SPECIFIC JURISDICTION OF COURTS
1661
A. SUPREME COURT - Question of law
URBANO V CHAVEZ
183 SCRA 347
GANCAYCO; March 19, 1990
NATURE
Petition to review decision of RTC Pasig
FACTS
- there are 2 cases involved here: a criminal action for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019) and an civil action for damages arising from a felony (defamation
through a published interview whereby Chavez imputed that Nemesio Co was a close
associate (crony?) of Marcos), both against Solicitor General Francisco Chavez (among
others)
- in the criminal case (filed in the Office of the Ombudsman), the Office of the SolGen (OSG)
entered its appearance for Chavez and the other accused (DILG Sec and 2 sectoral reps) as
far as the Prelim Investigation is concerned. Urbano et. al. filed a special civil action for
prohibition in the SC to enjoin the SolGen and his associates from acting as counsel for
Chavez in the PI. The contention is in the event that an information is filed against the
accused, the appearance of the OSG in the PI would be in conflict with its role as the
appellate counsel for the People of the Phils (counsel at the first instance is the provincial/
state prosecutor).
- in the action for damages, the OSG likewise acted as counsel for Chavez, who was then
the SolGen and counsel for PCGG, the agency responsible for the investigation of graft and
corrupt practices of the Marcoses. The OSG filed for extension of time to file required
pleading, and afterwards filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of Chavez. Petitioner Co
objected to appearance of OSG as counsel, contending that he is suing Chavez in his
personal capacity.
- OSG manifested that it is authorized to represent Chavez or any public official even if the
said official is sued in his personal capacity pursuant to the unconditional provisions of
PD478 which defines the functions of OSG, as well as EO300 which made OSG an
independent agency under the Office of the President
- RTC denied the petition, thus allowing the appearance of OSG as counsel. It also denied
the MFR. Thus, this petition for review
ISSUE/S
1. WON the OSG has authority to appear for (a) a certain gov’t official in the PI of their case
before the Ombudsman and (b) the SolGen in a suit for damages arising from a crime
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at ANY stage of a criminal
case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony (applies to all public officials and
employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches).
Reasoning PD47811 defines the duties and functions of OSG:
SEC1. The OSG shall represent the Gov’t of the Phils, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. x x x
- the OSG submits that since there is no qualification, it can represent any public official
without any qualification or distinction in any litigation.
- Same argument seems to apply to a similar provision in the Rev Admin Code (Sec. 1661:
As principal law officer of the Gov’t, the SolGen shall have the authority to act for and
represent the Gov’t , its officers and agents in any official investigation, proceeding or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer). In Anti-Graft League v Ortega, SC interpreted Sec.
to embrace PI. However, should an info be filed after, then OSG can no longer act as
counsel. The rationale given was that public officials are subjected to numerous suits, and
threats of criminal prosecution could stay the hand of the public official. OSG provides
assurance against timidity in that they will be duly represented by counsel in the PI.
- However, the court declared this ruling abandoned in this case. The anomaly in this ruling
becomes obvious when, in the event of a judgment of conviction, the case is brought on
appeal to the appellate courts. The OSG, as the appellate counsel of the People, is
expected to take a stand against the accused. More often than not, it does. Accordingly,
there is a clear conflict of interest here, and one which smacks of ethical considerations,
where the OSG, as counsel for the public official, defends the latter in the PI, and where the
same office, as appellate counsel of the People, represents the prosecution when the case
is brought on appeal. This anomalous situation could not have been contemplated and
allowed by the law. It is a situation which cannot be countenanced by the Court.
- another reason why the OSG can’t represent an accused in a crim case: the State can
speak and act only by law, whatever it says or does is lawful, and that which is unlawful is
not the word or deed of the state. As such, a public official who is sued criminally is actually
sued in his personal capacity inasmuch as his principal (the State) can never the author of a
wrongful act. The same applies to a suit for damages arising from a felony, where the public
official is held accountable for his act; the state is not liable.
** Re: Question of Law (copied verbatim. This is all that is mentioned)
-both issues raise pure questions of law inasmuch as there are no evidentiary matters to be
evaluated by this Court. Moreover, if the only issue is whether or not the conclusions of the
trial court are in consonance with law and jurisprudence, then the issue is a pure question of
law (Torres v Yu). Thus, the Court resolved to consolidate both Petitions and to treat them
as Petitions for certiorari on pure questions of law in accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court.
Disposition Petition is granted.
ORTIGAS V. CA
106 SCRA 121
ABAD SANTOS, 1981
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
-In 1974, Ortigas and Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Maximo Belmonte in
the Municipal Court of San Juan Rizal, praying that judgment be rendered 1.) ordering the
defendant his successors-in-interest to vacate and surrender the lot to plaintiff; 2.) declaring
the residential building constructed on the lot by defendant as forfeited in favor of plaintiff;
3.0 condeming defendant to pay monthly rent of 5,000 from July 18, 1971 up to the time he
vacates, together with attorney's fees and exemplary damages. The Ruled in favor of
plaintiff and granted the relieves prayed for.
-Belmonte filed a motion to dismiss in the Cfi based on lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
MC. CFI denied motion and affirmed in totot the MC judgment. The said court also issued a
writ of execution. Belmonte filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminsry
injunction in the CA, assiling the 1.) the jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of
the judgment on the pleadings rendered by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of the issuance of
the writ of execution issued by the CFI. The Ca ruled in favor of Belmonte, holding that the
MC has no jurisdiction. Hence the present petition.
ISSUES
1. WON the CA has appellate jurisdiction over this case
2. WON the MC had jurisdiction to resolve the issues in the original complaint

HELD
1. NO.
Reasoning. After analyzing the issues raised by Belmonte before the CA, namely 1.) the
jurisdiction of the CFI andf MC; 2.) the propriety of the judgment on the pleadings rendered
by the MC; and 3.) the propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution issued by the CFI,
the SC held that the same are purely legal in nature. Since appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving purely legal questions is exclusively vested in the SC by Sec. 17 of the Judiciary
Act (RA 296), it is apparent that the decision under review rendered by the CA without
jurisdiction should be set aside.
2. NO.
Reasoning. Where a subdivision owner seeks not just to eject the lot buyer who defaulted in
his payments but also prays that the residential building constructed by the buyer be
forfeited in plaintiff's favor, jurisdiction over the case belongs to the CFI not the MC in an
ejectment case. The issues raised before the inferior court did not only involved the
possession of the lot but also rights and obligations of the parties to the residential building
which under Art. 45 of the CC is real property. Aslo, plaintiff's claim to the bldg raises
question of ownership.
