THE SEEDS OF DISASTER

Robert A. Doughty

The framework of French doctrine, organization, equipment, and training came from an
emphasis on the destructiveness of firepower, the strength of the defense, the ascendancy
of the methodical battle and the unifying power of the commander. The French firmly
believed that the new weapons and greater firepower made the battlefield much more
lethal than in the past. The great destructive power of the new weapons strengthened the
defense, and relatively less man could establish a virtually impenetrable barrier of fire.
An attacker could overwhelm a defender only by the closely coordinated employment of
massed men and materiel.

The doctrine which emerged from this perception of great lethality stressed what the
French called the bataille conduite, or the “methodical battle.” By this term they meant a
rigidly controlled operation in which all units and weapons were carefully marshaled and
then employed in combat. The French favored a step-by-step battle, with units obediently
moving between phase lines and adhering to strictly scheduled timetables. Such methods,
they believed were essential for the coherent employment of the enormous amounts of
men and materiel demanded by modern combat. A hastily prepared, impulsive fight was
doomed to failure. The focus of decision-making was best kept at higher command
levels, because centralized control was necessary to coordinate the actions of numerous
subordinate units.

The French preferred rigid centralization and strict obedience. Their doctrine stressed the
necessity of avoiding an encounter battle in which moving armies unexpectedly collided
and had to fight in an impromptu or spontaneous fashion. They thus opted for a time-
consuming, intricate process that prized preparation rather than improvisation. As a
consequence of this approach, French doctrine envisaged first the weakening of an
attacker by a defender’s fire, and then his destruction by a massive but tightly controlled
“battering ram” attack.

METHODICAL BATTLE: This step-by-step process relied upon the tightly controlled
movement of men and materiel, usually between phase lines and according to a rigid
timetable. It permitted the production of the maximum amount of firepower from every
arm, and ensured that higher-level commanders could completely control or direct the
battle. It accorded very little freedom or flexibility to lower-level commanders.

Doctrine placed great stress upon the defense. It stated that the defense served to
“repulse” enemy attacks, while the offense routed him from his positions and destroyed
his forces.

ANTITANK DEFENSE: The antitank gun, rather than the tank, accorded more with
France’s approach to national defense, since it was less expensive, was primarily a
defensive weapon, and could easily be handled by the citizen-soldiers. By 1940, the
French possessed an excellent series of antitank weapons. Their 25mm cannon was
effective up to 800 meters against heavily armored vehicles (40mm of armor), and up to
1,500 m against lightly armored vehicles. The 1938 infantry regulations specified that the
25mm cannon, however, was not to be fired at targets beyond a thousand meters because
of difficulties with target acquisition. By ’39-’40, the old 75mm cannon was gradually
being replaced by the new 47mm cannon, which was undoubtedly the best anti tank
cannon employed in the battle of France.

The limitation of military service to only one year necessitated considerable

simplification. One area that was simplified was the number of possible infantry
formations for the squad, platoon, and company was reduced and less flexibility in their
application was expected. Greater emphasis was placed on fire rather than manuever.
Regulations explained the importance of placing a “sufficient number” of projectiles on
specially selected enemy positions instead of trying to move around them by “subtle”
maneuvers. The platoon was the small4est unit that was capable of performing an
“elementary manuever” It was easier to train the short-term recruit in the firing of their
weapons than it was to train them to manuever.

Rather than seeing a need for tank units, the French foresaw a need for much greater
motorization of the infantry and artillery units that would be moved forward. They
consequently led the world’s military in motorizing their forces.

The cavalry could accomplish an economy-of-force mission and guard the infantry-heavy
forces as they occupied their positions.

From their analysis of WWI, the French concluded that increases in firepower had greatly
altered conduct on the battlefield.

Separate and powerful attacks along converging lines. The enemy could not reinforce one
area without weakening another, and thereby could not prevent the attacker from pressing
forward. While attacking across abroad front might appear to be a linear attack, it actually
consisted of concentrating powerful means along several areas in a defender’s line and
then attacking This type of operation ensured that the attacker was always stronger than
the defender, and that the defender could not mass sufficient forces to halt the attack. The
single axis attack sought dept. It could be used in the opening of a campaign before a
strongly organized defensive front had been established or in striking at the boundary
between different armies or the e armies of different nations.

The attack was divided into three separate operational phases: the preparation, the attack,
and the exploitation. Within the planning for the divisions and corps in the battle, several
bounds and phases had been foreseen for the operation. These controlled the forward
movement of the divisions and prevented accidental bombardment of french units by
friendly artillery.

Even though they preferred a restrained attack, they believed a limited attack could serve
useful functions. Such attacks could improve an unfavorable situation, could gain
objectives the enemy could not recapture except buy a concerted and costly effort, or
could destroy enemy forces without using the enormous means normally required for a
more extensive attack.

The French military placed the greatest emphasis on the requirement for firepower. The
reliance on firepower supported the need for the methodical battle, fought offensively or
defensively. The vast “curtains of fire” could only be coordinated and delivered through
tightly centralized, successive actions in which the artillery played a large role. “The
attack is the fire that advances, the defense is the fire that halts the enemy.” Fire
permitted the maneuver or movement of infantry which remained the “queen of battle”.
Whether from tanks, aviation, artillery, gas, or the infantry, supporting fires assisted the
infantry with the “principal mission of combat>” thus the machines of war appeared as
the auxiliaries of the infantryman.

The concept of centralization of artillery assets corresponded with the concept of

maneuvering masses of fire. Such control was necessary for maneuver, since it enabled
the commander to concentrate his fires on the decisive point in the battle. The ‘decisive
point’, however, was one defined by larger unit commanders, and maneuver was viewed
in terms of the movement of larger units, rather than smaller ones. While the need for
decentralization during the advance was recognized, the military leaders preferred to have
a major portion of the artillery for the use of the larger unit commanders. A “central
reserve” of artillery provided the higher commander the means to exercise a major
influence over the battlefield, and it was a readily available reserve that could be r rapidly
shifted to another area. The requirement for such a reserve meant that a major portion of
the artillery was long-range, heavy artillery under the control of corps and higher
headquarters. But the use of artillery in this manner favored a more stable battlefield,
rather than a highly mobile one, and it viewed mobility predominately from its strategic
rather than its tactical aspects.

Centralization affected not only the overall allocation and control of artillery, but also the
ability of tactical units to receive immediate and responsive artillery fire. This effect can
be seen in the relationship among the units being supported, the forward observers, and
the commander of the artillery unit. Forward observers did not have to accompany the
units being supported. They remained to the rear, observing from a vantage point, so that
they could identify centers of enemy resistance. As soon as an observer collected
information about a potential target to his front, he passed the information to the artillery
battalion, where the commander decided if rounds would be fired. If the commander
decided not to fire, or if he believed more artillery support was needed, he passed the
information to his higher headquarters, where that artillery commander decided if his unit
would engage the target. Apparently the unit being supported had little influence over the
artillery fires it received. Such methods placed the greatest emphasis on massed fires
favoring larger units rather than smaller ones.

Even requests for direct support fires were not passed directly from the unit needing
support to the artillery units. Requests were passed from a battalion to the commander of
a regiment and if the request affected only his units, he passed it to the artillery
supporting his regiment. If it affected the maneuver of units in another regiment, he
passed the request to division HQ, which could place all the artillery fire from the
division on a target if it desired…. once again, massed fires on targets identified by
higher-level commanders. In 1936, the manual concentrated on improving the rate of fire
by using preplanned firing points.

“Tanks are only supplementary means of action placed temporarily at the disposition of
the infantry. They considerably reinforce the action of the infantry, but they do not
replace them. ”The action of the tanks can substitute for the direct support and close
protection demanded heretofore of the artillery.” Armored units tend to move too quickly,
thereby losing part of their offensive capability and becoming vulnerable to
counterattacks.” The solution of the problem of tanks moving forward too quickly lay in
successive objectives. If these objectives were placed about fifteen hundred meters apart,
the infantry and artillery could provide protective fires and the tank’s movement could be
closely controlled.

CHARS DE MANOEUVRE ENSEMBLE: The tanks for mass maneuver were not
constituted into units larger than a battalion. Apparently, a variable number of tank
battalions would be grouped into larger units according to the needs of a specific mission.
They would normally be deployed ahead of the infantry and their accompanying tanks in
order to destroy the stronger defenses of the enemy. After they overran the enemy
position, the following infantry and their tanks would then move forward to destroy the
enemy resistance completely. They could also be committed against an enemy flank in an
oblique fashion, or they could thrust more deeply into the enemy’s rear.

The chars de manoeuvre ensemble, therefore, were little more than a leading wave of
tanks that prepared the way for the infantry, which was the decisive arm, or that enabled
an infantry unit to move.

The speed of the attack was conditioned by the ability of the artillery to provide support.
Large armored formations could move no faster than their artillery, which would remain
under centralized control at as high a level as possible.

The French placed great importance on the various arms cooperation together. They
thought an infantry attack could be decisive only if carried out with tank support and if
supported by artillery. In the name of combined arms, they preferred to subordinate each
arm to the others, and rejected the possibility of the tank acting relatively independently.
The French wanted the tank to be bound tightly to the infantry and to be restrained by the
tether of artillery support. Their emphasis on combined arms on the battlefield overruled
any possibility of the tank performing a function other than supporting the infantry. As
the tank was made more vulnerable by slower speed, French tanks were more heavily
armored than were the German’s.

Gamelin described the best use of armored divisions was in an action “on the decisive
point of the battle”. They were obliged to advance in successive jumps according to the
classic process of slow attacks based on the movement of infantry and artillery. Armored
divisions were to operate in the same manner as other tanks in a mass manuever. . in a
step-by-step, carefully controlled fashion within the methodical battle. Gamelin failed to
recognize the ability of the armored division to restore mobility to the battlefield, but he
did recognize tank units to be most valuable for their ability to add considerable
firepower to an attacking force and for their potential for crushing any opponent in their
path, and believed a tank division provided more firepower and mass than any other
organization.

The 1939 manual concentrated on the employment of the armored division to assist the
maneuver of a larger unit, which was obviously an infantry unit. It also discussed the
actual employment of the division as if it were simply a much larger grouping of mass-
manuever tanks. The French still intended to employ the large tank units to increase the
offensive power and assist the maneuver of the infantry, which remained the decisive
arm.

The manual also included a concept for successive objectives, but the bounds were
increased to three or four kilometers because of the great size of the division. The tanks
would be “habitually” organized into two echelons with tow or three battalions in the first
echelon and one or two battalions in the second echelon. While the first echelon fought
its way to the next objective, the second echelon protected its flanks or reduced centers of
enemy resistance bypassed by the first echelon.

The DLM was designed to fulfill the traditional roles of cavalry units on the battlefield
and also to be able to accomplish, with appropriate reinforcement, missions usually
assigned to infantry or armored divisions. Ironically, the wartime doctrine for the
employment of the DLMs, except for the emphasis on cavalry-type missions, closely
resembled the eventual doctrine of most Western powers for the employment of
mechanized units during the battles of WWII.

The cavalry was viewed as being particularly suited for ‘rapid engagement on extended
fronts’ for ‘abrupt and violent’ action by fire, and for the conduct of the exploitation. The
cavalry division could be employed on security or reconnaissance missions and as a
‘highly mobile reserve of fire.’ While the division could be employed in the offensive, it
was best suited of r employment in weakly defended intervals on exposed flanks, or
against unprepared defenders. The regulation emphasized that an attack by a cavalry
division was different from that by an infantry division, for a cavalry division attack was
based on ‘the exploitation of the effect of surprise,’ while an infantry attack was based on
a ‘succession of efforts.’ Defensive combat, however, was like that of the infantry
division; it was based on the ‘establishment of barrages of continuous fire.’ As for the
effect of firepower, the regulation strongly emphasized that fire and movement were
‘intimately bound together’. There was on inordinate emphasis placed on firepower,
since the cavalry had depended on mobility is one if its distinct characteristics for
centuries.

The DLM was given the mission of security and reconnaissance operations, the
exploitation of a breach of enemy lines, and the sealing of a breach in friendly lines by
occupying a defensive position or by counterattacking. Although capable of the
offensive, the division was thought most suited for movements to contact, operations on
an enemy’s flank, and for exploitation after a front had been ruptured by other units. The
manual emphasized that such an attack should be closely supported by the artillery and
infantry and should not be conducted against an enemy in a strongly held position.

The DLM ‘could accomplish the same sort of mission for a large motorized unit that a
non-mechanized cavalry unit could accomplish for a normal large unit.’

The defense was described as a ‘necessary form of operation, so long as it contributes at

the least cost to the success of the offense.” Defense could therefore contribute, but only
the offense could gain final success. The recognition of the importance of the offense did
not mean that the French always preferred to attack rather than to defend. The perception
of an immense amount of fire available on the battlefield contributed to the army’s belief
that the defense was stronger than the offense. The employment of automatic weapons
and artillery permitted the establishment of a curtain of fire that would extract a terrible
toll from any attacker. For an attack to succeed, a larger number of troops and materiel
were required than for the defense. A hasty attack against a well-prepared defender would
probably lead to failure, since the defender had the advantage and could inflict heavy
casualties on an attacker. The only way for an attacker could penetrate a deadly curtain of
fire would be to create a much greater concentration of fire with “three times the infantry,
six times the artillery, and fifteen times the ammunition.” The complexity of such an n
effort limited the possibility of maneuver dramatically.

The manual: “The offensive battle thus assumes the form of successive actions of force,
preceded by indispensable delays for their preparation, and followed by periods of
movement more or less long.

