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DI{AFT

Preface

Aim

in a counterinsurgency
doctnnefor mrlitaryoperatrons
This publicationestablishes
environment.

Applicability
'I'his
publication rs intendedfor staff of ficers involved in planningthe deploymentand
employrnentof CanadianArmy formationsand units to combatinsurgencyand for
commandersand staffofficers,down to sub-unitlevel,involvedin the planningand
conductof counterinsurgencyoperations.

Scope

To make this publicationusefulto commandersand staffsinvolved in counterinsurgency


in
operationsregardlessof geographiclocation,the doctrinecontainedherein is broad
This publication deals
scopeand involves principlei appticabieto any areaof operation.
of
firsily, with the poliiical, social-indeconomicfactors,that-canleadto the development
country,
armedattemptsto overthrowor affect the legally constitutedgovernmentof a
wars are conducted' The major
and secondly,with the way in which typical insurgent
campaign at the
factorsand mechanismsinvolved in planninga counterinsurgency
strategic,operationaland tacticallevels are described'

AssociatedPublications
-l'his
publication should be readin conjunctionwith the following Land Force
publications:

B-GL-300-000Canada'sArmY

B-GL-300-00I Operations

B - C L - 3 0 U - 0 0 2T a c t i c s

B - G I - - 3 0 0 - 0 0 3C o m m a n d

B - C L - 3 0 0 - 0 0 5I n f o r m a t i o nO p e r a t i o n s

lit

40202304-1-000001
DRAI.'T

C H A P T E RI

I N T R O D U C T I OT
NO C OU N T E R - I NUSR G E N C YO P E R A ' T I O N S
'ln.srtrganct,
i s r' o o / e d i n . s q u c t / o rctncl
, fearancl:u,f/ering
ure its'flav,er.r,'
( i c n er a l S i r F r a n k K i t s o n

SECTION I : DIIFINII.IONS

INSUII.GIiNCY

l A n u l n b eor 1 ' d e f i n i t i o ncsx i s tf o r t h ct c r r ni n s u r g e n cayn da l t h o u g hr l a n y


hal,c
bectd r e v c l o p co d v e rt h c y e a r s m , o s th a v ec o n t a i n etdh c s a r n ek e y e l e m e n t sv: i o l e n c e ,
,r
a t I e a s t h et h r e aot f v i o l e n c e s; u b v e r s i o np;r o p a g a n d a n; da p o l i t i c a l
aim

L An insurgency
has beendefinedas follows:

Theuctionsof u minority group v,ilhin u s/atev,hctarc intent on./orcilg politic,crl


c'hangeby meun.so.fu ntixlure oJ.subt,er.ston,
propagantlaancJmililurl:p're.r.sura,
ui.ming1opcrsuudeor inlimic/cttelhe hroud ntct.s.s
o.fpeopla to accep/.rtrc,h
ct
L',nu
n {c.

l R e c e ntl r e n d si n i n s u r g e n c i ehsa v ec h a i l e n g eidn t e l l c c t u a l ltyh e a s s L r r n p t i o n s


or
construcIin thisand otherdefinitions.NAI'o AAp 6 definesan ir.rsurgcnc!
?Sttn
rttgtrtti.secl movemenlaimeclut the otterthrowo/ ctcon.\'litltted government.Most recently.
NA'|O and AIICA stud;'groupshaveproposedslightlycliffeientdefinitrons
ro r.ecogrrize
t h et r a n - s - n a t i o n a tl u r eo f i n s u r g e n c i easn, dt h ei r o f t e nv a r y i n ga n c l i m i t e d
oblectii,es.
I { e n c c i.n s r - r r g e nhcavsb c e nr e c e n t l yd c i l n e da s f o l l o w s .

Itt.s'trrgencv
i.scrccttnpc/ilictn
int,olt,ing
ctlleu.slone non-slulemovcntcntu.\.i1g
nl:un\ thctlrnclttdaviolenccctgain.sl en e,\'tubli.\'hed
ctuthr;ril.1,/o
ctchicvt:
pplitigctl
cnun,qL'.

I n t h i sd c f i n i t i o nt,h e f b l l o w t n gc a nb e n o t c d :

a l n s u r g e n civs n o t a m o v e r r e not r p e o p l e .I t i s a c o m p e t i t i o ns,t r r , r g g loer.


c o n l l i c t .I t i s a r n a n i f e s t a t i oonf w a r .

b. It must includeat leastone nolt-state


n-]ovement
to cliffcrentrate
it fiorl
warsbetweenstates.

D c v c l o p e db y t h e W a r S t u d i e sD e p a r i m e not f R o y a lM i i i t a r yA c a d e r n yS, a n d h u r sat ,s c t u o r c d


in UK
A r n r y F i c l dM a n u a lV o l I C o r r r b i n eAc ri m s o p e r a ro n s .P a r t1 0 ,C o u n t e i - l n s u r g e ; c v
opei-ations.
l ) c f l n i t i o rar s t i e r e l o p e b
d v a c o u n t e r - r n s u r g c nsct u
v d yu r o u pd u r i n gU S M C J o i n tL l r b a nW a i l . i o2r 0 ( ) 5

( ' l r a pl : L l 5

an?nr?ntr_{ nnnnnt
DRAF'f

I h e c s t a b l i s h eadu t h o n t vn e e dn c t u c c e s s a r i l l ' b t heeg o v c r n n r c n o ti ' t h c


r r a t i c ns u b . ] e ct ot a n i n s u r g e n c yI.t c o u l db e a l o c a la u t h o r - i tay ,r e n t p o r a r v
m i l i t a r ya u t h o r i t yo, r a g o v ei n u t e n to 1 ' at h r r dp a r t y

lnsurgencie se s e kp o l i t r c acl h a n g cl .i k e a l l r v a r s .B r L t h ep o l i t i c anl a l u r c


o f i n s u r g e n ciys s o r n p o r t a r ritl s h o L r Lbde e r n p h a s i z ei nd t h ed e l l n j r i o n ,
'l'he
c h a n g es o L r g hcto L i l db c g o v c r n m e ncl o l l a p s et ,l , p i c a l l ya n o b ' J e c t i voel
1 9 5 0 - 6 0cso m m u n i si tn s u r g c n c i eosr .a l e s s eor b j e c t i vseu c ha s s c l l ' -
c l e t e r m i n a t i o nr r e l e a s e
o f p o l i t i c a pl r i s o n e r s .

CO T]NT[]I]. INSUI{GENCY

5 Counter-insurscncv
is deilnedas follor.vs
'fho.s'c
tnilitary, paramilitary, political, cconomic, p.sychologic'aluncl t'it'ic crt,tion.s
Ittkt tt lo dcft,ttt .tn insltrgt'nt'-V.J

6. Coutrter-insLlrgcn t hcuysi n v o l v e sm u c hm o r c t h a ns i r n p l ym i i i t a r ya c t i o n . I t r s a
m u l t i - a g e n cay p p r o a c h
t h a ts c e k st o n o t o n l y d e f e a t h e i n s u r g e n t sh e m s c l v c sb.u t t h e
root causesof-,and supportfor. the insurgcncy.

.II{E
SECI.ION 2: CONTINUUM OF OPEIIATIONS AND OPERATIONAL
( ' A ] \ I P A I C NT H E M E S {

CENEII.AT,

1 C a m p a r g nasn d s u b o r d i n a toep e r a t i o nosf i e nr e q u i r em i l r t a r yf b r c e st o o p e r a t e


e l ' l ' e c t i v e layc r o s st h e s p c c t r u mo 1 ' c o n f l i c ct .o n d u c a
t w i d c r a n g eo I m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s
s i t n u l t a n e o r , r salny d. t r a n s i t i o nq u i c k l yf r o r no n c t y p eo i ' o p e r a t i otno a n o t h e irt i r a p i t l l y
c l t a n g i i t go p e r a t i o n aeln v i r o n m e n t sC. o n r m a n d e rrsn u s tb e a b l et o v i s u a l i z eh o u , a
c a m p a i g no r o p e r a t i o nw i l l l i k e l yc v o l v eo v e rt i r n ci n l i g h to f c h a n g i n gc i r c u r n s t a n c e s .

.f
H I I C O N T I N U T - j MO F O P E I T A T I O N SF I I . A M E W O R K

ti T h e c o n c e po t l -a c o n t i n u u mo f o p c r a t i o nisd e n t i f i se a n u m b c ro f c a m p a r g n tirerles
and provides a frallcwork for cornmandcrs to understand the complexityof the
o p e r a t i o n aei n v i r o n m e nat n dt h e l r a n n e ri n w h i c h r r i s s i o n sc o n t r i b u t teo a l a s t i t r gp c a c c .
o r a t l e a s t o a n e n v i r o n n l e ni n t w h i c h c o n f l i c ti s d i m i n i s h e d T
. h e c o n t i n u u mo l '
( ) 1 1r ae t i o n sc t - r n s i sot sl f o u r a s p e c t s :

\,^, I-O Ar\P (r


''l
h i s s e c t r o nl r a sb e e r sr u n r r l a r i s c fdi o m t r v os o u r c c s N A I ' O A J I ) i 2 a r r dA 1 3 C AA r r n i e sp r o s r a r t l l e
( o n t i n u u r ro f O p e r a t i o n P s r c . j e cTre a n tF i n a lR e p o r t2 0 L l - 5 I. h e N r \ - f O d o c u m c r .ht at sb c c nd c r i v e da n C
l e l l r r c df i o I r h e A B C A d o c u r n e n t .

( ' h a p1 ; f r l 5

Ananttnt o nnnnnt
DRAFT

cl t h es p ec t r u n to i c o n f l i c t :

b p r e d o m r n a n( ot p e r a t i o n laei v e r c) a n i p a i g tnh e m e si,^ c l L r d i n g


coLintcr-
i n su r g e n c y ;

C. t y p c so f t a c r i c aoLp e r a t i o r(so f f ' e n s i v c l.e f ' e n s i a


' en ds t a b r l i t y ), :r d

d s : r n u l t a noeu sc o n d u cot f ' d i f f e r e nt ty p e so f t a c t i c aol D e r a t i o . s .

C O T ] N T E R - I N SU R GE N C Y W I T H I N T H E SP E C T R U M I . '
O C O N T ' I -I C ' f
-l'he
9 s p c c t r u nor f c o n f l i c ti s a b a c k c l r ofpb r a l l o p e r a t i o nasp cdl e s c r i b e s
t5e
c l l \lir o n l n e nitn w h i c ht h e yo c c u t ' .J ' h cm a i nd i s c r i m i n a t oi sr t h e
l e v e lo f v i o l c n c c
i r l v o l v e dr.v h r c hr a n g e sf i o m p e a c e f ui ln t e r a c t i oanm o n g sitn t e r n a t i o n a
p l a y e r s( s t a t e s .
c o r p t l r a t i o nNs G ' O s ) ,t h r o u g i lto w - l e v eci o n f l r c t st ,o g c n e r awl a r ( s e eF i g u r cl ) . M i l i t a r l ,
I t t r c e os p c r a t et h r o u g h o ut th i ss p e c t r L i m .

A b s o l u t ep e a c e /
p e a c e f uiln t e r a c t i o n A b s o l ut e /
g e n e r a tw a r

F i g u r e 1 . T h e S p e c t r u mo f C o n f l i c t

l0 A t o n c c n d o 1 ' t h es p e c t r u mi s a c o n c l i t i oonf s r a b l ep e a c ew i t h l i t t l e
or no
v ' t o l e t l c cl ' h e I n i l i t a r ym i g h tb e i n v o l v e di n p e a c e t i u rm e i f i t a r yc n g a g e npr et ( p M I r )
d c s i g n e tdo s h a p et h e e n v i r o n m e nt h t r o u g ht r a i n i n ga . s s i s t a npcreo g r a n r m e s , . j o i r t
c x c r c i s easn dc o - o r d i n a t i o n , ' 1 'm hei i i t a r yw i l l I i k e l yw o r k w i t h o t h e ra g c n c i e s

Il A s s t a b l ep e a c ed e g e n e r a t evsi ,o l e n c eo. r a t l e a s t h e t h r e a ot f i t . i n c r e a s e s
a sr w o
o f I n o r ei a c t i o n sc o n t ei n t oc o n f l i c t .M i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o nasr ec l o r n i n a t c d
b y p e a c es L' l p p o r r .
a r l di n s o l n ec a s e so u t s i d ep o w e r sr n a 1i,n t e r j e ci tn o r d e rt o I i m i t t i r ec o n f l i c i .
I,eace
s t t l l p t l rot p e r a t i o t lws i l l i n c l u d ea r a n g eo f c a m p a i g n sf i.o n r l o w l e v e lp e a c e k e c p i p u
tcr
n r o r cs t r e n u o Lpl sc a c cc n l b r c e m c n t s

ll I t ' a s i t L r a t i owno r s c n sa, n i n s u r g e n cnyt a ye r u p t .T h i s n t a l , i n v o l v e


signtficanl
i r t t r ao- r i n t e r - s t a tvei o i e n c eb, u t w i l l l a i l s h o r to f l a r g e - s c a lceo, n v e n t r o n a l
operatiors.
[ - h en r i ] i t a r vr o l e* , o u l d b c c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n( c yo l N ) , r v i t ht h e g o a l
of reduci'g
V i o l e n c ae i r dt r a n s i t i n g t o p e a c es u p p o r tw, i t h s u p p o r t i n pg o l i t i c a al p de c o n o r n i c
i . i t i a l i v e s. A g a i nt,h e m i i i t a r yw o u i d b e i v o r k i n gi n c o - o p e r a t i ornv i t h
o t h e ra s e n c i e s
a d d r se s i n gt l - r er r o n - r n i i r t a ar ys p e c tos f t h es c c u r i t ye n v i r o n m c n st ,L r c ahsg o v c r . n m c r t
r . cI o n n .

( ' h r p I : - 1i j
i l

DI{AFT

'l'hc
l-l f a r e n do 1 ' t h es p e c t r u nsl e e si n t er - s t a t ec o n l l i c t* , ] r e r et h em a l o rm i l r t a r r
i l c l l \ ' l t ) ' LcS
o t l l b aot p c r a t i o n sI ,f ' c o n d u c t csdu c c e s s f u l m l r ,a. j o rc o m b a rt v i l lb e a b l ct o
r c d u c et h e l c v e io t ' r ' i o l e n cacn dt h em i l r t a r y 'rso l ec a nt h e ni r a n s j t i olno l e s si n t e n s c
o p c r u t i o r r si d. e a l l y ,t h i s r , v i l e
l v e n t u a i ley v o l v et o p e a c e i uiln t e r a c t j o n ,

1-+ M i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o nds o n o t n e c e s s a r igl yo t h r o u g ha p r o g r e s s i oanl o n gt h e


s l l e c L r l l lrrnl e i t i r e rd i r e c t i o n .O p e r a t i o ntsy p i c a l l ys t a r ts o m e \ \ , h e ri nc t h e t r i c j d l co f ' t h c
spcclrtlm.Itot at eitherend. Therernaybe differentler.,els of conflictin di1'1-erent parlso1'
a s i r l q l ct h e a t r co f o p e r a t i o n so,r e v e nw i t h i na . j o i n to p e r a t i o nasr c a . l n d c e d ,l e v e l so f
c o r l l i' cl t l l l a Yv a r y o v e rt i r n c w i t h i n a s r n g i ea r e a ,I n g e n e r a lr,- r os p c c i f i co p e r . a t i oenx i s t s
at.L j r sot n ep o i n to 1 ' t h i ss p e c t r u m .R e a l i t yi s m o r ec o m p l e x :a l a n y o n e t i m e t h c r cr - n a 1 , b c
a i l u m a n i t a r i acnr i s i si n o n e l o c a t i o na. n i n s u r g e n ciyn a n o t h e ra. n d i n t e n s ef i g h t i n g
bctrvecn l b r c e sn e a r b y a, l l r v i t h i nt h es a m ea r e ao f o p c r a t i o n sS. i m i l a r l y a, t a i r l , o n e
Itlcation t h e r em a y b e h o u s c - t o - h o u si icg h t i n go n ed a y .c o l l e c t i o no f l b r c n s i cc v i d e n c c
LircItcxtdav.and restorationof electricityand watersr-rpplies thc day aftcr. In other
u o r d s .f u l l s p e c t r L r or np er a t i o n sw i l i b c c o n d u c t esdi n r u i t a n e o u sal yn d s e q u e n t i a l l y .

"In one momenl in time, our servicememberswill befeeding and clothing displacecl
refugees- providing humanitarian assistance.In the next moment,they wilt ie holcjing
hvo warring tribes apart conductingpeacekeepingoperations. Finatty, they will be
fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle. Alt on the same clay,allwithin three city
blocl<s.It will be what we call the threeblockwar."

GeneralCharlesC. Kruiak,USMC

PREDOMINANT CAMPAIGN THEMES

l--\ A s a c t t n f l i c vt a r i e so r c h a n g e o s v e rt i m c t h e c h a r a c t cor f a c a m p a i g nc a r rb e
d i f f l c L r ltto d e f i n ep r e c i s e l ya, n d i t i s l i k e l yt o e v o l v e ,I t w i l l c o n s i s ot f a w i d e v a r i e t yo f
t a c t i c aal c t i v i t i e st h a tw i l l a l s ov a r y w i t h t i r n e . l t i s p o s s i b l en e v e f t h e i e st os i d e n t i l y , a n d
d c s c r i b cp r c d o r n i n a nt ht e m e sa t t h e c a m p a i g r r / o p e r a t i ol e 'l-he
n vael l . c h a r a c t eorf t h c
carnpaignand the cmphasison differenttacticalactiviticsvary accorciing to the therre.
M a j o r c o m b a ti s i d c n t i f i a b l yd i f f e r c n t h a nc o u n t e r - i n s L r l g c nacnyd, b o t hd i f f e r f t o n r
p c a c es u p p o r t .D i f l e r c n tc z i m p e i gtnh e r n eds e m a n dd i ff e r e n ta p p r o a c h c ds i. l l er e p tl o r c c
p a c k a g c sa.n d d i f f - e r e nctm p h a s i so n v a r i o u st a c t i c atla s k s .F o r e x a m p l em , a j o rc o m b a t
u i l l i n v o l r , ct n o r eo l t e n s i v eo p e r a l i o n(ss u c ha s a t t a c k s )w, h i l e c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e nwcri ,l l
c o t l s i sot l ' L n o r ed e f en s i v ca n d i n f o r m a t i o n o p c r a t i o n si n. c l u d i n gc r v i l - r n i i i t a rcyo -
o p c r a t i o nt a s k sc o n d u c t e da t t h e t a c t i c allc v e l . i - l o v n , c v se or ,m ea c t i v i t i e s( e g f b r c e
p r o t c c t r o na)r ec o m m o nt o a i l .

i6 T h e c a n t p a i g nt h en t c i s a L r s c l uill i u s t l a l : r ,teo o l 1 b rc o m m a n d e r sa. n d c j i c t a t ctsh e


p t ' c d o r t t i l i a l t )i ' p e o f o p e t . a t i o nb c i n g c o n d u c t c da t a n v o n e r i r n c w i t h i n a j o i r t r
c t ' r t t l t n a i l d c r 'asr e a c f ' o p e t ' a t i o n s I t w i i l g u i d e s L r c hd e i a i l sa s f b r c e p a c k a p e s o. n e r a t i o n a l

(hapl.:1r15

A0202305-4-000005
DIlAFT

apprt)ache a sr l di a c t i c atla s k s . ' f h ev a r i o L rt sl i e m e sc a nb e p l o t t e da l o n g


t h c s p e c t r l i i(, - r j
c o n l l r c t o r c f l c c t h c g e n e r al le v c lo l . r , i o l e n coei - t h ec a n t p a i g (ns e c
I - . t g u r2c) .
-fhc
ll c a r n p a i gtnh e n l ea l s op r o v i d e st h ep r i n c r p l etsh a tg o y e r n
t h e c o n d u cot f '
o p e r a t t o n sl t s h o L l l idn d i c a t ct h c c o m m a n d c r 'isn t e n tr v i t h
r e i p e c ti o t h e u s co f f o r c ca r c l
g e n c r agl u i d c l i n e fso r a s s e s s i nt h g ep r o g r c sos f t h e c a m p a i g n I. t h a si r n p l r c a t i o r s
lirr
l b r c es t r u c t r r r easl.l o c a t t oonf r e s o u r . . r ,f b r . . p r o l e c t i o r i ,
a n dr a c t r c at a l s k sa s s i g n ctcoi
s u b o r d i t l ast.e E a c hh a sd i f f e r i n gp r i n c i p l eos f f b r c ea p p l r c a t i o n
'i a n dd es i r e dc n d s t a t .e
he ibur nra.jor thcmesare:

p e a c e t i mm
c i I i t a r ye n g a g e m e n t ;

p e a c es u p p o n ;

c o u r r t e r - i n s u r g e nacnyd;

ci m a j o rc o r n b aot p c r a t i o n s .

F ' i g u r e2 . P r e d o m i n a n tC a m p a i g nT h e m c s ,

Iu P e a c c t i l l lm
c i l i t a r yen g a g c m e n pt ,e a c es u p p o r tc, o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n c y ,
a r r crln a' oj r
c o m b a tb r o a d l yc o r r e s p o ntdo i n c r c a s i nlgc v e L os f v i o i c n c ea l o n gt h e l p e c t r u mo f

' A l i r ' i t e dr l i J i t a r ; ' i n t c r v e n r i(osnu c ha s a n o n - c o m b a t aenvt a c u a t i o n


0 p c r a t l 0 nr)s a n o p e r a t i o n al cl v e l
u r d c r t a k i n qb, u t i s n o t c o n s i d e r eadc a r . n p a i gt hne r n e( s e eA J p l 2 ) I l
I n a )o
/ c c u ra t a n v p o i n to n t h c
s p c c t r u io r lf c o nt l i c t .

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t o n l l i c t I ' h e r c1 sr a r el y ' a d i s t i n c b
t l e a kb e t r i . ' e e1ne \ /l es a n dt h e m e sa. l t h o r , r gi hhe r en r a y
b c , \ d c i i t i o n a l l )t'h. e f em a ) /b e d i f f ' e r e nl et v e l so f c o n f l r c at n dd i f f e r c n ct a m p a r g rnh c n r c s
r l c r . o sgse o g r a p h i ac r e a sa, n d i n s o n r ec a s e se. v en u , i t i r j na . ; o i n o t p c r a t t o uasr e a .

19. P r c d o r n i n a nc ta n i p a t g tnh e m e sh a v er n a n yo v e r l a p p i ncgh a r a c t e r i s t i chso.r v e v eirl


r s p o s s i b ) teo d i s c r r r n i n a a
t em o n gt h e u rb y c h a r a c t c r i z i nt h
g e l e v c lo f p o l i t i c a rl i s k .
l e s o r t r ccco m r n i t m e n ct .f f e c ts o u g h tc, h a r a c t cor f ' c o m b a ta, n dt y , p eo f e n e m yf a c e c l

20 C a r n p a i g tnh e m e ss h o u i dl . r obt e c o n f u s e di v i t ht a c t i c aol p e r a t i o n st a, s k so r


'factical
activrties t a s k sa r c t h es p e c i { i ca p p l r c a t i oonf c l o c t r i nleo s o l v es p e c i f i ct a c t i c a l
proLrlerns, atndare oftcn used to assignrnissior-rs to subordtnates. Campaignthemes,as a
r l t l c ,a r et o o g e n e r atl o L l s ei n a s s i g n i nm g i s s i o n s .R a t l i e rt,h e yc l e s c r i bteh e b r o a dg e n e r a l
c o n d i t i o n st h a t e x i s ti n a n a r e ao 1 ' o p e r a t i o nnso, t t h e d e t a i l so f e x e c u t i o nf o r s u b o r d i n a t c s

I l. W h i l c d i l ' f e r e ncta m p a i g nt h c m e sr e q u i r es i g n i rf c a n t l yd i fl - e r e ngt c n e r a l


a p p r o a c h et so a g i v e nc o n f l i c t ,i t i s s t i l i p o s s i b l et h a ta c t u acl o n d i t i o n fsa c e da t a n y t i r r c
o r p i a c ed u r i n ga c a m p a i g nm a y v a r y a l o n gt l i e s p e c t r u ronf c o n l l i c t . F o r e x a m p l e ,
h u r n a n i t a r i : ai ni d n a y s t i l l b e a f c a t u r eo f m a j o rc o m b a t a, n c a l n a t t a c ka g a i n s L
b c l l i g e r e n tm s a y b e n e c e s s a rdyu r i n gp c a c es u p p o r t .A l t h o u g hs u b o r d i n a tm e i s s i o n su r a y
r c q u i r ea p p l y i n go t h e rt a c t i c a l - l e v e p lr i n c i p l e sc, a r er n u s tb c t a k e nn o t t o c o n t r a d i ctth e
l o g i co f t h e o v e r a l ic a m p a i g n .F o r c x a m p l ea, n a t t a c kc o n d u c t e du r i n ga c o u n t e r -
rnsLlrgencY a m p a i g nm a y L r s e t a c t i c apl r i n c i p l e os f t h e o f f e n s i v cb, u t t h e d c c i s i o nt o
conductthe attackand the mannerin whioh it is done,shor-rld not contradictthe broader
'l'actical
principleo s f counter-insurgency. a c t i o n ss h o u l da l w a y sb e f o c L r s e tdo. f a c i l i t a t e
t n o v i t t gt o a l o w e r l e v e lo f c o n f l i c t . I t i s i r n p o r r a nt to r e a l i z et h a tu s i n gf o r c ec a n
p o t e n t i a l l y ' L r n d e r mci nr eea t i o no f t h e c o n d i t i o n sn e c e s s a rt yo I o w e rt h e l e v eI o 1 ' c o n f l i c t .
.f
YI'IIS OF OPERATIONS
'l'he
2). b r o a dr a n g eo f t a c t i c alle v e lo p e r a t i o n st a, s k sa n d a c t i v i t i e tsh a ta r e
. u n d t r c t c td, r r c a l i s es u c c c s isn l c a r r t p a i ganr ed i v i J c r il n t ot h r e eg r o r r p i n gosr c a t e g u r i c . ,
iisfbllows:

o f f e n s i v co p e r a t i o n s ;

b c i e f e n s i voep e r a t i o n sa;n d

s t a b i l i t yo p e r a l i o n s .

ll. T h e s et y p c so f t a c t i c a l e v e lo p c r a t i o n st o , g e t h ew r i t h t a c t i c atla s k s d
, escribe thc
t o t a lt a c t i c a al c t i v i t yu n d e f i a k e b
n y a r n i l i t a r yf o r c ew i t h i na c a m p a i g n E . a c ht y p ei s
'fhese
g u i d e db y ' a s e t o f ' p r i n c i p l e s . t y p e so f o p e r a t i o nasr ef u r r h e rb r o k e nd o r . v pinto
s u b o r d i n a tte- v p e o s f t a c t i c a oi p e r a t i o n(ss e cI i i g L r r 3
e).

l-+. N o t c t h a t e a c i rs u b o r d i n a ttey p c c o n s t i t u t cisn d i v i d u atla c t i c atla s k s A 1 a r t a c k


t l t a vc : t l t - t s o
i sf 1a s u p p o r b
t \ ' f i r e t a s ka n d c l e a r i n gt a s k .v i ' l t i l ch u r l a n i t a r i aai ts s i s t a n c c

( ' h a p l : ( r il 5

4o202305-6-000007
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r a ] ' s e eo n es L i b - u ndi tr s t r: iu t r n gf o o da n da n o t h cor n ec o n d u c t i r g


' \ g a i n .i t i s i r n p o r t a nt to n o t e i i n r e d r c ac r i n i c
t h a ti n a n y t - v p o
ef campaign t h e r n et.h e s ei a c t j c atl a s k sr r a r
b c c o n d u c t esdi m u l t a n e o u s lFyo. r e x a m p l eo, n es u b - u n i t
m a y b e c o n d u c t i n ag n a t t a c k .
a n o t h em r a y b e c o n d u c t i n sgc c u r i t lo, f a n a r c at h r o u g hv e h i c j e
c h c c kp o i n t s a, n caj n o l h c r
n r a yb e d i s t r i b u t i negm e r g e n cw y a t e ra n dr a t i o n st o i e f u g e e s

O f f e n s i v eO p e r a t i o n s D c f e n s i v eO p e r a t i o n s t;ou-r o*,;o";-=1
Arrack Raid Dc1'encc Controa
l n dS e c u r i t y( l )
Exploitation Delay S u p p o rtto D e m o b i l i s a t i o n ,
Pursr-iit Feint Disarmamcntand
R e i n t e g r a t i o( n
DDR)
Demonstration
S u p p o rtto S c c u r i t ,Sve c t o r
Break-ou1
R e l b r m( S S n )

E n a b l i n gA c t i v i t i e s
Rcconnaissance Link-up Retirement Advanceto Contact
Security R e l i e fo f [rncircledForce R e l i e fo f T r o o p si n C o r n b a t
M c c t i n gE n g a g e m e n t Withdrawal ObstacleBreaching/Crossi
nr
Notes:
l . control and sccurityrefersto the establishment
of a safeand s e c u r ec n v i r o n n r c l t t ,
in which otlternon-militaryagencies may operateand assistin the operational ancl
strategicobjectives.
S u p p o rtto i n f i a s t r u c t u raen dG o v c r n a n cwc i l l i n c l u d em i l i t a r yr e s o u r . c c s
being
uscdto suppoflcivil infrastrlrctLrre and theapplicationof miliiary resour.ce s a.d
p c r s o n n ct lo e s t a b l i s a
h n d / o rc o n c l L ricntt c r i mo r i n i t i a lg o v e n r a n ctea s k s .
I l x a r n p l eosf g o v e m a n c tea s k sr n a yi n c l u d er u n n i n gs c h o o l se. s t a b i i s 5 i n g
markct
placesiinclactingas mayorsand pubiicofficials
A s s i s t a n cteo o t h e ra g e n c i erse f e r st o ' i l i t u r y a s s i s t a ' c teo s p c c i f i c
agencies.
hclpingthem to reachoperational objectives. For example,n-,ilito.yfor.., may bc
allocatedto assistelectionorganisers with securityand iogisticalsupport

...--_-''..__--_-J

F i g u r e3 ' ' I ' y p c so f ' T a c t i c a o


l p e r a t i o n sa n d s u b o r d i n a t c' l r . r e s

CJrap
I. 7i:5

An.)noan E t nn nn 6
DRAI'"f

] - H F -C O N T I N T J U } , O
I F OPERATIONS 1\,IODEL
'l-hc
l-i t h r e ec o n t p o nnei s o 1 ' t h em o d e lf o r t h c c o r r t i n u u no f o p c r a t i o nrsh a th a r , , e
b c e nd e l l n e d- t h es p e c t r u no f c o n f l i c t p , r e c l o m i n a cnat m p a i g n t h e m e sa, n d t y p e so f
( ) l l c r a t l o n- su t r - t snto r vb e c o m b i n e cr vi i t ht h e f o u r - t e
hI e n t e n ts,i m r - r l t a n e i tlyn,o t h e r
r v o r d sd, r - r r i nag c a r l p a i g nw i t h r nt h c s p e c t r u ronf c o n f l j c t e. v e n t sw i l l r n c l u d ce l e u r e n tosl
t h e t h r ee t 1 ' p c so f t a c t i c aol p e r a t i o nosc c r . r r i n sgi m r - r i t a n e o u s-lfyh ea b i l i t yt o v i s u a l i z , e
t h i sr v i l l a . s s i scto m t n a u d e rbso t ht o b a i a n c er e s o L l r c e a sn dt o u n d e r s t a nhdo r vo p e r a t i o n s
rvill irnpactLlpoltcrneanotlierand the futurc,

16. z \ c a m p a i g ni s a s e r i e so f ' o p c r a t i o nl se a d i n gt o a d e s i r e de n d s t a t eo, n c


c h a r : t c t c r i s toi cf l v h i c hi s u s u a l l yt i ' r ec r e a t i o no f a s t a t b lpec a c e .I n o r d c rt o p r o g r e s s
t o w a r d st h e e n d s t a t ec, o m m a n d e rm s u s tc o n t i n u a ) lays s e stsh c c h a r a c t e n s t i o c sf t h e
c a m p a i g na n d ,a s s u c c e sosr f a i l u r eo f a g i v e np h a s eo l t h e c a m p a i g nu n f o l d s a. d j u s t h e
l l r e d t r t n i n a en at m p r r g nt h e r n e A d j u s t i n gt h c c a m p r i g nt h c m ei n t u r na d j u s t sl b c u s .
r e s o t l r c ed s .i r e c t e dt a s k s a, n d s o o n . A c a m p a i g nt l r a tb c g i n sa s m a " j o r c o m b as th o u l c l
ev e n t u a i l ) ' l c a tdo p c a c es L l p p o ratn d f i n a l l yt o p e a c e t i r l ren i l i t a r ye n g a g e m c n t' f. h e
c a m p a l g nm a y n o t i n c l u d ec o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n b c yu .t c o m m a n d e rm s u s tn o t o v e r l o o kt h a t
p o s s i b i l i t ya n d m u s tp l a n a c c o r d i n g l y I. t i s p a r t i c L r l a rilryn p o r t a nt th a to p e r a t i o n . s
c o n d t t c t e ud n d e ra g i v e nc a m p a i g nt h e m es h o u l dc o n s i d etrh o s ea s p e c ttsl i a tr v i l l 1 ' a c i l i t a t e
I r l o v el r e l l t t o a l o w e rl e v e lo f c o n f l i c ta n d i t s e q L r i v a l ecnat m p a i g nt h e m e . ' f h c r cr v i l l b e
lllstances whcn shofi term tacticalsuccesswiil haveto be sacrificcdin ordcr to suDDorl
t h e l o n g e rt e n n g o a l so f s t a b l ep c a c ea n dt h c w e l l - b e i n go f t h e p o p u ) a c e .

?7. W i t h i n a c a m p a i g nt h e n r ea, L it h r c et y p c so i ' o p c r a t i o nasr ec o n d u c t e d


s t t t - t u l t a n e o u(ssl e
y eF i g u r e4 ) . A l t h o u g hs o m em a y b c s e q u e n t i asl u , c ha s a n a t t a c k
l b l l o w e db y d e f e n c em , a n y o c c u rc o n c u r r e n t l yi .r o r e x a m p l e :

a w i t h i n a m a j o rc o m b a tc a m p a i g nt h e m e a . f b r c em a y b e a t t a c k i n gi n o r r e
a r e ad , e f ' c n d i n ign a n o t h e rr,n d c o n d r . r c t i h
nug m a n i t a r i aans s l s t a l r cl pc a
t h i r da r c a :

b off-ensive
operationsin part of the areao l o p e r a t i o nm
s aybe reinforced
with stabilityoperationsconductedby the leadcombatforccsor by
lbllow-on forces,and

d u r i n ga p c a c es u p p o :c1a n i p a i g nc .c - , r n p r i sri n a g i n l vs r a b i l i t ay c r j ri t i c s .
t h c r er n a yb e a r c q u i r e m e nt to s u a r dv i t a l p o i n t s( d c f e n s i v o ep e r a t i o n ) .
attacka rccalcitrantelernent(an ol'fcnsivcoperation)or securea block ol
b u i l d i r r g(sc o r d o na n d s e a r c h- s t a b i l i t yo p e r a t i o nd)u r i n gt h e a r r e s ot 1 ' a
u a r c r i n r i n atla s t a b i ) i t oy p e r a t i t - ' n . ) .

l8 I i t s h o r l . . , r ' i t l t vi ni r t u a l l ya n v c a m p a i e nt h e r x ec, o m r n a n C cm r su s l b e o r . e o a r et d
3
c o t t d r t cftL r i sl p c c t r u mo p e r a t i o nus , i t ha v i c l l , t o m o v i n gt o i . r , a r ct hl se m o r ep . u . . f u l e n do l
t h c s p c c t r r - uor1- r' c o n f l i c t T . h e b a l a n c ca m o n gt y p c so f t a c i i c aol p e r a t i o ngsi v e sa
c a t t r p a i g int s p r e d o r n i n a nc th a r a c t e ra: m a jo r c o m b a tc a r n p a i ginh e n t cr n a yc o n s i s L

C h a p L B / l- s

A0202305-8.000009
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p n m a nI\ o 1o' f i ' e n s i r o


. ,p
eer a t i o n s .h i i cc o L r . t c ri s- lLf r r g c rhca' sa c o m p l crx, , x o f ' a i l
tltree-
tvpc-i. "i

O f f e n si v e
Operations

D ef e ns i v e
S t ab i l i t y
Operations
Operations

P e a c eS u p p o r t cotN

F i g u r c 4 , T h e c o n t i n u u m o f o p e r a t i o n sM o d e r : A n I i l u s t r a t i v e
E,xampre

'lhc
29' r n o c lIeo f t h ec o n t i n u u mo f o p e r a t i o ni sl l u s t r a t etsh i sc o m b i n a t i o n
of
sttnultancous offensive'defensive, and stabilityoperations.The combinationar-rd balance
o 1 ' t h ct l i r c et y p e so f o p e r a t i o nws i l l c h a n g ew i t h t h e c a m p a i g tnh e m e .
A n y o p e r a t i o irsr a
combinaliono1-offe ncc' defence,and stabilitytaskscondirctlcl simultaneously. T5e
r c l a t i v cr v e i g h gt i v e nt o e a c ht h r o u g ht h ea l l o c a t i o no f r e s o u r c easn dt h c t a s kc r g a n i z a t i o n
i s d c p c n d c not n t h e p r e d o m i n a ncta m p a i g n themc.

l0 w h i l e d i f f e r e ntty p e so f o p e r a t i o nm s a y b e c o n c j u c t esci m l u l r a n e o u s tl yh,c w , e rg6t


a s s i g n etdo c a c hw , i l ls h i f tw r t h t i m e ,b o t hw i t h i n a c a r n p a i gtnh e m e
a n c bl e t w c e n
c a m p a i g nt h e m c s .i d e a l l y c, a m p a i g n t h e m e sw i l l s h i f ii i o r t r i g t - r .I ,e v e l so { ' c o n l l r cito
l o r v c t ' l c V c l bs u
. t t h c i ' m a ya l s og o i n t h c o p p o s i t c l i r c c t i oinf
c o n f l i c ti n c r e a s ecsl L r r i r r g
t l i ec i r r n p a i g nA. g c o dc x a m p l eo f t h i sw a st h e e s c a l a t i oopf t h e
o p e r a t i c ,r.n, S o ' a l i a
t i o t np ea c c s L l p p o rt o t c o u n t re- i n s u r g e n c( ,avi t h o L r gohf ' a v e r y l i m i t e dc l u r a t i o n ) ,

'l I when opcrating a t a n v p o i n ta l o n gt h ec o n l i n u u mc, o m m a n c l ear sn ds r a l ' f \


shoLrlci
c o n s i d ehr o w ' t op r e v e n t h ee s c a l a t i oonf v i o l e n c eb y t h ea d v e r s a r y .
D u r i n gp e a c c
s u p p ( ) f tf .b r c x a r n p l eo, p c r a t i o nm
s u s tb e c o n d u c t e w d i t h a v i e w t o p r e v e n t i ncgs c a l a t i t - r '
t o a n i n s u r _ ne cev o r t o m a j o rc o r n b a t .

ll I l c c o g n i z i n gc h a n g i n gc i r c u m s t a n c e
o sr c o n d i t i o n sc.s p e c i al yl o n c sl h l t r c q u i r ea
c l l a n s ct o t h e n l a J o trh e m eo f a c a m p a i g ni s, b o t ha n i n l c l l e c t L r a l
a s w c l l a sa n i n r e l l i g e n c c
c h a i l e n s eT h i . si s p a r to f t h e a r t o 1 ' w a r ,T h e i n t e l l i g e n csey s t e l n
m u s tb c a t t u n e ct oj . a r c j

( ' h a p1 : 9 , 1 5

Anonatn E n nnn^4^
DI{AFT

l ' - r t l k1 t - rlrn. d i c a t o t o
: si s h i l i s . a n dc c m m a n d c rasn c sl t a l ' 1m s u s tb e a b l ct o i n t c r . p r et ht ek e r
t t l d t c a t o rtsl t a ts h o r v ' as h i f t i s t a k i n gp l a c e C
. o m i n a n d c rasn ds t a f f sr n i i s t h e na c t i n a
c h a n g i n gc t l v i r o n n t e net ,i t h c rl o p r c v e n e t s c a l a t t ocnl ' v i o l c n c eo r f a c i l j t a t e
a s h i l tt o a
i o r v e rl e , v c io f v i o l e n c ei,n s u c ha w a ) /t h a tt h es i t u a t i o nr s r n a n a g e a bbl ey t h e f o r c e sa t
l r a l r d ".

S E C T I O N 3 : O V E I T V I E WO I . I N S U R G I T N C I E S
AND COUN'IER-
INSUIlGENCIES

ii. , ' \ t i t s n r o s t b a s i c , a t ' i i n s u r g e n c yi s a n r - r p r i s i nogr i n s u r r e c t i o na g a i n s t : r 1


c s t a b l i s h cfdb r r no f a u t h o r i t yn, o r r n a l l ya g o \ / c l n m e not ,c c u p y i n ga u t h o r i t yo . r o i i u l
s t r l l c t u r eV . a r i o u ss i t u a t i o nm
s a y g i v e r i s et o a n i n s u r g e n cayn da s i n g l ei n s u r g e n cLyn a y
h a v es e v c r arl o o t a n d c o n t r i b u t r ncga u s c s .I n g e n c r a lt,h e ys p l i n gf r o m c l i s s a t i i l o . t i o n
u ' i t ha s o c i a ls t r u c t u r e o r g o v e r n r n e natr r a n g e m e nat n, d t h eb e l i e ft h a to n l y v i o l e n c ea n c l
s u b v e r s i oct ta n b r i n g a b o u tt h ed e s i r e da n dj u s t i f i e dc h a n g e w s i t h i n a r e a s o n a b lbyr i e i '
t i r n cI i a me .

14. Although someinsurgentshaveexploitcdnew opportunities anclgainedhigh


p r o f i l c si n r c c e n t i m e s ,i n s u r g e n c i et hs e m s e l v easr en o t h i n gn e w . - [ ' h e ya r ea m e t h o d
u s e db y a d i s a f f e c t c a d n d c o m m i t t e dg r o u pt h a tk n o w st h e yc a n n o tw i n o n t h e i l e l do f
b a t l l ea g a i n s at s u p e r i o rc, o n v e n t i o n aml i l i t a r yf o r c e ,a n dt h e yt h e r e f o r er e s o r t o
a s y t r r n e t r iac c t i o n st h a ta t t a c kt h ew i l l a n d m o t i v a t i o no i t h e s t a t u sq u o g o v e n t m e nat n d
s o ci e t y .

Insurgenciesare not a new phenomenon.Insurgentseffectivelycausedthe withdrawalof


Roman troops over 2000 yearsago fiom what is today Gennanyand Scotland. The
Roman Ernpire had overextendeditself and was seenas lacking legitimacywith the local
peoples- peopleswho were not averseto utilizing violencein,alteringthe political
landscape.Likewise, the Jew'ishinsurrectionchallengedthe rule of Roman authorityrn
the Middle East.

l5 Ilach insurgencyrvill haverts own setof causesand its aim or desireclcpcJ-srare .


S o n t ci n s u r g e n c i ewsi l l s t e n rf r o r na p o l i t i c a ls, o c r aal n d / o r e l i g i o u si d c o l o g yt h a t
c t l v i s i o n sa n i t n p r o v e d( e v e nu t o p i a n s) t a t eo f a f f a i r s t, h er c a l i z a t i o o
n f w h i c | . i u s t i f i c rsh e
L t s eo 1 - s u b v e r s i oann d f o r c e. O t h e ri n s u r g e n c i ewsi l l s t e r nf r o m r e a lo r p e r c e i v e d
s t ' i c v a n c et sh a t h a v cn o t b e e ns a t i s f i e dh y p e a c e f um l e a n sw , h i l e o t h e r sw , i l lb e c o n d u c r c d

l r t l ra c o t t r p l e tdei s c u s s i o on n h o w c o r l n r a n d e rrsn a yu s el h e r n o d e ol f t h c c o n t j n u u nor 1 ' c p e r a t i o rl o rs


u . r r c lcca n r p a i g n sr e , f ' c tr o N A - l - OA J I , i 2 .
I ) c v c l o p e db y t h c W a r S l L r d i eD s e p a r t r n c no tf R o v a lM i i i l a r y A
, c a d e r l y ,S a n d h L r r sa rs.q u o t ed i i r U K
\ r : l r r ' i r r e l dM a n u a l V o l I C o m b r n c dA r m s O p c r a t i o n sP, a r tl O , C o L r n t e r - l n s u r g eC n c) pv re. a t i o r r s
'
I ) c i i r r i t i c rat s d e v e l o p c db v a c o u n t c r - i n s L r r ! e nsot uy d vg r c L t ldt L r r i n lg. . l S M C
J o i r t rL j r b a nW a r r i o r2 0 U - 5
\,'\l-o AAI) 6

( ' h a pI l0il5

Antn tanE_4n nnnn,t't


DI{i\FT

0 \ ' a p a n r c L r l ag fr o L l pl h a ts r r n D l rv. i i s h ctso g a i np o \ \ , c r - b u


cat n n oor o s o t n r o L l g h
l c q i t r r n a tmc e a n so r c o n v e n t i o n au is eo f m r l i t a r ,pvo- r ' ; c r S t i l l
o t h e r s . , r , i l i r i . , n - i - .u" , n
d c ' s i r fcb r i n d e p e n d e n co ef a d i s t i r r cnt a t r o n a l i toyr c u l t u r cl a c k i n g
i L so r i n a L r t o r r o r n l , .
ltlsurgencie a sr en ] o r c1 i k e 1tyo o c c u ri n s t a t e us ' h e r ct h e r ea r ei n h c r e nrta c i a l c. u ] i u r a l .
r c i i g r o u so,r i d e o i o g i c adl i v i s i o n st h a tl e a dt o a I a c ko f n a t i o n a l
cohcsion a n dw c a x .
i r l c f f i c i e r litr.n s t a b l eo .r u n p o p u l agr o \ / e r n mnet s A d c i i t i o n af a
l c t o r ss,u c ha s c o r r L i p t i o n
a n de x t e r n aal g r t a t i o nr n , a yf a c i l i t a t a
eninsurgency.

l6 I n o t h er r v o r d sm , a n yi n s u r g e n c i cwsi l l c i e v e l oopL r ot f i - a i l e od r f a i ) i n g
s t a t e sr h a t
1 ) r itlo a d d r c s os r s a t i s l yt h e b a s i cn e e d so f t h ei r p o p u l a c eT.h c s e
n c c c l rsv r l ld i l - 1 ' c r
d e p e n d i nugp o nt h c r e g i o na n dc u l t u r ei n v o l v e db, L r itn g c r r e r awl j l l
i n c l u d et h eb a s r c
e' s s e n t i aol sf a s t a b l el i f - er,e s p o n s i b g
l eo v e r n m e nrte, l i g i o u sf r e e d o ma n dc c o n o ni rc
viabiiity. It is fiom sr:chfertilecnvironments tharinsuigencies will oftcn grow.
'l'he
1 7' a i m o r d e s i r e de n ds t a t eo f t h e i n s u r g e n cm y a y b c q u i t cc x t r e p r,es L r c S a st 6 c
c r c a t r o on f a n e w s t a t ea n ds o c i a cl o n s t r u c to, t h e r sm a y i i m p l y
s e e kt o s c i z ep o w er .
c x p e Ja l b r e i g np o w e r !o r a c q u i r cs p e c i f i cb u t l i m i t e dp o l i t i c a l
u,tuontugo . ,r c o . t r o l .
w h a t e v c rt h c a i n t 't h e i n s u r g c n ttsh c r n s e l v el -se etlh a t 1 h . i r . u u r . ,
a n ciii m j u s r i l . yt h c u s e
i l f v i o l e n c ca n ds u b v e r s i o na,n de v e nt h c u s eo f t e r r o r i s rang a i n s t
t h ec i v i l i a np o n u l a c e i'
s o r n ec a s e s .

The rise of radicalNative Americanorganizations,suchas the Mohawk


warrior
society,can be viewed as insurgencle9
wlth specificand limited aims, Although
thev donotseek
comprere
contr'or
orth.r#;.:;;#.ffiil?]lili il';.lit"""
particular
political concessionsin their reldtionshipwith nationalgovernments
and control(eitherovert or covert)of politicalaffairsat a local/reserve
(.,First
Nation")level,throughthe threatol, or useof, violence.

-l'he
38' t a c t i c su s c db y i n s u r g e n trsv i l i v a r y w i t h e a c hc a m p a i g n 'l'hcv
a n csl i t u a t i o n .
r i ' i i l c c r t a i n l iyl l c l u d cv i o l e n c eo r a t t h ev c r y l e a s t h et h r e a t v i o l e n c c .
of SuU,,.r.r;n,.,,.,na
p r o p a g a n dhaa v et r a d i t i o n a l lby e e nu s e dt o g r e a tc f f ' c c t .M o s t r e c e n l y ,
r n s L L r e e rhtlsv e
c x p J o i t etdn a s st n e d i at o c o n v e yt h e i rm c s s a g ep,r o p a g a n d tah, r e a at n c l
-l-het'seek c a p a b i l i t i etso a
l a r g ca u d i c n c e . s u p p o r itn t e r n a l l a
y n de x t e r n a l l ya,n do f i e nm a s kf l n a n c i a l
c a l l l p a l g nws i t h { ' a c a d eosf c h a r i t a b loer p o l i t i c a ol r g a n i s a t i o n D s .e n s eu r b a nt c r r a i nr , i l, lr
b c c . r p l c l i t cidn o r d e rt o a t t a c kh r g hv a l u et a r g e t si ,n f l i c tm a s sc a s u a l t r e s ,
a n dh i d c t h c r r
o\\'njlresence.Unfortunatcly, many insrlrgencies rcsortto the tacticof terrorisnras ii
l l l e a n st o r c a l i z et h e l ro p e r a t r o n a in ds t r a t e g iecn d . I n s u r g e n twsi l l a l s o
expl.itthe
t t r h e r e nr tv e a k n c s s o e fs' t h es o c i e t yu n d e ra t t a c kp, a r t i c u l a r llyi b e r a dl e m o c r a c i e s .
in orcler.
l ( )s L l p p o rt h t e l ro p e r a t i o n sT. h e i rp r o p a g a n dwai l l c o n t i n u a l lpy a i n tt h e m s e l v e s
a st 5 c
V i c t i n i so f a r l u n j u s ts o c i a lo r p o w e rs t r u c t u r ea,n dt h e i ra c t i o n s
w i l l o f t e ns e e kt o p r o v o k e
arlovcr-reaction frorl governn.]ent forcesthatcan enhancetheirimageas thc yictirn

C I r a p1 1 1 , , 1 5
IIRAFT

l9 I t l s u r g e n c i ei lS
a l r b e c o n d u c t e idn r u r a la r e a si.n L i i b a rar r c a so, r r n b o r h .
i t t s u r g e n c i revsi l l a l s oc r o s sn a t i o i - Lbaolr d e r s1. ; r s u r g e nmt a s y b a s et h e m s c l v easc r o s as n
i t t l e r t r a t i o nbaol r d e ri n a s v m p a t h e t icco u n t r . )o/ r, t h e ! r n a yh a v ep a n - n a t i o : ra iln t sa n d
t h e r ef b r c c o n d u c t h e i ra t t a c k si n m o r et h a no n eg e o g r a p h iacr e a .D u r i n gt h c C o i d W a r
C o r r t n u n i set x p a n s i o fno l l o w e dt h i sr r r o d e la. n dr ec e n t l yr a d i c a rl e l i g i o r -tr-sr l o v e l r e n l s
h a v ed e u r o n s t r a t et hdc i rg l o b a lr e a c h ,

-10 I n s u r g e n c i ehsa v en o r m a l l yb e e nt b c L r s eodn g a i n i n gt h c s u p p o r ot f a s i g n i f i c a n t


p o r t i o no l - ap o p u l a c ei ,d e a l l ya m a j o r i t y .- f h o s ew h o d o n o t r a l l yt o t h e c a u s ea r e
s u b i ' e r t e ad n d i n t i m i d a t e idn t oa t l e a s ts i l e n ts u p p o r t .I n s u r g e n c i eus r . r a l g
l ya i nt h c i r
g r e a l c sst u c c e s a s m o n g stth a ts e g r n e notf t h ep o p u l a t i o tnh a ti s d i s a f ' f - e c toerd
d i s a t l v a r t t a g ei .de, .t h o s cr . v h oh a v eg a i n e dt h e l e a s tf i o n t h e c u r r e n st o c i a lo r g a n i z a t i o n .
l : v e ni f t h e r n a j o r i t yo f t h ep o p u J a t i olna i l s t o e v c n t u a l l rya l l y t o r h es i d eo f t h c
t t l s u r g e n t tsh, c i r r s u r g e n st si n t p l yh a v et o r n a k ed c f e n d i n gt h e s t a t u sq u o t o o e x p e n s i v oe r
d i f f i c u l tf i t r t h c s e c u r i t yf b r c e st,h e g o v e n r m e n tcso u c e r n c da,n dt h e g e n e r apl o p u l a c c .
, A nr n s u r g c n ciys . t h e r e f o r eo,f i c na b a t t l eo 1 ' w i l l s .

+I . O p c r a t i o n cs o n d u c t e w d i t h i n a c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e nccaym p a i g na i m t o d c 1 ' e aatp


i n s u r g e n ctyh r o u g hm i l i t a r y ,p a r a m i l i t a r yp,o l i t i c a le, c o n o m i cp, s y c h o l o g i c aal n . dc i v i l
actions.Actions not only targetthe insurgent,but moreimporlantly,targetthe supportto
t h e i t t s u r g e nat n d t h e r o o t c a u s e tsh a th a v el e d t o c o l l e c t i v e d i s s a t i s f a c t i oa n dj u s t i f yt h c
t t r s u r g e n tas 'c t i o n s .I r ro t h e rw o r d s ,t h e m i l i t a r yp l a y sb u to n e p a r ti n a c o u n t e r -
i t t s u r g e n cavn d t h e e n t i r ec a m p a i g nw i l l i n v o l v ea w i d e v a r i c t yo f o t h e ra g e n c i e s .

42. Thtrsthe military'srole, in generalten'r'rs, rvill be to providethc secr-rrc lramework


i r rw l r i c ho t h e ra g e n c i e m s a y w o r k t o s o l v et h e s o c i a p l r o b l e m sa t t h e r o o to f t h e
i n s u r g e n c yA . l t i r o u g ht h e m i l i t a r y ' sr o l e i s l i m i t e d ,t h em a n n e ri n w h i c hi t c o n d u c t si t s
r c s p o n s i b i l i t i ewsi l l i n f l u e n c et h e o v e r a l le n v i r o n m e nat n ds u c c e sisn a l l f a c e t so f t h c
c a r n p a i g nF. o r e x a m p l ea, h e a v y - h a n d erde s p o n steo i n s u r g e natc t i v i t i c sw i l l b e e x p l o i t e d
bv thc insurgents'propaganda and underrninethc trustof the locaIpopulacein the
s c c u r i t yl b r c e s .

'r+i. A government iacingan insurgencyin its own territoryis underdirectthreat.and


can therelbre be cxpectedto b e a ra h i g h e rr i s k a n d a c c e pht i g h e rc a s u a l t i etsh a na
c , ' e l i t i o rpra r t n c r s s i s t i r rigt .
'l'hc
+4. o v e r a l le f f e c ts o u g h ti n a c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e ni cs yr r o tt h e d c a t ho r c a p t u r eo 1 '
q i t t s u r g e n t sb.u 1I l o r e i r n p o r l a n t l yt h
. e p r o v i s i o no f s e c u r i t yt o t h e p o p u l a t i o nt ,h c
r e d u c t i o no 1 ' p o p u l asru p p o r tf o r t h e i n s u r g e n ctvh r o u g hr e f b r m .a n dt h ec r - r t t i nogf ' t h e
J -l-ypical
i t t s u r g c n t 'csx t e r n a l i n k s . m e a s u r eos 1 ' e f f e c t i v e n easrsc n u m b c r so f v i o l e n r
i r r c i d e n tasn d t h e l e v c lo f p o p u l a rs l l p p o r t1 b rt h eg o v e r n n t c n t .
1_.
4-5. AlthoLrgh r - r ost p ec i f - i c a l l dy e s i g n e df b r s u c hc o u r m i t r n e n tm s ,i l i t a r yf o r . c c hs a v e
o l i e t rb e c nu s c dt o c o n d u c ct o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n c y ' c a m p a i T gh n iss. i s g e n e r a l l d y u et o t h c
l e r " eol f ' r ' i o l e n c eo l f u r e db y t h c i t r s u r g e n t a - sn,d t h e r c s u l t i n gr e q u i r c m e nf o t r .l a r t e

C h a nI 12i15

A020230 5- 12- 00001


3
DIlAF'T

l l u n l b e rosi ' i v e l l - a r m ctdt o o p st o d e n vt i r ei n s u i ' q e nht si g h


v a l u er a r g e r sp.r o t c c t 5 c
p c p L i l a cacn c g o v e r n n - i e natn, ds e e ko u ta n cdi e s t r o vi h c
i n s u r g e n tws , l i e nl r e c c s s a r \ , .