-A CFI cannot assume jurisdiction in a case appealed to it under SECII Rule 40 where one
of the parties objected to its jurisdiction. Since the original case was decided by the MC
without jurisdiction over the subject matter thereof, the CFI should have dismissed the cases
when it was brought before it on appeal.
Disposition. Without prejudice to the right of Ortigas to file the proper action in the proper
court, the decisions of the CA, CFI and MC of San Juan Rizal are set aside.
JOSEFA V ZHANDONG
GR 150903
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; December 8, 2003
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Tan represented himself to be the owner of hardboards and sold them to Josefa. Josefa
paid all his obligations to Tan. The hardboards apparently belonged to Zhandong. When Tan
failed to pay Zhandong, it sent a demand letter for the payment of the hardboards to both
Tan and Josefa.
Trial Court ruled in favor of Zhandong
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner ascribes to the CA the error in affirming the ruling of the trial court that Josefa is
liabe to Zhandong despite “THE MOUNTAIN OF EVIDENCE” showing that they had no
business transaction with each other and that it was Tan who was solely responsible to
Zhandong for the payment of the goods.
ISSUE
1. WON Josefa is liable to Zhandong for the payment of the merchandise
HELD
1. NO
Reasoning. Evidence indicate that Tan bought the hardboards from Zhandong and, in turn,
sold them to petitioner. However, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ignored this
glaring reality and instead held that petitioner purchased the boards directly from
respondent.
General Rule : Only questions of law may be entertained by the Supreme Court in a petition
for review on certiorari
Exceptions:
(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
(7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
(8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case;
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.
Disposition Petition is granted.
Change of venue
PEOPLE v. MAYOR PABLO SOLA
103 SCRA 393 (1981)
FERNANDO, C.J.
NATURE: Petition for certiorari1
FACTS
-September 15, 1980: acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary
commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the CFI of that province issued a search
warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of seven persons believed in the
possession of the accused MAYOR Pablo Sola in his hacienda at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental.
-September 16, 1980: armed with warrant, elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company
proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves
containing the bodies of Fernando Fernandez, Mateo Olimpos, Alfredo Perez, Custodio
Juanica, Arsolo Juanica, Rollie Callet and Bienvenido Emperado.
-September 23 and October 1, 1980: the PC provincial commander of Negros Occidental
filed seven (7) separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco
Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and fourteen (14) other
persons of unknown names. After due preliminary examination of the complainant's
1 The one who filed this appeal which partakes of a nature of certiorari are private prosecutors Francisco Cruz and Renecio Espiritu. The
assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors is that they are instituting the action `subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal. (CJ
Fernando’s prefatory statement states that the two have no legal standing to raise this petition. Since Sol Gen Mendoza never bothered to
question their legal standing, the Court contented itself with the fact that the Solicitor General has authority to raise this petition in behalf of
the People of the Philippines)
The Solicitor General adopted a two-pronged thrusts in this petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of
Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition
for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice."
witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the
accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest.
-However, without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt
of the accused is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary
release. The accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, and Jose Bethoven Cabral availed
themselves of this right and have since been released from detention.
-In a parallel development, the witnesses in the murder cases informed the prosecution of
their fears that if the trial is held at the Court of First Instance branch in Himamaylan which is
but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the
accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released
on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports
made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses." The facts
alleged argue strongly for the remedies sought, namely a change of venue and the
cancellation of the bail bonds.
-March 15, 1981: this Court issued the following resolution: "The Court Resolved to: (A)
[Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and
cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by
certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael
Gasataya, granting bail to the accused (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial
of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice;
(B) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso
Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance,
Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering
the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis
and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan; and
(C) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to
the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the
witnesses of the prosecution." THUS, THE ISSUE OF A CHANGE OF VENUE HAS
BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
-The comments respectively submitted by respondent Florendo Baliscao on March 5, 1981,
respondent Francisco Garcia on March 11, 1981 and respondent Pablo Sola on March 16,
1981, dealt solely with the question of the cancellation of the bail bonds. Such comments
were considered as answers, with the case thereafter deemed submitted for decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the bail bonds of respondents should be cancelled
HELD
YES.
Ratio. There being a failure to abide by the basic requirement that the prosecution be heard
in a case where the accused is charged with a capital offense, prior to bail being granted,
must be decided in favor of petitioner. The bail bonds must be cancelled and the case
remanded to the sala of Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio for such hearing.
Reasoning. Bail was granted to the accused in the Order of the Municipal Court without
hearing the prosecution. That is to disregard the authoritative doctrine enunciated in People
v. San Diego.
-Justice Capistrano: "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was
deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the
considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a
capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should
be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and
the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground."
-J. Cardozo: "THE LAW, AS WE HAVE SEEN, IS SEDULOUS IN MAINTAINING FOR A
DEFENDANT CHARGED WITH CRIME WHATEVER FORMS OF PROCEDURE ARE OF
THE ESSENCE OF AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND. PRIVILEGES SO FUNDAMENTAL
AS TO BE INHERENT IN EVERY CONCEPT OF A FAIR TRIAL THAT COULD BE
ACCEPTABLE TO THE THOUGHT OF REASONABLE MEN WILL BE KEPT INVIOLATE
AND INVIOLABLE, HOWEVER CRUSHING MAY BE THE PRESSURE OF
INCRIMINATING PROOF. BUT JUSTICE, THOUGH DUE TO THE ACCUSED, IS DUE TO
THE ACCUSER ALSO. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a
filament. We are to keep the balance true."
-the very essence of due process as the embodiment of justice requires that the prosecution
be given the opportunity to prove that there is strong evidence of guilt. It does not suffice, as
asserted herein, that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted
could be characterized as searching. The fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional
character.
ON CHANGE OF VENUE: The constitution is quite explicit. The Supreme Court could order
"a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice."
-People v. Gutierrez, J.B.L. Reyes: "…to compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a
locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a
mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established.
-The exercise by this Honorable Court of its above constitutional power in this case will be
appropriate. The witnesses in the case are fearful for their lives. They are afraid they would
be killed on their way to or from Himamaylan during any of the days of trial. Because of this
fear, they may either refuse to testify or testify falsely to save their lives.
-there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less
than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will
testify.
-The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of
doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue,
Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the assailed order of judge Rafael Gasataya granting bail to
private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect.
Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, to
whose sala the cases had been transferred by virtue of the resolution of this Court of March
5, 1981, is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the
prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against
the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
B. COURT OF APPEALS
ST MARTIN FUNERAL HOME VS NLRC
G.R. No. 130866
REGALADO; Sept 16, 1998
NATURE
Petition for certiorari which stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by herein
private respondent before the NLRC
FACTS
- . Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner
St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-
monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner of its value
added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). Petitioner on the other hand
claims that private respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed,
the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent,
who was formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial assistance
from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in overseeing the business.
- In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the
management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the payment of
taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show that the same
were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business operation and private
respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof.
As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.
- Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a
resolution setting aside the questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter
for immediate appropriate proceedings. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit,
hence the present petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE
WON the SC should entertain the present petition
HELD
NO (should be remanded to CA)
Ratio. All references in the amended Sec 9 of BP No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for
certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed
in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate
forum for the relief desired.
Reasoning. It will be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of the
Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically referred to
therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree
No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled and said
all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting
clause literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of
Appeals, but to this Court by necessary implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court of
Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and
those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of
course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by transposition, also
supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in accordance with the Labor Code. This is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could
not have intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the
decisions, resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.
-Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the opinion that
recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the process of judicial
review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, as he
commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the
aggrieved party on this reasoning: i.e., , to allow these cases to be appealed to the Court of
Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence on record be
reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies
are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
-Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom that factual
findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme
Court. A perusal of the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions.
-While the SC does not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score it adds the further observations that there is a growing
number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at
times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there is
undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional protection to labor.
-This case therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that the Supreme Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
Disposition.The instant petition for certiorari is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent
records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action
and disposition consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement
as to costs.
C. RTC
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JOSE B. FERNANDEZ, VS CA,
JUDGE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and
PRODUCERS PROPERTIES, INC.
208 SCRA 652
DAVIDE; May 8, 1992
NATURE
The common origin of these cases is Producers Bank of the Philippines and Producers
Properties, Inc. vs CB, Jose B. Fernandez. Jr. and the Monetary Board filed before the
Makati RTC.
- the consolidation of the 2 cases was ordered:
FIRST CASE- a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and the resolution of the CA.
The impugned decision upheld the Order of respondent Judge Guadiz granting the motion
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining CB, Fernandez and the Monetary
Board from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions No. 649 and No. 751, or from taking
the threatened appropriate alternative action and the Order in the same case denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss and vacate said injunction. The challenged resolution, on the
other hand, denied petitioners' MFR.
SECOND CASE- a petition for review directed principally against the decision of the CA
dismissing the petition therein filed and sustained the various Orders of the respondent
Judge, but directed the plaintiffs therein to amend the amended complaint by stating in its
prayer the specific amount of damages which Producers Bank of the Philippines (PBP)
claims to have sustained as a result of losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds
and abuses; the Clerk of Court was also ordered to determine the amount of filing fees
which should be paid by the plaintiffs within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
FACTS
- Petitioners claim that during the regular examination of the PBP, CB examiners stumbled
upon some highly questionable loans which had been extended by the PBP management to
several entities. Upon further examination, it was discovered that these loans, totalling
approximately P300 million, were "fictitious" as they were extended, without collateral, to
certain interests related to PBP owners themselves. Said loans were deemed to be
anomalous particularly because the total paid-in capital of PBP at that time was only P
140.544 million. This means that the entire paid-in capital of the bank, together with some
P160 million of depositors' money, was utilized by PBP management to fund these
unsecured loans.
- at the height of the controversy surrounding the discovery of the anomalous loans, several
blind items about a family-owned bank in Binondo which granted fictitious loans to its
stockholders appeared in major newspapers. These news items triggered a bank-run in PBP
which resulted in continuous over-drawings on the bank's demand deposit account with the
CB. On the basis of the report submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector,
Department I of the CB, the Monetary Board (MB placed PBP under conservatorship.
- PBP nonetheless requested that the same be lifted by the CB. Consequently, the MB
directed the principal stockholders of PBP to increase its capital accounts by such an
amount that would be necessary for the elimination of PBP's negative net worth.
- CB senior deputy Governor Gabriel Singson informed PBP that the CB would be willing to
lift the conservatorship under the following conditions:
(a) PBP's unsecured overdraft with the Central Bank will be converted into an emergency
loan, to be secured by sufficient collateral
(b) A comptroller for PBP and any number of bank examiners deemed necessary to oversee
PBP's operations shall be designated by the CB, under terms of reference to be determined
by the Governor;
(c) A letter from the Management of PBP authorizing the CB to automatically return clearing
items that would result in an overdraft in its CB account shall be submitted to the CB.
- the MB approved the consolidation of PBP's other unsecured obligations to the CB with its
overdraft and authorizing the conversion thereof into an emergency loan. The same
resolution authorized the CB Governor to lift the conservatorship and return PBP's
management to its principal stockholders upon completion of the documentation and full
collateralization of the emergency loan, but directed PBP to pay the emergency loan in 5
equal annual installments, with interest and penalty rates at MRR 180 days plus 48% per
annum, and liquidated damages of 5% for delayed payments.
- PBP submitted a rehabilitation plan to the CB. Although said proposal was explored and
discussed, no program acceptable to both the CB and PPI was arrived at because of
disagreements on certain matters such as interest rates, penalties and liquidated damages.
No other rehabilitation program was submitted by PBP for almost 3 years; as a result
thereof, its overdrafts with the CB continued to accumulate. Consequently, per Resolution
No. 649, the CB Monetary Board decided to approve in principle what it considered a viable
rehabilitation program for PBP.
- There being no response from both PBP and PPI on the proposed rehabilitation plan, the
MB issued Resolution No. 751 on 7 August 1987 instructing CB management to advise the
bank that:
a. The CB conservatorship over PBP may be lifted only after PBP shall have identified the
new group of stockholders who will put in new capital in PBP and after the Monetary Board
shall have considered such new stockholders as acceptable; and
b. The stockholders of PBP have to decide whether or not to accept the terms of the
rehabilitation plan as provided under Resolution
No. 649 within one week from receipt of notice hereof and if such terms are not acceptable
to them, the Central Bank will take appropriate alternative action on the matter; . . .
