLXJ, No. 59; Jiang Guangnai, “Dui shijiu lujun yu ‘Fujian shibian’ de buchong”, ibid,
No. 59; and Xu Xiqing, “‘Fujian renmin zhengfu’ yundong”, GDWSZLXJ, No. 1 (1961).
117
Shenbao, June 13, 1936, p. 3.
118
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 295-302; and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, pp.
18-9.

296
invented public demand for the formation of a united government willing to fight Japan.119
Although this planned government was never established, it seemed that a united front for
national salvation had already appeared in Guangxi. According to the writers of the Clique,
the existence of a united front was proclaimed to act as a coalition against the Chinese
traitors’ front (hanjian zhenxian) which appeased Japanese aggression but suppressed the
internal elements and forces who wanted to fight Japan.120
Actual war between the two parties was finally averted when Jiang decided to
compromise with the Guangxi leaders. Perhaps Jiang had known that, if a civil war against
Guangxi occurred, it would be a prolonged one.121 If so, before he defeated the Clique,
Jiang would face another vital threat from the CCP, which was planning to form a similar
government as that planned in Guangxi by joining forces with both Yang Hucheng’s
Xibeijun and Zhang Xueliang’s Dongbeijun in the Northwest.122 If this happened, it was
possible that his rule would be shaken to its foundations. At the critical time, some GMD
veterans with potential influence in both military and political circles, such as Cheng Qian,
Feng Yuxiang, Zhu Peide, Ju Zheng, and Huang Shaohong, persuaded Jiang to compromise
with the Clique, and played the role of intermediary between the two sides.123 The Clique
had thus successfully used the consolidation of Guangxi and its influence in the practice of
the AJNUF, in fact, to form a threat strong enough to compel Jiang to sit down and to talk

119
For details see the discussions of Giu Guo Sh Bao at the end of 1935 and in the early
of 1936.
120
CJYK, Vol. 3, No. 12.
121
Huang Shaohong told Jiang that the Guangxi Clique would not be easy to defeat and
might resist an external attack for over three months or more according to historical
experience, and the morale of the Clique and consolidation of the interior, as well as the
varied topography of Guangxi. See Huang Shaohong, Wushi Huiyi, p. 310. Also see Yong
Sou (pseud., i.e. Zheng Renmin), “Jiang-Li diyici lihe neimu”, CQ, No. 62 (February 1,
1960), p. 5.
122
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 171-81.
123
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 296-302; Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of
Li Tsung-jen, p.310; Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19; and “Guiju dayou
zhuanji” (A favourable turn for the situation of Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 35; and
“Guiju heping jiejue jingguo” (The story of the peaceful settlement of the situation in
Guangxi), GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 37.

297
with Li and Bai.124 Showing his flexibility to seize the moment to compromise, Jiang
ordered all Central Government and Guangdong troops to withdraw fifty li125 from the
Guangxi border in order to avoid clashes, and the Guangxi leaders began to talk with their
old rival.126 After discussions between the two parties through Liu Fei and other politicians
and militarists, the main points of the terms that Li and Bai put forth to end their radical
action against Jiang instead of compromise with the latter are as follows:
1) The Central Government reaffirms the freedom of the anti-Japanese
movement, speech, publication, and assembly.
2) The Central Government promises that China will prepare for resistance
positively based on the present situation existing between China and Japan.
If the Japanese advance one more inch, China will carry out the nationwide
resistance. Once resistance begins, Guangxi will immediately send its
troops to join in.
3) Nanjing should make the anti-Japanese plan and schedule, and must carry it
out as soon as possible.
4) The status quo of Guangxi should be maintained and Nanjing should assist
the Guangxi troops with military expenditure.
5) Nanjing should provide three designations of the army (jun) to the Guangxi
troops and ensure Li Zongren’s commandership.
6) After the achievement of the agreement above, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi
will pledge allegiance to the leadership of Jiang Jieshi by a circular
telegram.127
In addition, except that item 3 above should be kept secret as military intelligence,
the Clique insisted that Jiang must announce these terms to the public by a speech to show
his trustworthiness. Although there was some small retrogression from their original
demand of immediate resistance, these terms still basically reflected the efforts of the
Clique in forcing Jiang to the stage of resistance, and showed that the Guangxi leaders were
realists in the Chinese political game - avoiding too drastic action to cause a result being

124
Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, p. 310.
125
One li = 500 meters.
126
For details that suggest Jiang Jieshi took action on his own initiative in peaceful
settlement of the differences between himself and the Guangxi leaders in August 1936, see
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-3; Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 296-302; and U. S.
Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936), and No. 9460 (September 11, 1936). Also see
Chongqing shi dangan guan (ed.), “Liangguang liuyi shibian hou Jiang Jieshi yu Li Zongren
deng laiwang handian”, LSDA, No. 4, 1987, pp. 75-9 (hereafter as “Handian”).
127
Liu Fei, “Liangguang”, pp. 297-8; and Chen Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 91-4; and
Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ, No. 127, p. 19.