+6 C o u n t e r - i n s u r g e ni sc cy h a r a c rt e
i z ed b t ,a l o r v e rp r e v a l e n coef ' c o m b atth a .
c x p c c t e ldn m a j o rc c m b a tc a m p a i g n sT. h i sc o m b a ot c c u r s
p r i m a n l ya t t h e s m a l l - u n j t
l c v c l 'i c s e c t i o np' J a t o o no.r c o m p a n ya, l t h o L L g l nhr g e r .
-lhe o r g o n i z a t i o nusr a ys o u r c t i m cbse
ttlvolved r a t eo f r e s o u r c ceo n s u n p t i o rns a l s ol o w e ri h a n i n m a jo r
c o m b a ta, l t h o L r g h
t h ec a m p a i g a n s a w h o l c r s i i k e l yt o i a s tm u c hI o n g e rw . i t h s e v e r avl e a r sb e i n gt y p i c a l
I'hLrs thc overallresourcerequirement is usualiyhigher. Certainlythe politicalu,..1.i ,.,,nrol
c o t l t n t t mnet o f t h e n a t i o ns L r p p o r l i nt hgec o u n tre- i n s u r g e
n c y a n dp r - o v i d i ntgh er e s o L r r c e s
n r r - r bs e
t enduring.

1 7' A n o v e r r i d i n gf u t r d a m e n t o a fl c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e nocpye r a t i o ni s t h a tm i i r t a r v
l i r r c e sp l a ya k e y b u t s u p p o r t i n rgo l ei n t h ec a n r p a i g nt.i i s u n l i k e l y , r - r u f
,i..onni., *iir
bc sucldenly endedwith a majormilitaryvictoryagainstthe insr,rrgents, who arc ofte'
1 ) c e t i nagn ds c a t t c r eidn s r n a l l c, l a n d e s t i ncec l l s . i l t h o u g h t h e r c
a r ee x a r n p l eosf
i r l s u r s e n c ia c sn dc o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n ct iheasth a v cr e s r - r l t c c J l n
< j e c i s i vrcn i l i r a i ys u c c e s s e s
lc g Castro'sCubanrevolutionin the formcrcase,and the defeatof'theNortlr
West
Rebcllion i n t i r el a t t e r c a s ct)h e l o n gt c r ms o l u t i o nsst i l l r e q u i r e cpio l i t i c a l
a n c cl c o l o r n i c
l.I]casures.

'1ll' I I i n s u r g c n c i csst e mf r o m p o l i t i c aal n ds o c i a d l i s s a t i s f a c t r oa nn s ,d i d e a sl b r s o c i a l


changc,thentheycan only be effectivelyfoughtwith rcfcrence
to clivcrsef'actors suchas
p o l i t i c se, c o n o m i c sp,o l i c ec a p a b i l i t ys,o c i a sl t r u c t u r ec,u l t u r e
a n dp s y c h o l o g la, ,l o n g
rvitiimilitarypower. Flencc,any counter-insurgency must con.sist of a multi-_;;nng;,
multi-agency approachat thc strategic, operational and tacticallcvels. Thc causes"and
sYlnptolns (t.e.symptomssuchas the insurgents themselves and theirpopularsupport)
tnustbe addresscd througha combinationof kineticand non-kineticcifects,alonj
'''ariouslincsof'operation.
Forexample,whilcpoliceandmilitaryareco-operatinginthe
scarchfor insurgentbascs.international andnon-govemmental aid organizations (ilong
vvithmilitarysupporl)may be dcvelopingimprov-dinfrastructure
in Jisadvantagcd L,.ban
areaswhilc lhe government,with help liom a supporlingwestern
democracy, n,,Iyb"
r c f b r r n i ne gl e c t i o nl a w st o a d d r e s s o m eu n d e r l y i n d g i s s a t i s l a c t i of bnr t h eg . n . r n l
Popuiatiotr'In short,althoughdifferentmethocls and aims may bc Lrsecl at clifl-crent ]cvels
o l a u t h o r i t l .a l l r n r - r sbte b o u n cbl y a u n i t yo f p u r p o s cr,h a ti s , i o c l e l ' c a t
theinsurgencv
a r l di l s c a L l s e sF i g u r e5 i l l u s t r a t etsh ev a r i o u sl i n e so 1 ' o p c r a t i o inn,
anintcrlo.Li.,g
s - \ ' s t eonf ' a c t i o nl,b c L r s codn a c h i c v i n gt h ep o l i t i c ael n d s t a t e .

(.hap I 13,:5

A 0 2 0 2 3 0 5 - 1 3 - 0 0 040 1
I)R,.\I,-T

POLITICAL

E
N
OPPOSNG

i'D
S
T

J) T
U E
R
P
o
S
F

F i g u r e 5 , M u l t i - a g c n c yA p p r o a c h

49. I i t e | ; i : r ei l t l c st l l L t l L r i t l cr n i l i t u l r o l t en r ( i r r r .rtrsr r rt ll r et i es r r i t h i n l r e( ) u n t ( . 1
i r l \ t t l . ! c r\ t, el t l t te r c t l i t i n c dc r t u n tl i r rd e c r i c i crsl n . t r tec r r t i r r i c sI .l r o s ct r l i n cj r r l e s
t r t l i c t t l l t lt e
J i r l l , r irrrr sl l r c i n s r , r r g ci cr tseo l ' t h cn r i c l c l tl rcl ' t l t cl i r s cl u n t r r l lrc r n l r i nr l r l i t rl r p t j
. ' i 'cl c L iti ' l r r r i l t r ( ' o t t rc r t t i r r t tilttrl . n t i ci lsl c n r ) ln c c c s s i r r i ] r ' s L r u c ttr9r rl lut lt rl r i l ! ' ! , 1 1 1 [ u r . -
i r t s t t t ' . - e nbcar t t l e .H o w e v e r ,s u c ho p e r a t i o nasr en o t t h ep u r v i e wo f s p e c i aol r e l i t e
rnilitaryor para-militaryforces(althoughthey rnayhaverolesto play as well). I{isrory
Itasdemonstrated that the most successful counter-insurgency operationshavc been
conductedby non-doctrinaire, conventional(evenconscript)anniesthat havc deployecl
r . v i t hs i r n p l l ' ag u i d r n gs c t o f p r i n c i p l e sd, c v e l o p i n gt h e i rt a c t i c sa s t h e s i t u a r i o pb e c a r n e
itndet'stood. Paramourtt to the success of the rnilitaryportionof the campaignhasbeen
t h e a b i l i t yo f o f f i c e r st o e x e r c i s e t h e i rc o m m a n dw i t h l i c c d o m ,f ) e x i b i l i t ya n d c o l f i c i e n c e
cvcn dow'nto tlte Iorryest levcls,usingingenuitllanclresourccfulness to take the battlcto
thetnsurgetto t sn o n e h a n d ,v l , h i l sat t t e r n p t i ntgo r e s o l v et h e r o o tc a L l s eosn t h e o t h e r .
l r r d e e dt,h o s ea t t r i b u t e os f a r e g i m c n t asl y s t e m- c o n f i c l e n cael f o r d e ct ih c c o m n r a n d ei n r
r c n l o l cs i t t t a t i c l nlsa,r n i l i a r i t ya m o n gc o r n r a d easn d a c r o s sr a n k s ,a n c rl e i i a n c eo 1 s u r a l l
L t t l i(t c v c t ls e , c l i t t na)c t i o n s- h a v ep r o v c r r r o s Ie f ' f e c t i vien c o u n t e r - r n s u r g e n c y
opcrao t ln s .

' 1t n t t a s n t / , r t ' , t , - l n / e n r r ' t . ) . C o n f l i-c tA C o r t t p c t r u ! i t , e


A n i t l . t ' . s r .c:d. .i t e d b y D a v i d C l t a r t e ras n d N l u u r i c c
i i r s * , e l l .l 3 r - a s s c ; , D ' se i ' e n c eI ) u b l i s h e r sT. o r o n t o . I 9 8 9 .

( ' l r a pi l.+/15

AnanttnE 4i nnnn{t
I)RAF'I

"successfulwqrri,rs arepractical men. 'they


rendro usewhat works. Ancj
tnsurgencyworks. Insurgentshave defeatedthe us in vietnam. ,

colonel[R-etd)
T.X.Hammes, uSMC,"why StudySmairwars?,,,
snart
Ilars Journol,Yol1 (April2005):1,3

'[-he
50 commitmentof westernclcmocracics anclailiancesto the stabilization of.
l a i l e do r f a i i i n gs t a t e sa n dt h ed e s i r et o l i m i t g l o b a l e f f e c t s
o f i n s u r g e n c r ei ns a n e r ao f
\ \ c a p o n so f m a s sd e s t r u c t i om n e a n st h a tg o v e r n r n c nw t si l l c l e p l o yb o t hr r i l i t a r yf o r c c s
a n dc r i v i l i a an g e n c i e st o, g c t h e ri ,n o r d c rt o a d d r e stsh e s et h r e a i s
t o r c g r o n aal n dg l o b a l
s t a b i l i t y N o t o n l y m u s tc o m t n a n d e rusn d e r s t a ntdh em i l i t a r y ' s
r o l ei n a c o u n t c r -
I n s u r g e l l ccya r n p a i g nb,L rtth e ym u s tb e a b l et o u n c l e r s t a n d
t l i ek e y r o l e p l a y e db y o t h e r
all agencies w,orkrogetherin a unrtyol.purposcro dcfcarinsurgcncics
:::'l:i.::. 1":lf"*
lrnoIltell'ca11scs.

('hap 1 5 1i 5
i.LJ

DRAFT

C H A P T E R2

DESCRIBING
A N I N SU R G E N C Y
' What
theIsraeli.s
soondiscoveredwasthatArafathadtransformed a loosefederation of
armedgroupsintoa campLex economicorganization.Actinglike a legitimatestate,the
PLOgenerated annualrevenuein excess
ofthegrossnationalproduit ofa numberof
Arab countries,includingJordan.
Thanksto thiswindfaltit effectively
ran Gazaanclthe
LlestBank"

LorettaNapoleoni,TerrorIncorporaled; Tracingthe Dollars Behindthe Terror


Neltyorks. New York:SevenStories Press.
2005:65, on the outbreakof the Intifada
( u p r i s i n gi n) D e c e m b e1r9 8 7 .

SECTION I: GENERAL

I Causes.An insurgencymay springfrom many causes;however,the classic


lnsurgencyusuallybeginswith the perceptionof oppressiondueto political,societaland
economicgrievances.When theseperceptions becomesufficientlyemotive,leadersmay
emergewho are ableto organiseprotestor resistance,
and influencepeopleto risk
imprisonmentand evendeathin orderto resistthe establishedorder.

2. Aim. An insurrectionwill aim to gainthe advantageof powerwithin a given


politicalcontextin order to realisesocio-economic,
cultural,religiousand geographic
goalsor somecombinationof these,

3 Characteristics. Each insurgencyis uniqueand will thereforehaveits own set of


characteristics. Although insurgencies may sharesimilarcharacteristics, eachwill have
exceptionalfeatures.For this reason,Cold War-styieintelligenceand planningtemplates
have reducedutility. In conventionalmanoeuvrewarfare,the known structureof military
formationsand evidentpatternof troop concentrationin specificterrainoften gave vcry
good indicationof intent.For example,the concentration of Army level bridgingassetsin
a MechanizedDivision's areaof responsibility frontingon a river,with two Armoured
Divisionsmoving into assemblyareasin the immediatedepth,arevery goodindications
of the preparatoryphasesof a deliberate assaultriver crossing.An insurgentmovcment
will probablyuse a cellularstructurewithin which the cellsdo not conformto a Datrern
amongstor within themselves. Nottcthclcss. altltoushntuchi.r-rtl'c
cprnitlcx.thc intent of'
insurgentsbascdon struclul'es can be rlcternrincd.Irttrerarnple,su.staitrecl
observation
may revealcertaince1lslinked with specificactivitiessuchas informationoperations,
kidnappingor bank robbery,Nonetheless, as a securitymeasure,insurgents may alteror
transformcells for specificoperationsin a randommanner.The one key attribuie,wSich
distinguishesinsurgencyfrom most otherforms of conflict,is the insurgent'saim o1'
f o r c i n gp o l i t i c a lc h a n g e .

4. T r a n s i t i o n a lN a t u r e o f I n s u r g e n c i e sI.n s u r g e n c i easr em o r el i k e l yt o o c c u ri n
stateswith inherentsocialboundaries, whoseracial,cultural,religious,or ideologicai

c h 2 ' .1 t 1 7

A0202306-1.000017
DRAFT

drlferences dtsruptnationalcohesion,Insurgencies thrivein stateslackingefficient,


s t a b l eo. r p o p u l a g r o \ er n m e n t sc, o n d i t i o ntsh a ta r ea g g r a v a t ebdy e c o n o m i cw e a k n e s s .
corruption, or foreignagitation.Althoughvariousinsurgency ntoclclsexist,ferv
i n s u r g e n c i ef ist n e a t J yi u t o a n y r i g i dc l a s s i f i c a t i osnu. c ha s r u r a lo r u r b a u L. e n i n i s ot r
Maoist.Effectiveinsurgents wiil takepreviouscampaigns'lessons andadaptthemto
t h e i ro u ' np a r t i c u l anr e e d sF. o r e x a m p l ei ,n r h e1 9 9 0 sH . a m a sp r o f i t e db 1 , t h ep L O ' s l o s s
dueto Arafat'salignmentwith SaddamHusseinandhis relativelymoderatepolicies
towardIsrael.The Saudiscut off moneyto the pLO, which causedthemto losc
influence.While not lessening its anti-lsraels[ance,Hamasavoidedsupportingthe Iraqi
dictator.Palestinians beganlookingto Hamasfor leadershipBy the end of the 1990s,
Flamaswas carryingout most of the terroractivityin Israel.Israelisourcesclaimedthat
in the l6 monthsbeforeMay 2002,Hamasreceived$135MILLION (uS) from Saudi
Arabiato meetexpcnses, '

5 Assessingthe Insurgencl,.Examiningthe completerangeof characteristics will


tissista commanderand staff in predictingthe insurgents'campaignplan.Prcvious
experienceand historicalresearchmay providevaluableguidance,however,the key to an
approprtate response remainsan objectivemilitaryestimate:seeannexA for a list of
factorsthat shouldbe considered. trsscntiallv.
1osupportopcrationalpiapninq.thc
estimatewiil identifythe insurgency'scauses, the extentof its'internaland external
support,includingthe basisof the insurgents'appealto the targetpopulation,motivation
and depth of iocal commitment,and the likely weaponsand tacticsCOIN forcesmav
face.

6. Forms of Insurqencv.As established above,it is vital to militarysuccess


for
commandersand staffsto fuily understandthe natureof the insurgency.To this end, six
main forms of insurgencyhave beendefined,which are listedin the foilowins table.

Comment
Anarchist Intent is to destroythe system.There Being very secretive, such
are normaily no plansto replaceany groupsremain smali and
form of governmentwith another lacking public support.
system.The mostpotentially Given the rising threatof
dangerousform of insurrectionis that terrorismbasedon
of the anarchistgroup which setsout Weaponsof Mass
to eliminateall poiitical structures Destructiontheirpotential
and the socialfabricassociated with d e s t r u c t i v e n etsoss o c i e t y
them. cannotbe overlooked.2
Egalitarian Seeksto imposecentrallycontrolled This hasbeenseenrecentlv
structuresand institutions.bv ln two variants:Communist
mobilizingthe people(masses). to (Malaya,Vietnam),and

LorettaNapoleoni,Terror lncorporated Tracing the Dollars behindthe Terror Netvorks. New york:
S e v e nS t o r i e sP r e s s2, 0 0 5 : 7 2 - 7 3p a s s i m .
:
F ' o re x a m p l e T , h e U S S e n a t eN u c l e a rP r o l i f e r a t i o snu r v e ya s s e s s eas7 0 p e r c e n tc h a n c eo f
n u c l e a r / r a d i o l o g i ct ae lr r o r i s r nw i t h i n t h e d e c a d eO
. n l i n eh t t p : / / l u g a r . s e n a t e , g o v / r e p o r t s , N p S u r v e y , p d f .
A c c e s s eld6 J u l y 2 0 0 5 .

ch2'.2t11

A n^n 6-n
DRAFT

p l o v l o ee q u a r l /t )r n t h ed t s t r r b u t rooln B a ' a t h r s(tS y n a ,I r a q )


all stateresourc
I-raditionalist S..kt to *".t1 ,".k t" -
l n l s I y p eo I r n s u r g e n c v
nafinral/nrinrno I vaiuesrootedin the oftenincitessimilar
nrprlinrrc nBen -. r. d
r J] "L^r ll ^w- li w
- -S. 1t z r u , l " i . r ^ . . ,
ritJ!v1) movementseisewhere. Seen
nf th e .e oi^. recentlyas IslamicJihad
(Egypt)or Ilezbollah
(Lebanon)
Separatist Seeksto removethemselves, and the T h e l n m n f n n l i t i n a l
areain which they live, from the systemadoptedby
control of the remainderof the state successful insurgents varies
enormously.Amongstthe
examplesarethe Tamils
(LTTE) in Sri Lanka
Reformist This form of insurgencyis similar to Fightingby Mexican
the separatisttype but more moderate, Indians(1994)in that
in that insurgentgroupsfight for country'ssouthis a recent
political, economicor socialreforms example.
and possibly someform of autonomy,
without dramaticallyalteringthe
oolitical statusouo.
Preservationist Seeksto maintain the political status Can be seenin the
quo becauseofthe relative Afrikaner Resistance
advantages available.These Movement in apartheid
insurgentsfight non-rulinggroups SouthAfrica, and Northem
and the goverrrment,where necessary, Ireland'sProtestant
in order to frustrateanv moves paramilitarygroups.
towardschanse,

SECTION 2: THE SCOPE, CONTEXT AND LIMITATIONS OF INSURGENCY

7. Strategies. Insurgentleadersare generallywell informed,astuteand will


probablystudythe lessonsof previouscampaignsof insurgency. Globally,because
popuiarinsurgentstrategies continueto provideinspirationand assistance
for diverse
groups,the professionaldevelopmentof inteiligenceand operationsstaff shouldinclude
study in this area.Analysisof an insurgent's
strategicapproachhaspracticalapplication,
includingthe productionof doctrinalCOIN guidance.Four broadstrategicapproaches
are sLrggested below,the elementsof whichmay be combinedby the insurgents:

a. Conspiratorial Stratesy. The oldestand leastcomplicatedof the


strategies featuressmall cellsattemptingto releasethe energyof a
disalfectedsociety.generating a "spontaneous" uprisingby meansof bold
a r m e da c t i o n .T h i s w a s t h e s t r a t e g u
y s e db y t h eB o l s h e v i k si n 1 9 1 7 ,
whereinke1'points are seized and a decapitating strikemadeagainstthe

Ch2:3117

An2n??nA_? nnnn,r o
DRAFT

g o v e m l n gr e g l m c I, n r t sm o d e r nv a r i a n tt.h e i n s u r g e n tpsl a c e
greae
t ilbrt
i n t oe x p l o i t j nm
g e d i ac o v c r a g. e

ProfractedPopular War This Maoiststrategyseesthree,,phase


s,,:
strategicdefence(organization), strategicequilibriumlgueniilawarfare)
and strategicoffensive(openbattle),culminatingin theleizure
of political
power.This strategyassumes that the causewill attractever-increasing
numbersof supporters. Its tacticsinvolvea mix of politicalactivitl,,
tenorism and guenilla warfare,with the former alwayspredominating.
The strategyhasbeenmostapplicablein rural,peasant_ius.,t
environments in situationswheregovemmentcontrolis weakor non_
existent.cities and urbanrzation may providea similarspacencededto
fosterthe groMh of this typeof insurrcction,

c . Urban Insurgencv.In its pure form this strategyinvolvesthe


application
of organizedcrimeandtenorismin a systematic and ruthlessmanner.This
strategy,morethanthe others,aimsto provokea repressive military
response that will alienatea volatilemassof the urbanpoor andmove
them to revolt.It reliesprimarilyuponruthlessterrortacticsaugmentect
by
media manipulationto generatean air of panic,erodethe morale
of the
politicians,the administrators and thejudiciary,the policeandthe army,
with the aim of inducinga climateof collapse.The insurgency
anticipates
that the governmentwill then capitulateor be provokedi-ntoactopting
repressive measures and,aboveall, causingbloodshed. Againstsuch
repression,the insurgentappearsas the peoples,protectoi

d. Militarv Focus. In contradiction with almostall insurgentstrategres, this


one placespriority on military, ratherthan political, suc-cess.
It hasbeen
ascribedto the cuban leadership (FidelandRaul castro,and ,,che',
Guevara).Assumingthat the populationwill flock to the winning
side,it
works only when the governmentis weak,has beendiscredited,
and racks
reliable,effective,armedforces,Be awarethat othertypesof
insurgent
groupsappearby seekinga well-publicized milita$ui..r, earlyon, so as
to gain popularsupport;and

e . Liberation Strategy. Whilst many insurgencies


may be focusedon
nationalaimsand the creationof a new state,someinsurgencies
may
simply aim at the expulsionof what is viewedu, un o...ipying
authority
or nation(s).In many peacesupportor stabilisingoperations u-.ing
conductedby a coalitionwith an rnternationally
ianctionedmandate ,a
disaffectedelement(oftenone that has lost power) may resort
to an
insurgencystrategyin orderto disruptthe effortsto stabilise
or cementthe
new politicalorder.

C h2 :4 / 1 7
DRA}'T

Basic Tenets.AII successful insurgen'rs adhereto certainbasrctenets.Naturally


s L r cp h r i n c i p i e sm u s tb e a p p l i e dr a t r o n a l i w l n dp o i i t i c a l
y i t h i nt h e e x i s t i n gs o c i a a
c i r c u m s t a n c ewsh e n a s s e s s i nagn i n s u r g e n c yT.h e s et c n e t sa r e :

a. a suitablecause;

b leadership;

c . popular support;and

d . organization.

9. Motivating Central Cause.As mentionedpreviously,the definitionof "the


cause" crucial as a rallyingpoint.The "cause"must appealto all levelsfiom
is
to the tacticalmotivationof
supportingthe philosophicidealsof the strategicleadership
the rank and file.

10. Leadership.An insurrection oflen givesriseto a charismaticleader,who


inspiresfollowers, convertsthe uncommitted,and commandsthe respector fear of those
who normally supportthe government.Often throughouthistory, such leadershave
become"cult figures"whosevery namebecomesa rallyingpoint,Lxamplcsinclucic
Lenin, GeneralFranco and Che Guevara.Insurgenciesrequireleadersable to determine
political/strategicaims as well as the enablingtactics.While a strongleaderis requiredin
the early stagesof an insurgencywhen it is necessaryto enforceonesleadershipagainst
contendingrivals or if the causeseemsweak or divisive. When the causeis sound,the
leaderneednot be so charismatic.
'fhe
IL Popular Support. causeand the leadermust appealto as wide an audience
as possible,Those who are uncommittedor hostile to the causemust be persuadedor
coercedto join the cause.Somemay have to be killed to persuadethe others.Popular
supportis important from a political point of view, and essentialto the provision of
intelligence,Iogistics,and to supporta protectivesecurityscreenaroundthe insurgents'
clandcstineorganization.

12. Orqanization. A successful insurgencymust havesomeorganizationin orderto


functionand respondto the many aspects of an insurgency. As the insurgencydevelops,
organiz-ation into groups/cellsi companiesetc will be vital for securityand to expand
f u r t h e r l. n a d d i t i o n t, h e o r g a n i z a t i omn a y p r o v et o b e t h en u c i e u so f a s u c c e s s o r
goverrrment shouldthe insurgencysucceed. Modern networkingenablescommunications
for the coordinationof rnsurgentactivities. Fund raisingand the transferof moneyare
madeeasierand more discrete.Virtual commandsaveson riskl'face-to-face meetings
and courieractivitiesbut alsotendsto lessencentralized control.The bombingsin
M a d r i d a n d L o n d o ni n 2 0 0 5 a r ec x a m p l e so f t h i s p a r a i l e l i s m e n a b l e db y m o d e r nw e b
basedcommunications. The Madrid bombings probably influenced an electionand

Ch2:5t11

a n 2n 2 1 0 6 - 5 - n n n o 2 1
DRAFT

caused t h e a l t e r a t i oonf S p a n i s h
g o v e r n m e npto l i c y .8 1 ,c o n t r a s t h
, eL o n d o nb o m b i n c s
rvereprobablycounterproductive anclonl1,servedto stifienBritishnationajresolve.

13' C o n t e x to f t h e I n s u r g e n c v .B e y o n dt h e s ef o u r b a s i ct e n e t s ,
a s u c c e s s l uCi o l N
programmust alsoconsiderthe insurgency's context,Circumstance will o{tendictate
whatan insurgentcan,and canrot,do. For exalnple,several
uprisingsthat slavishly
r"r]:r:r,-t:lussia or cuba were dism.alfaiiules The Spartacist
::fl:l revolts in Germany
\ t Y t v ) , a n dL h e u u e v a r r a ' sa t t e m p t rsn B o l i v i a( 1 9 6 1 )f a i l e dg i v e nt h a t
ideologica)ly
bascdcampaignplansdid not fit the socio-political contextof"G.rrnunyand Bolivia
respectiveiy.Nonetheless, a population,thatis dissatisfied with its conditionsin general
andholdsthe perception of a weak government, canprovidefertilesoil for a skillcd
insurrectionary leaderwith a popularcauseand comietentorganizational
support.A well
led and organizedinsurrectionmay, if the governmentcommands
a wide measureof
supportand can rely on its securityforces,devolveinto a protracted,
attritionalwar. Such
an attritioncampaignmay still succeedif the insurg.n.y.un
graduallyerodethe will of
thegovernment's supporters at and persuade publicopinionairongstits foreignalliesthat
thegovemment'scauseis hopeless.

14. Factors Affectins. The factorsaffectingan insurgency


can be as importantas the
tenetsof the insurgencyitselfand will contributesignificantiy
to the end resultsif
carefullyapplied.'l'he factorsare:

2 Protractedwar' Although a weak govemmentmay falr quite


quickry to a
well organizedrebellion,or evenovernightto a coup d'dtat,
u ,trung
governmentmay only be defeatedby a war of attrition.
Time is on the side
of the insurgent.Rural territorysupportsa gradualoccupation
of a
country,as demonstratedby Mao Tse-tungin china. arihough
an urban
guerrilla'sinability to occupyterritorycan be partially
overJore by
establishing"no-go" areaswith in cities,the strategyl,
-o." one of'war-
weariness,economicprivation,and the inability oith. gou"-ment
to
suppressterrorism,than on winning an overall militaryiictory
to achieve
victory.
b. choice of Terrain.Given the reiativewcakness, rn rerationto the
government's standingarmy,an insurgentforceis compelledto make
best
useof terrain.As recentlynoteciin one academicru*.y,,....without
the
abilityto seizeand hold rerritoryor to win quick victory,
,pu.. and time
becameweaponsratherthangoals."3when canadiantroops
hrst arrived
in cyprus,belligerentforceson both sidesrnadebestpossible
useof the
Troodosmountainsand urbanNicosia in orderto coniinue
operution..

' John
S h ya n dT h o m a sW C o l l i e r,,, R e v o i u t i o n aWr ya r , ,M
, a k e r sof Modern Strategt, peter paret, ed
O x f o r dC, l a r e n d oPnr e s s1,9 8 68: 3 9 .

ch2..6^7
DRAFT

" . thcguerrilla'g s r e a t e satd v a n t a g easr eh i s p e r [ e c kt n o w l e d g e of an


a r e a( w h i c hh e h i m s e l fh a sc h o s e na) n d i t s p o t e n t i a a l .n dt h e s u p p o r t
g i v e nh i m b y t h e j n h a b i t a n t sT. "o t u r nt h i sd e f e a itn t o a v i c t o r y ,t h e
c o u n t e r i n s u r g emnut s tr c c o g n i s teh a t" t h i s t o t a ld e p e n d e n cuep o nt e r r a i n
and populationis alsothe guenilla'sweak point."

Roger Trinquier,Modern lVarfare;A French Viewof COIll. New York:


Praeger,1964:citedin RobertR. Tomes,"RelearningCON Warfare,"
P a r a m e t e r sS, p r i n g2 0 0 4 .l 8 - 1 9 .

Intelligence.The insurgencythreatpicture is vastly more complicatedthan


most other forms of conflict in the sensethat thereare no "templated"
solutionsto the intelligenceproblem.Unlike conventional warfare,where
massfires and manoeuvremay potentiallysubstitutefor comprehensive
intelligenccand planning,neitherinsurgencynor COIN can afford that
luxury. For the insurgent,the bestsourceof intelligence is a sympathiser
working for the government,preferablyin security-related employment.
'fhe
media may also contributeto the insurgent'sinformationgathering
process,eitherinadvertently or intentionally.

Establishmentof an AlternativeSociety.The insurgentsaim to impose


their altemativeview of society,motivatedby nationalist,religious,or
politicai beliefs.Nationalismpresentsan emotivecall to patriotismto
replacea governmentnot portrayedas ruiing in the country'sbest
interests.An insurgents'desireto restructuresociefyalong more
fundamentaiist religiouslinesis increasinglycommon.Political
motivations,spanningboth left- and right-wingideologies, competewith
the simpledesirefor power,as a causeof insurgencies. Dependingupon
the political factionand the currentinternationalsituation,insurgentsmay
thereforereceivesupportfrom sympatheticnationsin terms of diplomatic
support,the supplyof weapons,and trainingassistance. Converseiy,
internalsupportmay also come in the form of wide spreadcriminal
activity,which will Iikely haveto be addressed in any COIN plan.

In a recentbook, Loretta Napoleoniputs forward the conceptof a


"stateshell" to establishan alternativesocietyas follows:" The result
of a processthroughwhich armedorganizations assemble the socio-
economicinfrastructure (taxation,employment, services,etc.)of a state
w
v Y ir t( lh
r vn
u Lr r r tL ll r^L e n o l i t i c a l
nno /nn tprrf^rv n n s e l f d e t e r m i n a t i n n )" In the
Pvrrrr!sr

courseof the book the authorconsidersnumerousexamplesincluding


the ChristianMiiitia in Lebanon,Ihe FuerzasArmadasRevelucionarias
de Colombia(FARC), Hamas,the IslamicMovementof Uzbekistan,
t h c N o r t h e r nA I I i a n c ei n A f g h a n i s t a nt .h eP L O a n dS a m e dt h r o u g h o u t
the Middlc Eastand elsewhere. and lastbut not leastthe Talibanin
Afghanistan.
ch2.1il7
LorettaNapoleoni, Terror IncorporatedTracingthe Dollars Behind
. w Y o r k : S e v c nS i o r i e sP r e s s , 2 0 0 56:-5 --R ^-'r ll
1 t h e T e r r o r N e l . , v o r kNs e - 0A rr.rrlt?nA_7 nnnnt?
DRAFT

Externalsupport As mentionedpreviousry. insurgencies will atlemptto


usethe various"weapons"at its disposal. The leadershipwrll aim ro wage
insurgencyon poirtical,economic,propaganda, and milltaryfronts
simultaneously, Foreignsupportis enlistedfor the insurg.n.y,while every
effortis madeto discreditthe govemmentat homeand abroud.
A mrlitary
struggleof "hit & run" tactrcswill be conducted,
potentiallyaugmented bv
tenorist attackswherethe insurgentdeterminestheir utility. ,{i
activity is
designedto overturnand embarrassthe stateto the point where
the
collapseofauthorityand controloccurs.

concurrentActivity As for any effectiveorganization, civil or military,


the ability to conductits rangeof activitiessimultaneously
enhancesthe
effectiveness of its overalloperationswith the coroliaryeffectof
heighteningthepublic'sperception of its cohesionuni"upubirity.In other
words,the insurrection thatlooksandactslike a competentparallelstate,
idcologiesaside,couldbecomcthe state.

I5. weak Points.Thereare usuallymanypotentialweak points


within an
insurgency,particr-rlarly
apparentin the earlydaysof a.urnpuign,that are vulnerable
to
someform of attackand disruptionby COIN forces:

Secrecv' Any group planningto use force and violenceto prosecute


its
aims must adopta secretive,conspiratoriar approachto their pranningand
actions.This may a'id a degreeof glamourand attractiv.n.r,
to potentiai
recruits.(stalinand Lenin arestill betterknown to history
by their,,noms
de guerre,"thantheir real names.)This secrecy,however,
.un ,oon
becomecounterproductive by affectingthe necessaryfreedomof'action,
loweringconfidencein othersimilarinsurgentgroups,and
courcireadily
leadto seriousmisunderstanding within the organisation.Therers a
balanceto be struckbetweena too secretiu.ond clandestine
approachto
insurgencyactions,and the needto avoid undueattention
by tire
authoritiesor rival groups Someinsurgencies haveattemptedto minimize
the difficultiesby creatinga morepubric,poiiticalarm. I.or
exanrpre. rhcre
i s t h e I I I A ' s a s s o c i a t eSdi n nF e i n :

Q4ining sunport. Gainingpopularsupportfor the causecan be a


difficult and sensitiveperiod in the early life of an insurgency.
if the
pubiicly acceptedreasonfor rising againstthe governmJnil-,u,
appealthe
rnsurgencyshouldthrive. Variousgroupingsand factionsmay
hold
differingopinions,requiringdifferenttechniques, includingpossible
compromisesand/orintimidation,to gain their support.Ind-iiference,
antipathy,and likely fearof government reprisal*ill urrohaveto be
overcome.Publicitydramaticallyimprovesthe prospectof gaining

C h2 : S l I l
DRAFT

p o p u l a rs u p p o r le, v e nb a dp u b l i c i t yc a ns p r e a dw o r d t h a tt h e r ei s 3 g r o u ; )
.^"i"ri-^ ^or ce AvPns 2l I nu d r- !p! /c n ur .i Lt rm
1g)lJLtllBl "w.. 1l l ^l Li i ^l h tdll r re
! .n
r . l. '

C, SecureOperating Base.Insurgents requirea securebasefrom which to


a l o c a t i o nd i s t a n tr o m a c t i v i t yc e n t r e sm a v h c
o p e r a t eS. e l e c t i n g f
potentiailymore securefor the insurgettts, but nral'alsoput tltentout of
touchwith the peopleandvulnerableto isolation.Closeproximity likel;,
easesthe securityforcetasksof surveillance. infiltration,and destruction.
Establishingan operatingbasein a borderregioncan oflen providea
temporary,or perhapspermanenlheadquarters beyondthe authorityof the
state;

d . Funding. All insurgencies requiresomedegreeof fundingin orderto


acquirethe staplesof conflict:weapons,ammunition,food and medicines.
Lack of sufficientfunds could limit the scopeof an insurgencyand inhibit
its prospectsof success.This is a weaknessthat the stateauthoritiescould
utilise to their advantageif it is recognised.Unlessa friendly nation or
individuals back the insurgency,funding can be found in criminal
activities suchas narcotictrafficking,robberies,and extortion.While
drugs in particularhave provento be a more enduringsourceof income
than bank robberies,it bringsthe movementinto contactwith unreliable,
vulnerablegroupswho could attractundueattentionfrom the authorities.
On the other hand,externalsupportmay also have a poiitical price that
could affectthe overallaim ofan insurgency,

The Problem of Chaneine Aims. Cliangingaims is not so much of a


problem at the startof an insurgencybut has a potentiallydamagingeffect
once an insurgencyhas beenin operationfor sometime. Changingaims is
a common occurrencewhen an insurgencyis still coalescing.Initial
operationsmay changethe outlookof someinsurgentswith somequestion
as to the price of the overallaim particrrlarly
if securityforce successes
spreaddoubt aboutthe causeor the insurgency'sleadership.A seemingly
generouscompromiseofferedby the stateto the insurgentscould prove
divisive; insurgentleadersmay have to apply ruthlessmeasuresto ensure
that unity and secrecyare preserved.Changingaims can be further
problematicgiven the aforementioned secrecy,which may spark
misunderstanding and suspicionthroughoutthe insurgency;

f Setting the Pace.Controliingthe paceandtiming of operatrons is vital to


the successof any campaign,Given that insurgentscan control the startof
operations,and havesomemeasureof controlover subsequent activity,it
is surprisingto note that many insurgencieshave failed to capitalizeon
opportunities, or have allowedthe paceof eventsand scopeof activitiesto
be dictatedby the stateauthorities. Oncemomentumis lost,the strategic
initiativereturnsto the state, Leavingthe insurgencyexposed;and

C h2 : 9 1 1 1

A020230 6- 9- 000025
DRAFT

0 Informers. while informershavesometimes beeninfiltratedinro


r n s u r g e ncte l l s ,i t i s f a r m o r ec o m m o nt o a c h i e v cs u c c e sbsy p e r s u a d i n g
I l r er n s L r r g etnolb e c o m ea n i n f o r m e rT h i s i s s o m e o n a e l r e a d yi n t h e
organization, or is a link betweenciandestine cellsandtheirpublic
accomplices, suchas the couriers,cut-outs,or suppiiers. Thereis nothrng
more demoralizing to the insurgents thanto fearthatof one of therrtrusteci
peopleis givinginformationto the government. Insurgentleaderswill try
to stifleinformersby ruthlessexemplarypunishmcnts.

S E C T I O N3 : INSURGENT WAYS AND MEANS

INSURGENT TACTICS

16. General.The deliberate promotionof adversepublicityagainstgovernment


agenciesand securityforcesis essentialand complementary. This aspecthasprovenrnore
effectivewith the growing trcnd towardspolitical groupsusing civil libertiesand
human
rightsto lower the toleranceof the public for harsherCOINrn.urur.r. 'fhe insurgents'
claim to legitimacyis basedon their declaredability to improvethe positionof tile
oppressed. The essentiallyviolent natureof insurgencies movesin two concurrent
complementarypaths,one destructiveand the otherconstructive,as follows:

a. destructiveactionsare clearly aimedat overthrowingthe cstablishedorder


and creatinga climateof collapsein the states.authority.Destructivc
activitiesincludc;

(l) subversion,

(2) sabotageof the economicframework,

(3) terrorismand guerrillaactivity,and

(4) largescalecombatoperations;

b. the constructiveeffort, meanwhile,aims at creatingan organizationto


subsequentlyreplacethe establishedorder at a suitablemoment.

17. Subversion.Subversive activityattemptsto underminethe political,economic


and military strengthof a state,r.vithout
resortingto the useof forcebythe insurgent.
Thesemay provokeviolent countermeasures to be denouncedas an over-reactionbv the
authorities,discreditingthe government.Subversiontakesmany forms.suchas
penetrating existingpoliticalpartiesand organizarions, and developingfront
organizationsthat can have the appearance ofchallengingand Oefyingtne authorityof
goverrlment.An insurgencywili seekto win supporterswithin the govemment,
especially
the securityelements,in orderto discernfutureplansandpossiblyany other."onor,.
and flnancialinformation.Theseare all usefulfor an insurgencyto exploitas approprrate.
pafiicularlyin the eariydaysof an insunection.

Ch2: 10/11

A0202306-10-000026
DRAFT

18. I n s u r s e n tI n f o r m a t i o nO p e r a t i o n sP . r o p a g a n di sa a k e 1 e , l e m e not f s u b v e r s i o n .
I t i n c l u d e sp u b l i s h : n g
information d e t r i m e n t at ol t h e g o v e m m e n l
o r s e c u r i t yf o r c e st.h e
s n ' e a r l j nn
oF r t r r r n r , - S
w .h e t h e tr n l e o l "f a l s e d e " i p n e dt o r r n d e r n i n ct r u s ta n dc o n f i d e n c c
1ntne goverrunent,

19. PassiveResistance. Dependingupon the societyin which the insurgencyis


operating,passiveresistance may be a usefultactic.It is more effectivein liberal
societies,given an authoritarian
regime'sability to crushsuchopendissent.Examplesof
passiveresistanceincludervithdrawinglabour from public services,obstructingthe iaw,
or sit-insin public places,

20. Sabotase.Sabotage is disruptiveactivitythat furthersthe insurgents'interests.


it
may be activeor passive.

2 Active sabotageseesinsurgentsset out to disrupt importantservices,


functionsor industrialprocessesby violent means.Targetsmay be
selectedat randomfor political or economicimpact,or they may fit into a
wider tacticaiplan with the aim of increasinggeneralconfusionand tying
down troopsin the staticdefenceof installations.Suitabletargetsinclude
bridges,roads,telephonelines,or dispersed military logisticssites.
Targetswhose destructionmight causemassunemploymentand thereby
lose the goodwill of the peopleare in generalavoided.

b Passivesabotageis generallyaimed at causingdisorderand disruptionby


deliberateerror, contrivedaccident,absenteeism or strikes.The targetcan
be industry,public services,suppliesor troops,where action is usually
plannedon a wide scalethroughpolitical front organizations.Data
sabotageis facilitatedby the universalityof computersin government,
business,and industrialcontrol systems.Thesecan be carriedthrough
cyberattackor by havingan insurgentor sympathizer physicallydamage
the system.

21. Terrorism. T'errorism,in its standardformulationof "killing one to intimidatea


thousand"is an ever-present techniquewithin insurgencies. Globally,terroristattacks
secnrto be increasingin frequency,violence,and numberof fatalities.Terrorcanbe used
t a c t i c a l l yt o p r o v i d cp u b l i c i t yf o r t h e i n s u r g e nm
t o v e m e n tc, o e r c et h e g o v e r n m e ni n
t to
changingpoliciesor surrendertng, and maintainingdisciplinewithin the insurgent
movement.Ubiquity of media and InternetJrassimplifiedthe insurgents'challengeol'
communicatingtheir message.Contemporary terroristssimplypassvideotapeto a
supporlivenews outlet,and thereis no doubtaboutthe insurgents'claimedmotivations.

"The chief claim usedro justify terrorismis that if oppressed groupswere required
to abstain,fromviolence directedat civiiians;,their,political
causewould be
condemnedto failure.In,th6l'faceof oppreSsibnand supeiiorforce, terrorism
rationalizesitselfas the only strategythat can Ieadthe oppressed to vicrory."

Michael Ignatieff, The LesserEvil Polirical Ethics in an Age of Terror. Toronro;


(:Fa4\AltEroup,2004. ix.
DRAFT

22. Fund Raising.The insiu'ge trts'costsfbr weapons,medicines, politicalbribesau6


thc like areoftenvery expensive. An indicatorof a developinginsurgencyshgLrlci
thereforeincludefund-raisingefforts.In the early stages,this will p-UuUty be covertand
criminal,suchas bank robbery.Subsequently, the politicai organizationwithin the
insurgency willtake on the taskof extractingaid from well-inientioned, chantableand
philanthropic organizations,and from sympathizers abroad.Somecriminalorganizatrons
blur the line betweenlawbreakingand insurgency.For example,the Cali drug cartel
fundsan insurgencyin Colombia throughnarcoterrorismthit has spin-off economic
benefitsto the localgrowersof the cocaplants.o More violentmethodsmay ilcludc, the
extortingof ransomfrom individuals(kidnapping),or from governments(Lijacking),and
perhapsthe enforcedlevying of taxeson intimidatedsectionsof the population.f;inall1,,
ashasbeendemonstrated by the PLO andthe FARC, a matureinsurgencycandevelopa
parallelsocio-economic order,which may attaina levelof politicallegitimacyin the eyes
of the localpopulacegreaterthan thatenjoyedby the legalgovernment.

23. weapons and Equinment. Insurgents tendto usebasicweaponswhose


essentialshavenot changedvery much sincethe i 940s.Beyond simple availability,
selectioncriteriaarebasedupon compactness,lethalityand simpleoperatingpro..du..r.
The followins shouldbe noted:

2 Personalweaponsare principallypistols,carbines,rifles and weaponswith


a high rate of fire. In recenttimes weaponsand bombshave been
miniaturized, explosivesharderto detectandmore lethal,accompaniedby
a dramaticincreascin improvisedexplosivedevices.

b . Insurgents generallyhaveaccess to a completerangeof combatsuppon


weapons.Sniperrifles utilisingarrnour-piercing ammunitionarebeing
secnmore frcquently.Improvisedmorrarsare easyto makealth,.,uglr ire
usuallyinaccurateand unreliable, Most requiresomeform of ,,flatbed,,
for transportation.
Acquisitionof miiitarymortarsand ammunitron
significantlyincreasethe rangeand iethalityof suchweapons.RpG-type
anti-armourweaponsproliferate. Portableair defencemissilesposea
significantthreat.The merepossession of air defen.. *.uoonr.

'Lorefta
N a p o l e o n iT , e r r o r l n c o r p o r a t e d ;S e ee s p e c i a l l C
y h a p t e r2 " T h e N , l a c r o e c o n o m iocfsT e r r o r , , p, p
I 3 - 2 9 a n d C h a p t e r3 " T h e P r i v a t i z a t i o no f T e r r o r " ,P p 3 l - 4 8 . N a p o l e o n e i x a m i n e sa n d c a r a l o g u ersh e
m e t h o d sa n d e f f e c t so f v a r i o u sI n s u r g e n m t o v e m e n t sl'i n k a g e si,f n o t o u t r i g h ti n v o l v e m e n tw
. ith narcotrcs
t r a d ea n d o t h e rf o r m so f p a r a l l e ls o c i o - e c o n o m isct r u c t u r eandactiviw.

Ch2:12111
. :iaJ

DRAFl'

i vA N P A I ) S , b y a n i n s u r g e ngt r o u pw i l l d i s r u p t h e
p a r . t i c u l a rM
goverriment useof helicopters.

c . E x p l o s i v e isn l a r i o u sf o r m sa r ef a v o u r e d w e a p o n so f i n s u r g e n t sM. i l i t a r y
minesb , o t ha n t i - p e r s o n naenl da n t i - t a n ka. r ef r e q u e n t l u y t i l i s e db y
insurgent. They havethe dual purposeof hamperingcounterrnsurgency
forces'effortsandterrifyingthe local population.lnsurgencyforcesare
increasrngly usingImprovisedExplosiveDevices(lEDs). fhe
effectiveness of theseweaponsis well known and experlisein their
manufacture and handlingis oftenof a high order.Sophisticatcd initiating
d e ri c e s a , n r i - l i f t i n gn r e c l i r n i s n ras n, di n n o v a t i v tea c t i c apl l a c e m e n t
( i r r c l r r d i rsr ge c ( ) r ) d r rI vI I D s )a r eb e c o m i n gc o m m o n F . u r t h e r a, n y i n c i d e n t .
bomb or hoax can be used as a bait to kill securityforcesand EOD
specialists. Recent)1,. the sLricide bomberhasemereedas a pafticularl\,
ef'lbctivevveapon. The sLricic'le bornberis in el'lectaplccisionrr,eapon that
aI so clcm onstratcsthc i ttsttt'gcnc\" s cttmmitntcttt

d. Sophisticated chemicai,brological,radiological,
or nuclearwcaponswill
likely remainbeyondthe capabilityof insurgentgroups.Sincethe release
of Saringas in Tokyo subway in 1995,the potentialfor insurgentsto use
crude CBRN devicesmust be considered.Sucha capability would be
expectedonly in an insurgentgroup alreadyemployingterroristtactics.

INSUITGENT TACTICS IN A RURAL ENVIRONMENT

24. Rural insurgencyremainswidespreadas the allocationof land, water or other


scarcemineral resourcescontinuesto provide a real or perceivedgrievance,particuiarly
in areaswhere there is a burgeoningpopulation.Insurgentbaseswill be establishedrn
remoteareasoften in ditficutl terraiu(rnouutains. jLrngles.tbrest.etc.).from which
attacksmay be launchedover as wide an areaas possible to dispersescarcesecurity
resources.Theseactionsmay be mistakenfor banditry;underthe pretextof protection
againstsuch banditry,isolatedvillageswill be preparedfor det'ence, includingthe
discreetclearanceof fields of fire, Other indicationsthat a campaignis developing
includehoardingsupplies,trainingand armingof village"self-defence" groups,and
increasedevidenceof local intimidationand coercion.

25. In its early stages,d rural insurgencyreliesupon smallbandsassemblingfor a


limited attack,probablyagainsta remoteand inadequately guardedtarget.As the
movement grows to the stagewhere it can commandsignificantsupportfrom the local
population,so its objectiveswill becomemore ambitiousand largerforceswill be
necessary. The relativestrengthof insurgentbandswill alwaysplacethem at a
disadvantage vis-ir-visthe securityforcesand they will seekto avoid a pitchedbattle;
thcrrtacticsare thereforebasedon mobility and surprise,generalLy using ambushes and
explosives.

C h2 : i 3 / 1 7

An4nttna ,o nnnn4n
DRAFT

?6 Ruralpopulations arevulnerableto terrorismand intimrdationandvery quicklya


f c c l i n go f i n s e c u r i t cy a ns p r e a da r o u n da w h o l er e g i o n S
, u c hi n t i m r d a t i oins c o m m o n
rvithinruralinsurgencies because of thepopulation'srelativephysicalisolationfrom the
p r o t e c t i vsee c u r i t yf o r c e s .

27. Ambushis the mostwidely usedinsurgenttactic.It is particularlyeffective


againstroadmovement,especially whenthe groundmakesit difficultfor the government
forcesto move off the road and take cover.In additionto snipingand massecl
fires
ambushes, thereis a growingtrendin ambushes featuringIEDs and suicidebombing

INSURGENT TACTICS IN AN URBAN ENVIRONMBNT

28. With the degreeof urbanizationincreasingglobaliy,encounteringurban


tnsurgencieswill likely expand.Urbancivilizationis sufficientlyvulnerableto provide
relativelysmall insurgentforceswith the opportunityto createan atmosph.r. oiserious
alarmand insecuritysufficientto discreditthe government.

29 lnsurgentsdo not normallyplan to occupyand controltenitory althoughthey may


seizesmallareasfor a limitedtime to establisha presence from which they co-uld
subsequently receivesupport,Lacking the ability to occupyterritoryon a significant
scale,insurgentswill aim to makethe government's positionuntenableby engendering a
stateof war-weariness, frustrationand angeragainstgovemmentemergencymeasures.
Undersuchconditions,the peoplemay rally to any organization or leaderwho offers
stability.

30. Cities and towns providegreatscopefor insurgencies.The conccntrationof a


largenumberof peoplein a relativelysmall areaprovidescover for the insursents.
Moreover,the needsof a greatcity, relatedto the complexityof urbanlivingihereby
intemrptionof power supplies,non-coliectionof rubbish,cuttingoff water,-etccould
soonbring a community to its knees.However,the insurgentmay only find supportin
cerlainareasof the townsor cities,

31. The urban insurgentcan operatemore boldly than his rural counterpartfor these
reasons,and his tacticsreflect this. Intimidatingthe local population,as seenin rural
insurgencies, also occursin urbanenvironments,In this sefting,populationdensity
lacilitatesthe,insurgents'
audacrty;they areableto readilydisappear amongstthe
populace.However,this too is anotherdouble-edged sword,populationdensitymay also
be usedto advantageby the counterinsurgent forcesin the recruitmentand placemcntof
agentsand in the stealthyinfiltration of patrols.

32. The readyavailabilityof largenumbersof peoplemeansthata crowd canbe


assembled and demonstrations engineered, with comparative ease;thesecan thenbe
rnanipulated.The presence of womenand childrenwili normallybe an embanassment to
the securityforces,panicularlf if the dernonstration
is stagemanagedto causeover
reactionby the sccurityforcesagainstsucha group.

C h2 : 1 4 1 1 1
;r riJ

DRAFT

INST-,
R.GENT COMMUNICATIONS

33. G i v e nt h e p o i i t i c a al i m sa n ds e c r e t i vnc a l u r eo f i n s u r g e n c yc,o m m u n i c a t i ni g s


c r i t i c a lC
. o n t a c ta m o n g stth e i n s w g e n t si s a c c o m p l i s h et d h r o u g hs m a l is u r e p t i r i o u s
groups,or cells.They make extensiveuseof sccuremethods,suchas dead-letter dropsor
codedgraffiti. In additionto the methodsbelow,the insurgents will alsousepolitical
iiteraturesuchas manifestos. magazines, postersand circularsin orderto communicate.
Today,modernmasscommunications facilitatethe taskof the insurrectionary leaderand
supportingcadres.They can gainsecurecommunications within their organization and
stagebroadappeaisto the massaudienceprovidedby the public.Therefore,a modern
militaryseekingto defendits parentor fostersociety,mustbe preparedto exploitmodern
mediaand deny its use to an opponent.Currently,insurgentsare known to employ
modemcommunications as follows:

a. Cellular Telephoneand Hand Held Motorolas. The mobilephoneand


the ICOM have becomeubiquitousin the developingworld. Insurgents
use them for communicationand deception.Veiled speechand false
informationare usedto compensatefor and even exploit the opennature
of thesetypesof systems;

b. Radio. Radiois an increasinglyusedcomponentof controlaswell asa


meansof passinginformationor propaganda.Undergroundradio stations
may disseminatepropagandaor order crowdsout for demonstrations.
They may also use radio frequenciesto detonatebombs;

c. Television. Almost every insurgentgroup has usedtelevisiondirectlyto


promotetheir cause,or indirectly,ensuringthat incidentsare newsworthy
enoughto be reportedon television.It is no coincidencethat the steeprise
in terroristand insurgentactionhas takenplace at the sametime as the
groMh in television.The distributionof video tapesalso enormously
enhancesan insurgentcause,as seenby the linkagebetweenal-Qaedaand
the al-Jazeeramedia network:

d. The Press.Codedmessages may be includedin newspaper


advertisements, articiesin magazines, or on postersor circularsto convey
instructionsto cells,perhapsin conjunctionwith the deadletterbox
system.Suchmessages may be usedto passinformationwhen time rs not
essentialfor the executionof an operationor to inform an insurgentof the
time and datea pre-planned attackor incidentis tn he steoed'end

e. Internet. The World Wide Web is beingusedincreasinglywithin


insurgencies. Not only can it be usedfbr propaganda purposes, but alsoas
a tool to passalongterroristand insurgenttechniquesand procedures.
Insurgentsare increasinglypublishingtheirversionsof eventsin orderto
a t t r a c st u p p o r a
t n d s h o w t h e i rs t r e n g t ho. f t e nt h r o u g hv i d e oc l i p so f a n a c k s

ch2'r5t11

A 0 2 0 2 3 0 6 -5l - 0 0 0 0 3 1
DRAFT

on securityforcesor killingsof kidnappedgovernmenr supporters.Such


r.vebsites
thusbecomea primarysourceof intelligence as analystsseek
rndicators
of insurgentmorale,noms-de-guerre, variousfactions,and their
motrvatorsor ideologies, which may thenbe usefulfor negotiationsor
PSYOPStargeting.

"There was a concertedeffort to take down the al-Qaidasitea few years ago
and it
keptpoppingup. The lsraelistriedto do it with the Hezbollahsire and il nrnmnrerJ r
war of escalation.The resultwas a Iive-and-let-livementalifv."

Bruce Hoffman, RAND, wastrington,cited in Jim Klane, .,Insurgency-friendly


Web
sites Proneto Hoaxes,"online, hftp://cnews.canoe.ca,
9 February2005

SECTION 4: OUTLOOK

34, A quick review of the internationalsceneon any given day will confirm
insurgencyis on the increase.A hostof groupsand statesare usingit to alterthe political
landscape.Over the lasttwo decades, the numberof intemationalterroristincidentshas
risenfrom 200 per yearto over 800.This increasein the incidenceof insurgencyremains
trueevenif the fightingin Iraq is discounted.Insurgencyseemslikely to.emain the most
prevalentform of conflict and sourceof human sufferingfor the foreseeabie future.

35. Insurgencyhas beena potentforce throughoutthe Cold War, a periodthat saw


both Superpowersdefeatedby insurgents,not decisivemilitary defeaton the battlefield,
but becausethc political and economiccostswere too high to sustainfurther
involvement.The end of the Cold War createdan unstablesecurityenvironmentthat
supportedthe growth of insurgentconflict. In paraliel,technologicaladvancesand
the
loweringof nationalbaniershavecreatedmany more vulnerabiiities,which the insurgent
canexp.loit.Developingcommunications meanthatthe media(eventhoseelementsof it
which arepotentially'friendly'tothe stateauthorities)canbringthe impactof insurgency
into homesworldwide and live. Thus providing the insurgentwith a free intematioial
public platfonn, with insurgentsdriven to seekever greaterspectacularattacksto make
news,September11thbeinga casein point,As a result,civil andmilitary leadershin
can
be subjected to enormouspressures to act,basedon the dubiouswhims of media-
informedpublic opinion.

36. The risein rural andurbaninsurgencies alreadynotedis beingincreasingly


influencedby the releaseof long suppressedethnicandreiigioustensions.Balkan
nationalismeruptedinto civilwar, the brutalityof which shockedliberaldemocracies.
To
the south,the spreadof radicalfundamentalisminto Algeria,'furkey and Egypt
contributesto regionalinstability.

