PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS
However, for
G.R. No. 159149
June 26, 2006
FACTS:
BP. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as
possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied
petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders.3 The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators
to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000.4
On June 9, 2000, Circular No. 2000-06-010 was issued by the DOE to
implement B.P. Blg. 33, thus enumerating the penalties for different acts in relation to
the BP.
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the
DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the
request for lack of merit.
Respondent then filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the trial
court.
After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground
that it introduced new offenses not included in the law.6 The court intimated that the
Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed
the maximum penalty under the law.
The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence this petition, raising the following issues:
ISSUES:
WON the provisions of the Circular is null and void
HELD/RATIO: YES
For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have
the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a
crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be
provided by the statute itself.16
The Circular satisfies the first requirement. B.P. Blg. 33, as amended,
criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of
petroleum products. Under this general description of what constitutes criminal acts
involving petroleum products, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the
said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing
scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no
trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no
embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG
cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. These specific acts and
omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, which seeks to curb the
pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.
As for the second requirement, we find that the Circular is in accord with the
law. Under B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, the monetary penalty for any person who
commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a
maximum of P50,000. Under the Circular, the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail
outlets is P20,000,17 an amount within the range allowed by law.
the refillers, marketers, and dealers, the Circular is silent as to any maximum
monetary penalty. This mere silence, nonetheless, does not amount to violation of the
aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Further, the mere fact that the Circular provides
penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that
B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
Clearly, it is B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, which defines what constitute punishable acts
involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the
corresponding penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law, albeit it is silent
on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the
Circular contravenes the law.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were
specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal
measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as
well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest.
To nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to
protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some
unscrupulous LPG traders.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Circular No. 2000-06-010 of
DOE is declared valid. The Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 161, in SCA Case No. 2318, nullifying said Circular and prohibiting its
implementation are herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
TOLEDO v Civil Service Commission, COMELEC
G.R. No. 92646-47
OCTOBER 4, 1991
FACTS:
Atty, Toledo was appointed by Comelec as Manager of the Education and Information
Department of the Comelec. He was already more than (57) years old at that time and
first time in government service as he was then engaged in active private practice
prior to said appointment.
Petitioner's appointment papers (Civil Service) and oath of office were endorsed by
the Comelec to the CSC for approval and attestation. However, no prior request for
exemption from the provisions of Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) was secured - prohibiting the appointment of
persons 57 years old or above into the government service without prior approval by
the CSC (CSC Memo). Petitioner officially reported for work and assumed the
functions of his office.
Comelec, upon discovery of the lack of authority required of the CSRPAP, and CSC
Memo, declared void from the beginning the appointment of Atty. Toledo as Manager
of the Education and Information Department of this Commission.
Petitioner appealed the Comelec Resolution to public respondent CSC which declared
the appointment merely voidable and not void ab initio. Hence, Atty. Toledo is
considered a de facto officer from the time he assumed office on June 16, 1986, until
and up to the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution on January 29, 1989.
ISSUES:
W/N the CSC Resolution is without legal basis because the CSRPAP is invalid and
unenforceable for not having been published in the Official Gazette or in any
newspaper of general circulation as required under P.D. 807.
RATIO:
No. The Civil Service Act(RA226): "with the approval by the President, to prescribe,
amend, and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the
provisions of ... the Civil Service Law," said rules "to become effective thirty days after
publication in the Official Gazette". It subsequently adopted and promulgated rules
intended to carry the law into effect: SEC. 5. No person shall be appointed or
reinstated in the service if he is already 57 years old, unless the President of the
Philippines, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, as the case may be, determines that he
possesses special qualifications and his services are needed; though the Act
contained no provision prohibiting such appointment or reinstatement.
Like RA226, PD 807 empowered the Commission to "prescribe, amend, and enforce
suitable rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Decree," and
also provided that said "rules and regulations shall become effective thirty (30) days
after publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation.
The provision regarding persons 57 years of age was purely a creation of the
Commission, having no reference to any provision in the decree intended to be
implemented.
It was this provision of the CSRPAP which was applied to Toledo. According to the
CSC, since prior authority for Toledo's appointment had never been obtained —
indeed, it would appear that the appointment papers were not transmitted by the
COMELEC to the CSC until February, 1989 at which time Toledo's appointment was
"approved as permanent" by the Executive Director of said CSC—the appointment
had to be struck down.
These rules and regulations (CSRPAP) were never published either in the Official
Gazette or any newspaper of general circulation, at least as of the time that it was
applied to Toledo to the latter's prejudice. The Chairman stated in a letter that CSC
had "no record of the publication of said Rules in newspapers of general circulation"
although "published and distributed by the National Media Production Center in 1975,"
and the Director of the National Printing Office stated that said Rules was not
submitted to this office for publication.
The Revised Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 cannot be
considered valid and effective after RA 2260 was repealed and superseded by
PD 807. PD 807 was obviously intended to take the place of RA 2260. In all
matters dealt with by both laws, the provisions of PD 807 were obviously
intended to be controlling. So, also, the rules promulgated by the CSC to carry
the provisions of PD 807 into effect were meant to supersede or take the place
of the rules implementing RA 2260. In other words, PD 807 and the CSRPAP
were intended to make RA 2260 and its implementing rules functus officio,
render them without force and effect except only as regards any provision, if at
all, not dealt with by PD 807 or the CSRPAP.
The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules (under said
RA 2260) cannot be accorded validity-it is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no
basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or
connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect,
such as a requirement, for instance, that age should be reckoned as a factor in the
employment or reinstatement of an individual, or a direction that there be a
determination of some point in a person's life at which he becomes unemployable, or
employable only under specific conditions. It was therefore an unauthorized act of
legislation on the part of the Civil Service Commission. It cannot be justified as a valid
exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function, to
repeat, may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of
the law into effect; and since there is no prohibition or restriction on the employment of
57-year old persons in the statute—or any provision respecting age as a factor in
employment—there was nothing to carry into effect through an implementing rule on
the matter.
The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying
it into effect.
Apart from this, the CSRPAP cannot be considered effective as of the time of the
application to Toledo of a provision thereof, for the reason that said rules were never
published. The argument that the CSRPAP need not be published, because they were
"a mere reiteration of existing law" and had been "circularized," flies in the teeth of the
explicit and categorical requirement of PD 807 that rules and regulations for carrying
into effect the provisions of the Decree shall become effective thirty (30) days after
publication in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. CSRPAP
cannot properly be considered a mere reiteration of existing law-the implementing rule
governing 57-year old persons is invalid and cannot in any sense be considered
"existing law."
OTHER DOCTRINES:
The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or
put it into effect, not to add to it; to carry the law into effect or execution, not to
supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of course,
the law itself can not be extended; said regulations 'cannot amend an act of
Congress.'
 DISPOSITIVE PORTION: When PITC elevated the matter to the Commission on Audit (COA):
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. - COA affirmed the questioned disallowance.
- It ruled that the grant of SFI by PITC was an illegal disbursement of public funds
- under Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 (SSL)
- because the DBM did not approve the grant of the SFI
PITC vs COA
G.R. No. 152688. PITC asserts that § 12 of R.A. No. 6758 is void because:
November 19, 2003 - DBM-Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10,
- its implementing rules,
- was nullified in the case of De Jesus v. Commission on Audit
FACTS:
- for lack of publication.

