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Bertossi, Christophe.
The Good Society, Volume 12, Number 2, 2003, pp. 33-39 (Article)
In 1999 the European Commission asserted that “the right to the relationship between the State of right and the capitalist mar-
equality before the law and the protection of all persons against ket. The second is republican. It adds solidarity and collective
discrimination (. . .) is essential to the proper functioning of dem- identity as a sine qua non of the polity; cohesion is seen as the
ocratic societies. (. . .) It has never been more important to under- third source of citizenship (Habermas, 1996: 21).
line these principles” (Commission of the European What is striking is the way by which this second paradigm
Communities, 1999. Emphasis added). There is much to be learnt has dominated debates on citizenship and immigration in Europe,
from this passage. This “forward-looking” assessment seems to both in the academic literature and public policies.
dismiss the relevance of past policy experiences regarding citi- Citizenship returned to this dual agenda when immigration
zenship in Europe (Flew, 1989: 166). Why is that so? shifted from an economical issue to a political “problem” in the
My argument is that this line on equality-cum-discrimination mid-1980s. The promotion of national citizenship among European
is part of a shift from formal and state-orientated citizenship to immigration countries entered center-stage of the political agenda
substantial citizenship. This shift is nurtured by debates on the when the modern nation-states started to face critical limits in
modern framework of the nation-state, limits of the national for terms of sovereignty and membership, the latter being challenged
embodying equality, and the liberal dilemma of diversity. by increasing migratory flows, the parallel process of migrants’
In other words, European policies are now recognizing the durable settlement and the European integration.
existence of a “European Dilemma,” in the same way Myrdal It is clear that the concomitance between the renewal of cit-
spoke about An American Dilemma (Myrdal, 1944), and Jim izenship (rights and membership) and the “problem of immi-
Rose applied it to late 1960s Britain (Rose, 1969). Does it mean, gration” (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991) has enhanced republican
as Rose claimed in his time, that we are subsequently witness- positions. For Christian Joppke, for example, “citizenship is both
ing a “liberal hour” for citizenship and a legal status and an identity, fusing the
immigration in Europe? In short, to divergent legacies of territorial state-
what extent may the development of My argument is that this line on ness and republicanism” (Joppke 1998:
European policies contribute to the for- equality-cum-discrimination is part of 23). In this view historical, sociologi-
mation of a new paradigm of citizen- a shift from formal and state-orientated cal, political and normative conditions
ship? If it exists, can the latter citizenship to substantial citizenship. of citizenship would be necessarily
incorporate non-EU foreigners into This shift is nurtured by debates on embodied in the congruence between
active citizenship? Do European the modern framework of the the individualist ethos and national
national policies of citizenship converge nation-state, limits of the national modernity (Aron, 1991; Leca, 1990;
on a mainstreamed framework? for embodying equality, and the Stinchcombe, 1975).
To provide some analytical elements liberal dilemma of diversity. Subsequently, the very recognition
addressing those questions, I start with of ethno-cultural and religious diversity
a critical approach of the republican has been set in terms of a challenge to
arguments that shape the formal understanding of equality and the congruence that exists in the Rousseauist tradition between
citizenship, both in public policy and scientific literature. Then membership, allegiance and equality of rights.
I turn to the nexus of transformation regarding citizenship, Therefore, citizenship has been profoundly affected by a
namely the challenge of European integration and the emergence never-ending “war of gods” (Weber, 1978) crystallizing the oppo-
of the anti-discriminatory agenda. I conclude questioning whether sition between identity and equality, but also homogeneity and
this process can get rid of the republican paradigm characterised plurality, essentialism and constructivism, structures and agency,
by a paradoxical reactive obsolescence. liberalism and communitarianism, republicanism and multicul-
turalism (Isin and Wood, 1999). This discussion has been an end-
Republican Limits state issue. It has also well developed as a core instrument of
Jürgen Habermas distinguishes between two main streams of public policies. Adrian Favell interestingly outlines that politi-
political thought. The first is liberal. It embodies citizenship in cians “depend increasingly on making dogmatic stands about
The Good Society, Volume 12, No. 2, 2003 • Copyright © 2003 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 33
SYMPOSIUM
sacred national values, virtues and ideals” (Favell, 1998: 248) societies, paralleling the post-colonial ambiguities and pater-
precisely when they lose control and responsiveness over the nalistic favours of the politics of religion.