C h2 : 1 6 1 1 l

A0202306-l 6-000032
DRAFT

37, T h e c o n f l i c t si n A f g h a n i s t aann d I r a qa r ec i t e da s g r i e v a n c ebs1 , ' ag r o w i n gt i d eo f


Islamicextrcmists.Added to this threatis growingevidenceof shadowyiinks between
rL ^! r*r ^v l-t i)^l t rl l-l ru :l -c* a, . t^i.nD o s c m e k : n d o f ' n t e r n a t i o n a l 'n"oht hv
SlUuP)) --,llLglll4LlUlldL lf U ll g
ol rl m U lf il Lnl c
) ur .r5-Uol n
r L. )r: -. v
L,eBilL U)

t h o s er v h od o n o t n e c e s s a r i sl yh a r es i m i l a rv a l u e so r i n s u r g e nat i m s .

38. The recentexplosionof religiousextremismhasbecomea real threalto Canada.It


threatensstability in severalNofih African states,aroundthe rim of the former Soviet
Union, partsof SouthEastAsia, and someof our NATO Allies. It is most obvious
throughoutthe Middle East.Fearsof violencein many of theseregionshas addeda
potentialtide of exilesand refugeesto the concemsof regionalinstability.

39. To the extentthat a radicalizedmovementconstitutes a dangerto Canadaor


elsewhere, the bestway to counterit is to understand the intellectualand organizational
mechanismsin which the adherents operate.While the miiitarymustbe preparedto
executethe "Defence"portionof the government's "3D" policy,effectivecounter-
measures rnustbeginwith comprehending the threat,becauseideas,eventhosethat
distorlreality,can only be foughtby otherideas.

C h 2 :1 7 l 1 7

A 0 2 0 2 3 0 6 -71- 0 0 0 0 3 3
tlLl.

A n n e xA DRAFT

C L ' L T U R AF
LACTOR.SI

GENER-AL

I. CulturalFactorsare dynamicaspectsof societythat havethe capacityto affect


militaryoperations.They includereligion,ethnicity,language, customs,values,
practlces,perceptionsand assumptions, anddrivingcauseslike economyand security
All thesefactorsaffect the thinking andmotivationof the individual or group and
make
up the culturaltenain2 of the battlespace.Not all factorsare applicable*to ail operations,
andadditionallactorsmay be considered asnecessary. This lisirngis not exhaustive.

CulturalFactors.

General.
a. Socio-culturalsystem
b. Culturalhistory
c. Shameand honour concepts
d. Tribal/Clan/Groupdynamics
e. Urban/ruraldivide
I S o c i a li d e n t i t y
g R o l eo f r e l i g i o n
h. Geopoliticalboundaries
i. Formalpoliticalsystem
j Politicalparries
k. National
i. Representatives
ii. Ministries/Depts
l. Regional
i. Representatives
ii. Municipalities/Depts
m. Local
i. Representative
n, For eachgroupconsider:
i. Wheredo they get theirsecurity?
ii. Wheredo they get goods,servicesand wages?
iii. What ideologiesresonate with them?
iv. who arethe traditionalauthorityfiguresthey look to for direction?
v. Who arc they allied rvith?
v i , W h a t i s i m p o r t a ntto r h c m ?
vii. Culturalnarratives
o. For eachleader:

'
E x c e r pftr o mA B C A c u l t u r a A l w a r e n e s sp r o j e c rt e a m F i n a lR e p o r t M , a r c h2 0 0 5 .
'
C u l t u r aTl e r r a i n .C u l t u r ei s s i m p l ya n o t h e e r l e m e not f t e r r a i n .C u l t u r atie r r a i np a r a l l e l s
g e o g r a p h ltce r r a i nf o r m i l i t a r yc o n s i d e r a t i oans b o t hi n f l u e n c de e c i s i o n s .
C u l t u r at le r r a i np r e s e n t s
b a t t l e s p a coeb s t a c l e asndopportunrties.

1t6

an,)nt'tn7_{ nnnnz,
A n n e xA DRAFT

r. Wheredoeshis authorttycomefrom?
ii. Coerciveforce?
1 i i . E c o n o m i ci n c e n t i v ea n dd i s i n c e n t i v e ?
iv. Ideology?
v. Charisma?
v i . T r a d i t i o n aAi u t h o r i t y ?
vii. Who is he alliedwith?
viii. What arethe reasonsfor that alliance?
p. Outsideinfluences
a. Foreigngovemments
b. Relationshipwith bordercountriesForeignNGOs
c. InternallyDisplacedPersons
d. Foreigngroups(non-criminal)
e. Misc
i. GenderRoies
ii. Visiting
iii. Greetings
iv. Interactions
v. ShowingRespect
vi. Work
vii. Gifts
viii. Taboos
ix. Weddingsand Funcrals
x. Blood money (or relatedconcept)

3. Ethno-Religious Groups.
a. Primary groups
b. Religious structure
i. Patronagenetworks
ii. Charities
c. Externaliinks
d. Tribes/Clans/Groups
i. Sub-Tribes
ii. Sub-clans
e. Families
f. Non-traditionalgroupings
g. Iror eachgroup consider:
i. Where do they get their security?
ii. Where do they get goods,servicesand wages?
iii. What ideologiesresonatewith them?
iv. Who are the traditionalauthorityfiguresthey look to for direction?
v. Who are they allied vvith?
vi. What is importantto them?
vii. Cuituralnarratives
h . F o r e a c hl e a d e r :
i. Where doeshis authoritycome from?

2t6

ao2fi)?o7 -2.000n35
A n n e xA DRAFT

ii. Coerciveforce?
i i i . E c o n o m i ci n c e n t i v e
a n dd i s i n c e n t i v e ?
iv. Ideology?
v. Charisma?
vr. TraditionalAuthority?
v i i . W h o i s h e a l l i e dw i t h ?
viii. What arethe reasonsfor thatalliance?
i. Patronage nctworks

4. Securitv.
a. Policing
b. Judicialsystem
c. Penalsystem
d. Criminalactivities
i. Narco-trafficking
ii. Black market
iii. Smuggling
iv. Routes
e. Commodities
[. Frontcompanies
g. Intimidationand extortion
h. Kidnapping,theft, murder,etc.
i. Ordnanceand miiitary supplies
j Unexplodedordnanceavailable
k. Weapons,explosivesmarkets
l. Weaponssmugglingroutes

5. Economy.
a. Importsand exports
b. Socialisolationlegacy
c. Agriculture
d. Barter economy
e. Tradingcompanies
f. Businesslaw, banking,contracts, insurance
g. Employmentratesand impact on population/perceptions
h. Labour forcc occupationand demographics
i. Local businesses and companies
j I n c o m ed e m o g r a p h i c s
k. Major sources
l. Per capitaincome
m. Coalitiongoverrrment projects
n. Naturalresources

6. Services.
a. Hospitaland clinics
i. Availabilityof advancedservices

3/6
JLa

A n n e xA DRAFT

i i . N u m b e r ,q u a L i t a
l n dt y p e
b. Educationof staff
c. E,ducation
i . Q u a l i t ya n dt y p e
ii Numberof schoolsand availability
i i i . A g e st a u g h tt,y p e s
d. Govemmentwages
e. Water
f, Sewer
i, Age and qualityof system
ii. Open systemand healtheffects
iii. Map of sewers
e. Electricity
i. Availabilityby zone,by Kilowat per/hour
ii. Sourcesand productionplants
i. How are the plantspowered?
ii. Distribution networksand administration
b . S u b s i d i z egdo o d s
i. Gas
ii. Cookingoil
iii. Food
iv. impact of changein subsidies
c, Governmentimprovementprojects
i. Ongoing,planned
ii. Rate success
d. Public Safety
e. Armed Force

7. InfbrmationEnvironment.
a. Formal communication
b. Broadcastmedia
c . P r i n tm e d i a
d. Newspapers
e. Freedomor lack thereof
i. Trust in tire media
ii. Connectionto govemmentor opposition
f Fliers,ftandouts
g. Outdoormedia(banners,ads)
h. Websitesand Internetavailability
i. InformationCommunication
j Impactof Internetby zone
k. Authorityfigures(Family,religious,group)
L Rumourcentres(teashops.markets,taxis)
m. Telecommunications
n. Cell phonenodesand availability
'fext
o. messagingcapable?

4t6
rfi,I

A n n e xA DRAFT

p. A v a i l a b i l i t ya n cul s eo f e m a i l

B. M a - i oR
r esources,
a. Drinking watcr
b. Reservoirs
c. Pumpingstatlons
d. Pipelines
c. Watertreatmentplants
f. Oil and fuel
i. Sources
ii. Pumpingstations
iii. Pipelines
iv. Refineries
g. Gasstations
i. Distributionlocations
h. Agricultural
i. Inigationpaths
j Chemicals
k. Communications
l. Telecomsystems
m. Intemetcafes
n. Courierroutes

9. Key Individuals.
a. Religious
b. Tribal
c. Community
d. Political
e. E,ducators
f. Medical
g. Business
h. Military
i. For eachgroupconsider:
i. Wheredo they get their security?
ii. Wheredo they get goods,servicesand wages?
iii. What ideologiesresonatewith them?
iv. Who are the traditionalauthorityfiguresthey look to for direction?
v. Who aretheyalliedwith?
vi, What is importantto them?
vii. Cultural narratives
j . F o r e a c hl e a d e r :
i. Where doeshis authoritycome from?
ii. Coerciveforce?
iii. Economicincentiveand disincentive?
iv. Ideology?
v. Charisma?

5/6
A n n e xA DRAFT

vi. TraditionalAuthority?
v i i . W h o i s h e a l l i e dr , ' i t h ?
viri. What arethe reasonsfor that alliance?

AnontanT a nnnn2o
DRAFT

CHAPTEI].3

COIN PRINCIPLES

"Thef rst thing that mu.stbe apparentwhen contemplating/|te .rortof crctionyyhich


ct
gavernment facing insurgency.chouldlake,is thal lhere can be no such thing as a ptrreiy
militarl' solutiortbecauseinsurgencyis not primarily a military activity At the,sctme
/inte
thereis no suchthing as awhollypoliticalsolurioneither,short of surrenrJer, becctuse
lhe verT'faclthat a state of insurgencyexist.s
implre.sthat violenceis involveclwhich v,iLl
huveto be counteredto someextentat leastby the useofforce.',

GencralSir Frank Kitson,reflectinguponhis experiences


from campaigns
in Kcnya,
Malaya,Oman and Cyprus.

SECTION 1: OVERVIEW

l. No insurgencyhas beensucce.ssfully foughtand defeatedin a purcrymilitarv


manner.Indeed,military forcesplay a key, but in many facets,supportingiole politrcal,
social,economic,psychological andmilitarymeasures all havetheirroleln restoringthe
authorityof a iegitimategovernment andaddressing the root causesof the insurgency.
All securityforces(includingthe military)act in supportof, and in harmonywiti,
civil
authorityin a rnilieuin which thereis muchlesscertaintythanrn conventional war. In a
conventional war, it is obviouswho conductsthe act againstan enemyposition.in a
COIN campaign,however,the insurgents, their supportandtheir motivation,all haveto
be attackedwith a myriad of assetsand capabilities.
That is, a mix of kineticand non-
kineticeffectsmust be appliedthatwill includemilitary force,policearrests,
reconstruclionin poor urban areasand informationoperations,to namea few.

2' At issuewithin a COIN, particuiarlyin the eariystages,is thatwith a lack of


sufficientinformation,decisionshaveto be macleaffectingsignificantaspectso1,
political,economicand sociallife in the country. Thesedccisionshavercpe.cussions
for
a nation far beyond its borders,both in the diplomaticfield and in the ail-imnortant
s p h e r eo f p u b l i co p i n i o n .

3. Althoughmilitary and strategictheories continuallyevolve,one constant


regardinginsurgencyand colN is the battleto win and hold popularsupport,in
the
theatreof operationsand at home. That is, not only doesthe coilectivepuUri.sllpport
haveto be won and maintainedwithin the areaor nationuncierthreat,but me populace
of
thosenationscontributingto the COIN-mustcontinueto supportthe missiontiai
may
well continuefor yearson end. Thus,operations at all levelsmust be conductedwith thrs
strategicgoalin mind.

4. Traditionally,insurgents havehad a head-start in the campaign.while the


government hashad to first discerna threat. and then formulatean appropnare response,
within the rule ol lar.v.The sidethatcan organisefirst and deveiopa tailor-mad"
,tru,.gy
thatis effectiveand attractiveto the seneralpopulacewili be at a iignificantadvantage,

C h a p3 : 1 i1 4
DRAFT

T h u s ,i n o r d e rf o r g o v e m m e n tas n dm i l i t a r i e st o o r g a n i s q e u i c k l y .i t i s i n v a l u a b l teo h a v e
a setof generalprinciplesfor the conductof a COll.Jcampaignthat canbe usedto design
a n dc o n d u c t h e c a m p a i g n .I t m u s t ,h o w e v e rb, e r e m e m b e r etdh a t p n n c i p i e sa r e
guidelinesonly and must be temperedby a realisticestimateof the situationand an
a p p r a i s aolf t h e v a r i a b l c sa n dp o t e n t i a l r e s p o n s S
e so.l u t i o n sc a n x o tb e t e m p l a r eadn dr h e
operational environmentmust be takeninto account.

5. Principlesoffer the civil leadership and the headsof all agencies, includingthe
I n i l i t a r yc o m m a n d e rb, o t ha s t a r rp o i n ta n du s e f u sl i g n p o s t sT. h e n i n eC O I N p r i n c i p l e s
proposedare arrangedinto a iogicalsequence and providea governmentand miiitary
commanderswith a generalpattem on which to baseand review strategyand operational
plans. Like all principlesthey shouldbe appliedpragmaticallyand with commonsense
to suit the circumstances peculiarto eachcampaign.The assessment of the situationwill
indicatewhereapplicationof a principlemay not be possible(at leasttemporarily),where
they may conflicl or wherethereis overlap.As with the principlesof war, they mustbe
balancedwith one anotherand all operations must be examinedagainstthem.
Underpinningthe principlesare the guidelinesof minimum necessaryforce and
legitimacyof all actions.

6. The nine principlesfor the conductof a COIN campaignare as follows:

a. effect political primacy in the pursuitof a strategicaim,

b. promoteunity of purposeto co-ordinatethe actionsof parricipating


agencies(includinggovernmentmachinery);

c. undcrstandthe complexdynamicsof the insurgency,


includingthe wider
environment;

d. exploit inteiligenceand information;

e. isolatethe insurgentsfrom theirphysicaland moral supportbase;

f. apply power discriminatelyto influencehumanwill;

g. n e u t r a l i s teh e i n s u r g e n t ;

h. s u s t a i nc o m m i t m e ntto e x p e n dp o l i t i c a cl a p i t a al n dr e s o u r c eosv e ra l o n g
period;and

i. conductlongerterm post-insurgency
pianning.

C h a p3 . 2 l l 1

Anrn??nR-t _AnAna4
DRAFT

S E C T I O N2 : E F F E C TP O L I T I C A L P R I M A C YI N T H E P U R S U I TO F A
STRATEGICAIM
'7
I t n t u s tb e u n d e r s t o obdy a l l t h a ta n i n s u r g e n ciys a p o l i t i c apl r o b J e m t h a rc a n n o r
be counteredby a singlemeans,Oncean insurgency hasbeenidentified,the government
(aLongwith its supporlers) mustdecidehow to stop,neutralise or reversethe
consequences of suchan insurgency This mustincludean effective,pro-activeresponse
t o t h c v i o l e n c ea n di n t i m i d a r i ognc n e r a t ebdy t h e i n s u r g e n t sA. p a f l f r o n ri m r n e d i a t e
short-termactions,many of which will be takenwith the adviceof the militaryforce
commander, thc government must formulatelong-termpoliticalaimsthat will be backed
by political,economicand socialprogrammes.Giventhis overarching aim, the security
fbrcesmust conducttheir part as a supportingprogramme.A COIN plan involving the
police,military,locallyraisedmilitiasandcoalitionsecurityforceswill implementthis.r

8. PoliticalprimacyunderpinsCON asit legitrmises stratcgic,


operationaland
tacticalactions.Allactions follow the politicalleadandsuppoftits strategicaim. Within
a coN, the specificstrategydetermines which instrumentof power(diplomatic,
informational,militaryor economic)is the focusof effort,andwhich agencymay have
the leadat operational
and tacticallevels.This will changeovertime as the COIN
operationand situationevolve.

S E C T I O N3 P R O M O T BU N I T Y O F P U R P O S B
T O C O - O R D I N A T ET H E
ACTIONSOF PARTICIPATINGAGENCIBS

CONTROL AND CO-ORDINATION

'fhe
9. Functionsto be Co-ordinated. COIN effortrequiresa multi-faceted and
multi-agencyapproachunitedby commonobjectivesandend state,Many of these
agencieshave differentphilosophies,modusoperandi,and methods.Unity of command
acrossthis array'isimpractical.Althoughunity of cffort is mostdesirable, it too may not
bc achievable. Unity of purposehowever,mustbe achievedand all agenciesmustagree
t o w o r k t o v r a r d tsh i sc o m m o np u r p o s e .I h e i d c a li s f o r t h eg o v e r r u n c nr ot g i v c o n c
personor errll responsibility for the directionof the government carnpaign, allowing
difil-erences of opinionbetweenagenciesto be resolvedby an impartialdirector. Whiie
this could be a soldrer,controlwill likely be vestedin a politicianor civil serv'ant.In any
case,hc rvill be rvorkingto strictgovernmentguidelinesand overallcontrol.Idcaiiv,a
joint commandand controlstructurewill be achieved.

10. SingleCommand System. In a singlecommandconstruct, the chairmanor


directorof tl-ieco-ordinated effort is in overallcommandof the campaign.In this system,
p o l i c ya n d e x e c u t i v e
a u t h o r i t ra r er e s t e di n a s i n s l ec o r n m a n d eur s. u a l l ya m i l i t a r y
officer,with seniorcivil sen,ice , policeand subordinate militarycommanders as advisers
T h e s y s t e mr e q u i r e as p er c e p t i v ea n dc h a r i s m a t i(ct e a mb u i l d i n e )c o m m a n d earn dw i l i

S e c u r i t yf o r c e si n c l u C en: i l i t a n ' : c c a l i t i o nn r i l i t a r ,f vc r c e s r; , a i i o n al ol l r c e ;l o c a l p o ) i c ca; n d l o c a l l y


ree."ited <rrnnnrf fnr- -r

Chap 3: ,:i 14
DRAFT

n s u r g e n ctyh r e a t .N o t r v i t h s t a n d rtnhgi s
f u n c t i o na g a r n sar r e l a t i v e l yu n c o m p l i c a t er d
nrilitarvIead,the commanderwill be actingon behalfof the government and u'ill havea
varietyof miiitary and civiiranadvisers.

1 l. The Committee System. Underthis system,committeesarefomed at the


strategic, operationaland tacticalIevelsin ordcrto co-ordinate all actions(kinettcand
non-kinetic)to counterthe insurgency. The civil administration providesthe chairmanof
tlre i o i n tn n e r r l i o nw
c h i l et h en o l i c ea n d ' h e a r m e df o - c e sn ' n v i 6 im
g e m b e rtso t h ev a r i o u s
operationscommitteesat eachlevel in the administrative and commandhierarchy.
Decisionsaretakenjointly and implemented by the chairmanandmembersthroughtheir
o w n c i v i l s e r v i c ep, o l i c ea n d m i l i t a r yc o m m a n d .A t v a r i o u sl e v e l st,h c c o m m i t t e c m
s ay
also include lead administratorsfrom variousnon-govelrtmental organisationsQ'fGOs)
and internationalbodiesproviding supportto the operation(suchas the LN specral
envoy, LINHCR co-ordinator,etc).The structureof the commifteesmust be flexible and
alteredto suit the circumstances at hand.While the committeesat variouslevelswill
guideand co-ordinateoperations, militarycommanders at all levelsmustbe preparedto
exploit fleetingopportunities in orderto do damageto the insurgencymovement.In
simpletenns,time may not existto referpotentialmilitaryactionsbackto a committee.
Any mrlitary action taken, however,must be fully in concertwith the overall strategyof
the COIN operation,use the minimal force necessaryand supportthe campaign
objectives.

12. Personalities.Given the inter-agency aspectof COIN operations and the need
for the military to work hand-in-handwith its civilian and police partners,many of whom
will have littie understanding2of how the military operates,the role of individual
personalities becomesmagnified.Any systemof controland co-ordination must be able
to adaptto the personalitiesof thoseinvolved. Military commanders must selecttheir
Iiaisonofficersand committeememberswith care,exploitingthosewho can achieve
progressthrougha balanceof charisma,persuasion and gracefulforceof personality.
Commandersmust be ableto realisethatthey themselves may not be the most suitable
individualsto conductdaily face-to-face operationsand co-ordination with their civilian
counter-parts and thcreforemust selectthe most suitablerepresentative.

13. Assistanceto Allies and Foreign Powers. -Whena militaryprovidesassistance


to a foreign state,the fbrces assignedwill necessarilybe subordinateto that government
in order to preservethe host nation's sovereigntyand the government'scredibility in the
cyesof its populace.The forceswill likely be obligedto adoptthe co-ordination system
of the host nation.

GOVERNMENT PLANNING

14. A s s e s s m e nat n d E s t i m a t eo f t h e S i t u a t i o na n d M i l i t a r y A d v i s o r s . W h e nt h e
so\errurrentis determiningwhich of its objectivescan bestbe attainedwith the help of

t
E x p e r i e n chea ss h o w nt h a t s o m eg o v e r n m e npt o l l t i c a l e a d e r sc,i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t oar n s ds t a f fo f N G O s w i l l
n o t o n i y h a v el a c k a n u n d e r s t a n d i nogf h o w t h e m r l i t a r yf u n c t i o n sa n do p e r a t e sb,u t w i l l h a v es i g n i f i c a n t
r r i s c o n c e p t r o na sn d e v e nh o l d h o s t i l i t i etso r v a r d tsh e m i l i t a r l ' a
, n d t h u sb e v e r y r e l u c t a nt to c o - o p e r a t e .

C h a p3 . 4 1 1 4

a n 2 n 2? n R- d . n n n n d ?
DRAFT

thearmedforccs,the mrlitarycommanders andadviserswill be ableto expiainthe


forces'capabilitresand limitationsin the contextof the particularemergency.A1
anaiysisof the situationshouldrevealthe areasin which the government ald the
insurgentsaremost vulnerable. Thesevulnerabilities arelikely to be spreadoverthe
entirepolitical,economic,sociai,and securityspectrum, The aim will be to identifythose
government vuinerabrlities
that arebestsuitedto militarydefensrve actronandthose
vulnerabilities
of the insurgentsthat aremostsLisceptible to offensivemilrtaryaction,

15 Allocation of Priorities. The co-ordinated nationalplanthatemergesfrom thc


aboveestimateshouldaddress the political,economic,socialand securityro..t.ur.
Determining the type of insurgencyfacedwill highlighttwo priorities:ijeniificationot'
wherethe insurgentsobtainmost of their support;and identificationof the goverlment
actionsthatwill achievemeaningfulresultsquickly,For example,an urbaninsurgency
will requiredifferentprioritiesto a rural basedinsurgency.'fhe nationalpriorities-need
to
be addressed at this stageof the planningprocess. Oncethe overarching prioritiesare
identified,otherallocationsof tasksand resources will follow, to include:

a. role and responsibilities betweengovernmentdepartments andmilitary


offices in order to avoid duplicationof effort, gapsand potentialconfllct;

priorityof actionbetweenthe social,economic,militaryand civil


administration fi elds;and

prioritieswithin eachfield of activity(social,economic,militaryand civil


administration).Just as the military will apportiontheir effortsacrossthe
operationalfunctions(command, Scnse,Act, shield, Sustain),so too must
the civil, police and other authoritiesset prioritiesacrosstheir own
organisations and linesof operation.

SECTION4: UNDERSTANDTHE COMPLEX DYNAMICSoF THE


INSURGENCY,INCLUDING THE WIDBR ENVIRONMENT

17. The variousinter-relateddynamicsof an insurgency will prescntprofound


intellectualchallengesfor commandersand staff. Given the largenumberof valables
al
\r'ork(seeChapter2, Annex A), it may very well be impossibleto predictthe secondary
and tertiaryeffectsof specificactions.Still, effort must be expendedto understand
these
variablesand dynamicsat handand how bestto tacklethem.

'fhe
18. dynamicsof an insurgencyrnayinclude:

a, cause* what makesthe insurgency


attractiveto the uncommitted;

- this may be an ideoiogl,or a strategic


centralideaof the insurgenc,v end
state;

armsof the insurgencl- long term.shortterm.advertised


anclhidden;

C h a p3 : 5 i I 4
DRAFT

d. o r g a n i s a t i oann dc a p a b i l i t i e- s l e a d e r sc,a d r e c, o m b a t a n t s .u p p o f bi a s e
andpoliticalwings;

e, e x t e r n asl u p p o r -t m o r a l ,p l r y s i c aal n dc o n c e p t u a l ;

f. methodology- strategies
and tactrcs;and

g t h e w i d e re n v i r o n m e n- t p o l i t i c a le, c o n o m i cs, o c i o l o g r c aal ,n dt e c h n i c a l

19. For everydynamicwithin an insurgency, the linesof operationwithin the


campaignplan must anticipateand counterthe evoiving dynamicsof the insurgency.

SECTION 5: EXPLOIT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION

20. The Overarching Importance of Intelligence. in orderto truly understandan


insurgencyand its dynamicsand, oncethis has beendone,to attackits weaknesses,
intelligenceand informationmust be exploitedin a systematicand thoroughmanner.All
individualsconcerned, civilians,commanders and soldiersof all ranksmust understand
the oveniding importanceof intelligencein actively defeatingan insurgency, It wilL
supportdirect military action againstinsurgents,guide non-kineticeffectsto attackthe
root causesof the insurgency,and allow for successto be measured.It appliesat the
operationaland tacticallevels.

2l . Operational Level Application - Local Knowledge. Knowiedgeof the country,


its ethnic composition,culture,religionsand schisms,the political sceneand party
leaders,the clandestinepolitical organisationsand their undercoverarmed groups,the
influenceof neighbouringstatesand the economy,providesthe essentialbackdropto
understanding the insurgencybut this takestime to build up. Suchbackground
informationis essentialbecausethe developmentof intelligence relieson an ability to
discernpattemsof changein behaviour.The host nation poiiceand its intelligence
serviceshouidbe the prime agenciesfor providing(at leastthe background)information
and intelligence,with the bestsourcebeing,naturally,a memberof the insurgencyitself.

22. Tactical Level Application, Without accurate, actionableintelligencethe


security forces conductrandom,ineffectiveoffensiveoperations,which tend to produce
very little positiveand much negativereactionamongstthe population.The ensuing
negative media reportingfurther benefitsthe insurgents.Furthermore,troops conducting
routine framework patrolling tend to loosetheir focus and motivation,with the result
oflen beingthe conductof patrollingforthe sakeof patrollingitself. Tacticalintelligence
requirements shouldbe pusheddown to the lowestlevelsand all sources,specialistand
routineframeworkpatrolsalike,shouldbe given specificinformationalrequirements to
gather, Furthermore,specialists whereverpossible,shouldbe pusheddown to the iower
( s u b - u n i t t)a c t i c a l e v e l ss o t h a tt h e y m a y r e m a i nr e s p o n s i vteo t h e i ri n t e l l i g e n c e
requireme nts ri'hilefulfiiling thoseof the unitsand formations.

C h a P ., 61 1 4

Antnntno a nnnnrtr
DR{FT

?3. T h e t a c t i c alle v e Ia p p i i c a t i oonf i n f o r m a i r oann di n t c l l r g e n cwei l l a l l o u ,l a r g e


NamedAreasof Interest("1\tAIs) to be reducedto pointNAIs and eventuallyto Tar:get
Areasof Interest(TAls) fbr subsequent precisionstrikes.For example,I,liMl\jT ieports
nlay indicatea gangand theirsuspected weaponscacheareiocatedin a neighbourhood
containing20,000occupants. Patrolsand othersources, throughspecifictasksancjstaterl
informationrequiremcnts, may reducethis areaNAI to u ,p..ifi. city block or l-iousc.
This will eventuallybecomea TAI that canbe passedto operations staffand commandcrs
for subscqucnt actjon,in this case.a surgicalcordonand searchoperatlon,

24' The samecan be saidregardinginformationexploitationfor non-kineticeffects.


HUMINT reportsor interrogationsmay indicatethat an insurgencyis recruiting
members
from a particularsuburbanregion.Furtherexaminationand collectionregardini this
area
may revealthat it is an ethnicenclavewith high unemployment.Hence,ihiru.!u1noy
becomea TAI for the applicationof CIMIC and otherInio Ops resources in orderto
stimulatedevelopment and inclusionof thjs enclave.Followluppatrolscan in time gauge
thepublic reactionto suchmeasures,In short,intelligence drivestacticaloperations,
limits collateraldamageand measures success.

25. T h e I n t e l l i g e n c eO r g a n i s a t i o n .I t s h o u i db e e x p e c t e tdh a ti n t e l l i g e n c e
organizations will haveto grow considerably.Ideally,the intelligence orfanisation
shouldstartexpandingin lock stepwith the insurgents'developing threatilnevitably,
however,thereis usualiyan embarrassing intervalbeforethe expandedorganisation
becomeseffective,

SECTION 6: ISOLATE THE INSURGENTS FROM THEIR PHYSICAL ANI)


MORAL SUPPORT BASE

26. Three Facetsof [solation. The aim heremustbe to isolatethe insursents and
theirmovement,physicaily,intellectualiyand morally. All agenciesinvolvel in the
COIN operationmust understandthis and work within their own fields to this end.AII
threeelementsmust be addressed:

insurgents must be separated


from theirphysicalsupport,which inciudcs
recruits.finances,weaponsand combatsuppliesthat may comefrom
internalsourcesor sourcesexternalto the nationor resion:

C h a p3 : 7 i 1 1
DRAFT

tr. i n s u r g e n tm y t h e i ra i m s .A l e g a l v, i a b l e
s u s tb e u n d e r m i n eidn t e l i e c t u a l il n
altemativeto the insurgencymustbe offeredto membersof the
insurgency, their supporters andthe uncommittedin the population.Hand-
in-handwith this is the fact that the conditionsthat pennit the spreadof
the insurgency, and its justification in the eyesof many,must be addressed
and resolvedwith long-tennsolutionsthat arewell publicisedthrough
informationoperations;

insurgents cannotbe allowedto be seento hold the moral [igh ground.


The legitimateor desiredgovemmentstructuremust be made to be, and
s e c nt o b e ,r n o r a l l ys u p e r i otro t h ei n s u r g e n cayn d i t s a l t e r n a t i voef f c r i n g s .
'fhere
is a greattendencyby somemilitarycommandersand others
operatingin a foreignnationto practisemoralrelativism,and thussimply
attributeviolationsof the rule of law to localcustomand culture,even
when suchviolationsclearlyunderminethe legitimacy,moral superiority
and effectiveness of thoseauthorities.Commanders conductinga COIN,
and even their soldiers,must understandthe needto help ensurethe
supportedgovelrlmentremainslegitimateand acts accordingly.Where
possible,they must assistin the raisingof standardsof conduct,from the
local level upwards.Violationsmust be reportedto the military and civil
chains-of-command.The insurgencymust be deprivedof any claim to
moral superiority.

27. Firm Base. The first requirementmay be to securethe baseareasessential to the


survivalof the governmentand,state.Thesenormallyincludethe capital,the pointsof
entry,key installationsand thoseareaswhich are loyal to the govemment.The provision
theirinhabitants
of securityin thosevital areasencourages to rally to the government.

28. Expansion of SecureAreas. Onceestablished, securityforcesexpandoutward


from the securebasesin an campaignakin to the spreading of an oil slick. As eacharea
loval local forces
is consolidated. would be raisedto secure
the areato releasemobile

C h a p 3 : t 3 I/ 4

A0202308-8.000047
DRAFT

I e g u l a tr r o o p st o s e c u r e
i h e n e x ta r e aw h r l et h e h o s ts t a t e ' sc i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i oann do o l r c e
t e - e s t a b i i st h e m s e l v ei n
s t h er e c e n t l yl i b e r a t e tde n i t o r y T
. h i s i s a w e l l - t r i e da p p r o a c i5o
combatingan insurgency.

29 E l i m i n a t i o no f t h e I n s u r g e n tS u b v e r s i v e
a n d S u p p o r tS y s t e m .T h e s e c u r i t y
lorces'operations mustfocuson eliminatingthe insurgents;subversive and support
organizations. This is an essential prerequisitc to defeatingany activcinsurgentgroupfor
t l r ef o l l o r v i n gr e a s o n s :

a. the subversiveorganizationcontrolsthe population,denicsthe


governmcntpopularsupport,spreads propaganda uncheckedand prevents
witnessesfrom providing information;

b. the insurgentscontinueto receivcsupplies,recruits,and information


regardingthe securityforces;

oncethe subversiveorganisationis destroyed,the insurgentsare forcesto


operatemore openly and thus exposethemseivesto deliberatemilitarv
actionsand arrest:and

d. subversiveelementsarrestedarethe bestsourcesof informationon the


illegalorganisation.
They mustbe carefullyhandledby specialiststaff.

30. SeparationMethods. A thoughtfulcombinationof methodsby all agencies


involved is neededto separatethe insurgentsfrom their subversiveandsuppJ.ting
constructs:

intelligenceshouldaim at the identificationof subversivecells and


propagandists.This informationshouldcome in good part from civilian
police sources,but where policeforceslack a phyiical presencein
a
remotegeographical the void may be filled with elementsof special
1rea,
forcesassignedspecificinformationrequirements;

securityforce protectionfor residentsand informers.This is bestdone


proactivelythroughthe useof anonymous tip teiephonelines,specialist
handlingof sourcesand low levelmeasures (suchas facernasks)to hide
the identifyof informers;

C. the gradualspreadof governmentand securityforce controlover areas:

d curfewsand searchesof individualsthoughtto be supportinginsurgenrs;

patrols,ambushes and vehiclecheckpoints(the latterbestdoneat low


Ievelsfor shortintervalson likely suspects);

interdictionoperations
againstthe entryofexternalsupplies

C h a p3 : 9 i 1 4

A n 6 A A ^ ^ ^
DRAFT

31. R e f o r m i n gt h e G o v e r n m e n ta n d I t s I n s t i t u t i o n s .l n m a n yc a s e st,h e
governmentunder attackfrom an insurgencyrequiressomeform of reform in orderto
s o l i d i f yi t s l e g i t i m a c yg. a i ni n t e m a t i o n aslu p p o r al n dw i n a n dm a i n t a i nt h e s u p p o f o
i lits
own populace. Governmentactions within a moral context, such as, observance of the
iaw, restraintin the useof force,gainingof popularsupportandthebenefits bestowed by
the socialand economicaspects of the nationalplan,will help to producea favourable
climatedomesticallyand internationallyDiplomacywiil alsobe key in gainingsupport
for the besiegedgovemmentand in denyingexternalsupportto the insurgents.

SECTION 7: APPLY POWER DISCRIMTNATELY TO INFLUENCE HUMAN


WILL

32, Instrumentsof nationalpowershouldbe employedto neutralise the power of the


insurgency.Often, the key will be to pre-empt or supplantthe ideasthat underhethe
insurgency.One of the principlemeans of influencingthe human will of the broader
populationis throughcontributingto the welfareof society,on the psychological, social
and securityfronts.

33. The exerciseof power by any of the agenciesoperatingwithin a COIN, must be


conductedwith legitimacy(ie, within the rule of law) and must follow the fundamentalof
the minimum use of force. Additionally, disruptionto normal civic life must be limited
to the greatestextentpossible.This must be applied at the operationaland tacticallevels.

34. For example,the impositionof curfewsshouldbe as limitedin time and scopeas


possiblein order to avoid disruptionto the lives of the majority of the populace,who are
alwaysat risk of becomingfatiguedby securitymeasures. Likewise,at the tacticallevel,
the conductof a cordonand searchin private homes may requireforced entry into locked
rooms.If the ownerscannotlocatekeys,evenwhen breachingtoolsareproduced,then
the door should,wheneverpossible,be removedfrom its hinges.If nothing is found(as
'fhis
will often be the case),the door can then be replaced without damage. in tums limits
embarrassmentfor the securityforcesand the extra effort taken to avoid damages to
privatepropertyis. to a certainextent,appreciated by the populace.It in turn helpsgain
and maintain their supportand counter the propaganda undoubtedlyspreadby the
ipsurgentsregardingthe security forces and their methods. In short,commanders at all
levelsmust understand the applicationof this principle,

SECTION 8: NEUTRALISE THE INSURGENT

35. The securityforcesof the goverrrment or coalitionwillhave a significantrole in


the seiectivedestruction,disruptionand dislodgmentof insurgents.Confidence,trust and
freedomof action (without the needto refer routine and anticipatedoperationsthat
exploit often fleetingopportunities, back to a higherlevel(s)of command)must be
ar'fordedtacticalcommanders(parricularlydown to sub-unitlevel)if thev are to be
: u c c e s s f uiln s t r i k : n gt h e i n s u r g e nat n d d i s l o d g i n gh i m f r o m h i s p o w e rb a s e.

C h a p3 : 1 0 / 1 4

a n r n ? ? n R - 1n - n n n n d q
DILAFT

36
. A 1 t h o u gm h u l t i p l eu n i t sm a y b e d e p l o y e d
i n a C O N o p e r a t i o na, c r i t i c aal s p e cot t
successfm u li l i t a r yC O I N i s c o m m a n da n da c t i o na t t h e l o w e s t t a c t i c al ei v e l
t h a ti n v o l v e s
the.luniorcommander(piatoonandsectionlevel)leadingsmallpatrolsinto the
tnsurgents' areaof operations. The aim shouldbe to defeatthe insurgenton,,home
ground"usingadequate , but no more,forcethanis absoiutelynecessary, Proportionality
mustbe the measureappliedwhen employingforce.

37' All militarytacticalactionsmustbe conductecl in harmonywith the othcracrrons


takento neutralise and defeatthe insurgency:amelioration
of thc causes;reformationof
thc government and local securityforces(if necessary);
informatronoperatrons (to
explainthe militaryactions);and socialdevelopment. Withoutthis multi-p.ong.d
approach, killing insurgentsmay sirnplycncourage more covertsto the insurcencv.

SECTION 9: SUSTAIN COMMITMENI.To EXPBND POLITICAL


CAPITAL
AND RESOURCES OVER A LONG PERIOD

38 Insurgencyis in many ways a protractedcontestof wills. Insurgentsunderstand


thattheydo not haveto win a decisivebattle,but haveto makethe campaign
too
expensiveand dcmanding(in termsof time, resources,financialuna poiit"lal
capital)for
the govemment,the populaceand/orthe government'sextemalsupporterr,
so-. of
whom may be supplyingtroopsto stabiliseand supportthe state. Not only
must the
commitmentof the localpopulacebe sustained, but the populationsof any supporting
nationsmust be convinccdto rcmaincommittedto the COIN.

39' A sustainedcommitmenttothe COIN is underpinned by unity of purposeacrossa


wide rangeof disparateelementsand organisationsinvolved inttre campaign.
Informationoperationswill haveto work towardsthis aim. Furthennore,.ealistic
measures of successwili haveto decidedand promulgatedso that successful linesof
operatronmay be fully identified,broadened
and exploited.

S E C T I O N 1 ( ) : C O N D U C T L O N G E R T E R M P O S T . I N S U R G B N C YP L A N N I N G

40. 1'herequirementfor post-insurgency securityand development probablyholdsthe


key to effectivelyappiyingallof the otherfive principLes.
Merely prouidingfoi ttre
military defeatof insurgentsdoesnot in any way end the governmentrequiiement
to
makesuitablelonger-termplansto cnhancethe cconomicand socialaspects
of its
populationand to ensurethat the politicalcausesof the insurgencyhavebeeneliminated.

4l . The announcementof bold governmentinitiativesto be startedafter the


rllsurgencyhas beendefeatedcan have a real and significanteffecton winning
the heafis
andmrndsof the populationduringany campaign.Suchinitiativesshould
be iesignedat
the sametime as the comprehensive strategicplansarebeingpreparedto defeatth"e
rnsurgency.The timing of any statement aboutlongertermplanscould be of crucial
tmpoftance and shouldbe handledin a sensitivcand controlledmannerby the state
authorities
in concertu,iththe overallinformationoperations olan.

C h a p3 ' ,I I l 1 4
DRAFT

I n t h eB r i t i s hD h o f a rc a m p a i g n( 1 9 7 0 - i 9 7 5 ;t.h ee n do f i n s u r g e nat c t i v i t yo c c u r r e d
in December1975,but the authorities had to work relentlessly for severalmore
yearsto achievecontinuedsupportfrom the population before the causesofthe
insurgencyhad beenfuliy rectified.As with subduinga fire, the flameshave to be
out and the emberscold. beforeit canbe considered finished.

SECTION 11: FACTORS BEARING ON THE APPLICATION OF THE


PRINCIPLES OF COIN

P o p u l a rS u p p o r t

42. Insurgent Aims. An insurgencyaims to discreditthe governmentand its


policies.It will have spentmuch time preparingthe groundfor insurgencywith
propaganda,using real and contriveddiscontents.When it considersthat the government
and/orits supportingauthorities(from an extemalnation)have been sufficientiy
underminedand that a significantpart of the populationhas beenalienatedfrom
authority,it will use coercionand terror to reinforceits propagandacampaign'

43. Hearts and Minds and Competition for Loyalty. A governmentmust


convinceits populationthat it can offer a bettersolution,bettergovernmentand a better
life than the opposinginsurgentsin order to win the heartsand minds of the population.
'fhis
will be a focal point for the informationoperationscampaign. Just as an insurgency
needsthe sympathyor the acquiescence of a sizeablepercentageof the popuiationto
survive and to overthrow the government,so the governmentneedsthe people'ssupport
to appearlegitimatein its eyesand to obtain informationleadingto the arrestor capture
of the terrorists.Violence,or the threatof it, is aimedat the citizen'sfearsfor his family
and freedomto earn a wage to feed them. Whoevercan guaranteea citizenssecuritycan
often commandtheir allegiance. An insurgencyis a competitionbetweengovernmentand
insurgent for the individual's loyalty. Unlessthe govemmentcan offer reasonable
protection,individuals are unlikely to risk their own or their families' lives by
'fhe in additionto
volunteeringinformation. securityforceswill meetpassiveresistance
the activeresistance ofthe insurgents.

44. Government Protection. Protectionof the civilianpopulationwill require


restrictionsand measures(searches, checkpoints,curfews,etc) that will disruptnormal
lives and frustratethe local populations.Their frustrationwill increasewith time.
Insurgentswiil seekto misrepresent necessary inconveniences as harshand oppresstve.
Consequently, the governmentand its security forces must anticipate a possiblehostile
public reactionto its securitymeasuresand prepareargumentsto rebutinsurgent
propagandain orderto keepthe initiativein the battlefor the heartsand minds of the
pcople.

C h a p3 : 1 2 1 1 4

a n 2 n 23 0 R - 1 t - n n n cn, l
DR-AFT

15 I n v o l v i n gt h e L o c a l P o p u l a t i o n si n t h e C a m p a i g n . E v e ni n s i t u a t i o nisn w h i c h
the localautholitiesand hostnationpoliceforcesrequireiignificantreform,much
effon
shouldbe madeto includethem,rvithinthedictate s of forceprotectionand OpSEC,rn
thecampaign.It will build theirconfidence, encourage higherstandards and raisetherr
profilein the eyesof the localcommunities. Lrkewise,local populatrons shouldbe made
to feel thatthey havea vrtalpartto play in countering the insurgency and leadingto rts
conclusion. They may evenextendto havingremotecommunitiesraisetheirown local
-fhe
defenceforces. trustthe communityinitiallyplacein theirprotectors is repaidby the
trustthe government showsin themby allowingthem to beararmsrn a commoncausc,

46 countering Propaganda. Insurgent propaganda mustbe monitoredand


addressed by a deliberate
andmulti-faceted IO campaign.Specialist advicewiil haveto
be sought.However,as muchauthorityas possiblemust be pusheddown to the tactical
levelsin orderthatinformationoperations at that levelare ableto be executedin a timely
andeffectivcmamer. A goodapproachandmessage aimedat the circumstances of a
specifictacticalareawiil be much moreeffectivethanan operational-ievel approved
message deliveredlateand watereddown to makeit as genericandbroadaspossible.
Canadianand coalitionsoidiersmust be awareof the key role that they play in countering
insurgentpropaganda,which will paint them as foreign,oppressiveoccupiers.
Their
friendly (but professional)disposition,toneand decorumwhile patrollingamongst
the
local population,and their abiiity to relateto the populace,will quickly rindermi'ne
that
propaganda.

POLITICAL AWARENESS

41. Commandersat all levelsand individualsoldiersmust be awareof the


consequences of any actionthey may take.This is especiailyimportantshouldan
unexpectedopportunitypresentitself or in a suddenemergencywhen thereis no time
tcr
scekadviceor directionfrom higherauthority.fhose with a knowledgeof the political
sceneare betterablc to assess the iikely effectof theiractionson publicopinionanclto
m a k ea s e n s i b l d
eecisron.

48. All ranksmust be briefedon the government aims,insurgency aimsand


propaganda. An understanding ofthe issuesat stakeensuresthat soldiersknow how to
reinforcethc governmentcffort.Furthermore. soldiersmust be educated as to what
constitutessuccessin a COIN,

ACTING WITHIN THE LAW

49. Althoughterroristsand insurgcnts uselawlessandviolentmethods,maintainrng


thatthe endjustifiesthe means,the securityforcescannotoperateoutsidethe law without
discrediting
themselves, the governmenttheyaresupportingandprovidingthe dissident
poiiticalmachinewith damagingpropaganda material.If the governmentand its security
forceslosethe moral high groundthe peoplehaveno incentiveto backthem. The poiice
and the anny must act within the law of the statewithin which they areoperatingunaU.
seeuto be doing so. In manv nations,the policeand localmilitarywill requireclose

C h a p3 ' ,1 3 1 4
DRA.FT

s u p e r v i s i r ni n o r d e rt o e n s u r ct h a tt h c y a n ot h e i ra c t i o n s[ a ] l w i t h r nt ) r i sp a r a n : e t e r .
Leadersat all levelsmust not be reluctantto voicetheir concernswith respectto the
conductof local securityforces.both on the spotand in their reportsto theirchain-of-
command.

MINIMUM NECBSSARYFORCE

50. No more forcemay be usedthanis necessary to achievea legaiaim. The amount


and it must not be
usedmust be reasonable punitive.
Oncethe aim is achievedno more
force mav be used.

51. The needto useminimum force is not to bc confusedwith deployingthe


'fhe
minimum number of troops. of a force large enoughto containa situation
appearance
at the right psychologicalmoment may convinceinsurgentsand other dissidentsthat the
authoritiesare well preparedand determinedto deal with lawlessness.

52. As in all operations,commandersremainmorally responsibleto ensurethat all


ranks can apply their rules of engagementrobustlyand with confidence. In doing so,
commandersand soldiersalike must recognisethe needto limit coliateraldamagesand to
only engageclearly identifiedthreats.insurgentswill undoubtedlyattackfrom the shelter
and screenof civilian populationsand soldiersmust ensurethat thcy clearly identify the
threatbeforeengagingwith deadlyforce.This mustbe a key aspectof training.

C h a p3 . 1 4 1 4

a nrnr?nR-4 / _nnnnql
DRAFT

CTIAPTER4

S T R A T E G I CL B V E L C O N S I D B R A T I O NFSO R C O U N T E RI N S U R G E N C Y

"...thefrst requiremenrfor
thesuccessful
conclucl
of a ColN campaignisfor the
goyernmenlto set L.tp
a soundframework v,ithin which it can takeplace."

Generul Sir Frank Kitson

S c c t i o n1 : G e n e r a l

l. In its widestcontext,an insurrection will be politicallymotivated;therefore,thc


overarching strategyto defeatthe insurrectionmustbe political.Military activitieswill
form a part ofthis higherstrategyto a greateror lesserdegreedependingon
the strength
of the insurgentforces,plus their tactics,techniquesand piocedures.In othcr words,
at
the strategiclevel,thereareincreasingly significantareaipecuharto COIN. Strategicand
operationalconsiderations arefundamentallydifferentfor COIN than for conventiJnal
wars: they requirecloserco-operationwith ongoingdiplomaticactivities
and more
considerationof the overarchingpolitical objectivesat lower operationaland
tactical
levelsof command.They are usuallyaboutminimum use of foice versusmaximum
firepowerand destruction.Therefore,they requirecloserand more extensive
coordination
betweenthe military and othergovernmentaland non-governmental agencies,
Nonetheless, whetheror not an insurgencydevelopsto thc point wherethereis major
combatas with the ChinesePeoples'LiberationAnny in 1947or the Afghan Norttern
Alliancein2002, the outcomeof a corN campaignrvrll be profound.

S e c t i o n2 : G o v e r n m e n tC o n c e p t

The Setting

2' Alliancesand globalsecurityarrangements improvethe securityenvironmentby


reducingthe threatof attackon Canadaand increasingthe likelihoodof support
fronr
others.Workingr'vithothercountriesis an essential elementof our foreignand defence
policy, Willingnessto contributeto allies,both regionaliyand on a moreglobal
level,has
beenseenas effectivein containingpotentialiyunstablesituations. The militaryhasa
provenrole in maintainingintemationalpoliciesand relationships.

4' Parriclpation
in intemationaldeployments is considered on a case-by-case
basis
and it would be expectedthat missionswould havespecificobjectiveswith good
a
probabilityof success, be of limiteddurationand be fuily resourced.Canadianinterests
and cos1s,risksto military personneland existingcommitmentsareadditionalfactors
that
mustbe considered.

5. It is possiblethat a nationalgovernlTlenr,
the LDrror other leadnation facedwith
an rnsurgent tiueat,will requestassistance
from Canadaand,in the eventof the

U6
DRAFT

Govemmentof Canadaagreeingto sucha request,the Canadianmiiitarymay deploya


forceto conductCOIN operatrons. Sucha deploymentmay be a unilateralaction,
reminiscentof the exerciseswhereintherewere Canadianinfantrybattaliondeployments
to Jamaicain the 1970s,or part of a multinationalcoalition,underthe UnitedNatrons
qLN) or otherlead-nationarrangements.

6 A n a t i o n agl o v e r n m e notr t h e [ , N c o n s i d e r i nrge q u e s t i nC military


ga n a d i a n
assistance is iikely to delaysucha requestin the hopethatthe existingsituationwill
improveso that outsideassistance will not be necessary. It shouldbe expected,therefore,
that insurgencywill be well established by the time Canadiantroopsare committed,

The Primacy of Host Nation (HN) Policies

1. A COIN campaignmust be conductedin accordance with an agreed,universally


applied,nationalpolicy of the HN. In the caseof a failed,failing or re-established
state,
an interim governmentmandate and its military campaign must be in accordancewith the
mandateissuedby the UN.

8. All actionsand restrictionsarising from strategicpolicy affectingthe nation,its


populationand resources,must be carefullyexplainedto all people.Similarly' the
operationsof the securityforcesmust be seento stem from nationalpolicy.

The Primacy of Law

9. The legalframeworkwithin which COIN operations may be conductedwill


almost certainly changcfrom situationto situation,but the primacy of the law cannotbe
usurpedby military action. Where the nationalor mandatedgovernmentmaintains
control of the country or parts of the country,it should determinethe policy and priorities
for COIN operationsand the restorationof legitimategovernment.If martial law or
emergencypowers are enacted,thesemeasureswould be temporaryin natureand their
purposemust be clearly explainedto the peopleof the HN. Thesefactsdictatethe
developmentand distributionof a strategicmessageby the highestlevel of government,
which pervadesdown to the lowest tacticalievel. Furtherrnore,restorationof legal
normalcyis a decisivefactor.

S e c t i o n3 : S t r a t e g i cO b j e c t i v e s

10. Sinceinsurgencyis principallya politicalstruggle,the ultimateobjectivewillbe


achievedby a combinationof complementary objectives,underthe overalldirectionof
the highestcivilian authority.Theseobjectiveswill be achievedthrough:

i) politicap
l olicy;
o ^n-^-in ^nlinrr'
b vLvrrvr.rr! PvrrvJ t

c. socialprogrammes;and
d s e c u r i t yo p e r a t i o n s .

2t6

an2n2?nq-?-nnnn66
DRAT-T

r n e a s u r eass t h e p o p u i a c es e e k ss e c u r i t yi n d e c d p, r o v o k i n ga n i l l - c o n s i d e r er d
e s p o n sies
: c l a s s i ci n s u r g e ni ta c t i c .

15. The governmentmay concludethata combrnation of selectivelegisiationand


p ,r e c i s i o ns e c u r i t yf o r c eo p e r a t i o nws o u l ds t a n da g o o dc h a n c eo f n i p p i n gt h e
smail-scale
'n
i n s r r r o e n c vi n t h e hu u' ur,d rrr n r e e t i r - ch n w e v e l c r o s s i n pt h a t t h r e s h o l d : s s e l d n m e
r q2
J Js v! a
e S

s e n s i t i v i ttyo p o t e n t i adl o m e s t i ca n d i n t e r n a t i o n rael p e r c u s s i o fni sr m l y i n c l i n e sa


governmenttowardsthe defermentof painfuldecisions.

16. During this thresholdperiod,the Governmentof Canadamonitorsthe situationin


the strategicenvironment.If it deteriorates,relevantdepartments, suchas National
Defenceand Foreign Affairs, would begin contingencyplanning. fhis would include
keepingthe respectiveMinistersinformedof possiblecapabilities, options,and
restrictions,within the context of the insurgency'sperceivedcausesand objectives.From
this initial planning,a strategicdirectivecouldbe prepared,'settingout the government's
policy vis-a-visengagementin the crucial areasof:

2 political,economicand socialpolicy;

strategicinformationoperations;and

military estimatesand plans.

11. Although sucha scenariois likely to developgraduallyas the seriousness of the


threatbecomesobvious,thereare a numberof issuesthat would be particularlybeneficial
to military planners,shouldthe governmentgive them earlyconsideration. Theseinclude,
but are not Iimited to formulatinga long-termpoliticalaim, integratingand expandingthe
requisiteintelligenceand securityservices, and cstablishinga multi-agencyframework
for the planningand conductof securityand otheroperations requiringcivil, policeand
military cooperation. Naturally,sucheffortswould be expandedshouidthe situation
continueto deteriorate.

Section5: Military Commitment

18. Guidedby the nationalstrategicdirective,the Canadianmilitarywili dcvelopa


military strategy,which is a subsetof nationalstrategy.The degreeof preparation
enabledby this military strategyduringthe thresholdphasewill detenninethe easeof
deploymentand subsequent operationsfor Canadiantroops,The earlierthat liaisonis
established betweenthe CF, govemmentagencies, coalitionand local forces,and the
more integratedthe planningthat hastakenplacebeforehand, the smootherwill be the
deolovment.

'
B - C C - 0 0 5 - 0 0 4 / A F - 0 0C0a n a d i a n F o r c e sO p e r a t i o n sd a t e c2i 0 0 0 - l 2 - 1 8s; e eC h a p r e3r " T h e C a m p a i g n
y e c t i o nl " C a m p a i g nD e s i g n " a
P I a n "e s p e c i a l l S , r t i c l e3 0 1 ," T h e S t r a t e g iEc . n v i r o n m e n t3"-:i ,

/ t a
+/o

anrnr?no-r-nnnnAT
DRAFT

19. The aim of militaryrntervention is to restorethe situatronto the point wherethe


p o l i c ea r co n c ea g a i na b l et o m a i n t a i nl a w a n do r d e r E . x p e r i e n chea ss h o w nt h a ti t i s
easierto committhe Army thanto extractit, with the risk thatthe militaryreplaces, rather
t h a ns u p p l e m e n ttsh,e l o c a lf o r c e s . ' f h i s r t u a t i om
n u s tb e a v o i d e di n t h e i n t e i e s tos f
maintainingthepropcrrelationship betweengovernment, police,andthe armedforces,as
well as preserving the securityforces'moraleandtherrstandingwith the populationit
,.villhaveto serveuponthe returnto normalcy,

20. when operatrng in supportof a friendlygovcrnment, the cF must be seento


operateclearlyin supporlof the civil powerand not in isolationfiom it. This canbe
accomplished more readilyif the locaisecurityforcesare incorporated into military
planningwheneverpossible,andthe civil government is seento be implementing ihose
aspectsof policy,planning,and controlwhich closelyaffectmilitaryoperations.As a
roughoutline,a tableof civil andmilitaryresponsibilitiesis providedas an Annex to this
chapter.