298
contrary to their original intention. It also indicated that the achievements of the practice in
the AJNUF was in fact a tactic used by the Clique to force a compromise with Jiang. In
the end, the latter adopted all terms demanded by the former in early September.128
Moreover, to show his willingness to unite all other political figures of the GMD, for
resistance, Jiang even ordered the wanted circular on Generals Li Jishen and Chen Mingshu
to be repealed, and pardoned them for having fomented the Fujian Rebellion in 1933 and
for having insisted on resisting Japan and opposing Jiang (i.e. kangri fan-Jiang) after
this.129
The result of the June 1 Movement indicates that, in most respects the Clique
achieved its objectives of “bi-Jiang kangri”. A number of writers suggest that the success
of the Clique in the promotion of the AJNUF was largely due to the CCP.130 However, the
development of modern Chinese history indicates that the formation of the AJNUF was a
reflection of the context, a requirement which many parties and groups, not the CCP only,
had called for from time to time. It is true that the CCP worked out the famous slogan -
“anti-Japanese national united front” - in 1935, which led this party not only to survive at
the eleventh hour but also to strengthen itself in the Sino-Japanese war until it successfully
overthrew the rule of the Nationalists on the mainland in 1949.131 There is no
corroborative evidence to show any close affinity with the CCP in the actions of the Clique,
even though both advocated similar policies but different tactics. For example, both of
them pushed for the formation of a united government or a national defence government for
resistance.132 In fact, the positions and policies of all parties and groups who insisted on
resistance against Japan were influenced by each other. In the case of the June 1

128
See “The major events of the week”, GWZB, Vol. 13, No. 38, p. 1.
129
U. S. Military, No. 9458 (August 28, 1936).
130
For example, see articles written by Wang Jingxia, Zhang Qi, Shi Shunjin, Luo
Yunshu, Li Ming, Lu Jiaxiang, Guo Xiaohe, Luo Jianing, Gu Guanlin, Cao Yuwen, Cao
Guangzhe, Chen Mingzhong, Li Jingzhi, Zhang Meiling, Zhang Guangchuan, Xia Chao,
Wang Qingshan and Deng Xueyi, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
131
For detailed discussion of the CCP’s road to the final victory based on the AJNUF, see
Kui-Kwong Shum, Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National
United Front, 1935-1945, Hong Kong and London: Oxford University Press, 1988.
132
For details of these discussions of the Clique, see CJYK, Vol. 3, Nos. 8 and 9, 11-12.

299
Movement, the work of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF was, to a great extent, on
their own initiative. The CCP preferred at that time to form a national united front with the
lower and middle classes in resisting both Japan and Jiang (fan-Jiang kangri).133 The result
of the movement indicated that reconciliation or unity with Jiang for resistance had been
the purpose of the Clique in the formation of the AJNUF, i.e. “bi-Jiang kangri”, although
preparation for “fan-Jiang kangri” proceeded during the movement, in case Jiang refused
reconciliation. The Clique always treated Jiang as an important element of the AJNUF.
This was perhaps a stance which suited their propaganda, for both the Clique and Jiang
were always more likely to compromise than Jiang and the CCP. As Li Zongren said on
June 8, 1936,
If the Central Government resists Japan, of course it is the fortune of our nation,
because we are willing to unite all of the people for fighting Japan with one mind.
If now they still hesitate, we simply must resist Japan by ourselves.134
The performance of the Clique in the Sino-Japanese War proved that Li and the Guangxi
troops not only put forth the political rhetoric for resistance themselves but also put it into
execution.135 As Diana Lary emphasizes, while fighting in central China, the Guangxi
troops “acquitted themselves well - far better than the majority under Nanking’s
command”136 throughout the War.
It was also a factor that the Clique, from 1931 onward, strove to build up and
develop its relationships and cooperation with other GMD factions, in particular, with those
of the Southwest region (as discussed in Chapter Five), in order to foster resistance to the
Japanese.
The Clique's AJNUF served the purpose of “bi-Jiang kangri”, which was the key to
all parties and groups who later came under Jiang’s leadership for resistance, whether they
were willing or not. In this sense, the AJNUF of the Clique was beneficial to resistance,
whatever the motive. Many writers recognize that the Clique practiced the policy of “bi-

133
For details of speeches and resolutions of the CCP in the formation of a national
united front for “fan-Jiang kangri”, see Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 1-166.
134
Li Zongren, “Kangri jiuguo de zhengzhi baogao”, in Meng Guanghan et al (eds.),
Kangzhan, p. 291.
135
Cheng Siyuan, Zhenghai mixin, pp. 155-156.
136
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 206.