The French perceived maneuver predominantly in the sense of moving units in order to
have them deliver fire or of moving fire without moving units. They rarely emphasized
the advantages of moving units to gain something other than an advantage in firepower
over an enemy. The physical destruction of the enemy was stressed to destroy his will to
fight, not the movement of a unit so it could have a decided advantage over the enemy.
“Manuever’ therefore, did not necessarily mean “movement’.

The key to the methodical battle and its frequent pauses was the role to b e played by the
artillery, since the ‘successive actions’ were necessary to permit the forward
displacement of the artillery during an attack.

France had 5,412 75mm guns left over from the Great War. It therefore remained the
major artillery piece of the division.

Description of ‘typical’ battle” When the attack began, the infantry advanced on or two
km before halting in order to readjust the artillery fire. The attack again commenced and,
after advancing one or two km, another readjustment was necessary. In order to control
the advance of the infantry and to ensure artillery support, a number of intermediate
objectives were established which corresponded to theses advances of one to two km.
After a total advance of the infantry of about four or five km, a displacement of the
artillery and a halting of the infantry advance was required. This displacement ensured
that the infantry remained under the cover of the artillery and did not go beyond its
maximum range. For control purposes, the maximum advance was sometimes limited to
three or four km before the artillery began its displacement by increments. One rule of
thumb stated that the distance of the advance ought to be half the maximum range of the
artillery supporting the attack.

Yet another aspect of the methodical battle affected by the artillery was consideration of
the proper frontage of units in the attack. The width of the attack depended upon the
amount of available artillery. A rule of thumb was that the depth of the attack would
equal about one half of its width. “If the front of the attacking troops begins to shrink
appreciably, the range of artillery permits the enemy to execute concentrations of fire
under the pressure of which the attack is weakened and finally is stopped.” The greater
the initial frontage upon which an attack is made, the more desirable the results obtained
from it.

Standard densities were also used for specific types of fires. A rolling barrage, for
example, that was two hundred m wide required one battalion of artillery, consisting of
three batteries. Consequently, a division supported by its own artillery and that of another
division, could attack on a front of about two thousand m. A density, even against an
unfortified front, of at least four battalions per km was essential. With its organic five
battalions of artillery, a division’s maximum front would still be from twelve to fifteen
hundred m. anything beyond this forced the commander to break down his operation into
different phases.

Obtaining the proper density of artillery was the prime factor in determining whether to
employ phasing. The artillery could be massed for the support of one attack; after that
phase ended, it could be massed in support of another attack and the completion of
another phase.

Another result of the emphasis on the artillery and the methodical battle was that infantry
units became burdened by the requirement to move heavy equipment. Infantry units
therefore became less, rather than more mobile. In 1914 a division of four regiments
would be thirteen km long when conducting a road march. A ‘30s division of only three
regiments would be thirty-four km long because of the additional number of trucks and
horses. The newer division was “much more complex and heavy and consequently less
supple and less tactically and strategically mobile.” Mobility was sacrificed for greater
firepower; the onerous burden of displacing massive amounts of artillery seriously
limited the possibility of any wide-ranging or sweeping operations.

The motorized divisions were different from “normal” infantry in their strategic mobility,
not in how they fought once they disembarked from their trucks. They required protection
while they displaced and had to disembark in a protected area. Essentially this was the
same concept of motorization that was practiced in the Great War.

“It is by lateral fire that the infantry makes the enemy feel his advance, it taking him from
the flank, the diagonal, the rear. It is by this fire that he will aid the progression of
neighboring units that have been held up.”

The smallest infantry unit capable of maneuver was the rifle platoon and that the
maneuvers should always be “simple”. A squad would never try to maneuver by using a
few of its men to provide a base of fire while the remainder moved forward. If a platoon
encountered fire from an enemy position, it should try to outflank this resistance, rather
than; make a direct assault. While one squad placed fire on this point, the rest of the
platoon would use favorable paths of approach toward it, move to its flanks, and then
place oblique fire upon it. Companies used their platoons in the same manner. The
platoons might move by bounds, but they moved slowly and eliminated enemy resistance
as soon as they encountered it.

After reaching the company objective, the company was supposed to halt so the
commander could issue a verbal order to his platoon leaders describing how the next
objective would be attacked. The company would utilize a succession of efforts and a
succession of attack until it reached the battalion’s objective.

French doctrine assumed that once a defender’s front was broken, he could reestablish
positions to the rear which could be taken only after the employment of large and
powerful forces. The defender would be able to establish subsequent defensive positions
rabidly and “solder” together the broken pieces of the front. This was not simply a
process of reinforcement but one of “sedimentation” in which the defenders augmented
the depth of a position of resistance and reestablished the continuity and depth of the
front. Only after the successive enemy positions had been penetrated would the
exploitation or pursuit begin.

The French doctrine suggested a completely different tempo and approach. The
preference for short-range attacks with numerous phases and bounds, the lengthy time
required to displace artillery, and the use of standard densities to compute the amount of
work demanded by such an operation.

German: “On the field of battle, the individual soldier fought bravely and well in this
war, but the fundamental training of the French army was faulty. It was not trained and
educated in the war of movement. “
On attack-The "Deliberate Advance"

Their experiences in 1914-1918 had convinced the French High Command that
mobile warfare was unlikely. Instead, they based their idea of an offensive on a
plan called the "Deliberate Advance". This was designed to give a slow but
extremely safe method of attacking, designed to maximize enemy casualties and
minimize friendly casualties. Of course it also minimized the chance of rapidly
winning the war. There was a common saying in vogue at the time that "The
Artillery conquers, the Infantry occupies", and the Deliberate Advance certainly
mirrored this theory. The basic idea of the DA was for friendly artillery to
pulverize enemy front line positions and neutralize the enemy artillery, after
which friendly troops would occupy their trenches. If this seems similar to what
happened in World War I, it is not coincidental!

The deliberate advance was to be done in distinct stages:

1. Reconnaissance
Using infantry patrols, air reconnaissance, and sound-ranging equipment,
the French would determine the German (the French had a pretty good
idea of who they were going to be fighting: front line and artillery
positions.
2. Preparation
Divisional and corps artillery assets would be brought forward and
carefully sighted. A comprehensive fire plan would be developed
designed to attain artillery supremacy. Prewar planning specified the
extensive use of chemical weapons, and it is one of the few small mercies
of WWII that they were not employed.
3. Bombardment and Attack
The plan would be put into effect. After the artillery plan had smashed the
enemy artillery and forward positions, the infantry, accompanied by
tanks, would occupy the enemy positions. Tanks were never seen as a
breakthrough weapon, but were designed to act as mobile artillery
platforms to overcome local strongpoints that survived the initial artillery
concentrations.
4. Consolidation
After advancing 6-10km (the limit of the artillery support), the friendly
forces would stop (ignoring that annoying Charles De Gaulle screaming
for them to continue on to Berlin), dig in and establish new trench lines
and artillery positions. A new fire plan would be developed for the next
stage of the advance.

The deliberate advance cycle could be repeated about once every 7-10 days.
Although an adequate fire plan to defend the positions could be developed within
a day, the reconnaissance necessary to for the next deliberate attack would take
longer. This would give an average advance of 1km/day which was quite
respectable by WWI standards. The key to the Deliberate Advance was the word
 Deliberate.

During the "phony war", the French used this a couple of times but then stopped
(Poland had disappeared and there was no hurry). The basic defensive mindset of
the French in 1939-40 meant that the Deliberate Advance was never really put to
the test. However, it relied on its power upon a certain amount of cooperation
from its opponent. If the enemy front-line trenches were heavily occupied and
batteries fired from fixed positions, the DA could cause severe casualties.
However, the build-up needed for a DA would be fairly easy to detect, and by
deception operations the Germans could ensure that the massive blow would fall
mainly on empty ground. They could then counterattack when the French
attempted to consolidate.

On Defense-Forts and Concrete

The French could see World War II coming, but spent much of their defense
budget on concrete instead of tanks and mobile forces. In hindsight, the Maginot
line was a waste of money, especially as it was not extended along the entire
Northern frontier (for both political and budgetary reasons). The Germans simply
went around the end of the fortification line. However, at the time, the idea of an
impregnable shield on the border supported by mobile forces to the rear seemed
to be sound doctrine. By the standards of 1939, the Maginot line WAS
formidable, and the Germans did not really attempt a break-through. One of the
features of the Maginot line was that almost every inch of ground around it was
plotted for artillery support. It would have been very difficult to take by direct
assault. When defending static positions, the fire plan should be comprehensive
and well developed.

On Defense- Mobile situations

The key to defending in mobile situations is whether the French have been allowed time
enough to register their artillery. As stated earlier, it took the French about 24 hours to
establish a basic fire plan.

A PERSPECTIVE ON INFANTRY
John A. English

FRANCE
The French army tended to think in terms of artillery dominating the battlefield.
Described by some as a “clumsy army”, still beladen with much equipment from 1918.
Tactically the French remained convinced that the artillery-infantry array was all but
invincible. The defensive orientation of the French army naturally placed great stress
upon the dominance and development of firepower. “Weight of metal” was considered
paramount for both attack and defense. A standard division comprised three or four
infantry regiments, each of three battalions, supported by two regiments of organic
artillery. An infantry battalion consisted of three rifle companies and a close support
company, which included a section of antitank guns and close support mortars. Within a
rifle company there were four sections (Platoons) each of three groups. The tactical
distribution of the division was effected in three echelons; the battle echelon, entrusted to
the divisional infantry commander; the artillery; main body, under the divisional artillery
commander; and the divisional reserve. It was more a rigid fighting machine, with
artillery openly regarded as the decisive arm, than a flexible instrument.

The combat and fire unit of the French infantry was its Great War innovation, the groupe
de combat, 12 strong. Its members were virtually tied to the light machine gun according
to whether their individual role was “to move it, service it, feed it, or protect it.” Not
surprisingly, the tactical training of automatic-rifle and machinegun teams was
maintained at a reasonable standard, the technique of creating a tidal wave of small-arms
fire ahead of advancing infantry being developed to a particularly high pitch. The rifle, on
the other hand, was regarded as very much a subsidiary weapon and the standard of
shooting was universally low. The further subdivision of the groupe into an automatic
rifle squad and a rifle team partially reflected their priority since the latter, commanded
by a corporal, was not strictly a rifle team but rather a specialized bombing cell of
grenade thrower, grenade firer, and three riflemen-cum-grenadiers. Ideally suited for
clearing the firebays and traverses of a trench system, the French groupe remained
essentially indivisible and untrained to manuever within itself.

French defensive thinking, based on the preeminence of firepower, remained essentially

linear in conception. Superiority of fire was thought of as superiority along the whole
front, not in a localized sense. Defensive tactics thus stressed stringent centralized control
and the protection of flanks. Antitank weapons, of which a division in 1940 had 52 on
paper, but in reality only 12, were to be placed well forward. Reinforcement of forward
positions by reserves was considered normal practice, though little reliance was placed on
the counterattack. Practically no emphasis was given to preparation of strong points in
depth.

In offensive operations the French that the “offensive power of the unit was to be
maintained by the gradual fusion of the reserve into the echelon of fire.” The doctrine of
direct reinforcement rather than outflanking manuever indicated a distinct French
preference for deliberate methods of attack. French military opinion advocated attacking
with preponderant fire on a narrow frontage of from 300 to 800 meters, the principle
being that such concentration would ensure a dense volume of fire. The initiative of small
units was restricted to a minimum.

The role of tanks was thought to begin at the moment the infantry were held up or
reached assault distance. Although normally controlled at a high level (corps) tanks were
treated essentially as a subdivision of infantry. Because of the perceived antitank threat,
the 1937 manual stated that tanks should never move out of the range of artillery support.
It was common practice, therefore, to attach a tank company to an infantry regiment for
extra firepower. The task assigned tanks would usually be to reduce centers of resistance
encountered by foot soldiers. In the assault, they would advance immediately in front of
the infantry, which on “point of honor’ were never to let a tank fall into enemy hands.
The French tanks were thus employed, in fact, as but armored ‘pillboxes on tracks,’ and
so endowed with the power of movement at a foot soldier’s pace.

STRANGE DEFEAT
Marc Bloch

More than once during the First War it was brought home how inefficient the High
command could be when calculating accurately the length of time needed for an order,
once issued from HQ to pass through its various recipients until finally it reached the
formations who would have to act upon it. No amount of ‘instructions’ will ever succeed
in convincing the unimaginative that a runner’s pace is slow, and that he will often go
wrong when roads and tracks have been turned into sea of mud.

One simple and obvious remedy for this state of affairs would have been to establish a
system which would have made it possible for small groups of officers to serve, turn and
turn about, in the front line and at HQ. But senior generals dislike having the personnel of
their staffs changed too often.

What drove our armies to disaster was the cumulative effect of a great number of
different mistakes. One glaring characteristic is, however, common to all of them. Our
leaders, or those who acted for them, were incapable of thinking in terms of a new war.
Faced with the undisputed evidence of Germany’s new tactics, we ignored, or wholly
failed to understand the quickened rhythm of the times. The relative value of distances
had changed. For example, a unit pulled back to reform and reorganize, would not be
pulled back far enough and would be over run sometimes even before all its sub-units had
arrived. Supply depots were so close to the front that they were commonly over run.

But it would not be fair to confine these criticisms to the High Command. Generally
speaking, the combatant troops were no more successful than the staff in adjusting their
movements or their tactical appreciations to the speed at which the Germans moved.
From the beginning to the end of the campaign, the Germans showed the same
embarrassing skill in appearing where they ought not to have appeared.

