Lewis R.

Binford U nlversitv
. of New Mexico , Alb uquerque 459

In Pursuit of the Future

Background

In the late 1950S an d ear Iy 1960s a numbet of us advocated some fun-

d amental chang es III
. t h e way arc h"'aeologists Viewed the archaeological
record and p ti Iar Iy III
" ar ICU . t h e conventIOnS
" then current for assigning
meaning to archaeological facts. Subsequently, there have been major
changes in the ways archaeologists approach the archaeological record
and, III turn, in the ways in which we seek 10 justify the meanings we
assign to archaeological observations. What I wish 10 discuss is nor what
we have done-that is a matter of record and should perhaps more ap-
propriately be discussed by others. Instead, I want 10 discuss what needs

to be done.
Science is a field that is dedicated to addressing our ignorance and,
as such, should have built-in tactics designed 10 guide us 10 the recogni-
non of ignorance in need of investigation. For the generation of those
who were my teachers, recognized ignorance consisted largely of rhe sites
we had not dug or the places and time periods we had not investigated.
Ignorance was recognized as primarily arising from a lack of observa-
tions or discoveries. I tried to cballenge this view of ignorance by point-
ing out that ignorance must also be recognized in the character of the
knowledge and belief base that we use when interpreting our observa-

tions. This challenge arose directly from the implications that the findings
of general anthropology bave for archaeology. It was difficult 10 Ignore
the teachings of anthropology, especially rhe demonstration that culture,
the received knowledge and beliefs that we use 10 Vlewmg the world: ed (r)
. diff d"" I ItS aod (2) IS charactenz
1 erent among
IS di iverse
" SOCIOCU
h hi tura
. I sys. em , of a given cultural sys-
t ry
y ifferenr stages dutlng t e !SlOlIca traJec 0
b
 460 American Archaeology Past and Future
Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 461

tern. It had to be acknowledged that scientists are not exempt from cul-
ture; they, like all other humans, are participants in culture. This means Two Responses to the New Archaeologv
that for science to be truly successful it not only has to acknowledge
, , , he exclusive explanation for the
ignorance about the external world but also to view its task as recogniz- The shift from believing In culture as t h d irs contain inforrna-
., that t e eposl
ing ignorance of a particular type, ignorance relative to the culture, the archaeological record to recogruzmg h ture of culture itself
received "knowledge" and beliefs, of the scientists themselves, This is a ' 'II
tion that will potentia yen I ten u
ligh s as to t every na
I f 'nnocence, For many,
very different view of science than that which characterized the earlier is described by Davi id CI k
ar e 197 ( 3) as our ith hIssI of innocence an d
ass a
the state of innocence was a secure 0 . ne W,t rne ro, ty What do we do?
phases in the development of scientific methods, Under early, strict em-
,
security they found themse ves in a, I ' sea of uncerram ,. In this SItuatIOn
"
piricists' views it was thought that the dedicated scientist could clear his
' hat i ducrive strategy, ,
mind of cultural bias and see reality "objectively." Anyone familiar with How do we proceed? W at IS a pro f ther fieldsof invesn-
anthropology cannot accept such a position. We cannot operate as hu- many archaeologists ists began to see k guidance " rom auences. On the at her
mans outside Our cultural milieu. garion, in many cases, t hiIS h as h ad ennchmgI conseq umber of misgur iseuid ed
hand there has grown up WIt rn ar , hi chaeo ogy a among those who WI'II
n
The task of science is not only to sharpen and hone our culturally
' " ing converts 'd
conditioned ideas about the external world but, in addition, to investi- arguments that many claim are gaml t that I feelare in nee
, I' these argumen s
gate the limitations of our received knowledge and beliefs about the ex- replace the current generation. tIS, I the could well lead arch ae-
ternal world. In short, the task of science is not the objective approxi- of review. If they are not treated SetlOUSy, Iuctive era, Iwill refer to
mation of "truth" but just the opposite: the investigation of our ology mro , . anot h er b ac k w ard and
still " nonprod (2) contextua I-SIructural-
culturally guided ignorance about reality. If we accept this goal, and the these arguments as (1) recons ru , t ctlOlllSman t between these two ap-
view that culture is learned, then it is clear that the enhancement of , f dlsagreemen hei opo-
ism. There are many pomts a , tellectually unique, t ell Pfrh '
knowledge could modify our culture. If as anthropologically informed preaches, and while 'themasm
I treat f 'I to acknowledge many ote"
nents will surely be a en e y ff d d b my at ure ,
scientists we are successful in approaching our goal, then our refinement
of knowledge (and thus of culture itself) will enrich our ability for deal- detailed claims to diisnncuviveness . b I'ntellecma ega I I cy of archaIC
I'
ing with reality. I consider reconstructIOnISm " ta e anach with which tra di'lion ahIStS f
' ' " It IS an appro "th the groW! 0
How well does our received knowledge allow us to deal with the science or stnct empmcism. d cates the posmon at b 'Id'ng an
world of experience? How accurate is our alleged knowledge of the ' f ble It a vo d on UI I
would be quue com orta ,', I sively depen ent up , k b brick.
d ndmg ISexc u I' bnc Y
world? If one adopts other perspectives or contrastive means of obser- knowledge and un ersta Id bout external rea Ill' 'Ill' limit-
vation, how different does the world of experience appear? These are the f k owe ge a . 's traglca
accurate structure on, mp[etely wrong, It I ho think
' thIS IS not co he ones w
questions and tactics I used in my early papers to question the utility of While in a StrIct sense I dge that we are r ( did the
' , ay acknow e II assumes as
the traditional archaeological paradigm, Itried to demonstrate that using ing. Its practllloners m, yet it operationa Y d 1 ssumes that
the normative culture concept as an exclusive explanation for archaeo- Id f xpenence, Iwar! . t a
about the war a e h 'des in the externa 'I f mation pro-
, ' ) h t trut reS! ch 10gICa or
logically observed differences and similarities was inadequate and mis- archaic sClennsts tanding of ar aeo ,,, bserver-we
leading. I tried to demonstrate that processes and forces other than the te understa th " bJ'ectlve a ,
by gaining an accura h Id be clear to e a b' tively Thus, Crtt-
mental templates of the ancients conditioned the archaeological record cesses-processes that s ~u haeological record a Jec f a~empring to
as seen by archaeologists. Once this is recognized, it becomes clear that can, by force of will, see t, e a~cequently takes the form abiases of "this
h' int of vIew r , tales, t eh f the
the archaeological record contains information of relevance to the inter- icism from t IS po . and cautlonary "e~ nature 0
strallon , the tru th'
esting problem of understanding cultural differences themselves. This point out, by reman h eologist from seemg 'us statemenr on 15
was an attempt to enrich our archaeological knowledge. At the same world" that keep the arc a , ford 1983 for a prevlO
B
time it was a critical evaluation of the inadequacy of traditional archae- archaeologica I reco rd (see m , 'ntellectual, m , that

