01.

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10. Burma Latest Target For America's Extortionate Demands - APFN

11. U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA – Leon T. Hadar

12. U.S. Punishes Myanmar's Leadership; Will It Help - NPR

13. Burmese people suffer brunt of U.S. sanctions on Myanmar – Michael Lwin

14. Changing Contours US Policy towards Myanmar – Sanjay Pulipaka

15. US engagement with Myanmar falters – Brian McCartan

16. Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism - ILE

Wednesday, January 23, 2008

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Barber, J. (1979) ' Economic sanction as a policy instrument', International Affairs, 55

(3)

Elliot, K. (1998) ' The sanction glass half full of empty', International Security, 23 (1)

Hufbauer, G., Scott, J. & Elliot, K. (2007) Economic sanction reconsidered: History and

current policy, 3rd edition

Lindsay, J. (1998) ' Trade sanctions as policy instrument'. International Quarterly, 30

(2)

Mack, G.& Khan A. (2000) 'The efficacy of UN sanctions', Security Dialogue, 31 (3)

Pape, R. (1998) 'Why economic sanctions still do not work?', International Security, 23

(1)

Pape, R. (1997) ' Why economic sanctions don't work?', International Security, 22 (2)

Rogers, E. (1996) ' Using economic sanctions to control regional conflicts'. Security

Studies, 5 (4)
Rarick, C. (2006) 'Destroying a Country in order to save it: The Folly of Economic

sanctions against Myanmar', Economic Affairs, 26 (2)

Schreiber, A. (1973 ) 'Economic coercion: an instrument of Foreign Policy', World

Politics, Vol. 25

www.mmentrepreneur.blogspot.com
Tuesday, May 19, 2009
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Burma Campaign For

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Saturday, 04 December 2010

The Washington Times Suu

Kyi seeks to review sanctions on Myanmar

(NLD)
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www.irrawaddy.org
 Burma Latest Target For America's Extortionate

Demands

Myanmar Slated For Downfall

Citing its "abysmal human rights record" and its failure to cooperate in the war on

drugs, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Burma. President Clinton

approved the sanctions on April 22. The measure is intended to bring pressure against

and hasten the downfall of Burma's military government.

Congress approved the use of sanctions against Burma in 1996 in a measure

sponsored by then Senator Sam Cohen, now the Secretary of Defense. The measure

authorized sanctions in the event of "large-scale repression of or violence against"

Burma's democratic opposition.

Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, hinted that the sanctions were coming while

giving a speech at the U.S. Naval Academy last week. "Unless the clouds of repression

are lifted, they will face investment sanctions under U.S. law," she said of the Burmese

government.

Burma Digs in Against Chaos

What the U.S. calls "clouds of repression" may merely just be keeping the lid on a

political pandora's box in the minds of Burmese officials. Many Americans, including
President Clinton, protested the caning of an American teenager in Singapore after he

had been convicted of vandalism in that country. Burma has invoked the wrath of the

political paragons in the West to a greater degree by maintaining a hard line against

what it sees as outbreaks of lawlessness, disrespect for authority, and a certain drift

into moral and political chaos. The Burmese government has expressed its doubts about

the western democratic system being imposed on it, and with good reason. Russia,

Haiti and South Africa, to name a few, with their myriad calamities since "democracy",

are powerful arguments against such an experiment.

Burma, which calls itself Myanmar Naing - Ngan rather than the name traditionally

used by English speaking people has had much experience in dealing with the intrigue

and sophistry of the West. In 1948 it won independence after many years of British

colonial rule. With the Cold War just getting under way, the Burmese people chose a

path of non-alignment with the super powers and peaceful coexistence with its

neighbors. Its path was not to be one of peace, however, as powerful and cunning

forces assaulted this country from within, resulting in internal political strife in the

decades that followed.

Burma Recognizes the True Forces Involved

These forces were described in an article written by Tekkatho Myat Thu and

published by the Myanmar News Agency on May 31, 1996. The writer states:
 "During the Cold War (between East and West), cunning propaganda methods were

used for disintegration of their main rival group and to win the Cold War. Rumours and

whispering campaigns were used to gain the upper hand at that time. The Western

Capitalist Block applying various means could monopolize the mass media such as

newspapers and radio and television. They have appointed in their mass media

machinery persons who will do as they wish them to; especially opposition members of

many nations and (Burmese) expatriates. They won over many journalists with money

and by brainwashing, using them for their propaganda network. This way, news of the

Western media became dominated by lies and the West began to ignore the principles

(of Burma's true position)....The Western mass media totally blacked out information

which they never wanted to disclose and made fabrications for propaganda, making the

nonexistent exist, fakes as genuine and lies as truth.

"Minions of (Western) countries who always rely on their foreign masters in accord

with the West's methods are pretending not to notice (Burma's) favourable conditions

(improvements in education, infrastructure, etc.)...but they with their main intention to

seize power are only shouting the word "democracy"....The West-assisted so-called

human right groups are turning a blind eye on the nation's true situation and are

shouting false accusations on Myanmar in accord with the wishes of the West, (along

with) internal axe handles and traitors."

This roughly translated document reflects the Burmese understanding of the assault

on their nation by the western news media and the forces of international control,
namely, the large money cartels that work their will in the earth from their seats of

power in the West. The tactics of subversion and deception used by this cartel in

whipping up turmoil and unrest in the name of political freedom and human rights, with

its cunning expertise at making the genuine look false and the false genuine, has

caused the Burmese government to dig in its heals with alarm. It recognizes the tactics

of international imperialists, now more refined and efficient than the last century.

The Truth about Democracy

We in the West have been accustomed to the word "democracy" having a hallowed

ring to it. During the two world wars our troops helped "make the world safe for

democracy." Most Americans, if asked what kind of government their forefathers

founded, would reply, "a democracy." The American forefathers deliberately rejected a

democratic form of government, however, choosing instead a constitutional republic

that would protect the nation from both the tyranny of government and the mob alike.

James Madison, who is called the father of the U.S. Constitution, wrote in Essay

Number 10 of The Federalist Papers, "...democracies have ever been spectacles of

turbulence and contention; have even been found incompatible with personal security

or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives as they have

been violent in their deaths."

The vast difference between a democracy and a constitutional republic may be

illustrated by the French and American Revolutions. One was a fanatical orgy of
bloodletting and destruction, the other was calmly built on the bedrock of truth and

principle. One ended in degradation and dictatorship, the other bound together a nation

of men of varying temperaments who forged a common destiny. Of France, Beethoven

remarked in a letter to a friend that "before the French Revolution there was great

freedom of thought and political action." However, the revolution that had promised

"Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" had produced, instead, "the present policy of

repression."

Democracy - The Road to Enslavement

One may be assured that it is not constitutional republicanism that the U.S. and the

West is forcing on the nations of the world, but a form of "mobocracy" or mob rule. In

the vacuum created by the absence of strong, effective leadership, will reside the power

of international banks and the large, multi-national corporations that accompany them.

In a "democratic" nation there resides no strong government to "just say no" to the

ravages of multi-national corporatism, national debt and world socialism. If Burma

caves in to the mob screaming for a "democracy", its rich energy and mineral

resources, as well as its "human resources", will at last be in the hands of the

international banking elite. Global control is the true aim of the originators of modern

"democracy", not freedom and human rights.

There is little doubt that there are serious and complex problems brewing within

Burma, as there are within many of the world's so-called "democracies". The illusion is
that a change in the political system will change the difficulties that are inherent to this

region and its 135 national races, each with its own unique culture and dialect. In a

statement faxed by a Burmese spokesman to Reuters on April 16 the question was

asked, "Does U.S. human rights mean priority of one favoured person or a party is

above everything else? And does the U.S. really believe that installing an overnight

Western democracy is the cure for all developing, unstable and problem-ridden

countries of the world?"

The question rings with irony when one considers Burma's options - continued

entrenchment against the West with its sanctions and domestic turmoil, or a plunge

into the abyss of democracy with its certain Yugoslavia style disintegration. "If the U.S.

is so genuinely concerned about the human rights of the Myanmar (Burmese) people,

why is it so necessary to deprive one of the most essential rights of the Myanmar

people -- the right to earn a living and support the family?"-- the Burmese statement

questions. The Burmese know that the U.S. is not concerned about human rights at all -

unless there is financial or political gain involved. Sanctions are simple extortion, a way

of saying, "Bow down to my wishes or I will starve you and make you suffer." It is an

act of war meant to destabilize and overthrow a backward, third world country.

The Burmese spokesman concludes the faxed statement with the declaration, "The

United States is using the threat of economic sanctions against Burma like a weapon

aimed at destroying basic rights of the Burmese people....The U.S. economic sanctions
is a policy which is being extensively used today as a weapon of destruction against a

nation or a population regarded as unfriendly."

Threats and Extortion - True Character of Western Democracy Revealed

This official Burmese statement reveals the truth that American foreign policy is built

on threats and extortion. Burma need not feel that it is alone on America's blacklist. In

the past four years, the U.S. has imposed 61 unilateral trade sanctions against 35

nations that have not bowed to its wishes in some way. Burma is just the latest country

the U.S. has found to be "quite disappointing in recent months", in the words of State

Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns.

Of all the American companies doing business in Burma, petrol giant Unocal stands

to lose the most with a $1.2 billion gas exploration deal on the line. The long term

benefits will be greater, however, if sanctions succeed in driving out the military

"junta". A democratic government will be pliable and easier to manipulate, resulting in

long term collateral benefits to the bottom line. In an interview with Dow Jones News

Service, Unocal Chairman, Roger Beach, called the U.S. sanctions a "temporary

setback" to his company's business plans in Burma and he also said, "It won't change

our strategy one iota."

Each to be Judged - Not by Western Propaganda

The present Burmese government will be judged and held accountable for the

policies it pursues towards the weakest members of its society. Also figured into the

balance of judgment will be the cultural mores, customs, traditions and history of the

Burmese that may not be seen and understood by the Western mind, especially the

Western mind captivated and inflamed by "democratic" propaganda.

The final judgment will also include the honest efforts made by members of the

present Burmese government to defend their country, their culture, their values, and

their very lives against what they rightly perceive to be a threat from the "Western

Capitalist Block", or what might be more accurately described as "totalitarian one-world

government".

The deceptive system of so-called "democracy", as well as the powers of world

finance that promote it for their own interests, and the mindless mobs that chant its

meaningless slogans and wave its flags, will also be weighed together in the balances of

justice and will be found wanting. The attendant horrors of this deceptive system will

be their reward.

Link to external site:

Myanmar News Agency

www.apfn.org
Trade Policy Analysis No. 1 March 26, 1998

U.S. SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA A Failure on All Fronts

by Leon T. Hadar

Leon T. Hadar is an adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute and a Washington, D.C.-based

journalist who covers international politics and economics with a special interest in East

Asia and the Middle East.

Executive Summary

The U.S. policy of imposing unilateral trade and investment sanctions against Burma

has proven to be a failure on all fronts. By forcing U.S. firms to disengage from Burma,

that policy has harmed American economic interests and done nothing to improve the

living conditions or human rights of the people of Burma.

Sanctions have denied Burmese citizens the benefits of increased investment by

American multinational companies--investment that brings technoloygy, better working

conditions, and Western ideas.

State and local sanctions against Burma have compounded the problem caused by
federal sanctions and raised troubling constitutional questions.

Unilateral sanctions have alienated our allies in the region and strengthened the hand

of China but achieved none of the stated foreign policy aims. If Washington had

allowed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to take the lead in setting policy

toward Burma, the United States could have enjoyed a "win-win" situation--better

relations with our allies and more influence over the regime in Rangoon.

As an alternative to the failed policy of sanctions, the United States should allow U.S.

companies to freely trade with and investment in Burma. A pro-business approach to

engagement would more effectively promote political, civil, and economic freedom

around the world. Congress should enact legislation requiring a full accounting of the

cost of sanctions and explicit justification on national security grounds before they can

be imposed.

Introduction

The proliferation of unilateral economic sanctions by federal, state, and local

governments against nations around the world has become a central trend in U.S.

foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Ironically, as the world moves toward a more

liberal flow of products, people, and ideas and the adoption of the American free-

market model, U.S. politicians--spurred by a coalition of labor unions, environmental

lobbyists, human rights organizations, and ethnic groups--have increasingly succeeded

in impeding globalization through an ever-widening array of economic sanctions.(1) Such

intervention in the market undermines the competitive position of U.S. companies by

preventing them from doing business in targeted nations and damages trade the same

way traditional tariffs and quotas do.(2)

The successful campaign by American groups to force the U.S. government to impose

economic sanctions against Burma highlights the damaging strategic, economic, and

moral consequences of America's new approach to determining foreign policy. It is a

trend that weakens U.S. ties with Asia, reduces American diplomatic and economic

influence, and retards creation of a favorable balance of power in the region. Sanctions

have already damaged the interests of American companies operating in the region by

undermining their reputations as reliable suppliers and denied U.S. firms the ability to

compete aggressively with rival foreign firms for market share and profitable

investments.