- the PBP, without responding to the communications of the CB, filed a complaint against the
CB, the MB and CB Governor Jose B. Fernandez, Jr. The complaint, alleged that the
conservatorship was unwarranted, ill-motivated, illegal, utterly unnecessary and unjustified;
that the appointment of the conservator was arbitrary; that herein petitioners acted in bad
faith; that the CB-designated conservators committed bank frauds and abuses; that the CB
is guilty of promissory estoppel; and that by reason of the conservatorship, it suffered
losses. It prayed for a judicial review of the MB Resolutions and the issuance of a TRO.
- The case was raffled to Branch 147 of Makati RTC court which was then presided over by
respondent Judge.
- respondent Judge issued a TRO; Subsequently, he issued an Order enjoining defendant-
petitioners or any of their agents from implementing Monetary Board Resolutions Nos. 649
and 751 or from taking the threatened "appropriate alternative action" including exclusion of
plaintiff bank from settlement of clearing balances at the Central Bank clearing house or any
other action that will disturb the status quo or the viability of plaintiff bank during the
pendency of this case conditioned upon the posting of a bond in the amount of
P2,000,000.00.
- PBP filed the Amended Complaint impleading PPI as an additional plaintiff. No new
allegations or causes of action for said plaintiff were made. Petitioners filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
- the respondent Judge handed down an Order denying the motion to dismiss on the
following grounds: (a) the amended complaint alleges ultimate facts showing that plaintiff
has a right and that such a right has been violated by defendant; the questioned MB
Resolutions were issued arbitrarily and with bad faith, "being a part of a scheme to divest
plaintiff's present stockholders of their control of PBP and to award the same to the PDIC or
its unknown transferees"; and the averments of legality or illegality of the conservatorship
are relevant to the cause of action since the complaint seeks the lifting of the
conservatorship; (b) While it is true that under Section 28-A of the Central Bank Act the
conservator takes over the management of a bank, the Board of Directors of such bank is
not prohibited from filing a suit to lift the conservatorship and from questioning the validity of
both the conservator's fraudulent acts and abuses and its principal's (MB) arbitrary action;
besides, PPI is now a party-plaintiff in the action; and (c) plaintiffs have paid the correct filing
fees since "the value of the case cannot be estimated."
FIRST CASE
- Unable to accept the above Order, CB and Fernandez filed with respondent CA a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul the Orders of the respondent Judge, restrain
the implementation of the same and nullify the writ of preliminary injunction. They contend
therein that: 1. The trial court's injunctive order and writ are anomalous and illegal because
they are directed against CB acts and measures which constitute no invasion of plaintiff's
rights; and 2. The complaint filed was, on its face, dismissible: (a) for failure to state a cause
of action, (b) for being unauthorized by the party in whose name it purports to have been
filed, and (c) for failure of the purported plaintiff to pay the required filing fees.
- CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the CB's sudden and untimely
announcement of the conservatorship over PBP eroded the confidence which the banking
public had hitherto reposed on the bank and resulted in the bank-run; it then concluded that
when the CB "peremptorily and illtimely announced" the conservatorship, PBP was not given
an opportunity to be heard since the CB arbitrarily brushed aside administrative due process
notwithstanding PBP's having sufficiently established its inherent corporate right to
autonomously perform its banking activities without undue governmental interference that
would in effect divest its stockholders of their control over the operations of the bank." It
further held that the challenged resolutions of the MB are not just advisory in character
"because the same sought to impose upon the respondent bank petitioners' governmental
acts that were specifically designed and executed to devise a scheme that would irreparably
divest from the stockholders of the respondent bank control of the same."
On the issue of the non-payment of the correct docket fees, the said court, in ruling that the
correct amount was paid, said that "the instant case is incapable of pecuniary estimation
because the value of the losses incurred by the respondent bank cannot be calibrated nor
pinned down to a specific amount in view of the damage that may be caused by the
appointment of a conservator to its goodwill and standing in the community."
- petitioners filed with this Court the instant petition for review. It is alleged therein that the
respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in:
(1) Ignoring petitioners' contention that since PBP did not pay the correct filing fees, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case; hence, pursuant to Manchester Development
Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., the complaint should have been dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the court;
(2) . . . ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the conservatorship as a basis for
determining the existence of a cause of action since the amended complaint does not seek
the annulment or lifting of the conservatorship;
(3) . . . not holding that the amended complaint should have been dismissed because it was
filed in the name of PBP without the authority of its conservator; and
(4) . . . not setting aside the Order of the trial court granting the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction which unlawfully restrained the CB from exercising its mandated
responsibilities and effectively compelled it to allow the PBP to continue incurring overdrafts
with it.
- private respondents argue that the Manchester rule is not applicable in the case at bar
because what is primarily sought for herein is a writ of injunction and not an award for
damages; it is further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is neither appealable
nor be made the proper subject of a petition for certiorari absent a clear showing of lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
SECOND CASE
- Pursuant to the powers and authority conferred upon her by the Central Bank, Atty.
Leonida Tansinsin-Encarnacion, in her capacity as conservator, instituted reforms aimed at
making PBP more viable. With this purpose in mind, she started reorganizing the bank's
personnel and committees.
- In order to prevent her from continuing with the reorganization, PBP filed an Omnibus
Motion asking the trial court for an order:
(a) reinstating PBP officers to their original positions and restoring the bank's standing
committees to their respective compositions prior to said reorganization; (b) enjoining the
lease of any portion of the bank's space in Producers Bank Centre building to third parties
and the relocation of departments/offices of PBP as was contemplated; and (c) to hold, after
an opportunity to be heard is given her, said conservator in contempt of court for
disobedience of and resistance to the writ of injunction. An opposition to the contempt
charge was later filed by said petitioner.
- respondent Judge issued an Order (a) requiring conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion to
reinstate PBP officers to their original positions prior to the reorganization of the bank's
personnel and restore PBP's standing committees to their original compositions, and (b)
restraining her from leasing out to third parties any portion of PBP's space in the Producers
Bank Centre building.
- A second Order directed Tansinsin-Encarnacion to publish the financial statement of PBP
- On several occasions thereafter, conservator Tansinsin-Encarnacion caused the
publication of PBP's financial statement as required by regulations, without, however,
carrying the items enumerated by the trial court as "suspense accounts." Consequently,
contempt charges were filed against her, of which she was found guilty. Tansinsin-
Encarnacion filed a petition for certiorari against respondent Judge, Henry L. Co and the law
firm of Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista. She prays therein for judgment declaring
respondent judge to be without jurisdiction to entertain both the complaint and amended
complaint; declaring null and void all his orders, specially the contempt orders; and finding
respondent Judge and respondent lawyers guilty of violating their respective oaths of office.