ological concept of culture to guide us to an understanding of the past ,

Issue). rructionism ten s
d to be anll-'
f borh canceptua gr
J owth
and, more importantly, of cultural processes themselves. In addition, recons, the importance a
advocates fall, to appreclate
 462 American Archaeology Past and Future
Binford / In Pursuit of the Future 463

and change. New ideas that are not perceived as simple, self-evident ex-
process assumes that the inferential target is the on-going behavioral
tensions of "direct-empirical" experience are disparaged (e.g., Schiffer's
events of the once-living individuals who participated in the cornmumty
[r985:192) concept of personal gear and Gould's [1985:640-641J dis-
responsible for the archaeological remains. Presumahly, if we couJd ac-
cussion of the same issue). In such discussions the demand is made that
cornplish this we could t en participate as peers w ith ethnologists in their
'. hen narti "
the warrant for an idea of potentially great importance must rest with
discussions of behavioral variability.
the empirical credentials out of which the reconstructionists expect it to
In the early days of the new archaeology a number of arguments
have arisen. Here we see the old, discredited notion that theory and con- dif-I
were mounted to demonstrate t h at cu Itura I sys terns were internally
"
cepts must be directly generalized from experience! If one is evaluating
ferentiated and, as such, could be expecte d to resu It in , differentia
, the
and seeking a more useful set of intellectual tools and one demands that , f disti I I remains within and among
spatial partitioning 0 isnncnve cu tura
all new tools be justified with respect to experiences cognized in a man- , . b h world would devastate
sites. If true this ontological assertion a out t e hi' I
ner consistent with the old tools, then one never changes the paradigm; ' , , l' m led the arc aeo ogrca
the ways in which traditional archaeo ogrsts sa p , d
one only elaborates the old one. New approaches come from new ideas. h basic assumptIOnS un er-
record and would successfully c h a IIenge t e
Their utility must be tested in the future, not by reference to old ideas or If h w arguments were accurate,
lying their interpretive arguments. t ese ne d diff nces among
to the credentials of their origins. ibl ider measure I ere
it would no longer be POSSI e to consl, es of cultural
Nevertheless, at the observational level reconstructionists admonish 'J I s as direct measur
casually collected archaeologica sarnp e , ' Th arguments called
us to build brick by brick a solid structure of knowledge and understand- 'I I f amzatlOn, ese
differentiation at the et h mc eve a org, J" order to demon-
ing about the processes of archaeological formational dynamics, without h ological rea uy In
for a restudy of the nature a f arc ae I ' adequate and rhus
addressing the important issue of evaluating our archaeological culture , Iconcept a f cu ture was In
strate that the archaeologica
or seeking to understand what we want to know in new ways. We are . . ff views of the past. I
had a distorting e ect on our d onstrate that cultura
only reminded of alleged biases that could prevent us from seeing "real- . . b 'mportant to em
In this context, It ecame I, 'd ganizationally so that a
ity" clearly. According to reconstructionist literature, if we would only . fact i 11 differentiate or 'J be taken as a srmp . Je
systems were In act mterna Y
open our eyes to the lessons of nature through the use of more detailed Id not necessan Y
difference in cultural content cou ,. h been sustained by every
and rigorous observational strategies, we could empirically understand .' (This posinon as 8
measure of ethnic dIfference. '[ Binford 1976, t97 ,
archaeological formation processes and, therefore, archaeological truth. desi d to evaluate It e.g., 8 ])
major piece of research esigne 8t. Weissner t9 J .
I recently read a paper by two behavioral archaeologists who list all 8 b· Longacre t9 , .
r979, 1980, t982; Hod d er 19 2, as to demonsttate that orgamza-
the "distorting" events that might stand between the archaeological rec-
The focus in this intellectual context w Id produce different forms
ord as observed and the systemic context as it might have existed in a , hi Irural systems cou h pan-
tional conditions Wit 10 cu , 'I in different cultures at t e
past system. The paper is supposed to be an object lesson to archaeolo-
of archaeological remams Without ImP Y hg meaning of interassemblage
gists who would seek to make statements about past systems before they . Th f
systerruc level. ere was diSCUSSIOn , 0 t e
' t' on of sites" IUtOac livity areas,
had recognized and correctively "transformed" all the behavioral events . al differenlla I d ' of srarus
variability study of the mtern "from the stan poml , h
that intervened to render the organization of the archaeological record ' . I diff nnatto n , blty m t e
and exploration of SOCIa I ere, h ight affect valla J I
different from the organization of on-going life as it existed in the past. , ' h' SOClenes t at m
and social groupmgs WIt 10 Id for
The old empiricists' argument regarding the limitations of the archaeo-
'I d f h xternaJ wor
logical record is central to these positions. The distortions, and the real- archaeologlca recor. 'd an exploration 0 t, e e d bout that
o
This was a tesnng pen "I' of the assumptIOnS rna de a degree
ity that all events are not equally visible archaeologically, are boringly I 'g the ull Ity d '1IClZe t he
repeated to caution archaeologists not to think beyond their data (Gould the purpose of eva uann I' ts It exposed an erl alistic or
world by traditional archaeo ~g~st~tprerive devices were unreguided by
-t 1980:1-28, 1985; Schiffer 1985:192). The message is clear. We must
to which certain conventlOnah Iwnorld of experience but. wa •s a tactical
build up generalizations about past systemic contexts by the laborious f ed on t e 'h's SituatIOn a
"transformation" of contemporary data in its archaeological context simply wrong. It ocus Id Instead of viewmg t I, . seem III have
new ideas about that war . . the reconstructlODlsts
into descriptive statements about past behavior. This reconstructionist h of a SCIence,
phase in the gro wt
 464 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 465

