Cable Viewer 10.12.

10 18:34

Viewing cable 08RANGOON557, CONTINUING THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin

08RANGOON557 2008-07-14 06:06 2010-12-09 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Rangoon

Currently released so far...
1269 / 251,287
VZCZCXRO6089
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHTRO
DE RUEHGO #0557/01 1960656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140656Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY RANGOON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7905
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1345
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 4870
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8433
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5995
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1703
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1850
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

Articles
Monday, 14 July 2008, 06:56
Brazil C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RANGOON 000557
Sri Lanka SIPDIS
United Kingdom DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, AND IO
PACOM FOR FPA
Sweden EO 12958 DECL: 07/13/2018
Editorial TAGS PGOV, PREL, PHUM, BM
United States SUBJECT: CONTINUING THE PURSUIT OF DEMOCRACY IN BURMA
Latin America RANGOON 00000557 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: P/E Chief Leslie Hayden for Reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Rangoon pol/econ chief departs Post this week after
Browse latest releases ending a two-year tour that saw the largest political uprising in Burma
2010/12/09 in twenty years, the arrest and imprisonment of the pro-democracy
opposition’s most talented leaders, and the worst natural disaster in
2010/12/08 Burma’s recorded history. We asked her to share her candid observations
2010/12/07 on the current political situation, and her recommendations on how best
2010/12/06 to advance our democratic goals.
2010/12/05 -------------------
2010/12/04 The Senior Generals
-------------------
2010/12/03 ¶2. (C) The Burma army remains firmly in control throughout most of the
2010/12/02 country, with Senior General Than Shwe retaining almost absolute power.
2010/12/01 He has the final word on all significant political and economic
2010/11/30 decisions. While outsiders may portray him as an uneducated, crass, and
2010/11/29 blundering man, he has successfully consolidated and held onto power for
several years, while at the same time building lucrative relationships
2010/11/28 with his energy hungry neighbors that undermine Western efforts to
cripple his regime.
Browse by creation date ¶3. (C) The generals keep their power through a vast system of economic
patronage, not unlike a Western style Mafia. Military-owned enterprises
66 72 75 79 86 88 89 90 control every profit-making natural resource and industry in the
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 country. Economic prosperity can only be enjoyed by rising thorough the
08 09 10 ranks of the Army, or having extremely close ties to the senior
generals. This is why China’s urging to the generals to begin reforming
Burma’s economy falls on deaf ears. Economic liberalization and reform
Browse by origin would require the generals to dismantle the very system that ensures
A B C D F H I J their power. Dismantling this system will be one of the biggest
challenges for any future democratic leader of Burma.
K L M N O P R S ¶4. (C) Rumors of splits at the top of the regime are the result of
T U V W Y Z uninformed analysis and wishful thinking of the exiles and outside
observers. While the senior generals may disagree from time-to-time
Browse by tag amongst themselves (as witnessed after Nargis), they follow the orders
of Than Shwe. The senior generals are keenly aware that if they do not
A B C D E F G H stand together, they will fall together. True democratic change will not
I J K L M N O P likely happen until the top two generals, Than Shwe and Maung Aye, are
Q R S T U V W X off the scene. Both are extremely concerned for the safety and financial
Y Z security of themselves and their families. Third-ranking general Thura
Shwe Mann is rumored to be Than Shwe’s pick for Burma’s President in
2010, but if Than Shwe and Maung Aye are still alive, they will likely
Browse by classification pull his strings from behind the scenes. Sources close to Thura Shwe
Mann tell us he is smart, sophisticated, and well-aware of Burma’s
CONFIDENTIAL problems. Some talented Burmese intellectuals and political dissidents
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN tell us they pass him policy papers that are reportedly solicited on his

