G.R. No.

81567 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL
and RENATO VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE,
petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN,
RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and
RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners, vs. HON. FIDEL V.
RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT.
CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY
RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs. BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner, vs. THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI
SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-entitled petitions,
seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for
brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs.
Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from
P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the statement that the
decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is
Communist Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest without
warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations
obtaining in the several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein be dealt with
shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no longer reflect the thinking or
sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the
Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests made without
warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule
113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the constitutional rights of the
persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be
abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to
their membership in the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive documents found in their
possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply with the
requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
filed by petitioners under the Rules of Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy
and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of
the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention, 5 so
that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the
Court before rendering decision dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned
arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in
accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or
authority to arrest anyo without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized
by law. 6 The law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be
conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R. No.
81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the contemplation of Section 5
Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership
penalized, 7 and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia
vs. Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. . . .
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for
the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined
in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as one of several persons who the day before his
arrest, without warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in their
patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as
a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another opportunity,
would have shot or would shoot other policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of
organized government. It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is
perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and
rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of
lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing organized government
is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting officers
of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported by
actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the facts of the Umil
case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first, that the
person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and second, that the arresting peace
officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers
to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting
officer or private person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant must be based
uponprobable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10 A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of
the peace officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that the wounded
man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon,
before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the
same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as
"Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA
member ("sparrow unit") was being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is
deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said
hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31
January 1988, two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by
five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a wounded person listed in the hospital records
as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address
entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando
Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate
attention and action and, in fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion
for reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the arresting officers to the
effect that Dural was then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done in good faith by
the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural
are deemed to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law enforcers are
presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers
did not appear to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the
arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the requirements of paragraphs
(a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest, without
warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against agents of persons in
authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No.
C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of
the arresting officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal before this
Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their
arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition
in their persons. They were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it should be
mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in
court against said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and disposition.
Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court
during the hearing of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody
of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a former NPA about
the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one
Renato Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said
house was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; that when Renato
Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any permit to possess the firearms,
ammunitions, radio and other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the
evening of 12 August 1988, and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him
letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of
Buenaobra who had in his possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at
the time of her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live ammunitions,
and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on
13 August 1988, when they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of
said date; that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and loaded guns were
found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May
1988) at the premises ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of
the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the
time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found
ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the
reason which compelled the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the
information given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one occupied by Renato
Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA for their
operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine
and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of
Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents
that the information they had received was true and the persons to be arrested were probably
guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the
search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named
Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his
possession were unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of
their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive
documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in
the organization as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The records also show that, as
in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military agents in the
Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-
motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-
named persons (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can
say that it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted at all and made
any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and a cause for
disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the
hands of executive and judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the
acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative measure. The power to
arrest without warrant is without limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113
are met. This rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance with the
conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not whether the persons
arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly compel the peace
officers, in the performance of their duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an
arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under
the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the
arrested persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting officers are not
liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the said conditions, the arresting officers can
be held liable for the crime of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without warrant, on the basis
of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22
November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila,
Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National
Press Club (NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of
jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not
for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which,
in the perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the language as
falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the
right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to
free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of
the peace officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or
soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and freedom, which
obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, tilted the scale in favor of
authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has
ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot and academic.
For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace
officers did not appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court a quo at the
resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14 December 1988,
Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at
about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in
the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
during the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the police
agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest
without warrant was made only on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under
Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police authorities
came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the
arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and
despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without
warrant of Nazareno noted several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as
follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information
charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye
II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock eted therein
as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by
the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed
by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to
the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court
to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad
taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding
informations against them were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based
on probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They complied with conditions set
forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a
quofor murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of
conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still
undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for
admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that he was an NPA courier. On
the other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms,
ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession during her arrest, belonged to
her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons of their
membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and documents in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by
the records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting
officers based their arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the
persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance
with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is
not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons
arrested without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of
the case on the merits.
As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs. Enrile should be
abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly
ln the light of prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still directly
challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that
everv arrest without warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This
Court. will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do the same —
the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113,
Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall forthwith
be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to
languish in his detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted
or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.
A Final Word
This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a Communist Party
member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the arrest without warrant of the
suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in these
petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set
forth in Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress,
are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further, on the basis of,
as the records show, the actual facts and circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the
allure of popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED.
This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-
appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial
Region, Digos, Davao del Sur convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The crime
of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos sufficiently established beyond
reasonable doubt, of the offense charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General Order No. 7, dated September
23, 1972, in relation further to Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm
subject of this case was not used in the circumstances as embraced in paragraph I thereof,
applying the provision of indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum, as
minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B,
of Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory penalties, as provided for by
law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this case (Homemade revolver,
caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor
of the government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise, the subversive
documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime of illegal possession of firearm
in furtherance of subversion in an information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above- named accused with intent to
possess and without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the proper
government agencies, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess,
carry and have in his possession, control and custody one (1) homemade revolver, caliber .38,
make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221, which firearm was issued to and used by the
accused at Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one Alias Commander Pol
for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive organization organized for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless and violent
means, of which the accused had knowledge, and which firearm was used by the accused in
the performance of his subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the NPA
and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo Taroy, it appears that by virtue
of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos,
Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surre0ndered
to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary
Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos as member of
the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of rice and one
peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14,
1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of fifteen
(15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13,
1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben Burgos. The team
left the headquarter at 1:30 P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM
where through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to locate
accused, who was plowing his field. (TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team and Pat. Bioco asked accused
about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said
firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro Buncalan with the wife of the
accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
(TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which
he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team, subversive documents
which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from
his house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon grass and likewise
recovered documents consisting of notebook colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for
the prosecution; a pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and back covers
entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng
Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980, marked as Exhibit
"C", and another pamphlet Asdang Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and
April 1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D" for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its recovery, readily admitted the
same as issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly
team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army, responsible in the liquidation of target
personalities, opposed to NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late
Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos, Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16,
Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a former NPA convert was
presented, who declared that on March 7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos,
Davao del Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions Landrino Burgos,
Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him
downstair. Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their purpose was to ask rice and one (1) peso
from him, as his contribution to their companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their group otherwise, he and his
family will be killed. He was also warned not to reveal anything with the government
authorities. Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok joined the group.