tossed out the "testing of ideas" aspects and focused on the external
world as the direct source of knowledge. They saw knowledge as flowing
to us from "discoveries" in the world of experience (Gould 1985). Our
ideas were tacitly seen as potential "distortions" of rhe true reality, a
reality that could be known directly through insightful, observational
"purification" and accurate measurement. This purification has been ex-
tended to include skepticism regarding the "borrowing" of ideas from
other fields (Schiffer 1981:9°1-904), a failure to see value in concept
and theory development (Schiffer 1981:9°5), and, recently, the open ad-
vocacy of a return to empiricism (Gould 1985).
The tactical research focus on behavior by new archaeologists,
which occurred in the Context of idea evaluation, has been strangely mis-
interpreted as a denial of the importance of culture itself. Some have even
advocated the scrapping of the culture concept in favor of a focus on
behavior (see Flannery 198:> for a reaction to this trend). For them, the
goal of archaeology should be the accurate reconstruction of past dy-
namics in the proximate or behavioral sense, which will eventually lead
to an "ethnographic" picture of the past. The final goal is seen as uncov-
naively believe to be the scientific method: the archaic view of science.
The result has been exactly the opposite of the response by the re-
constructionists. Where the reconstructionists have adopted a "reaction-
ary" view of science by returning to a strict empiricism, the contextual-
structuralists have largely rejected all science. Wbete some reconstruc-
tionists essentially reject the concept of culture, the contextual-
structuralists embrace it not only as the explanation for the archaeolog-
ical record (Hodder 198:>a) but the explanation fat the behavior of scien-
tists (Landau 1981: Perper and Schrier 1977). They espouse the view that
science is incapable of producing knowledge, instead, it is thought to be
capable only of projecting subjective, culture-bound views onto the ex-
ternal world. From this perspective the new archaeologists are labeled
out-of-date archaic scientist/empiricists or "ditty" positivists, while at
the same time the demand is made for a return to the traditional "cul-
tural" approach for the interpretation of archaeological remains. This
, ' sk epncrsrn.
posture leads to crippling " It d's
eme that we can evaluate the
.
utility of our own Ideas an d t hit'
at we can ana y IC ally understand culture;
in short, it denies that science can help us to learn.

