Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian Belief Networks for Reliability and

Risk Assessment
Chengdong Wang, University of Maryland
Ali Mosleh, University of Maryland
Key Words: Reliability, Bayesian Belief Networks, Risk, Qualitative, Quantitative
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS capabilities of the conventional probabilistic risk assessment
methodology to also include risks associated with human
This paper presents an extension of Bayesian belief
activities and organizational factors in addition to hardware
networks (BBN) enabling use of both qualitative and
and software failures, and adverse conditions of the physical
quantitative likelihood scales in inference. The proposed
environment.
method is accordingly named QQBBN (Qualitative-
BBN is a powerful tool not only for graphically
Quantitative Bayesian Belief Networks). The inclusion of
representing the relationships among a set of variables, but
qualitative scales is especially useful when quantitative data
also for dealing with uncertainties in values and relations
for estimation of probabilities are lacking and experts are
among those variables. It provides a flexible framework for
reluctant to express their opinions quantitatively. In reliability
modeling the relation between “soft factors” and hardware
and risk analysis such situation occurs when for example
reliability or systems risk. However, for such cases it is
human and organizational root causes of systems are modeled
usually difficult to express the uncertain relations and values
explicitly. Such causes are often not quantifiable due to
in numerical probability terms. Accordingly there is a need for
limitations in the state of the art and lack of proper
more flexibility in expressing and assessing uncertain
quantitative metrics. This paper describes the proposed
relations, ideally in both qualitative as well as quantitative
QQBBN framework and demonstrates its uses through a
scales. In response to this need a ‘qualitative-quantitative
simple example.
BBN” (QQBBN) approach is developed in this paper,
1 INTRODUCTION meaning that the model can be populated with numerical
probability values as well as linguistic non-specific
Conventionally, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree
expressions such as “good”, “medium”, “few”, “frequent”, or
Analysis (ETA) or alternatively Event Sequence Diagram
“rare”, or “often”. We will first provide an overview of some
(ESD) have been the main tools in systems modeling in risk,
fundamentals in Sections 2 and 3, and then in Section 4
reliability, and safety applications. Ref [1] is an example of
introduce the proposed QQBBN. The paper concludes with a
such methodology and software platform for use in Space
simple illustrative example.
Systems probabilistic risk assessment (PRA). For a variety of
reasons, Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) is also being 2 BAYESIAN BELIEF NETWORKS
considered for such applications, particularly in PRA [2, 3].
BBNs are currently the predominant technique in artificial
BBNs are widely used in the artificial intelligence domain [4,
intelligence for knowledge representation and reasoning under
5]. In risk assessment, BBN method is adopted for its
uncertainty [7]. A Bayesian belief network represents the joint
capability to model “soft factors” such as management,
probability distribution (JPD) that may be written as:
organizational, and human performance factors that impact the n
performance of complex socio-technical systems [2, 6]. Pr (X , X ,  , X ) =
1 2 n ∏ Pr [X parent ( X )]
i i
(1)
A good example of such socio-technical system is the i =1

civil aviation system as a whole; an extremely complex web of
private and governmental organizations, operating or
regulating flights involving diverse types of aircraft, ground
support, and other physical and organizational infrastructures.
In contrast with many other complex systems, the aviation
system may be characterized as an “open” system, as the there
are large numbers of dynamic interfaces with outside
organizations, commercial entities, individuals, physical
systems, and environments.
In order to develop a more comprehensive risk model for
these systems, an important step is to extend the modeling
Under conditional independence assumption denoted by the
BBN structure, the joint probability (X1, X2, …,Xn) is a
product of local conditional distribution of all nodes.
Inference algorithms include exact and approximate methods.
Pearl published an efficient message propagation inference
algorithm for polytrees [8, 9] and developed the clustering
algorithm for exact inferences in general Bayesian belief
networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of
clusters [10, 11]. Later, the junction tree algorithm [12] was
developed which is a time and space-efficient version of a
variable elimination algorithm. In addition, a conditioning