Accused then told him, he should attend a seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with
this invitation, accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver which Masamlok
really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from accused, which make him easily
Identified said firearm, as that marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73,
and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok, accompanied by his father, Matuguil
Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the seminar,
Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez,
Landrino Burgos, alias Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very distinctly that he is an NPA
together with his companions, to assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group
to overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who attended the seminar were already
members of the NPA, and if they reveal to the authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and documents, then finally
shouted, the NPA will be victorious. Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those
marked as Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75, 76 and 77,
Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar Gomez, who likewise
expounded their own opinions about the NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a
certain Tonio Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the contribution from the
members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to Captain Bargio of the Provincial
Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove that on May 19, 1982, he
administered the subscription of th extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked
as Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his confession, Fiscal Lovitos,
realizing that accused was not represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog,
whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused in the subscription of his extra-
judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession from English to Visayan
language, resulting to the deletion of question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted
certification of Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having understood, the
allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to him his constitutional rights
to remain silent, right to counsel and right to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the presence of Atty. Anyog and
Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were
sent outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40,
nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio
Comabig in-charge of firearms and explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary,
Digos, Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists of firearm holders in
Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name
included among the lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its case and offered its exhibits,
which were all admitted in evidence, despite objection interposed by counsel for accused,
which was accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case against him is stated in the
decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot recognize, brought him to the
PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same
date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by soldiers, whom he
cannot Identify because they were wearing a civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15,
1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he was detained with respect to
the subject firearm, which the investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its
ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting him on the left and right side of
his body which rendered him unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity,
crying and with emotional attachment, described in detail how he was tortured and the ordeals
he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again confronted with subject firearm,
Exhibit "A", for him to admit and when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he
was subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony. Accused said, his eyes were
covered with wet black cloth with pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only
blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and over his private parts, making his entire body,
particularly his penis and testicle, terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The process of beating, mauling, pain
and/or ordeal was repeatedly done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted
only whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and physical ordeal he was
seriously warned, if he will still adamantly refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm,
he will be salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and agony, accused
admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but accused was made to sign his
affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the
certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him, accused, by way of explanation
and commentary in details, and going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his
alleged extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those questions involuntarily made
only because of fear, threat and intimidation of his person and family, as a result of unbearable
excruciating pain he was subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he cannot Identify
and was able to obtain his admission of the subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over
his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive activities, and also to support
his denial to the truth of his alleged extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35,
38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those questions, involving
Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said Honorata Arellano appeared and declared
categorically, that the above-questions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in the
extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol,
Anthony, etc., were not true because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the
persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did she meet the accused nor
able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118- 121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez, and that she was personally
charged with subversion in the Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary,
Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed without reaching the Court. She likewise
stated that her son, Rogelio Arellano, was likewise charged for subversion filed in the Municipal
Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was likewise dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to
sustain his conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay Captain of Tiguman, Digos,
Davao del Sur, Salvador qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not personally
aware of any subversive activities of accused, being his neighbor and member of his barrio. On
the contrary, he can personally attest to his good character and reputation, as a law abiding
citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and farmer thereat. (TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May
18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot of arrests made by the
authorities in his barrio involving subversive activities but they were released and were not
formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of allegiance with the
government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his wife, Urbana Burgos, was
presented and who testified that the subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok
and one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left the gun, alleging that it
was not in order, and that they will leave it behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They
were the ones who buried it. She said, her husband, the accused, was not in their house at that
time and that she did not inform him about said firearm neither did she report the matter to
the authorities, for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22, 1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the recovery of the firearm, was
wearing a mask, she can still Identify him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally rested his case in support of
accused's through counsel manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or in
the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession of firearm, 'under the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of
counsel for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
FOR FIREARM WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and
valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged meet the test of proving guilt
beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of Ruben
Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the
accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA), they did not have any
warrant of arrest or search warrant with them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61,
November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the
privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. This Court explained
in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also looked
upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293 [19661) What is sought to
be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that
haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be
welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants around him. There the state, however
powerful, does not as such have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any
unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757
[1966], Brennan, J. and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court [1966], could
fitly characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against
the long reach of government is no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must
not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without any warrant as falling under
one of the instances when arrests may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6
* of the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a
reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even without
judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
and applicable jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the firearm and the alleged
subversive documents would become an incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126,
Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80
Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the
arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok.
The location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must
clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without
warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would
infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of
full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under
Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar
Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact oractually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is
an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed.