wt~::::ltO~~c~~~~:?
ering, in the empiricist's sense, laws of human behavior. The challenge
offered by new archaeologists and the tactics appropriate to that chal- We might be able to see the I'ast more clearly
lenge were proposed as an evaluarion of the intellectual tools of archae- between our misinterpretatl?nbs Iand [Leon/ and Palkovich
realistically, there IS no surra e met a
ology and paradigmatic growth. Reconstructionists, however, were led
1985:430].
to redirect the goals of archaeological inference (i.e., describing past be-
haviors particularistically rather than past cultures organizationally) and , irion h ve only nihilistic an-
What can we do? Advocates of this poSltfIOn afi methodology in
adopted a reactionary idea of science. the " nny" 0 SClentl c
swers. We should aban don e tyrarmr n society since "our
At the same time that reconstructionism was building in the litera- ), . f relevance In our ow ,
favor of "important ISsues a "(M e and Keene 1983:4-
ture, another important and very different reaction to the new archaeol- ' I context oor
research is a result a f our SOCia h learn from our inter-
ogy was taking place. This response was guided not from an attempt to 'need t at we can
II). For those of us who are convi b ill chauvinistic suggestions.
return to outdated methods of science, but from what was thought to be ,. ' th se appear to e 51 y, . '
acnon WIth expenence, e I" and reconstCllCtlonJsm, ar-
a "new" view that challenged the very utility of science itself. I refer to , 'h t tual-structura ISm
In contending Wit con ex em. d bl b' d"
this reaction as contextual-structuralism. 'lll"ouecrua
chaeology is clearly in an mte
The recognition that we cannot achieve "objectivity" in the manner
conceived by archaic scientists became a popular point for endless reiter-
ation. The recognition of the importance of culture, standing as a filter A Theoretical Response to the Issues
between us and "reality," was emphasized. During the era of the growth ixed with misguided
ggets a f rru th m Id
of the new archaeology the writings of Thomas Kuhn (1970) were read As in many contlicts there are nu h t I cannot use knowledge a
" ite true t a h e
widely by the new generation of archaeologists. Kuhn makes important thought. For instance, It IS qui think with ideas I do not ave.
points regarding objectivity that are directed toward philosophers of not have. It is equally true that I cann:~ent that we are limited by re-
science. When read from a nonscientific perspective, however, these Thus the contextual-strucrura!tst arg I tools available in our time IS
, d b the conceptus
arguments appear to cripple the approach to learning that many readers ceived knowledge an y
 466 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford i In Pursuit of the Future 467

demonstrably correct. Demonstrating that the ideas with which we work
are consistent with the culrure of which we are a part is trivial. Do we
really expect scientists to be "outside" their culture? That, of course, is
impossible. Pointing such things our, however, does not mean that we
are intellectually determined. Just because scientists are culture-bearing
animals does not mean that they are intellectually shackled by culture
and doomed to the ignorance and subjectivity of their time. Similarly,
demonstrating a consistency between what we think at anyone time and
the broader cultural matrix in which we participate does not provide an
evaluation of the utility and accuracy of those ideas, regardless of their
ongin.
The reconstructionist position contains equally limiting ideas. The
most restricting, in my opinion, is the strict empiricist approach to learn-
ing. The reconstructionist tendency is to view empirical generalizations
as the primary goal of research; to attempt the inductive elevation of
such descriptive statements to "lawlike" status; and in turn to believe
that this empirically grounded description of the world will somehow
allow us to gain an understanding of the world (Raab and Goodyear
one accepts this damning criticism of empiricism, then the consequence
will be that empiricists in fact only describe the world "subjectively,"and
the growth of knowledge will be tragically curtailed.
The defenders of empiricism could note with justification that "dis-
coveries" are possible, that we can encounter experiences for which we
have no prior cognitive devices for accommodation, and that we can
thereby expose the limitations of our ideas. Although this is certainly
correct, the presence of anomalies does not ensure their recogrunon. As
most cultural anthropologists would be quick to point out, we have the
I remarkable capacity to accommodate the world of experience to what
we already believe about that world. I would argue that dis~overiesare
I not simply the intrusion of the external world on our cogrnnve frame-
work. Instead, they come about largely from a skeptical posture on the
part of the scientists, who search for the inadequaCIes 10 their reeel,ved
I wisdom and thereby prompt their most valuable asset (th~1[irnagma-
tions) to develop and invent new and more appropriate cogrunve devices
I and theories, Such things come from us, not from experIence.
The empiricist approach seeks to ground empirically o~r experr-
,

1984; Salmon 1982; Schiffer 1976:4; Smith 1982). The positive aspects ences in conventionally made and synthesized observatIOns.!liIS en5~re~
of this "empirically grounded" posture are that a focus on description
can lead to more accurate recording, to the recognition of complexity
I that we will never see challenges to our conventions, A Strict empmca
approach tends to reinforce the false view that our contemporary cogm-
d at the same time suppresses
(such as many of the so-called distortions that may stand between the
static record and the dynamics of the past), and to a greater appreciation I tive tools and knowledge are ad equate an,
,
our most valuable asset, our ImagInatIOns.
di f h
' ' The Important pOlO
we use our expene
' there I'S
, nces An ap-
.
for the character of the empirical domain that we study: the archaeolog- to have a clear understan mg 0 ow d d description in con-
ical record. Accurate description and justified inference are crucial to
science, but as Hugh Mellor (1982:60) has pointed out:
I proach that seeks empirical generalIzatIons ernan s oach to learning is
ventional terms. On teat h h hand the correct appr
er nanu, the limitations of our
f ience to expose