978-1-4244-5103-6/10/$26.00 ©2010 IEEE

algorithm is presented by [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. There are local Low Medium High
conditioning algorithms [15], global conditioning [16], Low Low Medium High
dynamic conditioning [13], and recursive conditioning Medium - Medium High
algorithms [17]. High - - High
While normally BBN are quantified, research has also
been done on qualitative probabilistic networks. An example Table 1 - Qualitative Addition Formula
is QPN [18]. QPN is a pair (G,Q), in which G = (V(G), A(G))
The multiplication rules in Table 2 follow a similar
is an acyclic digraph, where V(G) is a set of nodes and A(G) is
approach. For example “Low x Low = Low” and “Low x
a set of arrows. The set Q contains qualitative probabilistic
Medium = Low”, etc. Again while these rule may be used as a
relationships between the variables that are represented by
general guide, in some cases the analyst may believe that for
V(G). Relationships can be one of four qualitative influences: example “Low x Medium = Medium” may be more
positive, negative, zero or ambiguous. These influences are appropriate.
represented by signs: ‘+’, ‘_’, ‘0’ and ‘?’, respectively. The
same signs are used for representing the observed or
Low Medium High
calculated effect of any variable on other variables.
Osseiran [19] presents a qualitative Bayesian network Low Low Low Medium
approach, but the approach is limited to “singly connected” Medium - Medium Medium
tree structures, for example one parent and two children nodes. High - - High
3 QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE BAYESIAN BELIEF Table 2 – Qualitative Multiplication Formula
NETWORKS METHODOLOGY
The elements in these formulas can be expanded based on
The Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian Belief Network the analysis needs. When necessary, subtraction and division
methodology (QQBBN) is developed to extend the application rules can also be developed, for instance by reversing the
of belief networks to cases where numerical probabilities are addition and multiplication formulas.
hard to estimate for some or all network nodes. As stated An example of inference with these rules is shown using
earlier, many applications in social sciences and engineering Figure 1. The inference is done by applying the classical BBN
fall into this category. QQBBN improves the flexibility for the inference methodology [4, 5, 7], for example the junction tree
analyst building the hybrid causal logic model [3]. algorithm. The binary states of variables are Flu={present,
The QQBBN likelihoods are expressed in qualitative absent} and Fever ={high, normal}. The likelihoods values are
terms (e.g., low, medium, high) as well as quantitatively {Low, Medium, High}
(probability scale). This is done for the likelihood of state of
variable as well as the conditional likelihoods.
Flu Fever
4 QUALITATIVE-QUANTITATIVE BAYESIAN BELIEF
NETWORKS ALGORITHM
We note that typical likelihood assessments and inference Figure 1 - Qualitative Inference Example
steps involve “addition” and “multiplication” rules
corresponding to OR and AND operations in logic. While The conditional likelihoods are given as
such rules for numerical probabilities follow the well- P(Fever = high︱Flu = present) = High
established calculus of probability, the rules for “qualitative P(Fever = normal︱Flu = absent) = High
inference” are not unique. The analyst essentially assesses the Assuming P(Flue = present) = Low, and by propagating
consistency and “correctness” of the results after applying the information through the network and according to the rules in
rules. In this paper for the purpose of demonstrating the Tables 1 and 2, the posterior probability for Fever will be:
QQBBN approach, we use a simple qualitative likelihood P(Fever = high)
calculus shown in Table 1 for addition formulas, and in Table = P(Fever = high︱Flu = present) * P(Flu = present)
2 for multiplication rules. These rules, which would guide the + P(Fever = high ︱Flu = absent) * P(Flu = absent)
inference through the network, are based on a three-level = high * low + low * high
qualitative likelihood scale (low, medium, high). A more = medium+ medium
refined scale is also possible depending on the particular = medium
subject of analysis and the analyst’s preferences. This type of qualitative reasoning is carried on for the
In Table 1 the italic value in each cell is the result of qualitative parts (subnet) of the QQBBN. In many
adding likelihoods define by the corresponding row and applications, the quantitative subnets are located closer to the
column. For example “Low + Low = Low” and “Low + surface of the network where observation based assessments
Medium = Medium”. At each stage the analyst needs to of probabilities are possible, or where experts feel more
examine if the combination rule produces acceptable results, comfortable expressing their beliefs in numerical probabilities.
and modify them if necessary. For instance in particular case The quantitative subnets will rely on standard probability
“Medium” may be more accurate result for “Low+Low”. inference rules in BBNs. The interface between the qualitative
and quantitative “subnets” (see Figure 2) of the QQBBN, Sin gle Engin e
however, needs a set of conversion to relate the qualitative Fa ilur e

likelihood scales to probability scales.

Inte rnal Eng ine En gine Fail ure E ngine F ailu re E ngi ne
Fa ilu re (3 .57E - Mai nten ance due to External Mism anagem ent
5) R e late d Caus e (1 .47E -6) by cr ew (2.1 5E -6)