The Germans took no account of roads. They were everywhere. They felt their way
forward, stopping whenever they ran up against serious resistance. Where, however, the
resistance was not serious and they could find a ‘soft spot’, they drove ahead, exploiting
their gains and using them as a basis from which to develop the appropriate tactical
movement of, rather, as it seemed, to take their choice of a number of alternative
possibilities already envisaged in accordance with that methodical opportunism. They
relied on action and on improvisation.

Many of our military pundits were profoundly suspicious of armored units, judging them
too heavy to be moved easily (and their rate of progress as shown in official statistics
was, it is true, very slow, but only because it was assumed that they must move by night
—for security reasons---whereas, as things turned out, the war of speed was conducted
almost uniformly by day); because those attending the Cavalry courses at the Staff
College had had it drilled into them that, though tanks might be tolerably useful in
defense, their value for attack was nil.

Rear area support troops were not armed or trained for their own defense.

Army promotions---with very few exceptions---was, generally speaking, slow, and the
old men at the top, even when they did show willingness to help their juniors up the
ladder, were inclined to pick their men from among those who had shown themselves to
be model pupils—almost excessively model.

They were defending a country, which they did not seriously think could offer any
genuine resistance. The soldiers under their command were the sons of that “People”
which they were only too glad to regard as degenerate.

WHY FRANCE FELL

Guy Chapman

In April 1917 a law was passed requiring that divisional generals should be retired at age
62 and brigadier generals at age 58. This was rescinded in 1919 and the collection of
overage generals began.

Each division had an infantry commander and an artillery commander. The CG had to go
through both and coordinate both.

A British officer who attended a course for divisional and regimental commanders shortly
before the war reported that seventy-five percent of the time was devoted to defense. The
main theme was artillery. There was no tank officer among the instructors. There was no
sense of the time element in war, which was presented as a series of mathematical
problems, rules for frontages, numbers, and weight of fire. The defense was ingrained
and initiative deprecated.

If the active regiments were reasonably equipped, the newly formed ‘A’ divisions were
without many necessities. Most of the requisitioned elements were defective. The army
had only 30,000 trucks and the balance was made up by civilian vehicles. One
reconnaissance squadron, for example, had cars and motorcycles of twenty-four
manufacturers and forty-two types. Weapon availability was equally deficient. Few of the
newer weapons allotted to reserve formations actually existed.

The failure to rear-echelon elements to defend themselves may, to a large degree, be

explained by the fact that there were not enough weapons to arm the entire army and
many of these units were disarmed so their weapons could be given to units more nearly
expected to see combat.

There were 23 active infantry divisions. Then came 16 ‘A’ divisions made up of
reservists aged between 24 and 32 years. These units normally had 19-20 regular
officers, 76 NCO’s, and 50 or so enlisted specialists. The ‘B’ divisions (numbered from
51 through 71, were made up of men over 32 years old. These divisions were supposed to
have 3 regular officers…. normally the CG and the infantry and artillery commanders.

The 47mm antitank gun was likely the best piece fielded by any army in 1940, but was
horse drawn.

Corps artillery included two groups of 105mm guns of two batteries each, and two of
155mm. Corps troops also included a commo group, a regiment of pioneers, and was
supposed to have an observation group of eight planes.

THE IDES OF MAY

John Williams

The completion of France’s fortification system had been geared to the year 1935, the
first of the “annees creuses” when, owing to the low wartime birth rate, the annual intake
of army recruits would begin to fall sharply from an average 24,000 to 170,000.

In response to the mood of a war-weary nation, military service had been reduced to
eighteen months in 1923 and to one year in 1928.

With the war won, and Alsace-Lorraine recovered, the much-depleted professional cadres
of the French Army suddenly found themselves deprived of the sense of purpose that had
inspired them in pre-war years. Not only were there no more worlds to conquer, but in the
horror of the trenches, war had lost its last vestiges of glory and glamour.

Deprived of its old respect, without an inspiring goal, and subject to damaging cuts and
economics, the army was falling into a vague “malaise militare.” The postwar inflation
and high cost of living put officers and NCO’s at a disadvantage financially. This,
together with poor promotion prospects, was causing promising officers to leave the army
for more attractive civilian employment and discouraging potential entrants from
traditional military families.

The older generals were staying on, perpetuating the blockage at the top that was so
discouraging to ambitious colonels and majors. Their retirement age, which during the
war had been fixed at sixty, rose in the twenties to sixty-two, sixty-five, and finally
seventy. The general staff and Ecole were unduly influenced by the rigid military
thinking of elderly wartime commanders whose minds were unreceptive to new ideas.
Petain’s dicta, pronounced in his PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMBAT
OF LARGE UNITS (1921) that “a continuous front cannot be broken by the attacker,”
and “tanks can only be simple auxiliaries for the infantry,” still held sway. Among
France’s senior generals the trench-bound Western Front had created its dangerously
persistent myth of stasis, impregnability, and defensive supremacy. It was a myth that
enshrined not the final success of 1918—when defense lines had cracked and
concentrations of tanks, used independently, had contributed to the breakthrough—but
the long exhausting years of attrition that had gone before. Now, behind the passive
concept of the Maginot line, strategy was being neglected; warfare was being reduced to
meticulously worked-out but unimaginative tactics that continued to give the infantry
pride of place and subordinate movement to firepower—producing an army that Captain
Liddell Hart described in 1927 as a “slow-moving steam-roller of fire.” The postwar
French army seemed to miss the old moral force. The loss of 80,000 of its officers, dead
or disabled in the war, was beginning to make itself felt.

A series of cuts in budget, personnel and officer strength prompted Weygand to say upon
retirement in 1935, “My feeling of impotence at getting the government to see the
military situation in its reality made my last years of active service particularly painful.”

A hard and bitter winter of 1939 slowed down what training there was and in many
places stopped work on the defenses. Training was one of the major difficulties of the
High Command during these months. Four-fifths of the French Army was composed of
reservists; likewise 100,000 of its 128,000 officers were from the reserve. In a number of
inferior reservists or “series B” divisions, the men’s average age was as high as thirty-
five. These troops were in poor physical shape and in need of toughing-up, let alone
training. Moreover, the officers and NCOs in charge of them had only short peacetime
courses and were inexperienced in up-to-date arms and equipment, as well as lacking in
training expertise.

Gamelin May 18 1940: The French soldier, the citizen of yesterday, did not believe in the
war. His interest did not extend beyond the group in his factory, office, or field. Prone to
constant criticism of anyone wielding authority, encouraged…to enjoy an easy day-to-
day life, in the inter-war years today’s call-up man did not receive the moral and patriotic
education that would have prepared him for the drama in which the fate of the country
was to be enacted.” Gamelin seemed to forget that the High Command had had eight
months in which to reindoctrinate these defaulting troops.

Apart from the disappearance of most able-bodied males, civilian France retained an
almost peacetime atmosphere in these waiting months. Troops returning home on leave
saw nothing to inspire them with the zeal that was wanting in the Zone of the Armies.
Many Frenchmen felt that since Germany had achieved her aims in the East, there was
small point in continuing to oppose her. But if the war had to go on they had little doubt
about the result. The press, fed with official propaganda, optimistically assumed victory
as a forgone conclusion. Germany, it was implied would eventually be beaten by the
Allied blockade; and in any case, there was the impregnable Maginot Line. After four
months of eventless war, Paris, and with it France, seemed lulled into a comfortable
oblivion of danger.

The French tanks were ill fitted for modern mobile warfare. They were slow, heavy and
unwieldy. The largest, of 35 tons, had armor up to 70 mm thick and mounted two guns, a
47mm, and a 75mm. These could withstand all German tank and antitank fire and pierce
all German armor. Firepower and strength were the chief assets of all French tanks, but
for these they sacrificed precious mobility and cruising range and speed.
With antiaircraft artillery: compared with the German total of 9,300, the French were to
turn out less than 3,000. French antitank gun production, 8000 at the highest estimate,
was to be well below the army’s needs only in field artillery was France to exceed
Germany. In this arm for which she was always famous she would, by May, possess over
11,000 guns of all calibers from 75mm to 280mm, as against Germany’s 7,700 odd. But
even here France was at a disadvantage, for her artillery was mainly horse-drawn and
therefore unsuited to mobile operations.

The 55th division, one that was to have a key role, was a ‘Series B” reservist division. The
average age of all the men in this division was over thirty. Most were married and had
children. Many had forgotten much of the soldering that they had learned during their
one-year active duty. Many were overweight and in poor physical condition. Whatever
enthusiasm they had brought with them when called up had been eroded when they found
that not even uniforms awaited them and they had to drill in their civilian clothes for
weeks.

The 55th and similar formations suffered a lack of regular officers. Out of a total strength
of 450 officers, only 20 were active. These 20 were at the end of their careers and had
been given an “easy” last tour of duty.

In late May, Weygand introduced a new defense. No longer was there to be a thin
defensive line which, if broken, would be re-formed further back. Now the line was
designed as a band of strong points, extending in depth as well as length, a qudrillage, or
checkerboard, of fortified positions such as villages of small woods, chosen mainly with
the aim of denying the roads to German tanks. From these mutually supporting points,
counterattacks were to be made; and from them there would be no withdrawal. This
system depended on armored forces to destroy whatever Germans that had bypassed
these strongpoints and thus restore the front.

Divided and Conquered

By: Jeffery A. Gunsburg

This is the first book I’ve read about the fall of France in 1940 that
doesn’t repeat a bunch of sets of conventional wisdom about the
campaign. It uses a variety of new sources to understand what the French
generals were thinking, and why they thought it. After reading this
book, I still think that the French made some fundamental mistakes in
the war, but those mistakes were an entirely different set than the ones
the conventional wisdom about the campaign put forward.

The conventional wisdom about the fall of France in 1940 says that
France prepared to fight World War I again, spreading their tanks out in
penny packets to support the infantry. Most importantly, the
conventional wisdom says that the French tried to re-fight World War I
by building the Maginot line, and then cowering behind it until the
Germans swept around behind it through Belgium and Holland and swept the
French army away.

There are some elements of truth to some of that conventional wisdom.

The French probably did spend too much money on the Maginot line. They
did spread a lot of their tanks out in infantry support roles. That’s
not the full story though. The French high command understood the
advantages of concentrating their armor, and they did have three light
armored divisions (DLM’s) and three heavy armored divisions (DCR’s).

Those divisions were not hasty reactions to German successes in Poland.

As early as 1930, the French planned to motorize five infantry
divisions, turn one cavalry division into a light armored division and
motorize one brigade each of the other five cavalry divisions. Those
plans were delayed by the Great Depression, but by 1936 the French had a
functioning light armored division. In the early 1930’s, "Students of
the Army Staff College learned that strategic maneuver by motorized and
mechanized forces, particularly on the flanks, would dominate at least
the early stages of the next war." In the fall of 1936, the French
government approved a program that would equip 3 light and 2 heavy
armored divisions, along with 7 motorized divisions. The program would
also produce equipment for 3 more motorized divisions. That plan called
for production of 3200 tanks, 5000 armored utility vehicles, over 6500
25mm and 47mm anti-tank guns, and mechanized artillery for the armored
divisions.

The French were quite aware that the Germans could and probably would
avoid the Maginot line by attacking through Belgium. Channeling the
Germans in that direction was the main point of the Maginot line.

The French had a plan to counter that attack, and attempted to implement
it in May 1940. That plan resulted in the defeat of France, but not
because France cowered behind the Maginot line (they didn’t), and not
because the French high command attempted to re-fight World War I. The
French lost primarily because they tried to implement a daring, highly
mobile strategy in May 1940 with an army that simply wasn’t as good at
or as well equipped for that type of war as their German opponents.

The French had three fundamental problems as they developed their forces
and strategies for World War II. First, the defense of the vital
northern industrial areas of France was dependent on Belgium. Meeting
the Germans on the France/Belgium border was a prescription for the
devastation of Northern France. Unfortunately, even after the experience
of World War I, Belgium refused to cooperate with France on defense
issues in the late 1930’s. Instead Belgium enforced a very strict
interpretation of neutrality, refusing to even covertly talk to the
French about coordinating defenses. That made things very difficult for
the French. If the French took the offensive on the French/German
border, they risked the Germans going through Belgium and cutting off
any forces used in that offensive. As long as they respected Belgium’s
neutrality, the French handed Hitler the initiative. He could chose the
time and place that any war got serious.

Second, France simply didn’t have enough high-quality manpower to match

the Germans. They didn’t have the population base Germany did, and as a
result they had to use people who would not have been in the German
army, at least not at this stage of the war. They had a number of
‘Series B divisions’ composed mainly of flabby shopkeepers in their late
30’s, who had last trained ten or fifteen years ago. These men were
officered by a minuscule cadre of active duty officers, supplemented by
reserve officers who had often also been out of the army for years. The
French had enough sense to put that kind of division on sections of the
front that they thought would be quiet. Unfortunately, that meant that a
couple of ‘Series B divisions’ ended up taking the initial assault from
elite German units like Gross Deutschland, followed by most of the German
panzer divisions.

Third, France’s main ally, Great Britain, simply was not prepared for a
war on the continent. With a population comparable to France’s, and all
of the resources of the Commonwealth countries to draw on, they still
had an army on the continent about half the size of Belgium’s, and an
even smaller fraction of France’s. By May 1940, England had less than a
dozen divisions capable of actually fighting on the continent. Given
their population, they should have had four or five times that number of
divisions, and they approached that later in the war. England did have a
very good air force, but it wasn’t designed to help defend France.
England’s fighter aircraft were tied to an elaborate system of air
defenses that later proved its worth in the Battle of Britain, while its
bombers were designed for a strategic bombing role. Together, England
and France had enough aircraft to give the Germans very strong
competition. Unfortunately, the majority of England’s aircraft, though
not all of them, sat on runways waiting for German attacks on England
through much of the battle of France.