Explanation is not a kind of inference. Just because the phenomenon I dependent upon the use a expen
' t tegy empIrICIsm
conventions, As a Iearrnng s raregy,
," I'Sclearly limited.
li t a roaches may appear to
to be explained would be more safely predictable if it were more Although the contextual or structura s, pp an be argued in ways
probable doesn't mean it would therefore also be better explained.
I , 'If
challenge SCience itse , many
ib
that could well contn ute to
.,
of these posItIons c
h f
the growt a our
that we cannot t In
,
science, For mstance,
hi k thoughtS that we
When the strict empiricist approach to understanding is followed
there is a disdain for the use of imagination and for inventive thought,
and a cry for grounded empirical relevance for every idea introduced
I strong dedication to the posItIOn,
,.
id
do not have or use k nowe g
I'd
ceptance of this posItIon va I ares
e that IS unavar a
f
If'
the goa SO sere
'I ble to US is crucial. Ae-
nee as I have presente
cognitive and theoretIca
d
, I
(Gould 1985:641). Bur the search for understanding-explanation-is
an intellectual activity and not strictly a synthesis of observations. Thus,
I , I ist st c ourown
them namely, the skeptIca rrus ru,
, , ' , dedIcatIon to
tools and hence the sCIentIsts ,
trauon 0 our
fawn
the exposure of their mura-
d
culrure-boun perspec-
.'
I' '

" hat
the empiricist approach ensures that understanding will not be forthcom- rions, The continuous demons, f "f will" and "objectIVIty t
ing, only that we will have a more accurate description of the world as 1 if the old claIm a ree I in human
tives clearly faIsi es, d traditional attempts to exp a
it appears when we are guided by our particular cognitive framework. If plagued both archaIC SCIencean

l
 -----------------"""!""------------------~;
468 American Archaeology Past and Future
Binford / In Pursuit of the Future 469

behavior. The limitations of the contextual-structuralist position appear

when there is a failure to acknowledge that the enhancement of scientif-
ically guided learning strategies can result in the growth of knowledge.
The anti-science posture derives not from recognizing the role of
culture in our daily lives but from the acceptance of a "generative" model
of culture change, which is characteristic of the contextual-structuralist
position. A generative view assumes that an inner core serves as the or-
ganizing feature for surficial behavior or action. This organizing feature
is manifest by the actions of participant/actors who are programmed to
this core of belief, meaning, or symbolic structure (for a clear example
of this view, see Glassie 1975 and Deetz 1982).
I or reason with information we do not possess. The paradox arises when
As Ernest Gellner (1982:II6) has insightfully argued, however,
I that we cannot know the past except by seeking
the point about the symbol tokens used by systems such as language
understanding of these processes, not from some imaginative character-
ization of a stable and internally closed symbolic system capable only of
"acceptable" rearrangement of its finite components. The structuralist
position is inappropriate to sociocultural systems, and more importantly,
it is wrong.
The falsity of this posture is demonstrable by the fact that a paradox
is inherent in its arguments. For instance, we acknowledge, as
contextual-structuralists have that we cannot use ideas we do not have
this proposition is linked with the false generative idea of sociocultural
dynamics . descnbe. d a bove. Wh en t hiISIS done, ,'t I'S commonly suggested
h h
I to understand the par-
ticular symbolic codes or systems 0f th oug t e.Id hy ancient. peoples. We

l mIg . h t reasona bl y as,k h ow wou Id this aid us 11 those ancienr peoples, I

is that they are cheap .... Sounds, marks on the paper, symboltc
like us could neither think Ideas . t hey did not have nor accumu I f ate
gestures, all cost virtually nothing .... Because this is so, but only I

because this is so ... we can expect symbolic systems to play out ' . th sked? For examp e, rom
knowledge relevant to quesnons ey never a· bl k
their full inner potential.
I .
my retrospective viewpoint as an arc aeo 0
what caused the transition from I e to .'
Middl
h I gist J might reasona Y as ,
P I I' hi , If I could
Upper a eo it Ie.
. ith a popula-
Unfortunately, as Gellner (1982:II6) also points out, adherents to this , ime f th aphic mrervrew WI
magically go back in time or an e nogr 'I fi d hat (r) they would
"generative" view fail to appreciate a fundamental point, namely, that I tion of late Neanderthals, I would most certahmy n ttl'on and (2) they
,' duri g sue a rransr ,
there are extensive aspects of human life, alas including those that not know that they were Iivmg unng su- sses both condition
seem essential to survival, whose actual sequence of events is deter-
mined not merely by the free play of some underlying core mecha-
I if
would have little 1 any awareness
their lives and at the same nrne mov
.
that major proce
'of
e the trajectory
their culture his-
nima.inable to them.
nism (if it indeed exists at all), bur by the blind constraints and . .' f f life unknown or u "..... . .
shortages and competitions and pressures of the real extraneous en-
vironment.
I tory In the direction 0 a way 0

.
How can the thou gh ts, e Ie,.
id
b h fs or
.,
oplmons
. solvmg a pro
of the partiCIpants m
blern that arises from a
.
ancient cultural systems ar me m 'hat the ancients could nei-
. erspecnve t ,N
totally different perspecnve-r-s P I d they did not have. 0
Generative approaches fail to explain cultural systems because of 1 . b t with know e ge bl
their stubborn denial that we are dealing with thermodynamic systems,
ther experience nor reason a ou. I" solutions to pro ems
Id VIde rea isnc
Neanderthal would or cou pro f my vastly differentper-
not simply with cost-free symbolic codes. Cultural systems are organi- ., 'the context 0 h
[ Posed by me , problems arrsing in . . t As a modern arc ae-
zations with essential dynamics that are dependent upon the flow of en- d oral V1ewpom. . th t
spective knowledge base, an temp, know somethmg of e pas
ergy through them. Energy is captured by such systems in nature, not by
human participants thinking or codifying costless symbolic dreams ( i
ologist have the wonderful opportumty to , 'pants in any intellecrually
. lly invisible to partlCJ . fast par-
on a temporal scale vrrtua "1 f the perspeCtlve0 P
abour this very concrete materialist process. In turn, the trajectory of a ,. I I tern Slmtlar y, rom . aginabIe to
culturally organized thermodynamic system is not determined by what
the bearers think about the process. Instead, it is determined by the be-
I unspecialized cu tura sys .
thing a t err
f h . future in ways unrm
ticipants I can know some . . . hts into an order 0 rea , rh I
them. I can quite literally gam msig Irural systems. Demanding diat
f lilYthat was