Main tena nce

Quantitative T rain in g
Quantitative
Procedure

Management
Qualitative
Qualitative
Figure 2 - Layers between qualitative and quantitative
Bayesian belief networks Figure 3 – Engine failure model
For example, as implemented in the Integrated Risk
P(Management=Effective) High
Information System software [6], this can be by using
P(Management=Ineffective) Low
conversion tables such as Table 3 as a guide. The conversion
applies in both directions going from qualitative scale to Table 4.1 – Prior probability of Management
quantitative scale and vice versa.
P (Training = P (Training =
Management Adequate) Inadequate)
Qualitative Low Medium High
Effective High Low
Scale
Ineffective Low High
Quantitative 0< P ≤0.25 0.25 <P ≤0.75 0.75 <P ≤1
Scale Table 4.2 – Conditional probability of Training given
Management states
Table 3 – Example conversion table of qualitative and
quantitative scales for the QQBBN nodes and conditional P(Procedure= Correct ) P(Procedure =
likelihoods Management Incorrect )
5 AN EXAMPLE Effective High Low
Ineffective Low High
An example is shown in Figure 3. The graph has a Table 4.3 – Conditional probability of Procedure given
Qualitative-Quantitative Bayesian belief network that feeds a Management
fault tree with four basic events. This exemplifies cases in
systems reliability and risk where some of the causes of Training Procedure P(Maintenance= P(Maintenance=
hardware failure are attributed to human and organizational or Success) Error)
factors modeled by BBNs. Adequate Correct 0.9 0.1
Node Management represents the maintenance Adequate Incorrect 0.7 0.3
management team capability (effective or ineffective). Node Inadequate Correct 0.7 0.3
Training represents whether the maintenance crew has
Inadequate Incorrect 0.2 0.8
adequate training or not; node Procedure represents whether
the maintenance procedure is available or not; and node Table 4.4 – Conditional probability of Maintenance given
Maintenance represents whether the maintenance act will Training, Procedure
succeed or cause failure of the engine, a basic event in the
Procedure, Maintenance). The probability of node
fault tree. The likelihood of this basic event “engine failure,
Maintenance = Error will be used in the fault tree basic event
maintenance related” is calculated as a function of the BBN
to quantify for instance the probability of system failure.
model of the maintenance effectiveness.
The prior and conditional probabilities of this example are
P(Training, Procedure)
listed in Tables 4.1-4.4. Note that in Table 4.4 direct
Manage Adequate, Adequate, Inadequate, Inadequate,
assessments of probabilities are made given various states of ment Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
Training and Procedure. Effective High Medium Medium Low
The inference process is as follows: We first perform Ineffecti
qualitative inference in the bottom layer (including ve Low Medium Medium High
Management, Training, Procedure), and then perform the Table 5: Conditional probability of Node (Training,
quantitative inference in the upper layer (including Training, Procedure) given Management
 The conditional likelihoods for Training, Procedure
|Management are shown in Table 5:
After summing the node Management into Node
(Training, Procedure), P(Training, Procedure |Management)
*P(Management) and applying the rule in Table 1 and Table 2,
the marginal likelihoods of various states of Training and
Procedure are obtained as shown in Table 6:
P(Training, Procedure)
Adequate, Adequate, Inadequate, Inadequate,
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
High Medium Medium Low
Table 6: Marginalization of Node (Training, Procedure)
probability over node management
Starting from here, the inference requires converting to
quantitative inference. During the conversion, the
probabilities of the intersectional nodes are changed from
qualitative description to probability values. This conversion
needs to satisfy the rules of the specific application, as well as
the basic probability axioms.
In this process, when applying rule in Table 3, the
resulting probability distribution of various states needs to be
normalized to unity to ensure the basic probability axioms is
followed. For example, during converting Table 6,
high/medium/low is specified as 0.9/0.5/0.1 respectively.
After normalization, the Node (Training, Procedure)
probability values are as shown in Table 7.
P(Training, Procedure)
Adequate, Adequate, Inadequate, Inadequate,
Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect
0.45 0.25 0.25 0.05
Table 7: Node (Training, Procedure) quantitative
probability
The probability of node maintenance is now calculated as
P(Maintenance)=P(Maintenance|Training,Procedure)*P(T
raining,Procedure)
The probability of maintenance error will be:
P(Maintenance=Error)=0.1*0.45+0.3*0.25+0.3*0.25+0.8
*0.05 = 0.235
The probability of maintenance error state is 0.235.
If we assume that the above probability applies to each
maintenance episode, the probability of engine failure due to
maintenance over a period of time depends on the frequency
“fM” of maintenance episodes in relation to system mission or
operational period. For instance if maintenance occurs every
1000 hours, then P(Engine Failure due to Maintenance) =
0.235/1000=2.35E-4, a number that is then used to quantify
the fault tree top event.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
The original ideas for QQBBN were discussed with Dr.
Hossein Eghbali of US Federal Aviation Administration with
whom the authors collaborated in developing causal models
for aviation maintenance. The authors express their
appreciations for valuable insights and suggestions made by
Dr. Eghbali in formulating the method proposed in this paper.
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BIOGRAPHIES treatment of model uncertainty, risk and reliability of hybrid
systems of hardware, human, and software, methods and tools
Chengdong Wang, PhD
for dynamic systems risk assessment, cognitive models for
A. James Clark School of Engineering
human reliability analysis, and models of the influence of
University of Maryland
organizational factors on system safety. Holds several patents
College Park, Maryland 20742
and has edited, authored, or co-authored over 300
e-mail: cdwang@umd.edu publications, has led numerous projects on risk, safety, and
security assessments for the aerospace, nuclear, chemical, and
Chengdong Wang is a senior reliability engineer at ASML. He
telecommunication industries. Ph.D. in Nuclear Science and
earned his Ph.D in 2007 and the current paper is one of the
Engineering from the University of California, Los Angeles,
methods he developed as part of his PhD dissertation on
in 1981.
hybrid causal logic methodology for risk assessment. Prior to
joining ASML he worked as a reliability engineer at GE
Medical Systems.
Ali Mosleh, PhD
University of Maryland
Room 0151F, Building 088, Glenn L. Martin Hall
A. James Clark School of Engineering
College Park, Maryland 20742