ANOTHER LOOK AT

ANTONY FLEW'S PRESUMPTION OF ATHEISM

by Chris Ullman
M.A. Trinity Evangelical Divinity School of
Trinity International University

Presented November 18, 1995 at Philadelphia

to the 47th Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society
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I.
"Do not presume anything!" is a common warning in the academic world, in the
scientific world, in the legal world and in the business world. It is repeated because we so
often accept certain things to be true and certain methods to be reliable, regardless of the
time or the context, and in so doing, we often fall into error. Successful thinkers question
presumptions, and new ideas result. These new ideas bring with them new presumptions,
which must in turn be subjected to scrutiny and adaptation. It is not that presumptions are
never made. They must be made, every day, or life would grind to a standstill. David
Hume, although he was one of the most rigorous of all skeptics, nevertheless saw that
there must be an end to the endless skeptical tedium, and a beginning to the armchair
comforts of a good game of backgammon. Even for him, there was a point at which he
presumed the existence of the chair, the board, the blots, the dice, the opponent seated
opposite him, and of course, himself.
Rather than the brusque prohibition in the opening sentence, it seems more
appropriate to require that no presumptions be made without first examining the context
in which they will serve. The rules should fit the game. When we can agree on the right
presumptions, then and only then should the players take their positions.
The esteemed philosopher Antony Flew, in his article "The Presumption of
Atheism,"1 writes that a debate over the existence of God should properly begin at a
certain starting point. It should begin with the presumption that each party to the debate
is (for procedural purposes) an atheist.2 Flew maintains that if this presumption is
accepted, and he feels it must be accepted, then the burden of proof lies on the one who
claims to be a theist, in much the same way as in a court of law a presumption of
innocence is accepted and the burden of proof lies on the prosecution.

II.
Terms need to be identified. By 'presumption,' Flew means the opposite of
'presumptuousness;' indeed it might be regarded instead as a "modest teachability,"3 in the
sense of a condition or basis for accepting knowledge in its broadest form, as the
courtroom presumption of innocence is a modest teachability (in theory, at least).
Presumptions, he writes, can be of two types:
(a) substantive, in which the content of one's convictions are necessarily part of the
presumption, or
(b) procedural, in which no convictions are assumed, but for the sake of argument a
certain methodology is accepted.4
It is in the sense of (b) that he asserts the presumption of atheism.
'Atheism,' for Flew, has at least two meanings:
(a) 'positive atheism,' the positive assertion of the non-existence of God, or
(b) 'negative atheism,' the stance taken by anyone "who is simply not a theist."5

1Flew, Antony, "The Presumption of Atheism," in Contemporary Perspectives on Religious

Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 19.
2See Flew's definition of "atheist" below.
3Ibid., 19.
4Ibid.
5Ibid., 20.
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This second novel use of the term 'atheism' is of crucial importance. Negative atheism is
not synonymous with agnosticism, for in the latter case one has apparently already
"conceded that there is, and that you have, a legitimate concept of God"6 that theoretically
could have an application. The negative "a-theism" prescribed by Flew does not even
concede this. We shall refer to this as 'pre-agnosticism,' in that it seems to represent a
stage he would like all of us to go through before we consider whether there is enough to
even decide to withhold belief.
This atheism exhorted by Flew is neutral and "completely noncommittal"7 (his
words). Because of this, the theist is put in the proponent position of the debate, and thus
bears the onus of proof. This proof will need to consist of two parts:
(1) the theist must introduce and defend his proposed concept of God, and
(2) the theist must provide sufficient reason for believing that this concept has an
application.8
If he fails to do so, the opponent wins by default. Flew favors the forum of a debate,
rather than that of a discussion. As such, he depicts the action to consist of a beginning
proposition, followed by a rebuttal. It is his contention that a beginning proposition has
yet to be offered on this topic which is intelligible.9