Present U.S. policy toward Burma is not going to bring meaningful change in the human

rights practices of the regime and will probably make the bad situation in Burma even

worse. Sanctions strengthen the hand of the ruling authorities by creating a scapegoat

for their own internal policy failures and narrowing the opportunity of private individuals

in Burma to expand their economic, social, and cultural contacts with the citizens of the

West.
Sanctions: The New Tool of Choice of U.S. Foreign Policy

Unilateral economic sanctions have become a staple of U.S. foreign policy. According to

a study issued by the National Association of Manufacturers, from 1993 through 1996

the United States promulgated 61 laws and executive actions to impose unilateral

economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. More than 35 countries have been

targeted, including important trade partners such as Canada, Mexico, and Italy.

Cambodia and Sudan joined the list in 1997. The NAM study found that the sanctioned

countries represented 2.3 billion potential consumers of U.S. goods and services, or 42

percent of the world population, and $790 billion worth of export markets, 19 percent

of the world's total. It stated that "the economic implications of the unilateral actions

have been seriously underestimated" since the above figures did not take into

consideration all the countries affected by "secondary boycott" measures, which apply

U.S. law to foreign companies doing business in a targeted country. And the study did

not calculate the effects of sanctions that have been adopted at the state and local

level.(3) Another study found that since 1993 Washington, states, and localities

combined have slapped 142 unilateral sanctions on 41 countries.(4) And according to the

U.S. Council on Competitiveness, more than $6 billion in U.S. export sales and 120,000

jobs were put at risk by U.S. unilateral actions.(5)

Most worrying from a constitutional perspective has been the flurry of state and local

trade curbs aimed at foreign countries and companies. Massachusetts and more than a
dozen counties and cities, including New York City and Berkeley, California, have

already adopted sanctions that bar government purchases from companies that do

business in China, Burma, and Nigeria. California, Texas, New York, New Jersey, North

Carolina, Connecticut, and Rhode Island all considered similar sanctions before rejecting

or tabling them. In most of the cases in which sanctions have been imposed, they go

beyond barring the political entity itself from dealing with the targeted country to

imposing the dreaded secondary boycott on companies that do business in the targeted

country.

Indeed, with the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the ideological and

strategic challenges that helped to define the U.S. national interest and provide a

driving force for American diplomacy and national security for almost five decades have

disappeared. In place of the old policy is a new interest-group-based foreign policy in

which the ideological convictions and political agendas of small but vocal activist groups

have come to dominate the U.S. approach to the world. Economic sanctions have

become the dominant weapon, to the detriment of U.S. global economic and strategic

interests.

Burma Becomes Public Enemy No. 1

Burma has not traditionally been a top foreign policy concern for Washington, although

it does have some limited effect on U.S. economic and strategic interests as well as on
counternarcotics policy. (Burma is the world's largest grower of opium.)

Washington has sought to isolate Burma since the State Law and Order Restoration

Council came to power in 1988, and especially since it refused to transfer power in

1990 to the National League for Democracy, which had defeated the SLORC in an open

election. (Burma's ruling junta officially abolished the SLORC in November 1997, only to

replace it with the equally repressive State Peace and Development Council.)

The United States has refused, among other things, to recognize the government's

change of the country's name to Myanmar, but it has maintained limited diplomatic and

economic ties as well as counternarcotics cooperation with Rangoon. In 1990

Washington withdrew its ambassador from Rangoon, and since then it has opposed

Burma's membership in various multilateral financial organizations, refused to approve

licenses for the export of military-related items to Burma, and imposed limited economic

sanctions on that country (for example, suspending Burma from the U.S. Generalized

System of Preferences).

Since 1990 the U.S. policy of isolating Burma has been rejected by America's trade

partners in Asia, who happen also to be Burma's major trade partners, but it has

received some symbolic backing from Washington's Western allies.

Congress Targets U.S. Trade, Investment

Reflecting the U.S. frustration over the inability to force domestic political changes on
Burma, Congress, supported by an impressive bipartisan political movement, launched a

legislative assault on Burma. Numerous resolutions, amendments, and bills condemned

the military regime in Burma and threatened economic sanctions against it and funding

for pro-democracy programs in that country. Indeed, judging by the press attention and

column inches in the Congressional Record in the early 1990s, it appeared that Burma

had become one of Washington's top foreign policy concerns.

In 1990 Congress passed the Customs and Trade Act, enabling the president to impose

new sanctions against Burma, which then-president Bush declined to do. In 1993 the

Senate passed a resolution calling on President Clinton to work for the immediate

release of the Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and for adoption of a

United Nations embargo against Rangoon. President Clinton expressed support for the

resolution but did not take any serious steps to implement it.

Finally, in the Republican-controlled 104th Congress of 1995-96, both the Senate and

the House of Representatives threatened to drop a legislative "nuclear bomb" on

Rangoon. The 1995 Free Burma Act,(6) introduced by Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.),

called for the imposition of stiff economic and trade sanctions on Burma, as well as on

countries that trade with and provide aid to that country (a provision that was later

deleted). Similar legislation, the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, was introduced in

January 1996 by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.).(7) Later in 1996 a successful

amendment by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) and then-senator William Cohen (R-
Maine) to the fiscal year 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act permitted the

president to determine if and when to impose sanctions against Burma. The measure

provided the administration the diplomatic flexibility to decide whether the SLORC had

improved its human rights policy.

Clinton Administration Reluctantly Joins the Cause

The Clinton administration had earlier tried to respond to congressional pressure by

announcing various reviews of its Burma policy and sending State Department officials

to Rangoon. It argued that some form of diplomatic cooperation with Rangoon on

human rights, democratization, and counternarcotics measures could produce positive

results, asserting that the SLORC's response to the U.S. approach was "mixed." For

example, Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners were released, and Rangoon

agreed to cooperate with U.S. counternarcotics efforts, including a survey of opium

production.(8)

But rising political repression by the SLORC and growing congressional pressure on the

administration forced President Clinton--following months of public and

intrabureaucratic debates, including leaks to the press warning the business community

of impeding U.S. action--to finally "do something." And since the administration

concluded that, if anything, the military junta's political repression had become harsher,

it decided to move ahead with the Burma sanctions. (9)

On May 20, 1997, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13047, which took effect on

May 21, banning most new U.S. investment in "economic development of resources in

Burma." To justify the ban, the president cited a "constant and continuing pattern of

severe repression" of the democratic opposition by Burma's ruling junta. Clinton said

the SLORC had "arrested and detained large numbers of students and opposition

supporters, sentenced dozens to long-term imprisonment, and prevented the

expression of political views by the democratic opposition." Clinton stressed that under

Rangoon's "brutal military regime, Burma remains the world's leading producer of

opium and heroin and tolerates drug trafficking and traffickers in defiance of the views

of the international community." He added that relations between the Burmese

government and the United States would improve only if there was "a program on

democratization and respect for human rights."(10)

The decision to impose sanctions on Burma was championed by Secretary of State

Madeleine Albright. Even before her appointment as America's top diplomat, Albright

had established close political and personal ties with Burma's opposition NLD and its

charismatic leader, Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. But President Clinton and

his top economic and national security advisers were not enthusiastic about the

sanctions. The administration was worried about the effect of the move on the position

of U.S. companies operating in Burma as well as on Washington's relationship with the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

America's ASEAN allies argued that only a dialogue with the regime in Rangoon would

lead to political changes in Burma. Without engagement with ASEAN, its members

argued, there was a danger that the country would form closer ties with China, a

development that would pose a direct strategic threat to Vietnam and an indirect one to

the United States. But none of those strategic considerations was enough to dissuade

the administration from imposing sanctions.

State and Local Governments Enter Foreign Policy Fray

Press and pressure-group attention spurred various state and local governments to pass

laws that prohibited U.S. and foreign companies that trade and invest in Burma from

receiving public contracts in their jurisdictions, or restricted their ability to do so.

Mobilization of the state and local governments in the campaign against Burma was

modeled on bills adopted by some 130 cities and 28 states in the mid-1980s that

targeted South Africa's apartheid regime. Among the state and local governments that

joined the Burma campaign by passing or considering "selective purchasing ordinances"

were the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the cities of San Francisco, Oakland, and

New York; and several other local governments, including those of the small, liberal

college towns of Madison, Wisconsin, and Berkeley, California. Altogether, at least a

dozen cities have passed anti-Burma legislation.(11) A number of universities and other

academic institutions have jumped on the anti-Burma bandwagon by divesting

themselves of stock in companies that do business in Burma. (12)

Legal scholars have challenged the constitutionality of those local forays into foreign

affairs. In a recent article in the Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, David

Schmahmann and James Finch conclude that state and local sanctions against Burma

run afoul of at least three constitutional principles. (13)

First, the sanctions appear to violate article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which declares

that laws and treaties passed by Congress shall be "the Supreme Law of the Land." In a

string of cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that federal policy "preempts" any

state or local authority in matters of foreign affairs. By rejecting the McConnell bill that

would have banned U.S. investment in Burma, Congress established a policy that clearly

conflicts with, and preempts, the sanctions imposed by Massachusetts and other

subfederal units of government.

Second, the foreign commerce clause in article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution

grants explicit and exclusive power to Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign

nations." By seeking to influence the direction of foreign investment, state and local

sanctions against Burma violate the Supreme Court's interpretation of the clause as

saying that the nation must "speak with one voice" on foreign commercial relations. (14)

Third, the supremacy clause of the Constitution in article VI grants the federal

government exclusive power to conduct foreign policy. In a series of rulings, the

Supreme Court has struck down state and local efforts to meddle in America's relations
with foreign states.

Despite the strong legal case, U.S. firms have been reluctant to challenge state and

local sanctions on constitutional grounds. The authors of the Vanderbilt Journal article

blame politics: "Few corporations would have been bold enough to challenge a

community's censure of apartheid, and not many more will want to be perceived as

supporting the SLORC regime in remote Burma."(15)

The main legal challenge to state and local sanctions has been in the international

sphere, where local communities that adopt their own foreign policy are in conflict with

international trade law as administered by the World Trade Organization. The European

Union has filed a complaint against the Massachusetts anti-Burma measure before the

WTO, and other challenges are in the pipeline.(16)

The growth of state and local sanctions places Washington on a collision course with

foreign governments and firms and creates a headache for U.S. companies. As one

journalist described it, "Trying to monitor the foreign policy of 50 states and 7,284

municipalities is, to put it mildly, a nightmare for companies and national governments

alike."(17) Considerable hypocrisy is apparent in some of those actions. For example, the

city of Seattle is considering the imposition of sanctions against economically marginal

Burma but would never ponder a similar move against China, a major buyer of aircraft

produced by the Boeing Corporation, a local company. (18)

The Futility of Sanctions

One of the most powerful arguments against unilateral economic sanctions is that they

rarely work. Sanctions are an inherently flawed strategy because the kind of regime

likely to become the target of U.S. sanctions--an authoritarian regime in a less

developed country such as Burma--is also the least sensitive to unilateral U.S. economic

pressure. Indeed, by reducing the influence of U.S. companies in the target country and

driving a wedge between the United States and its allies, unilateral sanctions are likely

to be counterproductive.

A Record of Failure

Economic sanctions have failed dismally in the past. The record of U.S. foreign policy is

chock full of sanctions that did not bring about the intended change in the target

country. Since 1970 unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States have

failed to work in 87 percent of the cases in which they have been tried. (19) Among the

more spectacular fiascoes were the grain embargo against the Soviet Union in

retaliation for its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan and the 1982 sanctions against

companies that participated in building the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western

Europe. In both cases U.S. exporters and investors lost business to foreign competitors

while Soviet behavior was unaffected. After 35 years the U.S. embargo against Cuba

has failed to topple the Castro regime. Its only real impact has been to push the long-
suffering people of Cuba deeper into poverty.

Advocates of sanctions have pointed to Haiti, Iraq, and South Africa as examples of

success. But the political change in Haiti came about only after the United States

prepared to invade the island. And the United Nations-imposed embargo on Iraq did not

force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait; it was the U.S. military campaign against

Baghdad that achieved that goal. In South Africa sanctions accomplished nothing until

the end of the Cold War changed the political dynamic in that country. Furthermore,

those sanctions were imposed by a broad coalition of its major trading partners and

were aimed at a government that was democratically responsive to a sizable (albeit

minority) segment of the population. Neither of those conditions applies to the vast

majority of sanctions imposed by the United States in recent years, including those

against Burma.