300
Jiang kangri” in the movement, but they attribute it to the influence and collusion of the
CCP, or believe it was only with the assistance of the Communists.137 However, that was
not the case.
CCP documents before the June 1 Movement emphasized the “anti-Japanese and
opposition to Jiang” policy as their main task, although they called for a national united
front. Theoretically, this united front was based on a national defence government in which
the CCP would be the main force. In this policy, the national united front was part of the
general tactics to achieve its purpose. The CCP believed the June 1 Movement was one of
the “kangri taoni” (resisting both Japan and traitors), i.e. “kangri fan-Jiang”. For example,
in a telegram on May 20, 1936, the CCP leaders still emphasized that the single and central
task of the party at present was to oppose both Japanese imperialism and Jiang.138 On May
31, the CCP stated that its task in the two Guangs was to promote Li immediately to carry
out programs of “kangri fan-Jiang” in the sphere of Guangxi.139 In other words, there is no
corroborative evidence that the CCP had changed its policy to that of “bi-Jiang kangri”,
before the June 1 Movement.
Further, while it is true that the CCP sent its representative Yun Guangying to
Guangxi during the movement, Yun left the base of the Red Army in northern Shaanxi late
in June, and stayed in Tianjin for a short period. He could not have arrived in Nanning
until early in August 1936.140 He may have passed some CCP messages to the Guangxi
leaders, but the CCP and the Red Army had not completely changed their policy before he
left, while the Clique had already carried out the policy in the province before his arrival.
At the very least, these messages could have had no influence on the Clique's policy which
had already been put into practice; but it is possible that they ensured the Red Army support

137
For details of this view in the relevant articles, see Cao Guangzhe, Cao Yuwen, Chen
Mingzhong, Gu Guanlin, Guo Xiaohe, Luo Jianing, Li Jingzhi, Li Ming, Lu Jiaxiang, Luo
Yunshu, Wang Jingxia, Shi Shunjin, Wang Jianqiu, Zhang Qi, Wang Qingshan, Deng
Xueyi,Zhang Guangchuan, Zhang Meiling and so on, in the Bibliography of this thesis.
138
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 148.
139
Dashiji, p. 97.
140
For details of dates when Yun arrived at Nanning, see Yun Guangying, “Liuyi”.

301
for the action of the Clique, because the Communists saw it as an action which could cause
a split within the GMD bloc, according to Mao Zedong’s speech on June 8.141
On the contrary, there is evidence to indicate that the Clique’s practice in “bi-Jiang
kangri” provided an example which caused the Communists to modify their policy. The
most important evidence is a secret telegram issued by Mao Zedong and other CCP leaders
on September 1, 1936. The telegram clearly expressed the view that they should modify
their present policy (i.e. “kangri fan-Jiang”) in the promotion of the AJNUF, according to
the changed situation. It says:
The main enemy of the Chinese people at present is Japanese imperialism. For this
reason, it is wrong to put Japanese imperialism and Jiang Jieshi on an equal footing,
and the slogan of “kangri fan-Jiang” is also not suited (to the needs of the present
situation).142
Many scholars suggest that this telegram is a sign of the CCP finally forming its policy of
“bi-Jiang kangri”, instead of its previous “fan-Jiang kangri”.143 Judged from the process
of the June 1 Movement, the issue of this telegram coincided with the events that showed
the Clique and Jiang reaching a point close to reconciliation. Jiang’s new willingness to
compromise with the movement indicated that he was also willing to assume the leadership
of national resistance. It was also a chance for the CCP and the Red Army to readjust their
policy. At that time, the CCP was forming an alliance with the forces of Zhang Xueliang
and Yang Hucheng in the Northwest, which will be discussed later. Apart from this,
another main force of the Red Army led by Zhang Guotao, Zhu De, Xu Xiangqian and He
Long, i.e. the ally of the Second Front Army (dier fangmianjun) and Fourth Front Army
(disi fangmianjun), was on the way northward to the northern Shaanxi and would soon join
forces with Mao Zedong’s Central Red Army, i.e. the First Front Army (diyi fangmianjun).
The fact that the three forces of the Red Army were on the point of joining forces and that
the alliance with Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng had worked well provided the CCP
with a powerful backing to convert its policy from “kangri fan-Jiang” into that of “bi-Jiang

141
See Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 161-4, and pp. 167-170; Meng Guanghan et al
(eds.), Kangzhan, pp. 183-91; and Dashiji, p. 98. Also see Wang Jingxia, “Shilun
Zhongguo gongchandang yu ‘liangguang shibian’”, GXSHKX, No. 4, 1988, pp. 194-216.
142
Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 251.
143
Rong Weimu and Zhao Gang, “Zhonggong ‘bi-Jiang’ celue fangzhen de xingcheng”,
JDSYJ, No. 3, 1988, pp. 280-90.

302
kangri”, at the same time as the Guangxi leaders did. In this sense, there is no doubt that
the Clique’s initiative provided the CCP and the Red Army with a theoretical basis for the
conversion of their policy. Of course, the result of the June 1 Movement was not the only
reason behind the CCP’s change of policy,144 but it was undoubtedly an important one.
The future of the formation of the AJNUF was made secure by the support given in
cooperation by the Clique and the CCP (as dealt with in Chapter Five), and confirmed
when reconciliation with Jiang guaranteed genuine resistance to the Japanese after the
outbreak of the “Lugouqiao Incident” in July 7, 1937. It became both the symbol and the
unifying organ of that resistance. The CCP had, by taking advantage of the unity
throughout the country to fight the national enemy, adjusted its policies to accommodate
those of the Clique, and went on to expand and develop its policies and its power base in
the AJNUF, realizing clearly the significance and potential of this unifying body. On the
other hand, the Clique, having made its deal with Jiang, began to concern itself with the
parties and groups which had come to the province to help the June 1 Movement, with
preparations for the impending war, and with ensuring that Jiang carried out fully his part
of the agreement and that its group fulfilled its duty in the field of resistance. In doing so,
they left much of the united front initiative to forces within the CCP, which alone seemed
to sense its enormous potential for power.

