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Viewing cable 08RANGOON44, CHINESE LOSING PATIENCE WITH BURMA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

08RANGOON44 2008-01-18 10:10 2010-12-09 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon

Currently released so far...
1269 / 251,287
VZCZCXRO5943
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHGO #0044/01 0181034
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181034Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7059
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0842
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4402
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 7933
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5494
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1282
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

Articles Friday, 18 January 2008, 10:34

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RANGOON 000044
Brazil SIPDIS
Sri Lanka SIPDIS
United Kingdom DEPT FOR P, EAP/MLS AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
Sweden EO 12958 DECL: 01/16/2018
Editorial TAGS PGOV, PREL, BM
United States SUBJECT: CHINESE LOSING PATIENCE WITH BURMA
Latin America Classified By: CDA Shari Villarosa for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Charge hosted the Chinese Ambassador for lunch on
January 17. We discussed the lack of political dialogue and the need for
Browse latest releases all countries to speak with one voice to persuade the generals to start
2010/12/09 talking and quit dragging their feet. The Chinese Ambassador no longer
tried to defend the regime, and acknowledged that the generals had made
2010/12/08 a bad situation worse. The Chinese have used their access to the
2010/12/07 generals to push for change, without much observable result, but remain
2010/12/06 interested in working with us to promote change. The Ambassador
2010/12/05 indicated that fear of losing power and economic interests may be the
2010/12/04 key obstacles keeping the generals away from the negotiating table. End
Summary.
2010/12/03 Chinese Fed Up
2010/12/02 --------------
2010/12/01 ¶2. (C) Ambassador Guan Mu no longer tries to defend the regime as
2010/11/30 making any progress on political dialogue. He admitted that he did not
2010/11/29 know why the dialogue apparently stopped last November, although he
added that some in the senior leadership understand that they must open
2010/11/28 up to the outside world. He acknowledged that accurate information about
the current situation does not get passed up to the senior levels.
Browse by creation date Although claiming that it was un-Buddhist for monks to become involved
in politics, Guan agreed that the monks’ involvement indicated how bad
66 72 75 79 86 88 89 90 the situation had become in Burma. He pointed out the designated liaison
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 officer met with Aung San Suu Kyi last week after a two-month hiatus,
08 09 10 but quickly admitted that this gap was “too long.” Charge pointed to
Senior General Than Shwe as the main obstacle to moving forward. The
Ambassador responded that he believed that Than Shwe would be ready to
Browse by origin open up in a few more years. The Burmese people can’t wait that long,
A B C D F H I J the Charge warned, stressing that further delays would only increase the
possibility of further turmoil.
K L M N O P R S ¶3. (C) Ambassador Guan stated the various Chinese officials traveling
T U V W Y Z to Burma have counseled the senior generals to speed up the political
dialogue and warned them that the international community would not
Browse by tag accept any backtracking. He agreed that the various parties just needed
to start talking, and urged us to offer positive, constructive comments.
A B C D E F G H Charge said “start talking now” was very constructive advice, and real
I J K L M N O P dialogue would be welcomed by the whole world. If the generals were
Q R S T U V W X serious about a dialogue, they should be meeting everyday, not just with
Y Z Aung San Suu Kyi, but with ethnic leaders, and other interested citizens
as well. A one hour meeting with one person after two months was just
for show, claimed the Charge, not serious. In addition, she continued,
Browse by classification the regime has not permitted ASSK to meet with anyone else. The regime
should be easing the restrictions on her, so she can get advice and
CONFIDENTIAL counsel from a wide variety of people.
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Control vs. Turmoil
SECRET -------------------
SECRET//NOFORN ¶4. (C) Guan cited two concerns that might be hindering the political
dialogue from getting started: losing power and economic interests. Guan
UNCLASSIFIED suggested, if the senior leaders could be offered assurances that they
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR would not “lose their lives” and could keep their economic interests,
OFFICIAL USE ONLY they might be more amenable to ceding power gradually. He implied that
the economic interests were of higher priority for the generals and
Community resources their families. Charge replied that this could all be negotiated,
reiterating the need to get started now. If turmoil breaks out as