Civil Resnonsibilities Militarv Res


The formulationof the politicalaim and the Advice on the overalldirectionof security
long-termplanningcoveringthe duration force operations
of military commitmentand its aftermath
Definingpolicy,particulardetermining: The militarycontributionto joint/combined
- at which levelsof the government actionin:
and securityforce hierarchy - Planning
decistons on policy mattersof - Intelligence and security
varying degreesof importanceare - Informationand counter-
to be taken. propaganda policy
limits to be imposedupon security
force planningand operations,both
overt and covert
policy for intelligence, direction
and coordination.
informationand counter-
nde nn]in.r

E s t a b l i s h i nt hgec i r i l m a c h i n e rfyo r l i a i s o n Assistance in the provisionof secure


with the securityforceson all planningand commLlntcatlons.
rationalmatters
Draftingand promuigatinglegislation, Advice on:
ii l' r. L
^ ll u
" .ul li i-l^B s l n s r
Bciluy p O W e f S . - Training
ExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal
(EOD)
Equipmentand weapon
development.
TheprovisionofcivilintelligenceAssistance*itffi
a n d e n g i n e e rr e s o L l r c e s
Maintenance
o f s t o c k so f e s s e n t i a l
commodities

5t6
DILAFT

M a i n t e n a n coef e s s e n t i asle r v i c e s
T a b l e 4 - 1 : A C o m p a r i s o no f C i v i l a n d M i l i t a r y l { es p o n s i b i l i t i e s

S e c t i o n6 : W i t h d r a w a l

21. The withdrawalphaseof militarydisengagement may proveprobLematic. Whilst


no goverrrment or miLitaryaspiresto a protractedconflict,historyprovidesscantfew
examplesof short-livedcounterinsurgencies, Thereis alwaysthe potentialthat pubiic
, a n r f e sitn w i d e s p r e aodp p o s i t i o tno a d e p l o y m e nat n dd e m a n d sf o r
a n t i p a t h ym
uithdrawal,could form a strategicchallcngeto thc Coverrlmentof Canadaand the
military to maintainthe moraleof the public and of militaryelementsdeploycdand in
trainingto deploy.The key eiementin achievingtheseobjectivesis a strategicpublic
allalrsprogramme.

In March1964,theGovemmentof Canadaagreedto deploytroopsto Cyprusfor a


four-monthperiod.Forty-one years later, as of this writing,theCF is still involvedin
LINFICYP.

22. Potentially,a domesticor internationalsettlementmay allow for a swift troop


withdrawal. Nevertheless,the history of COIN indicatesa greaterprobabilitythat a
prolongedattritional strugglewill ensue.Often the ll\l govemmentwill only regain
control of its disaffectedterritory areaby area.This willnecessitatea prolongedmilitary
withdrawal phase.Therefore,as military manoeuvreforce levelsare reduced,it will be of
vitai importancestrategically to carefullymanagethe informationoperations campaign.

6i6

Antnaond ^ n^nn EA
DRAFT

C F I A P T E I {5 :

O P E R A I ' I O N A I , - L E VF ] , IC
- O N SI D E I { A T I O N S F OI I C O U N T E R I N SU R G E N C Y

li the lrtng-terrn
po/iticaloh1eclit,er.;natJir.strn thentintlof rtllpctrtigiputtt.s
thera
v ill be u lendenc'ylo odr,tpl,shorl-lerrn,
ctclhoc n1ea.tltre.\'
tn raspon.\'e lg il.suycantot.
l , t ' r t t t i r Id ( l i I i l \

SrrRohcrl'fhontpson

SECTION I : IN'TRODUCTION

, fo i n t a n d C o m b i n e dA s p e c t so l ' C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y ,
'Ihe
l p l a n n i n ga n dc o n d u cot f C O I N a t t h eO p e r a t i o n al el v e lr e q u i r c sa m i l d s e td i f f b r e n t
f t ' o t tct o n v c n t i o n awl a r f i g h t i n gM. i l i t a r yu n i t st e n dt o b e t r a i n e do, r g a n i z e ad l d
e q L r i p p cf b
dr
cOllvct.ttional r'varfighting, nccessitating a reorientation to defeatinsurgcncy. COIN-will bc
c o n d u c t e tdh r o u g ha j o i n t a n dc o m b i n e ccio m m a n di,n t i m a t e l lyi n k e c*j i t h . i u i l i u n
political
a c t i v i t i e s . ' l ' hseh i f i i n l o g i c a e
l m p h a s i{si o m d e s t r u c t i otno p e r s u a s i orne q u i r e g s r c a t ear w a r c r e s s
c f i n t e l l i g e n caen d i n f o r m a t i o nP. l a n n e rm s u s tc o n s i s t e n tel ym p h a s i zteh e m i n i m L r nui s eo 1 ' f b r c e
ratherthanmaximumlircpower.All of thesewill requirea greaterdegreeof cooperation
apd
ulritl'of effort.',vitha morediverserangeof civilianandsccurityfbrceactors
than is cllstomarv
tr.)ntltnYwithin the military

?-. S t r L r c t u r a l ol yr,g a n i z a t i o nast t h c o p e r a t i o n al el v c lw i l l m i r r o r t h o s ec i v i l a n d


nilitary
a r r a l l g e n l e nct rse a t c da t t h es t r a t e g i Ice v e l ,t h u se n s u r i n cg o n t i n u ejdo i n t a n d c o m b i n e d
integrity
t h r o u g h o ut th ev a r i o u sl e v e l so f c o m m a n dM . i l i t a r yl e a d e ras t t h eo p e r a t i o n al el v c lu , i l l c o p t i s u e
t'')asstrre lhat Inilitaryeffortsretnainsubordinate to political-civilconstraints arrclreclLlilclnents,
l - h i sw i l i h o l d t r u cr e g a r d l e sosf t h e s h i f t i n ge i l b r ta n dc m p h a s iass t h e i n s u r s e n c v
cvolves,

S i n g l cC ' o n r m a n d eSr y s t e m

l. l i n i t y ' o 1 ' c f f o ri st f a c i l i t a t e bd y o r g a n i z i n tgh eC O I N c a m p a i g nu n d e ra s i n g l e


c o t r l l t t a n c lo e r .C o m m i t t e eD i r e c t o r W . h i l e t h ep e r s o ns o c i c s i g n a t e J r o by e c i v i l i a no r r n i l i t a r l , ,
i l i s c r i t i c a tl h a tr e s p o n s i b i l i tf yo r o v e r a l ld i r e c t i o ni s v e s l e ci i o p e h c a d q u a r t e r . s
A o v i s o r sw i l i
b ' et l r a d ca v a i i a b l ef i o m a l l o f t h e r e l e v a npt a r t i c i p a t i ncgl em c n t s s, u c ha s t h e c i v i l s e r v i c c .
'fhe polrce
a n dr l r i l i t a r y c o m m a t l d cwr i l l o v e r s c ea c o m m i t t c cc. s t a b l i s h ct do e n s L l rtch a ta l l p l a n s
arrd
a c t i o l l sa r cc o n d u c t c tdo w a r d sa c o n t m o nq o a l .

( l o n r m i t t e cS y s t c r n

'1 ( ) p c r a t i o n a l - 1 c cv o
em l m i t t esea t ' ci b r r l ed . a g a i n m
. i r r o r i n gt h c s t r a t e g i c -vl ce l c o ' r n a n d .
I h c s cc o r r t - n i L t eweisl l c o n d u c tj o i n t p l a n n i n gi,n o r d e rt o e n s u r et h a tt h er e p i c s e n t o t i " e
s L r b o r d i n aet lcc n l e n tes x e c l l t es u c hp l a n si n a m a n n c rk e e p i n gw i t h t h eo v e r a r c h i n g
'l-he caurpaigu
plarl a c t u a cl o m m i t t c es t r u c t u r ac n dr c p r c s e n t a t i ol vni l l r , , a r b
y e t r . v e ei nns u r c e ] r c r easn.d

( h5:1r11
DRr\Fl'

i;iiieciu j i l l l i k e1 l c h a n g ca s i h e c o n f l i c te v o L v e sA,s a t l i t t t t r t L l mr e. p r e s e n t a t i vre" rsl l i n c l u d et h c


I , l N p o l i t r c aal n c ci i v i l a u t h o r i t i e sh.o s l - n a t i oLul i l i t a r y ' a n sde c u r i l va u t h o r i t l e sp.o l i t i c a al n c c i v i l
tt.otrp c o n t r i b u t i nrge p r e s e n t a t i v ct lso,o pc o n t r i b u t i nrgn i l t t a Lcyo t n m a n d e rasn ds e l e c st t a f f .
s c c u r i t ; , c o n t r i b u t rr e a sn,dp r o b a b l yI n t c r n a t i o n aOl r g a n i s a t i o nr' e
- rpgr e s e n t a t i v e s presentativcs.
-fhis
,S A kcy facrorin makingsuchan organization work effectivelyis trust. is often
h c r o s sd i f f e r i n gc u l t u r e sF. o r c x a m p l e
c l i i ' f l c u ti ro e s t a b l i s a , t h e m r l i t a r yr e q u i r c u e nfto r s c c L t r l t l '
l n c l e x p e r t i s ien a p p l i e dv i o l e n c ei s p o t e n t i a l l t
y h e a n t i t h e s iosf h u m a n i t a r i aNnG O s ' n e r : t t ' a l
-fhe
L r a l s p a l c n cayn d a b h o r r e n coef t h i n g sr n i i i t a r y . C o r n m i t t eD e i r e c t o ra, n da l l m c t n b e r sI -n u s t
c o n t i l u a l l l ,a n d a c t i y e l ys t r i v et o m a i n t a i nm u t u a lo p e n n sesa n dc o n f i c l e n c e .

S E C - T I O N2 : P L A N N I N G A N D E X E C U T I N G T H E C A M P A I G N

0PERAT IONAI, CAMPAIGN PLANNIN(;


-lhe t f operations,
(r n i n ec o u n t e r i n s u r g e npcryi r r c i p l eisd e n t i f i e df o r t h es u c c e s s f uc lo n d u c o
as detaiieclin Chapter3, must be clearlyunderstood, and integrated into daily operations.'
Devclopilg t [ e m i l i t a r ya s p e c t o
s f a C O I N p l a nd e p e n d o
s r l m a n yf a c t o r sb, u t u s u a l l yi n v o l v et h e
secLrring o1'aflnn basefrom which to operate. Once this is establishcd military forcesshor"rld
tScpseizcthe initiativein separating the insurgentfiorn the supportlng populatiott,in orderto
s u p p o r t h e g o v e r n m e n t 'ssu b s e q u e na tm b i t i o n s .
'lhe , h i c hi v i l l
7. l o n g - t c r mo b j e c t i v em u s tb e b a s e du p o n t h ei n s u r g e n t 'cse n t r eo l - g r a v i t yw
b,ethe organizations, anclconditionsthat createand support the insurgency, and not individual
terroristsor their tacttcs.Higher headquarters and nationalsourcescan providevaluable
b
i p t e l l i g e l c ea n c li n f o r m a t i o n , u t w i l l s e l d o mb e a b l et o p r o v i d ei n f o r m a t i o n
o f t h er e q u i s i t e
qLraliLy to conducttacticaloperations. 1-heoperational planning process will therefore dedicatea
siglilicant arnountof effort towardsacquiringthe informationnecessary to targetthe insurgents'
c c n t r co 1 ' g r a v i t y .

(]AMPAIGN OB.IECTIVES

'[
8. h e a i r no { ' r n i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o niss t o a s s i stth e i r o s tn a t i o ng o v e r n m e nt to r e - e s t t i b l i s h
c o n t r o lt h r o u g h o utth ec o u n t r ys o t h a tt h e c i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i ocna ne x c r c i s ei t s p r o p c rf u n c t i o n .
l ' h c n i l i t a r y c o t n m a n d e r 'tsa s kw i L in o t b e a s s t r a i g h t f o r r v aar d s i s l i k e l yd u r i n gc o t l v e r l t i o t l a i
r v a r l h r cT. [ c O p e r a t i o n aPl l a n n i n gP r o c e s m s u s tt a k ea c c o L l notf a r v i d er a n g eo f p o l i t i c a l ,
ccctpguri , c i v i i a n c l
s e c u r i t i
y n t e r e s t T
s .h e s er e a l r t i e as r c r e f l e c t e idn t h e w a y l n w h i c ho p e r a t i t l n s
a r es L r b . j ctcot t h e a p p r o v a l o ft h e c i v i l a d r r i n i s t r a t i otnl r r o u g ht h ej o i n t c o t n m i t t e se y s t e n ll.n
p o s r i n s t a l c e st.h c o p e r a t i o n apli a n w i l l a i m t o i s o l a t ea n d n e u t r a l i zteh e i n s u r g e r r bt so t hr n o r a l l y
ar-.d h u l t a n e o u s cl yo n d u c t e a
p h l , s i c a l l y , ' t i r r o usgi m d n d p a r a l l epl o l i t i c a ls. o c i a l a
. n dr n i l i t a r l '
actr0lrs,
( ' c n i r eo f ' ( i r a v i t v

i i r r n i n sp r i n c i p l easr e :E f f c c tP o L i t i c aPlr i r n a c yP. r o t r t o t c ' t j n o i t t. vP u r p o s cU. n d e r s t a ntdh e l n s u r q e n c v ' s


l . ) ,r r r n r i c sE, x p l o i tl r r t e l l i g e n cl e
so; l a t ct h e l n s u r g e n tA s ;p o i y P o r v e D r i s c r i r n i n a t e lNye; u t r a l i z teh e I n s i t r g c n t ,
. - (:.i:r r r C o n r nirt r r e n t ,a n d ,C o r t du c t P o s t -llt s u r g e n cP l 'l a n ni n g

( I r5 : 2 r l 1

Anrnt2'ln t nnnnA'l
DRAFT

!) T h e s t r a t e g rcce n t r eo f g r a v i r l ',. r , i lbl e r h ci e g i t i n r a c l , ot hf e g o v e r n r n e nbt o


. th
c o n l c s t t c a lal rn di n t e r n a t i o n a l iOy p . e r a t i o n a l l vy h, r i stth c r ci s n o t n e c e s s a r ial yl n i f o r p i l ,
o b v r o r -or sp e r a r i o n a l - 1 ec' e ln t r eo f g r a v i t 1t,h, es u p p o rct f t h em a s s e o s f t h e p o p u l a t i o1no rt h e
( J L r \ ' c r n l r eanct .q L r i r et hdr o L r gpho l i t i c a al c t i o n .
a s a f ea n ds e c u r ee n v j r o n m e natn ds o c r o -
e c o r t o m ipc r o g r a m m ei s o n eo f v e r yh i g h s i g n i f i c a n c Ict i s f r o m t h i so p e r a t i o n a cel n t r eo f
g r a V i t ;t'h a tt h e i n s u r g e n tdsr a wt h e i rf r e e d o mo { ' a c t i o np, h y s i c asl t r e n g i ho, r i v i l l t o f r g h t .
A l t h o u g hc a r n p a i gpn) a n n i n g m l l s ts u p p o rtth eo v e r a r c h i negf f o r ta g a i n stth e i n s L r r s e n tsst 'r a t e g i c
c c n t r eo f g r a v i t y o , p e r a t i o n a l - l e vl eal d e r s h im p u s td e t e r r n i nteh e r e l e v a not b i e c t i i u , i i h i nt h e i r
a r e ao f o p e r a t i o n sP.o t e n t i acl r i t i c a lf i c l d sm a y i n c l u d ec i e s t r u c t i oonr c i i s r u p t i oonf i n s L r r g e p t s ,
highercOmntand andcontrolstrllctures, removingfearof reprisalsur.'-rnngri the genera)
p o p u l a t i . no, r t h ep r o ' i s i o no f u t i l i t i c sa n dm e d i c aal i c tl o s o c i e t ya t l a r q c .

llcr511ctryLtt

10. F r o mt h eo p e r a t i o t rcacl n t r eo f g r a v i t ya n a l y s i st h, ep i l l a r so f ' t h ci n s u r g c n t s ' c a n r p a i g n


c a n b e i d e n t i f i e dT. h e g o v e r n m e natn ds e c u r i t yf o r c e st h e nt a r g e t l r e s ep i l l a r si n o r d e rt o
redrrce
t l l c i n s u r g c n t si n' f l u e n c co r h o l d o n t h e p o p L r l a t i osne, t t i n gt h ec o n d i t i o n tso p r e v a i ol v e r
thc
i t - l s u r g ecnet n t r eo 1 ' g r a v i t yT.h e s ed e c i s i v ep o i n t sa r ed e t e r m i n etdh r o u g ha s i r a t e g iacp p r e c r a t l o n
p'roccss, fiom which will flow furtheroperational andtacticalestimatesand plans.-fhe militarv
a s p e cst h o u l df b r m b u t o n es t r a n di n a c o o r d i n a t eads s a u lut p o nt h e i n s u r g e n t s ' o v e r a l l
ims.
\Vhilernilitarvlbrcesmay havea criticalrole to play duringceftainstageiof the carnpargn,
irs
o v e r a l l c o n t r i b u r i owni l l b e s e c o n d a rayn ds h o u l db e k e p ti n p c r s p e c t i v e .

ll T h e r cw i l l t y p i c a l l yb e f b u r l i n e so f o p e r a t r otnh a ta r ep o l i t i c a l c, i v i l i a n 2I,e g a (l i n c l u d r n g
p o l i c ea n c l j t r d i c i a r ay )n d m i l i t a r y ,w o r k i n gt h r o u g ha s e r i e so f s e l e c t e d e c i s i v cp o l n t su n d
c o o | d i n a t etdh r o u g hj o i n t c o m m a n de f f o r t st o a c h i e v er e s p e c t i vpeo l i t i c a lc, i v i l i a n p . o l i c ea n c l
nriiitaryobjectivesculminatingin the achievement of the cnclstate as depictedin figure L Once
t l t ec a r n p a i gpnl a ni s d e v e i o p e idt m u s tb e r e v i s i t e cd o n t i n u o u s l a y ,s i n . s u r g e an cr t i J i t i eas n c j
t e r t i a r ye f f ' e c tw
s i l l c a u s cd e c i s r v pe o i n t sa n do b j e c t i v ct.os s h i f tb o t h i n t i m e a n ds p a c e .

2 l : , . l rl h' e p L l r p c r s oe fs b r e v i t y ,i t .r s c o n s i d e r etdh a le c o n o t r i ca n d b u s i r r e si isn e s


o f ' o p e r a t i oanr e i n c l u d c dr v i t ht l r o s e
p o l i t r c aalr r Cc i v t l t a nI .n r e a l r nt h c s e\ \ ' o u l db e 6 u i t i - l a y e r e ad n d s e c t o r abl u t , , v o u l d
overlap.

( ' h5 . 3 r l i
t)RAF'T

POLITICAL

(,, OPPOSING
C Of C

it _
F i g u r e I : l \ l u l t i a g e n c Ya P P r o a c h

I m p l e m e n t i n gt h c C a m P a i g nP I a n

12. P h a s e sC. a r n p a i g n p l a n i m p l e m e n t a t i om n a y c o n v e n i e n t lbye d i v i d c di n t o a n u m b e r o l '


p,6aseA hn i n s u r g e n cw
s .l t h o L r g a y i l t d c v e l o pu n e v e n l ya c r o s sa n a f f l i c t e dc o u n t r y t, h c n a t i o n a l
i t r a r e g i cp l a nw i l l l a y d o w n p r i o r i t i e sf o r t h ep r o s e c u t i oouf t h c c a m p a i g np, o s s i b l yc o n c c n t r a t i n g
on seicctedarcasin turn. At the operationalIevelthe phasesin any one areaare not mutually
crclLLsivc. The COIN requirements in thesedifferentareaslnay thereforebe understoodthrough
t)rc ctinentlYpopular"three-blockrvar" construct.

ll. S e c u r i n ga I l a s eA r e a .l t c a nb e a n t i c i p a t etdh a tt h e h o s tn a t i o ng o v e r n m e rw ltill have


s L r f l l c i e ncto n r r o o l f i t s t c n i t o r yt o p r o v i d ea s e c u r eb a s ew h e r er e i n f o r c i n g c o a l i t i o rcr o n t i n g e r t t s
can builcu l p a n de s t a b l i s e h s s e n t i asl u p p o r et l e m en t s .C o n s i d e r a t i omn u s lb e g i v e nt o n o t
over.burdenilgthe host rration; tl-riscan be bcstachievedthroughincreased self-sLrfilciency b1'
r h e d e p l o y i n gu n i t s I n c o r n i n gm i l i t a r yl b r m a t i o n s a n d u n i t ss h o u l db e d e p l o y e do n t h e s a m e
g e o g r a p h i c abla s i sa s t h e h o s t - n a t i o sr re c u r i t yf o r c e sc, o r r e s p o n d i n g w i t h t h e b o u n d a r i eos1 ' thc
c i v i l a d r l i n i - r t r a i i o Inr.i s p o s s i b l,eh o r v c v e rt,h a lt h e s i t t r a l i o h o t h c c x t c n tt h a t
n a sd e t e r i o r a t et d
p r )i l r e at s s a l ei r t t r ni n s u l g e nat c t i l ' i t 1 I' ,t t n a r ' t h e r e l b rbcc n c c c s s a rtyo h o l d s o r n ci o g t s t i ca s s c t s
a l l o u tc l . . n : i : i t i r c cj o u n t f yr v l i i l et r o o p sa r ec o t r l l t t i t t etdo s e c u r ea b a s ea r e a .F r o t t it h i ss c c L t r c

(.h5 ril

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DRAFT

i l r . c al.f o i ) p sl f 3 d e p l o ) ' e dt n t o h o s t i j et c t ' r i t o r vt o b e g i n t h e p r o c c s so 1 ' r c i n t e g r a t i ntc5 c l a i r d


ard
p c o p l ec t i p t u r e db 1 i n e r e b e l s

11 L s t a b l i s h n r e n t o l ' a F i r m l : o r r . v a r d O pB e raastCi o] n
F aa l! l ' l - h i s i s t h e i n i t dr ar ol p o l ' o r J
r n I h c l u c h ec l h u i l e . s t r a t e g F
y ,o r e x a m p l ei,t m a y b e f e a s r b lteo c s t a b l r sah f o r w a r do n e r a t r o n a l
b a s cl L ta s u r t a b l p e r o v r n c i acla p i t a w
l l i i c hh a sb e c o m ci s o l a t c df r o m t h ea r e as t i l l J o y . ,taolt 5 c
i l o v c l ' n m e nPt r e f ' e r a btlhy e a r e as e l e c t esdh o u l db e o n er v i t ht r a d i t i o n al o l y a l r i etso t h e
g o \ ' c f l l n l e nvtu h e rtch ep o p u l a t i o rnv i l i r e a d i l vr a 1 l yb a c kt o i t s o l d a l l e p i a n c e
o n c ci t l . c c l s e c r , r r c
lrotlt an insr-rrqcnt -l'he
off'ensive aud serioLrs terroristattack. areaseLectcci mustbc o'c tl'ratca'
bc consollclatq euc i c k ) ya n du s e da s a b a s ef o r f u r t h e o r p e r a t i o ndse s i g n c tdo l j n k L r pi i , i r ht h e
n r a i nb a s ea n dc x t e n cgl o v e r n m c ncto n t r o tl o o t h c ra r e a s .

15. S e c u r i n pa C o n t r o l l e A d r e a .O f f c n s i v eo p e r a t i o uasr ec o n d u c t c d i n o r d e rt o s e p a r a trch c


illsltrgellts iiom thcir sLlpportcrs, fbod suppliers, and sourccsof infornrationirrthe clcsigrratecl
a r c a .S r " r col lp c r a t i o nasr et o b e b a s e do n a c t i o n a b lien t e l l i g e n caen d s o u n dp l a n n i r r gC. i y i i
a d r n i n i s t r a t i owni l l t h e n b e r e - e s t a b l i s h a
e sda r e a so f h o s t i l et e r r i t o r ya r ec i e a r e dn f t i n r . . , r g . n , r .
J ' h ca r m Yn l a l ' p r o v i d er o b u s ts e c u r i t ys r - r p p ot rot t h c p o l i c e o, r b e a s k e dt o h c l pr s l r a i nl o c a l
a L r x i l i a rfvb r c e st h a tw i l l s L r p p otrht c p o l i c ew h e nt h ec o a l i t i o rfro r c c sr . r , i t h d r a w . ' l ' h lers- e s h l y
corttrollcdareasthenprovidefirrn basesfor furthersecurity opcrationsuntil graduallythe entire
c o u n t r )i/s r e s t o r e tdo g o v e r n m e ncto n t r o l .

16. I : o l l o w - o nO p c r a t i o n sS.u r v e i l l a n c b ea , s e dL l p o na c o i r e r e nptl a n ,p r o v i d e si n f o r m a t i o gl r - r


t h c i n s u r g c n t sc .o n t r i b u t i ndgi r e c t l yt o t h ee f f e c t i v e n e o s sf f b l l o w - o no p e r a t i o n T
s .h i ss u p p o l s
l{-)118-range raidsand penetrations designedto destroyspecifictargets,suchas insurgcnt
c o n c c t l t r a t i o nkse. y i n d i v i d L r a losr, s u p p l i e d s e p r e sisn s u r g c nm t o r a l ea u ds u p p o rtth ef r i e n c l l y
" I l c a r t sa n d N l i n d s "c a r n p a i g nS. u c hs u r g i c aol p e r a t i o nasr el a u n c h e d o n l y w h e nt h e r ei s
s u t f i c i c n t l yr c l i a b l ca n dd e t a i l e di n t e l l i g c n cteo m a k es u c c e scse r t a i n .

17. Rslqtionshipbet*eer . Counter-insurgency


cperatiotlsmay bc groLrped into two categorics, del'ensivc andol'fensive. Generalkitr,,,,,
d e s c r i b etsh c s ec a t e g o r i easn dt h er e l a t i o n s h ibpe t w ec n t h e ma s f b l l o r v s :

I'-irstlytherearedefensiveoperations. which arethosedesignedto prevent


insurgents tiorr disruptingthe government's programme.Seconcily thereare
o l ' f - e n s i voep c r a t i o n sw,h i c h a r c t h o s ed e s i g n e tdo r o o to u t t l r ei n s u r g e n r s
l l l e n t slev e s ,. . i t i s w o r t hn o t i c i n gh o w i r n p o r t a ni t i s t o s t r i k ea b a l a n c cb e t r . r , e e n
t l r en r , l 1 ' t o ol r t t l cc m p l - r a srissp l a c e do n d e f e n s i v rex e a s u r ci sn o r d e rt o
concentrate resources on the offensive,the insr,Lrgents arc ofl'crecl an opporrupity
t t l a c h t e v ee a s ys u c c e s s cw s ,h i c ht h e yc a nL r s e t o e m b a r r a st sh eg o v e r n m e lat u d
l l l e r e b vu t t d e r n i i niet s s u p p o r tI.f , o n t h eo t h e rh a n d ,t o o l i t t l ee m p h a s iiss p l a c e d
o u o l l e u s i v eo p e r a t i o n st h, e i n s u r g e not r g a n i z a t i ognc t sb i g g e ra n d b i g g e r a n da n
e v e r - i n c r e a s ip n rgo p o r t i o no f t h ec o u n t r y ' sr e s o u r c ehsa sr o b e d e v o t e dt o t h e
SecLrrity [rorce s for defensivecounterrneasLrres, so tirateventuallythe insurgeqts
a c h i e v et h ei r a i m b y m a k i n gi t a p p e atrh a tt h e p r i c eo f f u r - t h er re s i s t a n ci e sGo
l rl [ 1 r .

'
I : r i r n kK j t s o l . l J t r n c l o
. if l . ' t , e .L . o n d o n :F a b e r a n d F a b er , I 9 7 1 . p a . s . t r i . t

( ' h - - i :5 1 1 1
DRAF'T

lE. O p c r a l i o r r a ln d T a c t i c a l , c v e l so J ' C o n t r oT l h c r c i a t i o n s h ibpe t v v e et nh e o p e r a t r o n a ln d


t i r c t i c alle v e lo f c o n l r o ld u r i n gc o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c \ e
o p / r r t i o n sr v i l i d r f f e rf b r e a c hs i t u a t i o rat ,n d
r r i l l n o t b e a s c l e a rc u t a s i s t h e c a s eo f c o n v e n t i o n awl a r . A c t i o n sa t t h e l o w e s t a c t i c alle v e lc a l t
lrav,e f a r r e a c h i n go p e r a t i o n aaln de v e ns t r a t e g icco n s e q u e nsc,el n d e e di,f t h e t e s to l w h e t h e r
r h e r ci s a p o l i t i c a dl i r n e n s i o n i s r i g i d l ya p p l i e de, v e r l ' p a t r oiis p o t e n t r a l lcyo n d u c t e a dt the
" o p c r a t i o n a ll'e' v c l b e c a u s teh e c o n d u cot f a n i n d i v i d L r as lo l d i e ra, m p l i f i e db y t h e m e d i a .c a n
b c c g r l ea n i s s u er e q r - r i r i nsgt r a t e g iac t t e n t i o nA. t h o u g h t l e sm s o v eo r o v e r r e a c t i oant s e c t i o tol r
p l a l o o nl e v e lc a n c a s i l yh a v e r a m i f i c a t i o nasb o v et h e i m r n e d i a ttca c t i c alie v e i .

SECTION 3: APPLICATION OF MILITAIIY DOCTII.INE

l9 lv{anoeuvrist Approach.While the pastis repletewith examplesof a straightforward


attritionalapproachto operations, therecordofattritionalsuccess in counterinsurgency is
g e p c r a l l l , ap o o r o n e .L , f f e c t i v C e O I N p l a c e sd u e e m p h a s i os n t h e i n t e l l e c t u aaln d p s y c h o l o g i c a l
a s p c c to st'operations, n o t s i m p l y t h em a t e r i a lI.t e m p h a s i s et sh e f o c u so n p e o p l ea n d i d e a sn, o t
o l l y , o n g r o u n d .I n s u r g e nct o h e s i o ni s i d e n t i f i e da n d a t t a c k e b d y a p p l y i n gc o n c e n t r a t eyde t
d i s c r e t ei o r c ea g a i n s ct r i t i c a lw e a k n e s s eSs u. r p r i s et ,e m p o . ds i m u l t a n e i tayr c u s e dt o
a n
overrvhelm a n d u n h i n g et h e i n s u r g e n b t ,r i n g i n ga b o u ta c o r n p l e t ceo i l a p s eo f w i l l . a r r du l t i r n a t e l y
5 e l p i p gr o c r e a t e t h e c o n d i t i o n f
s o r p o l i t i c a d
l e f e a t l
. t i s w o r t h e m p h a s i z i ntgh a tf o r c ei s a p p l i e d
s el e c t i v e i yd; es t r u c t i o ni s a t n e a n sn o t a n c n d

this
20. \4issionComrnand.Echoingthe sentimentof Sir RobertThornpsonthat opened
chapter,COIN successrequiresallparticipantsto be activelyawareof the long-termgoalsand
thc plan to get there.The missioncommandapproachto leadership reaffirmsthis view.
eniphasiz,ing infonned initiativethroughoutthe force.This methodology is particularly
a p p l i c a b l teo C O I N , g i v e nt h e k e y r o l ep l a y e db y l o w - l e v c tl a c t i c acl o m m a n d e r sm; i l i t a r i l y ,
( ' O l N i s q u i t eo f t e n a p i a t o o na n ds e c t i o nc o n f l i c t .

21. S u c c e s isn O p e r a t i o n sS. u c c c s iss d e f i n e db y t h e s t a t eo f a f f a i r sw h i c h n c c d st o b e


a c h i c v e db y t h e e n d o f a c a m p a i g nS. i n c ci n s u r g e n c iys p r i n c i p a l l ya p o l i t i c a sl t r l r g g l ei .t m a y b e
t6at t5e clesiredaim of the governrnent falls shortof victory in a strictlymilitary contextand
s e t t i n gC. O I N " s u c c e s sm " a y e q u a t et o h a n d i n go v e r a n i n t e r n asl e c u r i t yp r o b l e mt o t h e c i v i l
p o l i c c .o r s i m p l yn o t l o s i n g .i f , f o r e x a m p l et,h e i n t e n t i o no f c o m m i t t i n gt r o o p si s t o b u y t i m e i n
which to aclclress particulargrievances, then dramatictacticalmilitarysuccessmay in factbe
cc)uptcr-procluctive,'l'roops m u s t b e a w a r eo f ' t h em i l i t a r yr o l ea n dc o m m a n d e rssh o u l ds e l e c t
a c c r l r a trel e a s L l r easg a i n s wt h i c ht o j u d g et h e e f f e c t i v e n e sosf r n i l i t a r yt a c t i c sg, r o u n dc a p t t t r e d
h a se v e nl e s ss i g n i f i c a n c ien c o u n t e r i n s u r g e ntchya ni t d o e si n c o n v e n t i o n awl e r f i g h t i n g
N 4 i ) i t a r i lsyp e a k i n gc. a r n p a i g vn i c t o r yr n a ye q u a t et o t h ec o n t a i n m e notf t h e v i o l e n ta s p e c tos 1 ' t h e
i l s L r r g e n ct;o. a l e r , , erlv h e r et h e p o l i c ec a nd c a lw i t h t h e r na n ds o c i e t yf u n c t i o n sn o r t n a l l v .

jl. L ) c s r l ojrn g t l - r c . _ l n s u r s eln tC s .O I N p h y s i c adl e s t r u c t i oonI t h e e n e m ys t i l l h a sa r r


i1.t1-.e1',.,,, f . l L -l o p l a y . A t t r i t i o nw i l l b e n e c e s s a r yb ,u t t h e n u m b e ro f i n s u r g e n tksi l l e c si h o u l db c
: - . o; t L . r 3 : i t a :irs a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a i
r o
y a c h i c v es L l c c e sW s . h e r e v epr o s s i b l e",s o f t " t n e t h o d cs l l '
- -
i teg e n e m y a r r e s tp, h v s i c ails o l a t i o n .
l ' r c L i l : ' . l l i z li h o r s u b v c r s i o-l l- a r cr n o r cl i k e l y t c la d v a n c c
t t . S . ) . ,le. n u t c n t ' cs a u s c I. n a n e r ai n l v h r c hi t r t e n s e r n e d i as c r l t t i n ya n dd o n t c s t i ca r t di n t er n a t i o t l a l

(iri 6,ll

Ln)n)'t.4 n-A_nnnnAA
t)RAFT

i c u l l o r ' ' c r s i g rhit' i l lb e c o n r rcr o r ei n a t t e n d a n cseo. u n d u. ld g e n r c natn ccj l o s ec o n i r o lr . , , j lpl e e dt o


beexerciscd

]3.@.Attackrngtheinsurgcnts'will(andbyinferenceunit
c o h e s i o ni )s l i k e l yt o b e m o r cp r o d u c t i v teh a np h y s i c aal t t a c kp. a r l r c u l a r liyn t h ee a r l . sv t a s c so l ' a
( ' o l N c a u r p a i gbne l o r et h e i n s u r g e n chya sc o n s o l i d a t eTdh. e r e
a r em a n yv v a ) ,isu r v h i c hi t r s
possible t o a t t a c ka n ds e i z ct h e i n i t i a t i v et i o m a n i n s u r g e ngtr o u p .E x p e r i e n chca ss h o w nt h a ta
c o r l l b i n a t t oonf a c t r v i t i essi m u l t a n e o u sal yp p i i e dh a st h eb e s tc h a n c co f s u c c c s s . - f ht e
h r c em . s t
a p p l r c a b laep p r o a c h ei ns v o l v ep r e e m p t i o nd,i s l o c a t i o na .n dd i s r u p t r oant t h e o p e r a t i o n a ln d
tlcticalcvel

21. Attqrkrlg&lsdp-l]. Any cornbination of the aboveactivitiescan be usclulin shatlering


t h e c n c t n y ' st n o r a a l n dp h y s i c acl o h e s i o nC. o h e s i o cna nb e a t t a c k e tdh r o u g hb o t hl e t h a al n dn o n -
l c t h a lt n c a n sF. i r e p o w em r a y n e u t r a l i skee y n o d e so r c e l l s w . h i l eP S Y O p Sa n c H l UMIN'l'
C i s o r i e nct .o t r l u s a
e n dt r a n s f o r m o t h e r sC . l a s s i cp o l i c cw o r k w i l l u n d e r m i n e n e r n yc o h e s i o b ny
c v i d e n c eg a t h e r i n ga,n e s t ,a n d i e g a la c t i o n S . u r p r i s cea nb e a c h i e v e df ,o r e x a m p l qt h r o u g h
d e v c l o p i r rign f o r m a t i o bn y a l l s o u r c e tsh e na c t i n go n t h ec u eo f i n t e l l i g e n cgea t i r e r i ntge c h n o l o g y
t : ' rI l [ j M I N T . I t a p i de x p l o i t a t i oonf t h i s i n t e l l i g e n cbey e i t h c rc o v e r ta c r i o no r r a p i d
c o n c e n t r a t i oot1t ' c o m b af o t r c e si n t o a g i v e na r e a . s e wcso n f u s i o a n n dd i s r u p t i o n t h r o u g h o Lt h
r te
ellclny'sstrtlcture. This occursin largeparl because the lcveiof trustwithir-ranclanronssr epemv
c e l l si s c o m p r o m i s eadn dr e d u c e d ,

25' Simultaneitv. All effectiveinsurgentstrategies emphasise simultane ity by creatipg


p a r a l l epl o l i t i c a al n ds o c i a cl h a l l e n g eass w e l l a s m i l i t a r y o n e sI .f t h eu s eo f s i m u l t a n e i tiys
prodttctir,'e foI the insurgent, thenit is equallyapplicable fbr the COIN effort. Tacticallyit can be
achieved t h r o u g ht h er e s t r a i n eadn d c a r e f u l l yc o n s i d e r cuds eo f ' a m i x o f a g e n c i e sa,n db y
gror-rping for irldependent action,suchasjoint military-police patrolswith compatible
conlnrunicalions workingto a singlcheadqr-rarters. Operationally it is achievedihroLrgh the
dei"clopmen r lt1 ' ah a r r n o n i z ecda m p a i g rp-lra na l o n gm u l t i p l el i n e so 1 ' o p e r a t i oans. d c s c r r b e c i
p r c ri . r r r s l y .

2'6.i.@'AllCoINoperations,incontrasttoconventionalwarfighting.are
altnostalrlal'sconductcdin a non-contigr-rous battlespace. For most purposesther.eis no rear
a r c a .a l i a r e a sr e q u i r es e c u r i t yB. e c a u s e o l t h e c l o s e l yi n t e g r a t cnda t u r co f t h e r e s p s l s ct o
r i r s L r f { e n ca} J' ,i a s p e c tosf t h er n i l i t a r yc a r n p a i grnn u s tb e e q u a l l yb a l a n c e d . - f 5aei ' s h o u l dn . , c r
L ' ea s i l e 0 t a c u l ar rs,o l a t c sdu c c c sfso r o n c a r r no f g o v e r r i m e nbt u . t a s e q u e n coef s u c c e s s et hsa t
ccnlbrine to r'"'orkin cornplementary waystowarda singlestrategicgoal.The carrpaignplap
s l r o L r lbcci d i r e c t e di n s u c l 'ar w a y a s t o s e q u e n caen dc o o r d i n a tteh e c i r s t r n cl itn e so f o p e r a t i o .
a c c t l r d i n tgo t h eo v c r a l ls t r a t e g ircc q u i r e m e n tast t h et i m c . ' f h ei n t e n ti s t o o v e r l a pt h e
c , p e f aj ot n a lp l a n so f e a c hw i t h t h e o t h e r s .

S E C ' fI O N . 1 :K E Y S E C U R I T Y F O R C E P A R T I C I P A N T S

l ' h c A r n r r " sI t o l ei n C O I N

(lhi Till
DRAFT

'lhc
)1 p r e d o m i n a nSt c r v i c ei n c o u n t e irn s u r g e n ciys t l i eA r u t v a L t h o u gAh i r F o r c e sc 1 1 e n
p ^ 1 aar s t l ' o n gs L l p p o r t i nr go l c .U n L e stsi r ci u s u r g e n tasr el o i n e cbi 1 'a n o u t s i d ep o l v er r . v i t h
s r g n i l r c a nnta v a la n d a i r f o r c e s c. o u n l e r i n s u r g e nwc ivl l r e m a i rp- r i m a n l ya g r o u n dl o r c e
a L g e l yi i r s u p p o r lW
t h eo t h e rt w o S e r v i c e as c t i r - rl g
r e s p o n s i l t i i i rt y. v r t h . h i l e s p e c i f i cA r r r y ' r o l e s
r i i l l b c e x p a n d c du p o ni n c h a p t e 6 r , t h e A r m y c a n e x p e c t o b e c a i l e du p o n ,p a r t i c u i a r lay t t h e
t r r c t i c al le v e l .t o e m p l o yi t s t r a d i t i o n asl k i l i s ,r a n g i n gl r o m p r o v i d i n go b s e r v a t r oann d s e c u r i t \t o
c l o s i n gl , i t h a n d d e s t r o y i n tgh e e n e r n yT. h e s u b t l ep o l i t i c a n l u a n c eus n d e r p i n n i nC gOIN
c p c r a t i o n sc,o r - r p l ewdi t h t h e d i s p e r s cnda t u r eo f t h e b a t t l e s p a cIet o , w e v c rr,c q u i r e sg r e a t e r
r r i t i a t i v ca n d f l e x i b i l i t va t l h c s u b - u n i tp. i a t o o na n d s c c t i o nl e v e l .

'l'he
l{oleof Other Militarv Arms and Elcments

,urir Supnort

28. C l a n a d i aAni r F o r c eo p e r a t i o ndsu r i n gt h e K o s o v oc a r n p a i gdne t n o n s t r a t et hde p o t e n t r a l


'l
c f'advancedtechnologyfor surveillance, targetacquisitionand attackof targcts. hcse
c a p a b i l i t i ehsa v eb c e ne x p a n d e d u p o nt h r o u g ht h e u s eo f U A V s i n A I ' g h a n i s t aarnt d t h u sb e c o m e
a s i g n i f i c a net n a b l e ro i l a n d o p e r a t i o n sM. a j o r i m p r o v e m e n thsa v eb e e na c h i e v e ci nl r e d L r c i n g
casLralties altd collatcraldamageto infrastructure nearthe targetarea,which sccondaryeff'ects
t h a t1 r ' a d r t i o n a l il ryn i t c do f f e n s i v ea i r s u p p o r it n s o m eC O I N o p e r a t i o n s .

)9. ( l a n a d a ' se x t e n s i v e x p e r i c n c ien p e a c cs u p p o r ot p e r a t i o nasl s oi n d i c a t e tsh e p o t e n t i a l


'l-hrs
applicatioo n 1 ' a i rp o w e rw h c r et h et e c h n o l o g i c agla pb e t w e e nb e l l i g e r e n tcso u l db e l a r g e
v v a si l l L r s t r a t ebdy t h e u s eo f C F - l 8 s t o d e t c ra n d n e u t r a l i zteh ee l f e c t i v e n e sosf g r o u n df o r c e si n
t h e [ ] a l k a n sc. o n c u r r e nwt i t h r o t a r ya v i a t i o n ' ss u r v e i l l a n caen dm o b i l i t y - s u p p o r t i nr ogl e s .[ : o r
('OIN operations,fixed-wingaircraftcan providethe sametypesof supportas they do Jbr
c o n v e n t i o n aolp e r a t i o n ss,u c ha s t r o o pl i f t a n dr e s u p p l ya, n dp h o t o g r a p h iacn dv i s u a l
rrconnaissance. Air Forcecapabilitres can escalateup to interdictionrnissiot-ts, when worthwltile
t.lrgel.s c,rnbe found alongan insurgent's lines of communication. Nonetheless, one n)Llstnot
r - r n d e r c s t i m taht e e n e u r y ' sa b i l i t yt o c o u n t e rW e s t c r ttry p ea t r p o w e rt h r o u g hd e c e p t i o nr .e d u c e d
signatura c n de v e n l o i v I c v e la i r d e i - e n cwee a p o n s u c ha s M A N P A D S .

i0. l - l e l i c o p t c rhsa v eo b v i o u sr o l e sf o r t r o o pc a r r y i n gs, u r v c i l l a n c cl i ,a i s o n a, n d t a c t r c a l


d t o t h e o v e r a l lc o n c e pot f
h el i c o p t e rl i f t o l ' a s s a u lttr o o p s ,b u t s h o u l da l s ob e f u l l y i n c o r p o r a t ei n
c r p c r a t i o litns a r n a n n e sr i r n i l a rt o o t h e rc o r n b aat r m s .A v i a t i o nc a ub e u s e di n m a t t yr o l e s
c o n r p a r a b lteo t h o s eu i v c nt o a r m o u r e dr e c o n n a i s s a nrcecg i m e n t ss'u r v e i l l a n c e p ,o i n l a n da r e a
r e c o n n a i s s a n. ci m e
e a g c r ys u p p o r t o i n t e i l i g e n c e ,c o l t o m y
o f f o r c et a s k s a, n d C 2 .

Ndef$ppsa

I i. \ , 1 u c ho i ' t h e w o r l d ' sp o p u l a t i o nl i v e si n l i t t o r a ls t a t e a
s n dr n l a r g ec o a s t acl i t i c s .
t l i c r c l b r cr. n a r i t i m ec o n s i d e r a t i o ni ns s u c hs i t u a t i o r -wr si l l h a v ca s i g n i f i c a ni tm p a c tu p o nI a n d
j ' f r r : i , n S .\ : \ a i s u p p o l tr v i i lc o n s i sot t p r o v i d i r rrg p o l i r i c asl t a t e m e n t ht r o u g hp r e s e n cpca t r o l s .
c i t 1 i - . r ' c lU s d b l o c k a d c sa.n d p r o v i d i n gs o t n ed e g r e eo f s u p p o r ft o r t r o o p sa s h o r e .
: t\_ :s a n c t i o r .ar n
) , r 1, a . s i l p s i r a 1 , b ec l o s ce n o L r giho p r o v i d ea t i m e l y ,i r i g hp r o f i l ea p p e a r a n ct o e demonsllate
s . r i - - : t .i,cl ii . , rt h r e a t e n eadl l r , ,C c - - n v e r s enl ya.v a lf c r c e sh a v ei h e a b i l i t i , t oh o v e ro v c r t h e h o r i z - o n

( ' hi : 8 r 1 1

40202310,8.000067
DRAFT

l i r r n r o l o n g e pd e r i o C sp,r o v i d i n ga , , ' " a r n i itrog h o s t i l cc l c m e n l sr.i , i t hr r j n i m r - r rpl r o r , o c a t i oAns.


d et t t o n s t t adt e
i n S o m a l i aC, a n a d i aNn a v ys h i p sc a np r o v i d ca s ec u r el o c a t i o fnc r t h eN a t i o n a l
C o n t m a nE d l c m e n ia. s s r : r i ncgo m m u n i c a t i obnest w e etnh ed e p l o y e ud n i t sa n dN D I I e . 1 n
a d d i t i o nn, a v a ia v i a t i o nc a np o t e n t r a l layu g m e ntth c o t h e rh e l i c o p t eor p e r a t i o ni sn - t h e a t r e ,

i2 A r n a . j oi rm m e d i a t a
e d v a n t a gocf N a v a lf o r c e sw i t h t r o o p se m b a r k e adp d
a v a i l a b l feo r c o u n t e r i n s u r g e nocpye r a t i o ni s t h a lt h e" b a s ea r e a "i s s c c u r ea n dc o s te f f c c t i r . , e
TIrcreis no tleedto -Quard thc barrackswhcnat seaandthe insr-rrgent cannotlnountanl,cff-ectivc
l l a n c eo f t r o o pa c t i v i t ya n dm o v e m e n t' f h e ya r ct h u sl e s sv u l n e r a b laen dm o r cf l c x i b l c
s u r . vi e
t h a nt r o o p sl o c a t c di n s t a t i cb a s e s .

Spcci al I-orces
-Iire
33. o r g a n i s a t i oonf ' s p c c i aIl r o r c e (sS i r )L r n i t st h
, c h i g hq u a l i t v v, e r s a t i l i t l , a l d
c t l l l l p r e h e n s i tvrea i n i n go f t h e s ct r o o p sa, n dt h e i rc a p a c i t yt o w o r k w e l l i n s m a i le r c l u prsn a k e
t i r e r np a r t i c u l a r lsyu i t a b l ef o r C o l N . C a r cs h o u l db e t a k e n h , o w e v e rt,h a tt h e yb e L r s etdo
c o m p J c m e nr at t h e rt h a nr e p l a c ec o n v e n t i o n a u ln i t s .

i'+ O n eo 1 ' t h em a i nc h a r a c t e r i s t iocfsm o s tS p e c i aFl o r c e si s t h e i rc a p a c i t tyo c a f f yo u ra v e r v


ra'idespectrumof tasksranginglrom discreet, advisoryvisitsof a few daysthroughto a
p r o l o n g e cda n t p a i g inn v o l v i n ge x t e n d e d e p l o y m e n tosf a c o m p l e t es q r . r a c i r T
onh .e r i i i s i p ga n c l
traillingt;f local forceshasbecomea traditionaltaskfor somespeciallorcesLroops.

IRegarding the CanadianEmbeddedTrainingTeam,trainingthe 1stBattalion/]sr


Brigade/Afghan NationalArmy] This is not the first time that the CanadianForceshave
beeninvolvedin mentoringsoldiersof othernations,but previoustaskswereof a much
smallermagnitude.In the lastfew years,individualCanadiansolcliers were involvedin
trainingw'iththe armiesin SienaLeoneandin the Congo.This time the 21-person teamis
trainingatl entireinfantrvbattalion,with mentorsat everylevelof the commandstructure.

Army LessonsLearnedCentre,Bulletin I 0 ,N o .

35. S p e c i aF l orces'skilld s e v e l o p efdo r o p e r a t i o ni sn c o n v c n t i o n awl a r c a nb e a p p l i e d


c q L r a l lcyl ' f e c t i v c livn t h o s ec o u n t e r i n s u r g e nccaym p a i g nw s h e r el a r g ea r e a sh a v ef i r i l e nu n c l ctrh e
a d v c r s a r v 'cso n t r o l B . r i t i s hS A S o p e r a t i o ntsh r o u g h o ut h t e 1 9 , 5 0asn d 1 9 6 0 se x e n p l i f i e st h i s
c l c e pp e n e t r a t i opna t r o l l i n ga n d s u r v e i l l a n ccea p a b i l i t yC a n a d i a n S F p e r s o n n ewl i i l a l s ob e
c a l l c cui n o nt o p r o v i d ce x e c u t i v e a n dd i p l o m a l i c l o s ep r o t e c t i o rt-hr e
; a s s a s s i n a t ioofn' a
1:rtlrrlinctlt d i p l o n r a t ioc r r n i l i t a r y
l e a d c r
w o r . r l c
p i
r o v i d e
t h e i n s u r g e n tws i t h a p r o p a g a n dcac ) u p .
'l
l6 l t e r l a i n c o n s t r a i n tosn S p e c i aFl o r c c so p e r a t i o nasr ep e r s o n n erLe,a c t i o nt i u r e a . ncl
endttrance B.e c a r t sSe p e c i aF l o r c e sa r eu s u a l l yf c w i n n u r r b e r c, a s u a l t i ecsa n n o b t e c a s i l yo r
q u i c k l yr e p l a c e db e c a u s o e f t h e l o n gs e l e c t i oann dt r a i n i n gp r o c e s sM. o r e o v e rt,h e l t e n dt o l a c k
t ; r c t i c aml o b i l i t y .a n d r e q u i r ea d d i t i o n al lo g i s t i cs L r p p oor tn c cd e p l o y e di n t h e f i e l d .F o r e x a m p l e .
i : l h o s tlit :e n v i r o n m e n tpsr o v i s i o no f r . v a t ecra np r e s e nar m a j o rp r o b l e ma, s s e e ui n A f g h a n i s t a r r ' s
n){)Llntailts.

('h i: 9/ll

Alla^naa n n nnnn^6
DIIAFT

3,' S p c c i aIlr o r c eps r o v i d eu n i q u cc a p a b i l i t j el bsr C O I N H o r i ' e v e trh. c l ' c a no n l ; , b c


c a m p a i g na p p r c c i a ttch e i rp o t e n t i a tl ,h e r rl i r l i t a t i o n sa. n dt h c
ef l c c t i v ei f t h o s ed i r e c t i n gt l " r e
p r i n c i p l egso v e r n i n tgh e i re m p l o y m e n t .

[,ocalSecuritF
y orces

!olis-q-&r!!

38. t h e p o l i c cr o i e s ,a n d l e v e lo f f o r c ee m p l o y e dd, c p c n do n t h ec u l t u r ea n dp r e v a i l i n g
a t t i t u d e os f c a c hc o u n t r y S . o m ec o u n t r i c m s a i n t a i np a r a m i l i t a rpyo l i c e{ b r c e sc, i t h e ro n a
perntancnt basisor as a reselrye, which can bc feared/hated in authoritarian countries.In states
r.r,,ircrc suchforcesare acceptable to the populationthey provide an importantrelrcfto the policc
c t u r i n gt h ee a r l ys t a g e so f a n i n s u r g e n c ya,l l o w i n gt h e l a t t e rt o c o n c e n t r a tocn c r i m cp r e v e t r t i e r r l .
a n dp r o f e s s i o n a
I f t l r ey a c t i n a d i s c i p l i n e d ml a n n e tr h e yr n a yh a v ea u s c f u ls t a b i l i z i n eg l f e c t .
cncorrralling Inodcrateopinion to rally to the government.

-19. lt is possrble t h a tt h e p o l i c ef o r c e so f a s t a t ea r en o t o r g a n i z e o
d r c o n t r o l l e di n a t n a n n e r
coutntonto liberaldernocracies. fhere havebeenmany instances when policefbrceshavebccn
poorly organized,ill equipped,or decidedlyhostileto any fonn of cooperationwitli the rnilitary.
Onc must also understand the potentialramificationof usingformer-combatants as police.E,r'err
il'Canadian l e a d e r s h ihpa sl i t t l c s a yi n t h ed e c i s i o na, c c o u nm t u s tb e t a k e no f t h e s ef a c t o r sw h e n
p , l a r r n i nt h
g e o v c r a l lc a m p a i g n .

r u x i l i a r yF o r c c s
I n d i q en o u sa n d I r r e g u l a A

40. I n a l r n o s at l l C O I N c a m p a i g n gs o v e r n m e n thsa v ea t t e m p t e tdo r n o b i l i z et i r eI o c a l


population t o p r o t e c t h e m s e l v ebsy f o r m i n ga u x i l i a r yf o r c c s W
. h e ns o u n d l yb a s e ds, e n s i b l y
c,rganizedand properlycoordinatedwith otherunits,theseforceshaveprovedindispensable and
indccdo, n o c c a s i o n st h, e k e y t o a s u c c e s s f uc la r n p a i g n .

41. lr is not r,u'rusual for regularsoldiersto be scathingaboutthe appearance, operational


c l ' l i c i e n c yf,i g h t i n gp o t e n t i aal n d l o y a l t yo l ' a u x i l i a r yf b r c e sl.' h i s a t t i t u d eu, s u a l l y ' s t e m t t t i n g
florl an ignorance o f t h ec h a r a c t c r i s t io c sf a u x i l i a r yl b r c e sa n da m i s u n d e r s t a n d i on fgt h e i r
ntotivation. t o g c ' . h crrv i t ha l a c k o f a p p r e c i a t r oonf t h e w i d e ri s s u e sa t s t a k ei n a C I O I Nc a r n p a i g n .
r r t a \l t a v cu n f b r t u n a t ceo n s e q u e n c eIst .c a n h : n d e rt l t ep r o p e rd e v e l o p m e notf a u x i l i a r yf o r c e s
a n d r h c i ri n t e g r a t i o n i n t o t h e o v e r a l lo p e r a t i o n apll a n .A l t h o u g ht h e n a t u r eo f t h e s ef b r c e sn t a v
d i f l ' c rb e t r v e e cn a m p a i g u sc,o m m a n d e rasn ds t a f fo f f i c e r sn e e dt o u n d e r s t a t rt d h ec h a r a c t e n s t r c s
c , 1 ' L h c sl ber c c sa n d t h c r c q u i r c m c n tas n d p r o b l e m sa s s o c i a t ewdi t h t h e i rr a i s i n g.