Relationship Between the June 1 Movement and the Xi’an Incident

Whatever the role the Guangxi Clique played in the promotion of the formation of
the AJNUF, it is certain that the June 1 Movement had a great impact on the events
afterwards. On December 12, 1936, Young Marshal Zhang Xueliang of the Dongbeijun
and General Yang Hucheng of the Xibeijun joined forces and kidnapped Jiang in Xi'an,
capital of Shaanxi province. After shocking China for two weeks with a series of
complicated negotiations and internal struggles in which many groups became involved, on
Christmas Day, surprisingly, Young Marshal Zhang personally flew his prisoner back to

144
For detailed discussion of the CCP’s “bi-Jiang kangri” change of policy, see Zhang
Guiying, “Lun Zhang Xueliang jiangjun zoushang liangong kangri de daolu”, in Quanguo
zhonggong dangshi yanjiuhui (ed.), Kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian yu dierci guogong
hezuo, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1989, pp. 294-331.

303
Luoyang, Henan, a base of the Central troops, then to Nanjing on the following day, in his
private aeroplane. The event dramatically ended there. It was the famous “Xi’an Incident”,
a milestone which greatly changed the course of modern China’s history.145 In fact, this
event had a close relationship with the June 1 Movement.146 Three days after the “Xi’an
Incident” occurred, Mao Zedong and other Red Army generals, in a telegram to the
Nationalist Government, set a high value on this incident and put it in a close relationship
with the June 1 Movement:
The Xi’an Incident today is no more than one of the triple event (dingzu ersan147),
following the Fujian Rebellion and the Two Guang Incident. In all of the three the
justice flag is resolutely raised by the wise and sagacious heroes of your party as
they have insisted on resistance against Japan and are discontented with Jiang's
actions of yielding to Japan and betraying our country.148

145
There are many books and material collections available on the Xi’an Incident, such as
Yin Detian, Zhang Xueliang; Li Jinzhou, Xi’an shibian qinli ji, Taipei: ZJWXS, 1972;
James Bertram, First Act in China: The Story of the Sian Mutiny, New York: Viking Press,
1938; Edgar Snow, Random Notes on Red China: 1936-1945, Cambridge, Mass.: East
Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1974; and Cuncui xueshe (compiled), Wei
dierci guogong hezuo puping daolu de - Xi’an shibian yu Zhang Xueliang, Hong Kong:
Dadong tushu gongsi, 1978; Zhongguo dier lishi dangan guan et al (eds.), “Xi’an shibian”
ziliao xuanbian, Beijing: DACBS, 1986. Jiang Jieshi and Song Meiling as well as Kong
Xiangxi published their memoirs of the Xi'an Incident. See Jiang Zhongzheng (Jieshi),
Xi’an banyue ji, in Dadi chubanshe (ed.), Xi’an shibian sanyi, Hong Kong: Dadi
chubanshe, 1962; Jiang Song Meiling, Xi’an shibian huiyi lu, in Ibid; Lu Bi, Lun Zhang
Xueliang xiansheng, in Cuncui xueshe (ed.), Wei dierci guogong hezuo puping daolu de -
Xi'an shibian yu Zhang Xueliang, 1978, pp. 309-385; and Kong Xiangxi, “Xi’an shibian
huiyi lu”, DSYJTX, No. 11, 1982. Also see Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhenhzhi
shengya, Shenyang: LNDXCBS, 1988; Sima Sangdun, Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, Hong
Kong: Xinghui tushu gongsi, 1986; and Tien-wei Wu, The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in
Modern Chinese History, Ann Arbor: Michigan University, 1976 (hereafter as The Sian).
146
In an article in memory of the two events of the June 1 Movement and the Xi’an
Incident, Professor Te-kong Tong expresses the same view. See Te-kong Tong, “The
Fiftieth Anniversary of the Xi’an Incident and the June First Incident: A Casual Review of
Liu Tingfang’s ‘Untold Story’”, Chinese Studies in History, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1988), pp. 79-
94.
147
Dingzu ersan might be translated as the three legs of a tripod. Here the Fujian
Rebellion, the June 1 Movement and the Xi'an Incident are treated as a whole, each
representing a leg of a tripod.
148
See “The Reds generals to the Guomindang Nationalist Government for the Xi’an
Incident, December 15, 1936”, Wendian xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 319.

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 Indeed, the June 1 Movement not only resulted in reconciliation between the two
major factions within the GMD, but also led to disaffected generals Zhang Xueliang and
Yang Hucheng taking another and more radical action to compel Jiang by military force to
launch war against Japan. The Xi'an Incident, in fact, was the continuity of the policy that
the Clique insisted on in the June 1 Movement, and was the opening signal that the second
national united front between the GMD and CCP for resistance had begun to form. In this
sense, the contribution of the June 1 Movement to the AJNUF can not be overestimated.
In that case, how did the June 1 Movement relate to the Xi’an Incident? Let us
explore some possible dimensions of the relationship between them.