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Cable Viewer 10.12.10 15:39

reiterating the need to get started now. If turmoil breaks out as

Follow us on Twitter people’s frustration continues to grow, there might be nothing left to
Check our Reddit negotiate, she added.
¶5. (C) The generals want to stick to their roadmap, stated Guan. Charge
Twitter this suggested that they could still call it a roadmap while increasing
Digg this page participation at each of the remaining steps, including the current
constitution drafting. Even though this might slow the roadmap process,
courage is contagious she said it could produce more broadly accepted results in the end,
which would be better for all. The roadmap process as it is will
RANGOON 00000044 002 OF 003
not deliver the stability that everyone wants to see, the Charge said,
because it does not incorporate provisions the pro-democracy supporters
and ethnic minorities want to see. Instead of taking credit for speeding
up the roadmap as he has in previous meetings, Guan nodded in agreement.
He repeated the Chinese interest in stability. Charge said more
demonstrations were likely in the coming months if the people saw no
signs a genuine dialogue was underway. She expressed confidence that
many issues could be easily resolved, if the various parties just
started talking and kept talking.
¶6. (C) Guan acknowledged that the regime has done nothing to improve
the lives of the Burmese people, even though they recieved increased oil
and gas revenues. He recognized that the huge increase in satellite fees
will further turn the public against the military. Charge characterized
the latter as an attempt to keep people from the news, but also
effectively blocking them from some of their few escapes--soccer and
Korean soap operas. Guan mentioned that China had learned that when the
government tried to press down too hard, it increased the likelihood of
an eruption; he understood the risks of more turmoil in Burma.
¶7. (C) Guan questioned whether democracy could work in Burma citing the
experience of their first decade of independence and Ne Win’s efforts to
promote a democratic transition in 1988. Charge explained that many
nations went through the same struggles after independence, and reminded
Guan that it was the current generals who blocked a transition in 1988.
The Burmese have learned from the past, according to the Charge, if they
have a voice in deciding their political future then they will have an
interest in maintaining stability. Guan said there were some issues that
were inappropriate for outsiders to decide, like sexual problems in a
family. Charge agreed saying the role of the outsiders should be in
persuading the parties to talk; what they talked about and the decisions
they came to was up to them. Charge urged China to join with the U.S. in
urging genuine talks get started now and keep going until a more broadly
acceptable way forward can be agreed upon by all the relevant parties of
Burma.
Meet the USDA, not the NLD
--------------------------
¶8. (C) Charge noted that the most recent Chinese visitor had spent a
lot of time with Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA-the
regime’s mass member organization) members. Guan described He Luli as a
senior official from one of China’s eight political parties, and of the
People’s Congress. Guan did not believe that her meetings meant USDA was
preparing to formally become a political party. He noted that while USDA
claimed 24 million members, 60% were under the age of 18, so could not
vote. Charge asked if the He met with the National League of Democracy
(NLD), and Guan quickly replied that the “government would not permit
that,” referring to the Burmese government.
¶9. (C) Charge mentioned that the Foreign Ministry had complained that
we visited NLD “excessively” and asked if the Chinese had been called
in. He smiled, shook his head no, and asked if Charge visited NLD. Yes,
she replied, adding she would be pleased to introduce the Ambassador to
NLD members. He said he received a letter from U Aung Shwe, the NLD
Chairman, requesting a meeting, had not scheduled anything, but shook
their hands when he encountered them at National Day receptions. He
noted that the Foreign Ministry did not prohibit Charge from seeing NLD,
just advised against too many visits. Charge said we would go on meeting
with NLD regularly since they were always willing to talk with us,
unlike the government. Guan stated that Chinese officials had
recommended to senior leaders that they meet with Charge, and said Than
Shwe had told the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that he would.
¶10. (C) Comment: The Chinese clearly are fed up with the footdragging
by the Than Shwe regime. While democracy, demonstrations, and
politically active monks make them nervous, they recognize that the
risks of further turmoil are
RANGOON 00000044 003 OF 003
increasing so long as the generals refuse to talk. This turmoil will
inevitably affect Chinese business interests here, making them more
amenable to our approaches regarding Burma in the interests of promoting
stability. The Chinese can no longer rely on the generals to protect
their interests here, and recognize the need to broker some solution
that keeps the peace, including bringing in the pro-democracy
supporters. Those discussions need to get started now. The generals no
doubt fear for their futures, so some quiet assurances of protection
might help bring them to the negotiating table. The Chinese share our
desire to get them to the negotiating table. The Chinese Ambassador has
made clear his continuing interest in working together with us.
VILLAROSA

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