42. A u x t l i a r yi b r c e sc o n t r i b u t ei n f o u r r n a i na r e a sc: o t n t n i t m e nrt n; a n p o w e ri n , telligence.


a n d .l i g h t i n gs k i l l s . ' l ' h eg o v c r n r n c ncta m p a i g nt o d ef c a ta n i n s u r g e n cw y ill sr.rccee odn l yi f i t
r i , i n st h e l o y a l t i , a n ds u p p o r o
t f t h e p o p r i l a t i o n
T .h e a c i dt e s to f l o y a l t y i s w h e t h e r
t h e p e o p l ew ' i l i
a c t i v eI v s L l p p o r h l .c C O I N c a r n p a i gsni n c et h i s w i l l r n e v i L a b l t ' i n v o i v e
r i s k .C O l t . xi s c r p e n s i r ci n
p c r s o n n c lr.. i t h s r - : c cs e i m p a i g nh
s f ' Lcr a s a r . , i nags e c u r i t yf b ' r c c - t o - i n s u r g crnatt i oo 1L- L pt o 2 0 . 1.
'l'hcv
A L r r i l i a r _l irt,r c c sh c i p n r c c tt h e p e r s o n n crlc c l u i r e r n e n i . a r ep a r t i c u l a r l y , u s e tf iorrl d e f e n s i v c

( h i i l l l

Arranaa4n 4n nnnnao
DI{AFT

o p c r a t l o n sr e. I c a s t l ttgh e m o r er r ' o b i l .eb e l l e r - t l a i n er cdg u l a rt i o o p sa n dp o l i c ef o l o l - j ' c n s i v c


o p c r a i L o nPsr.o p e r loy r g a n r z eadu x i l i a r l ' f b r c e s ' t h o r o L kn r gohw l e d goef t h e r rl o c a a l r e aa n crl t s
p e o p l ec o n s i d e r a bel ya s et h c i n t e l L i g e n cp er o b l e n rT, h e v a r cm o r el r k e l vt o p i c k u p i n f o r m a t i o n
f l o l t l t h en c t q ' o r ko i i n f o r m a lc o n l a c t tsh a tl i n k v i l l a g e r sw i t h b o t hg o v e r n m e natn di n s L r r s e n , .
f i r r c e st h a na r cr c g u l a tr r o o p sw h o a r en o t n a t j v ct o t h ea r e a f r i n a l l i rs. o t n ea u x i l i a r r , f o r c ehsa v c
s p e c i a l i z efdi g h t i n gs k i l l s ,w h i c hc o n - i p L e m ct hnot s eo f t h c r e g u l a fro r c e sW . h i l et h e l , h a v c
n e i t h e trh et r a i n i n gn o r c c l L r i p m ctnoto p c r a t el i k e r e g u l asr o i d r e r st h , e ym a y e x c e li n c e r t a i ns k i l l s
s t t c ha st l a c k i n gp, a t r o l l i n go, b s e r u a t i o tnh, eu s eo f g r o u n d a. n dc o m m u n i c a t i nvsv i r ht h e l o c a l
p op L r l a r otn

'13 8 y t h et i r n cC a n a d i a fno r c e sd e p l o y l,o c a la u x i l i a r yi o r c e sm a y b e u n d e rc o n s i d c r a b l e


p r c s s u ra e n dd i s c o u r a g ebdy i n s u r g e nst u c c e s s eTsh. e yw i l l n e e ds u p p o rat n dc n c o u r a g e u r eanst
r ^ , e lai st h c o p p o r t u n i ttyo p l a y a p o s i t i v ea n dc o n s t r u c t i vr eo l e i n o p e r a t i o n A
s .s a r e a sa r e
sLtcccssively broughtbackundergovernment controltheywill be handecj ovcr to the local
adrrlirlistratirtn togetherwith its policcand armedforces.Thoscrecruitedandcleployecj on a
t c r r i t o r i abl a s i sn e a rt h e i rh o r n e s l - r o u lbde u s c f u ls o u r c eos f r n f o r m a t r oann dm a k ec o m n e r e n r
g r r i d e sa r r d p. e r h a p sp.r o v i d ci n l e r p r c t e r s .

41. C u s t o m sI,m m i g r a t i o nB, o r d c rP o l i c ea, n dC o a s t g u a r dasr ea l l d e s i g n e tdo c o n t r o l


lllovelrentacrossfrontiersand coastlines andpreventsmugglingWhile tliey tenclto coucentrate
tJreircffortsat officiallydesignated crossingpointsthcy alsoincorporare a mobilcelementfbr
p a t r o l l i n gu n r v a t c h esde c t o r sl '. h e s es e r u i c easr cu s u a l l yw e l l a c q u a i n t cw
d i t h t f i ei d e n t i t i e s ,
h a b i t sa n dr o u t e su s c db y s m u g g l e ras n di i l e g a lb o r d e cr r o s s c r sw, h i c ha n i n s u r g e notr g a n i z a t i o l
vvill rrseto lrlovctroops,armsand equipmcntinto the threatened state.lnsurg"nir.oy alsotrv to
b r i b co r s u b v c rol l l l c i a l s .W h e r et h c y e x i s tt h e ys h o u i db e b r o u g h tw i t h i nt h es c c r - r r iftoyr c c sa s
c u r l va sP o s s i h l c

( ' h 5 1 t / lI
DRAFT

CHAPTER 6

A I I M Y O P E R A T I O N SI N C O U N T E R - I N S U R C E N C Y

SECTION l: IN'IRODUCTION

l. s e p l o y e dt o a C O I N t h e a t r eo f ' o p e r a t t o n s .
A m o n g s ta l l t h c v a r i o u sr n i l i t a r ya s s e t d
r h eA r m y p l a y st h ec e n t r arl o l e .I t s t a c t i c a l u n i t cs o n d u c at l l o p e r a t i o n af ul n c t i o n s
( C ' o r n m a n dS.e n s eA, c t , S h i e l da n d S u s t a i nt)h r o u g he x c c u t i o n o f t h e t h r e et y p e so f
operations:off-ensive, defensive, and stability. Indeed,givcnthe natureof COIN
o p e r a t i o n st h, e e m p h a s i isn t e r m so f t i r n ea n dr c s o u r c ew s i l l b e a l l o c a t e tdo t h e l a t t e r .

I I n t h c c o n d u co t f full spectrum o p e r a t i o n su,n i t sw i l l c a r r yo u t t a c t i c atl a s k st h a t


r r i l l b e . i n t e r r n so f t h e i rp u r p o s es,h a p i n gd, e c i s i v eo r s u s t a i n i n gi n, s u p p o r o t 1-the overall
objcctivcsand campaign.Through the operational functions, they will find. lix and
s t r i k e . W i t h i n a s i n g l eu n i t ' sa r e ao f o p e r a t i o n so,n e s u b - u n im t a y b e d e f e n d i n gi n d u s t r i a l
vital points.anothermay be attackinga recentlydiscovered insurgentIlQ, another
assisting p o l i c ei n c o n d u c t i n sg n a pv e h i c l ec h c c kp o i n t sa n da n o t h epr r o v i d i n gs e c u r i t y
l o r c i v i l i a i rc o n l r a c t o rasn da s s i s t i n ign a r e eo n s t r u c t i o pn r o j e c t .

Operationswili be conductedthroughthe applicationof doctrine, both


-l-actics.
c o n v e n t i o n aolp e r a t i o n s d o c t r i n a
e n d t h a tw h i c h i s s p e c i f i t
c o a C O i N .
t e c h n i q u easn d p r o c e d u r e(s' l ' T P s w ) i l l b e a l t e r e dt o m e e tt h et h r e a ta n d s i t u a t i o ni n
lhearrc.Although tacticaloperations may be plannedandco-ordinated at the highest
l c v e l s t, h e l ' m u s tb e c o n t r o l l e da n d e x e c u t e d a t t h e l o w e s tl e v e l s U
. n i t sb e c o m ec n a b l e r s
l i r r t h e i rs u b - u n i t st h a ti n t l l r np r o s e c u tteh c t a c t i c a tl a s k si n a d c c e n t r a l i s ebdu t c o -
ordinated Iashion.l-he battle,both physicaland moral,is foughtand won at tlte sectiorr
a n d p l a t o o nl e v e l .

S E , C T I O N2 : E S T A B L I S F I I N GT H E F O O T H O I , D _ P H Y S I C A L A N D M O R A L

+. A s w , i t ha n y m i l i t a r yo p c r a t i o nt,h e f i r s t p h a s eo f a C O N f o r c ed e p l o y r n e nwt i l l
l i k e l v b e t o s c c u r ca l b o t h o l d .A u n i t / s u b - u n w i t i l l b e a s s i g n e dn,o n r a l l y ,a, n a r c ao f
o p e r i r t i o n(sA O ) i n w h i c h i t r v i l l b e r c s p o n s i b l fco r t h ec o n d u c ot f f L r l ls p e c t r u r n
olrcrurtiorrs.

j. 1 ' h i sp h y s i c a fl o o t h o l ds h o u l df b l l o w t l - r ep r i n c i p l e as n dc h a r a c t e r i s t ioc 1s ' t h e


clcf'cnce b .u r a d . l u s t efdo r C O I N . ' T h i s f b o t h o l dw i l l b e c o m e( a t I c a s ti n i t i a t l y )t h e b a s eo j
( ) p c r a t i o nfso r t h e u n i t / s r - r b - u nIitt s h o r - r lbde l o c a t e do n k e y t e r r a i nt h a tr v r l la l l o u ' t h e

. e a r c aw i L lh a v eO P s .s t a n d - t op o s i t i o n sa n d i n t e r l o c k i nagr c so f f i r e- t h a t i s .d e f e n s i b l c .
[ : o rr : x a r n p l et h
l b r c ep r o t c c t i o nn r e a s Lsisl - b u t u , i l l u n l i k e i yc l e a rl l e l d so f l l r e i n t h e u r b a na r e aa n d l i a i s o nr v i l lo c c u r v i t l r
t er e ai n o r d e rt o i d e n t i f yl h e l o c a lp a t t c r no f l r f e
l o c a l si n t h e i r r r u i e d i a a

( h a p6 : l / i l

Anonat.l 'l 't //rnrl^a'l


I)ITAFT

f i ) f c c st o r e s p o n rcai p i C l l ' t oa n vt h r c a tc r j n c i d c nitn t h e , A O ,t o s c i z cs u c l c ] c i t


o p p o r t u n i t ractsl dl o p r o t ' i d ca c o r s t a npt r c s e n ci n e t h c , { C . A l l h o u g hi t ; t p s rb c
d e f - e n s i btl h ee , l o c a t r o nc a n n o tb e v i e r , , , eadsa f b r t r e sos n a h i l l , r e m o t ea n d
d j s r a nlti o r r
t i t cl o c a ip o p u l a c ei t m u s tb e ,p h y s r c a l layn de m o t i o n a J layr, r o n g stt6 el o c a lp o p u l a c c
I t t d b c c t l n tp c a r to f t h e d a i l y l a n d s c a p c . ' l ' sh oe l d i e r ns i u s tb e s e e l lt o r n t e q r a tuc,.i t h
the
p o p Ll ar t i o n .

6 A p a r tf i o m t h c g a i n i r - rogf ' a p h y s i c zfrol o t h o l dt,h c r n r l i t a r yt o r c em l r s tg a r na


r l o r a l f i l o t h o l dw i t h i n t h e A O ; t h a ti s , t h el b r c er n u s tr v o r kq u i c k l yt o e s t a b l i s l i a
rrcasqrc
o 1 ' a u t h o r i at yn dt o e s t a b l i s a h l e v c lo f t r r - r sa tn dc o n f i d e n cw
e i t h t h c i o c a lp o p L r ) a t i o n

l W h i l s tt h ec o m m a n d ewr i l l s e c ko u t a n di d e n t i l yt h c k e y p u b l i cf i g u r e si p t h c
arca
( p o l i c ec h i e fc o n s t a b l el o, c a lm a y o r ,i n d u s t r ym a n a g e r sr n ) t e l l i g e n csep e c i a l i s t s
( l i t J M I N l ' . c o u n t e r - i n t e l l i g e nacnedp o s s i b l yS F )w i l l s e e k
t o i d e n t i f ya n dc o l r a c tr l i c
actlralpowerbrokerswithin the sociaistructurc. who may be differentfrom thc pub)ie
l i g u r c s .P l a t o o na n d s c c t i o np a l r o l sw i l l s e e kt o e s t a b l i scho n t a c w t , i t ht h ea v e r a g c
c i t i z c n si n t h c s t r e c t a
s n d v r l l a g e s , ' l h ct o n ea n dd e u r e a n o rs.er rtb y t h ep a t r o i si s i r i t i c a l .

8 A c e r t a i na r n o u not f r i s k m a n a g e m e n mtL l sbt e t a k e nt o a l l o r vp a t r o l st o s e tt h i s


n c e d c dp r o f i l ea n dt o s e n dt h e a p p r o p r i a tre. n e s s atgoet h e p o p u l a c e-. f h i s
o f c o u r s ec j r e s
rlotnlealltliatthe troopsconductthemsclves in a lax manner.Althoughthe patrolleacler
r l a y b e t a l k i n gw i t h l o c a ls c l - r o oc lh i l d r e no r s h o p k e e p e rost,h e rm e m b e r s
oithe patrol
maintaina securestancethat irnpliesthe patrolremainsa hardtargetfor
insurgcnts1-hrs
b l e n do f o p e n n e sasn d s t e r np r o f - e s s i o ncax lt e r i o irm p r e s . s tehsec i v i l i a n s .
e i v e it h e r l
c o n l r d e n caen du n n e r v e tsh c i n s u r g e n t w s ,h o w i l l a l w a y sb e w a t c h i n g
-l'his
9 footholdnot only beginsto reassure the populaceand dislocatethc insLrrgenr.
b u t i t b e g i n st h et a c t i c alle v e li n t e l l i g e n cceo l l e c t i o na,g a i n sw
t h i c h m e a s u r eost ' s u c c e *
i r i l l b e u s ed u s t h c c a r r p a i g np r o g r c s s c s .

l() , \ s t h es i i L i a t i odne v e l o p so t h e rs a t e l l i t cea m p so r p a t r o lb a s e sm a y b e e s r a b l i s h e d .


p c r m a n e l l t iCVr t e l n p o r a r i l ye,v e na t t h ep J a t o o lne v e l .1 ' h i ss p r e a d tsh e
i n f l u e n co ef t h e
s l c t r r r t rl b r c c ss. L l p p o nisn t e l l i g e n cceo l l e c t i o an n dd r s l o c a t et sh e u r s L r r ! e n t s .

Upon arrir"alin Haiti in March 2004,1Coy,2RCR established theircompanylocationin


the centreof their AO, on the main MSR, acrossfrom a public park. Withiniours
of
aniving, an OP reporteda civilian man beatinga woman in the park. Whilst
many may
havesimply dismissedthe matteras a non-miiitaryaffair, or asjust an aspect
of Haitian
culture,the companyrecognisedthe incidentas firstly a violation of the rule
of law. and
secondly,as simply unacceptablebehaviourin their AO. The
QRF was dispatchedand the
man was apprehended and detained.The actionand the ,.uronr=for it, were explainedto
the individual and thosein the immediatearea.After a quick medicalinspection,
the
detaineewas transportedto the nearestcivilian police stition and passedio their
authority.
Althoughit was highly unJikelvthatany civilianchargesresulted,a clear
message had been
sentto the populace.The securityforceshad estabiished their physicaland mora'ifoothold
in the area.In addition,the actionbegantodislocatethe influaqceof the criminaland
insurgentelementsin the region.That following Sunday,the park was populated
wrth
lamilies,
DRAFT

SIiCTION3: ATTACKING THE INSURGENTS,WILL

ITOLEOF THL'IACTICAL COMMANDIIII

I l. l : v c n a t t h c t a c t i c alle v e la r n a n o e u v r i as tp p r o a ctho a C O I N o p e r a t i o nr v i l l s e e kt o
s h a t t etrh e e n c r n ym o r a la n d p h y s i c acl o h c s i o nr,a t h c rt h a np u r s u ch i s w h o l e s a l e
destruction.Commanders at the tactrcallevel,affordedconfidenceand freedomof
..rction a .n d s u p p o r t c b d y g o o d i n t c l l i g c n cw
e i l l , t l r r o u g hi n g c u u i t ya n d a p r o - a c t i v e
s t a n c eb, e a b l et o u n d e r m i n e t h e p o w e r .a u t h o r i t ya n de v e n t u a l lw y i 1 l ,o f t h e i n s u r g e n t .

12. C o m m a n d e rm s L r sbt e a b l et o q u i c k l yi d e n t i f ya n de x p l o i tt h o s eo p p o r t u n i l i ct so
p r e - e r n pdt .i s l o c a t ca n dd i s r u p t h e i n s u r g e n cmy o v e l n e nat n d i t s o p e r a t i o n sH. issupport
baseand the powerthat the insurgcntsholdsover the localpopulacemust be scvcred
L r s i na
gl l t h ea s s e ta svailable.

ll. t h e i n s u r g e notn t h e p h y s i c a al n d n o r a l
l n o r d e rt o b e s u c c e s s f ui nl a t t a c k i n g
p l a n e st,h e t a c t i c acl o m r n a n d er re q u i r e sm o r ea s s e t si n , d c p ne d e n c ea n d a u t h o r i t yt h a uh c
r i o u l d n o r m a l l yh a v ei n c o n v e n t i o n aolp e r a t i o n sS.o m ee x a m p l e as r e a s f o l l o w s :

a. independence and flexibility to establishandif possiblc,chair,operational


a n d i n t e l l i g e n cceo m m i t t e eas p p r o p r i a t eo h i s l e v e lo f c o m m a n dw i t h
NGOs, coalitionpartnersand local policeand civic authorities;

b. r e s o u r c e(sn a m e l ym o n e y )a n da u t h o r i t yt o c o n d u c tl o w - l e v e C
l IMIC and
reconstruction projectsin orderto createan irnmediateirnpactthatwill. in
turn,reinforccthe positiveaspectsofthe securityforce'spresence;

c. a u t h o r i t yt o r e s p o n di m m e d i a t e l tyo c a l l sf o r a s s i s t a n cfei o m l o c a lp o l i c e
and securityforces,without referenceto higherauthority(as long as thc
requirements fall within the ROE, tacticaltasksassignedto the unit and
t h ec a m p a i g no b j e c t i v e s )a;n d

d a u t h o r r t yt o c o n d u c ti n f o r r n a t i oonp e r a t i o n(sl O ) i n a c c o r d a n crev i t ht h c


p L r b l i s h eI dO t h e r n e s C o m m a n d e rusr u s tb e a b l et o p r e- c m p ta n d
J i s l o c a t ct h e p r o p a g a n dm a c s s a g eosf t h ei n s u r g e n t s .

PRE.ENlPTION

ll I ) r e - c r n p t i oi ns t h e t a k i n go f a c i i o ns o a s t o p r e v e nst o r n e t h i nhga p p e n i n gl n .
r n i l i t a r yl p e r a t i o n sp, a r l r c u l a r C l yO t N , p r e - e r n p t i or .nv i lrle q u i r e
t h c s e i z i n go 1 ' a) i k e i y
i l : c : i l r ! .o p p o r t u n i t vb e i b r ea n e n c r n ) ' c a na c l ,i n o r d e rt o d e n yh i n r a n a d v a n t a g e o u s
e( , L l - soei a c t i o n .I t a i n r st o i d e n t i f i 'a n d e x p l o i tt h e f l e e t i n go p p o r t u n i t yt o r n a x i r l i s e
'fhe
: u : p r i s ca r r dp r e c l u d ei n s u r g e nat c t i o n , l n s r t r g e nm l s a y b e c o n s t a n t l y , d c s t a b i ) rbs1e,d

6: 3r31
C'hap

Anrnr2,l 4 I nnnnT?
DIIAF-T

i h c i r l i t i a t r roc i ' s e c ' r r i t t ' f o raccet i o nlsn t e r u r o


s f b o l hk r n e L tacn cni o n - k i n e t i c
; t p p1 i ca t i on s ,

l'5 P r c - e i n p t i oins I a c i l i t a t ebdy a s e n s otro s h o o t e lri n k t h a ti s r n s t i t u t etdh r o u g l r


c l t l c t r t n tce: c h n o l o g vt r; a r n i n ga; n do r g a n i s a t i o nP.r e - c r n p t l voep e r a t i o nrsv i l l d e p e n c l
on a
p t o - a c t i v ae n dr e s p o n s i vien t e l l i g e n csey s t e u ' l , l i n k ewdi t h a r a p i dd e c i s i o n r a k i n g
p f o c c s si n s u c ha w a y t h a tt h ed e t e c t i oor rf a n o p p o r t u n i t cy a nt e r r a n s l a t crdn i o
a
sLrcccss 1Lrlor.rtcome.

1(i K e y t o p r e - e r n p t i oi ns a c o v e r sl u r y e i l l a n ccea p a b i l i t a
y t t h eu n i t a n csl u b - u n r r
'fhis
lel'cl. m a y c o n s i sot f d i s m o u n t erde c o n n a r s s a nacses e t ss,n i p c rd e t a c h m c n ot sr r i l l e
pJatoon elel.nents rehearsed and equippedfor the task.Cunninguseof surveilialcewrll
actas triggersfor otherforcesto deployto exploitthc 1'leeting opportunrty.

l 7' L v e n o v e f tf r a m e w o r ko p e r a t i o ncsa np r e - c m pitn s u r g e n tIs . F o r ex a r l p i e ,t S r c a t s


b v I n s u r g c n ttso k e e pt h e l o c a ls c i t o o lcsl o s e d( a n da t t e m p t tso i n t i m i d a t c
f a m i l i c st o k c c p
c h i l d r c nh o r n e )c a nb e p r e - c m p t ebdy t h ep l a c e m e not f s t a n d i n p g a t r o l sa t t h es c 6 o o l s ,
c t t c hd a v a 1o p c n i n gt i m e ,a t l e a sut n t i lt h ei n s u r g e n tn' so l o n g e r h a vteh ew i l l t o
continuc
t l r i sl b r r no f i r r t i m i t j a t i o n .

l li ln COIN it is fiequentlythe casethat one slrccess leadsto opportunitics fbr


attotlter: an arrestmay leadto the discoveryof an armscacheandso on. SpecialIrorces
(SI-')and Quick ReactionForces(QRF-s) must be available,properlypositionecl and able
to exploit unplannedopporlunities to strikeat the insurgency.Locatingthe
eRps with
. s L t rivl lea r r c ea s s e t (sf o r e x a m p l ec, o v e r t l yi,n s i d ea d i l a p i d a t ebdu i l d i n g Jw i i l
ensr_rre.n
i l n r n c d i a trec s p o n s eP . o l i c ea n do t h c rg o v c r n m e nat g c n c i em s L l smt o v er n q u i c k l yb c h i n d
thenrilitaryforcesto rc-establish and retaincontrolancjinfluence.

l() l ) r e - e m p t i osnh o u l da l s ob e a g o a lo f I O t a c t i c sA. f l y e rh a n d e colu t b y p a r r o l s


cxplitinillgthe purposeof the secttrityforcesand thcir futureoperations will pfc-emtlt
l n s t l r g e nptr o p a g a n dtah a tp a i n t st h es e c u r i t yf o r c e sa so p p r e s s o rls. .i k c . w r s e ,
t 5 ct i r n c l y ,
irnplerrrcntation of rcconstruction pro.iccts at local schoolswill rob insurse nts of a
possible g r i c r ' a n cteh a tt h e c u r r e nrt c g i m ef a i l st o p r o v i d ef o r t h e . u r n t r i ' , c i t i z c r r r y , a n d
I L Lutr e .

I)ISI-OC,\TION

: I ( ) n e o 1 ' t h er l l a i na i m so i f i a m e w o r ko p er a t i o n sj s t o
d i s l o c a tteh e i n s L r r g canpt c l
l r i si r r l l r - r c n oc ve e rt h e p o p u l a c eD i s l o c a t i o dn e n i e st h e i n s u r g e nt th c a b i l i t yr c , - b r i n g
hrs
s t r en s t h t o b c a r ,a n d q o e sb c y o n dm e r e l yl i u s t r a t i n gt ) r ee n e m y ' sp l a n sb y r n a k i n g" h i s
s t r c n g t hi r r e l e v a nbt y r e f u s i n gt o { i g h to n h i s t e r m s .l t r v i l lc o n s i sor f d e t e r r e n .o. n d
s c c r ' t r i lI1n'e a s u fses u c ha s : p r o t ec t i o no f v L r l n e r a btl ae r g e t ss;ea r c ho p e r a t i o n so .v e r l

-
l r a n t e u ' o rok p e r a t i c nasr et h o s eo v e r tm i l i t a r yc p e r a t i o r rcso n d u c t erdo e s t a b l l sah
s a f ea n ds c c u r c
c r r v l T o n l r e nr tv' h i c hc o n t r i b l r t et o
s t h ed e l e a ot f t h e i n s u r g e nitn a n a r e a (. B r i t i s hA r : n y F i e l dM a n u a l .V o L
-ihe;r
l , I ) a r ti 0 ) p l l - - v i i et h e s e c u r ee n v i r o n m e ni nt w h i c h o t h e ra g e n c i ersn a yc o n d u c t
t h c i r l i n c so f
' l c r l l . o rI . . . r : . : 1 . :t : . _ . _ - : l p : i t r .

( ' h a p 6 ;: 3 i
DRAFT

s L l rr-i \l l a n c eo 1 p- o t e n t i aml c u n t i n ga f e a so r m e e t i n gp l a c e os r p l a c e so t ' r n t i m i d a t i oant,t c l


r t p r o a c t i v eI C m e s s a g teh a lr e i n f o r c etsh e l e g i t r m a coy f t h e g o v e r n m c nat n d s e c u r i t \
l b r c c s . I - h cr c s u l t so f a d e t c r m i n ecdf f o r tt o d i s l o c a t teh e r n s u r g e nmt a y n o t b c
s p e c t a c u l aarn d m a y n o t e v e nb e a p p a r e nt to t r o o p so n t h eg r o u n d b , u t o v e rt i r r e r v i l l r o b
t h e i n s i r : ' g e uo tf t h e r n i : i a t i v e

DISRUP'fION

11. l ) i s r u p t i o ns c e k st o a t t a c kt l " r ei n s u r g e nst e l e c t i v e l yt a. r g e t i n g


h i s m o s ti r n p o r t a n t
a s s e ta s n d s o t h r o w i n gh i m i n t o c o n f u s i o nW . e l l - e x e c u t eodv e r tr n i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o nrsv i l l
I r c . l tpo d i s r u p tt h c i n s u r g e nbt y t h r e a t e n i ndge p l o y r n e natn de s c a p er o u t e sl,o c a t i n ga r n t s
c l c h e sa n t l r e s t r i c t i n mg o v e m e n t sE, , v e nt h et h r e a to f a g g r e s s i vceo v e r ta n d o v e r t
o p e r a t i o ncsa n b e e f f e c t i v e .I n s u r g e n tws h o k n o w t h a tt h e ya r eb c i n ga c t i v e l yh L r n t erdv i l l
lr,- t,'rrnrnd tn {lce lhn erce,rf nnerrtinnc

l5 [ ) i s r u p t i o nc a l l sf l o rt a c t i c aal w a r e n e s cs u, n n i n ga n da r o b u s tu s eo f f b r c e s .
C o m r n a n d e rssh o u l da l s oa p p r e c i a tteh a tr a r eo p p o r t u n i t i ems a y b e b e t t e rc x p l o i t e db y
r r t h c ra g e n c i e s( a m i n o ra n n sf l n d f o r e x a m p l cc o u l d .i f l e f t u n d i s t u r b e db,e c o m ea
l ' r L r i u ualn r b u s hs i t ef b r S p e c i aFl o r c e s ) .S p c c da n da l e r t n e sws i l l b e e s s e n t i a l .

)6. ln order to affectdisruptiorr, tacticalcommanders mustbe affordedfreedornoi'


a
a c t i o n .C l o m m a n d e cr sa n n o t w a i ta u t h o r i t f
y r o r nh i g h e r
e c h e l o n fso r f e a ro f l o s i n ga n
opportunitv.

A P P R E C I A T I N G S E C O N D A R Y A N D 1 ' E R 1 ' I A R YE F F E C T S

21. (lommandersand staff must understand that everyactionwill havesecondand


third order effects,On one hand,pro-activeframeworkoperations, robustdelibcrate
operationsarrdthoughtfulIO lneasures will dislocate and disrupt the insurgents'presence
and inflr-Lcnce amongstthe populaceand in turn corrodeand underminetheir confldence
and rvill. On the otherhand,theseoperations, pafiicularlyif they do not mcettheir
i r n m e d i a ta e i r n sa n dp r o d u c ep h y s r c asl i g n so f s u c c c s sm, a y c a u s ee m b a r r a s s n t ct no tt h c
s c c u r i t yf b r c e s .u n w a n t e dd i s r u p t i o nt o t h e p o p u l a t i o n
a n di n t u r n u n d e r m i n et h ep L r b l i c ' s
c o n l l d e n c ea n d e m p a t h y .L o n g - t e n ns L l c c e si ns C O I N w i l l d e p e n du p o nt h c s es c c o n calt r c l
third order effects
'l
l(), d y t h e f o l l o w i n ge x a m p l e .A c o r d o t at n ds c a r c h
h i s i s s r " r cn a yb e s tb e i i l u s t r a t e b
o l t e r i i t i o uo f ' a s u s p e c t ew d e a p o n sc a c h ei n t h e h e a r to f a n i n s u r g c ncLo n t r o l l e d
n e i g h b o u r h o o dc ,o n d u c t e w d i t h t h e a s s i s t a n coef l o c a lp o l i c ef o r c e s r, n a yf ' r n df e,.vif any
! \ e a p o n s .l l o r v e v e r t, h e s e c o n da n d t h i r do r d e re f f e c t sm a y b e s i g n i f i c a nat n d n r a yh a v e
b o t h p o s i t i v ea n d n es a t i v eef f e c t s :

s e c o n c l a rayn d t e r t i a r ve f 1 - e cm
t h ep o s r t r v e t sa v i n c l u c l ct h e 1 ' o l l o r r , i r r r : :

C h a p6 : 5 i 3 l

antnt14,l -E_nnnnTq
DRAFT

( l) n e * ' r n t e l l i q e n-c\ eo L l rscaer ci c i c n t r f i cr vc i t h i nt h c e s t a b i i s h r n c i r l


a n di i o m r v i t h i nt h es p e c t a t o rus, h og a t h c r c cdl u r i n gt h e c o n d L r cotl
t h eo p e r a t i o n ;

(l) i r l s u r g e nl et a d c r a
s r ci d c n t i f i c dc i t h e rt h r o u g ha r r e s t / d c t e p t i oorrr s
f r o me v i d e n c e f o u n da t t h c s c e n c :

(l) t h eu s eo f l o c a lp o l i c el b r c c sn t a yh a v es e v c r acl 1 ' f c c t s :

(a) i n c r e a steh e l e g i t i m a c o
y f t h er n i l i t a r yf o r c e si n t h a tr h e v
areseento be rvorkingw,ithlocalauthorities;

(b) increascthc profilc anciesteemof the local polrceforccs


( w h om a yn o t b e r v e l l - r e g a r d e
bdy t h e l o c a lp o p u l a t i o n s ) ;

(c) l m p r o v et h ep r o l ' ses i o n acl o n d u cot f t h e l o c a lp o l i c ef b r c c


b y w a y o i ' e x a r n p laen dt h r o u g ht h et r a i n i n gv a l u co f t h e
operation;

(4) insurgents,knowingthat thcy and theirrcsource


s are beiqgsoLrgSt
actively,are forcedfurtherundcrground andmay evenflce thc
area;

(5) thc localpopulacebeginsto i'eelrrlorcsecureand lessafiaiclof'the


rnsurgcntsand their power; ancl

(6) weaponsare forcedf unher undcrground


and areiessrcaclilv
availableto insurgentfbrces;

b'. thc negativceffectsin this examplemay rncludethe fbllowing:

( l) ernbarrassment
in that no weaponswerelound;

(2) i n s u r g e n t s ' p r o p a g a nhdi gah l i g h t tsh i sl a c ko f s u c c e s sa n da t t e n r p t s


to demonstrate thatthe securityforccsareover-reacting, heavy,-
handedanclnot to bc trr_rsted;

(3) i r r t c l l r g e n cs eo u r c e as r c c o l n p r o r n i s e d ;

(4) i n t c r f ' e r e n tcoet h el o c a lp o p u i a t i o n 'dsa i l yr o r i t i n ei n c i t e sa n g c r ;

(-t) l o c a lp o l i c ea s s i s t i nw
g , i t ht h ea c t i o ni o o s ec o n f i c j c n caen c tl r . L r isnr
the secr:rity.. forces.

C'lra6
p. 6 -l1
DRAFT

(5) c l a m a goc c c u r r i n qt o s h o p sa n dh c n t c sc l r " r r i nogD e i ' a t i c nasl t g ef s L i l c


populace'

i(). n p e r a t i o nisn supportof' fi-amew,ork


I n l b r r n a t i oo and deLrberate operalionsshor-rld
lr,' rrl,rnnn.lt,' t h c r r n c i t i r r e f o l l o w - o nef f e c t sa n da t t e m ptto m i t i g a t e
t h e i m p a c to 1
"r.loit
the negatir.'e effects.

S E C T I O N 4 : S E C U I { I N G A N D C O N S O L T D A T . I N CA C O N T R O L L E D A R E A

I1. O n c et h e p r e s e n coef a s e c u r i t yf o r c eh a sb e e ne s t a b L i s h eodp,e r a t i o ntso c l e a r ,


s c c u f ca n d c o n s o l i d a tteh c n e x ta r e at o b e b r o u g h u t n d e rg o v e r n m e ncto n t r o l a , re
-l'he
Iaurrchcdfiorn established operatingbases. immediateaim of a fiarnework
o l t e r a t i o rvr .i e w e da s t h e s p r e a do f a n o i l s l i c k ,i s t o s c p a r a tteh e i n s u r g e n tfsr o m t h e i r
-fhese
s r r p p o r t e rfsb. o d s u p p l i e ras n d s o u r c e o sf information. o p e r a t i o nasr ee s s e n t i a l l y
of'fensivcin natureas they aim to wrest territory,and more imporlantlythe heartsand
r n i n d so 1 ' p e o p l w e h o l i v e i n i t , f r o m i n s u r g e ncto n t r o la n d i n f l u e n c e .

ll. l h e o t f e n s i v ee l e m e n ot f f r a m e w o r ko p e r a t i o nisn c l u d e s u r g i c acl o r d o n sa n d


scarches. raids,offensivepatrollingand attacks.'l'hese tacticsforcethe insurgents to react
o r s u r r e n d etrh e i n i t i a t i v eW
. ell p l a n n e d
a n d o r g a n i z e a
d m b u s h cds e s t r o y
t h e c n e m ya s h e
rcacts.\,\/henthc opportunityarises,infiltrationsand attacksmay be usedto destroy
knor.r,n and vulnerableinsurgcntcampsand basepositions.Success however,restson
v c r y g o o di n t e l l i g e n c e .

l-1. As areasof the hostiieterritoryarc clearedof insurgents, the civil administration


w i l l b c r e - e s t a b l i s h eIdt .i s p o s s i b l ct h a tm a n yo f t h e a r e a ' sf o r m e rc i v i l s e r v a n t s .
nragistrares and policernayhaveescapedthe initial insurgenttakeover and woLridbe ablc
to pLrtthcir local knowledgeto good use on their return.Iiowever,they and the civil
policewill undoubtedlyneedthe backingof suitablernilitaryforcesfor sometime and
c c r l a r n l ;u n t i l t h e n e i g h b o u r i nrgc g i o n sh a v eb e e nb r o u g l i bt a c ku n d e rg o v c n t m e n t
-[he
c c r u t r o l . a r m y m a y b e a s k e dt o h e l p t o t r a i nI o c a la u x i l i a r yf o r c e st h a tw i l ] e v e n t u a l l y
s r . r p p otrht ei r o w n p o l i c e .

S [ . C ' I I O N 5 : D I ' ] F E N S I V EO P E I { A T I O N S A N I ) T A C T I C S
.I'YPES
O F D E F E N S I V EO P E R A T ' I O N S

i-+ D c l c n s i v eo p e r a t i o nbsy t h e s c c u r i t yf o r c e sr v i l l a s s i s itn t h e s t a b i l i s a t i oonf ' t h e


I r r c au r r da l l o r vt h e g o v e r n l n e natn d o t h c ra g e r t c i etso e f f - e ct th e r rt a s k s .T h e m a i n t y p c so f
r l c f - c n s i re' cr p c r a t i o ra. rt sea s f o l l o w s :

-r p r o t e c L i v cm e r s u r e s :a t t d

( i r r r l l a n J c r sr r u s t i n s i s {t h a td u r i n gs u c ho p e r a t i o n sc ,o l i a t c i adl a m a g e as r e I r n r i t e tdo t h e g r e a t e set x t e i r t


.,-rtssibA l e).t h o u g ht r o o p sl t l u s :b e p r e p a r e df o r b r e a c h e sl o, c k e dd o o r sc a n u s u a l l yb e r e m o v e dl i o r r t h e i r
: i r g e s .c L r li o c k sc a n b e r c p l a c e oa n Cc l a r r a g ersc p a i r e db , 1 , . ' ' , t , n . . ti tn t h e d a y sl b l l o w i n gt h e o p e r a t i o n .

C h a p6 : 7 i 3 1

A0202311-7,OOOO77
I)]IAFT

b d ef c n s r i , e
c o m i l a n da n dc o n t r o ul , a r f a r (eC 2 W )

P I l O T E C T I V EM E A S U R E S

-l'hreat
'l-5 l n m a n yc a m p a i g n sa ,r e a so f o p er a t i o nr v i l l b e
n o n - l r naer a n dp c r h a p s
t l o t ' t - c o l l t i g u o' L
f hi se
t h r e a tr v r l lb e a s v m m e t r iacn dn o a r e ac a nb e a s s u m e d
t o b es a f c
u n l e s si t i s s e a r c h e d _ atnhceing L r a r d c E j . v e ni n a c l e a r e da n dc o n s o l j c l a t e d
itlsttlgentsrnaystill havea few operational a r c at h c
cellsthat can launchborrb attacksor carry
o u ta s s a s s t n a t i oTn hs e y m a y a t t e n l ptto r e i n t r o d u c e
i n s u r g c nct e l l st o l a u n c ht c r r o r i s t
attacksboth for theirpropagancla valucandin an attemptIo fo..e a redeployment
policeancltroopsto removethe pressure of.
lrom their l'orceselsewhere. Hence,defensive
lreasllrcsand protectionmay be nccessary fbr a wide rangeof people,erreas apd facilitjes
i6 ECurancc Protectivemeasures will still be requiredin the mostsecurebasc
areas'althor-rgh the tasksmay eventua)ly be handedover (at Ieastin part)to the civil
p o l i c eo l ' a l r x i l i a r i e sA p r i o r i t yw i l l b e f o r c ep r o t e c t i o n
o f t h es e c u r i t yf o r c e s b
, a s ea r e a s .
C o v c r n m e nat n d i n d u s t r i avl i t a lp o i n t sa n dl i n e so f
c o m m u n i c a t i o nwsi l l r e q u i r e
protectionfor they providehighvaluetargets
fbr the insurgents.At all timesa'ci at all
l e v e l sv i g i l a n c el n u s tb e s t r e s s eadn de n f o r c c d .

i(r' I J a l a n c cP
' r o t e c t i v lcr c a s u r e isn h i g h r i s ka r e a s
a r er n a n p o w errn t e n s i v cM. a n yo l
tlie titsksare routit.tc and boring,and soldierstendto losetheirvigilance
p c r i o d sw i t h o u ta n i n c i d c n ti.f p o s s i b l et ,r o o p s al.terlong
o n s u c hd u t i e ss h o u l db c r o t a t c dw i t h
t h o s eo n r . o r e a c t i v eo p e r a t i o nasn de v c r ye f r b nm ' s t
b e m a d et o k e e pa t r a i n i n g
p r o g l ' a m mgco i n g .

l7 ob.iectivesof ProtectiveMeasures.Protectivcmeasures
applyto botht6c
sccLrrity
fbrcesthemselves,otheragenciesin the carnpaignunJ tn. localpopulace.l-hc
gcnelalobjectivcsof protectivemeasures
incluciethe fofowinc:

a. ensuresecurityof all baseareas,ircluding lirrward


operatingbasesaucl
t e m p o r a r yb a s e s ,

b. - s c c u r ec o n t r o ll c d a r e a s ;

s c c L r r lei n c so f c o r n r n u n i r . l t i o n .

d p r ev en t s u p p l ya n dr e i n f o r c e m e on ft i n s u r g e nut n i t s ;
and

c. p r e v e l t td i s r u p t i o no J ' t h ee c o n o m i cl i f c o f
t h en a t i o n .

i7. T a s k s . P r o t c c t i rc m e a s L l r e,s, v i l li n c l L r d ae w r d ev a r i e t yo f t a s k s .T a c t j c allc v e


L r n i t sr v i i l b c e x p e c t e c1l o c o n d u c tt h e f o i l o . . 1, 1 1 g ' I

( i h a p6 ; 8 _ 3
I

A n 4 n 6 4 a / A ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^
DRAFT

l p e r s o r ' ) nperlo t e c t i o nf o r V I P s T h i sr , , i 1iln c l r , r dkee y m e m b e r -osf t h c


g o v e r n mnet , c e r t a i ns c c u r i t yf o rc e c o r l r n a n d e rasn d v i s i t i n gd i g n i t a r i c sI t.
r n a yi n c i u d et h e t r a i n i n go f l o c a lf o r c e si n t h i s r o l e , C l o s c p r o t c c t r ownill
i i k e l y b e c o n d L r c t ebdr ym i l i t a r yp o l r c ea n dS F t r o o p s r, v h i l et e m p o r a r y
o u t c rc o r d o n sm f , yb e c o n d u c t ebdy l r r r eI r o o p s ;

[r, . o t ho n a n do f f d u t y . A d m i n i s t r a t i v m
s e c u r i t yf o r c ct r o o p s b e o v e so f
t r o o p so f t e ne x p o s ec o n c e n t r a t i o on fs' t r o o p sa s s o f t t a r g e
t s . F o r c e su , j l l
l i k el y h a v et o b e a l l o c a t c df o r t h c i rp r o t c c t i o n :

c. c o n v o ys e c u r i t y . ' f h es e c u r r t fyo r c e sw i l l b e e x p e c t c dt o s e c u r e
governmentand NGO convoys,as well as their or.r'n;

d. largeprotectedroad movements, Largemovernents of unitsor assetsfrom


o t h c ra g e n c i e sp,a r t i c u l a r liyn t h ec o n s o l i d a t i oonf n e w l ys e c u r c d e r e a so r
i n a s i t u a t i o no f n o n - c o n t i g u o ub sa t t l e - s p a cwei,l l r e q u i r es i g n i l i c a nltb r c e
a l l o c a t i oIn

c. p i c k e t i n gr o u t c sa n d l i n e so f c o r r m u n i c a t i o n sM. S R s a n d l i n e so f
c o n r m u n i c a t i owni l l a l w a y sb c v u l n e r a b lteo a t t a c k L . i k e l yo r p r e v i o u s l y
u s e da m b u s ha r e a sm a y r e q u i r e p i c k e t i n gT e c h n o l o g yc a n b e e x p l o i t e d
and picketslocatingon dorninating terrainwill be ableto act as triggers
for the dispatchof reservcsto eitherincrease protectionor disrr.rpt an
i n s u r g e not p c r a l i o n :

l-. both militaryand civilian;and


guardinginstallations,

g. c l e a r i n gp a t r o l so r s w e e p s( n o r m a l l ya r o u n df i x e d b a s e so r e s t a b l i s h e d
MSRs) in orderto defcatinsurgentsurveillance and identifypossible
i m p r o v e de x p l o s i v ed e v i c e s( l E D ) .

18. C o u n t c r - S u r v e i l l a n cM e e a s u r e s .l n s u r g c ngt r o u p sw i l l r e l y o n t h e i rn r e r n b e r s
l b r s u r v c i l l a n caen d i n f b r m a t i o no n t h e a c t i o n so f H N a n dc o a l i t i t r ns e c u r i t yf o r c e s '
: r c t i o n sc.a p a b i l i t i easn d w e a k n e s s e sM. u c h o f t h i ss u r v e i l l a n cwei l l o c c u ri n a f a i r l y
o p e n ,l o w - t e c h n o l o gfya s h i o nw i t h w a t c h e r b s l e n d i n gi n r v i t ht h e g e n e r apl u b l i c .
shaclow'ing p a t r o l s
or u , a l c h i n g
b a s ec a r n p s C, o u n l c r - t n e a s u rmeus s tb c e n r p l o y c d atall
l c v e l s . V i g i l a n c em u s t b e s t r c s s e ad n dp r a c t i s ecdo n s t a n t l yS. o l d i e r sc a nb e a s s u r etdh a t
i n r n t t s ct a s e st h e i rd e p a r - t u r ca sn d m o v e m e n tasr er e p o r t e d S . o m em e t h o d si n c l u d e
c h a l l e n g i n sg u s p i c i o ups e i s o n so r t h o s es h a d o w i n p g a t r o l sa, n d a v o i d i n gp a t r o l l i n g
p a t t er n s .a n d u s eo f c l e a r i n gp a t r o l s ,

C ' l r r p6 : 9 ' 3 1

Antnt?,1 4-o nnnn7o


DRAI'-T

Survetllance
by insurgentgangsbeganas soonas cdn troopsarrrvedin ljaiti in earl1,
2004' Observantsoldiersin OPsand clearingpatrolsquicfty identified
and eliminated
watchers.Patrolcommandersdetainedindividualswho werl shadowing
patrols,
removed(temporarily)their ce1lphonesand recordedthe namesand
nurnters in the
callingmemory and directory. This informationwas passedto USMC
regimentaland
Canadianintelligencestalfswho usedit to identily the insurgentorganrsation
and
command.

D E F E N S T V EC O M M A N D A N D C O N . T R O LW A L F A R E ( C 2 W )

i9' [ ) c f e n s i v cC 2 W i s u s e dt o d en y , n e g a t er,c d u c co r l u r n t o f i i c n d l ya d v a r r t a g e .
c l l e n l ye f l b r t st o d c s t r o yd' i s r u p te, x p l o i to u r c o m m a n da n dc o n t r o l
s y s t c m si.n c l L r i i n gi t s
s u p p o r t i ncgo m m u n i c a t i o ni sn,f o r m a t i o a n n d i n t e l l i g e n caec t i v i t i e si a. f c g u a r d i n gt h c
conttnandsystemsof the securityforcesand governmentis a lundamental
considlerati,n
a s f a i l u r et o d o s o i s l i k e l yt o r e s u l ti n l o s so f f r e c d o mo f a c t i o na n c il n i t i a t j v e .
rris-
d i r c c t i o no f e l ' f o r to, r e v e nm i s s i o nf a i l u r e .

r10 [ ) e l i : n s i vC
e 2 W w i l ] h a v et h e f b l l o w i n gg o a l s

protectthe vulnerabilityof commandsupportassets. procedurcs


and
i n s t a l l a t i o nt os a t t a c ks, u b v e r s i oonr i n f i l t r a t i o n ;

b. reducethe effectsof enemydeccptionactionsagainstour co.rrnand


systems,particularly thoseof the government which,in seekins
i n c x p e n s i v el o, w r i s ko p t i o n sm
, a y b e m o r es u s c e p t i b tl o
e clece"ptior;

n u l l i f yt h ee f f e c t so f e n e m yE W a c t i o n sa g a i n sftr i en d l y c o m m a ' d
syslems;

d e n yt h e e n e m )t/h e a b i l i t yt o e x p l o i tl i i c n d l yc o m m a n ds y s t e m s ;

e n s l r r teh a tt h e e n e i r y ' sP S Y o p s a r ei n e f f e c t i v em, a i n l yt h r o L r g h


del'ensive IO plans;and

b r i e f i n gt r o o p so n i n s u r g e nIto a i r n sa u dm e a n si,n o r d e rt h a tt h e ' a r e


awareof the possibleeff'cctson the populaceand in orderto inoculate
them from thc effcctsof hostilepropaganda.

S E C T I o N6 : o F F E N S I V Eo p E R A t ' I o N S- c A T N I N GT H E I N I ' I I A T I V E

'l l ( ) f f - c n s i 'oep e r a r i o n s s L l p p otfhr e' , i r i t a r v ' sk e yr o l ei n n e u t r a r i s itnhgei ' s r - r r g c . 1


'l'hey
c f t ' e c t i V c lt)a k et h eb a t t l et o t h e i n s L r r g c n i nt o r c i epr f e - e m p tc,l i s l o c a taen c d
l isr:,pr
h i r n o f f ' e r s i r ztea c t i c sr v i l l r , a r y b, L r*t ' i l l l i k e l ' i n c l L r c lreh ef o l l o r v r n s :

C h a p6 : 1 0 i 3 1
DRAFT

l a r f a r e( C 2 U / )o p e r a t i o n s ;
c o m m a u da n dc o n t r o w

p a t r ol l i n g ;

C q u i c kr e a c t i o nf o r c e s ;

arnbushes;

C raids;

L l a r g e rs c a l ed c l i b e r a t oe p e r a t i o n st o, d c s t r o yo, r a t l e a s td i s i o c a t a
en d
d i s rrrn t i n s r r r p o rnrln i t sa, r e a su n d l i n c so f c o m r n u n i c r t i o n .
u , u r e y ! )

C2W OPERATIONS

-+1. C2W is usedto dcny insurgentcommanderscffectivecornmandof'theirforces


t h r o u g hd e s t r u c t i o nd,i s r u p t i o ne, x p l o i t a t i o nd,e c e p t i o ni n, f l u e n c eo r d e n i a lo f a l l o r p a r t
o f t h e i rc o m r n a n ds y s t e mi,n c l u d i n gi t s s u p p o r t i n cg o m m u n i c a t i o nisn,f b n n a t i o n and
i r r t c l l i gnec c a c t i v i t i e sC. 2 W i s a p a r t i c u l a r l ey f f e c t i v ca, n do f t e nt h e m o s te c o n o r n i c a l ,
n r e a n so f ' r e d u c i n gt h e c o m b a te f f e c t i v e n e sosf i n s u r g e n t a s ,p p l i c a b l a
e t a l l l e v e l so 1 '
c o r n u r a n dT h c p r i n r a r yo b j e c t i v eos f C 2 W d i r e c t e da g a i n sitn s u r g e nct o m b a tp o t e n t i a l
a | eI ( ) :

slow his tempoin relationto that of'the sccurityforces;

d i s r u p th i s a c t i v i t i e s ;

t h e i n s u r g e nct o m m a n d e r 'as b i l i t yt o c o m m a n da n dc o n t r o l a
degrade ; nd

disrupthis ability to generatcand sustainoffensiveaction.

-13. -l'echnological
a d v a n c ew s i l l g r e a t l ye n h a n c e t h c a b i l i t yo f s e c u r i t yf b r c e st o
a i t e c tt l r e i n s u r g e n t s ' C 2 s y s t e m sC. a r e m u s t b e t a k e n ,h o w e v e rt,o r n i n i m i z en e g a t i v e
c o n s c q u e n c cf o s r t h c n o n - i n s u r g e n tAsl.s o , o n e m u s tb c a w a r eo f ' t h ee f f ' e cLt r p o n the
r r r t e l l i g e r - rbcact t l e w
, h e nt a r g e t i n g i n s r . r r g e n t s ' Cs 2y s t e n ' I[S' o. r e x a r n p l es,h u t t i n gd o w n a
c e l l L r l atre l e p h o n e g r i d i n o r d e rt o d c n y i t s u s eb y i n s u r g e n thsa sa s t r o n gn e g a t i v e iurpact
( ) nt h e c i v i l s o c i e t yi n a d d i t i o nt o p r c c l u d i n gE W e x p l o i t a t i oonf i n t e r c e p t e d
c t l r lr n u ni c a t i o n s .

PATIIOLLING

+4. ( l c n e r a l . f h e t y p e so f p a t r o la n d t h e i rp u r p o s ea r et h e s a m ef o r c o u n t e r -
insurgn e c v o p e r a t i o nas s f b r c o n v c n t i o n awi a r f a r c w, i t l i s o m em o d i f i c a t i o n sP,a t r o l sa r ea
r n i i i n s t a y ' oCf O I N o p c r a t i o n as r r dm u s tb e c o n d u c t e w d i t h a n o f f e n s i v es p i r i t ,t a k i n gi n t o
c o n s i d e r a t i ohr ro r . v e v etrh, a tt h e y w i l l b c o c c u r r i n go f i e na m o n g sct i v i l i a np o p u l a t i o n s .

C h a p6 : I t / 3 1

an,nta4,'l -.1I -nnnoR,l


DRAFT

\ l O s it r p c so l ' p a t r c lssh o L r ibdc a s s i g n csctla n d i nagn ds p e c i f i c


I R s t o s L r p p crritr co r . c r a l l
c ' t t t l l l a i ual l l c s- ip e c i f i c a l lpyl a n n e do p c r a t i o n sG. r r . , et n
h c o \ / e r tn a t L r roei ' m o s iC O I N
p a L r o i i i npea' t r o l a s r cm o r cv u l n c r a b ltcc a m b u s h i h a nt h o s ec o n d u c t eidr rc o n v e ntional
o D c r . r t i o n1s-.h et 1 , p eosf p a t r o l l i n g t h a tv i ' r l l o c c Lirnr c o l N a r e :

r e c o n n a l s s a npcaet r osl;

standinp
gatrols;

fiameworkpatrols;and

fightingpatrols.

4-i R e c o n n a i s s a n cPea t r o l s . A t t i r n e st h e r ew i l l b c a s p c c i f i cr e q u i r c m e l t
ibr rhe
c o n d u cot f a p a t r o lw h o s es o l ep u r p o s ci s r c c o n n a i s s a n A c es .i n c o n v e n t i o n aolp e r a t i o n s .
t h e yt n a vb e c o n d u c t eads p o i n t ,a r e ao r r o L l t cr e c o n n a i s s a n c e .
I n d o i n gs o ,t h e f o l l o w r ' g
slrould b ec o n s i d e r e d :

a. s m a l lr e c o n n a i s s a npcaet r o l s( w h i c harerelativelyweak)will
bc
vulncrable,parlicularlyif concluctecl o v e r t l yT. h e y c a nb e e a s i l ya t t a c k e d
or srvarme d by crowds;

b. covcrtpatrolshavea rcducecl threat profile,avoid e a r l y w a r n i n g t o


i n s u r g c n tosf t h c i rp r e s e n c ca,n dc l on o t r e v e atlh e i n l ' o r m a t i o n
being
soLrght;

r e c o n n a l s s a npcact r o l sw i t l - tre c h n i c arle q u i r e m e n(t es g ,r o u t e


r e c o n n a i s s a n cseh)o u l di n c l u d es p e c i a l i sst su c ha s e n g " i n c c r s ,
u,here
a p p i i c a b l eD
. epending u p o nt h e i n t e n d e m d i s s i o ni,t m a v i n c l u d c
n r e m b e rosf o t h e ra g e n c i e s ,u c ha sN G O s :

d the insertionof covertpatrolsand ops is very difficult in clense


Lrrban
a r e a s .I n g e n u i t ym u s tb e u s e dt o d r s g u i steh e i ri n s c r t i o nw, h i c h
ca, be
concealed amongstan ovefl operation;

a quick reactionforce(QI{F) niustbe prcparedto extract


or reirlbrcethe
patrol;

l t h ep a t r o lm a y a s s u m e a d d i t r o n ar le s p o n s i b i l i t iaesso p p o r t u n i t i cpsr e s e r t
t h c m s e l v e s ,u c ha s t h c c o n d u c ot f s n a pv e h i c l ec h c c I p o i n t s

17' S t a n d i n gP a t r o l s . T h e e s t a b l i s h n i eonft a n e t r v o rok 1 ' o v e rat n d c o , , , e r t


standnrg
l l a t r o )os c c u p y i n gk e y p o s i t i o n sp r o v i d e sa n i r n p o n a nrtn e a n os f a c c l u i l n gi n f o r m a t i o '
l r n df t t r n i s h i n ag s e c u r i t yf o r c ep r e s e n c el -.h i s r n t r - r rw
n i l l a s s i sitr r c i o m i n l t i n ga n a r . e a .
'f
h c t a s k sa l l o c a t e tdo s t a n d i n gp a t r o l sm a y i n c l u d e .

( . h a p 6 :l 2 i i l
DII.AFT

a o b t a i n i n gi n f o r i r a t r o no n i n s u l g ne t a c t i v r t ya n d n o t i n gp a l i ef n s .

b observir-ig brcakersand crorvcis:


the moverlentand activityo1-cr.rr1'ew

c r i n g - l e a d e rasn dl a w - b r e a k e r s ;
rdentiiying

d. u n i t so r h e l i c o p t e rtso i n c i d c n t s ;
d i r e c t i n gp a t r o l sp, o l i c c ,r e s e r y e

c. g i v i n gc o v e r i n gf i r e t o v e h i c l ea n dI b o tp a t r o l ss h o u l dt h e yc o m cu t t d c ra
l e v c lo f a t t a c kw h i c h n c c c s s i t a t tchse L t s eo f f i r e a r m s ;

f', e b l i e sa n d c r o w dc o u f i o t t t a t t o n s
a s s i s t i n ign t l i e d i s p e r s aol i L r n l a w f uai s s m
b y p a s s i n gi n f o r m a t i o nt o e l e m e n tosf t h es e c u r i t yf o r c e si n v o l v c di n
crorvdcontrol.and

g. e n g a g i n gs n i p c r sw h o o p e nf i r e i n t h e i rv i c i n i t y ,a n d d o m i n a t i n ga r c a st o
prevent.snipers from takingLrplire positions.