The DTI Secretary issued a Department Order No. 79 (DO #79): Thus, PITC claims that COA committed abuse of discretion when:
- it granted a Staple Food Incentive (SFI) - it based its ruling on a void DBM Circular
- in the maximum amount of P7,200.00
- to each to the officials and employees of DTI bureaus, attached agencies and ISSUES:
government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs).
- subject to the availability of savings of those attached agencies/GOCCs
1. WON COA committed abuse of discretion in disallowing the
disbursement of funds for the SFI of PITC?
Pursuant to DO #79, Phil. Int'l Trading Corp (PITC):
- a GOCC attached to the DTI,
2. WON the nullification of the DBM Circular also nullified § 12 of the SSL?
- issued a resolution
- approving the grant of SFI to its officers and employees.
- Thus, it released the total amount of ₱ 1M as SFI for the year 1998. RATIO:

Later, the Resident Auditor of PITC issued a Notice of Suspension:
- disallowing the grant of the SFI and
- requiring the PITC to submit the approval of such grant by the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM)
- in accordance with Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, or the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL)
§ 12 of the SSL provides that:
- (1st Sentence) allowances, subject to certain exceptions, shall be deemed included
in the standardized salary rates as prescribed by the act
- (2nd sentence) but other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being
received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary
rates shall continue to be authorized.
Those exceptions to allowances, which are not included in the standardized salary
rates include:
- representation and transportation allowances;
- clothing and laundry allowances;
- subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and
hospital personnel;
- hazard pay;
- allowances of foreign services personnel stationed abroad; and
- such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be
determined by the DBM
1. No, the COA did not commit abuse of discretion in disallowing the disbursement of
funds for the SFI.
The Staple Food Incentives was granted under D.O. No. 79:
- to help the DTI employees
- cope with the present economic difficulties,
- boost their morale and
- deepen their commitment and dedication to public service.
Thus, SFI is a financial assistance or a bonus:
- falling under the second sentence of Section 12 and
- not a payment in consideration of the performance of an official duty.
It is not a benefit within the ambit of the first sentence:
- because it was not granted to defray or reimburse the expenses
- incurred in the performance of their official functions,
- like representation and transportation allowances, and other benefits of similar
nature.
Accordingly, in order that the SFI may be allowed:
- the requisites for the entitlement of benefits
- falling under the second sentence of Section 12 must be established.
- Unfortunately, there is no evidence on record
- that the recipients of the SFI were incumbents when R.A. No. 6758 took effect on
July 1, 1989 and
- that they were in fact receiving the same at the time.
- Hence, no abuse of discretion was committed by COA
- in disallowing the disbursement of funds for the SFI of PITC.

2. No, the basis of COA in disallowing the grant of SFI was Section 12 of R.A. No.
6758 and not DBM-CCC No. 10.

The nullity of DBM-CCC No. 10 will not affect the validity of R.A. No. 6758.

It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that:

- statutory provisions control the rules and regulations
- which may be issued pursuant thereto.

Such rules and regulations:

- must be consistent with and
- must not defeat the purpose of the statute.
- The validity of R.A. No. 6758 should not be made to depend
- on the validity of its implementing rules.

OTHER DOCTRINES:

PITC need not refund the questioned SFI received by them in 1998. This is so
because National Tobacco Administration v. Commission on Audit which made a
definitive interpretation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 6758 was promulgated only on
August 5, 1999. Prior thereto, PITC is presumed to be without knowledge that, absent
the requisites under the second sentence of R.A. No. 6758, the disbursement of funds
for the SFI is without legal basis.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the March 5, 2002 decision of the
Commission on Audit in COA Decision No. 2002-044, which disallowed the grant of
Staple Food Incentive in 1998 to the officers and employees of the Philippine
International Trading Corporation, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The officers
and employees of the Philippine International Trading Corporation need not refund the
Staple Food Incentive they received per Resolution No. 98-12-07 dated December 9,
1998.
SO ORDERED.