The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok
led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing
for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on
the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful, If an
arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened
or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also
tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the
accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok
who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him
to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14,
1982). Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a
warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his
field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards
could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused
to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first
that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused
failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search
therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case
of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by
force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a
search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights at the time of
his arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were not armed with an arrest
warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you surrender that firearm, first he
denied but when Sgt. Buncalan interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights under the constitution
considering that he was purposely under arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged subversive documents were obtained
in violation of the accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures,
it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, the
prosecution presented the two arresting officers who testified that the accused readily
admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it was buried. The
officers stated that it was the accused himself who voluntarily pointed to the place where the
alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted
ownership of the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents after
questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in violation of this right is
inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the
admissions made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical
terror, violence, and third degree measures may not have been supported by reliable evidence
but the failure to present the investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the
"provocative presumption" that indeed torture and physical violence may have been
committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel
during the custodial interrogation. The lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of
counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his statement at
the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of
counsel at the time of the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement was being
taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents
inadmissible in evidence against the accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain
the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of
Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It
is true that the trial court found Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we
are not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular
witness. As stated inPeople vs.. Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to question of credibility the findings of
the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was
able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial.
But we have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of
convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record
discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the
trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous to that found in People vs.
Capadocia(17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony, and the issue hinges on how
much credence can be accorded to him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands
uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on the mimeographing
incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He knew his fate depended upon how
much he cooperated with the authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident
campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony We discounted for the same
reason, that of Ternura cannot be considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that
Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. The
trade-off appears to be his membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, January
4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. It can not be said that his
testimony is free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated
for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar of April
19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74,
January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that the accused
used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the
prosecution never presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59),
where after stressing that accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous
with guilt, it was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at
a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must
survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What
is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v.
Joven, 64 SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA 69; People
v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513;
People v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; People v. Gabiana, 117
SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga 124 SCRA 697).
We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in Davao del Sur where there
appears to be a well-organized plan to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and
replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The open defiance against duly
constituted authorities has resulted in unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering
publicized all over the country and abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for all freedom
loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their legitimate efforts to maintain peace and
national security, we must also remember the dictum inMorales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538,
569) when this Court stated:
While the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels,
and the lawless with an the means at its command, it should always be remembered that
whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our
laws.
Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude towards
constitutional liberties and protections will only fan the increase of subversive activities
instead of containing and suppressing them.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the
crime with which he has been charged.
The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson,
with Serial No. 8.69221) and the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in
accordance with law.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with
in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great
difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular
government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall
the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in
the Philippine Islands?
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of
the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers
that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings,
and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had
not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor indirectly
given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on board the
steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary
soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of
October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the
case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled
from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges
growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means
to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting
in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the
women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them
all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient
facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of
their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full
court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain
facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun
in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an exhibit
attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at good
salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in
answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila
without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila,
Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of
Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their
liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense.
On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the
Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918,
none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila
through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before
the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand
taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the
city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that
had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao
and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not
possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married
or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that he did not have any
of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second
order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the
satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those
of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce
the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that made
compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents
were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in
the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of certain
detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before the clerk
of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically
presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their own efforts
and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the
respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that
the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from
Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on
notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right
through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and
that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for
petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked
the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city
of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the
Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The city
fiscal requested that thereplica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence
of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By authority of what
law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons
from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes
and we find —
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice
of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of
the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and
other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of women
convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities
compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper
colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any law, order,
or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of
police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands — and these women despite their
being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens
protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels
any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as
to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional system,
liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so
elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative,
either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts
within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere
behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then
any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons
would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes
and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the
same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall be taken,
or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng.
stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum
which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The law,"
said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, "is the
only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and
to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority which it gives."
(U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same
high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of
living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery
itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary
question was whether the courts should permit a government of men or a government of laws
to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the
citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup
money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it
was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in
force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this
action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in
a case which will later be referred to— "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an
application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until
the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure." (In
the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ ofhabeas corpus was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that
the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only
extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives
and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made it
impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for
the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it
the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the
court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing
in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First
Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule
of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown
that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the
women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ
was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant
the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer
examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible
taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other
parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when
and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived
his right.
Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to
defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no
restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe
the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and
has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of
law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the
State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the
Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and
Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally
divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed.
Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom
concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice Campbell
was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and since, as will
hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent
passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ
on the petition which was laid before us. . . .
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half
have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment;
after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that
"Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should
now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty,
which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed
to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it
is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the
former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison
doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to
release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails
to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are
resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is,
therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by
the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording
redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as
greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich.,
416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs.Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been
taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's
Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to
produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the
child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had
been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it
was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the
court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the
Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her
being taken and detained.That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child
before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that
might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful
excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ
cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ.
The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not
producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B.
D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.
S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to
the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored
persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that
he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they
were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus,
and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to
show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was
bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce
them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the
negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that
Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run
away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of
the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also
Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales, and
Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the
city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted
effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or
(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf
the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through
ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that
about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second
hearing by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail
until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he
must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and
even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the
matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of
excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic
action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents
another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record
might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is
a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual
is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless
when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a
valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of
contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the
body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a
contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re
Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human imperfections,
we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the first named, has
flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann,
Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law
of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful
mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case
through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto
Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of
the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to
strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into
this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record
discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered
the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and the
constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the
head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate
women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress
the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ ofhabeas
corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.
It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would
reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since
respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged
his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban
to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of
justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his
conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly
oppressive — such an amount is P100.