Given those constraints, French strategy called for bold action as soon
as the Germans attacked Belgium. The best, most mobile French army units
would dash forward into Belgium, occupying positions along something
called the ‘Dyle line’. If Germany attacked the Netherlands too, then
French forces would make an even longer dash through Belgium to link up
with the Dutch army. In theory, that would keep the Netherlands and
Belgium in the fight, and make the British more apt to fight seriously
because of the threat that German occupation of the Low Countries posed
to England.

The Netherlands part of that strategy--called the Breda variant--was

very controversial among the French high command. The French commander,
Gamelin, rammed it through in spite of almost unanimous opposition from
the other French commanders. It may have been part of the reason that
French Prime Minister Reynaud tried to fire him—ironically on the day
before the German offensive started. The problem was that the Breda
variant cut French reserves for the central front in half, taking seven
of the most mobile French divisions, including one of the three light
armored divisions and putting them in the worst possible position to
counter any German breakthrough. The Breda variant also diverted scarce
anti-aircraft guns from more important fronts, as the French set up an
anti-aircraft screen to protect those divisions as they dashed across
Belgium.

France had made enormous strides in rearmament from September 1939 to

May 1940. Gamelin apparently looked at the large French mobile forces
and felt that France had built up to the point where it could match the
Germans at mobile warfare, at least under certain circumstances. France
had implemented most of the 1936 plans. It had 3 light and 3 heavy
armored divisions, (versus 10 panzer divisions) 7 motorized infantry
divisions, (versus the same number of German motorized divisions) and 5
partially mechanized cavalry divisions. The Germans would have to go
fight their way through Dutch and Belgian defenses, while the French
would be arriving at the battle site relatively unscathed. Doing the
Dyle plan with the Breda variant was a gamble, but Gamelin though it was
worth it. If it succeeded, it would keep Belgium and the Netherlands in
the war, and make an allied offensive in 1941, after England built up a
real army, a realistic possibility.

The Breda variant probably made the German task much easier than it
would have otherwise been, but the fundamental problem was that the
French command was trying to implement a mobile strategy with an army
that really wasn’t as well trained or equipped for that type of warfare
as the French high command apparently thought. The French training
philosophy was one of "Methodical Battle". The French were not taught to
go off on impetuous, risky tangents. They were trained to hold a line,
bring up massive firepower, then go over to the offensive. That
philosophy might have been fatal against the Germans even given more
rational deployment of French resources. The point is that an army
trained that way was flung into a wild adventure that had to result in
an encounter battle between them and the Germans—exactly the type of
battle they had been trained to avoid. In adopting that strategy,
Gamelin also managed to commit every one of his seven motorized infantry
and three light mechanized divisions before he knew where the main
German thrust was coming. That proved fatal when the Germans broke
through south of the mobile French forces, cutting them off in Belgium.

The French did make some major mistakes in weapons design and
organization. For example, their heavy armored divisions (DCR’s) were
built around the B1 series of tanks. The B1 was heavily armored and had
a lot of firepower, but it was also very expensive, complex, hard to
produce, and not very reliable (The reliability was apparently made
worse by some very sophisticated sabotage efforts on the part of French
Communists). The B1 tanks had a very short range without refueling, and
track life was short. The French intended to get the tanks to the front
by railcar, while moving the rest of their armored divisions by road. In
the confusion of the German breakthrough, the two components of the
armored divisions tended to never link up, and tanks did tend to be used
in small packets, but that was not the French intention.

Some individual French commanders apparently didn’t get the concept of

armored divisions, and one vital heavy armored division was squandered
when a corps commander scattered it along the flank of the German
breakthrough as mobile pillboxes. Again, this was not French doctrine.
It was a matter of an individual being stupid. Every peacetime army gets
a few people like that in key positions, and spends the first months of
active combat getting rid of them. The French didn’t get time to get rid
of them.

Another major French problem was their shortage of radios. They relied
on telephone systems to make up for that shortage, which turned out to
be a major mistake. Their phone network got cut to pieces by a
combination of bombing, military movement, and actions of refugees. The
radios they had were not very reliable, and they were overly cautious
about using them, at least partly because the French had no equivalent
of the German Enigma coding machines, and they suspected that the
Germans would be able to monitor radio traffic. As the phone system fell
apart, the French command lost contact with their armies to a greater
and greater extent.

Another problem: all French tanks, including the otherwise very good
Somua S35, had one-man turrets. The one man in that turret had so many
roles that it was virtually impossible for him to do them all well. The
Germans captured quite a few S35’s and apparently initially thought they
would be valuable additions to their armored force, but ended up
realizing that there really wasn’t much they could do with them, beyond
security work.

Yet another problem: as mentioned earlier, the French had five partly
mechanized cavalry divisions. Those divisions each still had a major
component of horsed cavalry, along with armored cars and light tanks.
These divisions proved to have very little fighting ability. They
couldn’t move any faster than the horsed component, while at the same
time they didn’t have the cross-country mobility that a purely cavalry
force would have had. The Germans really hammered a couple of these
divisions early on, and routed them. That may have played a role in
destroying the morale of some of the French "B" divisions who saw the
remnants pass through their positions shortly before the main German
assault.

Bottom line: *Divided and Conquered *claims that the French worked hard
and reasonably rationally to prepare for a German attack. The fact that
they were defeated so quickly was due in part to mistakes on their part.
They had some serious flaws in their weapons and organization. Gamelin’s
strategy made those flaws worse by putting French troops into a
situation that they weren’t trained or equipped for. On the other hand,
England and Belgium share a major part of the blame too. French "B"
divisions wouldn’t have had to be on the front line if England had built
a serious land army. The French dash into Belgium wouldn’t have been so
dangerous if the Belgian government had allowed some covert coordination
between the forces. The Germans would not have had as easy a time as
they did in the air if the English had been willing to commit the
fighter squadrons they had sitting on the runways of England early in
the German offensive. The French are still bitter about the fact that
hundreds of British fighters were sitting idle while French troops were
getting picked apart from the air, and French pilots were flying their
inadequate planes against the full weight of the Luftwaffe.

The defeat of 1940 was an allied defeat, not just a French one. England
and Belgium contributed to it in very major ways. This book paints a
picture of a French command that made mistakes, many of them in efforts
to make up for the deficiencies of their allies, but which generally
acted in a reasonably rational way to prepare for the assault that they
knew was coming.

French Army of 1940

This was a conscript force with a considerable proportion of regular

soldiers particularly in its Colonial units. It depended upon the recall
of reservists to bring its divisions up to war strength. Conscript service
was for two years followed by part-time reserve service and continuing
reserve obligation to the age of 42. Divisions were on several
establishments: Active, consisting of regulars, conscripts and the first
three-year groups of reservists; 'A' reserve divisions, consisting of the
 next year-groups of reservists up to the age of 32; 'B' reserve
divisions, of the older reservists, with an average age of 36; Colonial
divisions of white regulars, with some black or Arab regiments; and North
African divisions, with some white conscripts, and a majority of Arab
regulars. The cavalry, mechanized, armored, fortress and alpine divisions
were a mixture of regular, active, A and B classes. These establishments
provided seven active motorized divisions, ten Active infantry, 17 'A'
infantry, 19 'B' infantry (of which three were alpine), ten North African,
seven Colonial, five fortress, five cavalry, three mechanized and four
armored divisions; two other alpine divisions were a mixture of Active
and A reservist classes. There were a number of combat units not formed
into divisions, including the Foreign Legion, and Polish and Czech
volunteer legions.

The infantry divisions were organized into three infantry regiments of

three battalions each, with two artillery regiments, given 36 field and 24
medium guns, and a reconnaissance squadron, two engineer companies and
services; it had 52 light (25mm) anti-tank guns. Alpine divisions were
similar; fortress divisions had infantry only.

The cavalry divisions consisted of two horsed and one mechanized regiments
and a reconnaissance group ,and its artillery of 12 field and 12 medium
artillery pieces and eight 47mm anti-tank guns; it had 20 light tanks and
15 armored cars. The mechanized divisions (division legere mecanisee) had
two tank regiments, each of 87 medium or light tanks, a reconnaissance
regiment with 40 armored cars, and three motorized infantry battalions;
its artillery was 24 field and 12 medium guns and nine 47mm anti-tank
guns. The armored divisions (division cuirassee) of which the first three
were formed between January and March 1940 and the fourth
during the Battle of France itself, contained two light and two medium
tank regiments, one infantry battalion in armored carriers and an
artillery regiment of 24 105mm guns. Tank strength was 62 medium and 84
light tanks; anti-tank guns numbered 167. There were also about 50
independent tank battalions attached to armies.

Equipment was of mixed quality: the 75mm field and 105mm medium guns were
improved World War I models; the anti-tank guns varied in caliber from the
plentiful but obsolete 25mm to the excellent but scarce 47mm. Tanks were
of eight types from the completely obsolete Renault F tanks of 1918 to the
excellent modern Somua and B.I. models, both mounting the high velocity
47mm gun, the latter also a 75mm low-velocity gun. Total strength was
2235.
The command system was over-complicated and slow moving. At the head stood
the Supreme Commander Land Forces (Gamelin), with headquarters located at
the Fort de Vincennes, near Paris; subordinate to him were the front
commands, the most important of which was the Commander North East Front
 (Georges) at La Ferte. Georges commanded three Army Groups, 1st
(Billotte), 2nd (Pretelat, with 35 divisions) and 3rd (Besson, with 14
divisions). Besson's and Pretelat's Groups garrisoned the Maginot Line,
with the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 8th Armies. Billotte commanded the field army
consisting of 1st, 2nd, 7th, and 9th Armies and the British Expeditionary
Force (which, however, took its orders direct from Gamelin). The French
Air Force had a separate command system and its headquarters were not
co-located with the Army's.

Fall of France 1940 :

Strategic and Tactical Blunder

By Khan.

Introduction

After the dramatic fall of France in June 1940, many Frenchmen asked themselves
whether they had been betrayed. If military ineptitude can be called betrayal, then it is
fair to say that France's army betrayed her. At the forefront of this betrayal were the men
who led it. Analyzing at all levels; serious command and control differences were the key
to the undoing of French defenses. Nobody noticed these differences until after the war
was over. The First World War was fought in the grip of rigid doctrine. Since such
doctrine hates imagination, all that the both sides could do was throw men at one another.
Of course the result was that Germany lost, having fewer men to lose. When WWI was
over, the Allies convinced themselves they had won and that the Central Powers had lost.
In Germany this broke the power of old theories for some time; whereas in France, it
strengthened them. Eventually this formed the basis for leaders like Hitler to come to
power and for generals such as Heinz Guderian and Erich von Manstein to rise within the
ranks.

The German Invasion of May 1940 followed a series of spectacular German victories in
Czechoslovakia, Poland and Norway. Contrary to many beliefs, the campaign in Poland
was not a rapidly mobilized armored assault like that in France. It was fought more
conventionally with foot soldiers led by concentrated tanks in a WWI fashion. Yet this
was a campaign that the French should have taken serious note of. Their failure to
improve the Army and Air Force command system would have disastrous consequences
in the fast paced campaign that was to follow. A rigid adherence to principles of the First
World War was also to prove disastrous. Exploiting these lapses on the part of the French
army, the Germans were able to penetrate at Sedan and encircle the best armies the Allies
could field at the time.
France and her Allies

The France of 1939 was very different from the France of 1914. After the Great War, a
wave of pacifism had overtaken the country. While anti-war literature in Germany had
been hastily put aside and hidden by Hitler, the citizens of France accepted it
wholeheartedly. "Never again!" was the cry in the hearts of the people. From the time of
Armistice to the time WWII broke out, 19 governments had been elected and then ousted.
Otherwise, the existence of a socialist government by the name of the 'Popular Front' had
done much to damage national unity amongst Frenchmen. France in 1939 was a divided
country whose people had no idea why they had been suddenly thrown back into a state
of serious conflict. As the Army failed and disaster befell them, the general population
resorted to accusations of betrayal and the presence of a "Fifth Column" of spies and
traitors. This was a way to avoid blaming themselves and their leadership for failure
when the critical time was upon them and national unity was required the most.

The French Army: Ripe for Defeat

Generals and Doctrine
While the German army modernized with radical new ideas, the French army was
commanded and dominated by a cadre of Generals that had fought the First World War.
The great catastrophe that was about to overtake France would require quick and
dynamic thinking from its leaders. The French system of command at this time was rigid
and inflexible, a relic from the previous war. Bypassing orders and making quick tactical
decisions was almost shunned. At the pinnacle of this huge Army was General Maurice
Gamelin. He evolved and issued all orders to the entire army. Gamelin's headquarters
lacked radio. His method of issuing orders was through dispatch riders and the often-
unreliable telephone network. Thus it usually took 48 hours for his orders to get through
to his men. One is shocked upon discovering this; in the fast paced and dramatic
campaign that would follow, every minute was precious. Gamelin also had no General
Staff to make the passage of commands easy. The 'operational' head of the Army was
General A. L. Georges. There was no boundary to demarcate where his powers started
and Gamelin's ended. To make matters worse, there was an animosity between the two
men.