havioral and organizational ways in which the system articulates with , ' . anClent cu I ff 82 for a s-
energy sources and with internal and external competitors. Understand-
ing patterning in the history of past cultural systems derives from an
! unknown to partiCIpants In ,
.. ,
adopt a particIpant s persp
.' )
ectlve (see 1n
theonyrea'
I
B' ford and Sab 0 r9
r ty makes about as much sense as
cussion of thIS Issue as
I
470 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 471

demanding that we not look through microscopes, since the "true" re- ever, the position moves so as to transform archaeology into moral phi-
ality is that which is available only to the naked eye! Archaeology is not losophy.
served by acceptance of a false ontological assumption. We can accept the fact that we can neither reason with knowledge
We cannot understand the past through the eyes of the ancients. we do not have nor think with cognitive devices unknown to us, and we
Similarly, we cannot know the past or the present by simply accepting can also acknowledge the fact that we commonly accommodate the
one form of subjective view as correct on the basis of asserted privileged world of experience to our own belief system of the moment. We can
insight (e.g., binary oppositions). We must seek to know the past accu- support the view that an awareness of how our ideas of the moment
rately through, and not in spite of, the use of our perspective. It follows came into being could constructively sharpen our skepticism. We can
that we must accept responsibility for the character of the intellectual subscribe to the position that we should be both moral and ethical m our
tools we use, and we must continuously seek to improve and modify search for knowle d ge, We may su bsenibeo,t the view that our choices of.
them in terms of the knowledge available to us and the opportunities for ' , to th e needs for knowledge within
research problems shou Id b e sensmve
learning open to us. At the same time we accept this responsibility, we ,
our own society. None 0 f t h ese positrons,
', however' demands that we
must realize that both our knowledge base and the conceptual tools with deny our ability to learn an 10 turn to rna , the limiting
, . d ' dify , effects that
which we approach the archaeological record may be limited and/or in- our culture places on our understanding of external reality,
appropriate. As suggested earlier, our job is quite literally the evaluation
of our own cultural tools-the tools that we use in seeking to describe
and understand the external world, which for us is simply the archaeo- A Practical Response to the Issues
logical record.
Most contemporary archaeologists, except the strict empiricists, ac- , Wh scientists hope to accomplish is
Science is a strategy for [earning. at I arid so that they
knowledge that we cannot know reality in terms of itself, but only , ' in the externa w
to perfect ways of seeking expenences , I d Put another way,
through the cognitive and explanatory devices that we use. We further " lleged know e ge.
will implicate inadequacies 10 our a ,. f hei Ilegedknowledge by
acknowledge that these devices may be wrong and are part of a broader , , d [iability o twa
sciennsts study the accuracy an re ,,' 'the body of ideas
tradition of received "knowledge" within which we participate (in other icned ose "maanons 10
seeking experiences designe to exp, Th seek to put rheir ideas
words, our own culture). Many may reasonably ask, how can we know and beliefs with which they begin their quest. ey creationist might be
the past? Frequently, the answer is that we cannot. We should, therefore, , . k th m more secure, as a
in Jeopardy, not to rna e e h di very of "truth" or to
abandon our self-deceiving exercises and address ourselves to a critical , d di ted to t e rsco
prone to do. Science IS not e lea . .« . hr."
understanding of our own culture-bound ideas from the perspective of , b d of ideas IS rig .
the demonstration that a given 0 Y I h f the new archaeology.Ir
internal criticism, since the external world is thought to be denied us by , d h centra trust 0
These ideas constitute t e k transform ignorance
virtue of Our subjectivity (see Hodder I984). edure that see s to
advocated attention to t h e proc . b ddressed are whether we
This position has been well stated by Mary Hesse. She concludes .
into knowledge. The Importan t1ssuestoeawz do not learn by flld a se Y e-
that we must adopt a position denying "that there is a fundamental dis- if
can learn and, I we can, how we learn. we rge ourselvesa ignor ance
f'
tinction between theoretical and observation predicates and statements" . h ki g that we can pu , d not
ceiving ourselves Into t 10 10 for instruction. SimIlarly,we a
(Hesse I974:33). The nature of the external world is denied to us by and "obJ'ectively" approach nature ibl F' IJv we do nor learn by
. sposs1 e. inauj, . J
virtue of the assumed fact that our cognitive system molds experience so learn by denying that learn10g I , if tion for adopting a parttcu ar
that the external world is not permitted to intrude on its internal integ- editing an alleged past to serve as jusn chaIpresent. Welearn by expJor-
rity. At first blush this sounds reasonable; it even appears consistent with " I I posture 10 t e 'h ds that
value-laden polmca or mora , ing with sciennfic mer a ,
many of the points I have advocated here. In addition, on one level it is , b expetlmennn rId of expen-
ing learning strategIes, Y " d relative to the wo
good advice. Certainly, the more aware we are of the context of our ideas 10 )eopar y
continuously PIace our
ideas, the less likely we would be to accept such received ideas as "true" , al record that was
ence, d there is an archaeoJogIc
(Leone I982). In denying a scientific method for evaluating ideas, how- There was a past, an
472 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 473