1. The close contact between the Guangxi Clique and the Zhang Xueliang-Yang
Hucheng union strengthened their determination to pursue the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy.
As mentioned earlier, the Clique had contacts with Zhang and Yang during the June
1 Movement. In fact, such contact can be traced back to 1934. On March 27, in a meeting
of the two Southwest organizations, Li Zongren supported the policy of getting in touch
with Zhang and his Dongbeijun.149 Of course, at that time the aim of this contact was to
serve the Guangxi’s “fan-Jiang kangri” policy.150 Zhang and his Dongbeijun also secretly
gave positive response to the Southwest.151 According to General He Zhuguo, a senior
subordinate of Zhang, the Dongbeijun had then carried out a policy of keeping in touch
with and mutual support for the Clique.152 After the Guangxi leaders changed their policy
to “bi-Jiang kangri”, the Clique strengthened contact with both Zhang and Yang.153 In

149
See Yang Tianshi, “Hu Hanmin de junshi dao-Jiang mimou ji Hu-Jiang hejie”,
KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1991, p. 125 (hereafter as “Hu Hanmin”).
150
Ibid, pp. 109-12, and pp. 123-5.
151
Ibid.
152
He Zhuguo, “Xin Guixi yu Dongbeijun zhijian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 27-36.
153
According to Liu Zongrong, who was sent by Li Zongren to Xi’an calling on Yang
Hucheng and Zhang Xueliang in late 1935, the leaders of both Dongbeijun and Xibeijun
expressed their support of the Guangxi Clique's anti-Japanese action. For details see Liu
Zongrong, “Xi’an”. Also, in the summer of 1935, General Ye Qi met Zhang Xueliang in
Hankou. It might be regarded as the Guangxi Clique strengthening its relations, on its own
initiative, with the Dongbeijun. See Yunnan sheng dangan guan (ed.), “Liuyi shibian

305
early 1936, Zhang sent Xie Fang, his private representative, on behalf of him, to Guangxi to
call on Li and Bai. Li expressed his positive feelings to the Dongbeijun, which now had
been sent to Shaanxi to fight the Red Army, which had just ended its Long March and
arrived in the north of this province, and explained his belief that the Dongbeijun should
avoid a civil war with the Red Army. Instead Li hoped that Zhang could maintain his
strength to redress the stigma of “non-resistant general” when the opportunity came. Li
also expressed the will of Guangxi to cooperate with the Dongbeijun for resistance.154
When he received these messages passed by Xie Fang, Zhang “was somewhat moved”.155
Furthermore, in April of the same year, Li and Bai wrote Zhang a secret letter. In the letter,
they stated that the most urgent task of national salvation at present was that of resisting
Japan. They hoped that Zhang would join them to stop the civil war waged by Jiang and
demand instead that he fight against Japan.156 These points indicate that the Clique
frequently and continuously tried to draw Zhang and his Dongbeijun over to its side, and
perhaps, as a result, the two parties were establishing a close relationship.
The efforts of the Clique won eventual success. There is evidence that Zhang and
Yang indeed worked out a plan to coincide with the action of Li and Bai in the Southwest
during the June 1 Movement. According to some sources, the reason for the failure to put
the plan into action was that, on the one hand, both the Dongbeijun and the Xibeijun
worried at first about the security of Zhang, who was attending the Second Plenum in
Nanjing at that time, and, on the other, that after Zhang returned to Xi’an, the base of both
the Dongbeijun and the Xibeijun, the June 1 Movement had withdrawn to Guangxi and

zhong de Long Yun”, YNDASL, No. 7, 1984, p. 45; and Huang Xuchu, “Guangxi”, CQ,
No. 126, p. 13.
154
For details of Zhang Xueliang’s “non-resistance” and his relations with Jiang Jieshi in
dealing with Japanese aggression before 1936, see Wu Tianwei (Tien-wei), “Jiang Jieshi yu
jiuyiba shibian”, KRZZYJ, No. 2, 1992, pp. 41-53; and Gao Cunxin, “Zhang Xueliang,
Jiang Jieshi zai ‘rangwai’ yu ‘annei’ wenti shang de fenqi”, KRZZYJ, No. 1, 1992, pp. 44-
51. Also see Guan Ning and Zhang Youkun (trans.), Jianmo wushi yunian, Zhang
Xueliang kaikou shuohua, Shenyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1992 (hereafter as
Jianmo wushi).
155
Quoted in Zhu Dexin, “Lun Fujian shibian, Liangguang shibian, Xi’an shibian de
guanxi”, XSLT, No. 5, 1992, p. 39 (Hereafter as “Guanxi”).
156
For contents of the confidential letter, see GXWSZL, No. 19, p. 237.