In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100).
The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al
Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and
to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur. Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET
AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo,
Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7,
1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6,
Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well
as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction be
issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal
Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of
Quezon City, their representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or
successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the petition. The
plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June 28,
1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioners had
come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the validity of the warrants before
this Court, should have filed a motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued
them. 3 But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of
the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public
interest generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel 7
and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special circumstance
justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the words of the
revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is
always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a particular
case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is
laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of
more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the filing of the
petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with the
fact that the Petition was filed on June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they had waited this long to
bring their case to court, it was because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The
events of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from
release of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has become a matter of
executive benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons close to the President,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had
been sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the
Presidential Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that the latter would
yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to come to Court. [pp. 123-
124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find
no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they
had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the
charge of laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and marked
as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants. We do not follow the logic of
respondents. These documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as
evidence does not and cannot in any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants
assailed in this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search warrants
in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court . 6 This objection,
however, may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded
during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by
respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at
the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e.,
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means of committing the crime
of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the
same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search warrants were
applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. It
would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent judge to have issued two warrants intended
for one and the same place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be searched were
specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the
team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of
the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent judge had in mind when he issued
Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with
sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the
executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows
that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it
has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to
resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners
Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be
seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person
against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact,
under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the properties that may be seized
is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of
no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has
control or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to
meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo 9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that
machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other
person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in
fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col.
Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. 10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law,
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive
materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment
and other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
Presidential Decree 885, as amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained
in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above- mentioned and the articles
and things above-described were used and are continuously being used for subversive
activities in conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the
Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce;14 the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant
or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As
couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent judge hardly
meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe
the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo (equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the subversive organization known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for "books,
records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S.
Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and
that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing
with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question cannot be
characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to
such historical episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to
suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing
and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of
the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic
to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is essential for the
political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the ground that
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended,
which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person, natural or artificial,
engaged in subversive activities against the government and its duly constituted authorities ...
in accordance with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense." It is doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of
National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that no less than
President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities to sequester the
property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its printing presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We Forum offices in Quezon City
and took a detailed inventory of the equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its equipment remain at the
disposal of the owners, subject to the discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further confirmed
by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983 of
U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE
FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the recommendation of our authorities to
close the paper's printing facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly
set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the seized articles is
hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant. Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-appellees. No appearance for
plaintiff-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ
ofmandamus issued by this court in G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the following: In the justice
of the peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was filed of
the following tenor:
The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and municipality of
Lumban, Province of Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro
Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense against religion committed as follows:
That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of Lumban, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused, while
holding the funeral of one who in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the
rites of religious sect known as the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the chruchyard fronting the Roman
Catholic Church, which churchyard belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to
the said Church and is devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the opposition of the
undersigned complainant who, through force and threats of physical violence by the accused,
was compelled to allow the funeral to pass through the said churchyard. An act committed in
grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious feelings of the Catholics of
this municipality, and in violation of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES Parish Priest Complainant
(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)
The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn statement
regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the facts and of
the witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the court, the fiscal,
instead of filing the corresponding information, put in the following motion for dismissal:
The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban, Laguna. The
said priest charges the accused with having caused, through force, intimidation and threats,
the funeral of one belonging to the Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the
Church. Apparently, the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to
the Church of Christ.
The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused does not constitute
the offense complained of considering the spirit of article 133 of the Revised Penal Code. At
most they might be chargeable with having threatened the parish priest, or with having passed
through a private property without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert, commenting on
the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the religious feelings of
the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of anything constituting a religious dogma;
works or scoffs at anything devoted to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys
any object of veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the
churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life belonged to the Church of
Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious feelings of those who belong to the Roman
Catholic Church.
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the case,
reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file another information for the crime found to
have been committed by the accused.
From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter given due
course by the court by virtue of an order of this court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer
questions the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an essential part
thereof, to wit, that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is devoted to the religious
services of said church, and it is through this churchyard that the accused, over the objection
of the parish priest and through force and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under
the rites of the religious sect known as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this
essential part, he would not have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not
constitute the crime defined and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act committed by the
accused had offended the religious feelings of the Catholics of the municipality in which the act
complained of took place. We believe that such ground of the motion is indefensible. As the
fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any
of them, but must admit them, although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises
a question of law, not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must be judged
only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other faithful ones, for it is
possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who profess a certain religion, while
not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those professing another faith. We, therefore, take
the view that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in
article 133 of the Revised Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said
facts and a trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established,
the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of coercion, or that
of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be proper, pursuant to section
29 of General Orders, No. 58.
The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty under the law,
without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, and Diaz, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 36453 September 28, 1932

CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. TOMAS EARNSHAW, Mayor of the City
of Manila, defendant-appellee.
Vicente Sotto for appellant. City Fiscal Felix for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an action of mandamus brought against the defendant mayor of the City of Manila. The
plaintiff alleges that he is the president of the Communist Party in the Philippine Islands, a
political group seeking the speedy granting of independence in these Islands and the
redemption of the proletariat, numbering over 300,000 men and woman in its ranks; that on
the 2d of March, 1931, by means of a letter to the defendant mayor of the city, the plaintiff
requested the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones in that city,
on the afternoon of March 12, 1931, to be followed by a parade through the streets of Juan
Luna, Azcarraga, Avenida Rizal, Echague, and General Solano in order to deliver to the
Governor-General a message from the laboring class; that on the 3d of March, 1931, the mayor
of the city denied the plaintiff's petition, instructing his subaltern, the chief of police, to
prohibit all kinds of meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he
had revoked their permits and licenses; that consequently, the Communist Party has not been
able to hold any private or public meetings in the city since the 6th day of March, 1931; that in
refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party within the city,
the defendant deprived the Communist Party of a constitutional right. The plaintiff further
prays "that a writ ofmandamus be issued against the herein defendant compelling him to issue
a permit for the holding of meetings and parades by the Communist Party in Manila."
