India willing to close Doha Round

As long as its farm sector is protected, meaningful liberalisation is secured in services

and a fair deal on industrial goods is promised, India will be a deal-maker in the WTO
talks, says Pradeep S Mehta

THE jury is still out whether the Doha Round of the WTO is a development round or not,
observed the Brazilian and US ambassadors at a recent workshop on the Doha Round of
trade negotiations held in Geneva on November 2. At the concluding session moderated
by WTO director-general Pascal Lamy, ambassadors from China, India and EU asserted
that this is a development round. It was a candid assessment of the geopolitics of the
trade and reflected the grim scenario that countries continue to speak to each other, with
each looking in different directions. But, the workshop was not only about geopolitics; it
was also about numbers. Many analysts opined that up to $200 billion could be added to
global welfare by the current package of offers. More importantly, they contended that
the world could see a 10% contraction in trade if the Doha Round fails.
Jayant Dasgupta, the Indian ambassador, succinctly summarised the discussions by
reminding the meeting of the old metaphor that it is time to enter a period of give-and-
take negotiations and that it is no longer feasible to raise ambitions. This author was
speaking at the workshop on rules and environment, not too easy but certainly, no hurdles
in sewing up the Doha Round.
India has been playing a leading role in the Doha Round negotiations. Indian commerce
minister Anand Sharma was recently at Geneva to test the waters and reaffirm India’s
willingness to negotiate. India has not only been a part of the complex variable geometry
of delegations meeting to thrash out differences and pull the negotiations out of its
decade-old quagmire, but it also has taken a lead to pull them along when required.
India has contributed to the emergence of credible draft chair texts on agriculture and
non-agriculture market access negotiations that led to the last two most hope-generating
efforts in July and December 2008. The efforts failed, though Lamy gives it 80% marks.
In the fall of 2009, when appetite for a trade liberalisation deal was minimal in the wake
of the financial crisis, India hosted a mini-ministerial where Lamy unveiled a road map
for intense negotiations with capital-based senior negotiators. That effort, too, fizzled out
by the next spring, and the focus of Genevabased delegations shifted to more procedural
and practical matters like the templates for making commitments, collection of data to
determine base years and so on. In the meanwhile, political leaders continued to meet on
the margins of various occasions, with this November seeing the Apec meeting in
Yokohama that followed the G-20 meeting in Seoul. Another spring is coming, yet no
deal appears on the horizon.
In this pessimistic scenario, what can India do? As an engaged trading partner, it can
reassess its offers for others to emulate. The critical decision area that needs attention is
the ‘modalities’ on agriculture and non-agriculture market access (Nama): involving
reduction of tariffs on agriculture products; elimination of export subsidies and reduction
of domestic subsidies; and reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers on industrial
products.
In Nama, the discussions focus on three issues — ‘coefficients’ for tariff reduction, the
anti-concentration clause and ‘sectorals’. On the first two, while India may not accept
blanket restriction on flexibility built into the December 2008 texts, it is not likely to
block a deal. The issue of sectorals, where members may agree to undertake deeper tariff
reduction commitments in selected sectors, is more sensitive. India has not shown any
aversion to engage on the issue in its effort to get a deal through.
DURING the last couple of rounds of talks, India has come out with more substantive
economic arguments on the difficulties in sectors of interest to others and submitting joint
proposals in sectors like chemicals. These contributions should enable its trading partners
to make a balanced assessment of how far to push India. India has also been at the
forefront of developing a mechanism to address non-tariff barriers, a joint proposal on
which was discussed at length in the last round of negotiations in October.
Agriculture negotiations are more important for India, with two-thirds of its population
dependent on subsistence farming. Although a number of issues appear to be far from
settled in these negotiations — like cuts in overall trade distorting support, percentage of
products to be declared as sensitive and the connected issue of tariff rate quota expansion,
tariff capping and special products — the critical issue that calls for innovative handling
is the proposed special safeguards mechanism (SSM) for developing countries. The SSM
would enable developing countries like India to take remedial action through higher
tariffs in case of import surges or import-induced price declines. The main differences are
between India and the US about the extent of increase in import volume (i.e., the volume
trigger) required to cross the Uruguay Round (UR)-bound levels of tariffs and the extent
to which these tariffs could be exceeded. Rather than try and reach a compromise, the
waters are being muddied by some newly proposed instruments. However, the feeling is
that India will agree on a new trigger benchmark, and the US should show flexibility on
these new issues as well.
The state of negotiations is unclear at present. The technical work in various committees
appears to have moved forward, with the task on scheduling having progressed in parallel
to the deliberations about commitments. Given the broad support to calibrated
liberalisation accompanied by regulatory and institutional flanking policies among our
political establishment, India will not be the deal-breaker. It will continue to sit on the
high table as a deal-maker rather than a deal-breaker so long as its farm sector is
protected, no commitment of a zero-for-zero in industrial goods sector is insisted upon,
commercially meaningful liberalisation is secured in services and a commitment to
accommodate the UN Convention on Biodiversity in TRIPs is agreed to.