- In her Memorandum submitted to the CA, Tansinsin-Encarnacion alleged that: (1)
respondent Judge has no jurisdiction because the filing of the case was not authorized by
the petitioner or the conservator in violation of Section 28-A of R.A. No. 265, as amended, it
was filed after the ten (10) day period prescribed by Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as
amended, and the correct docket fees were not paid; (2) respondent Judge illegally ordered
her to return to PPI the administration of the bank's three (3) properties, contrary to his own
writ of preliminary injunction and earlier order to make the bank viable, and to publish the
alleged "suspense accounts" contrary to Section 28-A of R.A. No. 265, as amended, the writ
of preliminary injunction and her constitutional right to silence; (3) respondent Judge erred in
declaring her in contempt of court notwithstanding his lack of jurisdiction over the case and
failure to set any date for the hearing and reception of evidence, in violation of her right to
due process of law; and (4) respondents Judge and lawyers are administratively liable for
their grossly illegal actuations and for depriving the Government of at least P13.2 million in
filing fees.
- In disposing of the issues raised, respondent Court merely adopted with approval the ruling
of the respondent Judge on the question of jurisdiction, sustaining the respondent Judge's
ruling. As to the filing of the complaint after the lapse of the 10-day period provided for in
Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, it ruled that the Section does not apply because the complaint
essentially seeks to compel the conservator to perform his duties and refers to
circumstances and incidents which transpired after said 10-day period.
- On the issue of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of correct filing fees, to which an
exception was made in the dispositive portion, the respondent Court found the same to be
"partly" meritorious. It agreed with petitioner that while the other losses and damages sought
to be recovered are incapable of pecuniary estimation, the damages inflicted on PBP due to
losses of operation and the conservator's bank frauds and abuses were in fact pegged at
P108,479,771.00 in paragraph 26 of the amended complaint. This specific amount,
however, should have been stated in the prayer of the complaint. It also held that the
Manchester case "has been legally construed in the subsequent case of Sun Insurance
Office Ltd. and the case of Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. to the effect that applying the
doctrine initiated in the case of Manchester, together with said subsequent thereto (sic),
plaintiffs in the original case should be given a reasonable time to amend their complaint,
more particularly, to state in their prayer in the amended complaint the specific amount of
damages . . ."
- On the orders of contempt and the reasons therefor, respondent Court merely stated:
. . . Generally, when the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and of the person,
decisions upon or questions pertinent to the cause are decisions within its jurisdiction, and
however, irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.
- Finally, on the administrative liability of the respondent Judge and the lawyers, the
respondent Court declared the claim to be without merit.
ISSUE
WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in not dismissing the Civil Case on the ground of non-payment of the correct
amount of docket fee in violation of the rule enunciated in Manchester Development Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
HELD
Ratio The action must be dismissed for failure of the plaintiffs therein to pay the correct
docket fees, pursuant to Manchester. The said case was decided by this Court on 7 May
1987, exactly 3 months and 20 days before the filing of the original complaint and 5 months
and 18 days before the filing of the Amended Complaint. It was ruled therein that:
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not
thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based
on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.
Reasoning The respondent Judge, in ruling that PBP and PPI had paid the correct docket
fee of P102.00, said that "the value of the case cannot be estimated" since what is sought is
an injunction against the enforcement of the challenged resolutions of the MB; in short, the
claim for damages is merely incidental. Upon the other hand, respondent Court, in its
Resolution, ruled that the case is "incapable of pecuniary estimation" because the value of
the losses incurred by the PBP "cannot be calibrated nor pinned down to a specific amount
in view of the damage that may be caused by the appointment of a conservator to its
goodwill and standing in the community."
Both conclusions are unfounded and are the result of a misapprehension of the allegations
and causes of action in both the complaint and amended complaint.
- While PBP cleverly worded its complaint to make it appear as one principally for injunction,
deliberately omitting the claim for damages as a specific cause of action, a careful
examination thereof bears that the same is in reality an action for damages arising out of the
alleged "unwarranted, ill-motivated and illegal conservatorship," or a conservatorship which
"was utterly unnecessary and unjustified," and the "arbitrary" appointment of a conservator.
Thus, as stated earlier, it devoted the bulk of its petition to detailed events, occurrences and
transactions in support thereof and patiently enumerated the losses it sustained and
suffered.
- These are the very damages referred to in the prayer:
“to fully repair the damages inflicted on PBP consisting of losses of operation and the
conservators' bank frauds and abuses”
but not specified therein. To this Court's mind, this was done to evade the payment of the
corresponding filing fees which, as computed by petitioner on the basis alone of the
specified losses of P108,479,771.00, would amount to about P 437,000.00. The PBP then
clearly acted with manifest bad faith in resorting to the foregoing clever strategy to avoid
paying the correct filing fees. The pronouncements in the Manchester case should thus be
reiterated:
The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the
practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this case of omitting any specification
of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in
the body of the complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the
payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of the
filing fee. . . .
- The respondent Court itself, confronted by the same issue, but perhaps unaware of its
earlier Resolution, ruled that PBP and PPI are liable for the filing fees on the claim for
damages.
- respondent Court applied the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office and Filipinas Shell
Petroleum Corp. which were, by then, already overturned by Manchester. Even granting for
the sake of argument that Sun Insurance and Pilipinas Shell may apply in this case, the
Court categorically stated:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter
or nature of the action. Where the filling of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow the payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
- The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the period within which a specific action
must be filed. It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid before the lapse of
the prescriptive period.
- There can be no question that in the instant case, PBP's claims for damages arise out of
an injury to its rights. Pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, the action therefor must be
initiated within 4 years from the time the cause of action accrued. Since the damages arose
out of the alleged unwarranted, ill-motivated, illegal, unnecessary and unjustified
conservatorship, the cause of action, if any, first accrued in 1984 and continued until 1987,
when the original complaint was filed. There is no showing that PBP paid the correct filing
fee for the claim within the prescribed period. Hence, nothing can save the case from being
dismissed.
DISPOSITION
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the
CA are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case.
All proceedings undertaken and all orders issued by respondent Judge are hereby SET
ASIDE for being null and void.
ASCUE v CA (ANTONIO)
GR No. 84330
Padilla; May 8, 1991
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Private respondents Ramon Antonio, Salvador Salenga and Ulipia Fernandez (lessees)
filed a complaint with the MetroTC alleging that petitioner Ascue (lessor) refused to collect
their rentals. Hence, they sought consignation of the payments with the MetroTC.