The tactics and doctrine of the French army were as antiquated as its generals. During
and after the war, many French officers and leaders alike claimed that they had gone to
war in 1939 with a 1918 army. Indeed the concepts of warfare the French generals clung
to during the May campaign can be called antique. More than once French senior officers
failed to show required aggressiveness in defense against the German armies. Instead
they contented themselves (in WWI terminology) to 'sealing off' and 'containing' the
enemy where counter attacking would have had devastating effects upon the German
columns. It is apparent from the command decisions these men took that they were still
caught up in the defensive siege mentality of the previous war. Otherwise, the
cumbersome system of command would always mean that orders would be received late
and would not be able to keep up with the rapidly changing face of the battlefield.
Matters were made even worse by the use of the unreliable telephone network.

Tanks were simply viewed as a support weapon for the infantry. New theories and tactics
presented by officers such as Colonel Charles de Gaulle were completely ignored. The
theory that tanks should be used as the cavalry of an infantry attack prevailed. This
literally meant that these valuable weapons would be dispersed ahead of the infantry and
the deadly effect of concentrated armour would be lost. Their duties would be limited to
infantry support and reconnaissance, rather than actual breakthrough. Inevitably, a
German force applying exactly the opposite tactics defeated the French army.

Men and Material

Contrary to what many have said after the war, the French army and her Allies were
hardly outnumbered by the Germans. The total number of French divisions fielded was
94. These were of mixed capability. Alongside these were 10 British, 10 Dutch (these
were eliminated early in the war) and 22 Belgian divisions. Bringing the total to 136.
Against them, the Germans could count upon 136 of the Heer's 157 divisions. Of these,
only about a third were first rate offensive material. As to the number of tanks possessed
by both sides, the Germans appear to have possessed between 2,400 to 3,000 tanks. At
least half of these were Mark Is and IIs, which could hardly be considered tanks, taking
into account their light primary weapon and Armour. The Allies on the other hand fielded
around 3,100 to 3,400 vehicles of which at least 2,285 could be considered modern and
formidable. Thus, there were three French armored divisions and three light mechanized
divisions. It is clear that the Allies possessed enough vehicles to match that of the
Germans in quality and quantity. (1)The only serious lacking we see in Allied armor is
that of radio. This would to lead to much confusion and lack of coordination in the
ensuing battles.

The only lack of weapons in the French Army was that of anti-aircraft (AA) guns, anti-
tank (AT) guns and anti-tank mines. There was a grave shortage of AT guns, yet in the
period up till May 1940, the French were still exporting such guns. 830 AT guns, 500
Artillery pieces were actually exported on the eve of the German attack . Of the last 500
Renault R35 tanks, nearly half were exported. Even till the end of the campaign, supplies
of AT guns were far from sufficient. To top these shortcomings, there was a stunning
lack of AA weapons. France had only 5 AA regiments, whereas the Germans possessed
about 72. Later on this was to prove to be another of many fatal flaws as French troops
would not be able to defend themselves against air attack.

France had many reasons to doubt the quality of her army in 1939. Much of this was due
to the destabilization of French society. There was a huge gap between the workers,
communists and the bourgeois. The lack of national unity was bound to affect the men at
the front as well. Although there were some excellent professional 'A' class divisions, the
bulk of the Army was formed by reservists and conscripts. The discipline amongst these
units is hardly worth calling adequate. The reason most historians give for this is
boredom. The 'Phoney War' after Poland had left many servicemen with nothing to do.
Drunkenness and disorder was common. There was hardly any attachment between the
officers and the men. Both the latter and former were seemingly more concerned with
pay and holidays. The question of "Why are we here?" was asked more than oft amongst
soldiers. German propaganda also took its toll; with right wing and communist
newspapers it managed to instill a strong feeling of Anglophobia amongst the men and
officers. This situation contrasts heavily with that of the well trained and well disciplined
Wehrmacht.

The French Air Force at the time had 3,289 modern aircraft operational. Of these 2,122
were fighters. Although French aircrew were very well trained and morale was high, they
had no idea of modern tactics. They knew nothing of extensive ground support and
tactics of concentrating air power to maximize sortie success. To make matters worse,
there was no coordinated system of command for the Air Force. No specific body was in
charge of issuing orders, and the chain of command overlapped in many places;
maximizing confusion. These factors were to prove to be the undoing of the French air
fleets.

The Maginot Line

Due to the wholesale slaughter of Frenchmen in the fields of World War I, there were
approximately 300,000 fewer men to defend France in 1934 than were in 1914. Thus the
French built an elaborate system of forts and defenses along the Franco-German border.
This was called the Maginot Line. It was a great feat of engineering and a formidable
defense against any attacker. The only problem was that the Line could not be extended
along the Belgian order and up to the sea due to the dense presence of the French industry
in the region. It was along this route that the invaders of May 1940 would come. Thus all
the Line accomplished was to lull the French public and leadership alike into a fatal false
sense of security.

Rearmament
It has been said by some that the Maginot Line prevented the French army from
rearming. This statement seems quite hollow when looking at the amount of credits given
to the military to modernize. The Maginot Line was completed in 1934 at a cost of £30
million. During 1933-5 an average of 47% of military credits went unspent. In 1936, the
War Minister asked for a 4-year rearmament plan in light of the rise of Nazism in
Germany. General Gamelin asked for 9 billion Francs. The minister raised it to 14 billion.
In 1938, there was another 12 billion increase, and in 1939 a further 11 billion was added.
Thus it cannot be denied that France's generals were given enough resources to expand
country's military capability.

The BEF

To aid France, the British Government sent a force of 10 divisions called the British
Expeditionary Force. This force was tiny in comparison to the great French and German
armies massed at the borders. The size of this force was to cause much bitterness in
Frenchmen when viewing the British contribution. The armored elements present could
hardly be called an armored division. Due to the tiny size of this force, it was placed
almost entirely under French High Command. General Montgomery later said the entire
British Army at this stage was not prepared for the full-scale exercise, let alone a war.

The 'Revolutionary' Wehrmacht

Leadership
General Gauderies is hailed as the father of modern armored warfare. It has been said by
many other German generals that without his superb tactical and organizational thinking,
the campaign in France would not have succeeded. In General Erich von Man stein, the
Germans found their "Finest operational brain". It would be his plan of invasion that
would provide the German armored columns to hack their way into France. At the
forefront of the German assault, both men understood the need for a combined arms
operation and the importance of communications. The leaders of this relatively new army
had an advantage; the ability to experiment and innovate. The new breed of German
general staff officers rising in the Wehrmacht would lead their men from the front in
armored communications vehicles. Command decisions would be made at a local level
and time would be the key to everything. The leadership of the French army was dismal
in comparison.

Luftwaffe: A New Weapon is realized

As the campaign started, the two invading air fleets of the German air force had 2,670
aircraft. Of these around 1,000 were fighters, many of these were the twin-engined Me-
110s. From the bomber Gruppen of the Luftwaffe, about 350 aircraft were the new Ju-87
Stuka dive-bombers. Armed with 500 lb bombs and a terrifying siren, this aircraft
combined with other bombers would act as the artillery of the Army. The Stuka itself was
to be rigorously used for close air support. Taking into mind that twice the number of
aircraft as the Stukas available was earmarked for recon duties, we can judge that the
Wehrmacht took its information gathering capability very seriously. This role for an air
force had never been applied before. The new strategy contrasted deeply with the
thinking of the French Army who almost shunned the air force. Gamelin had once said,
"There is no such thing as an aerial battle. There is only battle on the ground".

Offence and Defense

The 'Dyle-Breda' Plan

Also called Plan D, this was the French strategy for compensating for the lack of
coverage of the Maginot Line. It called for the movement of the best 30 Allied divisions
into Belgium to take up positions along the River Dyle. The hinge of this swinging door-
like movement would be at Sedan. This strategy was based on countering the Schlieffen
Plan of 1914. Since the Germans would have much more to lose if they attacked the
heavily defended Maginot Line, it was considered that the blows would come through
Belgium. A major problem with this plan was that there had been almost no exchanges
between the Allies and the Belgian government about the implementation of it. And when
the Germans actually invaded, the Belgians actually protested to Dyle- Breda as a result.
Also, as the French High Command had ruled out the possibility of any enemy movement
through the Ardennes forest in Belgium, the weakest units were placed ahead of this vital
sector. Gamelin having visited the region many times, declared it impossible for tanks to
scale the narrow winding forest roads of the region. Ironically this would be the focus of
the German thrusts. Which would then slice through a 40-mile stretch of the Meuse, held
by the poorly equipped 9th Army under General Corap. France would be caught
completely off guard.

Sichelschnitt
The original German plan for the invasion was a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan. It called
for the passage of German forces through Belgium and into France. However, General
von Manstein saw things differently. He was not prepared to let this war stagnate into a
bloody slugfest like WWI. Contemplating that the Allies would consider the Germans to
be using the 1914 plan, he drafted an ingenious offensive plan. Army Group B (North)
under General von Bock was to make a frontal assault into Belgium with its 29 divisions;
of these 3 were panzer divisions of which 2 would later be handed over to the southern
sector. While these were almost diversionary, the main thrust would come through Army
Group A (South), commanded by General von Rundstedt, whose armored columns would
be proceeding through the Ardennes forest. It would strike a passage across the Meuse
approximately 45 miles wide. The key focus would be at Sedan, and as the German had
broken French codes, they knew that it was the weak link in the French army. The force
would consist of 43 divisions. Of these, 7 were panzer divisions and would be
concentrated to provide a huge armored cleaver. Once breakthrough was achieved, the
columns would rush across the rear of the Allied armies in Belgium in a Sichelschnitt
(sickle) like maneuver and cut them off.

10th May: Hell Unleashed

Meuse Crossings
On the 10th of May, Hitler issued the orders for attack. The mobilized German army
started offensive operations immediately. Within 36 hours Holland's condition had
become irreparable, and the columns of Army Group B were heading into Belgium. In
response to this, the Allies rushed their best Armies into Belgium as the Dyle-Breda Plan
required. Upon hearing this, Hitler was overjoyed; the trap had been sprung. In the
meantime, Army Group South was making its was through the Ardennes forest in a long
stretch of traffic jams. Roads were clogged for up to sixty miles in some places.

One wonders whether Gamelin was blind. Indeed, French pilots had been flying over the
area had made reports of huge massing of German armor. Yet these reports were not
believed, and no action was taken. Had the French Air Force taken a serious air offensive
against the long immobilized columns of German vehicles, the results would have been
horrific. Only by the 11th of May did the German movement start to make sense. Not
becoming uneasy and calculating that the Germans would not be there till the 14th and
would then have to wait for artillery, Gamelin ordered 11 divisions to the sector. Given
the state of the French logistics, it would mean that the first of these would arrive on the
14th and the last by the 21st. Unfortunately, Gamelin had miscalculated the time the
German army would take to reach the Meuse.

By the 13th, the Panzer divisions were present at the Meuse, ready to cross without delay.
Facing them was the grossly overstretched 9th French Army under Corap. Seven
divisions were holding 75 miles of front. Sedan was where the 9th met the 2nd Army
under General Huntziger. The 55th and 71st Infantry divisions held this critical crossing
point. It is hard to understand the High Command's confidence in these troops when most
of the units were composed of second-rate reservists. It were men like these who had led
to so many stories about the lack of discipline and fighting punch in the French army.
Arrayed against them were the finest legions Germany could field.

The first crossings took place in the Dinat sector where the 7th Panzer division crossed
under the energetic General Rommel. In a display of extraordinary leadership abilities,
Rommel personally led assaults across the river and defense against French armour on
the other side. These were followed by a breakthrough at Sedan by General Heinz
Guderian's panzerkorps. Both of these crossings were accomplished after fierce fighting
and heavy bombardment by the Luftwaffe. By the nightfall on the 13th, German
bridgeheads had been established. At this point in time the German condition was
extremely fragile, a counter attack by even a small armored force would have routed both
bridgeheads.

The battle at Sedan has been called the battle through which France lost the war. At
Sedan, 3 Panzer divisions along with some motorized infantry divisions had to fight
through an array of French pillboxes and fortifications to secure a toehold of the western
bank. Had the muscle of the Luftwaffe not been behind them, one doubts if the attack
would have succeeded. French infantry was tied down by the aerial bombardment and
attacked by daring assaults of German troops in rubber boats. Considering that they were
up against the best troops the Heer could muster, initially the reservists of the 55th
Infantry division did not perform too badly. Yet some artillery commanders in the rear
areas panicked thinking that they were being attacked by tanks. This was impossible as
Guderian's armor was still sitting on the eastern bank of the river. A general rout of rear
echelon infantry and artillerymen followed. Men left everything behind and ran like
cowards. And thus, once the artillery stopped firing, the front line troops also routed or
surrendered. While at least the 55th made contact with the enemy and held for a while,
the 71st Infantry Division withdrew even before they were attacked. And so, Sedan fell
into German hands. Even so, the first tanks would not cross till the morning of the14th;
meaning that any determined attack before that would wipe out the bridgehead.

It is here that we see the French commanders sticking to the old tactics of 'sealing off' the
enemy. Counterattacks were planned of course, but the sluggishness and lack of punch
showed by French attacks at various levels is all too evident. Everywhere one sees
evidence of planned counterattacks being delayed time after time and then, in some cases,
cancelled altogether. The mild uncoordinated attack against Rommel's bridgehead is a
testimony to this (it was chased away by German infantry firing flare pistols to confuse
French tanks). Eventually a strong effort to check the German bridgeheads was never
made. And by the time the French command was thinking of a serious effort to cut the
advance, German bridgeheads had not only become quite powerful, the panzers were on
the move again by the 14th.