created in the past. Although we may be capable of fooling ourselves for the other hand, optimists commonly identify goals for learning that do
a time about both of these realities, a learning procedure that continu- not derive from an understanding of the archaeological record hut anse
ously compares our ideas with our experiences cannot help but reveal instead from their limited experiences and from the politicallmoral biases
situations in which our ideas are inadequate. In short, ambiguities deriv- of our contemporary world. ",
ing from inadequacies in our cognitive and intellectual tools will be ex- Pessimists decry attempts to develop learning strategies regardmg
posed. I am suggesting that, like sociocultural systems, intellectual sys- aspects of the past for w hiICh t h ey see no concre t e, "empirical" remnants
tems can also be open systems, although at times they may appear to be in the archaeological record, but they fail to,realize that all statements
dosed and internally "generative." This is particularly true for archae- about the past are inferences. On the other hand, optimists seek to learn
ologists, since the target of our search for knowledge no longer exists. things for which there are no understood methods for knowing, The pes-
The past cannot speak back or object; in short, there is little cost and , "
stmtsttc "
situation resuI'ts In d uII d escnp ioti100 of the archaeological .
record .
hence little risk of being wrong that does not derive from our own com- hil he overIy op rirnisric situation results m
in contemporary terms, wet
petitive social matrix. The openness of our intellectual structure must wild speculative just-so stones. , A rchaeologi aeo ogtsrs must face the fact that
" 'Wh h y study is the archae-r
be provided by our methods and procedures. We must ensure that the they do not study the past, they create It. at t e di
' I correct as the understan mg
past "gets a say," that it can object and guide our growth toward under- ological record. The create d past ISon Yas h
I 'I rd and the processes r at
standing. of the properties of the arc h aeo ogica reco , , II
, ' bei Th development of theorellca Y
The opportunity that opens this important door, that gives the past brought those propertIes into emg. e 'hi
h i h k t the inferentIal pro em.
a chance to object, occurs when ambiguity arises in our own thoughts guided middle-range researc ISt e ey a th f the
' ' ti on between e aspects a
relative to external experiences we have had. Ambiguity exists relative to Another problem concerns t he d isnnc I , h h log-
fast reality that r e arc aeo
some experience when two or more lines of reasoning would lead us to past we seek to know and th e aspects a p th h eological record is
rwo or more incompatible conclusions. In this situation we are in a de- I d ' d' S would say that e arc a
ica recor In rcates. orne iah behavior as we under-
ductive posture aimed at evaluating our ideas. (This is quite different f
the simple resu Ito h uman a 10 , ,,'
cti ns rhar is urnan
, lrural system, Oth-
from Gould's [1985J demand for inductive justification for ideas.) In such ti as partiCIpants 10 a cu
stand it, given our perspec ive h I 'cal record is a maui-
t that the arc aeo ogi ld
a situation we can be sure that there are inadequacies in one or more of ers, as discusse d a b ave, asser 'I d f am the energetic war
our lines of reasoning. This is the flag, the signal, that we must examine festation ion of
a a core Iideari
eatIona I structure IOSUate , r crions of indivi ividuaIs
, I h h the free creative a
in detail. When this signal is given we must research both our intellectual of life and changing on y t roug h '" distorted fragmented,
tools and the cognitive tools with which we assimilate experiences (Bin- S 'II h s suggest t at It IS a ' F
(Leaf '979:336). tt at er db lone past reality. rom
if there ha een on y ,
ford in press). At the same time we must use our most powerful tool, our limited record of t h e past, as I r that all these views are
d . I would like to sugges k
imagination, to generate new cognitive devices and intellectual tools that an ontological stan POlOt d h h archaeologist can noW
gg este t at t e 'f
will resolve the ambiguity. This is how we learn and how we grow: by inaccurate. I have a Irea d Y su fast p cultural mam esta'
placing our intellectual tools in interaction with one another in the con- something of both the past and the fulUre a aant sClearly, then, the ar-
'd h partlClP . f
text of experience. tion knowledge that was d enle t e 'f ation vastly different rom
, s WIt hIn orID I
Given such a posture, what realities do we address? Where do we chaeological record presents u " t within past systems. n turn,
seek experience? I have already suggested that archaeology is the science that which was available to the parllcIIPb~n ~ust guide what we seek to
. that 1Saval a e
of the archaeological record. Pessimists, and particularly empiricists, the type of in formatIOn ,
al duratIOns or
endlessly point to aspects of the past about which we cannot learn, even know 0f t h e past. I d monstrates tempor , d oJ
given our increasing ability to understand the archaeological record and The archaeological record a so e different from that perceIve
the conditions in the past that brought it into being. This pessimistic a tempo of chronological changeth~~: ::::s of culture change for mo't
attitude is incorrect; we will not know what these limitations on under- by persons who participated In It. ch slower thaD the rates of gener:~
, II k wn era, are mU This faa must
standing the past might be until we completely understand all facets of archaeolog1ca y no . ' 'n tho,e system'.
artiCIpants I
the archaeological record, a condition that we have not yet achieved. On tional replacement for P
 474
-------------------~---------------------~,
American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 475