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been nearing peaceful settlement.157 Although in the end they failed to carry out the action,
the plan they formulated indicates that Zhang and Yang were in full agreement with the
demands and policy of the Clique in the movement. Whatever the motive, according to
Tien-wei Wu, the anti-Japanese stand taken by the two Guang leaders was a great challenge
to Zhang, a young man who above all took upon himself the responsibility for recovering
the lost Northeastern provinces.158 Now the more he heard of the outcry for fighting Japan,
the more he felt ashamed of his failure in resisting Japan during the “September 18
Incident” for which he had gained the stigma of a “non-resistant” general, because the
Northeastern provinces were lost when he had been the paramount leader there. Instead,
leaders and soldiers, even those who lived in the South, far away from the front facing
Japanese aggression, had insisted on the anti-Japanese stand and prepared to take action on
their own initiative.159
After the peaceful settlement of the June 1 Movement, Li again sent his private
representative named Liu Zongrong to Xi’an for discussion of further joint action. They all
expressed the wish for “further cooperation in the future”.160 Although there is no evidence
that the Clique was involved in the launching of the Xi’an Incident, it is reasonable to
suggest that the close relations with the Clique and the support from the Guangxi leaders
strengthened the determination of both Zhang and Yang to put the “bi-Jiang kangri” policy
into action as the former had already done several months earlier.

2. The June 1 Movement provided a chance for both Zhang Xueliang and Yang
Hucheng to create and develop the situation of jointly resisting Japan in the Northwest.
According to a number of reminiscences and articles, before, during, and after the
June 1 Movement, the Zhang Xueliang-Yang Hucheng union emerged and both formed

157
Wang Juren, “Ji Xi’an shibian qianhou de jijianshi”, Quanguo zhengxie (ed.), Xi’an
shibian qinli ji, Beijing: ZGWSCBS, 1986, p. 135; and Shen Bocun, Xi’an shibian jishi,
1979, Beijing: ZHSJ, 1979, p. 71 (quoted in Zhu Dexin, “Guanxi”, p. 38).
158
Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, p. 38.
159
Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhengzhi shengya, pp. 158-9.
160
Xi'an shibian ziliao, Vol. 2, p. 166 (quoted in Zhu Dexin, “Guanxi”, p. 38); Liu
Zongrong, “Xi’an”; and Yin Detian, Zhang Xueliang, p. 75.

307
direct ties with the CCP.161 At the same time, the CCP also stepped up its alliance with
both Dongbeijun and the Xibeijun after Zhang met Zhou Enlai, one of the senior leaders of
the CCP and the Red Army, in April of that year. As a result, the three sides, i.e. Zhang’s
Dongbeijun, Yang’s Xibeijun, and the Red Army, formed an anti-Japanese united front in
the Northwest, which the CCP and the Red Army called “sanwei yiti” (three-in-one united
front).162 In other words, when the Clique formed a united front in a region (i.e. the
Southwest) for “bi-Jiang kangri”, Jiang moved most of his Central troops to the South for
encirclement of the two Guangs, later of Guangxi only. As the military pressure from
Nanjing relaxed after several months, this undoubtedly provided a good chance for the CCP
to take advantage and to expand its own strength and to form a united front between the
Dongbeijun, the Xibeijun and the Red Army in the Northwest, and this laid a foundation for
both Zhang and Yang to later launch the Xi’an Incident.163

3. The Xi'an Incident was a reproduction of the Clique’s “bi-Jiang kangri” policy
through its use of military force to compel Jiang to resist Japan, a policy which was
carried out during the June 1 Movement.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the successful building of a united front with
other parties and groups, what the Clique depended on in carrying out the “bi-Jiang kangri”
policy was to use a subtle form of pressure, a vague threat of military force, i.e. “advice by
military force” to Jiang against his “non-resistance”. Zhang and Yang did the same, but
went much further than the Guangxi leaders. There is evidence that Yang expressed his
appreciation of the Clique’s action with his own version of military force after the June 1

161
For example, Li Jinzhou, Xi’an shibian qinli ji, pp. 19-21; Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, pp.
51-53; Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang, pp. 53-63; Zhang Guiying, “Lun Zhang Xueliang
jiangjun zoushang liangong kangri de daolu”. Also see Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang Chung-
cheng), Soviet Russia in China - A Summing-up at Seventy, Taipei, China Publishing
Company, 1969, p. 78.
162
See “An outline for discussion of the task of the party” (May 30, 1936), Wenjian
xuanbian, Vol. 2, p. 158. Also see Zhang Xueliang, Xi’an shibian chanhui lu (Confession
of the Xi’an Incident), in Sima Sangdun, Zhang Xueliang pingzhuan, p. 389.
163
The documents of the CCP indicate that Mao and other leaders had a number of
instructions to develop and build up a united front in the Northwest for opposing both
Japan and Jiang during the June 1 Movement. See “Yuying and others to Zhu and Zhang”
(19/6/1936), Wenjian xuanbian, Vol. 2, pp. 165-6.