The defendant in his answer and special defense stated that subsequent to the issuance of the
above-mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the office of
the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the Philippines is an illegal
association, or organization, which having for its principal object to incite the revolt of the
proletariat or laboring class, according to its constitution and by-laws, states as follows:
The Philippines, as a subject nation, in order to establish an independent government, has to
revolt under the leadership of the laborers.
. . . It is clear that the different political parties of the burgesses (Nacionalista-Consolidado,
Democrata, etc.) are no different from another. They have but one aim; to rise into power and
exploit, with independence or not; to enrich themselves and strengthen the control of a
government which is procapitalist and proimperialist.
Because of these, we need a Communist Party, one that is not reformist but revolutionary.
Only by revolutionary means can we demolish the slavery of man by another and of one nation
by another nation. . .
The principal ideal of the C. P. P. (Communist Party of the Philippines) in the desire to head the
Philippine Government is different from that of the burgees political parties. Its aim is not to
strengthen the capitalist government but to engender — as it cannot be avoided — the war of
the classes and to bring about its downfall. Therefore, the aims of the C. P. P. are the following:
1. To lead the movement for the immediate and complete independence of the Philippines.
2. To fight and bring about the downfall of American imperialism which oppresses the
Philippines;
3. To stop the exploitation of the laborers and defend their rights and interests;
4. To establish in the Philippines a Soviet Government under the laborers.
5. To bring about the downfall of capitalism.
6. Under the dictatorship of the laborers, to emancipate and redeem the laborers and farm
hands, — to embrace communism.
With these high ideals the Communist Party of the Philippines will be established. And
inasmuch as these ideals are the same as those of the C. I. (Communist International), the C.
P. P. will extend its full help for the redemption and welfare of the laborers.
. . . Here in the Philippines, American Imperialism is being fought also. The reluctance of the
Moros in paying taxes to the Government, the disorders in the large haciendas, the farmers
resisting the owners and the Constabulary, the strike of the high-school students, the uprising
of the Colorums, and the oppression of the imperialists and capitalists of the laborers, are
symptoms of a movement, which if carried on with unity, will perforce bring about the downfall
of American imperialism and the obtaining of Philippine independence.
Before achieving this ultimate ideal of the C. P. P. we will have you take other steps. First, to
overthrow American imperialism which oppresses the Philippines; second, to overthrow
capitalism and feudalism; third, to seize the power in the government; fourth, the
establishment of labor dictatorship; fifth, the bringing about of class consciousness and class
struggle and the prompt establishment of communism.
Under this state of affairs, a struggle is indespensable. This struggle may be peaceful or
violent, but just the same it will be a bitter struggle, where life and death will be staked.
For the prompt overthrow of the institutions of capitalism and for the purpose of opening the
eyes of the people that the imperialists are not really in earnest about giving subject peoples
their independence — because independence is an enemy of oppression and exploitation —
unless their downfall is brought about, it is necessary to struggle, not only during elections.
The difference of the revolutionary movement advocated by the C. P. P. is not found only in its
principal ideal but in the steps that it will take. While the reformists advocate understanding
and cooperation with the burgesses or capitalists, the movement of the laborers is based on
the principle of class struggle. Instead of cooperating with the enemy we should master our
own strength and fight our enemies. And in order to achieve this union, strong and powerful, it
is necessary that we should counteract every move that will tend to prejudice the laborers.
In view of the revolutionary campaign of the C. P. P. for the sake of the laborers and farm
workers, the capitalists and imperialists will become more violent and antagonistic toward
them. And inasmuch as the capitalists and imperialists have control of the government, it is
not impossible that they will use their power to more violently oppress us; in such a case they
will make it clear that their ideals are inconsistent with those of the laborers. When that day
comes, the class struggle and the revolution will redouble their force, for they will be forced to
defend themselves by rising in revolt against the oppression they are being subject to by
means of the power of the state.
For the obtaining of the partial demands to be made by the C. P. P., it is necessary that all the
laborers and farm hands, now divided by their different industrial organization, be united. . . . If
the factory laborers and farm hands organizations are already established and ready for the
struggle, and if their movement is already under the leadership of the proletariat thru the C. P.
P., it will endeavor to make the movement more vigorous for the purpose of obtaining its
partial demands until the time comes when the factory laborers and farm hands are able to
wrest the control of the Government from the capitalists and imperialists and place it in the
hands of the sons of the sweat;
By virtue of the original permits granted by the defendant mayor to the said Communist Party
of the Philippines, several public meetings were held under the auspices of the aforesaid
association in different parts of the City of Manila, in which seditious speeches were made
urging the laboring class to unite by affiliating to the Communist Party of the Philippines in
order to be able to overthrow the present government, and stirring up enmity against the
insular and local police forces by branding the members thereof as the enemies of the laborers
and as tools of the capitalists and imperialists for oppressing the said laborers.