- Ascue filed a motion to dismiss complaint on the ground that it is the RTC not MTC which
has jurisdiction over consignation cases, the subject matter of litigation being incapable of
pecuniary estimation. The MetroTC denied Ascue’s motion to dismiss and held that the
inferior court had jurisdiction since the consigned amount was P5,625 (well below 20K).
- Ascue later appealed to the RTC but the same dismissed the appeal for being premature.
Ascue brought the case to the SC on direct appeal but the case was referred back to the
CA. The CA then dismissed the petition and ruled that the jurisdiction of a court in
consignation cases depends on the amount consigned, consignation being merely a form of
payment and the opposite of a demand by a creditor for payment.
ISSUE
WON the CA erred in holding that consignation cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
MetroTC and that the amount consigned determines said jurisdiction
HELD
No.
Ratio In valid consignation cases, where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of
money, the amount of debt due is determinable, hence, the subject matter is capable of
pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to be consigned then determines the jurisdiction
of the court.
Reasoning petitioner is of the belief that it is the RTC, not the MTC, which has jurisdiction
over the case, inasmuch as the subject matter of litigation (the amount to be consigned) is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. This is wrong. Consignation is the act of depositing the
thing due with the court or judicial authorities whenever the creditor cannot accept or refuses
to accept payment and it generally requires a prior tender of payment. Two of the requisites
of it valid consignation are (1) that there is a debt due. and (2) the amount is placed it the
disposal of the court. Thus, where no debt is due and owing, consignation is not proper. In a
valid consignation where the thing sought to be deposited is a sum of money, the amount of
the debt due is determinable. Clearly, the subject matter (i.e., the amount due) in
consignation cases is capable of pecuniary estimation. This amount sought to be consigned
determines the jurisdiction of the court.
- In the case at bar. the amount consigned being P5,625.00, the respondent metropolitan
trial court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the same in accordance with Section 33(1) of
BP Blg. 129.
Disposition Petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
NEGRE v CABAHUG SHIPPING
16 SCRA 655
 DIZON; April 29, 1966
NATURE
Appeal
FACTS
- On August 14, 1961, Negre (appellant) filed his complaint against Cabahug
Shipping & Co (appellee), a common carrier engaged in the business of
transporting persons and goods for a price within Philippine waters, to recover the
sum of P3,774.90, representing the value of a cargo of dried fish belonging to him
which was loaded on the latter's vessel, and which was totally destroyed on board
thereof, before it could be transported to its place of destination, due to the gross
negligence of the officers and members of the crew of said vessel
- As Cabahug’s answer admitted liability for the loss of said cargo, but only up to
the amount of P3,733,78, appellant moved for a judgment on the pleadings. In
replying thereto, however, appellee moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the amount of the claim did not fall within the jurisdiction of the court. Resolving
this motion, the court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without
prejudice to the right of appellant to file the same with the corresponding municipal
court.
- Appellant maintains in this appeal that his action is one in admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction, which, pursuant to the provisions of Section 44 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the courts of first
instance, irrespective of the amount or the value of the goods involved.
ISSUE/S
WON the case falls within the jurisdiction of CFI (RTC)
HELD
YES
Ratio. It has been held that, to give admiralty jurisdiction over a contract, the same must
relate to the trade and business of the sea Admiralty jurisdiction, it has also been held,
extends to all maritime torts.
Reasoning. The action was based upon an oral contract for the transportation of goods by
water.
-Moreover, the allegations of the complaint clearly show: first, that the contract entered into
between the parties had already been partially performed with the loading of the goods
subject-matter thereof on board appellee's vessel and the acceptance thereof by said
appellee, and second, that the maritime contract binding the parties was breached by the
carrier because through his fault and that of his agents and representatives the cargo
became a total loss.
Disposition Reversed.
BAITO V SARMIENTO
109 Phil. 148
PADILLA; APR 25, 1960
NATURE
Appeal from CFI Samar
FACTS
-Lucina Baito filed action for support against her husband Anatalio Sarmiento.
-CFI Samar dismissed her complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction, the
amount demanded as support being only P720
ISSUE
WON the CFI has jurisdiction over an action for support if the amount claimed or demanded
as support is only P720, or not more than P2,000 (now P5,000)
HELD
Ratio. An action for support does not only involve the determination of the amount to be
given as support, but also the relation of the parties, the right to support created by the
relation, the needs of the claimant, the financial resources of the person from whom support
is sought, all of which are not capable of pecuniary estimation.
Reasoning. An action for support falls within the original jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance under section 44(a) of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No.
2613.
Disposition The order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded
D. METROPOLITAN, MUNICIPAL, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil and estate settlement proceedings/over
provisional remedies
Exclusive original jurisdiction in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases
LIM V CA (PIZARRO)
00 SCRA 00
GANCAYCO; March 18, 1991
NATURE
Petition to review the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
FACTS
- Lim Kieh Tong, Inc. owns a building in Manila. One of the rooms in the building (Room
301) is occupied by Reginaldo Lim, an MTC judge.
- The original occupant of Room 103 was Lim Eng Piao, the father of Reginaldo. When Lim
Eng Piao died, the occupancy was continued by Reginaldo. Eventually, Reginaldo was able
to acquire a house and lot in Quezon City but he still used the room where he kept his
books, documents, appliances and other important belongings.
- September 1987 – LKT, Inc. changed the lock of the main door of the building which was
commonly used by all the occupants of the building.
- September 30, 1987 – Reginaldo was unable to enter the building because he did not have
a key to the new lock. He was unable to get his law books for a case he was working on so
he had to purchase new ones which cost him P1,235.00.
- October 1, 1987 - He requested for a new key from the OIC of the buiding but his request
was not complied with.
- October 2, 1987 – Reginaldo instituted a civil case against Rafael Lim and Lim Kieh Tong,
Inc. before the Metropolitan Trial Court. The complaint was denominated as an action for
damages with injunction but was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- October 23, 1987 – Another complaint was instituted in the MTC which had the same
allegations. Reginaldo alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable right to the use of said
room, entitling him to the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to command petitioner to
provide him the appropriate key to the lock of the main building; and to pay damages in the
amount of P1,253.00, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs of the suit.
- November 2, 1987 - A temporary restraining order was issued by respondent judge
pending trial on the merits, commanding LKT, Inc. to deliver the appropriate keys to
Reginaldo and to allow him to enter the premises and Room 301 of the building. -
November 3, 1987 – LKT, Inc. instituted the instant petition.