.18. Framework Patrols. Frameworkpatrolsprovidea forcepresencethat helpsto


createthe secureenvironmenl.It providesa mixtureof informationand protection.Thcy
operilteon a multiplesystemothat variesin accordance with the environment(urbanor
r u r a l ) .t h e t h r e a t t. h e i rt a s ka n d t h e i n v o l v e m e o
n tf o t h e rs e c u r i t yf o r c ee l e m e r r t s . ' l h c
patrolsntay work frornfirm basesand from temporarilyestablished patrolbasesThcy
rutaybe mountedor lnove on foot. Frameworkpatrollingshouldavoid creatinga pattern
of predictablehabits.In broadtcrmstheir tasksareto:

a. p r o v i d el o c a lp r o t e c t i o nf o r s e c u r i t yf o r c eb a s e sb y c o m p l i m e n t i nogt h e r
protectivemeasurcssuchas standingpatrols,OPs and sensors;

b. inhibit insurgents'freedornof movementby randomdeploymentat


clifferenttimes in dilferentareas.lhis supportstiredislocationo1'the
insurgent.;

c. i n c r e a s teh e c h a n c e so i ' i n t e l c e p t i nggu n t n a nb. o n r b e ros r w e a p o nr u n n e r s :

cl. c o n c i u cstn a pv e h i c l ec h e c kp o i n t so r " c o r d o na n d k n o c k "o p e r a t i o n s : .

'
I r ra r n u l r i p Lpea t r o ls y s t e mt,h e b a s i ct a c t i c ael l e m e n its t h e f o u r m a nb r i c k H e t i c ea r i l l e s e c t i o nr v r , ,
copsiso t f t w o b r i c k s .A m u l t i p l er v i l l n o r r n a l l yc o n s t sot f t h r e eb r i c k sa n dt h u sa p l a t o o nc a n J b r t rt r v o
n r u J t r p l eos n, e c o r n r n a n d ebdy t h e p i c o m d .t h e o t h e rb y t h e p l 2 l C . B r i c k sp a t r o li n s u p p o r ot f o n ea n o t h c r ,
, r a t I c a s tr a d i oc o n t a c ta, n da r et h u sa b l et o s u p p o r ot n e a n o t h e br u t f l e x i b l e
r r o r n r a l lryv i t l t i nv i s u a l o
e n o u g ht o o u t - r n a n o e u v ar en y i n s u r g e n tesn c o u n t e r e d
'
[ t a t r o l su i l l o f t e ne n c o u n t esru s p i c i o uas c t i v i t y n, o t i c ea n i r r e g u l aar c t i o no r t t o t i c es o t n e t h i r togu t o f i t s
t t r d i n a r yp l a c e ,o r s i m p l yr e c e i v ea t i p f r o m a l o c a l .T h e p a t r o l c o t n t n a n dnetru s tb e p r e p a r e tdo s t o pa n d
s c a r c hs u s p i c i o uvse h i c l e sA, d d i t i o n a l l yh, e n t u s tb e p r e p a r c tdo c o n d u cat i o w - l e v c l c o r d o na n ds e a r c h
\ \ , i t hr h ec o n t b a tp o r v e ra v a i l a b l eo, r r v i t l ra d d i t i o n ar le i r t f o r c e r t t e nhtesr,r a y s i r n p l ys e ta n i r r m e d i a t e

C h a p6 : l 3 / 3 l

L n t n t l . 4 4 - 4? - n n n n R ?
DIIAI,-T

b e r n p o s i t r otno r e a c t o a t h r e aot r d c v c i o p i n g . s r t L r ai nL ai opna r t i c L r l a r


e l h c rp a t r o l s ;
a r e ao r t o r e i n f o r c o

c e l c ra n r n s u r g c nalf i a c ko r s n i p i n go p c r a t i o n
b y s a t u r a t i nagn a r e aa n d
t h r e a t e n i nt g
h ee s c a p eroLlte o t ' a b o m b c ro r s n i p e ra; n d

g a t h e irn f o r m a t i o an n d i n t e l l i g e n ctch l o L r gthh e i s s u eo f s t a n d i n a


qn d
u n i q L rIcR s

During the deploymentto Haiti in2004, intelligencesourcesat the USMC regimental


level
indicatedthat a hardwarestorein the west end of Port auPrincewas a possibieweapons
cachcas the storewas ownddby a known gang leader.This was addedto u.o-puny
,u.g.,
list and frameworkpatrolsassignedto this arei wereifaskedto searchfor and identifv
this
store. Eventually,after about20 dayslater,a patrol locatedthe store. The patrol
commanderconductedhis combatestimateand after receivingauthorityto do so
from the
Coy CP, the patrol conducteda cordonand knock operation.Nothing was found and
two
locks had to be cut during the operation.It was explainedto the storemanagerthat
if the
owner wished,he could reportto the companylocationand his locks woulJbe replaced.
Threedays later,the owner and otherman arrivedat the camp seekingnew iocks,
The two
men were, and had been,posingas Haitian NationalPolice,(HNP)officersand were
listed
on the HNP most wantedlist, a copy of which was held in the companycp. They were
detainedand tumed over to FINIPauthorities.

'19. F i g h t i n g P a t r o l s ' T h e p u r p o s eo f f i g h t i n gp a t r o l si s t o d i s r u p rt h ei n s u r g e narl d


his airns. As in otherformsof warfaresuccess "n1.oru..,
-l'hc cannotbe obtainedb/ def'ensiv.
aione. aim is to bring troopsinto contactwith the insurgents on favourablctcrms.
'fhe
e s s e n t i apl r e - r e q u i s i ti se g o o d ,a c c u r a t ae n ds p e c r f ricn f o r m a t i o rne s a r d i n ct h e
p l a n n e do b j e c t i i ' cw, h i c h m a y b e o b t a i n e d f r o m a v a r i e t yo f s o u r c e isn c l u c l i n g " p o l iacned
n r i l i t a r yc o l l e c t i o nt,e c h n i c asi e n s o risn c l u d i n gi r n a g e r vI ,I U M I N T s o u r c e s .
r ec o n n a i s s a n cset,a n d i n ga n df r a m c r v o rpk a t r o l st,r a c k i n ga n d ,s o m e t i r nse. a l u c k y
c o l l t a c t .I n c l o s et e r r a i nw , h e r ei t i s s e l d o mp o s s i b l et o s e ti n a s t e a l t h ym a n n e a r cordor.r
s t t c c c s s i r " ral l yf i,g h t i n gp a t r o lh a sa b e t t e rc h a n c eo f s c o r i n ga s L l c c e s s . ' l 'phaet r o m
l aybe
a b l et o s c t a h a s t ya m b u s ho r r u s ha n i n s u r g e nbt a s e .U s c dj u d i c i o u s l yo f f e n s i v e
p a t r o l l i n gi t i s a n e x c e l l e nw t a y o f k e e p i n gs m a l lg r o u p so f e n e m yo n t h e m o v e .i n d u c r r g
a s c n s eo f i n s e c u r i t a y n d d i s l o c a t i nign s u r g e npt l a n s .

Therewere occasionsin Malayaduringthe British Army CON, when talkingand cooking


gave
awaycommunistterroristpositions and on the JebelAkhdarin the late 1950s,the smeilof bad
L insLugentsanitationprovideda timely ..varningof the enemy'sproximity for approachrng
natrols.
DI].AFT

QUICK REACTION FORCES

50. QLrickreactionforccs(QI{Fs)are formedat the tacticalIeveisin orderto: reactto


t h eu n e x p e c t c de;x p l o i to p p o r t u n i t i easn ds u c c c s sa,n d s u p p o r t / r e i n f o rtchcr e a t e n eacrie a s
a n dl i i e n d l yf b r c e s .

51. I n a d d i t i o nt o s u p p o r t i n rgn i l i t a r yf o r c e st,h e r er v i l l b e a r e q u i r e t l e ntto p r o v i d e


rapidsupportthrougha QRF to local securityforcesand institutions.Ilven in dense
r-rrban areas,civilian police stationsand otherofficesof local authorities can l'eelisolated
arrdlhrcatcned.In rural areas,policeoutpostsand borderstationsare vulnerable to attack
dLrcto their isolation.It is irnportantthat suchlocal forcesbe rnadeawarethe military
lirrccsarc willing to, and capableol',comingto their aid, rapidlyand eff'ectiveiY'.
Withoutthis confidence,they will be unwillingto undertakeoperationsand nrayflee
fiorn their posts,therebyallowinginsr:rgents to destabilise an areaand underminethe
g o v e r n m e ncto n t r o l .

52. L,ikewise,coalitionmilitary forces,operatingfrom smallplatoon-sized basesor


patrollingat the sectionand multiplelevel,will at certaintimesrequirereinforcement or
extraction.QRFs must be readyto respondto suchcallsfor support.QRFsmay alsobe
r u s e tdo e x p l o i tb r i e fo p p o r t u n i t i etso s t r i k ea t i n s u r g e n tosr t o s e c u r ei n t e l l i g e n cfei n d s .
.l-hus,
5i. Q R F sm u s tb e i d e n t i i l e da n dh e-l[dhi n r e a d i n e stso g o t o t h e a i d o f t h r e a t e n e d
e
c l c t a c h m c not sr t o e x p l o i tp o s s i b l es u c c e s s e s . p l a n n i n go f Q R F si n a C O I N o p c r a t i o n
s h o u i dc o n s i d e trh e f o l l o r v i n g :

the establishment of fixed comrnunications lrleans betwccnthe lbrccand


t h o s el o c a ls e c u r i t ye l e m e n l (ss u c ha s p o l i c ep o s t s )t h a ta r ew i t h i n t h c
u n i t ' sA O a n d f o r w h i c h i h e u n i t sa r er e s p o n s i b.l e

a l t e r n a t i v reo u t e sm u s tb e p r a c t i s e idn o r d e rt o r e d u c et h e r i s k o 1 ' a r n b i r s h


l'rominsurgcntswho havedelibcratelyplannedto attackthe relieving
forcc:

t h ea l l o c a t i o no f a r m o u r e dv e h i c l e s( L A V s , e t c )t o t h e Q R F w i l l i n c r e a s e
-l-here
r n o b i l i t ya n d 1 ' o r cpc r o t e c t i o r r . i s a p o s s i b i l i t tyh a tt h ey n t a l ' b r e
b l o c k e do n a u a p p r o a c h r o u t eo r a m b ushew d i t h a n t i - a r t r o uur / ea p o n s :

C i h a p 61 5 i 3 l

a n , ) i ) 2 , 4 , t _ 4E _ n n n n n q
DI{AFT

t h eu s eo f h c l l c o p r c rfsb r r a p i dm o \ , e n r e ni st o f t e nt h eb e s to p i i o nf b r r a r : j c l
i n s e f t i o .b u t a r e' u l r e r a b l et o a l l t 1 , p cosi f i r c a n c nl r a yn o t b e a b l et , l i a r i l
i n d e n s eu r b a ne n v i r o n m e n r s ,

{MBUSIIES AND RAIDS

't"i A m b r - r s h ae rsr dr a i d st a k el h c b a t t l ct o t h e i n s u r g c nat n dc a nh a v es i g n i rf c a n t


c i t - e c tisr rp r e - e r n p t i nagn dc l i s r u p t i ntgh e i n s u r g e n tl.t m u s tb e k e p ti n r n i n d
t h a ta l t h o L r c h
t t r i t t t . \ ' o 1 -pt hr ien c i p ) easn dt a c t i c so f a m b i i s h casn crJa i d sw i l l a p p l yi n
a COiN.reslrictive
I t O [ : r n a yp r e c l u d e t h e i n i t i a t i o no f d c a d l yf o r c ew i t h o L rstp e c i h c a u s ea n c tl h u st h e
l.sllrgentswor-rld haveto be given thc opporlunityto surrender.

'ii A n r b u s h casr eu s u a i l yd e l i b e r a tbeu t c j n i l sr n u s tb e d c v e l o p e tdo e n a b l e


a sectrolr
or patrolto tnoverapidlyand quietlyinto an ambushpositionwhen its
leadelements spor
Insurgent forces moving Ambushesmay bc conducted in areasunclergove1nlrent
c o n t r o ol r i n a r e a ss t i l l u n d e rt h ec o n t r o lo f i n s u r g e n t sR. a i d sw i l l b c c o n d u c t c c l
againsr
itlsurgent campsor strongpointsin areasnot yet underthe controlof govcrnm.ni?o,...,

i6. I - . n c o u n t earrseu s u a l l yb r i e fa n c a
l t c l o s er a n g eU
. n d c rt h em o s tf a v o u r a b l e
c i r c u l n s t a t l c ewsh. e r et h ee n t i r ci n s u r g e nfto r c ei s c a u g h et x p o s e dr n t h e o p e p ,i t n r a yb c
l l r l s s i b ltco c a l l o n t h e mt o s u r r c n d c ri n, w h i c hc a s ep r i s o n e rm s a y p r o v i d ev a l u a b l c
'l'his
itllortnatiotr. m a y b c t h ec a s ei f a n i n s u r g e npto s i t i o ni s i s o l a t e d
a n c cj a nb e
cornpJetely surrounded.

)7' A t n b u s h c as n dr a i d sm a y b c c o n d u c t ew
c li t h a n y c o m b i n a t i oonf t h e f o l l o r v i n L ,
airns:

t h ed e s t r u c t i oonf a n i n s u r g e nfto r c e ;

the captureor killing of a wantccjinsurgent;

the capturcor destructionof weaponsand ccluiprncnt;

g a i n i n go f i n t c l l i g n
ece;

detcrringthe insLrrgent
1'romLrsing
an area;and

prevcntingthc insurgentsliom approachi'giiicncil.v


positrons.

LARCE SCALE OPERATIONS

iS l t l c a s e su ' h e r ea n i n s u r g e n c yc o n t r o l sl a r g e a r e a so f ' t h c c o u n t r y s i c l e
t6e rebcis
I l t a r "r a i s ca n d d e p i o y a s i z e a b i ef b r c c . S L r c ha s i t u a t i o ni s n r o s tl i k c l y
t o o c c u r w h c r . et h c v
h r L v ea c c e s st o a f l i e r r d i l . , n e t g h b o L r r icnogu n t r y w h i c h t h e y u s e a s a
havcnto assenrble.
t r a i r ra n c le q u i n .

C h a o6 : 1 6 / iI
DRAF-T

-i9 d n dd e s t r o y eidn b a t t i cr v h i l ct h c t ' a r c


l d c a l l r s. u c hl b r c e ss h o u l db e e n g a g e a
r c l a t i v ey''ls r l a lI a n dbeforethey posea majorthreat.'l-his rnaynot be feasiblefor a
r r r , r n rrboeJ ' r ea s o r - r s .

t h e t h r e a ti s l i k e l yt o d e v el o p i n a r e m o t ea r e aw h i l et h eh o s ts o v e r n m e n t
f b c L r s cosn s e c u r i n gv i t a la r e a sc l o s et o t h ec a p i t a lt,h em a i nt o w n sa n d
t h e i rs u r r o u n d i nuge l l - p o p u l a t ea dn dc c o l t o m i c a liiryr t p , r r t t rnttL r aal r c t s :

t h c h o s tn a t i o nm a y h a v en e i t h e trh e l r o o p sa v a i l a b l e n o r t h c m c a n so f
i n t o a r e m o t ea n d p o s s i b i y
p r o j e c t i n gf o r c eo v e ra c o n s i d e r a bdl ei s t a n c e
r u i o u n t a i n o uj usn, g l er c g i o n ;a n d

t h e r em a y a l s ob e a r i s kt h a to p e r a r t i o o
nns t h e b o r d e ro f a s t r o t l g e rh. o s t r l e
r a y p r o v o k ca n u n w a n t c di n t e r v c n t i oonn t h e p r e t e r tt h : r t h e
n e i g h b o um
r-reighbouringcountry'sbordershavebcenviolatedor its security
thrcatened.
-l-irere
60. of a large-scale
lbr the success
are a numberof pre-requisites operation:

a. s d k c y l e a d e r si s
G o o d I n t e l l i g e n c e .T h e l o c a t i o n os f u n i t s ,h e a d q u a r t ear n
a s i m p o r t a n at s t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e e n e m y ' sp o s i t i o n a
s n ds e c u r i t y
scrccn. Equallyirnportantis good intel[genceon the insurgent's
l n d I o g i s t i co r g a n i z a t i o n ;
s u p p o n i n gp o l i t i c a a

lsolation. The areachosenfor the operationmustbe isolatedas much as


possibleto prevcntinsurgentreinforcementor exfiltration.If the escapeol'
small partiescannotbe stopped,the enemy should not be ableto evacuate
lbrmed units.Enemyescapcroutcsshouid, as far as possible,be blocked;
and

S u r p r i s ea n d D c c e p t i o n .O b t a i n i n gs u r p r i s e p r es e n t st h eg r e a t c s t
p r o b l e m .P r e p a r a t i o rar n s d p r c l i m i n a r yt n o v e st h a tc a n n o b t e h i d d c nr n L r s t
b e d i s g u i s e dP. a t r o l l i n gt o o b t a i ni n f o r t n a t i osnh o u l db e c a r r i e do u t i t r a s
m a n ya r e a sa s p o s s i b l er,. r , i tnho o b v i o u se t u p h a s iosn t h c s c l c c t e da r e a .
R u m o u r so f p o s s i b l eo p c r a t i o npsl a n n e dt o t a k ep l a c ee l s e w i - r em r ea y b e
f-edinto the insurgentintelligenceorganization throughchannelswhich the
insurgentsare known to trust.Ireintsmay be launchedin sucha lnanncras
n o t t o a r o u s es u s p i c i o nass t o t h e l o c a t i o no f t h er e a lo p e r a t i o t it t, s a i t r s
a n di t s o b j e c t i v c s .

(r5, T h c e x c c u t i o no f s u c ha n o p c r a l i o nr e q u i r e sr a p i dd e p l o y r n e nt ot e n c i r c l ct h c u r a i r r
en e n l vf b r c c s . l n s u r g e nfto r c es s h o u l dn o tj u s t b e s u r r o u n d ebdy a c o r d o n w , h i c hi s
l i k e l v t o p r o \ r ep o r o L risn l h c b e s tc i r c u r n s t a n c ebsu,t l o c a t e d
and p i n n e ddown. Once
d d b r o k c nu p . t h c i n s u r g e n ttsn u s tb e p u r s u c dr e l c n t ) e s s l y ,
s u r r o u n c l c d r. s o r g a n i z - ac n

( ' h a p6 . 1 1 1 3 1

1-17-000087
A.O20231
DIlAF'f

(t6. S r : c c e sms u s tb e f b l l o r i , e b
d y ,r o o t i n qo L ttth er n s u r g e n t s ' p o L i tai cnadll o g r s t i c
s L r p n oor tr g a n r z . a t taonndr e p l a c i n igt r v i t ht h eh o s tg o v c r n m e n t 'asd n r i n i s t r a t i o'nl -.h e
p e o p l ei n t h ea r e am u s tb e p r o t e c t e fdr o n rf u t u r ec o v c r tr e b e li n f i j t r a t i o n
b y i t sp o l i t i c a l
c c l l so r b y i n s u r g e nr rt a i nf o r c e s

SECTION7; STABILITY OpEITATIONS

GENT'I{AL

68. S t a b i l i t yo p e r a t i o nasr ea k e y e l e m e not f t h e C o n t i n r l u m


o f O p e r a t i o ncso p s t r l r c t .
arldttlgethcrwith ol'f-ensive and defensivcopcrations, arc pert of thaiebb and fle,.r.,
bctr'r'cen differenttypesof tacticaltasksthatconstitute the campaign.6TSeyrnaybe
d e f l r rde a s f b i l o w s :

iln opera/ion /hat imposes',s'ecurity und c'on/rol over un ctrcrrv,hile empl6ying


nrilirury capahilitie,sro resrore .servica.s
ctnd.supporl civilictn ugcrcies,,:,or

()7-taru/ionsin u'hich 'security.forces(combining


military, pcrramiliturl.,, un4pglicc
/tttt'c.11carry oul operalion.sfbr lhe re.storationand maintenance of'ordar unl
.stubi/itv.o

6L). Stabilitytasksoften includerequirements fbr reconstruction and humanitarian aid.


a t t da r c n o t u n i q u et o C O I N c a m p a i g n sI.d e a l l ym , i l i t a r yr e s o u r c easn dc a p a b i l i t i easr e
l i r r n o t r c c l r - r i rfcodr t h c s er e s p o n s i b i l i t i ebsu,t t h e ym a y h a v et o b e s o L r s c dW . i t Sr e s p c c t
I o t h es p e c i f i ce m p l o y m e not f m i l i t a r yf o r c e sd u r i n ga C O i N . T h e f o l l o w i n g
stabiliiy
t a s k sa r ek e y t o t h ec o n d u c o t f COIN:

a c o n t r o lo f m o v e m e n t ;

c r o w dc o n t r o o
l p c r a t i o n sa;n d

s e a r c ho p e r a t i o n s .

C O : \ ' T R O t ,O F M O V E M E N T

71. l L e q u i r e m e nfto r t h e C o n t r o l o f M o v c m c n t . C o n t r o io l m o v e m e nrt- sa v i t a l


a s p e cot i C O I N o p e r a t i o n sA.l t h o u g hi t c a nb e h i g h l yd i s r u p t i v ea n dp a n p o w e r
intensivc.
I t l s l l e c e s s a rt yo d i s l o c a t ea n dd i s r u p it n s u r g c nat c t i v i t i e a
s n dr e - a s s u rteh ep L r b l i c
\ I o l ' c m e n tc o n l r o lm e a s L l r ec sa nb e h i g h l yi n c o n v e n i e nt ot t h e g e n e r apl L r b l i c
ald a pornt
o f c o n t e r l t i o nT.h e r e f b r et .h e n c c df o r t h e n rm u s tb e c l e a ra n d r v el l a d v e r t i s e(di n r c r m s
o1
p u r p ( ) s ev ,i c e l o c a t i o na n d t i m e )t h r o u g ht h eI O p l a n l d e a l i y ,t h e ya r cc o n c l u c t e d
in
c o r r - j t i n c t irovni t ht h e l o c a lp o l i c e .

S e eC h a p r e ri
r \ B ( ' A P r c c. c t ' l - c a r -A- rC, T C a p a b i l i t yC r - o u pd, r a i tr i ei n i r i o . , J u l y2 O O 5
I ) r o p o s eCd a n a i t i adnr a f td e f l n i t j o nJ. u n e2 0 0 5

( h a p 6 : I 8 , - 11
DRAFT

1). P r i n c i p l cN I c t h o d s .B e f o r et h e ya r ei r n p o s e cnl t e a s l r r emsu s tb e d i s c L r s s e d


b e t r i , c ctnh c c i v i l a u t h o r i t r e st h, e p o i i c ea n dt h e m i i i t a r yt o m a k es u r et h e e n f o r c e m e ni sl a
p l a c t i c apl r o p o s i t i o an n d t h a tt h e n c c e s s a r l , p o l i ac n to pullhenr
e ds o i d i e r sa r ea v a i l a b l e
-l-he
i n t o ef f ' e c t . p r i n c i p l em e t h o d so f m o v e m e nct o n t r o i a r e :

a r o a db l o c k s ;

b. c h e c kp o i n t s( b o t hs n a pa n dd e i i b e r a t e ) ;

c tral'ficcontrolpoints;and

d. curfews.

73. t a y h a v ea n y o f t h e f b l l o r v i n ga i r n s :
A i m s . C o n t r o l l i n gm o v e u r e nm

a. perrnitsecurityforcesto cnforcethc law, thusincreasingpublic


confidencein the government's ability to protectthem;

b disruptinsurgentgroupsandplansby rnakingmovelrrentdifficult and


insurgentcellsand groups;
precludingco-ordinationbetrveen

c. dominatean areato preventcrowdsfiorn gatheringand to deterlrostile


actron;

ci. controlthe movementof crowdsthat do [orm and preventtheirreinforce-


ment;

c. i n t c r c e pat n d d i s c o u r a gteh e i l l e g a ln l o v e t n e not f a r m s ,e x p l o s i v e s .


m e d i c a sl u p p l i e sa n d f o o d ;

f' sealoff an areato preventthe introductionof weapons,cxplosivcsand


a a t er l a l ;
s u b v e r s i vper o p a g a n dm

g. t a n t e dp e r s o n s ;
a r r e sw

h r e c o r dm o v e m e r ltto d e t e c pt a t t e r n as n d o b t a i ni n f o r m a t i o na; n d

t n do p e r a t i o nosf t h e s e c u r i t yf o r c e sI.r o re x a t n p l e .
f a c i l i t a t et h e m o v e m e n a
p a r to f ' a n o u t e rc o r d o no f a d e l i b e r a toep e r l t i o nm a y i n c l L r dac t c m p o r a r y
road-block.

i1. \ ' e h i c l cC h c c k P o i n t s( V C P s ) , I n r . h ec o n c l u cotf V C P s i n a C O I N o p e r a t i o nt h. c


l i r l l o v v i npco i n t ss h o u i db e c o n s i d e r e c i :

C h a p 6 :l 9 / l l

Anonta,t,l io nnnnQo
.:

I)RAFT

m o d e r nc o m nL. ]L l tai ct io u d e vi c es , p a r t i c ualr l c c l uj a r r : c l c p h o n er vs i.


l, l l a l cr t
i n s u r g e n tsse e k i n gt o a v o i dt h c V C p t o i t s p r c s e n cw e i t l i i nm i n u t e so i . i t s
e s t a b l i s h m e nTt h u st l - r e u s eo f s n a pv c p s a t t h es e c t i o nl e v e lp u t i n
l o c a t i o nf o r v er ; ' s h o r tp e r i o d sa n dt h es i m p l cs t o p p i n go f s u s p i c i o u s
v e h i c l e as n d i r r d i v i d L r awl sr l l d o m o r ct o p r e - e m pat n i ld i s r u p i i n s u r g e n r s
t h a nl o n g - t e r m V C P s ,a n d

V C P sp r o v i d cm c m b e r so f t h c p u b l i ct h c o p p o r t u n i ttyo p a s s
inlormatio'
t o l h e s c c u r r t vl o r c e sr v i t h o u rt a i s i n gt h es L r s p i c i oonf i n s u r g e n t s
1-roops
c o n d u c t i nV g C P sr n i - r sbte p r e p a r etdo r c c e i v es u c hi n f b r m a t i o n
or to
p r o v r d et h e i n f o r n a n tr v i t ha c o n l a c t .

75' P l : r n n i n gt h e C o n t r o l o f M o v e m e n t . L a r g cs c a l eo r c o n t l n L l o L l s
trovclrent
c o n t l ' oli- n e a s u r wc si l l r e q u i r em u c hc o n s i d e r a t i opnl,a n n i n ga n dc o - o r d i n a t r o n .
l-ikely
p u b l i cr c a c t i o nm u s tb e t a k e ni n t oa c c o u ndt u n n gt h ep l a n n i n g
stage . A g l t a t o r sr v i l l b c
quick to erploit any adversereactionand the necdfor any una'voidable
irksonre
|cslrictionsshouldbe anticipated anclexplainedto weakenhostilepropaganda. 1l-
conccived m € a s u r etsh a tl c a dt o t h ec o l l a p s e o 1 ' p u b l i sc c r v i c e m
s u s tb e a v o i d e dJ. ' h e
c t l m t n i t t esey s t c me x i s t st o d i s c u s tsh e s ep l a n sa n c tJh c i rl i k e l yc o n s c q u e n c e s .
A srund
l- lflhaent n L t sbt e b a s e do n g o o di n t e l l i g e n c e w,h i c h i n v o i v e sc l o s el , a ' s o nw r t h t h ep o l i c e .
c o n c e p ltx u s tb e s u p p o r t ebdy a s p e c i f - rI cO p l a n .

CROWD CONTROL OPERATIONS

76' (lrowdsand violentdernonstrations areoftena featureoIinsurgencies arc]are


c'asilyexploitedby insurgents for thcir own cnds.Crowdsanciresr.rlting riotsundermine
t h er l v e r i t lsl e c u r i t ys i l u a t i o nr.v e a k e tnh e g o v e r n m c n t 'cso n t r o l
a n dd e s t r o yc i v r l
i nliastruct r.rre.

7 7' I n s p i t co f m c a s u rset o p r c v e n it t , c r o w d su i a vr a l l ya r o u n da p a r t i c u l a r
r s s u ea n o
a'ssemble, usuallyin urbanareas,in fiont of governnrent offices,securrtyforcccarnpsor
i n p L r b l i sc p a c e sT. h e c i v i l p o l i c em a y b c u n a b l et o c o p ew i t h t h e
s i t u a t i o na n dm i l i t a r y
a s s i s t a n cl n c a ) /b e r e q u i r e dT. h e s i z eo f a c r o r . v ids n o i n d i c a t i o n
o i ' i t s a t t i t u c l eA. i a r g c
t r t . tcco n t a t n i n m Q a n ; ' c r - t r l oo un s l o o k e rm
s a y b c c l o c i l cL, r n t ial g i t a t o rbs e g i nt o i n f l L r e n c c
r t A s m a i l c r o u ' dr r a y b e p e a c e f uol r i t r n a yb e a c o r r c e n t r a t i o ] r
o f t h o s ew i t h c x t r e r n e
V i c $ ' s . ' l ' hIcr i l i t a r yc o m m a n d eor n t h e s p o tm u s tu s ch i s o w nj u c l g m e n t
a s t o h o r . tvo d e a l
r ri t l rl r r ) p l r r l i c u l lsr i t r u t i o n .

78 ( l r o w dc o n t r oo l p e r a t i o n(sC C O ) r e q u i r es p e c r at lr a i n i n gi n s p c c i f i cl . ' l l ) s
'l-hese and
c(lulpmsnt. s h o u l dn o t b e a c q r : i r eodn - t h e - j o a b n cml u s tb e i n c l y d e di n a l l p r e -
d c p l o y m c r lt tr a i n i n g I. n t h e a t r er.e g u l a rt r a i n i n gs c h e d u l essh o L r l d
i n c l u d ec c o r e f i e s h e r .
l - i k e w i s eC . C o s p e c i f i ce q u i p m e nm t L r sbt e p o s i t i o n e fdo r w a r dw i t h t a c t i c asl L r b - u n i r s ,
l i r r v i o l c n lc r o r v d sc a ng a t h c ru , i t hl i t t l en o l i c e .F L r r t h e r n t orrveh, e n
t h e r ci s a t h r e a ot t .
er o l v dc o n f l - o n t a t i otnh,em c r ea p p e a r a n coef p r o p e r l l ' p r e p a l et fdo o p s
c a n6 e l pd i s s L r a d e
t h ec r o r ^ , .f cl ' 1o u rt u r n i n ev r c l c n i .

( h a p6 : 2 0 / 3 1
, i : r : _ : i

DRAFT

SIiARCtI OPERATIONS

79. G c n c r a l , A s s e c u r i t yf b r c e si m p o s ec o n t r o lo v e ru r b a na n dr u r a la r e a ss, e a r c h
r ) p c r a t i o nbse c o m ea m a i n s t a yo f t h e s e c u r i t ye n v i r o n m e n tA l t h o u g ht h e yh a v c1 ob e
c o n d u c e dw i t h d u ec o n s i d e r a t i otnh,e yc a nr e a pr e w a r d si n t e r m so f f i r s t ,s e c o n da n dt h i r c i
o r d e re f f e c t s .
'l-hc
3(). Purposc. p u r p o s co f s e a r c ho p c r a t i o niss t o r s o l a t e a selcctcd a r e ab 1 ,
d c p l o y i n ga c o r d o n e , i t h e rb y s t e a l t ho r a t s u c hs p e e dt h a tt h e i n t e n d e dq u a r r )hi a st i o
'fhc
c h a n c et o e s c z r p ca ,n dt h e ns e a r c h i nigt t h o r o u g h l y . t a r g e ta r e am a y b e a s i n g l eh o u s c
r ) l ' a nc r . t t i rcei t y b l o c k .O b v i o u s l yt,h e m o r ep r c c i s e
t h e t a r g e ta r e ac a nb e ,t h e b e t t e r .

8l . A i r n s . S e a r c ho p e r a t i o nasr cc o n d u c l c dw h e n e v epr o s s i b l ew i t h p o l i c e
i n o r d e rt o :
a u t h o r i t i e s[.' h ey m a y b e c o n d u c t c d

a. captllrer.r,anted devices,propaganda
persons,wcapons,communication
materialsand means.explosivesor documents;

b. disruptinsurgentactivities;

c. elirninateinsurgentactivityin a specificlocality,particularlywith a vieiv


to expandinga controlledarea;

d. gain evidenceto suppoftprosecutionsor to provelinks with expatriate


comtnuniticsand fraudulentfund raisingschemes,and

e. gain informationto supporlfuturcoperations.

87. s i t h t h e l o c a lp o l i c ea n do t h e rf o r c e sO
i n c o n d u c t i n gs u c ho p e r a t i o nw , P S E Ci s
cssential. It rs not uncontrnon for local security forces to be infiltrated by insurgents or to
c o n t a i n i n f b r m a n t s w h o p a s s t h e i n s u r g e n t s i n f o r mIaf tthi oi sni.s a c o n c e r n f o r m i l i t a r y
cornmanders, methodsshouldbe usedto conccalthc natureand areaof the operrtion
L r n t itl h e l a s tm i n u t e,
'l'he
8U e s t a b l i s i r m eonft' t h ec o r d o na r r dt h e s e a r c ha r ct w o s e p a r a taec t i v i t i c sb u t a r c
rnountedas onc operation.Becauscthe searchpartof the operationis r,rsually a lcngthy
tflair r h a td r s r u p t t
s h e i r f e o f a l o c a l i t y c
, o r d o n sa n d s e a r c h css h o u l do n l y b e n tounted otr
r eL i a b l ei n f o r m a t i o nA, s e r i e so f f r u i t l e s so p e r a t i o nm s erely a l i e n a t etsh e p o p u l a t i o f
n r o r.t-r
t l r c g o v e r n m e nat n dp r o v i d e st h e i n s u r g e r w r t i t h u n n e c e s s apr yr o p a g a n d a .

8(). C l o r d o na n ds e a r c ho p e r a t i o nas r en o t e a s yt o e x e c u t ed, u e i n g o o dp a r tt o t i r e


d i f ' l i c u l t yo f c l o s i n gt h e c o r d o ns o q u i c k l l t h a tl h e i n s u r g c n thsa v en o c h a n c et o e s c a p el ,t
is easier1o positiona cordonin oper-r colurtryrvith a goodroad networkanclr.liththe help
o 1 ' h e l i c o p t c r Isn. c l o s et e r r a i n( j L r n g i cu.r b a n )r t i s v i r t u a l l yi m p o s s i b lteo p o s i t i o na n d

A0202311-21-000091
I)ItAI.-T

I t r r kL t Da c c r r i o t rb c c a u s ct . t ' r o v e r r e inst r e s t i i c t e db. u r l d i n g sa r e c o n n e c t e Cr.v a t c h c r sL r a v


s c c t l l c f o r c c sc o m i n g a n d a l e i l i h e t a r g e ta r e a .a n d o b s e r v a t i e rnnr a y b e r c s t r j c t e di o a f ' c r i
inetres,

90. DLrrinC g O i N , c o r d o na n ds e a r c ho p e r a t i o nrs, v i lol f t c nb e c o n d u c t ebda s e do n


IIt,JN'4lNT sources. Informationfrom infbrmantsnrLlstbe treatedr.r,ith caution lt is alrvai,s
p o s s i b l teh a ta n i n f o r m a nm t a y s i m p l yr . v i s tho " s e tu p " a l o c a lr i v a l o r m a y w r s hl o l e a c i
t h cs c c u l i l vf b r c c si n t o a n a m b L r s h .

S E C T I 0 N 8 : M E A S U R I I SO F S U C C B S S

93. W i t h i nt h eC o n t i n u u mo i ' O p e r a t i o nos v, e r a l sl u c c e siss g e n e r a l l m y e a s u r ebdy


p r o g f c s as l o n gt h es p e c t r u m o f c o n f l i c t o w a r d st h ee n do f l e s sv i o l e n c eW . h i l s tt h i sh o l c l s
truc lbr COIN' thcrccan be much finerindications of success as operations areconcluctcd
o v c ra p e r i o do f ' t i r n eE . v e nt h o u g ht h c m e a s u r e m eonft o v e r a l sl u c c e siss o f i r r t c r e st ot a l l
l c v c l s s, t r a t c g i tco t a c t i c a lm
, a n yo f t h ei n c l i c a t i o nwsi l l b e r n e a s u r eadt t h et a c t i c allc v e l .

()4. At the starlof an operationthe start-state of the securitysituationshoLrlcl


bc notcd.
a n d r d e a t l yr.e c o r d e sdt a t i s t i c a l l yIndicators
. to be examinedin a spccif.ic arearriay
r n eI u d ct h c f o l l o w i r r g

n u n r b eor f m u r d er s o r k i l l i n g s ,

n u m b e ro f i n s r - r r g eant t a c k o
s n g o v e r n m c nbtu i l d i n g sp, e r s o n as . d
s e c u r i t yf o r c e s ;

c. n u m b e ro f - v i o l e nitn c i d e n tas n dg e n e r aLl e v e los f c r r m e .

n u m b e ra n d i n t e n s i t yo f ' p u b l i cd c n t o n s t r a t i o n s ;

s t a t ea n c p
l r o v i s i o n os f - c i v i ls e r v i c essu c ha s s a n i t a r yc o l l e c t i o n
scrvices.
schoolsopen,governmentofficesopen;

p o l i c cs t a l i o rm
r a n n i n ga n de q u r p p i n ag n dt h e p r o f i l eo f ' p o l i c ep l e s e n c ien
publrc;

g c o m m e r c i aal c t i v i t i c sp. a r t i c u l a r lsym a l ls h o p sa n do p e nm a r k et s :a n d

h. p u b l i ca c t i v i t i e isn u r b a na r e a sp. a f t i c u l a r layt n i g h t .

9-i. A s t h c r r i s s i o np r o g r e s s eisu,r p r o v e n r c r irnt st h ea b o v ei n d i c a t o rrsv i l l i n d i c a r tch c


r l T e a s t tor fes t t c c e s sC. I M I C t e a m sa n dp a t r o i sc a nb e a l l o c a t e sdp c c i f i cI R s t h a tl r e a s L l r e
s L r c ihn d i c a t o r s .

C h a p6 2 2 , / 31

40202311-22-OOOOq2
I)RAFT

96. S u c c c s st ,h a ti s , i m p r o v e m e n ti u u ' i i l n o t o c c u rc v c n l ) o \ / c ra
s t h ec i v r l s i t u a t i o n
r . e g i o nl n. r p r o v e m e n trsn a yo c c u ri n o n ea r e a v, v h i l ea n a r e ai n r v h i c ht h e i n s r - r r g e nhtasv e
r l o r c i n l l u e n c ea n dp o w e rw i l l b e s l o w e rt o i m p r o v e .L i k e w r s ei ,m p r o v e u r e n lt ns a yc o l n e
r n o r er a p i d l yi n t h e d a y ' t i m eb.u t t h e s i t u a t i o n
w i l l b e w o r s ea t n i g h t S u c hi n d i c a t o l sw r l l
alloivthe securityforcesto focustheil resource s nroreeff'ectively

S E C T I O N9 : C O N D I T I O N I N G T H E T A C I . I C A L L E V E L F O R C O U N T E R -
I N S L I R G E N C YO P E R A T I O N S

9J. ( l o m m a n d e ras n d s o l d i e r sa i i k em u s lb e m a d et o a p p r e c i a t eh ed i f f c r c n c e s
b c t r v c eC n O I N a n dc o n v e n t i o n aolp e r a t i o n s . ' f h m i s u s tb e g i ni n t h et r a i n i n gf o r
t l e p l r , y m ca nnt d c o n t i n u teh r o u g l r o u t ht eo p c r r t i o nl.t i s v e r ym u c ha n i n t e l l c c t u l l
c h a l l e n g teh a tm u s ta c c o m p a n tyh et r a i n i n gi n T T P s s p e c i f i ct o C O I N . ' P o i n t st h a tm u s t
b c c o n s i d e r eidn e d u c a t i n isu n i o rl e a d e r a s n ds o l d i e r si n C O I N w i i l i n c l u d et h e
lbllou,ins:

c u l t u r a tl r a i n i n gt h a tw i l l i n f b r r na t t i t u d etso w a r d st h ec i v i l i a np o p L r l a t i o n .
Soldiersrnustbe madeto appreciate the fear,stressand frustralionthatthe
civilian populacewill feel in tirnesof an insurgency, Furthermorc,they
must appreciate the affectthattheir tacticaloperations will havc on the
l o c a lp o p u l a t i o n s ;

junior leadersand soldiersmust be madcto realisethe key imporlanccthat


they have in the informationgatheringand intelligencc process.Every
s o l d i e rm u s tb e m a d et o r e a l i s et h a th e h i m s e l fi s a s c n s o a
r s s e t .P a t r o l
cornmanders must conductdetailedpatroldcbriefswith thcir troopsand
providedetailedpatrolreportsto the intelligence and operationsstaff.
Additionally,soldiersrequireregularfeedbackregardingthe value and
usefulness of the informationthey provide;

c o m m a n d e rasn ds o l d i e r sr n u s th a v em e a s u r eedx p e c t a t i o nr e s g a r d i n gt h e
q u a l i t ya n d c a l i b r eo f t h e I o c a ls e c u r i t yf o r c e sI.n r n a n yf a i l e do r f a i i i n g
s t a t e st,h e l o c a lp o l i c ea n dr n r L i t a rwy i l i n o t b e o f a s t a n d a r cd o m r r o nt o
m a n ys o l d i e r sT. h ey m u s tr e a l i s et h a tt h e s ea s s e t sd,e s p i t es o m e
shortconrings, have greatknowledgeof the local issues,threatsand
i n s u r g e n t sm' e t h o d sF. u r t h c r m o r es,o l d i e r sa n dj u n i o r l e a d e r sr n u s tb e
m a d et o r e a l i s et h a tp a r l o f t h e i rm i s s i o ni s t o e d r " r c aat ne d i m p r o v el o c a l
t o r c e sw n er e n e c e s s a r y ;

l L r n i olre a d e r sa n d s o l d i e r sm u s tb e m a d ct o r e a l i s et h a ts u c c e s isn
u f r c r a t i o ncso m e sa f t e ra l o n gt i n r ea n dc a n n o b t e m e a s u r e bd ; , o f f e u s i v c
a c t i o na n d t h e n u m b e ro f i n s u r g e n tm s a d et o d e p a r t h e t e m p o r apl l a n e .
T h e y m u s tu n d e r s t a ntdh a ts u c c e scso m e st h r o u g ht h e g a i n i n ga n C
r n a i n t a i n i nogf t h e p u b i i cr . r , i lo1v e rt h c l o r r gt e r m ;a n d

S t e C r r a l t e rl 0 f b r g u i d a n coen C O I N t r a r n i n g

( h a p6 : 2 3 , ' 3 1

Ln)nt2.4 4 _?1_nnnna?
DR4.FT

a l l l a n k sm u s tr e a l i s teh eo p e r a t r o naanl c sl t r a t e g i m c p L i c a t i otnhsa r


r n d i v i d u aal c t i o n sa t t h et a c t i c alle v c ic a nh a v ea c r o s st h ec n t i ; co p c r a t i o r r
A n o v e r - r e a c t i ot on a t h r c a o t r f a i i u r et o r e a c t o a s r n a l cl i v r l i a n
e m e r gnec y c a nc r r t r c a l l uv n d e r m i n teh eo p e r a t i o a n n dt h ee s t em o f t h e
s e c u r i t y1 ' o r c er sn t h er n i n d so f t h e p u b l i c .n a t r o n a l layn c il n t e r n a r i o r a l l y

SECTIONl0: CULI'URAL AwAItENtiSS

98 G c n e r a l . R e c e n et x p e r i e n chea sc o n f l r n r e tdh a ta n u n d e r s t a n d i n g
o { ' t h ei I N , s
c u l t u r ei s c r i t i c a tl o m i s s i o ns u c c e s sC.u l t u r aA
l w a r e n e s(sC A ) c a nr e c l u cbea t t l e f i e l c l
l i i c t i o na n dt h ef o g o f w a r d u r i n gC O I N ,a n dt h u si m p r o v et h ea b i l i t y t o
a c c o m p l r sthh e
niission.CA givesinsightinto the intentof insurgenis and othergroupsin thc battle-
while reducingculturalfrictionwith the HN peoples.Additionally
f Page', CA assistsin
b u i l d i n gr a p p o r w t h i i e p r e v e n t i nm
g i s u n d e r s t a n d i nt hg as tu n d c r m l n sc u p p o r ft b r t h e
sccurityfbrces.

99 D e f i n i t i o n s .C u l t u r ei s a b r o a da n de n c o m p a s s r n
t egr m , T h e f o l l o w i n g
i0
d c f l n i t i o n ds e f i n et h e k e y a s p e c tosf c u l t u r e

'ferrain.
cultural c u l t u r ei s s i m p l ya n o t h eer l e m e n o t f t e r r a i n .C u l t u r a l
t e r r a i np a r a l l e l gs e o g r a p h itce r r a i nI b r m i l i t a r yc o n s i d e r a t i oans
both
inf'luence decisions.culturaltcrrainpresents battle-spaceobstacles ancl
oppoftunitie s;

b C u l t u r a l F a c t o r s 'C u l t u r aFl a c t o r sa r ed y n a m i ca s p e c tosf s o c i c t yt h a t


h a v et h e c a p a c i t yt o a f f e c tm i l i t a r yo p e r a t i o n sT. h e yi n c l u d er e l i g l o n .
e t h n i c i t yr,a n g u a g e
cu, s t o m sv,a r u e sp, r a c t i c easn dp e r c e p t i o n si r i t h . r .
factorsaffcctthc thinkingand motivationof the individual
or urouoancj
m a k eu p t h ec u l t u r atl e r r a i no l ' t h eb a t t l e
- s p a c eN . o t a l l f a c l o r sa r e
applicableto all operations, and additionalfactorsmay be consicicrecj as
necessary. A crosssectionof lactorsthat shouldbe consiclered 1brrnilrrary
operationsis containedin Annex A to Chapter2; and

c Cultural Awarenes.s (CA). CIAis the knowledgeof CulturalFacrorsarcl


a n u n d e r s t a n d i nogf t h e i ri m p a c to n t h ep l a n n i n !a n dc o n d u c t
of rnilitiirv
operations.CA resuitsfrom both stanclardized andspecifictraining.

l ( ) 0 O p e r a t i o n s .C u l t u r a cl o n s i d e r a t i o n -sr L rbsel f i r l l yi n c o r p o r a t e d
i n t o t h ec o n d u c r
o 1 ' o p c r i i t i o uC s .o m m a n d e rm s u s tu n d e r s t a nt d
h e i r n p a cot f c u l t u r co n t h e e x ec L r L i oonl '
t h e r ro p e r a t i o nasn d p l a n sa n d t h ei r n p l i c a t i o ni n s h e r e nitn t h ef l u i d n a t u r eo f t h c c o r n p l c x
c l l v i r o n m e tpr tr e s e n t ebdy t h eC u l t u r a'lf c r r a i n .A l l p e r s o n n eml u s tc o n s i c l e r
'l'errain CLrltLrral
c l L l n n lgh e r c a s s e s s m eonf tt h e b a t t l e - s p a cteh,ea m e n d n i e notf e x i s t i r q
p l a r s .a n d
t r a n ist i o no f ' a u t h o rt iy l b a t t l ch a n d o v e r ,

'
E x c e r pftr o mA t s c A c u r t u r aA w a r e n e s sp r o l e c T
t e a m F i n a lR e p o r t
Nov2004

C ' h a p6 : 2 2 1 1 3 1
DI].AFI'

1 ( l l C A D u r i n g R e l i e fi n P l a c e .A k e y ' p i e coef t h es u c c e s s f Lu el l i fei n p i a c eb e l u ' e e i r


I n i o r m a t i o nt c m p l a t e
o f c u l t u r ailn f o n l a t t o n A C u l t u r a L
r a c t i c aLl t n i t si s t h e c x c h a n g e
l i r r u s ed u r r n gT O A i s a 1A n n c x A .

l ( 1 2 . T r a i n i n g . A n y p r e - d e p l o y m e tnrta i n i n gf o r a s p e c i f i cm i s s i o na r e am u s ti n c l u d e
c O rs
b r i c f i n g s . o , - r . . * i n gt h e c u l t u r ei s s u e sr e i e v a ntto t h e o p e r a t t o n a ir e a I. f a s p e c r f i A
kr.iorvr-r prior to deploymcnt.then CA trainingshouldincludeany aspects that areLinlque
t g t h a tp a r t i c u l arre g i o n .A s p e c t so f t l i e c u l t u r s
e h o u l db e f o l d e di n t o p r e - deplovtnetrt
l l a i n r n ge x e r c i s c s( .S e eC h a p t e rI 0 . )

S E C T I O N1 l : T I { B T ' A C T I C A LL E V t i L C O M M I T ' [ E ' ES Y S T E M

I I S - T A B LI S F I I N GT H E , C O M M I T T E E S

1 0 3 G c n e r a l . T h e r n u l t i - a gnec y a s p e cot f t h eC O I N c a m p a i g nd e m a n d sc l o s ec r o s s -
agcncyplanningand co-ordinationdown to the lowestlevels.l'hc committecsysterno1'
cg-ordinationprovidesfbr suchco-operation in the multi-faceted approachto defeating
the irrsurgcncy in both the shortand long terms.

l{14. Roles. The comrnitteesystemwiil mirror that which is built a1the opcrational
level.blt will be affectedat an appropriate level of civilianand policeauthority. In tranl'
cases.thc committeeswill be basedon geographical and civilian linesof organisation,
sLrch a s r n u n i c i p a l i t i easn d c o u n t i e s A. t t l i e t a c t i c a lle svstclx
v e l ,t h e r o l e o f t h e c o m m i t t e e
r c m a i n st h e s a m ea s t h a t o f o f ; e r a t i o n l
a c l v e lo r n a t i o n acl o m m i t t e e s .

of priorities;
establishment

c o - o r d i n a t i oonf i n t e l l i g e n caen ds e c u r i t y ;

c o - o r d i n a t i obne t w e e ns e c u r i t ya n dc i v i l a c t i v i t i e s ;

j o i n t c o n s u l t a t i oann d ,a s I a r a s s e c u r i t yw i l l p e r m i t j,o i n t p l a n n l n g ;

r j o i n t d i r e c t i o no 1o' p e r a t i o n s ;

and
for public safetyand protectionof public institutions;
utrrangements

d i r e c t i o no f t i r eI O p o l i c ya r r dp i a n .

1 0 5 R e g i o n a l ,P r o v i n c i a lA n d D i s t r i c t C o m m i t t e e s .F u l l y i-nf ht cegsrea t ecdo - o r d i n a t i n g


c g m r l i t t e e sa r en e c e s s a rayt v a r i o u ss u b o r d i n a t tea, c t i c alle v c l s . r v i l l c o m p r i s eo f '
rhc;cgional r e p r c s e n t a t i v o
e f
s t h e a g e n c i e c
s o - o p c r a t i nign t h e c o n d u c ot f t h e C O I N .

C h a p6 : 2 - s 1 3 1

-25-000095
A0202311
; i i*.il

DRAFT

I ' h ec o m n r t t e e rsv i l l o f i e nb e b a s e do n b o L r n c l a r ti e
h sa tr e f l e cct i v i la d m i n i s t r a t i ao n d
l r ) c agl o v e r r l m e nbto u n d a r i ersn r e g i o n sp. r - o r , i n c ecso L i n t l casn d / o d r istlcts

1 ( 1 6 C l o m m i t t e eF c a t u r e sa n d M e m b e r s h i p . I n t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n a tn d c o p d L r c9l 1 l h e
t a c t i c a l e v c l c o m m i t t e es y s t e m ,t h e f o l l o , , v i n gs h o u i d b e n o t ec l :

t h e s el o i v e rl ev c l c o m m i t t e easn da n y s L r b o r d i n actoe- o r d i n a t i nbgo c i i c as r e


u s r - r a lrl e
y f e n e dt o a so p e r a t i o nosr a c t i o nc o m n t i t t e e s ;

t h ec l i a i r m a ni s u s r - r a ltlhv e s en i o r o f l l c c r / a d : r i n i s t r a o
r oi 'rt h el o c a lc i v i l i a n
adrninistration in whosesupportthe security forcesare,,vorkinq
D e p e n d i no g n t h es i z eo f t h c a r e a h , c c o u l db e a r n i n i s t ear p p o r n t eftbl r t h e
p u r y o s ea, p r o v i n c i agl o v e r n o rt.h ec h a i r n a no f a c o u r ] t yc o r : n c i ia. c i v i l
c h i e fe x e c u t i v oe f f i c e ro r a m a y o ro f a l a r g ec i r y ;

t h c I o c a lp o i i c ca n dm i l i t a r yc o r n m a n d e ar sn dt h e r n t e l l i g e n caen ds e c L r r i t y
organisation representatives will forrnthe membership. Local civilian
e x p e r t sm a y e i t h e r b ef u l l m e m b e r so r ' i n a t t e n d a n c ea' s, t h e o c c a s i o n
demands.coalition 1'ormation commanders of the appropriate levelwoLrld
n o r m ally a t t e n dt h ea p p r o p r i a theo s tc o u n t r y ' sc o m m i t t e e s ;

scnioradrninistrators from variousNGos operatingin the regionmay srt


o n t h ec o m m i t t e e
or bein attcndance.

d e p e n d i n ug p o nt h ec u l t u r cc o n c e r n e dl o. c a lr e l i g i o ulsc a d e r m
s a ya l s o
a t t c n dt h c c o m m r t t e e s .

I 0 7 ' T o t v n ,W a r d a n d V i l l a g eL e v e l .S m a l l e rl,e s sf o r m a lc o m r n l t t c e s
a r en e e c l ctd.
c o - o l ' d t n act ei v i l , p o l i c e ,r n i l i t a r ya n di n t e l l i g e n coep e r a t i o nast t h e l o w e r
l e v e l sw , ,ithout
lcopardizing security or creatinga cumbersomebureaucracy. fhis is the levelat wlirch
t h ec a m p a r g p n l a ni s i n t p l e m e n t cads t a c t i c alle v e la c t i o n I. i m u s tb e s e e nt o
succecd to
r c t a j t lth e l o y a l t ya n d s u p p o rot f t h ep e o p l eI.t i s i m p o r t a ntth a tI o c a li n t e r e s t s
are
f c p r e s c n t eadn d t h a tt h e p e o p l ec a nr c l a t et o g o v e r n n l c npto l i c y . F a i l p r e
a t t h i s l e v c lw r l l
m e a nd e f ' e a tT. h e c h a r r m a n i s n o r m a l l yt h e h e a col f t h ec i v i l a d r n i n i s t r a t i opno,s s i b l yt l r e
localInayor,the chicf adrnirristrative ofllcer or the ruralcor-rncil chairman.The
r l c n t b e r s h i rpe i l e c t st h ep o l i c e ,r n r l r t a r a y n do t h e ri n l c r e s tas t t h i sl e v e l .l - h c r n i l i t a r v
r c p r c s e n t a t l vl nea y b c a b a t t a l i o n o f c o m p a n yc o r n m a n d cdr ,c p e n c l i nogn t h e s c a l ei i n c j
u e o g r a p h i c a rl e ac o n c e r n e d .

C O } 1M I ' T T E ES T R U C T U R EL E V E L S

CON{MITl'EE
- -T
L ,E V E L
l wLrErVrE-Lf f i ctvr|- oTr-rERS I
OF POL,ICI {I)MINISTRATION i
coMD i

C h a p( > :2 6 i 3 1

A A N A A '
l r ; l

DILAFT

COIVIMIl'TEE MILITARY f-
crvrLr],--al- cIvIL OTHEIlS
t,EVEL LEVEL OF POLICL, ADMINISTRATION
COMD
C oal i t i o n C hi e f c o n s t a b l e S e n i o rg o v e r n t r l e n t Un'Special
C o r n d& of national o f f i c i a io r r n i n i s t eor f E . n v o yo r o t l r e r
P ol i t i c a l p ol i c ea n d defence or internal internationaI
advisor p a r a mrI i t a r y affa i rs, parties.
(POLAD) p ol i c e N a ti o n a I
c o r n m a nedr s . r el i g i oL r s
Ic a d er s .
I)r.ovirrcia o lr, Formation C h i e fo f c i t y I S e n i o pr r o v i n c i a l A d mi n i s t r a t o r s
l a r g cr e g i o u a l Comd p o l i c eo r I I n i n i s t eo r r f e d e r a l lor rnajor
p r o v r r r c rIaclrc l I r c p r e s e t t t a t iM ve a .y o r N C O s
p o l i c cf o r c c . I o f l a r g ec r r y . L o c a lr e l i g i o t r s
1ea o er s .
l { e g i or r al . [ J r r i ct o m d . I L o c a l p o l i c e I M a y o r o r s e r l l o l l - o c a lN C o
c o L l n l oy r c i t y . c h i e f .1 ) i v i s r o n a c i n r i n i s t r a t o i vf ef i c e r o f f i c e r s .
c o n r do f I tbr city/towro rr L o c a lr e l i g i o u s
; p a r a m i l i t a r i I c o u n t y a d r r t i n i s t r a t o r . a ulhorilics,

I ' o w n .d i s t r i c t S u b - u int S t a t i o np o l i c e M a y o ro r d i s t r i c t f - o o u fN C O
'. c hi e f ( s ) . representative. L o c a lr e l i g i o r r s
cornd
( P o s s i b lPy l au tl ro r i t y .
l e v e li n r e m o t e
uteas.'t;

o f C o m m i t t e eS y s t e m
F i g u r e6 - l : E x a r n p l eS t r u c t u r e

CI{ALLENGES IN THE IMPLEMENTA'IION OF THB CAMPAIGN PLAN ANI)


COIN PRINCIPLES

l g 8 . I t \ \ , i l lb e i m p o r t a ntth a ta l l l n c l n b e r so f ' t l i ec o m m i t t e e sa,t w l l a t e v e lre v e l ,l ' u l l ; '


u ; d c r s t a n dt h e r o l e a n d c a p a b r l i t i eost ' t h cr n i l i t a r ye l c n t e n t . ' 1 ' hm e yu s ta l s ou n d c r s t a n d
i
t h e i rl i m i t a t i o n s n t e r m so f r e s o u r c e s k
, i l l sa n d R O E . F u r t h e r m ore t h' e y m u s t
r . r u d e r s r atnhcei n a t i o n asl t r a t e g ya n d c a m p a i g p
n l a n ,i n c l u d i n g
t h e i ri n d i v i d u a rl o l e sa n d
t h a t9 f ' t h c c o m m i t t e ei t s e l f . M a n y m e m b e r so f t h e c o m m i t t e e w i l l n o t b e f a m i l i a ro r e v e n
egmlbrtablewith theseissuesand military personalities mustbe preparedto takea

, . \ rr h r sI e re L .f o r m a lc o m m i t t e e m s a y n o t e x i s t ,b u t t h e n t r i i t a r yc o m m a n d ewr i l l c o n d u c it n d i v i d u a l
a
L r ; : i s . rann d c c - c r d i n a t i o n ,n d c a l l t o g e t h eur t l h o c m e e t r t r gass l n l s s L :l en a y w a r r a n t .
t d t t h ep l a t o o nl e v e ls h o u l da p l a t o o nb e
f l . 1 se a , r , em a l n e r o l a d h o c c o - o r c r n a t i onnr a yb e r e q u r r e a
!,peratina g r v a yf r o m t h es u b - u l j tr v i t hr t so i v n A O .