The communists further insisted that it was the duty of the laborers to bring the government
into their hands and to run it by themselves and for themselves, like the laboring class in
Russia; that when the laborers were united, neither the Constabulary nor the United States
Army nor the imperialist Governor-General could stop them when they rose up as one body in
order to free themselves from slavery by the capitalists; that America was cunning and a
coward, as evidenced by the fact that when she entered the World War, her enemies were
already weak; that the Constabulary and the police were the ones who made trouble for the
laborers because they were the agents of the American imperialists in the Islands and they
were used as instruments by the American Imperialist Government; that united together, the
laborers could down the American Imperialist Government; and other terms and expression of
similar tenor and import.
It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged in the constitution
and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered,
delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are
highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and disturb and
obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty.
Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it is evident that he
cannot expect that the defendant will permit the Communist Party to hold meetings or parades
in the manner herein described. Furthermore, it may be noted that the complaint of the case is
written merely in general terms and calls only for a judicial declaration upon a question which
is not at present an issue between the parties to this case. But be that as it may, it must be
considered that the respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see that nothing should
occur which would tend to provoke or excite the people to disturb the peace of the community
or the safety or order of the Government," did only the right thing under the circumstances,
that is, cancel and withdraw, as was done, the permit previously issued by him to said
Communist Party, in accordance with the power granted him by law — "To grant and refuse
municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinance
are being committed under the protection of such licenses or in the premises in which the
business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of
general interest." (Act No. 2774, sec. 4, amending sec. 2434, par [m], Administrative Code.)
Instead of being condemned or criticised, the respondent mayor should be praised and
commended for having taken a prompt, courageous, and firm stand towards the said
Communist Party of the Philippines before the latter could do more damage by its
revolutionary propaganda, and by the seditious speeches and utterances of its members. In
the case of Gitlow vs. New York (268 U. S., 652), the Supreme Court of the United States said:
Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the public peace and to the security of
the state. They threaten breaches of the peace and ultimate revolution. And the immediate
danger is none the less real and substantial because the effect of the given utterance cannot
be accurately foreseen. The state cannot reasonably be required to measure the danger from
every such utterance in the nice balance of a jeweler's scale. A single revolutionary spark may
kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive
conflagration. It cannot be said that the state is acting arbitrarily on unreasonably when, in the
exercise of its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and safety,
it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into
the conflagration. It cannot reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its
own peace and safety until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the
public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the
exercise of its judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. In People vs. Lloyd,
supra, p. 35 (136 N. E., 505)., it was aptly said: "Manifestly, the legislature has authority to
forbid the advocacy of a doctrine designed and intended to overthrow the government without
waiting until there is a present and imminent danger of the success of the plan advocated. If
the state were compelled to wait until the apprehended danger became certain, then its right
to protect itself would come into being simultaneously with the overthrow of the government,
when there would be neither prosecuting officers nor courts for the enforcement of the law."
At any rate, the right of peaceful assemblage is not an absolute one. In the case of People vs.
Perez(45 Phil., 599, 605), this court said:
. . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures
designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution
and the laws, and the existence of the State. (Citing III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et
seq.; U. S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto [1922], 43 Phil., 887.)
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Imperial, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority
Parties,petitioner, vs. VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.
Ramon Diokno for petitioner. City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor
for respondent.
FERIA, J.:
This is an action of mandamus instituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaig
manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of
Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda on Sunday afternoon, November 16, 1947, for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress to grievances on the groun that the respondent refused to grant such
permit. Due to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a writ
of mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of November 15, 1947, without prejudice to writing
later an extended and reasoned decision.
The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. But it a casettled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute
for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, not injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign "police power" which is
the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by
the government through its legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and
other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative bodies, called municipal and city
councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is the
legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board, among
others, the following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition and
suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate the use of
streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the abatement of
nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants."
Under the above delegated power, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila, enacted sections
844 and 1119. Section of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibits as an offense against
public peace, and section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor,
"any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a
riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or
disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the
following:
"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free
and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and
the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as provided by ordinance or
regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports, or exercise during the
celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of the city and on the patron
saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by means of a permit issued by the
Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places or portions thereof, where such
athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And provided, further, That the holding of
any parade or procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor
is first secured from the Mayor who shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the
streets or public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession:
And provided, finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to
the Mayor not less than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."
As there is no express and separate provision in the Revised Ordinance of the City regulating
the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the provisions of saif
section 1119 regarding the holding of any parade or procession in any street or public paces
may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or public places.
Said provision is susceptible to two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is
vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a
lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the
City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be
granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with the view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to
provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.
After a mature deliberation, we have arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not
confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the parade or
procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
Our conclusions find support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New
Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New Hampshire P.L. Chap. 145, section
2, providing that "no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be
permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men of the
town or from licensing committee," was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as
not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant the license, and
held valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States in its decision (1941) penned by Chief
Justice Hughes firming the judgement of the State Supreme Court, held that " a statute
requiring pewrsons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement of the rights
of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state
courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a
consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession, with a view to
conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... ."
We can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration as
conferring upon the Mayor power to grant or refuse to grant the permit, which would be
tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places for
holding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction would make the
ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. As the Municipal Boards
is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and the other public places, and the
word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised Administrative Code, means and
includes the power to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed a
synonimous with construed "suppressed" or "prohibit" (Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil.,
103), the Municipal Board can not grant the Mayor a power that it does not have. Besides, the
powers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief Executive of the City are executive and one of
them is "to comply with and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful performance
and execution of laws and ordinances" (section 2434 [b] of the Revised Administrative Code),
the ligislative police power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances regulating reasonably
the excercise of the fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the streets and other public
places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other officer by conferring upon him
unregulated discretion or without laying down rules to guide and control his action by which its
impartial execution can be secured or partiality and oppression prevented.