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tell us they pass him policy papers that are reportedly solicited on his
SECRET behalf. However, he is intimately involved in Burma’s corruption,
SECRET//NOFORN primarily through his sons’ business interests.
¶5. (C) Several of our sources close to high and mid-ranking military
UNCLASSIFIED officers tell us that some of the regional commanders are reform-minded
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR and aware of the need for political and economic reform. However, most
OFFICIAL USE ONLY of the military believe that working within Burma’s current military
system is the only way to bring about this change while maintaining
Community resources stability. While some officers begrudgingly respect Aung San Suu Kyi,
they do not sympathize with the pro-democracy opposition in general. We
Follow us on Twitter should not expect an imminent coup to save us from the hard-line senior
Check our Reddit generals.
--------------------------------------------- --
Twitter this Aung San Suu Kyi and the Pro-Democracy Movement
Digg this page --------------------------------------------- --
¶6. (C) Since the September protests, the most dynamic and talented
courage is contagious leaders of Burma’s pro-democracy movement have been jailed, left the
country, or remain in hiding. Tellingly, the NLD remain free. While many
outside Burma perpetuate the
RANGOON 00000557 002.2 OF 004
impression of Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD)
party as a large movement with massive support waiting to take the
Parliamentary seats they won in the 1990 election, the reality is quite
different. Without a doubt, Aung San Suu Kyi remains a popular and
beloved figure of the Burman majority, but this status is not enjoyed by
her party. Already frustrated with the sclerotic leadership of the
elderly NLD “Uncles”, the party lost even more credibility within the
pro-democracy movement when its leaders refused to support the
demonstrators last September, and even publicly criticized them.
¶7. (C) Many of the younger political activists are turning away from
the NLD and preparing to run in the 2010 parliamentary elections, to
effect political change any way they can. This includes members of 88
Generation. There is reportedly an ongoing, heated debate among the 88
Generation leaders in Insein prison on whether or not the groups’
members should contest the election, with Ko Ko Gyi advocating members
do so, and Min Ko Naing opting for a boycott. Those who want to run tell
us they do not agree with the new constitution and despise the regime’s
roadmap to democracy. However, with the absence of any alternative, they
see the new Parliament as a possible mechanism for dialogue between the
military, the pro-democracy opposition, and the ethnic cease-fire
groups.
¶8. (C) The way the Uncles run the NLD indicates the party is not the
last great hope for democracy and Burma. The Party is strictly
hierarchical, new ideas are not solicited or encouraged from younger
members, and the Uncles regularly expel members they believe are “too
active.” NLD youth repeatedly complain to us they are frustrated with
the party leaders. Repeated overtures from and “summits” with the
leaders of the 88 Generation in 2007 failed to result in any significant
cooperation between the factions. Indeed, lack of unity among the pro-
democracy opposition remains one of the biggest obstacles to democratic
change in Burma.
¶9. (C) The “Uncles” have repeatedly rebuffed the most dynamic and
creative members of the pro-democracy opposition, who reinvigorated the
pro-democracy movement throughout 2006 and 2007 by strategically working
to promote change through grass-roots human rights and political
awareness and highlighting the regime’s economic mismanagement. Nor has
the party made any effort to join forces with the technically
sophisticated bloggers and young, internet-savvy activists, who have
been so clever at getting out the images which repeatedly damaged the
regime and undermined its international credibility. Instead, the Uncles
spend endless hours discussing their entitlements from the 1990
elections and abstract policy which they are in no position to enact.
XXXXXXXXXXXX Additionally, most MPs-elect show little concern for the
social and economic plight of most Burmese, and therefore, most Burmese
regard them as irrelevant.
----------------------------
The Ethnic Cease-Fire Groups
----------------------------
¶10. (C) The cease-fire groups remain an important component of Burma’s
future political stability and it is noteworthy that none have chosen to
support Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. Instead, they have entered
dialogue with the regime, at the same time cutting lucrative concession
deals for many of groups’ leaders. However, many leaders of the cease-
fire groups have told us they would cast their lot with whomever best
looked out for their interests. However badly the regime does this, the
NLD has repeatedly missed opportunities to reach out to the cease-fire
groups to demonstrate that they would. Instead, it has consistently
issued statements calling for a dialogue between the NLD and regime
first, before the ethnic cease-fire groups are brought into the mix.
They have also continually feuded with ethnic MPs-elect on the Committee
to Represent the People’s Parliament (CRPP).
RANGOON 00000557 003.2 OF 004
¶11. (C) It is these long-held ethnic tensions that has kept the cease-
fire groups from defecting from their dialogue with the regime to form
an alliance with the NLD. Many of Burma’s neighbors, including China,
are aware of the tension between the NLD and the ethnic nationalities.
The NLD’s continuing alienation of the ethnic minority groups gives
credence to the regime’s most effective argument with its neighbors and