America's Limited Leverage

America's potential leverage over Burma has always been marginal at best. The United

States is only the fifth largest foreign investor in Burma (Britain, France, Thailand, and

Singapore lead the list), with total investments of $226 million. (20) U.S. investment

accounts for less than 10 percent of total foreign direct investment, and the share may

be even smaller because of Burma's large black-market economy. For example, in 1993

total imports and exports reached nearly $2 billion, but the value of black-market trade

with India and China was about $1 billion.(21) In 1994 the United States accounted for
about 1 percent of Burmese imports and took in about 7 percent of that country's

exports. China, Singapore, and the rest of the Asian countries were the origin of about

90 percent of Burma's imports; and India, Singapore, and China were the three main

destinations for its exports.(22)

Those figures suggest that the U.S. economic stake in Burma is limited and that Burma

therefore is not susceptible to U.S. economic pressure. Cutting U.S. economic ties with

Burma will only reduce the already limited leverage the United States has on Rangoon.

Consequently, the failure of U.S. unilateral sanctions to change the behavior of Burma's

rulers is inevitable.

U.S. Policy Alienates Allies

The United States has failed to rally its allies to its campaign against Burma. In 1997

ASEAN admitted Burma as a member; the European Union has imposed only limited

and symbolic sanctions on Rangoon, declining to go beyond suspending Burma's access

to duty-free entry to its market,(23) and Australia has refrained from doing even that.

Now those allies are legitimately concerned that the United States, having failed to

persuade them, will attempt to coerce them to follow its policies against Rangoon.

That anxiety reflects the political realities of Washington. Congress was able, after all,

to force the Clinton administration to support both the Cuban Liberty and Democratic

Solidarity Act and the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. Both of those acts threaten to
impose U.S. sanctions on or to take other actions against the companies of third

countries if those countries fail to follow the U.S. line on sanctions.

Those acts of legislation represent the final stage of a now familiar pattern. First, the

United States adopts unilateral economic sanctions to force rogue regimes to change

their behavior. When that does not work, Washington tries to convince its trade

partners and diplomatic allies to join in the sanctions crusade. And when they refuse to

do that (as they usually do, with rare exceptions such as the case of Iraq), the United

States raises the ante by adopting secondary boycott measures against its reluctant

friends.

Since Rangoon is not expected to improve its human rights policies anytime soon and

ASEAN and the European Union almost certainly will continue to resist American

pressure to apply tougher sanctions, U.S. lawmakers may indeed decide to pressure the

administration to reinforce its Burma sanctions with secondary boycotts. That move

could bring the United States into a major confrontation with trade partners such as

Japan and Singapore, which invest heavily in Burma, as well as with the entire

membership of ASEAN.

Indeed, the potential for long-term confrontation with ASEAN is one of the most

troubling aspects of the Burma sanctions. Sanctions are seen in the region as part of a

general U.S.-led Asia-bashing campaign, with Washington weighing economic sanctions

against another ASEAN member, Indonesia, to punish it for its repression in the former
Portuguese colony of East Timor and for its lack of American standards of labor rights,

as well as against China, Southeast Asia's neighboring economic powerhouse. (24)

U.S. Fumbles a Win-Win Opportunity

Allowing ASEAN to lead the way on policy toward Burma would have been a realistic

and cost-effective approach on the part of Washington. A more cooperative policy

would have encouraged ASEAN to exert diplomatic pressure on Rangoon while allowing

the United States to avoid heavy-handed intrusion in regional politics. The United States

could have continued drawing the benefits of doing business with Burma as it waited

for the ASEAN governments to deliver the goods in the form of a growing willingness on

the part of the regime in Rangoon to expand its political dialogue with the opposition

NLD. It is the ASEAN members, after all, that have a direct interest in preventing China

from bringing Burma into its sphere of influence and encouraging Burma to instead join

the regional system.

One of the main reasons for ASEAN's opposition to the U.S. position stems from its

members' adherence to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other

members, reflecting the fact that their political systems range from democracy (the

Philippines) to soft authoritarianism (Indonesia) to communism (Vietnam). That is a

political reality that Washington should recognize. The notion that diplomatic and

economic relationships with a decaying communist regime in Hanoi are proper from a

moral perspective, while similar ties with a military junta Rangoon are not, smacks of
hypocrisy. In fact, a U.S. decision to delay sanctions might have persuaded ASEAN to

delay the admission of Burma to the organization.

As one expert put it, the dispute between the United States and ASEAN "brought both

the romanticism of the West and the pragmatism of Southeast Asia into sharp relief." It

has pitted Washington's unrealistic tactic of using sanctions to promote democracy in

Burma, an "act of a country that doesn't have to live with the consequences of its

actions," against the more cautious strategy pursued by nations that would have to

suffer the consequences of political and economic instability in Burma that could result

from a concerted policy aimed at isolating that country. (25)

After all, if American sanctions generate instability in Burma, it is ASEAN that will have

to repair the damage. Even the toughest hawks would shrink from sending U.S. troops

to Burma if that country fell apart. As Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon of the

Philippines suggested, "Those who are far away, if this particular case should not turn

out to be successful, they do not really suffer the consequences. We are involved, we

are near. You cannot leave [Burma] to collapse or to have an internal revolution." (26)

A Strategic Boon for China

The U.S. policy of isolating Burma has had the perverse effect of strengthening China's

hand in the region as it weakens our own. As former White House and State

Department official Peter Rodman has pointed out, U.S. friends in ASEAN "disagree with
the policy of isolating Burma and are eager to bring Burma into their group--to counter

the Chinese attempt to suborn it as a military ally." America's sanctions on Burma "are

thus a great boon to China," suggested Rodman, adding that "the law of unintended

consequences is at work here, as in so many other instances where Americans seek

moral ends without all that much care as to the practical effects." (27)

ASEAN members share that concern. Although Burma shares borders with other ASEAN

states, in its isolation, it "has drifted toward Beijing, its major arms supplier."(28) It is

indeed ironic that many people on both the left and the right who back the idea of

containing China, for ideological or strategic reasons, also support isolating Burma,

which of course plays directly into China's hands.

America's Self-Inflicted Wounds

No one denies that American-imposed sanctions on Burma or other countries harm the

interests of American companies in the countries targeted for punishment. As noted, in

addition to creating the impression that U.S. companies are not reliable suppliers of

goods and services, sanctions damage the good reputation of American businesses in

the region and around the world. Sanctions create an environment of political and

economic uncertainty in which risk assessment is chaotic, a situation that is usually bad

news for business.

The imposition of sanctions provides competitive advantage to foreign companies that

end up exploiting the trade and investment opportunities denied to American

companies. For example, before sanctions were imposed on new investment, White

Plains, N.Y.-based Texaco was the operator of the Yetagun field, located about 125

miles off the coast of Burma, that is believed to hold 1.1 trillion cubic feet of gas. But

following the sanctions decision, the company moved to sell its interest to a British

company. "In effect, the sanctions against Burma only hit our global oil companies to

the benefit of French and British competitors," concluded economist Paul Craig

Roberts.(29) Even when sanctions have been part of a concerted and enforceable

multilateral regime, they have usually failed to force changes. (30)

Before the Clinton administration decided to impose sanctions on Burma, separate anti-

Burma moves by state and local governments had already produced negative effects on

American companies. For example, when San Francisco attempted to upgrade its 911

emergency telephone system in 1996, the only two bidders with the technological

wherewithal to handle the $40 million project, Motorola and Erricsson, had both run

afoul of the city's Burma-or-us law banning contracts with companies that deal with that

country's military regime. Facing such pressure, Motorola decided to clear out of Burma.

Similarly, in October 1996, Apple announced that it would stop selling computers in

Burma as a result of a Massachusetts selective purchasing law; Eddie Bauer and

PepsiCo also pulled out of that country under pressure from state and local

governments.(31)
This is clearly a self-inflicted punishment of American companies and workers. And

when U.S. companies lose markets and investment opportunities abroad, the wealth of

the United States is diminished. One study estimates that U.S. companies were losing

$15 billion to $19 billion annually in exports in 1995 because of sanctions imposed by

the U.S. government against 26 target nations. Sanctions may cost the U.S. economy

$1 billion a year in lost wage premiums in the export sector. (32)

Sanctions Fall Hardest on People of Burma

What really matters is that the Burma sanctions have not worked to achieve their

political goals of domestic change. The SLORC/SPCD junta remains in control and is not

facing any serious challenge to its power. As many of the businesses operating in

Burma have pointed out, the sanctions' main victims are the Burmese people

themselves.

When it comes to advancing political and economic reforms, U.S. companies in Burma

are part of the solution, not the problem. "The presence of U.S. companies abroad

helps to promote the values we as a nation espouse, including human rights and fair

labor standards," noted Ernest Bower, president of the U.S.-ASEAN Council and one of

the leading opponents of sanctions. U.S. companies train workers and transfer

technology more readily than do their Asian and European competitors. They promote

democratic values, set a positive example, and improve the general quality of life by

providing fair pay, safe working conditions, and health and education benefits.
American foreign investment in Burma "is an extremely effective means of advancing

economic and social development, and should not be abandoned in favor of measures

which have no chance of success," argued Bower.(33)

One objection raised to U.S. investment in Burma is that foreign companies are often

required to deal directly with government ministries and state-owned enterprises,

including those tied to the defense ministry. Advocates of sanctions argue that those

joint ventures do more to prop up the government than to nurture an alternative

private sector. Dealing with the government is difficult to avoid in a country where

socialism has guided government economic policy for decades. Even when working

jointly with state-tied companies, American-owned investment brings higher wages,

new technology, and Western-style labor practices to workers in Burma. Outside

investment strengthens private institutions while exerting influence on the government

to liberalize its economic policies. The same influence has been at work in China, where

foreign direct investment, even when in partnership with state-owned enterprises, has

profoundly and positively affected the lives of Chinese workers.

Unocal's Positive Impact in Burma

One of the most prominent investors in Burma has been Unocal Corporation. Based in

El Segundo, California, the company is helping to develop the offshore gas field in the

Andaman Sea and to build, in a joint venture with Total of France, Thailand's PTT, and

Burma's MOGE, a $1.2 billion, 254-mile natural gas pipeline to transport the gas to
Thailand. The Yadana field is believed to contain 5.7 trillion cubic feet of gas.

Production from that field, which is to begin in 1998, will reach 525 million cubic feet of

gas a day during the first phase and probably 690 million cubic feet a day later on.

Since the Yadana project was well under way when the ban was issued in May, Unocal's

Burmese operations are grandfathered under the sanctions. But officials in the company

said that the ban could hinder Unocal's agreement to bid for oil and gas exploration

rights nearby and create doubts about the commitment of the company to remain

active in Burma if, for example, Congress decides to adopt tougher sanctions, such as

those in the McConnell bill. In any case, the company cannot build its business in

Burma beyond its current single project.

Unocal's investment benefits the people of Burma in a number of ways. Its project is

bringing natural gas to Thailand from offshore Burma, providing a clean source of

energy for a region suffering, like the rest of Southeast Asia, from pervasive pollution.

The construction of the onshore section of the pipeline that the company is erecting in

Burma is creating jobs, new opportunities for the 35,000 people who live in the area,

which is one of the poorest regions in the country. Unocal and its partners in the

project have begun a three-year, $6 million program to provide improved medical care,

better schools, electrical power, and sustainable development of livestock and farming

in the pipeline region.(34) The project "is an example of economic development

contributing to lasting social change," according to the NAM study on sanctions. (35) Or
as Unocal president John F. Imle Jr. wrote, "Sanctions are counterproductive. They hurt

people, not regimes." Noting the failure of U.S. sanctions to depose Fidel Castro, Imle

asserted, "Economic progress, fueled by foreign investment, provides the foundation for

more-democratic and open societies."(36)

Some of the advocates of sanctions against Burma charge that forced labor has been

used to help build the pipeline. Although the government of Burma routinely conscripts

civilians to work on state construction projects, the evidence is strong that forced labor

has not been used on the Unocal pipeline project. In a January 1997 human rights

report on Burma, the U.S. Department of State acknowledged the allegations of forced

labor but concluded, "The preponderance of evidence indicates that the pipeline project

has paid its workers at least a market wage." (37) In other words, there is no persuasive

evidence that forced labor has played any role in building the pipeline. Instead, as have

most other foreign investment projects in developing countries, the pipeline project has

paid wages at or above those in the prevailing labor market.

The very presence of American companies like Unocal, "grounded in American

traditions, pressured by the human rights expectations of the U.S. public and monitored

by the Western media, probably works as a speed bump to slow down SLORC," agreed

University of California-Los Angeles professor Tom Plate in a Los Angeles Times column.