In City of Chicago vs. Trotter, 136 Ill., 430, it was held by the Supreme Court of Illinois that,
under Rev. ST. Ill. c. 24, article 5 section 1, which empowers city councils to regulate the use of
public streets, the council has no power to ordain that no processions shall be allowed upon
the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police, leaving the
issuance of such permits to his discretion, since the powers conferred on the council cannot be
delegated by them.
The Supreme COurt of Wisconsin in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, 84 Wis., 585; 54 N.W.,
1104, held the following:
"The objections urged in the case of City of Baltimore vs. Radecke, 49 Md., 217, were also, in
substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its face committed to the
unrestrained will of a single public officer the power to determine the rights of parties under it,
when there was nothing in the ordinance to guide or cintrol his action, and it was held void
because "it lays down no rules by which its impartial execution can be secured, or partiality
and oppression prevented." and that "when we remember that action or nonaction may
proceed from enmity or prejudice, from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other
improper influences and motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and
exposed, it becomes unnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the injustice capable of
being wrought under cover of such a power, for that becomes apparent to every one who gives
to the subject a moment's consideration. In fact, an ordinance which clothes a single individual
with such power hardly falls within the domain of law, and we are constrained to pronounce it
inoperative and void." ... In the exercise of police power, the council may, in its discretion,
regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but can not suppress them,
directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or any other
officer. The discretion with which the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be exercised
within the limits of the law, and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city
officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its exercise a petty tyrant."
In re Frazee, 63 Michigan 399, 30 N.W., 72, a city or ordinance providing that "no person or
persons, or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or
through the public streets of the City of Grand Rapids with musical instrument, banners,
flags, ... without first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said
city;" was held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said Supreme
Court in the course of the decision held:
". . . We must therefore construe this charter, and the powers it assumes to grant, so far as it
is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such power over the subjects referred to as
will enable the city to keep order, and suppress mischief, in accordance with the limitations
and conditions required by the rights of the people themselves, as secured by the principles of
law, which cannot be less careful of private rights under the constitution than under the
common law."
"It is quite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger and disorder
in cities than in smaller towns or in rural places. This may justify reasonable precautionary
measures, but nothing further; and no inference can extend beyond the fair scope of powers
granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretion to suppress lawful action
altogther can be granted at all. . . . ."
"It has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most civilized
countries, for people who are assembled for common purposes to parade together, by day or
reasonable hours at night, with banners and other paraphernalia, and with music of various
kinds. These processions for political, religious, and social demonstrations are resorted to for
the express purpose of keeping unity of feeling and enthusiasm, and frequently to produce
some effect on the public mind by the spectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural
product and exponent of common aims, and valuable factors in furthering them. ... When
people assemble in riotous mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or public security,
they become unlawful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . ."
"It is only when political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public disturbances,
or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible public or private
mischief, that the law interferes."
"This by-law is unreasonable, because it suppresses what is in general perfectly lawful, and
because it leaves the power of permitting or restraining processions, and thier courses, to an
unregulated official discretion, when the whole matter, if regualted at all, must be permanent,
legal provisions, operating generally and impartially."
In Rich vs. Napervill, 42 Ill., App. 222, the question was raised as to the validity of the city
ordinance which made it unlawful for any person, society or club, or association of any kind, to
parade any of the streets, with flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or other
musical instruments, without the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The
appellants were members of the Salvation Army, and were prosecuted for a violation of the
ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid said, "Ordinances to be valid must be
reasonable; they must not be oppressive; they must be fair and impartial; they must not be so
framed as to allow their enforcement to rest on official discretion ... Ever since the landing of
the Pilgrims from the Mayflower the right to assemble and worship accordingto the dictates of
one's conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for a lawful purpose,
have been fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free people. The spirit
of our free institutions allows great latitude in public parades and emonstrations whether
religious or political ... If this ordinance is held valid, then may the city council shut off the
parades of those whose nations do not suit their views and tastes in politics or religion, and
permit like parades of those whose nations do. When men in authority are permitted in their
discretion to exercise power so arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of of our free
institutions violated. ... Where the granting of the permit is left to the unregulated discretion of
a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than partial and discriminating in
its practical operation. The law abhors partiality and discrimination. ... (19 L.R.A., p. 861)
In the case of Trujillo vs. City of Walsenburg, 108 Col., 427; 118 P. [2d], 1081, the Supreme
Court of Colorado, in construing the provision of section 1 of Ordinance No. 273 of the City of
Walsenburg, which provides: "That it shall be unlawful for any person or persons or association
to use the street of the City of Walsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession or assemblage
without first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of Walsenburg so to do,"
held the following:
"[1] The power of municipalities, under our state law, to regulate the use of public streets is
conceded. "35 C.S.A., chapter 163, section 10, subparagraph 7. "The privilege of a citizen of
the United States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be excercised in subordination to the general, be abridged or denied."
Hague, Mayor vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S., 496, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954,
964; 83 Law, ed., 1423.