308
Movement took place. Yang agreed with the view that this method would aim to “break
Jiang’s unification by force and the cessation of civil war”.164 Perhaps the June 1
Movement inspired in both Zhang and Yang the idea of “yinggan” (act recklessly).165 After
the peaceful settlement of the June 1 Movement, Jiang again moved his Central troops from
the Guangxi border to the Northwest. He aimed not only to eliminate the Red Army but
also to break the three-in-one united front. This was a similar situation to that faced by the
Clique during the June 1 Movement. It may also have supplied the reason for Zhang and
Yang to use military force to carry out radical action in order to reach their purpose of “bi-
Jiang kangri”.166 In fact, earlier in November, Yang had suggested to Zhang that they
kidnap Jiang to force the latter to launch a war of resistance.167 Whatever the motive,
Zhang finally adopted the method of “kidnapping”. The reason was, as Zhang said to his
subordinates, that he had failed in all his efforts to persuade Jiang to change the policy of
“annei rangwai”, and that radical action was the only means available.168 In fact, Li
Zongren also expressed a similar view that they had to take action of persuasion through
military force when the Southwest started the June 1 Movement.169 It indicates that the
more Jiang ignored the demand for the cessation of civil war to commence resistance, the
more opposition and radical action he would meet.

4. The demands of both the Movement and the Incident coincided.

The purpose of the Xi’an Incident was to urge Jiang to react positively to Japanese
aggression and to finally change his policy of “annei rangwai”. For this reason, Zhang and
Yang jointly put forth eight demands on December 12, 1936 as follows:

164
Wang Juren, “Ji Xi’an shibian qianhou de jijianshi”, p. 135.
165
Ibid.
166
For details, see Yin Detian, Zhang Xueliang, pp. 84-91, Li Jinzhou, Xi’an shibian qinli
ji, pp. 25-6; Guo Zengkai, Yige lishi wenti de jiaodai, in Wei dierci guogong hezuo puping
daolu de - Xi’an shibian yu Zhang Xueliang, pp. 265-72.
167
Zhang Xueliang, Xi’an shibian chanhui lu, p. 388. In fact, before the suggestion of
Yang Hucheng, Miao Jianqiu, a radical officer of the Dongbeijun, also suggested the same
idea to Zhang. See Fu Honglin, Zhang Xueliang de zhengzhi shengya, p. 171.
168
Jianmo wushi, p. 120.
169
Li Zongren, “Kangri jiuguo de zhengzhi baogao”, p. 291.

309
 1) Reorganization of the Nanjing Government in such a way that all parties
might share the joint responsibility of saving the nation.
2) Cessation of all civil war.
3) Immediate release of the patriotic leaders arrested at Shanghai.
4) Release of all political prisoners throughout the country.
5) Removal of all restrictions on the patriotic movement of the people.
6) Safeguarding of the people’s freedom to organize and call meetings.
7) Effectual implementation of Dr Sun Yatsen’s last testament.
8) Immediate convocation of a National Salvation Conference.170
In comparison with the demands of the Guangxi Clique in the June 1 Movement (as
discussed earlier), the Guangxi leaders, and Zhang and Yang focused on the freedom of
speech and anti-Japanese movement and on the launching of resistance against Japan. In
fact, according to Wang Juren, secretary to Yang Hucheng at that time, six points among
these demands had already been prepared by the three sides of Yang’s Xibeijun, Song
Zheyuan, Commander of the 29th Army stationed at Hebei and Chahar provinces, and Han
Fuju, ruler of Shandong province, during the June 1 Movement, in order to issue them as a
circular telegram to support and coincide with the action taken by the Clique. The reason
for the failure to issue it was that they failed to take coincidental action, as mentioned
earlier. However, when the Xi’an Incident occurred, the famous December 12 manifesto
including the above eight demands, jointly issued by Zhang and Yang, was, in fact,
composed of the above Yang-Song-Han six demands plus items 3 and 7.171

In sum, as Zhu Dexin points out, “the June 1 Movement was the prelude to the
Xi’an Incident”.172 The latter was the continuity of, and further affirmed and expanded the
purpose pursued by the former. As a result of the Xi’an Incident, Jiang promised that the
CCP and GMD “must not have any more civil war” and must unite to repel aggression.173
Afterwards, the cooperation and the united front between the CCP and the GMD for
national salvation and resistance against Japan were set in train by a series of

170
A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 168; Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, p. 82; and Ying Detian,
Zhang Xueliang, pp. 97-8.
171
Wang Juren, “Ji Xi’an shibian qianhou de jijianshi”, p. 135.
172
Zhu Dexin, “Guanxi”, p. 38. In this article, Zhu has the same view as the writer
discussed above.
173
Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, p. 148.

