Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Since the late 1990s and more so in recent years, the centre piece of Russian‐
Vietnam relations as been arms sales in the billions of dollars. Vietnam ranks among
the top five export countries for Russian arms after China, India and countries in the
Middle East. Russia will play a major and growing role in developing Vietnam naval
fleet including the six Kilo‐class submarines and on‐shore facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.
Q3. Would you class India‐Vietnam relations as a particularly important relationship
for either nation?
Answer: India ranks high on Vietnam list of friends. There is an historical dimension
dating back to the time of Ho Chi Minh and Nehru. There is a nostalgic relationship
as India was one of the main leaders in the non‐aligned movement. There is a
political relationship, given that both have fought border wars with China. And there
is a military dimension. India manufacturers and uses Soviet/Russian military
equipment. India has upgrades Vietnam’s fleet of aging MiG aircraft and supplied
much needed spares for Vietnam’s flotilla of fast attack craft and patrol boats. India
has trained a contingent of Vietnamese military officers and was recently
approached to assist Vietnam in training for peacekeeping under UN auspices.
Vietnam represents a friendly country in India’s testy relationship with China. India
has sent its naval ships to visit Vietnam as a kind of tit for tat response to the
appearance of the PLAN in the Indian Ocean.
Q4. How about the rest of Asia? Japan and Korea are some of the biggest investors
and more Vietnamese students are learning the languages and studying over there
these days also.
ANSWER: Japan and South Korea rank higher in Vietnam’s foreign policy priorities
than India. Japan is the major supplier of overseas development assistance. Japan is
also a source of modern technology, management technique and a destination for
Vietnamese students. Japan has been given the go ahead to construct two nuclear
power plants (Russia was awarded only one contract). This leaves the door open to
award future contracts to either a joint Japanese‐American consortium or American
company.
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung hopes to secure massive Japanese investment to
fund his high‐speed rail network. Japan is a natural political ally against China as both
Tokyo and Hanoi have maritime territorial disputes with Beijing.
South Korea is important for similar reasons. Prime Minister Dung is a big proponent
of the chaebol system. Snce 1992, Vietnam has welcomed and encouraged South
Korean investment. South Korea has been designated a strategic partner alongside
Japan. Hyundai is the core of Vietnam’s shipbuilding industry at Van Phong Bay and
can be expected to play a greater role in Vietnam in future. South Korea is also an
ally in balancing Vietnam’s relations with all powerful China.
Q5. And, lastly, Vietnam's other neighbours, Laos and Cambodia? History there is of
course complicated by thousands of years, along with the resentments Vietnam
often holds against China. However they share the Mekong, and borders.
ANSWER: Vietnam officially and in practice accords high priority to neighbouring
states – China, Laos and Cambodia – in its foreign policy. Vietnam does so because it
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shares land borders with Laos and Cambodia and wants their cooperation in border
security and protection for Vietnamese residents in these countries. The Vietnam
Communist Party shares an ideological affinity with the Lao People’s Revolutionary
Party.
Vietnam’s commanding political influence in Vientiane and Phnom Penh has been
eroded since 1991 due to China’s diplomacy. Both Laos and Cambodia (along with
Myanmar and Thailand) were conspicuously silent at ASEAN related meetings in
2010 when the South China Sea issue was raised, for example. Vietnam offers aid to
both countries but cannot compete with official Chinese largess and private sector
investment.
Vietnam offers its greatest number of training slots in its military academies for
military personnel from Laos and Cambodia. While Vietnam has good relations with
the Hun Sen regime, Hun Sen has also developed very good relations with China.
Despite lingering ties based on history, the Cambodian People’s Party and the
Vietnam Communist Party are not really ideological soul mates. Anti‐Vietnamese
racism in Cambodia, which always lurks beneath the surface, is a complicating factor.
Sam Rainsy, leader of the opposition, for example, continually harps on what he
claims was an inequitable demarcation of the land border. In Laos, fears of Chinese
migration and even the development of a “Chinese satellite town” outside Vientiane
have caused similar anxieties.
As Lower Mekong states, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia all share common anxieties
and concerns about upstream damning in China and its affects downstream.
Cambodia is most seriously threatened if insufficient water fills the Tonle Sap in the
dry season. Lower water flows will result in the intrusion of salt water into Vietnam’s
Mekong Delta. Vietnam has taken the lead in organizing a caucus of Indochina states
(including Myanmar) to press for special consideration in ASEAN as its least
development members. It is notable that the Obama Administration has responded
to sub‐regional concerns by launching a Lower Mekong Initiative and holding regular
high‐level ministerial meetings.
The development of the Greater Mekong Sub‐region extends well beyond the
catchment area of the Mekong to the continental land mass. The development of
land infrastructure – roads, bridges, rail, communications – is rapidly integrating the
economies of mainland Southeast Asia with southern China.