III.
In the article, "Atheological Apologetics,"10 Scott Shalkowski contends, against
Flew, that the traditional casting of the theist as the affirmer in this debate is arbitrary. He
shows that the general demand for grounds of epistemic justification may be expressed as
follows:
If it is to be established that _____, then we must have good grounds for
believing that this is indeed so. The blank may be filled with any proposition. It
may be filled with the proposition that God does not exist as easily as it can be
filled with the proposition that God exists.11
It should be noted, however, that Flew is not in this place arguing for a substantive
presumption of positive atheism ("God does not exist") but for a procedural presumption
of negative atheism.
Flew does not clarify how or if this could be expressed as a proposition, but
perhaps we could get a clue if we look at the courtroom presumption of innocence. "The
accused shall be presumed to be innocent until proven to be guilty" is one way of stating
this presumption in a proposition. Accordingly, "the concept of God shall be presumed to
be unintelligible until proven to be intelligible" is one way, then, of stating Flew's

6Ibid.
7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9This statement, from the fall of 1972, Flew repeated in 1991 in Does God Exist? A Believer and
an Atheist Debate, by Terry Miethe and Antony Flew (San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1991), 10.
Flew goes on to say on page 19 that, so far as he knows, no one has ever accepted his challenge to present a
rational apologetic for a legitimate concept of God.
10Shalkowski, Scott A., "Atheological Apologetics", in Contemporary Perspectives on Religious
Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 58.
11Ibid., 60.
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presumption of negative atheism. Plug this into Shalkowski's general demand for
grounds of epistemic justification, and one arrives at,
"If it is to be established that the concept of God shall be presumed to be
unintelligible until proven to be intelligible, then we must have good grounds for
believing that this is indeed so."
This effectively places the negative atheist in the position of the proponent of a debate
affirming the unintelligibility of the concept of God, and Flew loses his default strategy.
It may be, however, that this is not as "completely noncommittal" as Flew intends
his required presumption of negative atheism to be. His is a procedural requirement, not
a substantive one. He argues that if we accept that judicial presumption of innocence, we
ought to accept the presumption of atheism, for they are offered in the same spirit of
impartial inquiry.
It is instructive to examine the way in which Flew portrays the two presumptions
as analogous.
(1) Each uses the concept of "proof" in its widest, not narrowest sense. That is, proof
need not be in the form of a demonstrably valid argument, one in which the conclusion
cannot be denied without contradicting the premises. The type of proof sought is of the
ordinary, broad sense such that it can embrace any and every variety of sufficient
reason.12
(2) Each presumption is defeasible, or defeatable. The defendant may be found guilty,
under the courtroom procedural presumption of innocence, yet this does not mean the
presumption of innocence is an invalid procedure. Likewise, Flew maintains, the theist
could conceivably win the debate over the existence of God, without ignoring the need
for first presuming to be "not a theist."
(3) In both cases, it makes a difference which kind of presumption is adopted. Many
innocent people will be jailed, if defendants are presumed guilty until proven otherwise.
Moreover, the presumption of atheism requires the theist to begin at the absolute
beginning, which is to "ensure that the word 'God' is provided with a meaning such that it
is theoretically possible for an actual being to be so described."13
What Flew does not show is that the presumption of theism seems to fit equally
well in this analogous relationship to the presumption of innocence.
(1) Theism also can be approached from a variety of proof possibilities, not just from the
traditional standpoint of natural theology to which Flew alludes in his treatment of the
term 'proof.' For example, Plantinga has his updated ontological proof,14 Alston has his
argument from religious experience,15 and Moreland has his mind/body substance
dualism argument.16
(2) The negative atheist, even though he may be unshakably convinced in his state of
"not being a theist," will nevertheless not be betraying his negative atheism by accepting a