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credence to the regime’s most effective argument with its neighbors and
ASEAN: that the military is the only force capable of guaranteeing
stability in Burma.
¶12. (C) The recent statement Aung San Suu Kyi released through UN
Special Envoy Gambari indicated she is aware of this problem and wants
to rectify it. The overture she offered to the ethnic nationalities was
welcomed by the cease-fire group leaders with whom we spoke. But her
party failed to follow up on her initiative and issued only a half-
hearted invitation for the ethnic leaders to visit them at NLD
headquarters in Rangoon. Once again, they reduced the role of the
ethnics to second-class supplicants. The timing of ASSK’s statement was
strategic: just before the referendum on a constitution, which many of
the cease-fire groups were unhappy with because the regime had failed to
include key compromises promised by former PM Khin Nyunt before his
ouster. A genuine overture from the NLD offered the best chance yet to
split the cease-fire groups from the regime and undermine its
credibility with its regional supporters. The Uncles failed to use this
opportunity, so the cease-fire groups continue their relationship with
the regime.
-------------------------
Where do We Go From Here?
-------------------------
¶13. (C) Throughout the country, there is still widespread and growing
frustration with the regime for its brutal and incompetent rule. Though
most Burmese do not believe the NLD will be able to bring about
democratic change, at least while ASSK is under house arrest, they have
not given up on working for democracy. Instead, they are taking matters
into their own hands and creatively working in what space is available
to improve the lives of their communities.
¶14. (C) Like the many community-based organizations (CBOs), religious
organizations, and civil society groups that responded to Cyclone Nargis
while the international community was shut out, many dissidents and
ordinary Burmese are creatively trying to incorporate democratic
principles into their civil society programs, including private-tuition
schools, environmental programs, health education, and religious
organizations. Through this process, change will come about more slowly
than most want, but it is a channel that functions where most other
options were shut down by the regime after the September 2007
demonstrations. It is also a method that promotes change from the grass
roots, teaching community responsibility at the local level, rather than
a top-down movement by the urban, intellectual elite. A strong civil
society is something we should seek and encourage in Burma. It will make
any democratic transition in Burma more likely to succeed.
¶15. (C) Ending Burma’s isolation will also be integral to any
successful long-term change in the country. No matter how democratic
transition comes about in Burma, the military will be involved given its
vast control over the political and economic structures of the country.
We should make an effort to seek out and speak with the more progressive
military officers and to those who have access to the senior generals.
Their hostility to democratic change is motivated by paranoia and
distrust of the West, and a belief that we seek to punish them and
obliterate a significant role for them in Burma’s future. If we want to
counter this, we should pursue dialogue directly with them rather than
through intermediaries who can sometimes garble messages.
¶16. (C) If we do decide to speak with the generals again, we should do
it strategically. Dialogue could be used as a tool to bring the generals
into the twenty-first century.
RANGOON 00000557 004.2 OF 004
Discussions could take place on the margins of international fora,
exposing them to the outside world and its diplomatic norms, juxtaposing
Burma’s backwardness against the modern world, which could cause greater
realization among the generals about their country’s lack of
development. Careful preparation could be made before such events to
make sure Burma’s neighbors send the same messages to the generals
during their bilateral meetings. Such unity of message was extremely
effective in persuading the regime to open up to international
assistance after Cyclone Nargis.
---------------------------
Give a Little, Get a Little
---------------------------
¶17. (C) While our economic sanctions give us the moral high-ground,
they are largely ineffective because they are not comprehensive. Burma’s
biggest client states refuse to participate in them. However, the
generals despise the sanctions and want them removed because they
challenge the regime’s legitimacy. If we really want to see the generals
make progress, we need to show them what they will get in return. This
means being willing to gradually remove sanctions in exchange for true
steps toward dialogue and political change.
¶18. (C) We should start small and hold them to real action (unlike the
sham dialogue they purported to initiate with Aung San Suu Kyi last
November). If they do make concrete progress, we should be ready to
offer them something. For instance, removing them from Tier 3 on the
Trafficking in Persons rankings, or taking them off the Narcotics Majors
list, areas where the regime has actually made some progress. This
should be a gradual process that would be based only on the condition of
concrete results. Large rewards should come only with large compromises,
such as lifting the visa ban if they release Aung San Suu Kyi. We may
also want to consider putting security guarantees on the table for the

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also want to consider putting security guarantees on the table for the
most senior generals and their families if we are serious about removing
them from the scene. As we move toward the 2010 parliamentary elections,
it may be a strategic time to begin talks with them about such an
agreement. Allowing international election monitors, lifting laws that
restrict free and fair debate, and freeing key political prisoners could
be tied to lifting specific sanctions.
¶19. (C) While talking to the generals may be unpalatable, their firm
control over Burma and the weakness of the pro-democracy opposition are
a reality we must consider when working to promote change in Burma. The
prospect for democratic change in the near future is low, but despite
the setbacks after the September demonstrations, there is hope change
may eventually come. After many years of waiting for the outside world
to help free them from the generals’ despotic rule, many Burmese are
finding creative ways to take control of their country through
community-based organizations and building the capacity of civil
society. Through these organizations, leaders may emerge who will run in
the 2010 elections and work for democratic change.
¶20. (C) We should seek every opportunity to support and increase the
capacity of Burma’s nascent civil society by expanding humanitarian
assistance inside the country that promotes self-reliance, conflict
resolution, and respect for human rights. Such a policy will have the
added benefit of expanding our influence and increasing our access
throughout the country. Not only will this approach increase our
knowledge of the subtle changes occurring inside Burma, but it will
strengthen our position and influence inside when change does come, so
we can assist the Burmese to reform their political and economic systems
in a manner that best promotes U.S. economic and strategic interests.
Above all, our Burma policy should be focused on helping those Burmese
who are working to bring about democratic change themselves, for that is
the only way it can realistically come. VILLAROSA

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