C ' h a p6 : 2 7 l 3 i

aotnzal 1 -27-noo0q7
DI].AF'T

l c a c l e r s hriopl e i n w ' h a m t a y b c , i n i t i a l r l , , ,l ae ia s ra. c o l l e c t j v e d u c a r i opnr o c e s sl ,,i k e r v i s e ,


t r r l i t a r l ' m e m b e iosf t h e c o r n m r t t e ens, i l l h a v et o b e c o m ef a m i l i a rr ^ . , r
t h e a b i l i i i e sa n d
l i r n i t a t i o nosf t h e i rc o r : n t e r p aaf g
i cncics.

l ( ) 9 . N 4 r l i t a rcyo u m a n d e r m s l r s tr e m e m b et rh a tp r i n c i p l e a s r ee a s i e tro a f f j r mt h a nr o
a p p l ) 'p. a n t c u l a r l lyn a C O i N c a m p a i g n w i t h i t s i n h e r c nvt a r i a b l e st e
, n s i o r sa n dr n u l t i p l e
r s c n c i e s T h e c o m r r - r j t tseyes t e mw i l l h e l pc o - o r d i n a taec t i o r -ai sn dh a r r n o n i s c
nreans
a c r o s st h ev a r i o u sa g e n c i e sI.n m a n \ , { a r l eodr i a i l i n gs t a t e sw h e r ci n s u r g e n c i c s
rvrll
i ) c c u rt.h e t ew i l l b e a i a c ko f p r o f ' e s s i o n atlrl a
y i n c da d n r i n i s t r a t oarrsr col L l i c p
r rof'essionals
v r i l l l a c kd e p t ha n de x t e n s i vter a i n i n gH. e n c e p. f o g r e sas n di n r p l e m e n t a t i o nf t h c
l l r r n c i p l casn dp l a nw i i l b e s l o wa n dr e q u i r ep a t i e n c o e n t h e p a f i o f t h er n i l i t a r y .

I l0 l ' h e r ew i l l b e a n e c df o r t a c t ,u n c l e r s t a n d ianngdc o n r p r o m i saes i n d i v i d u a l s


ancl
tlt€anizations arepersuaded to give up someof theirpowerand influencein thc interests
o l ' g r ea t e re f f i c i e n c ya n dc l o s e rc o - o p e r a t i o n .

I . ' A C I L I ' I ' A T I O NO F T I I E C O M M I T T E E S Y S T E M

Ill B o u n d a r i e s .C i v i l a d m i n i s t r a t i opno, l i c ea n dr n i l i t a r yu n i t b o L r n d a r i e s
s h o u l db c
t h cs i t m ei n t h e i n t e r e s tosf I i a i s o np, l a n n i n ga n dc o - o r d i n a t i o n ,
a n dt o a v o i do p e r a t i o n a l
i L n di n t e l l i g e n ccco n f l i c t sa n dc o n f u s i o n P . o l r c eb o r - r n c l a rui es su a l l yc o i n c i d ew i t h t h o s e
o l ' t h cc i v i l a d r n i n i s t r a t i o ni n. c a s e so f d i s a g r e c m e nr nt ,i l i r a r y
b o u n d a r i essh o u l dc o n f b ' .
t o t h c c i v i l / p o l i c eo n e sb e c a u steh e l a t t e r a r eu s u a l l yw e l l e s t a b l i s h e d
a n dw i l l r c m a i '
r|hen thc:arrnywithdraws.Occasionally. it may be expedientto ac1.j ust boundarics ir,
orderto bringa known insurgcntorganizatiorr r'vithrntireareaof reiponsibrlitvof one
c o r n r n a n dr .e

| 1 2 ' L o c a t i o no f H e a d q u a r t e r sa n d J o i n t O p e r a t i o n sC c n t r e .
A loint operatiors
c c ' l l t r ae t e a c hL e v eol f c o m m a n di n s u p p o rot f t h c c o m m i t t e e
s y s l e mp, r o v i d e st h ef o c a l
P o i n tf o r t h ec o n d u c a t n d c o - o r d i n a t i oonl ' o p e r a t i o nasn d f b r t h e c o i l e c t i o n
of
i n f ' o n n a t i o nI t. a l s op r o v i d e sa s c c L l rm e e e t i n gp l a c ef o r t h c c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e sp,o l i c ea n d
rrlrlitarycotrltnanders and hasthe staff machineryfor disseminating decision,fn,.i,.,.,p1.-
l l l e n t a t l ob n y a l l t h e v a r i o l t sf o r c e sa n do r g a n i s a t i o nr vsi t h i nt h e l o c a lb o u n d a r y O . ther
p o i n t st o n o t ei n t h ee s t a b l i s h r n eonftt h eH e a n d 3 o i not p c r a t i o n s
c e n t r ea r e :

i t s h o L r lbde l o c a t e di f p o s s i b i e
a t t h ep o l i c eI I e w h e r ep o l i c cl i l e sa ' d
i n t e l i g e n c ea r er e a d i l ya c c e s s i b l e ;

i f t h e m i l i t a r yH Q i s n o t c o - l o c a t e dc ,o m m u n i c a t i o nmsu s t
b ec s t a b r i s h e d
betr.veen the two locations;

o P S E C w i l l r e m a i na r i m p o r t a nct o n s i d e r a t i ownh e nw , o r k i n g
withlocal
g o \ " c n t m e natn dp o l i c el o r c es ;

I X I ] C U T I O N O F T H E C O } I M I T T E E S Y S ' I ' E I I-I C O M M A N D


AND CONTROL

( lr;iPr: 28/3I
DRAFl'

-fhe
I ll C o m m i t t e eD i r e c t i v e sa n d O p e r a t i o n a Ol rders, c o m m i i t e ef i a t n e r t ' o r k
r r i l l v a n w i t h e a c hs i t u a t i o nb,u ts h o u l dr u n a l o n gt h ef o l i o w i n gl i n e s :

t h e c o m r n i t t eceh a i r m a no r d i r e c t o o r f o p e r a t i o nws i l l i s s u ea p o l r c y
directrve f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i oonf ' t h er - r a t i o naani dc a m p a i g np l a na t t h a t
r e g i o n alle v e LM . r l i t a r ya s s i s t a n ci ne d r a f t i n gt h i sd o c u m e nm t a Yb c
required. T h e d i r e c t i v s
e h o u l dt i e t o g e t h e trh e l i n e s o f o p e r a t i o n[ o r a ] l
a g e n c i c isn v o l v e da t t h a tl e v e la n d i n t h a tr e g i o n I
. t i s i s s u e di n i t i a l l ya sa
g L r i d i n dg o c u m e t tat n dr c v i c r v e d p er i o d i c a l l l ' ;

formationand unit cotnmaudcrs issueoperatlonal ordersthat ref-lect and


i m p l e m e ntth e c o m m i t t e e p o l i c yd i r e c t i v ea n dh i g h l i g h t h e r n i l i t a r y 's
s u p p o r tl o e a c ho f t h e l i n e so f o p c r a t i o r Irt. t r a n s l a t et sh c g e n e r apl o l i c y
d i r e c t i o ni n t o t a c t i c atla s k s I. t n t a yn e e dr e g u l a r e v i e wa n d u p d a t i n g .

r e g u l a ra, n d a t s o m el e v e l sd a i l y ,o p e r a t i o n aml e c t i n g sw i l l p r o v i d e
feedbackbetweenagenciesand allow for co-ordination and r-rpdate d
direction as required, and

d. at the unit ievel,the operationalordershouldguidethe day-to-day


frameworkoperationsof the sub-units,howeverit will requirercgular
updatingparticularlythe PlRs and IRs. Specificordersare then issuedfor
individualdeliberateoperations.

ll4. C o m m a n d a n d C o n t r o l . M u c h e m p h a s i hs a sb e e nl a i do n t h e n e e dl o r
centralizeddirectionand decision-making. However,the functionof the commrttee
s),stelris essentiallyto providea forum for planningand coordination. The cotnmand
f i r n c l i o nr em a i n st h e p r e r o g a t i vaen dr e s p o n s i b i l i toyf c a c hm i l i t a r ya n d p o l i c e
c t r m n r a n dr eo r c i v i l d e p a r t m e nhte a d .T h e s eo f f i c e r sa n do f f i c i a l sw i l l b e e x p e c t e dto
c o n s u l to n e a n o t h e b r e f o r et a k r n ga n y i n i t i a t i v e o
s r t n a k i n g
a n y c h a n g c t
s o p r e v i o u sly
a g r c c dp o l i c y o r p l a n s .

1 1 5 . R a p i d C o m m a n d R e a c t i o n .T h e r er , v i lbl e o c c a s i o nwsh e na q u i c kd e c i s i o n is
n e e d e dp. e r h a p st o e x p l o i t a f l e e t i n g
o p p o ( u n i t yo r t o f o i l a n u r l c x p e c t ci d
n s u r g e n t
i l i t i a t i v e .I f ' t h e r ei s n o t i m e f o r a m i l i t a r yc o m m a n d etro c o n s u l ht i s s u p c r i o o r r his
comrnitteernembershe will haveto take a tirnelydecisionand act upon it. Providedthat
a g o o du n d c r s t a n d i negx i s t sa m o n g stth e m e m b e r so f t h el o c a lc o m m i t t e ea n d u ' i t h i nt h c
c h a i no f c o m m a n d a, n d t h a ts o n t et h o u g h th a sb e e ng i v e no n h o w t o r e a c t o l o r e s e e a b l e
c o n t i n g e n c i e tsh, e c o m r n a n d e r 'dse c i s i o ns h o u l db e a s e n s i b i oe n e . A c o m m a n d ew r ho
r c l l sh i s s r - t p e r i ot rh,e p o l i c eo f f i c e ra n d ,i f n e c e s s a r yt h, ec h a i r m a no f h i s c o m m i t t e ew l i a t
I r e5 a sd o n ea u d r v h yh c h a sd o n ci t s h o u l de x p e c tr a p i ds u p p o f a i n dc o - o p e r a t i o r t .

S I I C T I O \ I 2 : E M P L O Y M B N T O F C O M B A T A R M S A N D S U P P O I I TA R I V I S

C h a p6 . 2 9 i 3 1

-29-000099
A0202311
I)RAFT

ll6 C c n e r a l , A s p r e v i o L r s l l ' d i s c L rtshseeAdr .m l , w , l lpl l a , vt h c k e y r c l ei n t l e


c c r l l d r -ot cf 'ta C O I N A s w i t h a n v t y p eo f r l i l i t a r yc a m p a i g nt h , ec o m b a a t r n r sa i r ds L l i r p o r r
a r t l s r ' v i la l l i h a r " es e p a r a tbeu t m u t u a l l ys r - r p p o r t irnogi c st o p l a y . M i l i t a r yf o r c c s .
r c n c l ' a l l ; ' l h cae l o r v e rt h r e a ft r o m i n s u r g e n ltsh a nt h e yd o u , h e nf a c i n ga c o n v e ; t t i o p a l
c l l c l l l \ /F. r r r t h e r t n o rt e
h ,e n a t u r eo f a C O I N o p c r a t i o cn r c a t e a s h i g h d c m a n df b r s o l d j e r
patroiling a n . i o l t gtsht ec i v i l p o p r - r i a t raonndc o r . i n t 1t1h,a, ti s t y p i c a l l yi n f a n t r yt a s k s
I l c t l c c .n o r r - i n l a n t ravr m sn ' l a yb c r c q u r r e d r e - r o l et o u n d c r t a kteh e s ej i a n - r c w o r k
o p er a t i o n sR . e g a r d i e sosf t h c s r t u a t i o ns.L r c uh n i t sr n u s tb e p r e p a r e tdo c o n c l L rtchtei r
rtorrlalcornbatir-rnctions shouldthe threat\varranl- i1.

ll7 I n f ' a n t r y .G i v e nt h et t a t u r eo f a C O I N ,v v i t hi t s r e q u i r e m e nf ot r p e l , a s i v er,v i c j c -


s;lreadf'rarnework operations, inlantryunitswill be in high demand.Both rnechanisecj
a r r dI i g h ti n f a n t r yc o m p l e t e t h e i rm i s s i o n d
s i s r n o u n t e( di n a l l o p e r a r i o n n
s ,o r s i n p l i ,
CON). Vlechanised infantryhavethe advantage of protection, rnobilityand firepor.ve r
\ l h i l e I i g h ti n f a n t r ya d a p tm o r er e a d i l yt o c l o s et e r r a i ns u c ha s u r b a na r e a sj ,u n g l ca n d
IlloLlntainous terrain.Giventhe natureoiCOIN, thc needto move rapidlyto react.thc
siz-erlf AOs and the doctrineof continuallyextendrng the influenc.of th. securitylbrccs.
cvcrrlighl ir-rfar-rtry wiil requircintegrallneansof transportfor the condnctof framework
o p e r a t i o n sI t.e g a r d l e sosf t h em e a n so f t r a n s p o r a t ,l l j u n i o rl e a d e ras n ds o l d i e r sm u s t
L r t l d e r s t atnhda ts u c c e sisn C O I N w i l l o n l y b e r e a l i s e b c ly d i s m o u n t i nagn d s p e n d i n tgi n r c
a r n o n g st th e l o c a lp o p u l a c e .

The 2 RCR deploymentto Haiti in2004limited the mechanisedrifle companyto only


four LAV III vehicles(enoughfor one rifle platoon)and to severallight ruppo.t vehicles
to supportpatrolling(8 x LSVWs * enoughfoi the remainingplatoons).Dispite the fact
that Haiti (and especiallyits capital)is the most denselypopiitated,"gion in ihe world,
the vehiclesproved invaluable,B vehiclestransportedtroopseven short distancesto their
patrol areasso that despitethe intenseheatand heavyequipment,soldiersarrivedrested
and focusedfor their patrol.When the company'sAO was madenon-contisuousand
cameto includetwo remotetowns, the LAVs (in additionto beinguseful iri the city)
provideda high profile presenceand protectionfor remoteplatoonbases,and robuit
transportationover routesnot alwayssuitablefor B vehicies.

I 1 8 . A r m o u r . A r n t o u r ,a n da l l h e a v yi i r e p o w e rm , u s tb c u s e dm o s tj u d i c i o u s l yi p
C'OINso as to avoidthe "David versusGoliath"PSYOPSaclvantage this couldgive ro
t h c e n e n t y .N o n e t h e l e spsa, r t i c u l a r liyn h i g h i n t e n s i t yC O I N o p e r a t i o n sa ,r m o L r i p l a yas
r a l L r a b ireo l e w i t h i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t iocfsf i r e p o w e ar n dp r o t e c t i o nA
. s r n o s lC O l N w i l l
t l c c L tirn u r b a na r e a st,h e e m p l o y m e not f a r m o u ri n o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n sw i l l b e a k i r rt o t h a t
i r l u r b a rct o m b a to p e r a t i o n sI t. w i l i a s s i sitn b r e a c h i nsgt r u c t L l r ense, u t r a l i s i nsgt r o n g
p r l i n t sa n d s u p p o t l i n gi n f a n t r yf o r c e s .W h e nn o t e r n p i o y e idn t h i sc a p a c i t yi ,n . t r o o p t
Ilay beernploved i n f r a m e w o r ko p e r a t i o nssu c ha s p a t r o l sa n dm o v e m e nct o n t f o l

I 1 9 . A r m o u r e d R e c o n n a i s s a n c cT,h e r n o b i l i t yp, r o t e c t i o nf i,r e p o r vrea n d


s L l r v c i l l a n c ca p a l - ' i l i t i tehsa ta r eo f f c r e db y a r m o u r e d
r c c o n n a i s s a nfcbcr c e sn r a k e tsh e r l

( h r 1 ,- ' : j u r I

1-30-0001
A.020231 00
DI{AI"T

l i a i , a r i e t ) , otfa s k s .A p a r tf r o m s u n , e i l l a n caen dm o u n t e cr ie c o n n a i s s a npcaet r o L s


L r s e f ut b
t h e y ' c a np e r f o r ma r e as e c u r i t l ,l ,i n e so f c o m m u n i c a t i osne c u r i t l 'r,o u t ep i c k e l i n gc. o n v o , v
cscol-t. and form part of a QR.F,amongstothertasks Nonetheless. armoured
r c c o n n a i s s a npceer s o n n eml u s tb e p r e p a r e tdo d l s m o u nat n d i n t e r a crt v i t ht h e l o c a i
p o p L r ) a t i oi nn o n C e r t om a x i m i s et h e i ru s e f u l n e sass i n f o r m a t i o nc o l l c c t o r as n dc o n f i d e n c c
bLrilders.

ll0 D i s m o u n t e dR e c o n n a i s s a n caen c lS n i p e r s . G i v e nt h e r c q u i r e m e nt bt r
i r r t c l l i g c n cg ea t h c r i n ag n dt h e n e e dt o c o n d u cct o v c r to p c l e t i o nisn c l o s et e r r a l n .
r e c o n n a t s s a uacneds n i p e rd e t a c h r n e nw t sr l l p l o v ev e r y u s e f u l .A p a r tf r o m g a t h e r l n g
i n { b r r n a t r o tnh, e y c a ne s t a b l i s ah n d m a nc o v e r tO P st h a tw i i i t r i g g e rt h e d e p l o y m e notf
.the r forcesto kill or captureinsurgents and disrupttheir actions.They can alsoprovrde
ovcr-u,atcltanclprotectionfor deliberate operations suchas cordonsand searches'

lll A v i a t i o n .A v r a t i o n a s s e t s d e p l o y e d i n a C O l Npw r oi lvl c r n o s t u s e if nu tl h e s a m e


lnanneras conventronal operations. Apart liom troop movement and sensortasks,thcy
o
p r o v i d ev a l u a b l eo v e r - w a t c hd u r i n gd e l i b e r a t ep e r a t i o n T
s .i m i n g sb e c o m ec r u c i a al s
i6eirappearancebefbrethestartofadeliberateopcrationw i n d i c ai ltleg i v e c a r l y
r v a r n i n gt o i n s u r g e n t s .

l ? 2 . A r t i l l e r y . P r c c i s i o nc a p a b i l i t i ews i l l a l l o w t h e i re m p l o y m e nat g a i n spt i r l p o i n t


targcts.When not providingobservation and fire support,their forwardobservation tealns
can act as Iraisoncells for rifle companiesandassistin rnanningcommandposts.The
batteriesrnaybe employedin frameworkoperationsincludingassistance with tactical
level IO and providingforce protectionfbr firm bases;

1 1 3 E n g i n c e r s .D u r i n g a C O I N , e n g i n eres w i l l c o n t i n u et o p r o v i d et h e i rm o b i l i t y ,
.,runr.r-,-,-,obility and generalengineersupportto all forcesin theatre.This will includea
j i r c u so n r l i ed e t e c t i o na n d c l e a r i n go f I E D s .T h c i r c a p a b i l i t i ews i l l b e a m a i n s t a y ' o l
. t i l i t a r y l e d C I M I C t a s k sa n d t h e i ri m p a c tc a nb e s u b s t a n t i aCl .o m m a n d c rnsr u s tg i v e
c a r c f u lc o n s i d e r a t i otno t h e b a l a n c eo f r e s o u r c ae n d t i n l ea l l o c a t e b d e t w e e nC I M I C a n d
sLrpport to the fbrce itself. A heavy weighting of resources to support for the forcevicc
( ' l M t C l p r o j e c t sm a y s e n dt h e w r o n gl n e s s a gteo t l r el o c a l p o p u l a t i o n .

1 2 4 . S i g n a l s . I n a d d i t i o nt o p r o v i d i n gc o t n t n u n i c a t i o tnost h e f b r c er t s e l ft,h c m i l r t a r y
g i l l l t e r e q u i r c dt o e s r a b l i s ch o m m u n i c a t i o nwsi t h o t h e ra g e n c i e ss,u c ha s p o l i c e . ' f h i s
l r a y c n t a i it h e p r o v i s i o no f s i g n a l sd e t a c h m e n t os t h o s el o c a t i o n sp, a r t i c u l a r liyf
st o b e s e c u r c
c o r n r n r . t n i c a t i canr e

ll5 1 , l i l i t a r yP o l i c e . M i l i t a r y p o l i c ew i l l p r o v i d ed i r c c tl i a i s o nt o c i v i i i a np o l i c e
s L - r y i c easl i c i n d o i n gs o w i l l b e a b l et o p r o v i d ea n a c c L l r a a t es s e s s m eonft t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s
r n d r t t i t u c l eo sI t h o s ep o l i c ef o r c e s .

t h e p6 : 3 1 i 3 1
AnnexA DRdFT
To Chapter

CULTURAL INFORMATION

l General.This tempLateprovidescommanders and staffwith a guide/checklist


that
identifieskey questions,
pertainingto culturalinformationthatmustbe addressedduring
a TOA This tempiatemay alsobe usefulas a reference documentduringthe conductof
a CON. It shouldbe usedin conjunctionwith annexA to Chapter2 (Cultural
Factors).

2. Transferof CulturalInformation, CulturalInformationincludedin this template


shouldbe made availableto units,down to the lowestlevel,preparingto enter
the battle-
space.As a minimum,the foliowingshouldbe addressed duringtheloA:

Leadershirr

i. Who arethe leadersin your battle-space?

(a) What groupsor interestsdo they represent?

(b) What aretheir personalitytypes?

(c) What is your unit history with eachleader?

(d) What is your personalassessment


of eachleader?

(e) What level of control doeseachleaderexerton his group?

(f) What level of influencedoeseachleaderhavewithin the battle-space?

(g) What strategieshaveyou usedto interactwith eachleader?

(h) Do someleadershave more or lesspower than it appears?

(r) How often do you meet with eachleaderand why?

0 )What meetingformat do you use,what works best?


(k) what negotiatingsrrategie
s do you find most effectivewith
eachleader?

(l) Is therean extantsuccession


plan?

(m) If so, what is rheplan to managethis change?

'
E x c e r pftr o mA B C A C u l t u r aAl w a r e n e sPsr o j e c tT e a m F i n a l R e p o r t M
, a r c h2 C 0 5

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Anlex A DRAFT
'fo
Chapter6

tn jncidents w v Y:t tL h
Ir v . ' t '
' r : l q d r t r i n ^ \ i ^ ' r r + n r* l - " . .
- - tu \ A ^h, :J tL Jspn
! re
l rc
r !i f l c r r l u r r v r r L J )vur
urrrLr uwr116
irvur
rvur rrqr !

with eachleaderand u'hathaveyou


impactedyour relationship
doneto alterperceptions
basedon that rmpact?

(o) What arethe reiationships betweenleadersand how havethose


s p a c t e dy o u r m i s s i o n ?
r e l a t i o n s h i pi m

(p) How haveyou aftempted/how do you plan to influence


betweenleadersto alterthe battle-space
relationships environment?

(q) What outstandingissuesdo you havewith eachleaderthat ma;'


impactthe mission/battle-space?What currentcontractsare in
force with eachleader?

(r) Handoverail meetingreportsfrom meetingswith leadersas available

(s) Handoverali biographicalreportson eachleaderas available.

on eachleaderas available.
(t) Handoverall intelligenceassessmcnts

2. What are the influential groupsin your battle-space?

(a) How influential is eachgrouP?

(b) How doeseach group influencethe battle-space?

(c) Has eachgroup had a helpful, neutral,or hostilerelationship


with your unit and how has that impactedyour mission?

(d) What strategyhave you employedto influencethe behaviourof


eachgroup?

(e) What specificincidentswith your units during your tour have


impactedyour relationshipwith eachgroup and what have you
done to alter perceptionsbasedon that impact?

(f) How doeseach group interactwith othergroupsand what


impact have thoseinteractionshad on your mission/the
battle-space?

(g) What is the sourceof power for eachgroupand how can you
influencethat sourceof power to accomplishyour mission?

(h) What outstandingissuesdo you have with eachgroup that may impact
the mission? What current contractsare in force with eachgroup and how do those
contractsinfluencethe group to supportthe mission?

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Annex A DR.AFT
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(i) IJorvdoescachgroupfit into the campaignplan?

(j) What non-tradjtional


"shadow"groupsinfluencethe battie-space
but
may not be readilyapparentto an outsider?

(k) Handoverall meetingreportsand intelligence


repofison eachgroup

Government

L What is the currentgovernmentstructurein the battle-space


and hor.vdoesthis
slructurediff'erfrom historicaldata?

2. Which elementsof governmentarefunctioningwell and


which are functioninq
poorly? Why?

3. What actionshaveyou takento alter,improve,or change


the govemmentin
your battle-space?

4' What govemmentservicesdo you considervital to mission


successand whar
actionshaveyou takento ensurethey continue?

5 How much influencedoeseachgovernmentleaderhave and


from whereis their
power derived? (appointed?elected?took power throughforce?)

6' What financial,suppon,or constructioncontractsare currently


in force or
signedwith the govemmentand how do thosecontractsinfluenceyour
relationshipwith
the government,people,and groupswithin the battie-space?

L In what key ways doesthe battre-space


differ from your pre-deproyment
impressionsand studiesand how can we uuoldth.r. misperceptions?

Battle-spaceEnvironment

1. What arethe atmospherics ("senseof the community")of eachviliage,tow.,


cit1r,province,region,or other key areaswithin your battle-space
and how do those
atmospherics impactyour mission?

2. Where have your units encountered


the most cultural lriction? (may include
reactionslike openhostility,hostilegestures,
sullenlooks.etc.) H o w h a v ey o u a t t e m p r e d
to deal with this friction?

3' What arethe perceptions


of your soldiers/personnel
of the people,groups,anci
leadersin eachareaand why?

C h a p 6 :A - 3 t 7

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of people,groups,andleadersof your
4. What arethe perceptions
qnldierc/ner<nnneJin each:rea and whv'

5. What aregeneraIperceptions of your unit that havehindered


or misperceptions
or heipedyour ability to accomplishthe mission?How haveyou attemptedto discourage
or encouragetheseperceptions?

6. What arethe cultural"hot spots"within your battle-space? Includeany site


rvherecultural friction could lead to a negativeincidentthat would detractfrom mission
accomplishment. How can thesehot spotsbe dealtwith to reducefriction?

7. What patternsare common on the streetsand how do changesin thosepatterns


indrcateshifls in hostility, supportiveness?

8. What other cultural factorsmay impact our mission? What are the normal
working hours,working days? What daysare childrenin schooland from what age?
Etc. Ilow doesthis information differ from pre-deploymentassessments?

9. What extemal cultural forces,suchas religiousinfluence,impact behaviourin


your battle-spaceand how have you reactedto that influence? What is the cultural
significanceof outsidegroups and or ieaderson the groupsand leadersin the battle-
space?

Relieion.Lansuage and Customs

and how do you perceive


l. What are the key religions in your battle-space
religiousinfluence? How do your culrentperceptionsdiffer from pre-deployment
assessments and how do you accountfor thesedifferences?

2. Where are the key religious siteswithin your battle-space?How doeseach


religioussite influenceyour mission? (e.g."no-go"areato reducefriction)

3. What influencedoesreligion have on each group and/orleaderwithin the


battle-space?How are religious groupsand leaderslinked with seculargroupsand
leadersand how doesthat relationshipimpact the battle-space?

4. What political influencedoeseachreligiousgroup have within the battle-space


and how do they exercisethat influence?

5. How doesreligion influencethe everydaybehaviour,actionand reactionof


peoplewithin the battle-space?

betweenyour
6 How do religiousperceptionsand beliefseffectthe relationship
and the people? How
soldiers,'personnei have you attempted to influencethose
pcrceptionsand beliefs?

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7. What religiousminorities live within your battle_space,


how aretheytreated,
horv to they interactwith majontyreltgiousgroupsJ and whathasy ' o u r e l a t i o n s h ibpe e n
rvith thesegroups?

8. Haveyou beenforcedto inter.lect


yourselfinto any religiousissues(e.g.
minorityrights)andhow did thatactioneffectthe perceptionof your unit with e;ch
group?

Ie-spac
eand
ho
wdo
es
run ffHl;,Ti:i$::iTJjil"Jffi,:,^tt
g,og?,Xi::iilJl:,
l0 What major stumblingblockshas languagecausedbetweenyour
unrt and the
people/groups/leaders
?

11. What is the availabilityof local translatorsand have you found them
to be
trustworthy'effective,biased/unbiased? What tacticscan you recommendfor- -recruitins.
- -- ----'-D'
employing,andmonitoringlocal translators?

12' How effectivewas your pre-deploymentlanguagetraining? What


did you do
to improve the languagecapabilityof your personnelauling operations?
what phrasesor
translationtools did you find the most usefulto reducecultu.ul friction
by
Ianguagebarriers? "uusecl

13' What local customshave causethe most friction betweenyour personnel


and
the people? How haveyou adjustedoperationsto reducethis friction?

l4 Recommendstrategies
to foliow localcustomswithoutcompromising
missron
requirements.

15. Which localcustomsdo you recommendmust be followedwithout


exception
and which can be ignoredwithout causingunduefriction?

16. What customshaveyour personnelfollowed that have given you


the most
dividend in improvedperception/atmospherics?

Ongoins Cultural Initiatives

1. What culturalinitiativeshave you undertakento improve perceptrons,


reduce
friction, and gain complianceor neutrality? What initiativeswould you
,L"o-nlend for
the future and what would you recommendagainst?

2. what culturalexchangehaveyou attempted


with groups,people,leaders?
Have theseexchangesbeeneffective?

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To Chapter6

3.l{ou,effectivehavecivil affairsprojectsbeenin influencingthe battle-space?


and tacticswouLd),ourecommendto improveor makebestuseof ctvil
\\/hatstrategies
affairsprojcctsand missions?

4. Wheredo you recommendapplyrngcivil affairsprojectsin the nearterrnto


achievethe greatesteffect?

Securifyand Armed Groups

1. What culturalinfluencehaveyou used,or is available,


to coercehostileforces
within your battle-space?

2. What culturaltactics(religioushatred,etc,)havehostileforceswithin your


usedagainstyou? How effectivewere thesetactics?How did you try to
battle-space
counterthem?

3. What are the culturalvulnerabilitiesof hostile,non-hostile,and supportive


groupswithin the battle-space?Are thereinherentculturalfrictionsthat can be leveraged
to reducetheir effectiveness?How haveyou exploitedthesevuinerabilitiesto ensure
missionsuccess?

4. If you are training or working with local securityforces,what cultural issues


have helped/hinderedyour relationships?What training strategieswork best within this
culture?

5. What cultural frictions exist within the securityforcesthat underminetheir


ability to accomplishtheir missions? How can we reducethat friction?

6. How do localsview the securityservices?How do thoseperceptionsimpact


their effectivenessand how can we reducefrictions/improveeffectiveness?

7. When and on what day do hostileforcesconductattacksand why? Is thereany


religiousor cultural significanceto thesepatternsthat can be exploitedor usedin
assessments?

8. What are the crime levels,what typesof crime are committed,and what are the
reasonsbehind crime trends? Are therecultural factorsthat we can influenceto reduce
crime or identify criminalsor criminalgroups?How do peopleacceptor rejectcriminal
activity and how have you usedthat perceptionto impact crtme?

Other Issues

1. What are the cultural differencesbetweenrurai and urbanpopulationsand is


thereany resultingculturalfriction? How doesthis effectyour mission?

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2' Arethereany outstanding


debtsor.ved
to any group,leader.or indivrdualin tne
battie-space?what do we owe and why? Are we overdueon u,rydebtssuchas
blood
nloneyor contractfees?

3 what havewe promised(money,contracts, support,mecrical


aid, etc.)to
groups,leaders,or individualswithin our battle-space?
What benefitwill we receive
from followingthroughon thesepromisesand whatarethe consequences
of not
following through?

4. Which relationships
(with leaders,
groups,inclividuals)
shouidwe maintain
rvhichonesshouldwe end,and which onesshouldwe alter
and why?

5. What culturalopportunitiesdo you seein this transition? Where


can a ,,fresh
start"help and wherewould it hurt?

6' Which groups,leaders,and individualswill try to take advantage


of our relative
ignoranceof the battle-space
environment?What actionsare they likelyio take and
why? IJow can we countertheseactionsor usethem to our
advantage?

7' What are the greatestculturalchallengesand dangersto our


mission? How
shouldwe overcomethesechallenges?

8' What has beenyour most successful-culturaltactic(e.g.frequentmeetings,


meals,ard delivery)?What would you like to havetriedbut didn't
becauseof a lack of
resources?

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A0202312-7-000108
DRAITT

CHAPTER 7

INTELLIGENCE
'They
O n t h e t r a n s f o r m a t t ofna c i n gt h e i n t e l l i g e n c see r v i c e sp o s t S e p t e m b e1r 1 , 2 0 0 1 ' .
have already learned lo regret the emergenceof new intelligencelargets thut lack any
concreteform; aggressive belief systems not subject to central authorily, shifting
alliances of dangerous malcontenls, stateless migrants disloyal to any country of
settlententIt is from those backgroundslhal lhe agentsof anti-Westernlerrorism are
recruiled."

John Keegan,lntelligence in War:Knowledgeof theEnemyfromNapoleonto Al-


Q a e d aL. o n d o nK. e yP o rteBr o o ks,2003:364

S e c t i o nl : G c n e r a l

l. The Need for Inteilieence. Good rnteliigence is vital in any phaseof war. In
counterinsurgency operationsit will be in constantand continuousdemand.Sound
intelligencesupportscontinuingsuccessin operationsrequiresteadysuccess,which will
wear down the insurgentmovement,restrictingits capabilityand reducingits morale,
Accurateintelligencewill permit commandersto conductoperationswith precision,
reducingthe detrimentaleffecton the HN populationand minimizing casualtiesamong
friendly forces.The combinedeffect will be to secureand maintainthe morale amongthe
securityforces and raisetheir standingwith the civilian population.Effective and precise
use of kinetic and nonkineticmeanswill earnrespect;vital in the campaignfor heartsand
minds. Ill-directedand indiscriminateuse of force will merelyserveto alienateany FIN
population.It may be appreciated, therefore,that soundintelligence is a precursorto all
counterinsurgencyoperations;it must be built up quickly and sustainedefficiently from
the starcof a campaign.A glossaryof abbreviations usedin this Chapteris at Annex A.

2. IntelligenceSupportto Operations. Thoroughknowledgeof the extentof the


insurgencyand the politicaland military aims,commandstructures and logisticnetwork
of the insurgentsshould allow the host nation (HN) government and coalition force tcr
developa long-termoverallstrategyand sensiblemilitarypoliciesto defeatthe
insurgencyon the physicaland moral planes.At all levels,intelligence will permit
commandersto put the strategy and policies into practice to allow the defeat in detailof
the insurgentsby killing, capturingor arrestingindividualsand deprivingthem of targets,
intelligence,the meansof commandand communication, weapons,ammunition,food and
other supplies.Attrition of ali theseelementswill reducethe insurgents'abilityto
. u i d e l i n eos n I n t e l l i g e n cS
r l a i n t a i nt h e c a m p a i g nG e u p p o rfto r C 2 W a r eg i v e ni n
A n n e x e sB a n d C .

I I n t e l l i q , e n ci ne C o u n t e r - l n s u r e e nOc yp e r a t i o n sT h e r ei s n o t h i n gr a d i c a li n t h e
a p p L i c a t i oonf t h e f u n d a m e n t a oi sf i n t e l l i g e n cteo a c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e nccaym p a i g nT. h e r e

1,23
DR,AFT

a r e ,h o w e v e rt,h r e ea s p e c ttsi r a tr v i i l c a n v g r e a t e r
e m p h a s itsh a nm r g h tb e t h ec a s ei n
conventiono ap l e r a t i o n: s

a. The predominance
of humanrntelligence
(r{UMTNT);
The influenceof the crvrlianauthorityon counter-
i nsurgency
operationsandthe consequent constraintsa n dc o m p l i c a t r o nosn
inteilrgence
gathering.

The appearance that,at times,operations


are in supportof intcrlrgcnce
ratherthanthe reverse.

3' The Importanceof I{UM|Nf. T'hepurposeof intelrigence,


in any phaseof war, is
to determinethe enemythreatby accurateandtimely
assess"ment of both capabilityand
intentions,so thatthe commandermay developa pranto bring
aboutits defeat.In
counter-insurgency operations,this is equallyih. .u..; the insurgentmust be
defeated,
militarilyor politically,and this canbe doneonly if
commanders aregivensufficient
knowledgeof the enemybythe intelligencc staff.In situationswherethe insurgentlives
amongthe population,pcrhapswithout uniform
or a recogniruur.military structure,his
capabilitiesand intentionsare likely to be determinea
tarfetf from informatlo,,prouia.a
by the populationand thoseindividualsabreto move
in .lor'. pro*,-ity to him.
Sophisticated intelligencescnsors, crucialin general*u., no.*ully cannotmatch
the
HUMINT agent,informer, informantl,surveillance
from observationpostsor thc repons
fiom routinepoliceor army patrols.-l'ime-consuming
collationof detailandpainstaking
analysismay then prove the key to unravelingi,npo,iun,
urf..t, ortn" insurgcnt,s
activity' ProcessingHUMINT is enhancedwith
the useof r..ent softwareapplications
suchas link analysisand spreadsheets.

4' civilian conlra-!-lntelligencegatheringin a counter-insurgency campaignwill, in


all probability,lack the freedomthatmay be e-njoycd
in conventional operations. The
primacyof civilian politicalcontrol,theialance
betweeneffortsto defeatthe insurgcncy
andthoseexpcndedon crimepreventionand resolution,Ihe
ruteof law and the needfbr
admissible evidencefor prosecution, will all constraintit. guth..ingof inteiligence.
Military intelligencestaffsmay well find themselves
in uniamiliarcircumstances,
subordinated to civilian controlandmethodsof operatingtrrai--av
haveconflictingaims
and priorities.

5 Patrolline.In operationswherethe relianceon HUMIN.f


is paramount,the
dismounted soldierbecomesthe eyesand earsof an intelligence
organisation. The value
of extensivepatroilingand subsequent de-briefingmay not"..uaitybe apparentto
' o r e x a m p l e ' t h e . t r u e a i m m i g h t b e t o d w e l o p a p i c t u r e o f ' p a t t e r nthe
s o l d i e rF sofinsurgent
behaviorover a protractedperiod,ratherthanshort-t.i.
i."orrnuissance for immediare
offensiveaction The needto win the heartsanclminds
of the popuiationrn orderto
rveakensympathyfor insurgents and thusincreasethe potentiatnow of information,
alsotry the soldier'spatienceand moraleas he finds himself r'ay
adoptinga lessaggressrve
stancethanhe might otherwisehavechosen.

2/23
DR.AFT

7. Principlesof intellieence.The four stagesof the Intel[genceCycle (directron,


c o l l e c r i o np.r o c e s s i nagn d d i s s e m i n a t i o an n) dt h e a p p l i c a t i oonf t h e e i g h tp r i n c i p l e o
sI
intelligence continueto be appropriate in CON and provides the structure within whrch
t h e i n t e l l i g e n coer g a n i s a t i oonp e r a t e sT.h e e i g h tp r i n c i p l e os f i n t e i l i g c n caer e :

a. centralisedcontrol;
b timeliness;
c, systematicexploitation;
d. objectivity;
c. accessibility;
f responsiveness;
g
o' sorrrceprotection;and
h. continuousreview.

SECTION 2. DIRECTION

IntelligenceArchitecture and the Organisationof Intelligence

8. Designof lntelliqenceArchitecture, Early in a counter-insurgency campaign,it


will be necessary to establisha chainof operationalcommandwhich reflectsthe political
and military requirementsof the Hlrl and assistingcoalition.When this hasbeen
established,therewill be a needfor a supportingstructureof intelligencestaffsplacedat
appropriatelevels in order to providetimely, responsiveintelligencefor commanders.It
is inevitablethat the intelligencestructurewill developwith the campaign.The
architecturemust anticipatethis and deploy progressivestagesof capabilitywhich are
readily linked together.In parallelwith thesestaffs,a communicationsnetwork must be
establishedthat permits the rapid,efficient passageof intelligencedataof different types,
upwards,downwards and sideways.In a coalition operation,it will needto crossnational,
military/ civilian and serviceboundariesso that it can link staffsand agenciesat every
level.

9. Unlike the military chainof command,which is purelyhierarchical, this network


shouldbe constructedon the principleof providingintelligence from whereit is available
to whereverit is required.This may resultin it bypassingsomelevelsof commandin
orderthat it reachthe appropriate user.This "skip-echelon"systemlike collaborative
parallelplanningwill ensure information is availableon the "pull", ratherthanthe "push"
principleat whateverlevel of commandmay needit. The intelligence architecture is not
simply a communications network; it includes the allocation of Areas of Intelligence
Responsibility(AiR), to eachlevel of command.It specifiespreciselythe authorityto
task individualcollectionassetsand allocatesthe reporlingauthority,( ie, who is
responsibiefor the provisionof fusedintelligencereports) basedon informationfrom
collectors.The intelligencearchitecture shouldform an annexrn the nncratinnal,lirgqlivs
underthe title of the intelligenceplan.

10. on this freeflow of datacausedby the


Constraints,Therewill be constraints

Anlrl22.1Q-?-nnn4 4 4
DRAFT

necessitY o a p p l yi h e " n e ed t o k n o r . vp" n n c i p l eT h i s i s v i t a l f o r F I U M 6 ; T


s o u r c-e
p r o t e c t i o nS' o m ei n t e l l i g e n c e
p ,e r h a p tsh a tp r o v i d e df r o m s t r a t e g isco u r c e sr n , a yn o t b e
madeavaiLable to all intelligencestaffsat everylevel.For example,material
with the
"CanadianEyesOnly" caveatmay be madeavailable
from Canadaexclusivelyfor
Canadian comtnanders. Therewill be a needfor specialhandlingprocedures for thrs,and
o t h e rm
, a t e r i a lI .n s u c hc i r c u m s t a n c eass,a m i n i m u m ,a
N a t i o n a Il n t e l l i g e n cCec l l ( N I C )
may be established. In supportof fuil operations it is nccessary to fbrm an Ali Souroe
Inteiligence centre(ASIC) within which rheremay be a HUMINT support
Group
a cryptologicalSupportGroup(CSG),providingsIGNT,
Fsc)' or.un tvnvr suppo.
Group(lSG).Specialistintelligence shouldui*uyt be kJpt underclosereviewwherr
operatingwith alliesas they can encourage exclusivityand reducethe mutualtrustso
nccessary for effecti ve cooperation.

Il StraininqCommunications Networks.Inevitabiy,extensiveintelligence datanet-


workswill placea largeburdenon the communications
available.This shouldbe borncin
mind whendesigningthe intelligence architecture
with as much usebeingmadeof
existingsystemsas possible.In a coIN campaign, the usageby inteiligence
organizations of availablebandwidthwill ouistripthat of ail other users
due to the need
for accessto nationa.ldatabases,
imageryproducisand the output of nationalagencies.
This is particularlythe casewhen satellitecommunications
are establishedin the theatre.
CentralisedControl

II The Needfor Centralised Control.Intelligenceassetsarenormallycentralised at


the highestappropriatelevel of commandin orderto be available
acrossthc widest
possibleareaofoperations.In counter-insurgency operationsthereare further
tmperatives for centralised
control.Whereseveralintelligence organisations areworking
againsta commontarget,thereis the dangerof overlap.Some
aupticationis always
necessaryin order to improve the evaiuationof information
by its beingconfi.-ed from
more thana singlesource.'fhe dangerlies in therebeing a
single,our.". exploireJby
morethanone agcncyeachin ignoranceof one-anoth.r. Thi, ian leadto false
confirmationand, in tum, givesthe sourccgreatercredibility
than may be its worth.
Thereis also the undesirabilityof wastageof effort and resourc.s.

l3 The Directorof Intellieence.In designingthe intelligenceorganisation, a decision


mustbe madeto coordinateall intelligence staffi,militaryind .iuiliun, HN and coalrtion,
centrallyIdeallya singleDirectorof Intelligen..',houlj be
establishedat nationalievel
with similarpostsat eachlower revelof command,perhaps
thoseof civilian
administrativeauthorityor miiitarycommandaependingupon trrecircumstances.

I n t e g r a t i o n- T h e C o m m i t t e eS y s t e m

Establishingan IntetligenceCommittee.The Director


.14 , of Intelligenceat national
levelshould,ideally'.chair an intelligence
commirtee.Subordinate intelii!ence
commlttees r'vouldthen meetat eachlower level.Eachcommitteewould
orvealiegrance
to thc next higherlevel whtch in tum would be responsible
for the effectivenessand

4/23
,,Jt,l

DRAFT

coordrnation of the inteliigenceeffortsof thosebelor.v them Committeesshouldmeet


r e g u l a r l r f t h c r ei s t o b e a u s e f u e i x c h a n g ae n dd i s c u s s r oonf i n t e l l i g e n caen da g o o d
r v o r k i n gr e l r t i o n s h i p
b e t w e e nc i v i l a u t h o r i t i e p
s .o l i c ea n dm i l i t a r yi n t e l l i g c n cset a f l s
estabiished.

15. M e m b e r s h i po f t h e I n t e l l i g e n c e C o m m i t t e eM . embership o f t h ei n t e l l i g e n c e
c o m m i f t e es h o u l db e a r r a n g e m d u t u a l l yb e t w e e n
t h e I - l Ni n t e l l i g e n csee r v i c c s .
c i v i l i a na n d m i l i t a r y .a n dt h o s eo f C a n a d i a a n n do t h e ra l l i e di n t e i l i g e n c e
staffs.

16. Coordination. The intellisencecommitteesshouldensurethat:

a. Civii, police and army boundariesare the sameand accordmore with the
civil authorityand securityforce commandsystem.This may not always
be possible;

b. Informationand intelligenceflow downwardsas well as upwardsand


sidewaysto neighbouringcommitteeswhereappropriate;

c. Representatives of governmentdepartmentsand HN expertsare co-opted


for specialadvice,with due regardfor security.They might come fronr
customsservicesand coastguards, such fields as the highwaysdepartment,
rail services,inland water transport,civil engineering,
telecommunications, power and water suppliersand from a wider circle of
the HN community which might include farmers,businessmen and other
traders.

5t23

13
an?n?3'13-5-0001
DR.AI-T

'I'he
C o m m i t t e eS y s t e m

11' Iilustration. "ur)ditroru!trictgrunr.s'


Figure 1((.saa
/irufor ltgttrar)) iilustrates
the
kind of committeesystemwhich might be developed
in a'theatreof operations. canadian
intelligence personnelmay find themselves runring committeesat brigadeleveland
Individualcanadianofficersshouldexpect,l u. puni.ipants
iniommitrecsa1any
i:;;'

lS Functionsof an Intelligence
committee.The functionsof inteliigence
areas foliows: committees

a' At the FrN rever,1o kecpthe government, the civil and miritary
commanders,or chiefsof stafl, and operationsstaffs
informedo1.allaspectsof
intelligenceand securityoperationsund to facilitate
th. ."a
provisionofthe intelligence necessary "-.rr*!.
for the prosecution ofa stratesrc
campaign.

b. At subordinatelevels,to keeptheirparalleloperations commrttees


and
thenext higherinteiligencecommittees furiy inform.a *i,n ,.i.uon,
intclligencefor operational
planning.

c To adviseoperationalstaffson securityand protective


measures.
To developthe coilectionpranagainstwhich
the collectionagencies
will be tasked.

I n t e l l i g e n cstaffs
e throughthe G3, to directthe collectionagencies,
allocatingtasksandprioritiesand trme within which
the informationmust be
obtained.

f. Wherepossible,to establish
commonprocedurcs
for all IN and allied
intelligence
and securityorganisations.

g. To providean appropriate
dissemination
serviceto commanders.

19' centralIntellieenceStaffs.In a canadianforce,subordinate


to the committees,
thereshouldbe a centralised, integratetr staffcapabieoip.rio.r,ng collection
coordinationand Intellig€nceRequirements Management (ccrRM), database
management and fusionfunctionson behalfof all the intelligence
staffsof thatparticular
mission'For this reason'the conceptof the ASIC was
d"uet6f.a. e, the outset,as parl of
the intelligence plan,clearordersshouldbe given on the ievei
at which responsibility for
maintenance of a masterdatabase will be performed.It is essentialto prevent
o f i n t e l l i g e n cset a f fr u n n i n gd a t a b a s ei ns p a r a l l e lA. l t h o u g h every levei
i , * i l t n e v e rb e p o s s i b l e
to
avoid someduplication.of record-keeping, thereshouldb! a minimum of databases
a single,prcbablythe highestHN. levelmaintainingthe rvith
masterdatabase rvith
subordrnate. and otherlevelssubmittingchangesto it in the form
of'data-change requests.

6t23
DR-AFT

N{aintenance is facilitatedb1'the"pull" ratherthan the "push"


of a singledatabase
methodof informationretrievaland by closecooperatlon betweenall coliectorsand
^-^I.+i-^1 -+^ff-
dllal j LlLal JL4LLJ,

20. C o m m a n da n dC o n t r o l W . h i l e i n t e l i i g e n cceo m m i f t e egsi v e g e n e r adl i r e c t i o nI.a y -


i n g d o w n p o l i c y a n da l l o t r i n gg e n e r aal i m s .c o l l e c t i o nt a s k sa n dp r i o r i t i e st,h e vd o n o t
exercisecommand.Commandand controiremainsthe prerogative of the commanders,
civilianand military,over both their respective intelligence staffsand their collection
agencies.

Factors Affectin g O rganization

23. the organisatronand the


Whatever the design of the intelligencearchitecture,
sourcesand agenciesdeployed,there are a number of factorswhich will be common.
These must be consideredat the outset and plans made for their inclusion in the
structures.

a. Continuity.Units shouldbe kept in the sameareaof responsibility (AOR)


for as long as possibie.This ensuresthat they become familiar with the HN
inhabitants,the other securityforces,the terrainand infrastructure.They are better
able to get the measureof their opponentsand they acquirethe ability to develop
information into intelligence.In short,they get a feel for what is normal as a
backgroundagainstwhich to observethe abnormal.

b. Flexibility.An intelligenceorganizationis designedto meeta specific


situation,but it must be receptiveto the adjustments neededwhen the insurgent
threat developsin new directions,themes,strategiesand tactics,or the situation
changesin someother way, Such changesin the situationmay make fresh
demandsupon specialistservices,suchas imageryinterpretationor intenogation.
Commanders,and their intelligencestaffs,must be ableto respondquickly to new
needsby redeployingresourcesand, where necessary, adjustingthe functionsthey
fulfil1.

c. InformationHandling.The intclligencesystem,whateverits shape,must


be able to copewith an increasingamountof informationas units,with growing
experience, becomemore productiveand betterfocused.With time, it is to be
hoped,the becomessufficientlyconfidentto passmore informationto
population
the securityforces.As this happens,sufficientintelligence-trained
personnelmust
be made availableto collate the additionaiinformation,analyzeand fuse it,
interpretits meaningand disseminatethe resultingintelligencein time for it to be
usedoperationally.

(1) Specialists.The training of analysts,source handlers,surveillance


operators.imagery interpreters,Iinguists, interrogatorsand other
intelligence specialistsmust be developedas early as possibleif the

7/ 2 3

Lot nt'aJ|?-7-nnn { .l \
DRAFT

r n e v i t a b l es h o f i a g eo f s u c h s k i r l e dp e r s o n n e lw
, h r c h e x i s t sa i t h e
begin'ing of any campargn,is to be overcome . The careful husbandr;v
o f s c a r c es k i l l s i s n e c e s s a rtyh r o u g h o uar c a m p a i g nb, ' t p a r t i c L r l a r l y
e s s e n t i aal t t h e b e g i n n i n gu n t i l m o r e t r a i n e d s p e c i a l i s t sb e c o m e
available.

(2) Liaison. If the intelligenceorganizationis to u,ork effectively


and
efficiently,good liaison betweena1l intelligenceorganisations ancl
agencies,F{N, allied, civilian and military, is paramount.The
specialistsreferred to above, are vital elements in establishing
effectiveliaisonwith FIN intelligenceagencies.The sensitivitiesof
suchintelligence liaisondutiesrequirethe liaisonofficerto havewide
experience of militarycapabilities
and knowledgeof intelligence.

(3) Securitll'The needfor security,especiallysourceprotection,


must be
fully understood within the intciligenceorganisationand amongthose
to whom it is disseminated. The "need to know', principlehas to be
enforcedand clearguideiinesgiven on dissemination, particularlyto
HN, civil ian authorities.

In the immediateera of canadianconfederation,l g64-1g70,the first


canadian
lnteliigenceservice was formedunderone Gilbert McMicken, a stinendiarv
magistratebasedin Windsor,Ontario,This period saw nurnerousund confusing
alarmsbroughton by the Americancivil war and the subsequent Fenian
insurrectionarymovement(an extremeIrish nationalistmovement)that
raidedCanada
--
with the aim to inJluencegritiitr policy on Ireland. McMicken ,fruO
o.gun12.Our'
excellentdetectiveforce alongthe frontier,and who hqd a wide acquaiitance
of spies
and informers'(Prime Minister Sir John Alexander)Macdonaldusuallyt
n"* ,oi"-
aboutthe plans of the Feniansthanthe Feniansdid themselves."

Extract and quote from Donald Creighton,John A. Macdonald; The young politician.
Toronto:the Macmiliancompanyof canada,Ltd; 1956:3g3,421and
43g_439.

C o m p o s i t i o no f a n I n t e l l i g e n c eO r g a n i z a t i o n

24' IntellieenceStaff Organisation. Thereis no fixed estabiishment for an intelligence


organisation,nor is thereany pre-determined scaleon which to baseits composition.It,
sizewill be determinedby the extentand natureof the threat,the commander's
requirements, the architecture
necessary to supportoperations andthe tntelligence
collectionagenciesthat can be madeavailable.As no two campaigns areevJr foughtin
quitethe samecircutnstances, it foliou,sthat the intelligence
oiganizationfo. each"ne*
commitmentshouldbe custom-designed, althoughpaslcampaignswill providegr-ridance
and generalprincipleswherethereareusefulparallels.tne sizeof any Canadian"
contributionto a ColN campaignwill haveto be designcdin consultation with the senror

8t23
DI{AFT

rnteliigence officerandthe intelligencestaff of the FIN.Almost certainly,the sizeof


intellrgence staffswill grow as the campaigndevelops. The probablefunctionsit would
rnaintainfor a counter-insurgency dcploymentareshowndiagrammaticallyin Figure?-
r ( s c a ' a d d i t i o n odl i a g r u n t s.'/ i l e ) )

l5 l n t e l l i e e n c e S u p p o n O r q a n i z aTt ihoenk.i n d o f s p e c i a l i sstu p p o r t h a tt h c


intelligencestaff would needwas coveredin paragraph 21 above, A diagramshowinga
o
p o s s i b i ei n t e l l i g e n cseu p p o r t r g a n i z a t i ois
n shownin Figure 3./ (TBD)

rs Affecting Integration.
F-acto

26. Although a single, centrally controlled, integratedintelligence organizatiott


answeringto a Director of Intelligenceis the ideal,the circumstancesprevailingin a HN
may not be conduciveto such a system,particularlyif a Canadiancontingentis part of an
international, allied force in which the senior Canadian officer may have limited
influence.Where it cannotbe achieved,a compromisesolutionmust be brokeredbetween
the interestedparties.The establishmentof a centralizedsystemmay be affectedbi' any
or all of the following factors:

a. The effectiveness, reliability and vulnerabilityof the HN's securityforces


and its intelligenceand securityorganization.

b. Willingnessby all partiesto cooperate,to shareinformation and details


of, perhapssensitive,FIN sources,otherintelligencedetailsand,
particularlyat the higherievels,mattersof politicalsensitivity.