- The Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the enforcement of
the temporary restraining order earlier issued by respondent judge and from further taking
cognizance of said civil case.
With regard to the issue of possession: Force was used by LKT, Inc. in depriving
Reginaldo of physical possession of the room when the main door’s lock was changed
without the knowledge and consent of Reginaldo.
- The issue involved is mere physical possession (possession de facto) and not juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor ownership.
- The purpose of forcible entry is that regardless of the actual condition of the title to
property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror.
- Considering that respondent judge found the applicability of the Rule in Summary
Procedure, the motion to dismiss was correctly denied, a motion to dismiss being one of the
prohibited pleadings and motions under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules on Summary
Procedure.
With regard to the issue of jurisdiction:
- LKT, Inc. argued that when the amount of damages claimed is not specifically alleged in
the complaint, jurisdiction over the case would fall under the RTC as the failure to so allege
would characterize the subject matter as one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
- In Singson vs. Aragon, the SC held that exemplary damages must be specified and if not,
the municipal trial court could still grant it, if together with the other money claims, the
amount of the total claim does not exceed P10,000.00 (now P20,000).
ISSUE
WON the action for specific performance in this case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC
HELD
NO
Ratio In Vichanco vs. Laurilla, it was held that what confers jurisdiction on the inferior court
in forcible entry and illegal detainer cases is not the amount of unpaid rentals or damages
involved, but rather the nature of the action because the rents or damages are only
incidental to the main action.
Reasoning
- The suit is one for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It was
through stealth that LKT, Inc. prevented Reginaldo from using the room.
- Any person deprived of possession of any land or building or part thereof, may file an
action for forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior court against the person unlawfully
depriving or withholding possession from him.
- This relief is available to a landlord, vendor and vendee and also to a tenant or lessee or
any other person against whom the possession of any land or building, or a part of it, is
unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise unlawfully deprived possession within 1 year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding possession.
Disposition Petition is denied. No costs.
Exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions involving title to or possession
of real property
RUSSELL V VESTIL
304 SCRA 738
KAPUNAN; March 17, 1999
NATURE
Petition for Certiorari
FACTS
- Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF
NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the RTC of Mandaue City
- The complaint alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land in Liloan, Cebu.
The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho.
- Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein
petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided until
petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND
DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION"
- By virtue of this deed, respondents divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners.
- The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued
to partition the land among all the heirs.
- Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
over the nature of the case as the action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value
of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the
jurisdiction of the MCTC of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu
- Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the complaint is for the
annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the RTC
- The respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.
- A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners
- Respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.
- Respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration.
- Hence, this petition
ISSUE
WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the civil case.
HELD
YES.
Ratio Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill: In determining whether an action is one the subject
matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend
on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed
of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the
assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the
case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).
Reasoning The subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document
denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to
declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves as the
only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and
entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this
is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-
described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
Disposition The petition was GRANTED.
E. SPECIAL RULES
MANUFACTURER'S DISTRIBUTORS, INC., V
YU SIU LIONG
11 SCRA 680
REYES, JBL; April 29 1966
NATURE: Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI Manila sustaining and affirming
an order of the MTC Manila dismissing the original complaint for want of jurisdiction.
FACTS
-Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. had filed action in MTC Manila, Branch III, seeking to
compel Yu Siu Liong to accept delivery of 74,500 pieces of plastifilm bags, balance of
100,000 pieces ordered by said Yu Sio Liong and supplied by the Manufacturer’s
Distributors; to pay P3,376.00, the value of the 100,000 pieces of plastifilm bags ordered by
him, plus 12% interest per annum thereon until fully paid; and to pay the amount of P844.00,
for and as stipulated attorney's fees. Manuufacturer’s Distributors also prayed for such other
reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.
-Yu Sio Liong filed MTD on the ground that, the subject of the litigation being specific
performance, the same lay within the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI. MTC upheld Yu Sio
Liong and dismissed the complaint.
-CFI affirmed the order of dismissal with costs, saying: “Manufacturer’s Distributors's action
before the MTC was one for specific performance… Whether refusal to accept delivery of
said plastifilms was justified or not is not capable of pecuniary estimation and was, therefore,
not cognizable by the Municipal Court."
-Manufacturer’s Distributors contend that the subject of the litigation were the 100,000
plastifilm bags, contracted for by Yu Sio Liong at a total price of P3,376.00, and, therefore, it
was susceptible of pecuniary estimation.
ISSUE
WON the issue is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and is therefore not within the
jurisdiction of MTC
HELD
YES.
-There is no controversy, as to the contractual price for the plastifilm bags; the dispute is
whether or not Yu Sio Liong was justified in its refusal to accept the delivery of the bags.
This matter plainly is not capable of pecuniary estimation, and, therefore, is not within the
jurisdiction of the MTC.
-Speaking of the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace and Municipal Courts, the
Judiciary Act, as amended, in its sec88, after conferring original jurisdiction in Justice of the
Peace and Municipal Courts over cases where the value of the subject matter or amount of
the demand does not exceed P5,000.00, provides nevertheless in its par2 that "The
jurisdiction of a justice of the peace and judge of a municipal court shall not extend to civil
actions in which the subject of litigation is not capable of pecuniary estimation, except in
forcible entry and detainer cases; nor to those which involve the legality of any tax, impost or
assessment; nor to actions involving admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; nor to matters of
probate, the appointments of trustees or receiver; nor to actions for annulment of
marriages; . . ." Jurisdiction over the classes of cases thus excluded is conferred on the CFI
(Judiciary Act, sec44).
-That Manufacturer’s Distributors's complaint also sought the payment by Yu Sio Liong of
P3,376.00 plus interest and attorney's fees, does not give a pecuniary estimation to the
litigation, for the payment of such amounts can only be ordered as a consequence of the
specific performance primarily sought. In other words, such payment would be but an
incident or consequence of Yu Sio Liong's liability for specific performance. If no such
liability is judicially declared, the payment cannot be awarded. Hence, the amounts sought
do not represent the value of the subject of litigation.
-Subject matter over which jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, has reference, not to
the res or property involved in the litigation nor to a particular case, but to the class of cases,
the purported subject of litigation, the nature of the action and of the relief sought.
-The [Municipal Trial] Court has no jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of a
contract, although the damages alleged for its breach, if permitted, are within the amount of
which that court has jurisdiction.