FAC E - O F F

Whither India’s Myanmar policy?

KANWAL SIBAL

Former Foreign Secretary

We should not spurn a friendly military regime

IT IS neither practical nor wise to base foreign policy on abstract principles or ill-defined
political morality. Myanmar, as our direct neighbour, compels engagement. It is
contiguous to our insurgency-affected north-eastern states, for handling which we need
its cooperation. Myanmar will be our gateway to South-east Asia when we complete our
multi-modal transport projects there. Myanmar is indispensable for promoting the
economic development of our north-east through sub-regional cooperation.
China made major inroads into Myanmar during the period India rejected the military
junta. Myanmar potentially provides it access to the Bay of Bengal, besides port facilities
to support increased Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. While China’s effort is
to develop north-south connectivity with Myanmar to anchor it more firmly into its
sphere of influence, our interest is to make Myanmar a key link in east-west connectivity,
and anchor it in an extended Southern Asian space, both Saarc and Bimstec, a grouping
of South and Southeast Asian countries.
Should we sacrifice our national interest in Myanmar solely because its regime is
antidemocratic? If ties with countries depended on their democratic credentials, we
should be having frosty relations with most, as the majority of them are not democratic.
With what justification would we pursue our national interest in China, Vietnam and
most of the Arab world and Africa? Around us, we have dealt with whichever
government has been in power. If we could deal with hostile or unfriendly military
regimes in Pakistan and Bangladesh, then what principle dictates that we spurn a military
regime in Myanmar friendly to us? Have we ever made the spread of democracy a
declared principle of our foreign policy? Should we join those who crusade for
democracy in the world selectively? President Obama’s finger-pointing at India on our
Myanmar policy on the floor of the Indian Parliament was regrettable. Why can the US
arm Pakistan’s military regimes, but India must not do business with the Myanmar junta?

TAPAN BOSE

Human Rights Activist

Democratic values should dictate our policy

DISCARDING the democratic verdict of the Burmese people in the 1990 elections, the
military junta had arrested Aung San Suu Kyi and hundreds of her supporters, letting
loose a reign of terror that forced more than a million people to seek refuge in India and
elsewhere. An estimated 50,000 refugees from Myanmar reside in India, treated as illegal
immigrants, often jailed under the Foreigners Act and periodically pushed back across the
borders into the hands of the Myanmar army.
The Indian government did not formally award the Nehru Peace Prize to Suu Kyi to
appease the junta. The refugee camps set up in Mizoram were closed under pressure from
Myanmar. As a quid pro quo, Myanmar offered to crack down on India’s north-east
insurgents. Distancing itself from the policy of ‘sanctions’, India opted for “constructive
engagement”, anxious to balance China’s rapidly increasing influence in Myanmar. India
has sacrificed its commitment to democratic values, rule of law and respect for human
rights in the interest of securing its security. It begs the larger question: is India likely to
be more secure by having an autocratic, military-ruled Myanmar? To seek to emulate
China in Myanmar, and in our neighbourhood as a whole, dangerously overlooks that
what India has achieved is not in spite of its tumultuous democracy, but because of its
democratic culture and values. Should we sacrifice our core values?
The EU has positioned itself as a “soft power” and is consolidating itself as an economic
powerhouse. The EU is proud of its democracy. It is following a policy of engaging with
China without abandoning its commitment to democracy and human rights. The
enlightened national interest of India requires that we do not support undemocratic
regimes in our neighbourhood. The release of Suu Kyi is welcomed as a possible
opportunity, and India should step forward to strengthen that opportunity by speaking up
for democratic values.
That is also the path for strengthening Indian democracy at home.
(The author is also a documentary filmmaker)