12Flew, 22.
13Ibid.,21.
14Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), 26-94.
15William P. Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 286-308.
16J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1987), 77-
103.
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procedural theistic presumption, say, that there may theoretically be an intelligible

concept of God.
(3) A presumption of theism as just described in (2) may well make a difference in the
debate proceedings. For example, it may open up to the atheist the possibility of a non-
material, non-natural explanation for aspects of the real world.
Therefore, there is nothing about the putative analogies between the presumption of
innocence and the presumption of atheism that excludes a similar relationship between
innocence and theism.
It may very well be that Flew suspects this. His presentation, under the heading,
"The Case for the Presumption of Atheism" (section C of his article17), lists three weak
and overly general lines of support:
(1) He appeals to a legal maxim: "The onus of proof lies on the man who affirms, not on
the man who denies." We have seen how negative atheism as well as positive atheism
may be framed as affirmative propositions, and Flew admits that this maxim by itself is
insufficient.
(2) He then appeals to a debate maxim: "The onus of proof lies on the proposition, not
on the opposition." Since "the concept of God shall be presumed to be unintelligible
until proven to be intelligible" serves the task of a debate proposition well, it appears that
this maxim, even in conjunction with the former maxim, is insufficient.
In this section, in order to push the onus-of-proof point, Flew has tried to produce
the following correlations:
Theism | Negative Atheism
-affirmation | -denial of affirmation
-proposition | -opposition
-prosecution | -defense
Yet he admits that these correlations have not so far been sufficiently demonstrated, and
we can safely concur in this admission, since the above attempts to link presumptions of
innocence and atheism analogously were similarly unconvincing.
He now approaches from a different level the presumptions of innocence and of
atheism, the level of policy aim. The underlying idea is that to accept a procedural
presumption is to adopt a policy, which can only be understood by referring to the aims of
those who formulated the policy:
(3) The policy aim of a presumption of innocence is that no innocent person should ever
be convicted, and that of a presumption of guilt is that no guilty person should ever go
free. To illustrate the implications flowing from these policy aims, an actual situation is
cited in which Leninist political bosses refuse to recognize individual rights if these rights
conflict with the Party's tenets. This may be preposterous, but it is not irrational, given
their policy aim. (Bear in mind, the connection between presumption of innocence and
presumption of atheism has still not been convincingly demonstrated.) Flew now
declares the policy aim of the presumption of atheism: "knowledge." The presumption of
guilt and the presumption of the Leninist political bosses and their policy aims now stand
juxtaposed to the presumption of innocence and the presumption of atheism and their
policy aims:

17Ibid., 23-25.
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Presumption: Policy aim Presumption: Policy aim

guilt: no guilty person goes free | innocence: no innocent person is
| jailed
Leninist political bosses: no rights | atheism: knowledge
contradicting party tenets |
are granted |
What is not mentioned in this list of associations is the place of theism. However, it is
not difficult to surmise in which group Flew insinuates it should appear. (A clue is that
the policy aim of theism is not directly mentioned here. It is commonplace that many
theists claim that knowledge, as well as true belief, is their policy aim.18 In the
completely noncommittal way required of negative atheism, ought not Flew to have
mentioned this?) So, the theist, with his presumption that there just might be an
intelligible concept of God, finds himself in the unsavory company of hanging judges and
communist apparatchiks.
A wise man once said, " If the iron be blunt, and he do not whet the edge, then
must he put to more strength" (Ec. 10:10). It is obvious as he closes out this section that
Flew is finding it needful to swing the ax with unusual vigor:
It is, therefore, not only incongruous but also scandalous in matters of life and
death, and even of eternal life and death, to maintain that you know either on no
grounds at all, or on grounds of a kind which on other and comparatively minor
issues you yourself would insist to be inadequate.19
As Donald Evans, in his published reply to Flew's article, points out, the above invective
applies to atheism as well as to theism.20

IV.
Flew describes three possible objections to his presumption of atheism. Some
object to the presumption of atheism because they misunderstand what the issue is. In
framing the question, "Why are you not a theist?" they miss the point of the debate. Flew
answers, "We're not doing biographical sketches here; we're trying to ascertain who bears
the burden of proof in theological matters."21 This hasty rebuttal has some validity, but if
the question above is reworded, "Why is anyone not a theist?" the rebuttal is weakened.
Besides, on some level theological matters are personal matters, settled through personal
lives in personal ways.
The second objection is the crucial one. The presumption of atheism advocated
by Flew is a procedural tactic to ensure that theistic terminology and presuppositions do
not get smuggled in to the debate. Is it possible to presume even as a noncommittal
procedure that one is no longer a theist? Is this not an entirely different matter than
presuming a defendant is innocent? The presumption of courtroom innocence does not