"But because Burma leads the evil-empire league of the moment, Unocal becomes the

cause celebre of the year in the U.S." If the human rights lobby gets its wish and
American investment continues to run away from Burma, "the Burmese people could

wind up in far worse shape." If anything, there is a need for more, not less, U.S.

investment in the country, and a guilt-ridden exit by American companies "could well

mean no exit, at least in the foreseeable future, for the people of Burma," Plate

concluded.(38)

As a former Bush administration official has argued, "Trade sanctions can function like a

neutron bomb, destroying the economy, wreaking misery on the general population but

leaving the policy establishment intact."(39) If anything, the collapse of authoritarian

regimes or any improvement in their behavior is "more likely to be delayed by

sanctions, which provide governments with an external scapegoat for their own failings,

serve as an excuse to repress political opposition and often ignite a popular will to

resist" external pressure.(40)

Sanctions Slow Burma's Liberalization

Burma is a nation with huge potential human resources. Its 45 million people "are

highly literate, skilled, and fully capable of making a significant contribution to the

economic growth in the region."(41) Burma is also a country with plentiful natural

resources including natural gas, mineral deposits, precious metals and gems, high-

quality tropical hardwoods, and freshwater and marine fisheries.

In recent years, while continuing to maintain tight political control over the country, the
military regime has allowed Burma to gradually emerge from decades of self-imposed

isolation and open itself economically. Indeed, its economy has begun to grow and

attract foreign investment. After several years of stagnation in the late 1980s and early

1990s, Burma's economy grew by an estimated 6 percent in 1994 and by an estimated

8.2 percent in 1995. Similarly, per capita income has risen modestly, from about $198

in 1993 to $224 in 1995. Under the regime's economic reform program, exports were

expected to increase by 30 percent from 1994 to 1997. And the Privatization

Commission led by the government's first secretary, Lt. Gen. Khim Nyunt, is responsible

for privatizing government-controlled enterprises. According to some figures, the private

sector now accounts for close to 80 percent of gross domestic product and is expected

to grow in the coming years. Japanese and South Korean experts are assisting in the

creation of a stock exchange, and foreign currency regulations and tax regulations are

being liberalized as the regime is approving larger amounts of foreign investment in the

country. Such investments reached more than $2.5 billion in 1995, up from $735 million

in 1992.(42)

Burma's integration into ASEAN is expected to accelerate the process of economic

growth and provide new opportunities for foreign businesses, although the economy

will continue to face major problems. U.S. unilateral sanctions against Burma will have

only a limited effect on that process, since other nations that already have substantial

foreign investment in Burma will proceed with that investment. In fact, since a lack of

managerial skills seems to be one of the major obstacles to the growth and reform of
the Burmese economy, U.S. economic disengagement from that country is preventing

Burma's Western-oriented business elite from acquiring the expertise needed to

integrate Burma into the global economy. Hence, while Congress and the Clinton

administration sing the praises of globalization, their policies toward Burma run contrary

to that goal.(43)

Advocates of sanctions point out that opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi supports

sanctions against her own country. If she favors sanctions, who are we to decide that

sanctions would be bad for her countrymen? But that line of reasoning dodges the all-

important question of whether sanctions are good policy. Aung San Suu Kyi's

courageous opposition to a repressive regime deserves respect, but that does not

necessarily mean that Western nations must endorse her choice of tactics. The fact that

the opposition within a country has endorsed a policy that hurts nearly everyone

involved and has little prospect of succeeding does not require the United States to

follow the same questionable path.

Challenging the Sanctions Mentality

The proliferation of sanctions has led to a debate in Congress and the media over the

diplomatic utility of economic sanctions. Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Reps. Lee

Hamilton (D-Ind.) and Phil Crane (R-Ill.) have drafted a bill to require that Congress

study and consider the effects of unilateral sanctions before moving to impose them on

this or that country. The bill would also require a determination of whether sanctions
would achieve their declared goals of changing the target country's foreign or domestic

policies and of the costs of the sanctions to the U.S. economy. (44) Still other proposals

aimed at stemming the sanctions onslaught include a requirement that Congress

determine that any sanctions be in the "national security interest" before they can be

imposed and that the U.S. government provide compensation to U.S. companies whose

investments are lost or devalued as a result of U.S.-imposed sanctions.(45)

Now, Congress exercises caution only if the potential cost of sanctions is relatively high.

Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is one of the world's leading abusers of human

(especially women's and religious) rights, Congress has not seriously considered

imposing trade sanctions against the world's largest oil-exporting economy. Nor did the

effort to impose trade sanctions against China, one of America's major export markets,

move beyond the stage of drafting bills and bashing Beijing on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers

recognize the political backlash that they could suffer as a result of rising oil prices, as a

result of sanctions against Saudi Arabia, or loss of American jobs, as a result of

sanctions imposed on China. So it is the small or economically vulnerable kids on the

global bloc, like Burma and Cuba, Iran and Iraq, that will continue to be the targets of

sanctions. Meanwhile, innocent civilians living in those countries will suffer as a result of

American politicians' new policy.

Another alternative to the current abuse of sanctions is a voluntary code of conduct for

foreign companies operating in Burma or other countries that violate human rights
principles. Such a code would be modeled on the Sullivan Principles that were adopted

by American companies that did business in apartheid-era South Africa.(46)

The pro-business approach to human rights is based on the notion that the effects of

U.S. investment in and trade with Burma (or, for that matter, China or Cuba) would be

conducive overall to economic and political reform, and by extension to the

strengthening of human rights. U.S. companies act as a "liberalizing force, helping to

strengthen the private sector, establishing alternate centers of power, and creating

subtle but important pressure for democratic reforms." (47) They also help raise wages

and labor standards in those countries and participate, as in Burma, in the building of

schools, hospitals, and roads that local governments cannot finance. The onus lies on

supporters of sanctions to prove that the citizens of Burma, and those of other nations

targeted for sanctions, would be better off without American investment and trade. Up

to now, they have failed to do that, requesting that we all join them in a journey to the

unknown, at the end of which, we are promised, sanctions will bring us to the promised

Jeffersonian land of democracy and freedom.

We have already taken the pro-business road in China, South Korea, the Philippines,

and Latin America; and the process of economic and political reform has, indeed, been

accelerated and not retarded by U.S. business engagement. China has clearly

demonstrated the positive effects of U.S. investment. As an American investment

banker points out, the areas of China where U.S. investment has been highest, coastal
Guangdong and Fujian Province, are also the most politically progressive. (48)

Instead of trying to reform the sanctions process by making it more "goal oriented" or

by forcing the U.S. business community to support campaigns to isolate other nations,

Washington policymakers should realize that economic sanctions are bad policy and

that any attempt to make them work better is a contradiction in terms. As noted, most

studies suggest that unilateral economic sanctions have done almost nothing to change

the domestic balance of power in targeted nations, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, or Cuba,

where the mullahs, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Kaddafi, and Fidel Castro, respectively,

remain in control. If anything, their power has been strengthened by the economic and

diplomatic isolation imposed on them by the United States. Their policies toward the

United States have been determined primarily by strategic considerations, in particular,

American military power, and have nothing to do with the U.S. economic embargoes

imposed on them.

Conclusion

The sanctions policy against the government in Rangoon never had any chance of

working because of the refusal of ASEAN, Japan, China, and the European Union--

Burma's largest trading and investment partners--to support it. The policy has created

diplomatic and economic tensions between the United States and its allies in ASEAN and

deprived Washington of the option of adopting the policy of working with those nations

to integrate Burma into the regional system and the global economy and trying to
influence the political balance of power in Rangoon through quiet, behind-the-scenes

diplomacy. The chaotic campaign to isolate Burma by a mishmash of federal, state, and

local sanctions is hurting American companies by increasing the risk to their businesses

in Burma, Southeast Asia, and around the world. It forces American firms to operate in

an unstable and uncertain business environment, providing a competitive advantage to

foreign companies in Burma and Southeast Asia.

Unfortunately, things will only get worse if Congress decides to adopt some form of

secondary boycott legislation to punish foreign companies, including those based in

Singapore and Japan, that trade with and invest in Burma, or if there is a serious

attempt by Congress to impose sanctions against Indonesia. Indeed, one lesson of the

history of economic sanctions is "that once launched, sanctions are very difficult to

terminate, with domestic politics militating against an administration's attempt to 'back

down.'"(49) Hence, one can expect a self-perpetuating cycle of Burma sanctions, with

the inevitable refusal of Rangoon to implement political reform (strengthened by

internal resistance to U.S. sanctions), leading to new and harsher sanctions against

Burma.

Conflict created by U.S. policy toward Burma will only raise the cost of promoting U.S.

economic and strategic interests in the region, at a time when the rise of China and

changing U.S. military and diplomatic relationships with Japan and South Korea are

creating a sense of growing strategic uncertainly in East Asia, and when the financial
turmoil in Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Japan is slowing economic growth in the

Pacific Rim.

In the final analysis, U.S. policy toward Burma is an irresponsible moral posturing.

Supporters of sanctions want to feel good that they are doing something to improve

political and economic conditions in Burma by forcing someone else--American

businesses, the ASEAN nations, and the Burmese people--to bear the costs. The result

will be reduced access of the Burmese people to American products, people, and ideas;

worsening economic conditions; and potential political and regional instability. It is

indeed ironic that some members of America's cosmopolitan knowledge class, who are

the main beneficiaries of the process of economic globalization, are supporting policies

that run contrary to free trade and open markets and deny the Burmese people the

ability to enjoy the fruits of the global economy.

Notes

1. Robert Corzine and Nancy Dunne, "U.S. Business Hits at Use of Unilateral Sanctions,"

Financial Times, April 16, 1997; David Kirschten, "Chicken Soup Diplomacy," National

Journal, January 4, 1997; and David Kirschten, "Economic Sanctions: Speaking Loudly .

. . But Carrying Only a Small Stick," National Journal, January 4, 1997.

2. Paul Craig Roberts, "A Growing Menace to Free Trade: U.S. Sanctions," Business
Week, November 24, 1997.

3. National Association of Manufacturers, A Catalog of New U.S. Unilateral Economic

Sanctions for Foreign Policy Purposes, 1993-96 (Washington: NAM, March 1997), pp. 1-

2.

4. "Going Slow on Embargoes," editorial, Rocky Mountain News, August 11, 1997.

5. Leon Hadar, "U.S. Sanctions Backlash," Business Times (Singapore), March 21, 1997.

6. Congressional Record 141, 104th Cong., 1st. sess., daily ed. (July 28, 1995): S10892-

95.

7. Mya Saw Shin, Alison Krupnick, and Tom L. Wilson, Burma or Myanmar? U.S. Policy

at the Crossroads (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 1995), p. 20.

8. "U.S. Policy towards Burma," U.S. Department of State Dispatch 6, no. 30 (July 24,

1995), electronic version.

9. Peter Baker, "U.S to Impose Sanctions on Burma for Repression," Washington Post,

April 22, 1997.

10. Quoted in Steven Erlanger, "Clinton Approves New U.S. Sanctions against

Burmese," New York Times, April 22, 1997.

11. Robert A. Manning, "U.S. Bullying Tactics Alienating Asian Allies," Los Angeles
Times, July 27, 1997; and Allan Wendt, "Futility of Sanctions against Burma,"

Washington Times, June 29, 1997.

12. See, for example, "American University Restricts Business Ties to Burma," American

Scene, Fall 1997.

13. David Schmahmann and James Finch, "The Unconstitutionality of State and Local

Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar),"

Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 30, no. 2 (March 1997): 184-202.

14. Ibid., p. 189, citing Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 285 (1976).

15. Ibid., p. 179.

16. "Europe Takes Massachusetts Law to WTO," Agence France Presse, June 20, 1997;

and Frank Phillips, "Massachusetts to Be Warned on Burma Law," Boston Globe, April

15, 1997.

17. Kevin Whitelaw, "The Very Long Arm of the Law: Is the World Ready for 7,284

Secretaries of State?" U.S. News & World Report, October 14, 1996.

18. "City's Burma Policy an Endless, Bad Idea," editorial, Seattle Post-Intelligencer,

August 18, 1997.

19. Kimberly Ann Elliott, Institute for International Economics, "Evidence on the Costs

and Benefits of Economic Sanctions," Statement before the Subcommittee on Trade of

the House Ways and Means Committee, October 23, 1997. The text of her statement

can be found at http://www.iie.com/sanctns.htm.

20. Economist Intelligence Unit, "Myanmar (Burma) Country Report," 2d quarter,

London, 1995.

21. Shin, Krupnick, and Wilson.

22. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington:

IMF, 1995), various country tables.

23. Wendt.

24. 24. Bunn Nagora, "Home Issues Shape U.S., ASEAN Policies on Myanmar,"

Asiaweek, July 4, 1997.

25. Stephen Brooks, "ASEAN Has No Choice but to Ignore U.S. on Myanmar," Asia

Times, May 3, 1997.

26. Quoted in Brooks.

27. Peter Rodman, "The Burma Dilemma," Washington Post, May 29, 1997.

28. Manning.

29. Roberts.
30. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic

Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington: Institute for

International Economics, 1990); and Bruce Bartlett, "What's Wrong with Trade

Sanctions?" Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 65, 1985.

31. Whitelaw.

32. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., "U.S. Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs

and Wages," Institute for International Economics, at

http://www.iie.com/sanctnwp.htm, 1997.