appreciated in two ways. First, the beliefs and perceptions of the past
participants could not have been germane to a reality of which they could
not have been aware, the macrotemporal scale of systems change and the
factors that were conditioning it. Second, the observations by ethnogra-
phers and historical figures, while perhaps documenting something of the
internal dynamics of cultural systems, cannot be expected to be necessar-
ily germane to an understanding of a much slower and larger-scale pro-
was the only reality. The archaeological record was viewed as a poor,
distorted reflection of this assumed unitary reality. Surely we need to
develop links between the varying scales of perception suggested above;
bur more importantly we must realize that we have the opportunity to
study scales of reality that are experientially denied to the ethnographer.
The appropriate action for us is not to lament the "limitations" of the
archaeological record bur to appreciate the limitations of the ethno- v

cess of change and modification. Thus, the reality with which we deal is graphic experience and the records and ideas that arise in the ethnogra-
one that living, breathing persons have in fact never directly experienced. pher's brief touch with a circumscribed reality. The archaeological record
lt is true that their cumulative participation provides the energy base documents a broader and potentially more fascinating reality.
upon which the macroforces of change operate; yet they never experi-
enced such impersonal forces. The archaeologist, seated in the present, is
outside history in the participant sense. We have a chance to understand Conclusion
humankind in a way that no participant, or no social scientist addressing
the quick-time events of direct social experience, could ever imagine. To My message in pursuit of the future has been made up of several com-
fail to recognize this potential, to fail to grasp a new understanding of ponents. First, I have argued that cultural systems are not closed Ideolog-
humankind from this different perspective-the perspective of the ma- ical structures. They are thermodynamic systems open to mfluence a.nd
croforces that condition and modify lifeways in contexts unappreciated even determinancy from the broader thermodynamic forces with which
by the participants within complex thermodynamic systems-is quite lit- they must articulate. Second, I have suggested that since there IS an ex-
erally to "abandon our birthright." .,
ternal world our scientific cu Iture nee db'not e vie wed as a closed ,system '
, 'f hange Weas SCIentistS
It is true that archaeology is anthropology in that it seeks to under- that is subject only to internal generative types 0 cnanxe- "
' r received and subjective
stand humankind. Yet it is simply wrong to attempt to force our unique have the opportunity to learn by p Iacmg ou , I
b ki eriences JD the externa
data and our ability to appreciate dynamics on a macroscale, in the or- views of the world in jeopar d y, Y see mg exp id F' Ily I
h , ' rions of our leas. rna •
/ganizational sense of the term, into the limiting experiences and frame- world that are designed to expose t e Imnra I , h 1-
, ' '1 domain rhat arc aeo 0
works developed for treating the quick-time events of the human parti- have suggested that the particular expenentla dd 'of
'I d d merits a scale an omam
cipants in history. We are not ethnographers of the past, we are not gists study, the archaeologica recor, ocu d b dJ continues to op- ..,
sociologists, we are not historians in the humanistic sense of the term; , , hast and un ou te y
process that was operative rn t e P, d k wledgethis pro-
,' d I fe span an no
.. we are scientists dedicated to an understanding of the archaeological rec- erate today, but because 0 f our 1urute "
ord. Its patterning and character strongly suggests that the common so- , II ' t d by partiCIpants.
cess IS genera y not apprecia e h II ' task 01 seeking to
ith the c a engmg
cial science perspectives on humankind are inappropriate to our archae- Archaeologists are ace d WIt
f h ne of UShave ever
ological view of humanity. Although we may, in Pompeii-like situations, ki d f henomena t at no
understand at least two rn sop , ortant the long-term
, If and more Imp ,
sometimes reconstruct quick-time events and situations, it is equally true experienced directly: the past itse . I' d documents. Archaeolo-
haeologlCa recor ind d
that we have the opportunity to view these human-scale events simulta- macroprocesses t h at t h e arc d ding 01 humankm an
, t gain an un erstan J • •
neously in terms of other observational properties indicative of the or- gists have the opportuntty 0 , d b ost social ,c,enllstS.
. ' I appreCIate Y m , h-
ganizational contexts in which they were conducted. In this opportunity its transformations not prevIOuSy .' archaeologIStssee t em
h ost practICIog I
we can learn something of the properties of the systems within which I think it is fair to say t at m J f "di t archaeology" and re egate
, " at the leve 0 rr ' depen-
past persons participated but did not necessarily cognize. selves as strict empmclSts b d for inference to an ID
For a long time archaeologists have had an inferiority complex rel- the fundamental debates regarding met rhar is considered to be largely
ative to ethnologists and cultural anthropologists. We were convinced dent domain of theoretical dISCUSSIOn This response stem, from the fact
, d day actIVIlles.
that the participant perspective and its personalized scale of experience irrelevant to their ay-to-
 ------------------~-------------------f'\
476 American Archaeology Past and Future Binford lin Pursuit of the Future 477

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