-Cruz vs. Tan (87 Phil. 627) is inapplicable. In said case, the plaintiff had made an
alternative prayer: specific performance or payment of the sum of P644.31. The alternative
prayer meant that the payment of the latter sum was a pecuniary estimation of the specific
performance sought, since it would equally satisfy the claims of the plaintiffs. In the present
case, the payment in money is not an alternative equivalent, but a consequence or result of
the specific performance, and hence can not constitute a pecuniary estimation thereof.
Disposition CFI order affirmed.
CRUZ V TAN
87 SCRA 627
JUGO; November 27, 1950
NATURE: Original action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and prohibition with injunction.
FACTS
- August 3, 1949: respondent Telesfora Yambao filed a complaint against the petitioner
Manuel Cruz, praying that the latter be ordered to finish the construction of a house
mentioned in the complaint, or to pay her the sum of P644.31.
- Within ten days from the receipt of the summons, the petitioner filed a motion for a bill of
particulars, which was denied by the court.
- September 19, 1949: petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the
CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit—the demand contained in the
prayer is only for P644.31, which falls under the Justice of the Peace or the Judge of the
Municipal Court. The motion to dismiss was denied by the court, and trial for the merits was
also set.
- Order setting the case for trial on October 10, 1949 was received by petitioner’s counsel on
October 12 (two days after). Since the parties did not appear at the trial, the court dismissed
the case for lack of interest of the parties on October 10, 1949.
- October 12, 1949: respondent Yambao filed a motion praying that the trial of the case be
set for November 14, 1949. The motion was heard on October 15, 1949, but as the
petitioner’s counsel received notice of the said motion on Oct. 15, he could not appear in the
said hearing.
ISSUE
1. WON CFI has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD
NO
Ratio The jurisdiction of the respective courts is determined by the value of the demand and
not the value of the transaction out of which the demand arose.
Reasoning
- The case comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal court or justice of
the peace court.
Judiciary Act of 1948
SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction.—CFI shall have original jurisdiction:
(c) In all cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in
controversy, amounts to more than two thousand pesos.
SEC. 86. Jurisdiction of justices of the peace and judges of municipal courts of chartered
cities.—
(b) Original jurisdiction in civil actions arising in their respective municipalities, and not
exclusively cognizable by the CFI.
SEC. 88. Original Jurisdiction in civil cases.—
Xxx exclusive original jurisdiction where the value of the subject-matter or amount of the
demand does not exceed two thousand pesos, exclusive of interest and costs.
- The alternative prayer for specific performance is also of the same value, for the alternative
prayers would not have been made in the complaint if one was more valuable than the
other; the specific performance alternatively prayed for is capable of pecuniary estimation at
P644.31.
DISPOSITION
Judge of CFI is declared without jurisdiction to try the case, and is ordered to stop further
proceedings by dismissing the case.
LAPITAN V SCANDIA
24 SCRA 477
REYES, J.B.L., July 31, 1968
FACTS
- Andres Lapitan has appealed directly to this Court against an order of the CFI of Cebu,
dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his complaint for rescission and damages against
appellees Scandia, Inc., of Manila and General Engineering Co. of Cebu. Plaintiff avers that
on April 17, 1963 he purchased from Scandia, Inc., one ABC Diesel Engine; that he bought
the engine for running a rice and corn mill; that defendants had warranted and assured him
that all spare parts for said engine are kept in stock in their stores, enabling him to avoid
loss due to long periods of waiting, and that defendants would replace any part of the engine
that might break within 12 months after delivery.
- The cam rocker arm of the engine broke due to faulty material and workmanship and it
stopped functioning; the sellers were unable to send a replacement until August 29, 1963;
barely six days after replacement the new part broke again due to faulty casting and poor
material, so Lapitan notified the sellers and demanded rescission of the contract of sale; he
sought return of the price and damages but defendants did not pay.
- Scandia, Inc., moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the total amount claimed
was only P8,735.00, and was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court, under
RA 3828, amending the Judiciary Act by increasing the jurisdiction of municipal courts to
civil cases involving P10,000.00 or less. The CFI dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction.
Lapitan appealed directly to this Court, arguing (1) that rescission was incapable of
pecuniary estimation, and (2) that as he claimed moral and exemplary damages, besides
the price of P3,735.00, P4,000.00 actual damages, and P1,000.00 attorneys' fees, the value
of his demand exceeded the jurisdiction of the municipal court.
ISSUE
WON CFI had jurisdiction
HELD
YES.
Ratio. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the CFI would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where
the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, or where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in
suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract and in actions for support, or for
annulment of a judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions
as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by theCFI. Actions for specific performance of contracts have been
expressly pronounced to be exclusively cognizable by the CFI. And no cogent reason
appears why an action for rescission should be differently treated. We, therefore, rule that
the subject matter of actions for rescission of contracts are not capable of pecuniary
estimation.
THE GOOD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION V TUTAAN
73 SCRA 189
CONCEPCION; September 30, 1976
NATURE: Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- A complaint was filed before the CFI of Rizal against private respondents Guillermo delos
Reyes and Marcelina Marcelo for the recovery of the sum of P1520 plus interest and the
sum equivalent to 25% of the total amount due as attorney’s fees, and in default of payment
thereof, to order the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage (worth P15,340) executed by the
said respondents. Gregorio Emperado and Leonarda de la Cruz were made party
defendants since they were co-makers of the promissory note.
- Private respondents, in their answer claims that the loaned sued upon is only one of five
loans secured by them from the petitioner wherein they were charged usurious interest.
They claim that the balance due is only P1260.
- For failure to plead, Emperado was declared in default while the case against de la Cruz
was dismissed w/o prejudice.
- Respondents file a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction since the petitioner only prays
for P1520. It therefore comes under the jurisdiction of the original jurisdiction of the
municipal court. Also, since the petitioner prays for foreclosure of chattel in Bulacan, it
should have been filed there where the deed of chattel mortgage is located. The CFI
dismissed the case. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the city court has jurisdiction
HELD
1. YES.
Ratio Although the purpose of the action is to recover an amount plus interest which comes
within the original jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court, yet when said action
involves foreclosure of chattel mortgage covering properties valued at more than P10,000,
the action should be instituted before the CFI.
Reasoning In the case at bar, the amount sought to be recovered is P1520 plus interest
and costs, and chattel mortgage of properties valued at P15340. It is therefore within the
jurisdiction of the CFI.

Disposition Petition granted