33. Ernest Z. Bower, president, U.S.-ASEAN Council for Business and Technology Inc.,

Statement before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, May

22, 1996. Some of the other figures and information referred to in this section were

mentioned in the testimony and related material issued by the council.

34. "Why Unocal Ignores Calls for Myanmar Sanctions," Asia Times, August 13, 1997.

See also Unocal's Web page, "Unocal in Myanmar Background," which includes

information on the company's efforts to improve education, health, and development in

that country. http:/www.unocal.com/myanmar/brmabkgd.htm.

35. National Association of Manufacturers.

36. John F. Imle, "A Case for Investment in Burma," International Herald Tribune,
February 6, 1997.

37. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Burma

Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996," January 30, 1997, at

http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/burma.html.

38. Tom Plate, "Capitalism vs. Moralism in Burma," Los Angeles Times, September 24,

1996.

39. Frank L. Lavin, "Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma," Foreign Policy

104 (Fall 1996): 146.

40. Donald L. Losman, "Good Intentions Gone Bad," Washington Post, October 6, 1996.

See also Richard Saluto, "Second Thoughts on Sanctions," Asiaweek, August 9, 1996;

and Bruce Bartlett, "Trade Sanctions Normally Don't Work," Detroit News, March 19,

1997.

41. Bower.

42. Shin, Krupnick, and Wilson, p. 14.

43. 43. Bertil Lintner, "Paper Tiger," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1997.

44. "Think before Sanctioning," editorial, Chicago Sun-Times, September 17, 1997.

45. Stuart Anderson, "Self-inflicted Wounds," Journal of Commerce, February 18, 1997.
46. James Finch, "Investors Can Help Break Myanmar's Political Gridlock," Asiaweek,

June 6, 1997.

47. Stuart Anderson, "Stop the Sanctions Game," Journal of Commerce, July 23, 1996.

48. William Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W. W. Norton, 1993), p. 392.

49. Losman.

www.cato.org.
U.S. Punishes Myanmar's Leadership; Will It Help?

September 27, 2007

The Bush administration says it is imposing economic sanctions against 14 senior

officials of Myanmar's government. Robert Siegel talks with David Cortright, author of

Sanctions Decade and scholar at the University of Notre Dame, about the impact of

sanctions on the regime in Myanmar.

Bush Imposes Sanctions on Myanmar

Officials

September 27, 2007

The Bush administration imposed economic sanctions against senior officials of

Myanmar on Thursday, as China appealed for calm and other Southeast Asian countries

condemned the violent repression of protesters.

The U.S. Treasury Department announced the sanctions against 14 senior officials of

Myanmar, also known as Burma.

"The world is watching the people of Burma take to the streets to demand their

freedom, and the American people stand in solidarity with these brave individuals,"

President Bush said in a statement.

Among those targeted for the sanctions are the junta leader, Senior Gen. Than Shwe,

and the No. 2 man in the military regime, Deputy Senior Gen. Maung Aye.

The action by Treasury will freeze any assets that the targeted individuals have in U.S.

banks and other financial institutions under U.S. jurisdiction. The order also prohibits

any Americans from doing business with the designated individuals.

Asian Nations Call for Restraint

Meanwhile, a statement issued after a foreign ministers' meeting of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations meeting in New York strongly urged Myanmar's government to

exercise restraint and seek a political solution.

The ASEAN ministers called for the release of all political prisoners, including Nobel

Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who is under house arrest.

"They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win over reports

that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that

there has been a number of fatalities," the statement said.

"They strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost restraint and seek a political solution.

They called upon Myanmar to resume its efforts at national reconciliation with all parties

concerned, and work towards a peaceful transition to democracy."

Myanmar is an ASEAN member, along with Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,

Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

China has come under increasing pressure to use its regional influence to urge

Myanmar's ruling junta to show restraint in dealing with the protests.

On Wednesday, China refused to condemn Myanmar and ruled out imposing sanctions,

but for the first time agreed to a Security Council statement expressing concern at the

violent crackdown and urging the country's military rulers to allow in a U.N. envoy.

The U.N. special envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, headed for Myanmar at Secretary-General

Ban Ki-moon's request to try to promote a political solution and reconciliation efforts.

U.N. deputy spokeswoman Marie Okabe said Ban had been told by Win that Gambari

"will be welcomed by the Myanmar government."

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said in Beijing that "China hopes that

all parties in Myanmar exercise restraint and properly handle the current issue so as to

ensure the situation there does not escalate and get complicated."

Myanmar Situation Problematic for China

The crackdown puts China in a bind. Its communist government has developed close

diplomatic ties with junta leaders and is a major investor in Myanmar. But with the

Beijing Olympics less than a year away, China is eager to fend off criticism that it

shelters unpopular or abusive regimes.

China and Russia contend the situation in Myanmar is an internal affair and doesn't

threaten international peace and security — as required for Security Council action — so

getting them to agree to the press statement was considered a positive step.

European Union diplomats agreed to consider imposing more economic sanctions on

Myanmar. Sanctions were first imposed in 1996 and include a ban on travel to Europe

for top government officials, an assets freeze and a ban on arms sales to Myanmar.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill told reporters in Beijing that the use of

force by the junta "will solve nothing."

"We all need to agree on the fact that the Burmese government has got to stop

thinking that this can be solved by police and military, and start thinking about the need

for genuine reconciliation with the broad spectrum of political activists in the country,"

he added.

Hill was expected to discuss the violence in Myanmar with Chinese officials on the

sidelines of North Korean nuclear disarmament talks this week in Beijing. He declined to

say whether Washington would request specific measures from Beijing.

Japan Demands Accountability for Journalist's Death

Among those killed Thursday was Kenji Nagai, a journalist for the Japanese video news

agency APF News. Nagai, 50, had been covering the protests since Tuesday, APF

representative Toru Yamaji said in Japan.

In Washington, Japanese Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura said Tokyo held Myanmar

"strictly" accountable for Nagai's death.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura said Japan will lodge a protest with

Myanmar, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official said.

"We strongly protest the Myanmar government and demand an investigation" into the

death, Machimura was quoted as saying by the official, speaking on customary

condition of anonymity. "We demand (Myanmar) take appropriate steps to ensure the

safety of the Japanese citizens in that country."

Japan will send Deputy Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka to Myanmar to protest Nagai's

death, said Tomohiko Taniguchi, a deputy press secretary traveling with Komura in

Washington.

Australian Prime Minister John Howard said his government would also press Beijing to

urge the junta to end its violent repression.

From NPR reports and The Associated Press

www.npr.org
December 17, 2009

Burmese people suffer brunt of U.S. sanctions on Myanmar

Young Burmese men sitting on bikes in Yangon. Photos: Michael Lwin

In recent months, U.S. policy on the isolated Southeast Asian nation of Myanmar has

been shifting towards greater engagement.

Worldfocus blogger Michael Lwin, who recently returned from Myanmar and is of

Burmese descent, argues that U.S. sanctions have been ineffective and have caused

undue suffering for the Burmese people.

During my trip to Myanmar, it was heartbreaking to listen to young Burmese people

who, because of geographic accident of birth, have a tiny fraction of the opportunities

and possibilities that I do.

―We go to college and get masters and are educated,‖ said one young Yangon resident.

―We have degrees in science and medicine. But there are no jobs for us.‖

Official statistics say that the unemployment rate is 5 percent, but many Burmese

people told me that it was much higher.

A man sharing a Yangon taxi with me said: ―We are so behind the rest of the world.

Look at Thailand. They cooperated with the West, and look at them now. We used to

be far superior, and now we are very behind. Our struggle is very sad.‖

For decades, the Burmese people have struggled in isolation as their nation has faced

sanctions from the U.S. and other Western nations aimed at punishing the ruling

military junta.

A Burmese woman peels onions at a roadside restaurant.

The Obama administration has been pursuing a policy of cautious engagement with

Myanmar. U.S. Senator Jim Webb, a Vietnam War veteran and Secretary of the Navy

under Reagan, has been pushing for a policy of even greater engagement.

In an August 2009 New York Times op-ed, Webb criticized the ―ever-tightening

economic sanctions against Myanmar,‖ on the basis that China, Russia and India still

make business deals with Myanmar.

Webb continued: ―If Chinese commercial influence in Myanmar continues to grow, a

military presence could easily follow. Russia is assisting the Myanmar government on a

nuclear research project. None of these projects have improved the daily life of the

average citizen of Myanmar, who has almost no contact with the outside world and

whose per capita income is among the lowest in Asia.‖

Sanctions also cripple Myanmar by encouraging educated Burmese to leave the country

for the West. Myanmar continues to lag behind ASEAN counterparts in human capital.

Sanctions also take away many jobs from the Burmese, forcing women into the sex

industry and giving rise to black markets.

I believe there is another reason that engagement might work in Myanmar.

Unlike North Korea, which actively stamps out other religions besides the state‘s

propagandist Juche ideology, the Burmese have been a deeply spiritual and

predominantly Buddhist people for over a millennium.

Senior-General Than Shwe, Myanmar‘s ruler, is influenced by Buddhist principles,

having built a massive pagoda in the new capital Naypyidaw.

The Naypyidaw pagoda is intentionally one foot shorter than the revered Shwedagon

pagoda in Yangon, presumably because Than Shwe does not want to offend Buddhist

sensibilities. It is also rumored that he enlisted astrologers to select the location of

Naypyidaw.

It is possible that Than Shwe, at the ripe age of 76, wants to build up good karma for

the next life by engaging the Obama administration.

Whether Webb‘s theory will work remains to be seen. While initial attempts at

engagement seemed fruitful, progress has stalled. But some are optimistic that relations

are picking up again.

For the sake of the Burmese people, I hope change comes soon.

- Michael Lwin

Comments

18 comments

#18 01/26/2010 :: 09:10:20 PM Nyunt Says:

Our international community should review the way we are handling Burmese military

government. We all have to agree that Sanction is not working. We need to educate
Burmese Government to be opening minded with open door economy systems (Like

China) and help them to see bigger picture of country future and give Burmese

government a new focus. That method proving to work with China, it should work with

Burma.

What do you think?

#17 12/21/2009 :: 12:32:31 AM SOS Says:

consider- if the junta had used the money it got from trades with Thailand, Singapore,

Korea, China, India, for good - not just buying the military equipments - but for health,

education and economic investments for the people.

Burma is still rich with natural resources - just leave the people alone - just stop sucking

blood etc, the people will make it just right.

The reality is - the junta needs money and it acquire it by robbing the people - at the

same time, junta gives no plausible services back to the people. What the junta has

done was just rubbish. As long as the junta is throwing its rubbish around, the people

will suffer.

#16 12/21/2009 :: 12:25:21 AM SOS Says:

If the junta let the people trade with no restriction and only with reasonable taxes, then

lots of problems can be solved within a year. The junta has but supply the needed

energy and electricity. As much as it sells to the foreign countries, it must also supply
the energy to the burmese people. The junta must stop the corrupt authorities and the

confiscation of lands etc. Must allow the farmers do their works. Health is another issue

for economy - and the junta must fix it.

Ha, ha, ha I don‘t believe the junta is competent to do these. As long as, the power is

in the hand of a murderer, and treasury is in the hand of thieves, don‘t expect any good

from the junta.

#15 12/21/2009 :: 12:18:16 AM SOS Says:

I think you people still remember the song of Ko Moon Aung: tin-done-ka-dot-tin-lite-

ya-de-pin-nya-dwe… you educated yourself, as though to occupy the world, that was in

the 1990s. Actually, images like these images you published here were seen by our very

eyes before the 1988s. How the Ne Win government demonetized the K100 note, K75

note etc. I saw the K75 notes rotten in expectation if the gov would make the same

exchange it did with the K100. We all know some female uni students sold themselves

to get education. Then there were still black markets along the borderlines. I think you

all know the custom trying to catch the traders during these black market days - plenty

of sad stories though. After the gov opened the official trade with Thailand, traders had

to pay tax, etc since - that was still like robbery. And now I think much worse. What‘s

the difference? The difference is they can rob officially in different way. I‘d like to

suggest the author also to visit these areas along the borderlines trade zones. Well,

why these things keep happening? That is economic mismanagement and corruption.
Why? Just because of those greedy, uneducated, unqualified, plutocrats of course.

Recently, the economic Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz suggested the junta what to do.

So why so rush – just wait and see if there is a new economic policy in Burma. If they

do love the people, they might already have open up the country for real. Burmese

people do not need to access American and EU markets – they only need plausible

economic policy and rule of law – not robbery.