18Theists for centuries have stated that Biblical injunctions to "know thy God" (Ex. 10:2, Je.
31:34, Jn. 17:3, 1 Pe. 1:3) provide powerful motivation, thus serving them as "policy aims."
19Flew, 25.
20Donald Evans, "A Reply to Flew's 'The Presumption of Atheism,'" in Canadian Journal of
Philosophy (Edmonton: Canadian Association for Publishing in Philosophy, 1972), 50.
21Flew, 25.
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impact issues of personal identity in nearly the force as the presumption of "not being a
theist." Many if not most theists would declare their stance on the question "Does God
exist?" to be fundamental to the way they identify themselves to themselves. Moreover,
do not a person's inquiries into this matter and into any matter have to begin from
wherever that person happens to be? C. S. Peirce contends that "we cannot begin with
complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have . . . These
prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim."22
Donald Evans elaborates on this point. He reminds us that the theist is asked by
Flew to adopt a procedural presumption of negative atheism. We recall that Flew defines
this as "not being a theist." Can a theist dispel his theism with a maxim: "Debate as if
you were not a theist"?23 Flew's reply is that, with positive reason, one may find the
means to doubt what one began by believing.24 This may be granted, but whence comes
this positive reason? This positive reason comes after the debate begins, not before.
Flew is asking the theist to approach the debate as "not being a theist" before the
presentation of reasons that the theist needs to doubt his theism.
Flew does not show how this particular objection is to be refuted, leaving quite a
stumbling block to adopting a procedural presumption of atheism. After all, for Flew the
purpose of the debate in part is to present positive reasons to doubt one's religious
opinions. Does he expect the theist to concede this before starting? According to Flew's
reading of Peirce, this is the only way the theist can shed his theism. If there is some
better way, then why bother debating?
A further point might also be stressed at this juncture. The theist is being urged to
accept the presumption of "not being a theist," prior to the presentation of positive
reasons for doubting one's theism. Isn't this tantamount to the theist accepting the
presumption of his own epistemic guilt? The theist is expected to act as if guilty in order
to get a hearing to prove his own innocence! How does Flew square this with his
equating of the presumption of atheism with the presumption of innocence?
A third possible objection Flew describes as follows: "Any program to prove the
existence of God is fundamentally misconceived . . . the territory which reason cannot
inhabit may nevertheless be freely colonized by faith." This fideistic objection is
answered by the philosopher Flew with a simple challenge. The rational man will still
require reasons before setting sail on a voyage of faith, so the venture will not be
"frivolous."25 Many a theist would answer the fideist in approximately the same way,
even if those required reasons serve a secondary role of support, rather than the primary
role Flew may demand.
Flew at this point adds one more dimension to his depiction of the worthiness of
the presumption of atheism. A correlation is suggested between the presumption of
atheism and the assumption of ignorance, borrowing from his interpretation of Pascal's
Wager. We recall that Pascal thought that the proposition "God is" was prudentially
rational, that is, in one's best interest to affirm, since the affirmer has next to nothing to