[2, 3] An excellent statement of the power of a municipality to impose regulations in the use of
public streets is found in the recent case of Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569; 61 S. Ct.,
762, 765; 85 Law, ed. 1049; 133 A.L.R., 1936, in which the following appears; "The authority of
a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil
liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they
ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration
of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is
designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by
the attempted excercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to
protection. One would not be justified in ignoring the familiar red traffic light because he
thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command or sought by that means to
direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions. As regulation of the use of the
streets for parades and processions is a traditional excercise of control by local government,
the question in a particular case is whether that control is exerted so as not to deny or
unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of
thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public
places. Lovell vs. Criffin, 303 U.S., 444, 451;58 S. Ct., 666, 668, 82 Law. ed., 949 [953];
Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 59 S. Ct., 954, 963,
964; 83 Law. ed., 1423 [1436, 1437]; Scheneider vs. State of New Jersey [Town of Irvington];
308 U.S., 147, 160; 60 S. Ct., 146, 150; 84 Law. ed., 155 [164]; Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 310
U. S., 296, 306, 307; 60 S. Ct., 900, 904; 84 Law. ed., 1213 [1219, 1220]; 128 A.L.R. 1352."
[4] Our concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance which leaves to the
uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporation to say who
shall, who shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public streets. No standard of
regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the ordinance as drawn, the chief of
police may for any reason which he may entertain arbitrarily deny this privelege to any group.
in Cox vs. New Hampshire, 312 U. S., 569, 85 Law. ed., 1049, 1054, said:
"In the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the public
streets in a lawful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinance before us, and we
therefore hold it null and void."
The Supreme Court of the United States in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial Organization,
307 U. S., 496, 515, 516; 83 Law. ed., 1423, declared that a municipal ordinance requiring the
obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public streets, highways, public
parks, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of public safety, for the
purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit
when after investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinent to the application he
believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid exercise of the police power.
Said Court in the course of its opinion in support of the conclusion said:
". . . Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the
streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets
and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
"We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void upon its
face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or parks the standard of
official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion that such
refusal will prevent 'riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record
discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on
national affairs for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such eventualities.
But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty
to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, which
provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits
of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the application of the
petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power is predicated upon the ordinances
enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses or permits to be issued by the Mayor, such
as those found in Chapters 40 to 87 of the Revised Ordinances of the City of Manila. It is not a
specific or substantive power independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which
the Mayor, as Chief Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434.
Moreover "one of the settled maxims in constitutional law is that the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or
authority," except certain powers of local government, specially of police regulation which are
conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal corporation. Taking this into consideration,
and that the police power to regulate the use of streets and other public places has been
delegated or rather conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal Board of the City (section
2444 [u] of the Administrative Code) it is to be presumed that the Legislature has not, in the
same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in section 2434 (m) the same power, specially if we
take into account that its exercise may be in conflict with the exercise of the same power by
the Municipal Board.
Besides, assuming arguendo that the Legislature has the power to confer, and in fact has
conferred, upon the Mayor the power to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes,
independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board on the matter, and the
provisions of section 2444 (u) of the same Code and of section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances
to the contrary notwithstanding, such grant of unregulated and unlimited power to grant or
refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions, parades, or
meetings, would be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in the cases
above quoted, specially in Willis Cox vs. New Hampshire, supra, wherein the question involved
was also the validity of a similar statute of New Hamsphire. Because the same constitutional
limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same objections to a municipal
ordinance which grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer are applicable to a law or
statute that confers unlimited power to any officer either of the municipal or state
governments. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be
validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national
emergency. As stated in State ex rel. Garrabad vs. Dering, supra, "The discretion with which
the council is vested is a legal discretion to be exercised within the limits of the law, and not a
discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an arbitrary authority making in its
exercise a petty tyrant."
It is true that Mr. Justice Ostrand cited said provision of article 2434 (m) of the Administrative
Code apparently in support of the decision in the case of Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil.,
255- 261, but evidently the quotation of said provision was made by the writer of the decision
under a mistaken conception of its purview and is an obiter dictum, for it was not necessary for
the decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intended to be held therein by the
Communist Party of the Philippines was clearly an unlawful one, and therefore the Mayor of the
City of Manila had no power to grant the permit applied for. On the contrary, had the meeting
been held, it was his duty to have the promoters thereof prosecuted for violation of section
844, which is punishable as misdemeanor by section 1262 of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila. For, according to the decision, "the doctrine and principles advocated and urged
in the Constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and the
speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or gatherings,
as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies
and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty."
The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that
passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar
speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their
government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the
peace and a disruption of public order." As the request of the petition was for a permit "to hold
a peaceful public meeting," and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a
lawful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any
consideration. As stated in the portion of the decision in Hague vs. Committee on Industrial
Organization, supra, "It does not make comfort and convenience in the use of streets or parks
the standard of official action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse the permit on his mere
opinion that such refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus,
as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of
views on national affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities." To this we may add the following, which we make our own, said by Mr. Justice
Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney vs. California, 71 U. S. (Law. ed.), 1105-1107:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men
feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage
of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to
fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to
believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe
that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear political
change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . .
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these functions
essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively serious. Prohibition of
free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the
means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a society. . . . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the deterrents
ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the
law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly." Whitney vs. California, U. S.
Sup. Ct. Rep., 71 Law., ed., pp. 1106-1107.)
In view of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no
reasonable objection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, for the meeting applied for, the
respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as requested. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon and Briones, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL
BECK, petitioners, vs.HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and
MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch,
and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico
P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any
peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in
the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that,
in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are
admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers,
documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct
from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations
adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11
Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were
unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were
the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a
question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of
defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the
evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged
in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it wasimpossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer,
against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting
in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to
an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific
guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in
a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then
just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which
its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf Case. In short,the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the
incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any
police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is
no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in
general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party
for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-
Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they
have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion
for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said
theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or
submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted
in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in
the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied,
as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places,
offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.