#14 12/20/2009 :: 07:32:12 AM phuweso Says:

Dear Zaw,

May I beg to differ.Yes, the military junta has botched the economy.However in the late

80s and early 90s they did open up the country to trade and life WAS easing up in

Burma ,until Aung San Suu Kyi asked for sanctions and things started to go back

downhill.She wanted the world to ―send a message‖ to the military junta.All it did was

to impoverish the country to the point that some young Burmese women are driven into

the sex trade to survive.Read Derek Tonkin‘s post.(#8)Is this what Aung San Suu Kyi

wants? As a woman she should care about the plight of her countrywomen. She IS a

hero.But is she a good leader?Shouldn‘t a good leader care about the people more than

the ideology?Don‘t we see even George W Bush going against ideology sometimes

,when he felt it was good for the country?Ditto Obama?Iran‘s opposition does not want

sanctions for their governmant although it is oppressive.I wish there was some debate
about this ,rather than just this blanket ―Suu Kyi is Good so she is always right‖.the

lives of 50 million people are at stake and the future of the country is at stake.

#13 12/20/2009 :: 01:43:34 AM Zaw Says:

phuweso, You must be kidding, are you trying to imply that Aung San Suu Kyi‘s wishes

are against the benefit of 50 million Burmese people? All the people suffering are cause

by pro democracy movement and sanctions? Are you crazy of what? Like a Burmese

proverb, the thief is pretending like a victim. Do you remember the economist situation

and people‘s life under the Mility Junta before Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and pro

democracy movement in 1988? It is your mility Junta who is causing all these suffering,

endless human rights violations, poverty, instability, and so on and on…

#12 12/19/2009 :: 09:26:39 PM phuweso Says:

I see there are pros and cons to the sanction issue.the most important thing is that we

are debating it.I commend Michael Lwin for being courageous enough to take a position

that is not exactly popular.My take is ,which is more important- Aung San Suu Kyi‘s

wishes,or the fate of 50 million Burmese people.

#11 12/19/2009 :: 06:12:41 AM douglas Says:

Please wait till next year election. Myanmar will be, as promise by the Junta, a

flourishing democratic prosperous country. Yes, 25 % will be represented by the

military in the Parliament .The rest will be civilian (or ex-uniform).So what? 75 % with
no direct military link is better than nothing ! Do you think country like Saudi Arabia has

more democratic values and freedom ? The Saudi will send you to jail for carrying a

Bible .Yet, UK and USA are selling billions worth of arms and munitions to such

countries.Sanction is a smart bomb in reverse –It only hurt the innocent.

#10 12/18/2009 :: 09:51:54 PM Matha Goram Says:

The end result remains the same for Myanmar (as well as Honduras and other poor

countries) proving once again Chairman Mao‘s assertion about power.

#9 12/18/2009 :: 02:02:02 PM Zaw Says:

All these suffering are existed even before the sanction. The economy was destroyed

systematically since the BSPP (Burmese Socialist Program Party) came into power. Ne

Win the smarty nationalized all business and imposed the sanction to the whole world

away form Burma by closed door policy.

I agree that sanction will cause people to suffer a little longer, but lifting them while the

military junta is still in power will not help people either. Poverty and unemployment

exist in all countries, it is directly related to how government handle the issues. What

the Regime did to help these poor people? If they did nothing now, they won‘t do

anything after sanctions are lifted either. Besides, you can‘t rebuilt a stable economy on

the top of unstable political foundation.

#8 12/18/2009 :: 01:16:24 PM Derek Tonkin Says:

The debate about sanctions takes place in a vacuum because no Western Government

has yet had the courage to provide an independent, impartial assessment of their

effectiveness. Indeed, both the European Council in 2006 and the British Government in

2007 declined to respond to high level requests for a public assessment, from the

European Parliament in the case of the EU, and from the House of Lords Economic

Affairs Committee in the case of the UK. These refusals for no good reason have led

many people to conclude that Western Governments know that their sanctions are

hitting the population and not the regime, but are too embarrassed to allow this to be

revealed publicly.

Suu Kyi has asked for information about sanctions, but I fear that what she has been

given will be partial information designed to show that sanctions are targeted only

against the regime. Examples of how the population have been targeted and which will

not have been given or explained to Suu Kyi include: denial of aid from international

financial institutions since 1989 (ADB, IMF World Bank) and curtailment of bilateral ODA

programmes; strong measures against labour-intensive industries such as textiles, agro-

industry, seafood, tourism, furniture manufacture which have put tens of thousands of

people out of work, in some cases forcing them to emigrate to Thailand and Malaysia

where they suffer exploitation and victimisation; blanket withdrawal of tariff preferences

designed to support developing economies; targeting of hundreds of small family

businesses by name in Annex V of the February 2008 EU measures simply because they
were engaged in small scale manufacture of e.g. furniture and jewellery though without

any suggestion that these business were State, military or crony, including a large

number of known supporters of the NLD and other pro-democracy parties.

As a result, the economy generally has become debilitated and the population poorer

particularly in the rural areas. OECD reported in 2007 that each Burmese citizen

received only US$ 4.00 per head per year in aid from all sources, compared with an

average among OECD‘s list of 38 ―fragile states‖ of US$ 42,00, including US$47.00 for

Cambodia and US$ 68.00 for Laos. Aid received for Cyclone Nargis relief, when 140,000

people died, was less than one-tenth of aid provided to the victims of the 2004 Tsunami

when 220,000 people died. In short, even humanitarian aid is subject to sanctions for

political reasons, even though Western Ambassadors in Myanmar have given

assurances that aid can be monitored and delivered effectively.

The regime, meanwhile, has been particularly fortunate to earn some US$ 200 million

monthly from sales of natural gas to Thailand. This will double when the Mottama and

Shwe gas fields come on stream and another pipeline is built to Thailand and oil and

gas pipelines to China are completed. With reserves estimated at US$ 3.6 billion, the

regime is not short of funds. Professor Joseph Stiglitz has pleaded in Nay Pyi Taw for

these reserves to be spent wisely, in support of the population.

#7 12/18/2009 :: 04:14:01 AM Myo Says:

Myanmar people really need business and better educational opportunities. Give direct

help to Myanmar people. Help to develop agriculture and small business sector.

#6 12/18/2009 :: 01:40:16 AM Zin Linn Says:

All foreign investments help financing the regime, which spent more than 40% of

national budget to expand and modernize the army. Needless to say how the military

regime has been brutalizing its own people. There are piles of reports by UN Human

Rights Special Rapporteurs and credible international human rights organizations. We

believe that foreign investment under the military rule is more beneficial to the regime

and more harm to the people of Burma. Therefore, those who are investing in Burma

today are indirectly responsible for the human rights violations committed by the

Burmese Army and its obstruction to democratic change in Burma. Two days after her

release from house arrest in May 2002, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi stated ―I don‘t think we

have found evidence that sanctions have harmed the Burmese people, because they

have been clearly limited and many of those who have suffered under sanctions have

belonged to the business community. Naturally some ordinary employees have been

exposed, but we have not yet found proof that large numbers of Burmese have suffered

as a result of sanctions. Sanctions have a role to play because they are a strong political

message. But also because they are an economic message.‖

But now, she has been proposing to solve out this question together with regime.

Actually, it‘s up to the junta‘s sincerity.

#5 12/18/2009 :: 01:15:47 AM Andy Says:

STOP(Lifting) sanction is not going to help ordaniry Burmese people.Why do Burmese

people have to suffer? Everybody knows that regime is every ministry sector and every

major management post on place in their army officers, they don‘t know how to

manage economic,education,health etc etc…They only like to show off their power and

how to rip off and crap.Even senction is lift off now because of their mismanagement

the country will still suffer and ordaniry people won‘t get to be well off.Think about it

other countries liked to help on Cyclone Nargit when it happened but what did the

military do? Because of them our country had and has to suffer so if you like to

sanction to lift regime must change first.

#4 12/18/2009 :: 01:12:06 AM Ta Pyay Thu Says:

Of Burmese descent? Right! But genetics does not guarantee the deep knowledge or

understanding of the grassroots and ground situations of people. Professional

journalists are not allowed to have opportunites to dig what/why is happening.

Someone like this Michael Lwin caracter (obviously harmless in the eyes of the military

intelligence) hops in, pops out and sucks up Webb and his pro-junta stance to echo

brainlessly that sanctions make people suffer. Sanctions or not is the point. The point is

the military generations have ruined the country for over 40 years that we are seeing
the consequences. Take the example of Nargis donors. You try to give and you end up

in jail. It is as simple as that. Don‘t bother yourself with pseudo-intellectual take on the

impact/effectiveness of the sanctions. Make an all encompassing, big-picture analysis,

―mate‖! Your article sounds too shallow and your sympathy to us living inside too

hollow.

#3 12/17/2009 :: 11:30:03 PM Julian Pieniazek Says:

I empathize with the ordinary people of Burma and would wish that this situation didn‘t

exist. That is does is entirely down to the junta and it‘s brutal, misanthropic control.

One thing I am absolutely sure of: lifting all the sanctions would NOT mark a turn round

for the people of Burma.

Why? The regime and its crony partners control nearly all business activity in Burma

and they have given ample evidence of complete indifference to the impoverished life

for the vast majority of Burmese people. So no surprises that the lion‘s share of Burma‘s

GDP goes to the junta; everyone else has to manage on crumbs and scraps. I don‘t

expect that to change after the 2010 election and I‘m equally sure that it wouldn‘t

change if, hypothetically, sanctions were lifted.

Salvation for the Burmese people and a much brighter tomorrow will come when there

is regime change.
#2 12/17/2009 :: 11:02:48 PM Khin Zaw Win Says:

Your first-hand account is greatly appreciated. The Myanmar people are being made to

suffer for no fault of their own.

#1 12/17/2009 :: 10:29:57 PM michael Says:

i agree with you mate.because our people needs more help and stop this sanction now.

http://worldfocus.org
Articles #2951, 18 August 2009

Changing Contours: US Policy towards Myanmar

Sanjay Pulipaka Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies (MAKAIAS),

Kolkata e-mail: sanjay.pulipaka@yahoo.com

The current Obama administration seems to be keen on changing the United States

(US) policy towards Myanmar. Over the years, the US has been demanding the

establishment of a democratic political system in Myanmar and to achieve this objective

it had adopted a three pronged strategy. First, the US sought to isolate Myanmar

internationally and drastically reduced its diplomatic interactions with the regime in

Myanmar. Second, the US, along with the European Union (EU), imposed economic

sanctions on Myanmar for its failure to move towards democracy. Third, the US

continued emphasizing the release of political prisoners, and making them active

partners in the political transition to democracy.

While the US continues to express its indignation at the detention of political activists,

its policy has become increasingly nuanced in the recent past. The statements and

actions of the US government and its representatives indicate that they are actively

working towards greater engagement with Myanmar. In February this year, the US

Secretary for State, Hillary Clinton, stated that the US is re-looking at its Myanmar

policy and is exploring ways to influence the government in Myanmar. In continuation

of the policy shift a month later (in March), the Director of the Office for Mainland
Southeast Asia, US State Department, Stephen Blake visited Naypyidaw, capital of

Myanmar, to interact with senior government officials. Incidentally, this was the first

visit by a senior US government official to Myanmar‘s new capital of Naypyidaw. While

there was no formal statement from US officials, news reports speculated that Stephen

Blake had suggested the possible of withdrawal of some economic sanctions while

continuing other targeted sanctions.

American attempts to engage the government in Myanmar experienced stress during

the trial and subsequent conviction of Aung San Suu Kyi on the grounds of violating the

conditions of her house-arrest. The US Secretary for State, Hillary Clinton, stated that

Suu Kyi should not have been convicted and called for her release. This rhetoric

notwithstanding, it appears that the US is disinclined to reverse the new policy, as Jim

Webb, the US Senator from Virginia, visited Myanmar in mid-August. Interestingly, this

visit came within a week of Suu Kyi‘s conviction. This was the first visit by a senior US

politician to Myanmar in more than a decade. Jim Webb is a political heavy-weight in

the Democratic Party and was mentioned as a possible Vice-Presidential candidate for

Barrack Obama during the US presidential elections. He also chairs the sub-committee

on East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the US Senate.

Jim Webb‘s visit was dubbed a ―private visit,‖ by US officials. However, Webb‘s visit fits

into the Obama administration‘s approach of using special envoys for specific foreign

policy issues. During his visit Senator Jim Webb met with Myanmar‘s top leader General

Than Shwe, which was interpreted as willingness on the part of the Myanmar
government to engage with the US. The US Senator was permitted to interact with

Aung Suu Kyi, a gesture that was denied to the UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon

during his recent visit to Myanmar. Jim Webb was also able to secure the release of

John Yettaw, the American who violated the conditions of Aung Suu Kyi‘s house arrest.

Significantly, after his interaction with leaders in Myanmar, Senator Jim Webb observed

that economic sanctions have not propelled Myanmar towards democracy. Does all this

mean that the US has given up hopes on stated objectives such as democracy

promotion and securing the release of political detainees? Not necessarily. It appears

that the US is treating issues such as democracy promotion and the release of political

prisoners as a consequence of diplomatic engagement rather than as a pre-requisite for

engagement.