310
negotiations.174 Under the circumstances that China needed to form a united front to fight
foreign aggression, the June 1 Movement could be seen as the prelude to the formation of
the AJNUF, and the Xi'an Incident was a continuation of the first stage of this AJNUF.
That is to say, although Jiang promised the Clique to cease civil war and to prepare for
resistance, his action of moving large numbers of Central troops and concentrating them in
the Northwest indicated that he still intended to carry out his policy of “annei rangwai”. In
fact he broke faith not only with the Clique but also with all other parties and groups who
insisted on “rangwai caineng annei”, or “rangwai annei” (only resistance against foreign
aggression could achieve domestic pacification), including Zhang and Yang.175 In this
sense, the Xi’an Incident was necessary to complete the work that the June 1 Movement
had started but not finished.
Furthermore, the June 1 Movement achieved reconciliation between two major
political and military groups of the GMD, while the Xi’an Incident marked the
commencement of the formation of AJNUF, which was primarily formed by the two
opposed parties - the CCP and the GMD. In the Chinese situation at that time, only the
achievement of the former could lead to the latter. Historical events were often related. In
the case of both the June 1 Movement and the Xi’an Incident, the former was the
prerequisite to the latter, while the latter was based on the former and took China a step
further to reach a new point - the cessation of civil war throughout the entire nation and the
joining of forces with all parties and groups to fight Japan, because both had always centred
on “bi-Jiang kangri”. As a result, Jiang was “eventually forced to assume the leadership of
a national united front” in fighting Japan.176 In this sense, it is understood that the action of
the Clique during the Xi’an Incident, in which the Guangxi leaders supported Zhang and
Yang through the manifesto issued on December 17, demanding the reorganization of the

174
For details of these negotiations and the final formation of the anti-Japanese national
united front characterised by reconciliation between the CCP and GMD, see Meng
Guanghan (ed.), Kangzhan, Vol. 2, pp. 810-66; and Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui? -
Zhanshi guogong tanpan shilu, Guilin: Guangxi Teachers University Press, 1992, pp. 1-59.
175
According to an interview with Japanese correspondents, Zhang recognizes that he
had insisted on “rangwai annei” as against Jiang Jieshi’s “annei rangwai”, during the
1930s. As stated in Chapter Six, the Guangxi Clique also shared the view of Zhang. For
details of Zhang’s view, see Jianmo wushi, p. 112.
176
A. Bisson, Japan in China, p. 174.

311
Central Government into an anti-Japanese national salvation regime and denouncing armed
suppression of the Xi’an rebels, and suggesting a peaceful solution of the incident as well,
was a historic and epic moment in the history of modern China. Li and Bai further declared
that the Guangxi authorities were still sticking to their anti-Japanese national salvation
policy and that the Xi’an problem should be settled through political negotiation.177 It
embodied the consistency shown by the Clique in carrying out its policy of “rangwai
annei” and “bi-Jiang kangri”.

Conclusion

The June 1 Movement was the culmination of the Clique’s policy of forcing Jiang
to resist Japan, which was based on Li’s “scorched earth resistance” idea. Along with
increasing military and political pressures from Jiang as counter-measures against the
action initiated by the Clique, the movement had eventually to give up all the group’s
regional and personal purposes, and the Clique was forced to focus on the pursuit of the
policy necessary to ensure China’s existence and to respond to the national tide of public
opinion in calling for resistance against Japan. In the end, through promoting the formation
of the AJNUF in the movement, which was the most successful and efficient tactic that the
Clique used, Jiang was forced to accept the demand for resistance. Of course, in this
political game, both the Clique and Jiang were winners. Jiang not only took Guangdong
under his direct control but also obtained the Clique’s declaration of allegiance to his
leadership throughout the entire nation, because the Clique outwardly abandoned its open
challenge to his leadership. For the Clique, not only did Li and Bai save face and retain
their power in the province, as Joseph Stilwell said, it appeared to be a case of “all is

177
Tien-wei Wu, The Sian, pp. 115-6; and Ying Detian, Zhang Xueliang yu Xi’an
shibian, pp. 106-7. For details of the Clique’s response to the Xi’an Incident, see He
Zhuguo, “Xin Guixi yu Dongbeijun zhijian”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 4, pp. 35-46; Lai Huipeng,
“Xi’an shibian yu xin Guixi”, GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 155-7; Liu Zhongrong, “Xi’an shibian
de huiyi”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 9, pp. 49-56; Long Zeying, “Xi’an shibian shi Guixi de taidu”,
GXWSZL, No. 17, pp. 158-9; and Bai Chongxi, “Zhongguo minzu geming jinhou de qushi,
28/12/1936”, in Nanning gengsheng baoshe (ed.), “Liuyi” Yundong hou Bai Chongxi de
yanlun, pp. 76-84; and Bai Chongxi, “Duiyu Xi’an shibian de renshi, 28/12/1936”, ibid, pp.
73-75.

312
forgiven, return home at once”.178 However, the result of the movement also forced Jiang
to promise to take the leadership of active resistance against Japan, the most direct and
apparent purpose of the movement. Whatever the gain that both sides made from the
movement, the result was significant for the nation. It marked the beginning of a new era.
On the one hand, it provided an example to the CCP to readjust its policy in the AJNUF to
mirror that of the Clique, an example for converting the policy of “kangri fan-Jiang” into
that of “bi-Jiang kangri”, which was the basis on which the CCP compromised with Jiang
later. On the other hand, it encouraged both Zhang and Yang to engineer the “Xi’an
Incident”, which in the end ensured the success of the June 1 Movement. In short, this
movement was a prelude to the “Xi’an Incident”, and became a prelude to the formation of
the AJNUF along with the peaceful settlement of the “Xi’an Incident”.

178
U. S. Military, No. 9460 (September 11, 1936).

313