Ineptitude at its Worst

The French armored assault scheduled at 4am during the morning of the 14th was
delayed and rescheduled to 7am. This delay is characteristic of most French
counterattacks during the campaign. It meant that the Germans were able to transport a
whole brigade of tanks across. Thus the French attack ran into stiff resistance and was
wiped out. Yet all hope for plugging the gap was not lost yet. One of France's three
armored divisions, the 3rd Armored had been ordered to the areas a few days ago. On the
14th it stood just south of the German bridgehead.

The division's orders were to "Counterattack with full force". In the meantime Guderian
made the decision to wheel the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions westwards without waiting
for the 10th Panzer to secure his flank. Only the mauled Gross-Deutschland Infantry
regiment was present for flank protection. The attack was supposed to take place on the
14th of May on Panzerkorp Guderian's exposed flank as it started to make its vulnerable
westward movement. For this attack, Huntziger had the entire fresh 3rd Armored division
(with its formidable H-39 tanks) and the A class 3rd Motorized Infantry Division. There
is no doubt that if the armored assault had taken place, it would have shattered the flanks
of the 1st and 2nd Panzer divisions rushing westwards.

Yet General Flavigny, commander of the 21st Corps of armor, postponed the attack for
the next day only 30 minutes before zero hour, and ordered the division to "Seal off the
area". This meant that the unit would be dispersed and all effect of concentration would
be lost. The next day, on the 15th of May, elements of the 10th Panzer had crossed and
were moving in to supplement the Gross-Deutschland infantry regiment. Huntziger
ordered a rigorous counterattack. Even at this stage, it would have severely set the
German plans back. Yet there were delays in putting the units back together and only a
few elements participated in the battle for Stonne before the attack was cancelled. In the
end Huntziger happily accepted Flavigny's excuses, dismissed the commander of the 3rd
Armored division for being incompetent, and gleefully added the divisions to his 2nd
Army static defense line. It was these static defense 'lines' that the French generals of
WWI loved so much. Thus the one of the golden opportunities of changing the course of
the war was lost.

Race for the Channel

After the breakout of all three Panzerkorps; Reinhardt, Hoth and Guderian, the German
steel columns raced for the Channel in a mad dash starting from the 14th and 15th of
May. They moved with such speed that the rest of the two armored divisions France
possessed (1st and 2nd) were surprised and caught in transit. In ensuing action, they were
hacked to shreds and scattered into tiny remnants by the advancing Panzers. The fact is
that French reconnaissance was so poor; Gamelin had no idea where the Germans were
headed! The list of possibilities included everywhere from Paris, Abbeville to the
Maginot Line. Advancing, using the Somme as a natural defense, by the 20th, Guderian
had secured Abbeville. Thus, effectively cutting of the Allied armies in the north and
creating a 'bulge'.

There had been a number of attacks in order to prevent the Sichelschnitt trap from being
set. Colonel de Gaulle attacked the columns from the south twice near Montcomet with
some armored forces, but was pushed back on both instances. On The 18th of May, the
seventy-three year old General Maxime Weygand replaced General Gamelin as the CinC
of the French Army. This man was known for his severe distrust for politicians and the
British. It took him two days to arrive in France, and then he took a further 2-3 days in
'judging' the situation. This wasted valuable time during which the counter attack south of
Sedan Gamelin had planned was shelved.

After passing his judgments, Weygand issued a nonsensical series of orders that required
8 Allied divisions to cut a path through the German encirclement. However this attack
would never be possible as the BEF had lost quite a bit of its muscle in attacking Arras on
the 21st and the trapped French forces had also sustained losses during an attack on the
22nd. The fact that these elements were attacking instead of conserving forces for
Weygand's plan shows the complete lack of coordination between Allied HQs. Two more
attacks were to take place from the south later, but both would fail to dent the Panzer
corridor.

Dunkirk

Eventually the Sichelschnitt trap forced the best troops the French and British armies
could muster into a small pocket around Dunkirk. Their situation was given up as being
hopeless and plans were made to evacuate as many men as possible. In a mass departure
that would sour the German victory, the British evacuated about 337,000 men trapped at
Dunkirk with every vessel available for the task. 30,000 men had to be abandoned as the
rearguard when the operation ended on the 2nd of June. This in a way marked the definite
end for France. Her military lay shattered, 61 divisions had been lost, and her entire
northern area was occupied with a ruthlessly efficient enemy.

After Dunkirk, the Germans reorganized and the total number of divisions available in
the north of France was around 102. Against this, the French could only muster 60
divisions.(2) There were only about 200 combat ready tanks. Of these, most units were
second-rate reservists and lacked proper supplies and organization to sustain a tough
campaign. Seeing the intact and victorious German armies pitted against them, the
inevitable was clear to everyone in France. She could resist all she wanted to, but France
would eventually fall. To make matters worse, on June 10, Italy declared war on France.

One last Battle

After Dunkirk, once again French armies were reorganized to for a 'solid front' like that
of WWI. General Weygand and Marshal Pétain had already decided that one last battle
was necessary to save the honor of the army before Armistice. They had given up hope,
whereas the Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud was contemplating fleeing to Africa and
continuing resistance from there. This seemed unacceptable to Weygand who feared
anarchy due to the destruction of the Army more than the Germans themselves.

Thus the remnants of the French army formed a line behind the river Somme and waited
for the German attacks once again. However things were different this time. French
infantrymen stayed in their positions and died there no matter how many times they were
harassed by the dreaded Stukas. Weygand himself was surprised by the new found
courage his troops displayed. If only they had shown the same fighting spirit at Sedan and
Dinat. Eventually Guderian and Rommel led their columns past French defenses and
eliminated the pockets of resistance, however, casualties this time were much greater.
Paris fell on the 14th of June.

It was clear to everyone; France was lost. The French Government that had earlier moved
to Tours now moved again, to Bordeaux. Premier Paul Reynaud made a desperate appeal
to President Roosevelt to declare war on Germany and come to the rescue of France, but
the response was negative. (In reply on June 15th, President Roosevelt promised every
aid short of military intervention). On June 15th, as 30,600 British troops were evacuated
from Cherbourg, and the Germans captured Verdun, the French Army GHQ moved to
Vichy. The 220,000 French troops holding the Maginot Line held out until June 25th.

Many wished to continue resistance from North Africa. The French ambassador in
London suggested a dramatic idea: the political union between France and Britain.
Churchill immediately approved, and Reynaud thought it would strengthen the resolve of
his cabinet to fight onwards. Unfortunately for Reynaud, his mistress, who favored peace
with the Germans, leaked the news. The cabinet reacted strongly and Pétain called such
an idea "Like fusion to a corpse". A broken man, Reynaud resigned. Pétain formed the
next government and immediately sued for peace on the 17th of June.

War in the Air:

While the Luftwaffe was hard pressed to maintain air superiority, one wonders where the
French Air Force was. Looking at the post campaign losses, the Luftwaffe lost 1,284
aircraft. The British RAF losing 931 aircraft, of which 477 were priceless fighters. The
Armée de l'Air lost approximately 560 aircraft (235 destroyed on the ground). These
figures alone speak the absence of French air power over the front.(3) They also show
that Britain went out her way to protect the airspace over France. While the Luftwaffe
was terrorizing French troops and actually protecting the flanks of the Panzer armies, the
French AASF was nowhere to be seen. Even German fighter pilots noted that most of
their air victories were over RAF aircraft.

The only explanation is that the evacuations of forward airfields after German aerial
attack lead to French aircraft being flown and dispersed into central France in a
disorganized manner. This coupled with the cumbersome and inefficient system of
command of air assets lead to a logistical and organizational disaster in the air force. To
top this, the French knew nothing of the lessons of air power the Germans had learnt
during the Spanish Civil War. They were ignorant to the effects of concentration of air
power and thus most of their attacks were piecemeal and ineffective. The failure of the
Armée de l'Air meant that the Luftwaffe could easily dominate the aerial battlefield and
hence contribute greatly to the German successes.

The Cost

The Battle for France had cost a number of around 90,000 French lives and about a
quarter of a million in wounded. Almost 2 million French soldiers were prisoners of war.
(4) The British had lost 3,475 dead and 15,850 wounded since the invasion on May 10th,
plus many thousands more to German prisoner of war camps. Germany had suffered the
loss of 27,074 dead and 111,034 wounded. At least 5 percent of these casualties were
officers. The concept of leading from the front had lead to victory, but there was a cost.

Conclusion
Many have argued that France had lost the battle even before it had started. The signs of
this are shown in various episodes before the campaign in May 1940. In 1936 when the
Germans reoccupied the Rhineland, France did nothing to check the movement of
German forces into the region and thus showed her unwillingness to fight. Later on, the
signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression pact in 1939 would mean that there
would be no relief from the east. This was compounded by the fact that France did
nothing to help her Polish ally when the Germans invaded. Any movement into Germany
would have been disastrous for Hitler as almost the entire Wehrmacht was busy in
Poland.

Aside from these facts, France in 1940 was a country severely divided by political and
social unrest. Some historians such Shirer and Horne have called the domestic situation
being almost at the brink of civil war. This certainly did nothing to help the morale and
discipline of the Army, which was at its worst in years. The indirect or direct effects of
these conditions were the routs at Sedan and other locations.

When the invasion started in May 1940, the French army was in the worst possible
position to react. Almost the all of first-rate divisions had been committed in Belgium. A
famous strategist had once said: 'One fault only in the initial deployment of an Army
cannot be made good through the course of an entire campaign'. In order to react to the
threat of the Panzers rushing through the Ardennes and concentrate enough French
armour, the decision to take immediate action should have come on the 12th of May.
However Gamelin took things very lightly and the delay was almost fatal. Had the
deployment of the 3rd Armoured division not been interfered with by its leaders, perhaps
the outcome would have been different. Any determined assault would have produced
some results in terms of stopping or delaying the enemy. This was definitely proved later
in the war when the Ardennes offensive in 1944 caused a serious delay to the invading
Allied armies.

More than she needed weapons, and perhaps even more than morale, France needed time.
And when one looks at the way the French system of command worked, the wastage of
time is blatantly evident. Even more evident is the refusal of French generals to
modernize. The important figures in this fateful campaign: Gamelin, Weygand, Corap,
Huntziger, Flavigny and others who held the fate of France in their hands displayed the
siege mentality so associated with the First World War. Where counterattacking would
have been the correct approach, they preferred to adopt a defensive posture. This
obviously resulted in local defeats all over the French landscape.

Needless to say, once the Germans had broken out of Sedan and completed the
Sichelschnitt, very little could have been done to salvage the situation. The leaders of
France would have to choose between the bloodbath of Verdun in 1940, or slavery under
the Nazis. Already plagued by a 'missing generation' of Frenchmen, they chose the latter.

Sources and Bibliography

Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle: France 1940:Macmillan, 1969.

Shirer, William L. The Collapse of the Third Republic: An Inquiry into the Fall of France
in 1940: New York- Simon and Schuster, 1969.

Deighton, Len. Blitzkrieg: From the rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk: London- Cape,
1979.

Galland, Adolf. The First and the Last: the German Fighter force in World War Two:
London- Methuen, 1955.

Cull, Lander and Weiss. Twelve days in May: London- Grub Street, 1995

Manstein, Field-Marshal Erich von. Lost Victories: Translated by Anthony G. Powell.

London- Methuen, 1958.

Notes
1) Although the number of armoured vehicles quoted by historians differs, it is clear that
the French and British forces possessed an equal, if not greater number of tanks.
2) Figures for remaining forces differ amongst historians. Shirer and Horne place it at 60,
while Deighton says 49.
3) It is interesting to compare the number of losses of French aircraft to the number
deployed. Negligence of this scale has never been noted in any air force up till today.
4) These are averages combined from figures presented by all historians. German and
British

Arming Against Hitler. France and the Limits of Military Planning. By

Eugenia C. Kiesling. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996. Pp. xiv,
 260. $35.00.)
Another possible title for this well-researched study would be "Defending
the French," for not only does Eugenia Kiesling analyze the security
dilemmas facing the French military establishment leading up to their
debacle in 1940, she also aims to explain sympathetically why military
leaders made such bad choices to solve them. The French army did not fail
so badly against the Germans because of inferior equipment or doctrine,
but it was instead so weakened by interwar national, political, social,
and economic policies that it was outfought on the battlefield by a more
flexible and better trained adversary.
Based on the lessons of victory in World War I and perceived strengths,
the French developed a "long-war strategy" predicated on comprehensive
national mobilization and universal military training through
conscription. In order to reduce risk and operate with conscripts and
reservists, they planned to fight methodical battles with centralized
control and plentiful firepower. However, political squabbles crippled
mobilization legislation and even limited military planners from
questioning the plans they had to implement. In addition, other government
policies and concerns about fairness produced a severely flawed
conscription policy. One-year draftees were brought in every six months,
ensuring that active units spent all their time training new recruits.
When war started, these organizations had to leave their latest levy
behind while reservists were assigned in their places! This practice might
have worked if the reserve system had the regional organization and
cohesion that planners intended, but, again, political reality intervened
and created a truly "unready reserve." French officer training was
particularly dismal, and Kiesling argues that fragile, ill-trained, and
poorly led reserve units were the greatest single reason for poor overall
battlefield performance. On the whole, the French army's formations
"lacked the aggressiveness, determination, and fundamental military skills
that come from solid units, thorough training, and experienced leadership"
(10). Military leaders realized that their instrument was flawed, but,
convinced that they could not change the policies that produced it, and,
buoyed by optimistic assessments of foreign observers, they chose to be
positive to keep up morale rather than complain and risk creating
defeatism. "Choosing optimism over cynicism or despair, military and
political leaders alike dismissed French weaknesses, exaggerated French
strengths, and persuaded themselves of the intrinsic merits of
arrangements that they had neither the ability nor the inclination to
alter" (3).