What explains the recent change in the US policy towards Myanmar? Economic

sanctions seem to be pushing Myanmar deeper into the Chinese orbit. China is one of

the largest trading partners of Myanmar. China is also constructing pipelines for

transporting oil and gas from Myanmar and to transship its energy resources from the

Middle East. Furthermore, Myanmar‘s active economic relations with neighboring

countries and regional associations have already blunted the edge of US-EU economic

sanctions. The US seems to suspect that attempts to isolate Myanmar may propel it to

acquire nuclear technology from countries such as North Korea. Finally, the experiences

of Iraq and Afghanistan may well be guiding the US towards a more cautious approach

to political transitions.
Will the Obama administration continue with this changed policy of engagement over an

extended period of time? From the statements of the US officials it appears that they

are keen on trying new approaches in Myanmar. However, the sustenance of the new

policy of engagement will be contingent not merely on the evolving political situation in

Myanmar but also on domestic political compulsions in the US.

www.ipcs.org
Southeast Asia

May 18, 2010

US engagement with Myanmar falters

By Brian McCartan

BANGKOK - After the only outcomes of a visit to Myanmar by a high-level United

States diplomat were "profound" disappointment over its election preparations and

a stronger line over its nuclear links with North Korea, President Barack Obama on

Friday formally extended sanctions against the country.

Washington's extension of the sanctions followed the visit of US Assistant Secretary

of State for East Asia and the Pacific Kurt Campbell to Naypyidaw, the capital, on

May 9 for a two-day visit. Campbell met top officials such as Foreign Minister Nyan

Win, Information Minister Kyaw Hsan, Science and Technology Minister U Thaung -

the point man for US-Myanmar engagement - and Labor Minister U Aung Kyi.

Charged with assessing Myanmar's preparations for elections to be held on an as-

yet unspecified date this year - its first polls since 1991 - Campbell also met

members of the Union Election Commission, officials of the Union Solidarity and

Development Association (USDA) and other government-affiliated political parties.

On May 10, Campbell travelled to Yangon, where he met senior leaders of the

opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), representatives of major ethnic

groups and pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Campbell had earlier said he would only visit the country if he could meet

opposition members and Suu Kyi. He previously met the 64-year-old last November,

when he became the highest ranking US diplomat to visit Myanmar in 14 years.

Before his visit, during a press conference in Bangkok on May 9, Campbell said the

US was concerned with the lead-up to the elections. "We're troubled by much of

what we've seen and we have very real concerns about the elections laws and the

environment that's been created."

Campbell's meetings in Naypyidaw seem to have only confirmed the US's worst

fears, with the envoy telling reporters in Yangon that he was "profoundly

disappointed" in the junta's approach to the elections.

"Unfortunately, the regime has chosen to move ahead unilaterally - without

consultation from key stakeholders - towards elections planned for this year," he

said. "As a direct result, what we have seen to date leads us to believe that these

elections will lack international legitimacy."

The NLD was officially dissolved on May 7, two days before Campbell's arrival, after

it declined to meet a May 6 registration deadline stipulated by new election laws.

The laws, which ban individuals serving prison sentences from being members,

would have forced the party to oust Aung San Suu Kyi as its chairwoman due to her

continued house arrest.

The party's headquarters in Yangon remains open and members are calling for a

boycott of the vote. Some 25 senior members of the party have decided to form a

new party and seek registration with the government, though no decision has been

made on their participation in the polls. The government is yet to announce a date

for the vote, though reports suggest it could be in October.

Campbell also noted the junta's continued pressure on the country's ethnic minority

groups to disarm before the elections. "The regime has ratcheted up the pressure

on Burma's [Myanmar's] ethnic groups in preparation for this year's elections,

forcing countless innocent civilians to flee. Burma cannot move forward while the

government itself persists in launching attacks against its own people to force

compliance with a proposal its ethnic groups cannot accept." The last sentence

refers to the regime's proposal that the armed wings of ethnic groups relinquished

to army control before the vote, a move many groups say would deprive them of

leverage against a regime that has frequently resorted to force.

Campbell also questioned Myanmar's relations with North Korea and its commitment

to implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which among other

things bans the export of weapons and nuclear technology from North Korea and

authorizes member states to search suspected cargos. Campbell mentioned "recent

developments" that were likely related to reports of North Korean involvement in

Myanmar's nuclear program.

North Korean military assistance to Myanmar in the past has consisted of hardware

including artillery and surface-to-surface missiles. Myanmar-exile magazine The

Irrawaddy claimed on May 10 that the junta had purchased mid-range missiles and

rocket launchers from North Korea during the Myanmar New Year in April. In

addition, the magazine claimed, "equipment necessary to build a nuclear capability

was reportedly among imported military supplies from North Korea".

Analysts believe North Korea is assisting the generals with a nuclear program that

includes the development of weapons. Two nuclear reactors are believed to be

under construction in Myanmar. One, at Naung Laing near the town of Pyin Oo Lwin

in central Mandalay Division, is being constructed with North Korean help. Several

thousand Myanmar military personnel have undergone nuclear training in Russia

and North Korea in recent years. Desmond Ball, a defense analyst at Australia

National University, believes the reactor could be online in 2012 and a deliverable

weapon could be developed by 2020.

In order to build international confidence in Myanmar's commitment to the UN

Security Council resolution - imposed on Pyongyang in 2009 after conducted an

underground nuclear test - Campbell asked the regime to put in place a

"transparent process".

"Without such a process, the United States maintains the right to take independent

action within the relevant frameworks established by the international community,"

said Campbell. The US had applauded Myanmar in July for refusing to allow a North

Korean-registered ship believed to be carrying weapons to dock, forcing the ship to

turn back.

The regime's response to Campbell's statement came in a long, rambling article in

the state-run newspaper The New Light of Myanmar on May 12. The report was

partly a description of Campbell's meetings with government officials and partly an

attempt to justify election laws and paint the NLD's decision to not re-register as

misguided.
The article said the new election laws did not target a specific person, a reference

to Aung San Suu Kyi, and that the banning of convicts to stand in election is a

normal practice in many countries, with all prisoners grouped together, political or

criminal. It also said that if the NLD wants to carry out its aim of amending the

controversial 2008 constitution, it should have joined the election process and tried

to make changes in the new parliament.

The constitution, passed through a referendum that observers say was rigged,

cannot be changed without a majority in parliament, something that is almost

impossible given the number of seats reserved for the military.

In response to a question on the possibility of independent election monitors, the

paper quoted retired Major General Thein Soe, head of the Election Commission, as

saying, "the nation has a lot of experience with elections. We do not need election

watchdogs to come here. Arrangements have been made to ensure a free and fair

election."

Seemingly at odds with this was a request by Information Minister Hsan for

unspecified American cooperation supporting the elections. "We would like to

receive your kind cooperation so that the election can be held peacefully and

successfully."

The New Light of Myanmar article welcomed the Barack Obama administration's

engagement policy and called on the US "to show a positive attitude towards our
internal affairs such as the drafting of the constitution and measures for holding

elections after issuing the necessary laws for democratization process".

Prior to Campbell's visit to Myanmar there was no sign in Congress of a "positive

attitude" with for increased pressure on Myanmar's military rulers that reflecting

concerns that the Obama administration's seven-month old engagement policy is

not reaping the desired benefits.

On May 7, the senate called on the Obama administration to show solidarity with

the NLD and consider tighter sanctions on the junta. Senators approved a resolution

led by Judd Gregg, a Republican from New Hampshire, requesting the regime enter

dialogue with the NLD, free Suu Kyi from house arrest and called for stronger US

sanctions on Myanmar.

Obama on Friday formally extended sanctions against Myanmar that were imposed

in 1997, "because the actions and policies of the government of Burma continue to

pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy

of the United States". The sanctions bar American firms from investing in Myanmar

and bans Myanmar exports to the United States.

A letter signed by nine senators was sent to Obama on March 26 urging full

implementation of the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE Act of 2008 in response to

the widely criticized election laws. The act, which targets US imports of Myanmar

gemstones, also calls for the nomination of a special representative and policy
coordinator for Myanmar and additional banking sanctions.

From the outset the Obama administration has said that it would consider

maintaining or even increasing sanctions depending on the regime's progress

towards improving the human-rights situation and progressing towards an inclusive

democracy. Opponents of the Obama's engagement policy say the generals have

given little indication of moving in that direction.

The generals appear unfazed by American criticism and sanctions and most analysts

believe election preparations will continue in the same vein regardless of

international disapproval. The US, noting that a lack of engagement also produced

little benefit, is not likely to revert to its previous strictly confrontational stance. This

is especially so given Myanmar's clear moves to acquire nuclear technology and

North Korea's perceived hand in the process.

Brian McCartan is a Bangkok-based freelance journalist. He may be reached at

brianpm@comcast.net.

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please

contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

www.atimes.com
Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism

Case: 88-1 US/EU/Japan v. Burma (1988- : Human rights, democracy, narcotics)

Note: In light of recent events, this case study is currently being updated.

This version provides useful background information.

Goals of Sender Country

United States

US State Department

"In coordination with the European Union and other states, the United States has

maintained sanctions on Burma. These include an arms embargo, ban on new

investment, and other measures. Our goal in applying these sanctions is to encourage a

transition to democratic rule and greater respect for human rights. Should there be

significant progress towards those goals as a result of dialogue between Aung San Suu

Kyi and the military government, then the United States would look seriously at

measures to support this process of constructive change. Continued absence of positive

change would force the U.S. to look at the possibility of increased sanctions in

conjunction with the international community." (Department of State Report "Conditions

in Burma and U.S. Policy Towards Burma for the period September 28, 2002-March 27,

2003")
Congressman Stephen J. Solarz

"Although our ability to influence the situation in Burma is certainly limited, we want to

be sure that we are making maximum use of opportunities to encourage political reform

and discourage abuses of human rights....It is important, therefore, that we

communicate our continuing support for the efforts of the Burmese people to create a

truly democratic Burma." (US House of Representatives 2, 13 September 1989)

US Secretary of State Warren Christopher

Burma's government not only violates basic universal human rights, but raises the

chance of instability, bloodshed and migration in the region...The steady deterioration

of the rule of law has increased the threat that Burma's burgeoning drug trade poses to

citizens from Bangkok to Berlin and from Shanghai to San Francisco. ( International

Herald Tribune, 24 July 1996, 9)

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

Explaining why the United States puts sanctions on Burma and not China despite similar

violations of human rights: "We have consistent principles and flexible tactics ... I guess

the easiest way to describe it, is different strokes for different folks."(USIS, 22 April

1997)
US President, George W. Bush

―The crisis between the United States and Burma arising from the actions and policies

of the Government of Burma that led to the declaration of a national emergency on May

20, 1997, has not been resolved. These actions and policies, including its policies of

committing large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, are hostile to

U.S. interests and pose a continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national

security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, I have determined that

it is necessary to continue the national emergency with respect to Burma and maintain

in force the sanctions against Burma to respond to this threat.‖ (White House Press

Release, 17 May 2005)

US State Department

―In coordination with the European Union and other states, the United States has

maintained sanctions on Burma. These include an arms embargo, ban on new

investment, and other measures. Our goal in applying these sanctions is to encourage a

transition to democratic rule and greater respect for human rights. Should there be

significant progress towards those goals as a result of dialogue between Aung San Suu

Kyi and the military government, then the United States would look seriously at

measures to support this process of constructive change. Continued absence of positive

change would force the U.S. to look at the possibility of increased sanctions in

conjunction with the international community.‖ (Department of State Report ―Conditions

in Burma and U.S. Policy Towards Burma for the period September 28, 2002–March 27,

2003‖)

―The international community must continue pressing the Burmese regime to change its

policies. To this end, the United States intends to pursue a UN Security Council

resolution that will underscore the international community's concerns about the

situation in Burma, including the unjustifiable detention of a great champion of

democracy, Aung San Suu Kyi, and our common position that the regime must ensure

an inclusive and democratic political process.‖ (Department of State Press Release, 31

May, 2006)

White House

―We applaud the passage of the legislation [Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of

2003]. This legislation sends a clear message to the Burmese regime that their

continued detention of Noble Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and their assaults on

freedom cannot stand.‖ (Washington Post, 17 July 2003, A22)

Japan

Ambassador to Burma Hiroshi Otaka, 27 September 1988

―[I]n determining future assistance, it would be important that a political settlement

reflecting the general consensus of the Burmese people should be achieved and the

stability of the domestic situation restored, and that efforts should be made for

economic reforms and for opening up of the economy.‖ (Communication provided by

Japanese embassy in US to authors)

―Current Japanese policy appears to be guided by three principal considerations: (1)

The government has repeatedly issued calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi…. (2)

The United States continues to influence Japanese foreign policy and Washington will

discourage a rapprochement with Rangoon unless SLORC institutes democratic reforms.