22C.S. Peirce, "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," Collected Papers, vol. 5 (Cambridge,
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1934) 156-157, in Flew, 26.
23Evans, 48.
24Flew, 26.
25Ibid., 27.
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lose and infinite bliss to gain, while the negater has next to nothing to gain but infinite
bliss to lose, if God is not. Flew makes much of Pascal's quote that "Reason can decide
nothing here;" in fact, he says that the wagerers approach the betting table in a state of
total ignorance. One gets the feeling that this assumption of blank-slate ignorance is what
Flew thinks his presumption of atheism will achieve for us.26 However, since he fails to
rebut the second objection listed above, he is not entitled to suggest that this could be
possible. Furthermore, he apparently overlooks Pascal's statement that "reason brings you
to this" supposed assumption of total ignorance.27
It cannot be total ignorance in which one finds oneself if engaging in Pascal's
Wager, if "reason brings you to this." This state of ignorance would be informed by an
awareness that its origination is the product of reason. Suppose you awake tomorrow in a
totally alien environment, where nothing is familiar in any way. You would still not be in
total ignorance, since you would know the environment in which you find yourself is
alien by virtue of the fact that it is not like the place from which you came. Its
unfamiliarity is one thing you would know about it, because the "slate" of your memory
would not have been wiped clean.
If Dr. Flew were to follow Pascal's train of thought a little further, he might
embrace that which Pascal so passionately relates when he says, "The heart has its
reasons which the reason does not understand."28 Then he might understand how Pascal
could write, virtually on the same page, "Reason can decide nothing here . . . Reason
brings you to this place."29 However, it apparently will not do for Flew to admit this
synergistic and inextricable intertwining of the passion with the intellect. Philosophers
and theologians can find fertile areas for research and dialogue concerning the emotional
nature of rationality and the reality that the rational intellect not only contains but depends
upon elements such as personal experience which have heretofore been excluded from
many definitions of rationality.30

V.
Where then does the burden of proof lie? Shalkowski concedes that the onus is on
the theist, if the context is one in which the term 'God' must be shown to apply to some
object. However, if the context of the debate is one in which the inquiry concerns who, if
anyone, "knows the correct propositions about the application of 'God,' then both sides

26Then Flew employs the "Many gods" objection to the Wager: since there is an infinite range of
theoretical possibilities, to bet on any one of them, none of which can be assigned a value of positive
probability, is capricious (Flew, 28). This objection is discussed and set aside by William Lycan and
George Schlesinger, in "You Bet Your Life: Pascal's Wager Defended," in Contemporary Perspectives on
Religious Epistemology, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Brendan Sweetman (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 273-277.
27Blaise Pascal, Pensees (Brunschvicg arrangement) 233, in Antony Flew, An Introduction to
Western Philosophy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1971), 220.
28Pascal, Pensees (Brunschvicg arrangement) 277, in Frederick Copleston, A History of
Philosophy, Book Two, vol. iv (New York: Doubleday, 1960), 164.
29Pascal, Pensees (Bruschvicg arrangement) 233, in Antony Flew, An Introduction to Western
Philosophy (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1971), 219-220.
30My thesis (Chris Ullman, "God's Personhood and God's Knowableness" [thesis, Trinity
Evangelical Divinity School, 1994] 87-98,) examines this.
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have work to do."31 Evans proposes a "presumption of epistemological innocence:" both

the atheist and the theist presume that the other has what are for him good grounds for his
knowledge claims, and the burden of proof is on each to show the other what reasons
there are for changing. This, he argues is a "genuinely neutral and non-substantive"
procedural presumption.32 As suggested in Section III above, the general demand for
good grounds for knowledge applies to everyone in this debate, whether they are
proponents of theism, positive atheism or negative atheism.
In concluding this essay, let us return to the warning at the beginning: "Do not
presume anything." Let us reword this to say: "Do not presume just anything." Flew
earnestly believes that he can strip careless theists of their unwarranted presumptions and,
in the light of rational debate, cause them to first question and then to jettison that for
which they have no good reasons. It appears to be an issue of epistemic morality for him.
In a general sense, it was for the apostle Peter as well. He coined the Apologetical
Mandate when he admonished believers to "be ready always to give an answer to every
man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you" ( 1 Pe. 3:15). This can happen
when we "sanctify the Lord God in [our] hearts," drawing near to that Person Jesus Christ
who is Truth and Wisdom Incarnate, allowing the Holy Spirit to guide us into all truth,
and when defense is called for, to teach us what to say.33

31Shalkowski, 60.
32Evans, 49.
331 Pe. 3:15, Jn 14:6, 1 Co. 1:30, Jn. 16:13, Lk. 12:12. I would welcome further communication
on this topic: Chris Ullman, 1515 N. Windsor #202, Arlington Hts., IL 60004 (ph. 708-392-6359).