Page 12
12Large Units (1921),52 is described as the battailleconduite, or the methodical
battle. In the 1921Regulations, the French General Staff expressed the viewthat
technology had so changed the battlefield thatfirepower was now the primary
element in warfare.53 Firepower made the defense extremely powerful. The
FrenchArmy, however, also determined that only the offense couldbring victory
and a successful conclusion to the campaign.Therefore, a great part of the
French doctrinal thought wastied up in the methodical battle, which is in
essence anoffensive doctrine. The French offensive doctrine of theinterwar
period had the following characteristics:_ Strict, centralized control by the
core and thearmy, with little room for initiative of juniorcommanders;_ Since
firepower dominated the battle, artillerysupport would be massive, centralized
andconcentrated;_ The infantry would move forward by short bounds of5 kilometers
or so, under massive artillery support,and at that point, the advance would halt
inaccordance with specific phase lines, so that theartillery could deploy
forward, and the battle couldbe rejoined, on successive days.Under the terms of
the methodical battle, commanders such asGamelin, Petain and Weygand believed
that the correctemployment of doctrine could ensure victory.The methodical
battle had its origins in the campaigns andmethodology of 1918. After the
disasters of 1916 and 1917,it seemed that the French Army had finally discovered
thesecret of success on the battlefield, by carefully plannedoffensives with
massive firepower. These forerunners of themethodical battle proved their
effectiveness in the Summerand Fall of 1918. In its essence, the tactics of late
1918were geared to the minimization of casualties of the FrenchArmy. Tanks, in
fact, played a very large role in theFrench methodical battle. In the interwar
period, studieson the armor force developed the corollary to the French52
Ministère de la Guerre, Instruction Provisoire sûrl'Emploi Tactique des Grande
Unités, October 6, 1921.53 Ibid., Chapter III, Paragraph 115: "Fire is the
mostimportant factor in battle. It destroys or cripples theenemy. Attack means
carrying the fire forward. Defense isfire that stops."

Page 13
13dogma: namely, that infantry would not in fact be able tosuccessfully advance
without strong tank support.54 The French Army doctrine was couched in the
terminology ofscience, or more accurately, pseudo-science. Articles
anddiscussions within the Army concerning the methodical battlecontained
numerous tables and formulae, which were publishedas appendices to the
doctrine.55 For example, variousattacks required specific gun frontages per
square kilometerbefore an attack could be initiated.56 The effectiveness ofthe
Maginot Line defenses, in another case was illustratedby tables demonstrating
the number of rounds from Germanheavy guns that were necessary to knock out each
armoredcasement. In this example the number of rounds was solarge, one could
conclude that the Maginot Line waseffectively unbreakable.57 In yet another
case,mathematical formulae were used to prove the effectivenessand superiority
of anti-tank guns defending against a Germanarmored attack.58 The French Army
spent considerable time, effort and moneyduring the interwar period to develop
the necessaryartillery and tank arms which would support the methodicalbattle.
The Army, in 1940, given the high priority of theanti-tank gun in French
doctrine, was equipped with good54 E. C. Kiesling, "Reform?--Why?: Military
Doctrine inInterwar France.", Paper presented to the SMH, April 8,1994, p. 11.55
A typical product of the French scientific approach to waris found in the 1930s
writings of General NarcisseChauvineau. An attack on a continuous front required
a 3:1superiority in infantry, a 6:1 superiority in artillery and15:1 superiority
in shells. See Alvin Coox, "GeneralNarcisse Chauvineau: False Apostle of Prewar
French MilitaryDoctrine", in Military Affairs, February (1973), pp.
15-19,especially p. 16.56 Robert Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster, pp. 102-103.57
The French calculated the destruction of each point of afortress' outer works
would require 100-150 rounds of 280-400mm artillery shells. An armored
strongpoint in afortress required 400 rounds of 320, 370 or 400mm mortarshells
to be destroyed. See "Französiche Anschauungen überAngriff und Verteidigung an
Festungsfronten", inMilitärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Issue 5 (December
1939),p. 702.58 E. C. Kiesling cites a 1937 French study thatoverestimated the
range and stopping power of a 25mm gun.The French posited a 1,000 meter
effective range, and a rateof fire of 15 rounds per minute, with a 25% hit rate.
Thus,the French estimated, 19 of 30 German attacking tanks wouldbe destroyed by
a single French antitank gun in a modelbattle. See E. C. Kiesling,
"Reform?--Why?", pp. 14-15.

Page 14
14anti-tank guns.59 Since rapid movement and maneuver werenot part of the French
interwar doctrine, however, verylittle effort was devoted to developing radio
communicationsfor the Army.The development of French motor vehicles provides a
usefulillustration of the superiority of doctrine over technology.The Army used
early model half-tracks in experiments of the1920s, and these greatly impressed
the German observers.60 Half-tracks were most suitable for rapid
operationalmaneuver and motorized units, however, which at the timewere not
emphasized in French doctrine. Thus, deployment ofhalf-tracks was dropped for
lack of interest. Armored carsplayed a relatively minor role in French doctrine
as well,because reconnaissance had less importance in the Frenchdoctrine. As a
result, the high-quality Panhard armoredcars of the 1930s were given a low
priority, although thequality of the product was technically equal to that of
theGermans.61 Yet another case of the primacy of doctrine over technologyis the
example of antiaircraft guns. Anti-aircraft was theresponsibility of the army's
Artillery Directorate. Thearmy placed little confidence in airpower as having
adecisive effect upon the battlefield. Gamelin himselfbelieved that the losses
of aircraft in the first few weeksof the war would be so heavy, that airpower
would cease tobe an important factor in the battle.62 Therefore, the59 On the
French antitank gun program, see Ministère de laDefense, Les Programmes
d'Armament, pp. 342-351. GeneralGamelin made production of the 25mm anti-tank
gun a toppriority in the 1938 army armaments budget. See HenryDutailly, "La
Puissance Militaire de la France en 1938", inRevue Historique des Armeés, No. 3
(1983), pp. 5-9. Seealso Franz Kosar, Panzerabwehrkanonen 1916-1917,
Stuttgart:Motorbuch Verlag (1980), pp. 55-60.60 German officers observing the
1922 and 1924 Frenchmaneuvers were impressed by the new French vehicles
andequipment, but held a low opinion of the French tactics forthe equipment. See
T-3 Truppenamt, "Die französischenHerbstmanöver 1922", September 11, 1923, in
BA/MA, RH2/1547, also T-3 Truppenamt, "Die französischenHerbstmanöver, 1924",
December 10, 1924, in BA/MA, RH2/1547.61 In 1940, the Germans had about twice as
many armored carsas the French: 350 French to 600+ German. See R.M.Ogorkiewicz,
Armoured Forces, pp. 432-434.62 In 1938, General Gamelin commented, "The role of
aviationis apt to be exaggerated, and after the early days of warthe wastage
will be such that it will more and more beconfined to acting as an accessory to
the army", as cited in

Page 15
15French lagged behind in the development of antiaircraftguns.

WWII French Artillery

French Theory

At the beginning of World War II, the French artillery system was based on the
lessons they had learned in World War I. They refined the techniques learned in
the "Great War" and their artillery tactics worked well when given the chance to
function as intended. At the Battle of Gembloux, the French Artillery-Infantry
defense stopped the German Blitzkrieg, allowing the French to hold their
positions until they were outflanked to the South. The fact that the Germans were
able to score a quick victory was not due to a deficiency in the artillery, although
the battle of movement that occurred in 1940 often prevented the French artillery
from being used to its maximum effectiveness.

The Fire Plan

The mathematics and techniques of bringing indirect fire down on specific

locations from separate battery positions had been worked out thoroughly in the
1914-1918 period and were used in some form by almost all nations at the
beginning of WWII. Whenever the French moved to a new position, the first
priority of the artillery was to establish a Fire Plan.

In other places in the tutorial, we use the term fire plan to refer to a pre-game set
of barrages and fire missions that will land on specific turns in the game. When
considering French Artillery, the meaning is different. It means the integration of
artillery assets into an overall control structure. Of course in a Battlefront games,
the French can have preplanned fire missions as well, but when discussing the
French artillery practices, we are using the more general meaning.
Establishing a French Fire Plan requires that:

• Forward Observer positions be established from where they could see

the area to be attacked/defended by artillery
• Battery Positions be established and their positions relative to the FOs
be determined precisely.
• Communications be established between the FOs and the firing assets.

Rather than having the FOs connected with specific single batteries, as was often
the German practice, the French added a twist by establishing the poste central
du groupe which was a small headquarters subordinate to the commander of the
artillery battalion. The poste central du groupe calculated the data necessary for
firing all three batteries of a battalion at the same target and Battery commanders
simply followed the instructions given them. The advantage of this system is that
it allowed an artillery battalion to mass the fires of its batteries quickly on a
single target. The disadvantage is that it took battery commanders out of the
loop. In many ways the poste central du groupe has a similar function to the late-
war U.S. Fire Direction Center (FDC), the primary difference being that the
French system was still tied closely to the Forward Observer, and the flexibility
of the U.S. map system and calculation aids had yet to be invented. If they had
been allowed the time, the French Artillery might have evolved into a much more
flexible system. In game terms, the effect of the French organization is that off-
board artillery should almost always fire by battalion.

The Moroccan division at the Battle of Gembloux had an artillery fire plan
within 24 hours of occupying their positions in Belgium. This included
registering some artillery battalions from an adjacent division that were allocated
to support the Moroccans. This indicates that a scenario designer can assume that
a basic fire plan has been developed if the French have been in their positions for
a day or more. The longer that the French occupied a position, the more
sophisticated the fire plan is likely to be. More batteries were registered, and
communications were improved. A scenario can specify that some battalion
assets are part of the plan and others are not (and are therefore less effective). An
extreme example of a fire plan is found in the main Maginot Line positions,
where virtually every angle and position had been pre-plotted over the months of
construction. Despite our modern contempt for these fortifications, it should be
noted that in 1940 they were considered "state-of-the-art" and the Germans never
made a serious attempt to force them by frontal attack.

Equipment
 The basic artillery support of the Infantry
Division was 3 Battalions of 75mm Guns (12 in
each battalion), one battalion usually assigned
to support each infantry regiment. These were
often the 75mm Model 1897 gun (the famous
"French 75"). While most countries were
standardizing on 105mm howitzer as the basic
weapon of the artillery the French were unable
to do so for political and budgetary reasons:

• They had a lot of 75mm guns left in

Small template -1 vs V, 0 vs T, G
• Many of the Generals who had
their arsenal. It was hard to convince
politicians to allocate money for new
artillery, especially while the bulk of the
defence budget was now being allocated
to the Maginot line. Also much of the
heavier artillery was procured during
World War I and was of relatively
recent design.
advocated the virtues of the 75mm gun
were in positions of high responsibility.
They were unconvinced that new
artillery was needed.

• After all, they won WWI using this gun,

it couldn't be all bad.

Large template -1 vs V, 0 vs T, G Large template 0 vs V, +1 vs T, G

In addition to the 75mm guns the French had some battalions of 105mm and 155mm
artillery available. Divisions usually had 1 or 2 battalions of 155mm howitzers. Corps
artillery had 2 battalions of 105mm guns and 2 battalions of 155mm howitzers.
Divisional and corps artillery are usually only in general support as part of an
integrated fire plan.

On attack-The "Deliberate Advance"

Their experiences in 1914-1918 had convinced the French High Command that
mobile warfare was unlikely. Instead, they based their idea of an offensive on a
plan called the "Deliberate Advance". This was designed to give a slow but
extremely safe method of attacking, designed to maximize enemy casualties and
minimize friendly casualties. Of course it also minimized the chance of rapidly
winning the war. There was a common saying in vogue at the time that "The
Artillery conquers, the Infantry occupies", and the Deliberate Advance certainly
mirrored this theory. The basic idea of the DA was for friendly artillery to
pulverize enemy front line positions and neutralize the enemy artillery, after
which friendly troops would occupy their trenches. If this seems similar to what
happened in World War I, it is not coincidental!

The deliberate advance was to be done in distinct stages:

1. Reconnaissance
Using infantry patrols, air reconnaissance, and sound-ranging equipment,
the French would determine the German (the French had a pretty good
idea of who they were going to be fighting :-) ) front line and artillery
positions.
2. Preparation
Divisional and corps artillery assets would be brought forward and
carefully sighted. A comprehensive fire plan would would be developed
designed to attain artillery supremacy. Prewar planning specified the
extensive use of chemical weapons, and it is one of the few small mercies
of WWII that they were not employed.
3. Bombardment and Attack
The plan would be put into effect. After the artillery plan had smashed the
enemy artillery and forward positions, the infantry, accompanied by
tanks, would occupy the enemy positions. Tanks were never seen as a
breakthrough weapon, but were designed to act as mobile artillery
platforms to overcome local strongpoints that survived the initial artillery
concentrations.
4. Consolidation
After advancing 6-10km (the limit of the artillery support), the friendly
forces would stop (ignoring that annoying Charles De Gaulle screaming
for them to continue on to Berlin), dig in and establish new trench lines
and artillery positions. A new fire plan would be developed for the next
stage of the advance.