public problems. For example, when integration was debated in Jacobin France
This is worth mentioning because it highlights how far repub- in the mid-1980s, it became clear that Islam was the central issue.
lican tradition has reached a paradoxical situation: republicans One of the main justifications of the 1993 restrictive reform of
have succeeded in asserting collective identity as a pre-condi- French nationality was that “Islam is not only a religion, but a
tion of citizenship. But they have done so when the very mod- genuine rule for social, juridical, philosophical and economical
ern frames of citizenship have blurred. The force of life, which is opposed to our own conceptions, as well as our
republicanism is then its probable reactive obsolescence. The own principles” (Assemblée Nationale, 1993: 347). This not only
framework in which it appeared is profoundly challenged illustrates the French policy attitude to Islam, but also reflects a
(Westphalian nation-state order with low migration) (Turner, more general feature (Joly, 1995).
1993), and yet the questions it raises remain obsessively strong In these circumstances, then, how is it possible to extend the
(cohesion, civility and the public/private divide). boundaries of membership? Under which conditions and for
which results? As Rainer Bauböck puts it, “for a liberal con-
Integrating the “Other” ception, in contrast with the republican tradition of Aristotle,
This is particularly clear regarding Rousseau or Hannah Arendt, the inclu-
the politics of integration in Europe. sion of the inactive and even the incom-
But this “political” identity yields petent as equal members in the polity
Integration addresses the question of
cohesion and legitimacy of the polity
ground to politics of cultural and is a basic achievement of contemporary
that faces an on-going centripetal
religious identities versus national democracy” (Bauböck, 1994: 202). The
process of fragmentation (Wieviorka,
identity. In other words the republican approach suspects outsiders
1996; Isin and Wood, 1999). It is an disintegration of national identity of resisting integration under the pre-
issue of guaranteeing a “moral public is assessed as a challenge to tence of their “encumbered identities”
order” above competing values, attitudes political cohesion. (see Miller, 2000). This is not to point
and interests. This Hobbesian question at resistance to integration as a more
(Favell, 2001: 2) obtains a peculiar resonance in the context of efficient or even successful strategy by
mass migration and durable settlement that leads to the dilem- which newcomers might obtain their franchise. The argument is
mas of liberal societies. limited to the “thin consistency” of their civic virtue. This echoes
The problem of integration is dual. On the one hand, Western the 19th- and first 20th-century exclusion of non-owners and
societies encounter a crisis of the school system (Dubet, 1987), women from political rights.
massive unemployment and changes in modern forms of socia- However in that case, the question of allocating rights and
bility that lead to a crisis of Welfare and citizenship in terms of membership to newcomers is directly linked to the fear of a loss
social mobility and political representation. of identity. Nationality reforms in Great Britain (1981) and
On the other hand, it is about integrating ethno-cultural and France (1993–8) or Germany (1999) appeared as resulting from
religious diversity into the classical strands of an equality-based the politicisation of immigration in these terms. Citizenship
society. As far as immigration is concerned, integration becomes extension (or restriction) had to go through nationality reforms,
a policy issue aimed at “cultural” attitudes and behaviours that based on the political consensus for which a liberal society has
would challenge the “core values” of Western societies. This the right to limit the rights (compare Arendt’s “right to have
underlies the blurred boundaries between integration and assim- rights”), as far as this is articulated to the political principle
ilation. More importantly, this hides how far social marginal- grounding the modern state’s legitimacy and moral order: the
ization does affect more deeply those who are suspected of nation.
“bringing in their luggage” the integration problem. In the same token, integration still dominates literature even
European national politics of identity have sharply illustrated if it appears as a loose concept, less defined by what it is than
these limits as far as Islam has been concerned. Whereas Islam what it opposes (i.e. Durkheimian anomie, segregation or majori-
became the second religion in Europe after the shift from influx tarian democracy, etc.). Integration also lays claim to understand
migrations to durable settlement and family reunification, citizenship in terms of homogeneous (or consensual?) political
Muslims represented the radical “Other” that could not possibly identity (see Van Gunsteren, 1997). But this “political” identity
be incorporated into Western citizenship framework. Islamo- yields ground to politics of cultural and religious identities ver-
phobia has been a common feature of contemporary European sus national identity. In other words the disintegration of national