… (3) However, Japanese business is keen to see a resumption of aid to Burma because

it fears that it will lose out to competition from other East Asian companies. Business

leaders have therefore been lobbying the government to adopt a more benign approach

to SLORC.‖ (Bray 52-53)

On the resumption of foreign aid to Burma: ―When asked, Japanese officials defend

their more conciliatory policy as merely another way of doing what the United States

wants: encouraging the military to open up to democracy.‖ (Los Angeles Times, 8

January 1996, 5)
Japanese minister of foreign affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi

"Japan strongly calls on the Myanmar Government for rectifying the current situations,

including an immediate assurance of the freedom of political activities by Daw Aung San

Suu Kyi and other members of the NLD, and for disclosing relevant information to the

international community." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Press Release, 5 June

2003)

Japanese government spokesman Hatsuhisa Takashima

"The Japanese government has made it very clear that if the situation continues it will

be very difficult to continue the policies of engagement." ( Financial Times, 18 June

2003, 6)

Japanese foreign ministry spokesman Yoshinori Katori

―Japan strongly hopes ... that it will expedite the democratization process, including the

early release of Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and resume

dialogue with Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi.‖ (Agence France Presse, 29 May 2006)
European Union

Upon suspending tariff preference for Burma: "The Regulation ... will remain in effect

until practices impeding human rights and democracy have been brought to an end."

(EU Press Release, 24 March 1997)

EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, April 2003

"The European Union shares the view of a number of international partners that the

best interests of the people of Burma/Myanmar continue to be served in current

circumstances by a balanced approach of carefully calibrated sanctions towards those

responsible for obstruction of reform and progress, together with significant

humanitarian support to ensure that the ordinary people of Burma/Myanmar suffer as

little as possible as a result of the damaging policies of their government." (General

Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, 14 April 2003)

EU General Affairs and External Relations Council, June 2003

"The Council urged the Burmese authorities to immediately release Daw Aung San Suu

Kyi as well as other members of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and to re-

open NLD offices and universities throughout the country... In order to re-launch a

process of national reconciliation and transition to democracy in Burma/Myanmar, the

Council urged the authorities to enter into a substantial and meaningful political

dialogue with the NLD as well as other political groups. The Council reiterated its call to
Burma to respect its promises to release all political prisoners and expressed its deep

concern over the noted increase of politically motivated arrests. …In accordance with its

commitment to react proportionately to developments in Burma/Myanmar and in light

of the serious deterioration of the situation in the country, especially over the last

weeks, the Council decided to implement without delay the strengthened sanctions

originally envisaged to enter into force by October 2003. The Council also decided to

monitor closely the further evolution of the situation in Burma/Myanmar, and reaffirmed

its readiness to react proportionally to future developments." (General Affairs and

External Relations Council Conclusions, Provisional Version, 16 June 2003)

―The EU remains deeply concerned that NLD leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi has been detained continuously for three years without charge since

the attack on her convoy on 30 May 2003. The EU notes that the house arrest of Daw

Aung San Suu Kyi will expire on May 27 and urges the Burmese government to fully

restore her freedom and civil liberties. The EU is hopeful that the Burmese government

will use this opportunity to enter again into a dialogue with the NLD leadership…. The

EU welcomes that UN Undersecretary General Gambari was able to meet the most

senior leaders of the SPDC as well as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and representatives of her

party during his recent visit to Yangon. The EU reaffirms its support for UN efforts to

help Burma/Myanmar move in the direction of an all-inclusive democracy and true

national reconciliation and calls on the SPDC to co-operate with the UN and its
agencies.‖ (General Affairs and External Relations Council Declaration on behalf of the

Presidency, 30 May 2006)

Local Initiatives

Berkeley, California

Preamble from Selective Purchasing Ordinance (28 February 1995):

"The citizens of the City of Berkeley, believing that their quality of life is diminished

when peace and justice are not fully present in the world, adopted Ordinance No. 5985-

N.S. to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,

recognize the responsibility of local communities to take positive steps to support the

rule of law and to help end injustices and egregious violations of human rights

wherever they may occur."

New York City council member Mary Pinkett

"We hope this will also push the US government to speak louder and more clearly and

to do more to press for democracy in Burma." ( Agence France-Presse, 31 May 1997)

Response of Target Country

The Burmese government denounces the United States and other Western countries for

their support of democratic opposition groups and for their criticism of the regime. The

Burmese government warns that Rangoon would use its close ties with Beijing to

balance Western influence and initiatives. (Reuters, 30 May 1996, 31 May 1996)

Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw

"We respect the norms and the ideals of human rights, but as in any other country in

Southeast Asia, we have to take into consideration our culture, our history, our ethos.

What is good in other countries cannot be good in our country." ( New York Times, 9

February 1996, A2)

Government of Myanmar

"American sanctions are for their own political consumption. We feel sorry for US

companies because they will not get a second chance later to invest in Burma if

opportunities are taken over by companies from nations with consistent foreign

policies." (New York Times, 25 April 1997, A6)

Burmese government official

"I would like to tell my American friends that sanctions will hurt you more than us. After

all, we virtually imposed sanctions on ourselves for 30 years, and we are still here."

(Christian Science Monitor, 29 January 1998, 6)

―Burma yesterday warned that fresh sanctions would further undermine the health,

education and welfare of the Burmese people, depriving them of job opportunities.

‗Sanctions, in short, do not solve problems. They only make them worse,' it said.‖ (

Financial Times , 21 February 2003, 6)

Burmese military describes the sanctions as ―weapons of mass destruction‖ intended to

―create havoc and bring hardship to the mass population…‖ ( Washington Post, 17 July

2003, A22; Financial Times, 17 July 2003, 7)

Prime Minister General Soe Win

In the face of international sanctions, Burma has become increasingly dependent on its

neighbors, especially China, to break its international isolation. China was instrumental

in thwarting attempts to put Burma on the UN Security Council‘s agenda. General Soe

Win praised China‘s ―resolute support and selfless assistance.‖ ( Washington Post, 23

April 2006)
Attitude of Other Countries

Australia

Australia suspends its $8 million-$10 million aid program after the coup but unfreezes it

within months. Departing ambassador to Rangoon Christopher Lamb states in Bangkok

on 27 September 1989 that reports of torture are "exaggerated." ( Far Eastern Economic

Review, 19 October 1989, 19).

Australia calls for the release of political prisoners, including Ang Suu Kyi. Australian

Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, urged ASEAN nations to ―continue to place

pressure on Burma.‖ (Australian Financial Review, 18 June 2003, 10)

India

On September 10, 1988, New Delhi states its support for "the undaunted resolve of the

Burmese people to achieve their democracy." India's External Affairs Minister P.V.

Narashima Rao announces that "strict instructions have been issued not to turn back

any genuine refugees seeking shelter in India." India also cuts off trade routes to

Burma, instructs Indian banks to freeze letters of credit to the Burmese government.

(Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989, 12; Keesing's 36870)

Despite concerns about democracy, India signed agreements on evacuation of natural

gas from Arakan port of Burma, either through a pipeline via North East or Bangladesh.

India‘s Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, said that India was ―interested in energy
supplies‖ and India‘s former Foreign Secretary, J.N. Dixit, emphasized that ―close

relations with Burma work for India on a number of levels including balancing China‘s

growing strategic reach and providing an alternative to Bangladesh.‖ ( Financial Times,

22 January 2003, 12; BBC Monitoring South Asia, 7 March 2006)

China

"Peking's policy on Burma—once directed toward all-out military and political support

for the rebels along the border—today appears to be guided almost exclusively by

economic considerations." With China having displaced Thailand as its major source of

"unofficial" consumer goods, Burma signs agreement with China legitimizing cross-

border trade. Total value of private, but officially sanctioned, taxed trade, as well as

smuggling through rebel-held areas along border, may be as high as $4.6 million a day.

(Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989, 13; 8 June 1989, 104; Keesing's

36870)

"China has provided economic and military aid and concessional loans far greater in

value than that of Japan to finance Burma's infrastructure projects...China's vested

interest in providing aid to Burma since 1988 has been to expand its naval power and

presence in the Indian Ocean via Burmese lands and waters." ( Bangkok Post, 5 April

1998, online)
Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan

"We believe this is something between the Myanmar government and the opposition,

and an internal affair of Myanmar." (New York Times, 13 June 2003, A16)

China has rescued the virtually bankrupt Burmese junta with financial support, including

offering a $200 million preferential loan for economic development, a grant of $6 million

for technological cooperation and an unspecified amount of debt relief. ( Financial

Times, 17 January 2003)

Thailand

"On 22 November [1988], the Thai Government granted temporary asylum to the

thousands of Burmese students who fled to the Thai-Burmese border after the military

stepped in.... [O]n 14 December, the Thai Army Chief, Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyut,

visits Rangoon and returned with lucrative logging and fishing deals—and began

repatriating Burmese students." Thai logging companies ultimately receive 40 three-

year logging concessions. (Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 January 1989, 13; 23

February 1989, 13; Financial Times, 21 June 1990, 6)

Thai Foreign Minister Prachuab Chaiyasar

On Burma's admittance to ASEAN, "Even a playboy can become a good husband after

his marriage with the family's help. That's the Asian way." ( Far Eastern Economic

Review, 19 June 1997, 11)

Thai Foreign Ministry Spokesman Sihasak Phuangkekaew

"We are neighbors of Myanmar. We have so many other factors to take into

consideration. …We don't think isolation and sanctions are the right way. We believe

that talking with the regime, cooperation—that's the best approach." (Washington Post,

10 June 2003, A14)

Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra

―...warned that the junta would face further international sanctions if it failed to free

Ms. Suu Kyi. ‗They have detained her long enough.. Now is time to decide whether to

release her or face more and tougher sanctions from the world community.‘‖ Financial

Times, 27 June 2003, 6)

Malaysia

Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad

"It is not very constructive if we keep on pressing people…Whenever they comply with

something there is no reward. If they do something else, more pressure is applied. It is

unproductive." (New York Times, 13 June 2003, A16)

Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar

―We have managed to convince people outside our region that Asean‘s policy of

constructive engagement is working, but recent events [arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi]

that have taken place in Myanmar have become a setback… not only is Myanmar

questioned, Asean is questioned‖ (Financial Times, 27 June 2003, 6)

Singapore

Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong rejects international sanctions against Burma saying that

the West should understand the "culture of ASEAN," which rejects foreign interference

in the domestic affairs of other states. (Financial Times, 25 February 1992, 4)

Indonesia

Foreign Minister Ali Alatas

By admitting Burma into ASEAN, "...we are also taking into account the overall long-

term consideration of peace and security and tranquility in our part of the world." ( New

York Times, 1 June 1997, A10)

ASEAN

Association of Southeast Asian Nations departs from its long-standing policy of non-

interference in the affairs of member states and calls on Burma/Myanmar to release

Aung San Suu Kyi and move towards democracy. Philippine foreign secretary Blas Ople

states "We in Asean are now sharing in accountability to the world about the slow

progress of the transition to democracy in Myanmar." ( New York Times, 17 June 2003,

A6; Financial Times, 18 June 2003, 6)

Canada

Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy

"The actions we have taken today are intended to convey the seriousness of our

concerns over the suppression of political freedoms and our frustration with Burma's

failure to curb the production and trafficking of illegal drugs." ( International Trade

Reporter, 13 August 1997, 1395)

Legal Notes

Sections 481 and 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibit foreign assistance,

including OPIC and Export-Import Bank funding, to drug-producing countries or transit

countries that have been denied counternarcotics certification.

Section 569 ("Cohen-Feinstein amendment") of FY 1997

Foreign Operations Appropriations bill:

Until the president certifies to Congress that Burma has improved its human rights

record and made progress toward democracy, Congress imposes the following

sanctions: there shall be no US aid to Burma except for humanitarian aid, counter-

narcotics assistance, and efforts to promote human rights and democracy; the US shall

vote against loans to Burma from international financial institutions; the United States

shall not grant entry visas to Burmese officials; if the president decides the Burmese

government has "physically harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled Suu Kyi or

has committed large-scale repression of or violence against the democratic opposition,"

the president shall outlaw Americans from making new investments in Burma.

Selective Purchasing legislation:

States, cities, and counties which have passed selective purchasing ordinances

regarding Burma: Alameda county, CA; Ann Arbor, MI; Berkeley, CA; Boulder, CO;

Brookline, MA; Cambridge, MA; Carrboro, NC; Chapel Hill, NC; Los Angeles, CA;
Madison, WI; Massachusetts; New York, NY; Newton, MA; Oakland, CA; Palo Alto, CA;

Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, CA; San Cruz, CA; San Monica, CA;

Somerville, MA; Takoma Park, MD; Vermont; West Hollywood, CA. (Organization for

International Investment, State and Local Sanctions Watchlist, as of 1 December 2000)

www.iie.com