The deliberate advance cycle could be repeated about once every 7-10 days.
Although an adequate fire plan to defend the positions could be developed within
a day, the reconnaissance necessary to for the next deliberate attack would take
longer. This would give an average advance of 1km/day which was quite
respectable by WWI standards. The key to the Deliberate Advance was the word
Deliberate.
During the "phony war", the French used this a couple of times but then stopped
(Poland had disappeared and there was no hurry). The basic defensive mindset of
the French in 1939-40 meant that the Deliberate Advance was never really put to
the test. However, it relied on its power upon a certain amount of cooperation
from its opponent. If the enemy front-line trenches were heavily occupied and
batteries fired from fixed positions, the DA could cause severe casualties.
However, the build-up needed for a DA would be fairly easy to detect, and by
deception operations the Germans could ensure that the massive blow would fall
mainly on empty ground. They could then counterattack when the French
attempted to consolidate.

On Defense-Forts and Concrete

The French could see World War II coming, but spent much of their defense
budget on concrete instead of tanks and mobile forces. In hindsight, the Maginot
line was a waste of money, especially as it was not extended along the entire
Northern frontier (for both political and budgetary reasons). The Germans simply
went around the end of the fortification line. However, at the time, the idea of an
impregnable shield on the border supported by mobile forces to the rear seemed
to be sound doctrine. By the standards of 1939, the Maginot line WAS
formidable, and the Germans did not really attempt a break-through. One of the
features of the Maginot line was that almost every inch of ground around it was
plotted for artillery support. It would have been very difficult to take by direct
assault. When defending static positions, the fire plan should be comprehensive
and well-developed.

On Defence-Mobile situations

The key to defending in mobile situations is whether the French have been
allowed time enough to register their artillery. As stated earlier, it took the
French about 24 hours to establish a basic fire plan.

Communications

Along with most nations during World War II, the French relied on wire
communications between their forward positions and their firing assets. These
were generally reliable, but could sometimes be broken up by shelling/bombing
the rear areas.

French Artillery can be classified:

• Command - High level*. When they were given the time to establish a
fire plan, the French were able to allocate artillery from Corps and
Division into their fire missions. The poste central du groupe allowed
them to control all fire of the battalion from a relatively high level. This
was one of the main differences between their artillery system and that of
 the Germans, where FOs were often tied to specific batteries. The fire
plan would improve while the French occupied the same positions with
more assets being tied into the plan. If they were not given time to
establish a fire plan, their artillery was considerably less effective.
• Control - Medium. Dedicated Forward observers made most of the
calls-for-fire for the artillery.
• Communications - Average. As long as they were using their
established positions, they could expect relatively good communications.
They were not particularly flexible in the advance. If their FOs left their
observation posts, their communications would become less reliable until
they had the opportunity to string new wire.

French Artillery Rules in Battlefront

For
Battlefront,
the scenario
designer must
decide if a fire
plan exists and
which assets
are integrated
into the plan.
It is possible
to have both
fire plan and
non-fire plan
assets
available in a
scenario. The
French use the
call-for-fire
table to the
right. Also, if
a fire mission
is called by a
forward
observer who
has not moved
from his initial
position, and
consists of
battalions that
are part of a
fire plan,
apply the pre-
registered
modifier to the
call-for-fire
roll.
Once a fire
plan has been
established,
French Off-
board Artillery
may only fire
by Battalion.
However, it
may always
use ALL of
the guns in the
battalion (6
templates for
the typical
75mm
battalion). The
French are
NOT limited
to fire by a
single battery
when firing a
shelling
pattern by a
battalion that
is part of a fire
plan. For a
typical 12 gun
(6 template)
battalion, they
may arrange
them either as
a linear (6
wide, 1 deep)
or rectangular
(3 wide, 2
deep) pattern.
The full
battalion
shelling
pattern is the
French
"special"
mission. To
the right are
the typical
shelling
pattern fired
by 75mm
battalion,
where the
basic IDF fire
strength is -1
vs V and 0 vs
T,G,sV.
Concentration
and thickened
concentration
fire missions
may only be
used by
battalions that
are part of a
fire plan. Once
again, the
entire 12 gun
battalion is
used as a unit.
To the right
are the
possible
concentration
patterns fired
by a 12 gun
75mm
battalion.
When firing mixed/smoke patterns by battalion, halve the number of templates in the regular
pattern.
• General Support Artillery is available only if there is a fire plan and may fire only in
conjunction with battalions that are part of a fire plan.

• Battalions that are part of a fire plan cannot be combined with those which are not in
the plan within the same fire mission.
For battalions which are NOT part of the fire plan, only shelling, smoke, and mixed
shelling/smoke fire missions may be fired. Also, no pre-registration bonus is used on
the call-for-fire table. However, the types of missions that can be fired depend on how
far along the fire plan has progressed. Mark Hayes thinks that they always would fire
by battalion, as this is their basic doctrine and training. He recommends that they
immediately be allowed to use the 3x2 shelling pattern above (or a 3x1 with mixed
shelling/smoke). My (your not-so-humble webmaster's) feeling is to be somewhat
 more restrictive, especially at the early stages of the fire plan, because the if the
batteries were not located in the same geographic area (and they often dispersed to
make them more difficult counter-battery targets), they would not be able to
coordinate battalion fire. I would consider limiting them to the almost useless single
battery pattern to the right at the beginning of the plan preparation (more to reflect the
difficulty of coordinating fire than any specific doctrine) and have them work up to
different battalion shelling patterns without pre-registration if they have been in place
for a few hours. In any case, the referee should specify the patterns they can use and it
would be perfectly reasonable to allow them to use more effective patterns as the
game progresses. If anyone has any more definite knowledge of how they developed
their plan, let us know and we will incorporate it into this tutorial. It should be noted
that the French really did not expect to fight without a plan, as they anticipated battles
to develop at a slower pace. Indeed, our sources almost exclusively describe the
French doctrine assuming that the plan has been established.

e German invasion there)

*Regional Infantry made up of men too old for B Reserves but

still of military age. They were given the role, along with the
Gendarmerie to guard the rear.

*Foreign Legion (Based in Algeria) and other foreign

volunteers (in particular Polish soldiers and sailors escaped from
the German invasion there)

PETAIN
Richard Griffiths

P had developed a technique of small-scale well-prepared attacks with

overwhelming strength, to wear down the enemy reserves while
preserving his own; of artillery taking far more part than the
infantry; and of elastic defense in depth, on which the enemy
would flounder.

1921 the PROVISIONAL INSTRUCTION ON THE UTILIATION OF

LARGER UNITS (INSTRUCTION PROVOSIRE SUR LA
CONDUITE DES GRANDES UNITES) became the doctrine of
 the French Army. This document stressed the impossibility of
breaking a continuous front, mainly through the strength, which
the new forms of firepower had given to even, improvised
defenses. Attack was possible only after the amassing of the
most powerful forces, in the form of artillery, tanks and
munitions Tanks were, however, regarded as merely subordinate
to the infantry needs, fighting closely in liaison with them, and
clearing the way for them. Aircraft were seen mainly as
instruments of observation of the enemy. It was the artillery,
supporting the infantry, which did the main fighting The main
point of the document was that such offensive tactics, meager as
they were, were seen as only possible after a prolonged defensive
action, as in the WWI.

You attack with projectiles and it is the artillery, not the infantry, which
conquers the ground.

THE BREAKING POINT

Robert Doughty

French Doctrine

Both 1921 and 1936 Field Service Regulations stressed firepower as

“The preponderant factor of combat.” “The attack is the fire that advances”
“The defense is the fire that halts (the enemy).” The development
of automatic weapons permitted the establishment of “curtains”
of fire that would extract a terrible toll of the enemy. The only
way an attacker could penetrate a deadly curtain of defensive fire
would be to create a much greater concentration of fire with
“three times as much infantry, six times the artillery, and fifteen
times the ammunition.” Obviously the complexity of such an
effort limited the possibility of maneuver dramatically and its
coordination could most effectively be done through the use of
what the French called the “methodical battle.”
This step-by-step approach to battle became a vital part of
French doctrine. By the term “methodical battle” the French
meant a tightly controlled battle in which all units and weapons
were carefully marshaled and then employed in combat. The
French preferred to have a step-by-step battle in which units
obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly
scheduled timetables, since they believed that such methods were
essential for the coherent employment of enormous amounts of
men and material. They preferred the time consuming, intricate
process that prized preparation rather than improvisation and that
made great allowances for the extreme complexity of massing
large amounts of weapons and material. If the French had their
way, they would weaken the attacker with their deadly defensive
fires, and then destroy him by a massive, but tightly controlled
“battering ram” attack.

The methodical battle the artillery provided the momentum and the rhythm for
the attack. When an attack began, according to French doctrine,
the infantry advanced 1000 to 2000 meters before halting to
readjust the artillery fire. The attack again commenced, and, after
advancing another 1000-2000 meters another readjustment of fire
was necessary. To control the advance of the infantry and to
ensure artillery support, a number of intermediate objectives
were established that corresponded to these advances of 1000 to
2000 meters. After a total advance of about 4000 to 5000
meters, a displacement of artillery was required. This
displacement ensured that the infantry remained under the cover
of the artillery and did not go beyond its maximum effective
range. For control purposes, the maximum advance was
somewhere between 3000 to 4000 meters before the 75mm
artillery began its displacement by increments. One rule of
thumb was given by an instructor at the Army Staff College
when he stated the distance of the advance ought to be half the
maximum range of the artillery supporting the attack (usually no
more than 7500 meters). Hence the French believed the infantry
had to remain under of artillery protection, and only the
methodical battle could ensure the maximum coordination and
integration of the artillery and the infantry.

The methodical battle resembled the methods used in World War I, but it
represented an intensification of those methods. According to the
French, the new firepower that had become available after 1918
made centralized control much more important than ever before
and made the methodical battle more essential in an offensive.
DEFENSE For the defense, the French emphasized the need for depth. When
a French unit (from battalion to corps) occupied a defensive
sector, it organized its forces into three parts: an advance post
line, a principal position of resistance, and a stopping line. The
principal position of resistance was the most important and
heavily defended portion of the French defenses. Theoretically, it
could be located along an easily protected front, preferably in an
area where the enemy could be channeled into carefully selected
zones or fields of fire between natural and man-made obstacles.
Because of the requirement for depth, the principal position of
resistance rarely resembled a line. To its rear was the stopping
line, which was supposed to halt an attacking enemy force after it
had been weakened by forward defenders.

If an enemy managed to penetrate the stopping line, French doctrine called for
a process known as Colmater, or filling. A commander expected
to meet a penetration by having his reserves, as well as the
reserves of larger units, move in front of attacking enemy troops
and gradually slow them down until they were halted. By
shifting additional infantry, armor, and artillery units laterally
into a threatened sector or forward from the reserves, an attacker
could be slowed and eventually halted. After sealing off an
enemy penetration, a counterattack would follow, but the
counterattack would usually rely on the use of artillery and
infantry fire rather than the charge of infantry or tanks. To halt an
enemy using this procedure, the defender would be able to move
units in front of a penetration faster than an enemy attacker could
advance.

The emphasis on the methodical battle and on the process of colmater

resulted in a dangerous degree of rigidity within the French
system for command and control. Centralization became the
primary cone of higher commanders, especially as they
considered how to shift units about the battlefield. The French b
believed the focus of decision making had to remain at a higher
level because the higher commander had to have greater control
for coordinating the actions of numerous subordinate units. The
army’s doctrinal and organizational system stressed the power
and authority of army group, field army, and corps commanders
and left little flexibility or room for imitative to lower level
commanders. Each lower level had less room for maneuver than
the level immediately above it. The entire system was designed
to be propelled forward by pressure from above, rather than
being pulled from below. In contrast to the decentralized battle
in which officers were expected to show initiative and
flexibility, the French preferred rigid centralization and strict
 obedience. Unfortunately, this resulted in a fatal flaw; the French
military could not respond flexibly to unanticipated demands and
could hardly capitalize upon an important gain made by a lower
level unit.

The French also encouraged commanders to remain in their command posts,

rather than moving forward and being drawn into the fighting. A
commander, in their view, should remain in his command post,
being constantly updated on the status of the ongoing battle and
frequently making decisions about the movement and
commitment of units and supplies. By keeping their hands “on
the handle of a fan,” and by managing units and material,
commanders were not available to lead by personal example, but
they could theoretically ensure the entire operation proceeded
smoothly and efficiently.

“In all the depth of the position on the principal line of resistance, as well as
the stopping line or between these lines, the defense will be
organized into circular fighting positions (points d”appui) of
resistance, capable of defending themselves when isolated, even
if bypassed by enemy infantry and tanks. As a consequence the
fighting positions or centers of resistance will be interlocked with
obstacles of terrain, woods, villages, etc.” By holding the centers
of resistance, the French expected to break up or disrupt an
enemy attack, which would eventually halt under concentrated
artillery fire and against newly established defensive positions to
its front. According to French doctrine, counterattacks could roll
back an enemy penetration but halting the enemy’s forward
movement was the first priority.

Increasing the artillery support for a threatened sector accorded completely

with French doctrine, for such an action added to the defensive
capability of the sector while placing sufficient forces on hand to
conduct a counterattack with fire, rather than troops.

French expected Germans to roll flank behind Maginot line after penetration
at Sedan. Reinforced sector to prevent this in classic Colmater
operation.

Fr cav was used in role US considers advance covering force…no movt to

contact.
Most of pop and industry were in areas of France near the border. 95% of iron
ore and 75% of coal.

Men 20-34 1870 slightly fewer than Germany; 1910 Ger 1.6 to 1 advantage;
1939 Ger twice as many