The different points of view and doctrineof the securityforces,HN and


allied,Becausethe HN's securityforces,in particularthe police,must
continueto live and work amongthe populationafter the eventual
departureof the allies, they will be subjectto greaterinternalpressures
and constraints.It is importantthat intelligencestaffsovercomethis
problem as failure to integratewill seriouslyimpedethe intelligence
effort.

The degreeof authority delegatedto officials at each level of the


commandstructure,national,provincial,regionaland district.

2'1. ASIC. Whetheror not an intelligencecommitteeis established, the normaifocus


for intelligencefor Canadianforces will be the ASIC or if a joint operation,the Joint
ASIC (JASIC), which will be locatedalongsidethe JointOperationsCell (JOC),forrning
the hub of an1' Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ). Within the ASIC will be the
senior intclligenceofficer and his staff, This vvill inciudeCCIRM and the AII Sources
C e l l ( A S C ) . i n w , h i c hf u s i o na n d b u l k o f t h e a n a l y s i sw i l l b e c o n d L i c t e dR e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
o f r h e a g e n c i e sf,o r e x a m p l eH S G , C S G a n d I S G , w i l l b e l o c a t e di n t h e A S C . I n s o m e
casesit rvill be necessary for theseelementsto be affordedtheir own segregated areawith

923

Ln2nt'l',4 ?-q-nnn4 17
DRATT

niore strlngenlaccesscontrolsthan pertainrn t h e r e s t o f t h e


A S C ( S e c p a r a g r a p h1 0
a b o i ' e .S) i m i l a rc o n s r r a i nm
t sa y a p p l yi f a N I C , ( c o l l o q u i a i l ya,C A N I C ) ,r s d e p l o y e d .

Tasking

28. . Directionwill beginwith a determi_


nationof the commander's intelligencerequirements or as theyaremore commonly
tennedpriority intelligence requirements (PIR). Thesewill be theproductof his mission
analysisand shouldbe discussed with the seniorintelligence officeiwho will be ableto
ensurethat they areaccurately focused.It may not be possible,in the earlystagesof a
campalgn'to stateclearlythe commander's intelligence requirements as insufficienr
operationalinformationmay be availableon which to plan. Where
this is the case,the
intelligencestaffshavethe responsibility of giving guiianceto commanders on the kind
of intelligence thatthey willrequire.This may be doneby meansof an inteiligence
estlmate. An intelligence estimatetakesthe commander's plan,no matterhow broadly
defined,and comparesit with existingintelligenceon the insurgency.
concurrentwith
the intelligence estimate,the staffshouldapply Intelligence preparation of the Battlefield
The intelligence estimate and IPB together will give the intelligence
llpel sraffa good
ideaof the gapsin theirknowledgeof the iniurgencyanldthese
canfbrm the basisof the
initialcollectionplan.It is likely,parlicularlyin the initial
stages, thattherewill be a
shortfallin intelligence.rhe probabilityis that therewill be
m"orebasicintelligcnce
availablethancurrentintelligence. The preparation of an initiaicollectionplaiwillalso
give someindicationof the necessary collectionassets, andintelligen..urihit..ture that
will bc neededfor the campaign.

29' Directionto the Collectors. Even when an intetligence organization hasbeen


established, informationdoesnot flow automaticallyinto the handsof
the intelligence
staff' and then to the commander.If directionis poor, the intelligence
organisationmay
be in dangerof collectinglargequantitiesof irreievantinformation.
A commandermusr
give his intelligencestaff cleardirectionand a firm indication
of the prioritiesto be
allottedto his intelligence requirements. on receiptof the commander,s intelligence
requirements, the intelligencestaff will first, with the aid of the intelligence
-l'hese esimate ancj
IPB, idcntify gapsin the intelligence already_held. gapsshould[e filled by iasking
collectionagenciesto collectagainstthem. fhe questions-put
to the coliectorsare known
as InformationRequirements(lR) and their collettion is piamed
carefullyby the ,.nio'.
intelligence offrcerin conjunctionwith his CCIRM staffwho will coordinate
the
collectionplan and IRs andmanagethe intelligencerequirements.
The resultant
collectionplan must,in turn,be approvedby the commanderprior
to collectorsreceivrng
theirdirectionfrom the intelligence staffs.The collectronplanwill normallybe
maintainedon a collectionworksheetwhich will show theallocatron
of'tasks,in orderof
prtority,to individualcollectionagenciesandthe time, and form
in which informationis
Io Dereported.

SECTION 3 - COLLECTION

30 Aspectsof Collection.Thereare two aspectsof collection;exploitation,


by

10t23
DRAFT

L n t c l l i g c n cset a t t so f t h e i rs o u r c e as n d a g e n c i eas n dt h et i m e l y ' d e l i v e rovf c o l L e c t e d


i n f o r m a t i o nt o i n t c l l r g e n cset l f f s f o r s r r b s e q r r epnr to c e s s t ni ct t t c

r 1t23

A0202313-11-00011I
--:: .r,.i ir-ti l l .r1 t

r,!ilr'::

DR-AFT

Itrt--.r-
INTELLIGENCE
J o r n It n t e l l r g e n C
c ee l l
( S e eF i g2 f o r d e b i t s ) PRCDUCTION

CClRlv'l

We a p o n s MILITARY
In te l l i i g e n ce INTELLIGENCE
Unit Company
2 5

1.Jointlymanned.Responsible for the productionof all air photography and imagery


support.
2 ProvidesSpecialistsupportincludingATOs for jFHQ and
IptelligenceStaff's.
3 Electronicwarfare SupportMeasures(ESM) unit provides
sIGINT suppoftfor JlrHQ.
4 Providesand administersHTJMINT'support eg: Agent Handlers,Surveiilance
personnel. JointForwardInterrogation Teams(JFITfcountry LiaisonTeams(ct.T)
includingde-briefers, Military lnteliigenceLiaisonofficers
irtarr-olnleta rntetlgence
N C O s( F N C O ) e t c .
5' Providesintelligenceand Field Securitystaff for JFHe and
sectrons and de-tachmenrs
at subordinate level,continuityNCos coNCos at Unit level.
F i g u r e3 I n t e l l i g e n c S
e u p p o r tO r g a n i s a t i o n

12t23

40202313-12-000120
DRAFT

inrelligenceo .r , w h e na p p r o p r i a t ed .i r e c t l yt o w c a p o ns y s t e m sC. o l l e c t i o nw i l l b e b a s e d
on the coilectionpian drawn up by the intelligence staffs,underthe directionof
commanders and the intelligencecommineesduringthe Directionphase.The CCIRM
staffwill managecollection.

S o u r c e sa n d A g e n c i e s

31. LIUMINT. As outlined above,the most effectivesourceof intelligencewill be


that derivedfrom the direct questioningof personswhetherformally or informally.This
is likely to includethe following:

a. Canadianand CoalitionMilitary Sources, This will includeall ranksof the


securityforcesespecially thosewhose dutiesrequire them to move amongthe I{N
popuiation,on patrois,on collectionof localiy-produced supplies,on liaisonwith
HN authorities,dockers,airport workers,aid workersand the like. It is vital that
all such personnelare thoroughlybriefedon the gapsin intelligencewhich their
dutiesmight enablethem to fill. They shouldbe made"intelligenceaware"so that
they are alwayspreparedto report informationwhich may appeartrivial but
which, when addedto other pieces,may be irnportant.Dismountedpatrolsare
critical to collectionin COIN operationsand all soldiersare sensors;

b. HN SecurityForces.This will includemilitary,paramilitary,auxiliaries


and reserves.They will be of valueboth on duty and when on leave.Like therr
Canadian and Allied counterparts,they shouldbe encouragedto become
intelligenceaware.Attempts shouldbe made systematicallyto brief thosegoing
on leave locally and debrief them on return.

c. Military Surveiilance.AII the usuaiconventionalwar surveillancesources


such as ObservationPosts(OP), mountedand dismountedpatrols,reconnaissancc
units,air reconnaissance, and troopssupplemented by specialistsurveillance
equipment,are equally useful in counter-insurgency operations.They must be
taskedand briefed with great carebecauseinsurgentsoperatemore covertlythan a
conventionalenemy.Units will be
frequently taskedto mount operations
specificallyto obtaininformationor to give coverto otherintelligence-gathering
operations,for example,the insertionor retrievalof covertOPs.

d. Covert Surveillance.SpecialForces(SF)havea long historyof success in


the role of staticcovertsurveillance andthe exploitationof the informationwhich
they obtain.The use of SF for intelligence-gathering and direct action must be
carefullycoordinated. When SF are deployed, it will be normalfor thereto be SF
liaisonofficersinthe HQ of the formation to which they are assigned.

e. IrregularForces. Units may alsobe raisedlocally from the police,the


Fllrl's army and from friendly sectionsof the civilianpopulationfor the purposeof
d e l e n s i v eo r o l f e n s i v eo p e r a t i o nass a i n s i:n s u r g e n t sD.e f e n s i v eo p c r a t i o nisn c l u d e

t3t23

A n r n r ? , . |1 - 4? - n n n 4? , 1
DRAFT

t h eg u a r d i n go f k e y p o i n t ss. t o r a g a c r e a sa n dv c r r j m p o f l a n t l yt .o r , ' ' r sa n dr i l l a g e s


r h a th a v ec o m et o t h eH N -g- o. v e r n m e n ls' si d e .1 nM a l a y as, u c h : r r c g u l awr se r e
r r s e dt o i n f i l t r a t et h e i n s u r g e n t sc o m m a n ds t r u c t u rbey c o m p l e t e lryc p l a c i n g: r
o r n r r n i n n - e n a r t i c r r l A rA r e A T h e v ' h e r nneratedto unravel the chain of command
f r o m t h e i n s i d eI.n K e n y a ,d u r i n gt h eM a u M a u c a m p a i g o n f t h ee a r l y 1 9 5 0 s ,
"pseudo-gangs" wereused to attackinsurgents in theirown tenrtory.Suchuseof
i r r c p u l atrr o o n si 5 .I S w e v e r r e i r l i v e ] vs n n h i s t i c a t ea dn dt h e s co n e r a t i o ncsa n h e
l l l l S g l q l t l v v P J

d e v e l o p eodn l y o v e ra p r o t r a c t epdc r r o di n a n c n v i r o r u x c nwt h i c h i s v c r y u c l l


understood by the intelligence organisation.

f. Intenogation. Prisoners canbe an imponantsourceof information.


l n t c r r o g a t i oinn a c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e nccaym p a l g nc a n .h o w e v e rb. e a s e n s l t i v c
matterpoliticallyandis likely to be subjectto rigorousoversight,both officialiy,
a n d ,u n o f f i c i a l l yf.r o m t h em e d i a .l t i s i m p o r t a ntto b c f u l l y a w a r eo f t h e l e g a l
basisunderwhich interrogation takesplace.Systematic interrogation of captured
insurgents canhaveexcellentresults, particularly in buildinga picture of
commandstructures,communicationsand otheraspectsof the insurgents'
infrastructure.In low-ievelconflict, intenogationis lesslikeiy to produce
intelligence of immediatetacticalvalue,simplybecause insurgentmethodsof
operating,normally involve a very restrictedcircle within which future plansare
discussed. In generalterms,but not alwaysso,interrogation shouldbe capableof
producingevidencethat will be acceptablein court.It is vital, therefore,that it is
conducted, strictlyin accordance with ruleslaid down by the host-nation's
judiciary and the Law of Armed Conflict.

g. De-briefing.Arrangementsmust be madeto providea DefenceDe-


briefingTeam (DDT), personnelskilledin de-briefingwilling subjects.
Thesewill
normallyincludeCanadiancitizenswith recentknowledgeof the I{N situation
and environment.Suchpeoplemight includetravelers, airlinecrews,expatriate
workersand membersof Canadiandiplomaticmissions.If the crisishasresulted
in an exodusof suchpeoplefrom the country,thendebriefingwiil be established
in Canada.If suchpeoplehaveremainedin the country,then a de-briefingteam
may deploy for de-briefingoperationsin the FI\I.

h. IlUMll.lT Support.Both interrogationand de-briefingrequireclose


steerage supportif they areto be effective.Liaison
and extensiveintelligence
representatives at appropriate
will be established ASICs and will needextensive
analyical and researchsupport.

i. CapturedDocuments,Equipmentand Stores.Thesearevaluablesources.
Troops must be trainedto realizetheir worth and encouragedto make them
availableto intelligencestaffsat the earliestopportunity.Documentsfound orr
suspects may assistin the questioning of prisoners by providinginterrogators,.vitl-r
i n f o r m a t i o nt h a rt h e yc a ne x p l o i td u r i n gi n t e n i e w s I. n c e r t a i ni n s t a n c c si t. m a y b c
necessary to employspeciallytraincdpersonnel to undertakesensitivesite
exploitation(SSE)when rulesof evidenceor humanrightsinvestigations ma1,be

1 1 / fI
N D ^ T T
tr l\n1 1

indicated

J LfN PoliceForces.HN Policcarean exceLlent sourceof informationbut


t h e ym u s tb e h a n d i e dw i t h g r e a ts e n s i r i v i t rC. a r em u s tb e t a k e nn o t t o d u p l i c a t c
the informationcollectionfrom policeofficersbeingundertakenby theirown
i n t e l l i g e n cset a f f .P o l i c ee q u i v a l e n tasr ev e r y l i k e l yt o b e h a n d l i n gt h e i ro w n
sourcea s m o n gt h ep o p u l a t i o nI.t i s p r o b a b l teh a tt h e r ew i l l b e a s t r o n gr e l u c t a n c e
to disclosethesesourcesto intelligence staffs,but their tasking,and the
i n l b r m a t i o nt h e yp r o v i d e s, h o u l db e c o o r d i n a r eadn d f u s e db y t h e c e n t r a l i s e d
intelligencemachinery.

k. HN Population.Undoubtedly, the HN populationwill, if systematically


exploited,be the best sourceof HUMINT. Greatcaremust be taken in developing
the HN populationas sourcesand closecoordination with HN intelligence
agencies, the PoliceIntelligenceBranchin particular,must be anangedif
difficulties areto be avoided.The insurgentsmay usebogus informantsto plant
falseinformationor uncover the source-handling network,HN informantsshould
be given the opportunityto contactthe securityforcesconfidentially.This can be
done by making confidentialtelephonelines or Post Office Box numbers
avaiiableand by keeping routine miiitary patrolsin cioseproximity to the
population.Doing so will permit a buddinginformantto passinformationwithout
unduly drawing attentionto himself.All military patroismust be trainedto talk to
HN peopleas a matter of course.Peoplewho have good causeto fear reprisals
should be given the opportunity to contactthe securityforce with information,for
example,at road blocks or on cordonand searchoperations,where their
interviewscan be concealedunderthe guiseof interrogation,The intelligence
organisationwill be capableof developinga systemfor making contactwith, or
beingcontactedby. sympathizers.

l. Informersand Agents. Much of the useful information,which reachesthe


inteliigencestaff, will come lrom informersand agents.A srnall numberof well-
placedand reliableagentscan provideinformationof value well beyondtheir
cost,particularlyif aimed at the pivotalpointsin the insurgents'command. If
agentsare ableto penetratethe top level of the insurgents'commandand control
organization, informalionmay be providedon the developmentof theirstrategies,
the identificationof importantleaders, the systemof liaisonbetweenthe military
wing and the insurgentpoiitical leadership and the methodsof acquiring
resources. At lower echelons,informersareusefulin providinginformationon,
for exarnple,personalities, tacticalplansand weaponcaches.At theselevels,if
continuity is to be rnaintained,it is importantthat the agentnetwork expandsat a
similar rateto that of the insurgentmovement,otherwrsetheir relativevalue will
diminish,The problemwith actingon informationsuppliedby an individualis
source-protection. In an insurgentorganisation the circieof knowledgeis kept
small. If an informerrepo(s the moveof a weaponto a new hide, for example,
perhapsonly threeinsurgentshavebeenmadeaware,the courier,the commander
a n d t h c q u a r t e r m a s t eAr .s u b s e q u e ni tm, m e d i a t e
operationb y r h es e c u r i t yf o r c c s

| 5/23

40202313-1s-000123
DRAF'I

t o r e c o v e trh ew e a p o nm i g h tr a i s eT h i s c o u l ds e r i o u s lj ye o p a r d i z e
t h es e c u r i l yo f
the souice,Caremust,therefore, be exercised rn suchmattersand the adviceof
theHSG soughtwhenplaming operations.

m' In HUMINT terms,an agentis a personspecificaily


recruitedandtrained,
placedin a hostiieorganization and who is taskedwitli informationgatheringon
the organizationof which he is pan - a controliedsource.An informer
is a person
who, perhapsuninvited,passesinformationto an opponent
abouthis organiz'tion
- an uncontrolledsource.An informantis one who giuesinformatron_
a casual
soulce.

32. Coordination. Whenever HUMINT sources are to be exploitedit is imperative


thatali HUMINT collection agenciesoperating
in thetheatrecffect liaisoncloselywith
eachother.Thisliaisonis vitalto ensure:

a. De-confliction. No sourceshourdeverbe run by morethana singre


agency'If a singiesourceworks for more than one agency,
it is possiblJthathis
reportscan' unwittingly,confirm themselves.This false
confirmation,sometimes
called falsecollateral,as well as being a dangerto
the intellig.n.. p.o..rr, .un
causethe sourceto gain greatercredencethan his worth, puri
..ror., iitn"
situationbecomesknown to the insurgents,they canexploit
the falsecollateralat
the expenseof the securityforces.

b. veracity. Thereis alwaysthe risk of a source,if not properly


handred,
producinginformationwhich is unreliable,or even
actingus'u ,loubl. agent.
Taskingmust be rigidly controlledto reducethe likelihood
of this iruppJning
Reliability of sourcesmust alwaysbe evaluatedwith great
careand records
maintainedby rhe HUMINT agency.

c' Security.The smallerthe circleof peopleknowingthe


identityof a source,
the saferhe can operate.If sourcesare to be maintained,
and confiden.. ,fr.na,
source-protectionmust be effective,and be seento be effective

33' Open Sourcelntelliqence. Intelligenccderivedfrom opensources(OSNT)


is
playingan increasinglyimportantrole.Nowhere,however,
*itt tt. role of the mediabe
more lmportantthanin counter-insurgency. The actionsof the securityforceswill be
scrutinrsedcloselyand will play a majorparl in formingpublic
opinion.Relationswith
themediaare not rhe directresponsibirity of the intellig;;cestaff.they should
remember,however,that reporterscan get accesswhere
securityforcesoften cannot.
Furthermore,pressteamsare often out and about for protracted
pe'ods. A warm
relationship,built up betweenintelligence staffsand individualmembersof thepress
corpscan reapdividendsin the form of low-levelinformation
Many Canadian journalists
will coverthe campaignfor an extendedperiod,visitingthe
countryfor, perhapssix
weeksat a time beforereturningto Canadafor one or two
months.If an intelligence staff
developsa sufficientrelationshipwith individualmembersof a mediateam,information
might be forthcomingin retum for, perhaps,a sanitizedupdate,
or a securitybrief on their

totzi

Anan^^'
DRAFT

r e r u r nr o t h et h e a r r e withcauLton
o I o p e r a t i o n sM e d i ar e p o r i ss h o u l da l u a y sb e r e p a r d e d
T h e v r r e l i k e l y r o i n c l u d ea b i a st o s o m ep a n i c u l apr u r p o s er a t h e rt h a nb e a s t r a r g h t
r e p o n i n go f u n a b r i C g eodr u n e l a b o r a t ef a dc t sC. o m m a n d e rms a y h a v es e e nt h em o r n i n g
newson televisionaboutthe campaignimmediatelybeforebeingbriefedby the staff.
r^^r ,^ ^'^ff- L^, i-^
Thic e rn i.erri1"hl,,
, , e a o t o s l a l l sn a v l n g1.6- .r e- c n n n d t.r-- l nr r. e- q- q- r e n o r t q r a t h e r t h a n l.e, a-d- l n g
nr rr r JsUrUr JhI vi LeJc rwnsl f rL h
u r l ueI it rlcl lL
U^
i + L
U J- l-l l:B^ ^ "w l L l l "U -l rcr U
^rr 'L 'upr r3s s1usr e s u l t sI.n t e l l i p e n c o
e f f i c e r ss h o u l dt a k e
stepsto avoid briefingsdevelopingin this way. HN media,in particular,will havea r,'itai
role to play in the heartsand mindscampaignand intelligcncestaff can expectto piay a
part in this with the Info Ops and PSYOPS staff

34. Open-Source Publications. In additionto the currentreportingof newsteamsln


l ep e n - s o u r cmea t c r i apl r o d u c e dp r i o r t o t h e
t h e a t r er,h e r ei s l i k e l yt o b e c o n s i d e r a b o
campaignwhich will go someway to meetinginteliigencestaffs'requirements for basrc
intelligence, This can includeinternet,atlases, encyclopedias, travelbooks,statistical
summariesand a hostof otherreferences producedby the specialist-interest press
coveringthe armedforces,the political,economic,geographical situationsinsidethe
country.

35. InsurgentUse of the Media. it mustbe remembered thatthe insurgentmovement


will also attemptto make use of the media to spreadits own views and discreditthoseof
the governmentand thc securityforces,Intelligencestaffsshould attemptto catalogue
insurgentpublications;they can sometimesrevealaspectsof the insurgentsthat are
otherwiseunknown.

Imagery Intelligence

36. ImaseryIntelliqenceas a Source.Intelligencederivedfrom imagery,(IMINT),


w,ill play an importantroie in counter-insurgency operations.Coveragewill include
imagery,ranging from map-quality prints from airborne platforms,both satelliteand
aircraft,someof very high resolution,to thermalimagery(TI), and Infra-red(IR),
pictures.TI irnageryis excellentat detectingbodieswhrcharewarmerthan their
surroundings, suchas peopleconcealedin densefoliage,or a warrnvehicleengine.II{
imageryis capableof detectingdisturbedsoil; valuablefor detectingburiedarmscaches,
commandwires for booby trapsand IEDs. Collectionplatformswill includesatellites,
strategicaircraft,tacticalair reconnaissance (TAR), helicopters and Uninhabited
AirborneVehicles(UAV). OPs and otherreconnaissance troopscan expectto be
equippedwith hand-heldcameras,video recorders, TI equipment,radarand Image
intensifiers(ll). Coordinationof IMINT is the task of an ISG, normally found from
w,ithinthe resourcesof the J2 Imagery at NDHQ There will be a constantdemandfor
photographiccoverageof areasof operations. The ISG will be ableto provide
intelligencederivedfrom the analysisof all kinds of imagery.Much analysiswill be
done,however,not on "wet fi1m", that is photographic negativeor print.but on ''sof1
copy", imageson a computerscrccn.Althoughprintsof imagescan be madeavailable,
careshouldbe takento ensurethat they aredemandedonly when necessary, for example
d s p r o o fo f i n t e l l i g e n cree p o r t sa sa
a s b r i e f i n ga i d s .P r i n t ss h o u l dn o t b e d e m a n d e a

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A.0202313-17-000125
DR-AFT

nlatterof course.The time takento interpretresultsof an IMNT taskis


consrdcrablr
lengthenedwhen printsof the imagery, arerecuired,

S i g n a l sI n t e l l i g e n c e

37. Signalsintelligence (SIGINT).Insurgcntgroupswill, however,have


a needto
communicate andwhen they do via any electronicmediumthey are
vulnerableto intercept,Besidesderivingintelligence from communicatiols
(COMNT), SIGIN'f analystswill exploitemissions from radarsandother
clectronicemitters.This ciectronicintelligence(ELN'f), can enablethe
detectionof, for example,radio-control devrcesand missiiecontrol,guidance
and target-seeking radars.WhereSIGNT collectionis envisaged, u iSG *ill
be availableto coordinateits collectionandto interpretthe resultswithin
the
ASC.

EW Detachments. EW Detachmentswiil provideusefulinformationand


intelligenceby exploitinginsurgentweakness
in moderncivil andtactical
communications.

SpecialisedFunctions

38 BattleDamageAssessment (BDA). BDA providesan assessment of the degreeof


effectivenessof Canadianoperationsand engagements againstthe enemy.It is useiul to
supportthe estimationand IPB processesby enablingupdatesto enemyorderof battle
(ORBAT) and the stateof enemyinfrastructure.Italso uidr in determiningthe effectof
thc PSYOPScampaisn.

39. SensitiveSiteExploitation(SSE).SSEis an activitythatrequires


speciallytrained
personnel.
SSE supportsa numberof functionssuchas Legaland CIMIC.
It alsosuDDorts
MP by identifyingand recoveringevidence.

SECTION 4 - PROCESSING

40' Processins as a Discipline.The processing stageof the intelligencecycleincor-


poratesthc work of the intelligence staffin collation,analysis,integratron or synthesrs,
and interpretationof information. The processingstaff wiil normally
be trained
intelligence
operators,oftenfrom ail threeserylces,supported by specialists in the
collectiondisciplines.Whereappropriate, specialistsfrom otherarmsand serviceswill
join the anaiyticalstaff,for example,engineerinteliigence
operators, with theirspecialrst
knowledgeof' particularly,terrain,explosivesand routeconstructron.
Ammunition
technicians with their trainingin explosives, finng devicesand weaponinspectionare
to developweaponsintelligence in conjunctionwith thepoliceforensicscientists.
1!le
This discipline,basedon suchtechriquesas weaponmatching,will be
ableto trace
wcaponsto their sourcesof supply,to roundsthey havefired,explosives
and detonators
to theirorigin and so on.

tB/23

40202313-18-0001
26
DRAITT

'l'he
41 A S I C .T h e b e s tr e s u l t sr v r l lb e o b t a i n e df r o mt h o s ei n t e l l i g e n coer g a n i s a t i o n s
n h i c h a r ef u l l y i n t e g r a t e dw,o r k t o a c e n t r a l l y - a g r eceodi l c c t i o np l a n .e m p l o ye f f e c r r v e
C C I R M p e r . s o n n ef ul .s i o na n d d a t a b a sm e a n a g e r sa,n a i y s tas n do t h e ri n t e l l i g e n c e
s p e c i a l i s tasn d a p p r o a c thh e i r t a s ki n a s t r u c t u r e do .b j e c t i v e
a n ds y s r e m a t iwc a y .

42. Fusion,Oneof the criticaltasksperformedin the ASC is that of fusion.This is the


collationof reportsand informationfrom the separate, single-source agencies, HUMNT,
SIGINT and IMINT, into a singleassessment. Eachagencyproducesits own view o1'an
e v e n to r a c t i v i t ya n dr e p o n si t t o t h e i n t e l ) i g c n cset a f [ T h i s i s k n o w n a s " s i n g l e - s o u r c e
p i c t u r ec o m p i l a t i o n " T
. h e f u s e da s s e s s m e nt ht ,a ti s , r h ea s s e s s m em n ta d eb y t h e
comparisonof morethan one single-source report,becomesthe "recognisedtactical
ground,(or maritime,or air), picture". The recognised prcturewill be producedat the
level with responsibilityfor reporting,usuallythe levei maintainingthe databaseas it is
therethat the broadestview will be. This then becomesthe authoritativeview which
forms the basisforassessments by all subordinate intelligence staff and will be
disseminatedupwards,downwardsand to the flanks in the form of intelligence
summaries(INTSUMs),which areoften pictorial.

43. D a t a b a s e s .O n e o f t h e f u n d a m e n t a l so f e f f e c t i v ep r o c e s s i n gi s t h e
m a i n t e n a n c e o f a n e f f i c i e n td a t a b a s e .I n a C O I N c a m p a i g n t h e r e w i l l b e a
p l e t h o r a o f s m a l l , a p p a r e n t l yi n s i g n i f i c a nat n d u n c o n n e c t e dd a t a . O n l y e f f e c t i v e
c o l l a t i o na n d c r o s s - r e f e r e n c i n gw i l l e n a b l e a n a l y s t st o a s s e s s t h e s i g n r f i c a n c eo f
i n d i v i d u a lp i e c e s a n d m a k e b e s t u s e o f t h e m .
SECTION 5 - DISSEMINATION

44. Responsibility.Disseminationof intelligence to subordinatecommanders is the


responsibilityof the Director of Intelligenceat the highestlevel and of the senior
intelligenceofficersat subordinatelevels.Whereintelligencecommitteesare established,
individualintelligencechiefsof the separate servicesrepresented will accept
responsibilityfor briefingtheir own commanders.

45. Use of IntelligenceArchitecture.It shouldbe emphasised that intelligenceshould


flow, not necessarilyin a hierarchicalmanner,as is the casewith ordersalong an
operationalchain of command,but quickly and efficiently,from whomeverholds it to
whomeverneedsit. This will meanthat,on occasion,it will bypasssomelevelsof
command.This is greatlyaidedby the useof informationtechnology.iNTSUMs should
be disseminated at regularintervals.Thesecanbe supplemented by detailedreportson
specifictopics,for example,insurgentORBATs or incidents,as required.As with
intelligencereporlingin any phaseof war, caremust be takento avoid "circular
reporting"in which partsof a summaryfrom one intelligence staff areplagiarisedin
anotherand returnedto the originatoras apparentconfirmationof the original.This
p r o b l c mi s p a r l i c u i a r l ay c u t ci n c o m b i n e do p e r a t i o nws h e r et h e d i f f e r e n nt a r i o n a l
authoritiesincludereportsfrom third partiesin their own summaries. The bestdefence
againstthis is clcarordersfor reporlingauthorityand a thoroughknowledge,on the part
o f i n t e l l i g e n co
e f f i c e r so, f t h e s o u r c e sa n d a g e n c i eas v a i l a b l teo a l l t h e i n t e l l i g e n cset a f f s

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A0202313-19-0001
27
DRAFT

providlngrepcfisfor the theatre,

17. S e c u r i t vW
. h i l e i n t e l l i g e n cies o f u s e o n l y i n t h e h a n d so f o p e r a t i o n adle c r s r o n -
makers,its dissemination shouldbe closelycontrolled.Source-protection must aiwaysbe
a proirity. If a sourceis at risk, inteliigenceshouldbe sanitisedor disguiseci
in sucha
w a y a s t o c o n c e a li t s s o u r c eA , c c e s st o i n t e l l i g e n c ien s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c essh o u l db e
restrictedto those with a real need to know. Securityof inteiligencemust
alwaysbe
balancedagainstthe valueto be gainedfrom its disseminatjon, Agenciesgenerallyhave
strictguidelinesfor dissemination of intelligencein an emergency,perhapsr.r,hen lives
are at risk' Intelligenceofficersneed to acquaintthemselveswith these ',action
on',
procedures so that emergency dissemination cantakeplacewith the minimum of delav.

SECTION 6 - TRAINING

48 Pre-Deployment Training.All personnelinvolvedin the Direction,Collection,


Processing and Dissemination of intelligenceshoulddeployto the theatrehavingmade
thoroughpreparation.They must be ciearon their role in the intelligenceorganiiation
and
havehad the opportunityto rehearsethe issueswith which they will be dealing,
with
thoseto whom they will be working. Seniorintelligenceofficers,in particular,
should
takethe time to examinethe forthcomingoperationagainstthe fundamentals
of
intelligence,which arethe samefor any phaseof war. It is necessary to ordertheir
thoughtson architectures and inteiligencesupportin sucha way thai they can seeclearly
what infrastructurewill be necessary to meettheir aim of supportingthe commander,s
plan. Thosepersonnelwith a role which willrequire them to effectiiaisonwith
other
authoritiesin Canadashouldhavehad the opportunityto makecontactwith
them,to
discussthe issuesand,particulariy,agreeon the meanswith which they will
communicate. Ideally,they shouldhavethe opportunityto exerciseusinssimilar
communicationssystemsbeforedeparture.

49. BackeroundIntelligence. Military staffshouldbe as thoroughlybriefedas


possibleon the situationin the theatreof operationsbeforedeployment. HN MI
companieswill be ableto assistwith individualandunit trainingon intelligence
matters,
currentaffairs and other aspectsofthe insurgency.

50. SpeciaiistSkills.Military staffwith specialistskillsshouldensurethat as much


trainingas possibleis doneprior to arrivalin theatre,Problemsaremuch easier
to solve,
particularlythoseinvolvingtechnicalequipment,in a benignenvironment where
extensrvesupportfacilitiesexistthanafterdeniovment.

51. Intellisenceat Unit Level.Furtheraspects


of unit intelligence
and security
trainingare coveredin otherPartsof the Army Field Manual,

S E C T I O N7 . D I F F I C U L T I E SF A C I N GA N I N T E L L I G E N C EO R G A N I S A l ' I 0 N

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28
DRAFT

52 Non-Operational R.equire ment.Althoughthe immediaterequirement al the stafiof


a campatgn w i l i b e f o r t h e e x i s t i n gi n t c l l i g e n cocr g a n i s a t i ot no e x p a n da n dp r c - r d u c e
intelligence to supporlcommanders for mrlitaryand poiiceoperations, it will haveto
T.h e i n t e l l i g e n c e
c o n r i n u et o p r o v i d eo r h e rs t r a t e g i cp,o l i t i c aal n d e c o n o m i ci n t e i l i g e n c e
organisation will be severelystretched in the expansionphaseand the recruitmentof
addirionalstaff may give the insurgents an opportunityto infiltratetheiragents,

53. Securit-y of the ExpandedOrganization. Finding,and vetting,suitablepersonnel


and preventinginsurgentpenetration systemwill
of a rapidlyenlargingintelligence
presentdifficulties and risks. The difficultiesmay be overcomeby effort and cooperation.
The riskshaveto be acceptedwith openeyesand minimizedby goodsecurity.

54. PoliticalDirection.Politicaldirectionof intelligenceis a sensitivematterin a


democracybecauseof publicly demandedchecksand balancesto ensurethat it is not
abusedto promotepersonal,party or factionalinterests.In a more authoritarianregime
the government'scontrolof intelligenceis closelyguardedto ensurethat itretainsa
monopolyof power.In eithercase,a seniormemberof the governmentusuallyexercises
direction.While at a policy or highercommandlevel,the principleis to centralize
intelligence. At the tacticallevel,wheresub-unitcommanders are expectedto exercise
initiative,the complex natureof operationswill have a "dispersingeffect" which will
appeariike a form of decentralization. Applying the principleof missioncommand,the
centralizeddirectionof intelligencepolicy and overarchingplansneednot stiflethe
initiativenecessary to counteran insurgency. Companyor CombatTeam Commanders
will have to be very aware of local politics and in future will probablyrequirean
intelligenceprocessingcapabilitywithin their headquarters element.Nonetheless, if not
centrallydirected,this manifestation of tacticalinitiativemay erode controlin three
respects.

a. Disseminationof lntelligence. The numberof peoplewho haveaccessto


sensitiveissueswill increase, controlof the intelligenceis more
thus centralised
difficult. There will be createdopportunitiesfor subordinates,newly in receiptof
intelligenceto take advantageof it or to be suborned

b. CollectionMethods.Methodsusedto collectinformationcan no longerbe


controlledrigidly from centralgovernment.HUMINT must be handledat the
lowestlevel.Agent handlersrequirethe kind of FiN knowledgewhich demands
that they live in closeproximityto thosewith whom they work.

c. Decisionson the Threat.Morc importantiy,thereis the increasein an


individual'sopportunitiesto exercisevaluejudgementsas to which peopleand
what groupsare to be considereda threatto the HN and who shouldor should not
be targeted.Often thereis not only a legaldividing line betweena proscribed
insurgentorganizationand its legitimatepoliticalpartybut alsobetweenthe
insurgentsand their sympathisers.

55. Increasein Military Influence.A funher difficultl',which insurgentpropagandists

21t23

ao?02?13-21-000129
,"il,t

DIlAFT

e x p l o i t i,s t h a tt h e d i l u t r o no f h i g h - l e v epl o l i t i c acl o n t r o il s e x a c e r b a t ebdy t h e r n c r e a s e d


influenceexercised overthe rnteiligence systemby the securityforces,The charge,
howeverunjustified, that the securityforcesaretherebyinvolvedin politics.un L. u
damagtngone.The obviousretort,thatthe Army is alreadyinvoivedto the extentthat it
supporlsa legitimategovernment againstlawlessinsurgents, will not convinceall The
relationship betweenthe government, thejudiciary,the securityforcesand rntelligence
shouldbe indrvrsibleA situationin which the intelligence organisation and the secusty
fbrcesareanswerable to separate authorities; government, regional,alliedor factionai
hasto be avoided.

56 lnfluenceof ForcignAllies.In combinedoperations, the chargemay be made,and


exploitedby the insurgents,
thatthe government is underthe controlof foreigners.
l'he
resultantsensitivitymay causethe governmentto placegreaterrestrictionson the
freedomof actionby the alliesthanmight otherwisebe the casc.This might inclucle
restrictions
on intelligence-gathering,
particularlysensitivecollectionin the HUMIN'p
and SIGINT fields.

22/23
I)I{AF I

2ii2i

31
A0202313-23-0001
DRAFT

ANNE.XA TO
C]IAPTE,R
7

G L O S S A R YO F A B B R E V I A T I O N S U S E D

Ali A r e ao f i n t e l l i g e n cIen r e r e s r
AIO A s s i s t a nl n t t e l i i g e n cO
e fficer
AIR Areaof Intelligence Responsibility
AOR Areaof Responsrbility
ASC A l l S o u r c eC s ell
ASIC All SourceIntelligence Centre
ATO Ammunition TechnicalOfficer
CCIRM CollectionCoordinationandlntelligenceRequirements Management
CB Citizens'Band(radio)
CLT CountryLiaison Team
CNR CombatNet Radio
CONCO ContinuityNCO
CPS CovertPassiveSurveillance
CSG CryptologicalSupportGroup
DDl' DefenceDe-briefingTeam
DIS DefenceIntelligenceStaff
DISC DefenceIntelligence& SecuritySchool
ESM ElectronicWarfareSupportMeasures
FINCO Field Inteiligence NCO
FS F i e l dS e c u r i t y
HCI Human-ComputerInterface
HSG HUMINT SupportGroup
I{UMIN'| Human Intelligence
IDB Integrated Database
II ImageIntensification
IMINT Imageryintelligence
IO IntelligenceOfficer
IR Infra-Red/lnformationRequirement
IRLS Infra-redLinescan
ISG IMINT SupportGroup
JFHQ Joint ForcesFleadquarters
.IFIT Joint ForwardInterrogationTeam
JIC J o i n tI n t e l l i g e n cC eell
JOC JointOperationsCell
JSIO JointServicesInterrogation Organisation
LAN IJN Area Network
MI Military Inteliigence
MILO MrlitaryIntelligenceLiaisonOfficer
MIO V i l i r a r y I n r e l l i g c n cO
e fficer

t-A7

4n202a14-1-nn'14 2^)
DR-AFT

MSTAR ManportableSun'eillanceand'fargetAcqursitionRadar
NIC N a t i o n a il n r e i l i g e n cC
eell
NIST e u p p o rT
N a t i o n a Il n t e l l i g e n cS t eam
OSNT Open-Source Intelligence
PIR Priority IntelligenceRequirement
PW P r i s o n eor f W a r
RII RequestFor Infonnation
RIC Reconnaissance InteiligenceCell
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SITS SecondaryImageTransmission System
SF SpecialForces
SIGINT SignalsIntelligence
SIW SpeciaiistInteiiigenceWing
TAR Tactical Air Reconnaissance
TI Thermal ImagerY
UAV UnmannedAerial Vehiclc
UGS UnattendedGround Sensors
I Inited Kingdom Military IntelligenceSupport
CANADAMIST :
I ermlnal
WIS WeaponsIntelligenceStaff

2-A1

A rlafra', 'l A a nnn4 aa


DRAFT

ANNEX B TO CHAPTER7

I N T E L L I G E N C E S U P P O R TF O R C 2 W I N A C O I N C A M P A I G N

Introduction

1 The components of Commandand Control(C2) arethe Commanderandhis staff.


includinghis supportingintelligenceorganisation,
communjcations and
informationsystems.All eiementsof the C2 processare important,largeiy
inseparableand contributeto the successful
outcomeof the Commander's-
plan;theyarealsovulnerableto attack,By preventingan insurgent
commanderfrom effectivelycontrollinghis organisation contributcs directly
to the colN principleof separatingthe insurgentfrom his support.
-fhe
2' natureand extentof all sourceintelligencerequiredfor the planningand
executionof c2w operationsis shown in the subsequent paragraphs.

Intelligenceto Support OPSEC.

2. Intelligencesupportfor OPSECplanningmust focus on the capabilitiesand


limitationsof the insurgentsintelligencegatheringsystem,in orderto reduce
the vulnerabilityof friendly C2 assetsand installationsto attack.Counter-
intelligenceresourceswill be concentrated on the securitythreat.Human
Intelligence(HUMINT), signalsIntelligence(SIGINT) and Imagery
Intelligence(IMNT) are importantto assessthe effectiveness of the OpSEC
plan.

Key information/intelligence
requirementsto supportopSEC are at ArLnexC.

l n t e l l i g e n c et o S u p p o r tP S Y O P S

A PSYOPSteamshouldwork very closelywith the All SourceIntelligence Cell


to plan PSYOPSand to integratethesewith the otherC2W functions.As part
of PSYOPSit may be necessary to concealaspects of friendlydispositions,
capabilities and intentions.OPSECmay thereforebe essential to the pSyopS
plan.Equally,it may be desirablein supportof pSyopS to reveaicertain
aspects of friendiydispositions,
capabilities
and intentions.PSyOpS canalso
be usedto supportDeception.

Basicpsychological intelligence- on the cultural,religious,socialand economic


aspectsof the targetcountry/populationand its governmenvieadership,
communications and media- is producedduringpeacerime in the fonn of
BasicPsychological Studies(BPS).During operations the BpS are
supplemented by currentpsychological intelligence,which is providedbv

l-87
DRAFT

s o r k i n gi n a G 2 l J 2c e l l '
P S Y O P Sa n a l y s tw

The resultantpsychological assessments aredifferentfrom intelligence


assessments because they use information and intelligenceto identify target
audienceswithin the opposingforce, and those factorsthat are most iikeiy to
influencetheir attitudesand behaviourin favour of the Commander'smission
The conditionsand attitudesof targetgroupsare likely to changeas the
situationdevelops.CurrentAll SourceIntelligence, in paflicularFIUMNT
and SIGINT, is thereforevital, both in the planning phase, and then
throughoutthe executionof PSYOPS,to assessthe effectivenessof current
campatgns,to relnforcesuccessand to re-allocatelimited resources,if the
desiredeffectis not beingachieved.

4 . Key information/intelligencerequirements- both for planningand executing


PSYOPS and for ensuringthat the insurgent'spsychologicaloperationsare
ineffective- are at Annex C.

Intelligenceto Support Deception

5. Deceptionaims to presenta deliberatelyfalsepictureto thosein an insurgency.


Deceptionis highly complex, in particularthoseaspectswhich seekto exploit
insurgentC2 assets,and it demandssecurityat the highestlevel. OPSECis
essentialto Deceptionin order to concealthoseaspectsand indicatorsthat
would allow the insurgentto determinethe reality behindthe Deception.

6, EW plays an importantrole in supportof Deceptionboth by targetinghostile


communicationsand by identifying thoseElectronicSupportMeasures(ESM)
-
elements- the ability to interceptand analyseour own communications
which it may be essentialto leaveintact as the conduit for electronic
decePtion.

1 . Intelligencesupportsdeceptionplannersby analysingan insurgent's'battlefield,


reconnaissance capabilitiesand identifying hrs perceptionof the
including his own deceptiondoctrine,tactics/procedures, capabilitiesand
intentions.This requires an insight into an insurgentcommander's way of
thinking, including the estimateprocess'

8. During the executionof deceptionoperations,All SourceIntelligence,particularly


oninsurgent movemenVdeployments, is requiredto monitor the insurgents
responseand to determinewhetherthe deceptionoperationis achievingits
aim. In analysingthis intelligence,attentionmustalsobe paid to possible
insurgentdeceptionplans to protecthis own operattons'

9. Ke1,information/inteliigencercquirements deceptionoperations
to plan/execute
and to reducethe effectsof insurgentdeceptionactionsagainstfriendlyC2

f a ?

5 - 2- 000135
A020231
DR-AFT

assetsareat Annex C.

lntelligence
t o S u p p o r tE W .

10.Ew hasapplications in providingearlywamingof insurgentaction,in self-


p r o t e c t i o ni n. l o c a t i n ga n d i d e n t i f o i nhgo s t i l ee m i n e r sa n d i n e x p l o i r a t i o n
l t.
dependson timely,directedAli SourceIntelligence, but communications
Intelligence(COMINT) andElectronicIntelligence(ELIN-f) and IMINT are
especiallyusefultoc2w plannersto locatean insurgents c2 means,to
identtfy any communicationsarchitecture, including offensiveEW capability,
and to highlight any critical/vulnerable C2 systems

I I . It is essential
to establishtargetacquisitionpriorities,basedon a commander's
conceptfor futureoperations.The decisionto targetinsurgentC2 assetsmust
be basedon an assessment of the balancebetweendestruction/neutralisation
and exploitation,and betweenhard-killand soft-kill methods.It may, for
example,be necessary to ensurethat certainhostileESM systemsare
protectedfrom attack,in supportof the electronicdeceptionplan. Suchkey
decisionsmust be made at the highestlevel and shouldbe includedin any
commander'sDirective.Decisionson targetingwiil also haveto be
coordinatedwith allies,wherethis is appropriate.

12. Key information/intelligence


requirements to supportEW - both to degradean
insurgentcommander'sC2 cycleand to nullify the effectsof hostileEW
actionsagainstfriendly C2 assetsareat Annex C.

Intelligenceto Support PhysicalDestruction

13.The physicaldestruction,or at leastneutralisation,


of hostileC2 and counter-C2
assetsis a centralobiectivein any C2W operations.

14.Intelligencefor physicaldestruction is focusedon supportingthe targeting


process.There is a requirementfor closeintegrationwith nationaltargeting
priorities.An assessment must alsobe made, with G2lI2 advice,on the
balanceof advantageof destructionagainstexpioitation,includingthe
possibledevelopment of a No-Strike(bothpassiveand activemeasures)
tarsetinplist.

15.As C2 systemscan be reconstituted,


it is essential
that timely BattieDamage
Assessment (BDA) - basedprimarilyon IMNT and slGrNT - is available.

16. Key information/intelligencerequirementsto supporttargeting,physical


Destructionand to reducethe vulnerabilityof friendly c2 assetsand
rnstallations
to attackare at Annex C,

3-87

Ananr2'l r:, n^^ar^


,- , All,lr

DRAFT

ANNEX C TO CF{APTER 1

KEY INFORMATIONINTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

FOR C2WOPSEC
1. CapabilitiesofinsurgentstocollecVprocess/analyseintelligence.
2. Intelligence SIGINT,HUMINT)on insurgent
(in parlicuiar objectives
intelligence
andachievements.
3, Factors,suchasculturalbias, theinsurgent's
thatcouldinfluence of
interpretation
intelliopnce oeined

4. Assessment of hostilecounter-C2capabilities to allow C2W plannersto make


prioritiesfor targetingl C2-protectionmeasures.
5. Counter-intelligenceon the securitythreatposedby agentsof foreign intelligence
scrvices.
6. HUMINT (from counterintelligence, the interrogationof prisonersor captured
insurgents)and SIGINT on the effectiveness of OPSEC.

PSYOPS

7. Detailed information on cultural,religious,social,economicand political


peculiaritiesof the country and region.
8. InsurgentC2 architecture.(possiblylinked with hostile forcesoutsidethe countryi
theatre).
9. Backgroundinformation on popularradio/TV programmesand personalities,
periodicalsand cartoons,and importantholidays,historicaldatesand religiousanniversa-
ries.
I 0. Assessmentof the systems,especiallycommunicationsand broadcastsystems,
usedby the insurgentto elicit supportfrom the populace,and mechanismsfor political
control.
I l. HUMINT is frequentlythe key to successfulPSYOPS,focusingon the target
group'sattitudes,alliances,and behaviourto identify:
a. Vulnerabilitiesand susceptibilities.
b. The leadershipstructure,key communicatorsand their relationshipwith the target
group.
c. Psychologicalprofilesof key politicaiand military leaders.Much of this can be
obtainedin peacetimeby FAClDefenceAttaches,
d. Ali agenciessuitablefor conveyingmessages to selectedaudiences
and bringing
maximum psychologicalpressureto bear.
e. Impact on unintendedaudiences.
f. Flostilepropaganda, analysingit for counter-propagandaand defensivePSYOPS.
g. Ascertainthe reactionof the insurgentto friendlyPSYOPS.

12. Assessmentof any insurgentPSYOPSdoctrine/capability


and propaganda/public
informationtechrioues.

t-c]

n n t n r z , t A - 4- n n n , t1 7
DRAFT

Deception

13' Assessment of the capabilrties


and iimitationsof the insurgentintelligence
coilec-
tron/analysis
system.
I4' Profilesof key leaders/militarycommanders, inciudinganalysisof theirdecisron-
makingprocesses andidentificationof biases/preconceived pJ.ceprions.
l5 Assessment of the hostiledeceptiondoctrine,tacticslprocedures and capabiliry.
l6' Currentintelligence on the insurgent's
ORBAT, forcedisporitionsandany chang-
es/redeploymentas a resultof deceptionoperations (to gaugesuC..r, of the deception).

EW

l7 Identifycriticalcommunications and non-communications c2 nodesfor exploita-


tion (ESM) or electronicattack- jarnming/DirectedEnergy
we apons(DEw),
l8' Identifyany hostileelectronicair defencesystemiithat
arecrucialto the success
of airlaviationoperations)for eiectronicattack
6ammingn)nW;.
19' Identify hostileESM systemsthat are exploitablJin support
of the deceptionplan.

PhysicalDestruction

20' Identificationof hostileC2 systems(in particularintelligence


collectionassets),
the communicationsarchitectureof thosesystemsandthe
facilitiesthat housethem..fhis
shouldincludean assessment ofthe degreeofredundancy.
2l' Assessment of the vulnerabilityof hostileC2 ryrt"., including
the role they play
tn supportingthe leadershipand military capabilities,in
orderto identify critical/
vulnerablesystemsas potentialtargets.
22' Identificationand locationof the defensivemeansused
to protecthostileC2
systems
23' Inteliigence(in particularIMINT or SIGINT) to assist
in any battlefielddamage
assessment of insurgentc2 targetsoncethey havebeensubjectedto
attack.
24' Intelligenceon any insurgentoffensivecapabilityand
targetingpriorities.

2-C7
r ,- 1 !f|I

DRAFT

D e f e n s i v eC 2 W

25. Intelligenceon any insurgentC2W organisation, doctrine/operating procedures,


capabilities
and potentiaivulnerabilities
dunng differentstagesof military operations
(bothin peaceand war).
26. Counter-intelligenceon foreignintelligenceservices.
27. Targetingintelligenceon hostileoffensiveC2W assets.
28. HUMINI- on insursentC2W intentions.

3-C7

AO202316-3-000139
i ;

'
: l []ILlrliT

CHAPTER 8

TNFORMATIONOPERATIOI.]S

Insurgencyis ultimatelye war of ideas,,.Recognizing


thisfact, successful
counterinsurgents havedevotedas muchffirt to defeatingtheenemy's
propogandaas theyhaveto defeatinghisfghters. Lltinningthewar of ideas has
oftenbeenthe decisiveline of operationsin successful
counterinsurgency
campaigns.'

Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, (/SA

SECTIbN I: INTRODUCTION

I . The centreof gravity of any COIN campaignis the indigenouspopulation.History has


shownthat insurgentsrequireonly the indifferenceof a populationto operatesuccessfully. Thus
the primarytargetof info ops in COIN operationsis that portionof thepopulationthat is mildly
supportive,neutral,or hostileto the insurgentmovement.Absenta neutralor friendly
environment,insurgentscannotoperateor thrive.

2' COIN operationsare lessaboutthe applicationof physicalforcethanthe influenceof


perceptions'The useof Counter-Command Activity (CCA) in COIN operationswill remain
important,particularlyin an environmentwherethe interdictionof eleitronicsignalsto IEDs is
critical to forceprotection.However,it is the influenceactivitiesof info ops,deined as .any
activity,be it physicalor cognitive,whoseprimarypurposeis to influencewill'that will
comprisethe bulk of info ops in a COIN campaign.

3. Influenceactivitiesseekto predispose,
penuade,convince,deter,disrupt,compelor coerce
approvedtargetaudiencesby promotingdesiredthemesandmessages, Theseactiiities may use
one or morecapabilitiesdependentuponthedesiredeffect,All activitiescreateinfluence;every
action,howeverinnocuousseeming,will havean influenceon thetargetaudiencein a COIN
campaign-the population.

4. The government'soverall informationcampaignwill concentrate on the two broadaimsof


winning the population'ssupportandconfidence,andconversely,loweringthe moraleand
effectivenessof the insurgentsand their supporters,
Somedegreeof succeJswith the frrst aim
may be a prerequisitefor progresswith the second.t-eadenhipat all commandlevelsmust be
awareof thepsychological implicationsof andthe correlation
betweenthe political,the military
and the moral aspectsof the campaign.In particularthey shouldtakecarethat actionin one
sphere,despitepromisinga quick retum,doesnotjeopardise thesuccess of theothertwo spheres
andso of the campaignas a whole,An opporrunity to ambusha particularinsurgentleadermay
haveseriousnegativerepercussions if theattackincludesunacceptable collateraldamaee.
I john
Nagi,"A BenerWarin lraq,-ArmedForces
Journal,August
2006

C h8 : 1 / 1 8
::r

5, Theprimaryinfluenceactivitycapabilities arePsyOps, PA,Presence PostureandProfile


(ppp),CINIIC,Deception, andphysiialdestruction. All activitiesmustbemutuallysupporting'
Thecomplexityof the rnfoopscampaign will besignificant andis a continuous setof
operations,As such,the G3 is responsiblefor info opsplanningandcoordination. Moreover,
bicauseall successfulCOINcampaigns have possessed detailedthematic directionfromthe
andpoliticallevels,theinfo opscampaign
strategic mustbeintegrated horizontallyandvertically
acrosJandup anddownthechainof command. Thus,thedestruction of aninsurgent safehouse
andseizureof a munitionscachemaybecombined with a CIMIC coordinatedproject that
providesresourcesto an NGO,publicised by PsyOps in-theatre,andPA intemationally,
protectedby a robustsecurityeiementdisplaying a strong deterrentposturcto theenemybut a
irienOly.nOn.lpful pmfile to thepopulation in aneffortto increase hostgovemment legitimacy
andestablisha safeenvironment for economic development. Obviously, sucha seriesof
operationsrequiressubstantiat inter-agencycooperation in both planning andexecutionto be
successful.

SECTION2: PRINCIPLESOF APPLICATION

1. Commander'sDirectionand PersonalInvolvement

6. Thecommander's penonalinvolvement drivesInfo Ops,andexercises controloverall lnfo


Opsactivitywithin a frameworkof timelydecision-making andconsultation up anddownthe
chainof command.Followingmissionanalysis the commander formulates his unifyingtheme,
in his statedintent. Tacticallevelplanningis basedonthatintent,with its defined
articulated
end-stateandsupportingeffects,andharmonises with otheractivities.
Info Opsactivities
Without the guidanceof the commander's unifyingthemeandintent,thelnfo Opseffortwill
lack focusandwill not achievethedesiredeffectsin harmonywith otheractivities.Messages
will becomeconfusedandcontradictory.

C h8 : 2 / 1 8
li):rLr, it'

I '.':i.ii i- DIL{F'II

7. Theimportance of info opsmustbe understood andcomrnunicatedby thecommander to his


subotdinates. Placingfaith in influenceactivitiesmay seemcounter-intuitiveto thecommander,
however,it is essential thatthiscognitiveleapis made;no successfulCOIN campaign hasbeen
conducted withouta sophisticated andintegrated info opscampaign(eventhoughit may not
havebeendescribed assuchat thetime),Moreover,thecommander mustundentandthat
influenceactivitiesmay resideoutsideof somesoldier's'comfortzone,'The confidence to trust
in andproperlyempioyinfluenceactivitieswill only occurif thecommander demonstrates his
own faithin non-physical activities.Becauseof this,thecommander wili needto be intimately
involvedin the info opscampaign.

2, CentralisedPlanningand Decentralised
Execution

8. The principlesof centralisedplanninganddecentralisedexecutionapplyto Info Ops at all


commandlevels.However,centnlisedexecutionmay be requiredfor certaintypesof targeted
informationactivities,when all involvedforceelementsarerequiredto adhererigidly to a plan,
or whenstrategicassetsareused,The approvallevelandprocessfor PsyOpsmessages mustbe
as low andstreamlinedas possiblein orderensuremessages aretimely and relevantto the
environmentat hand.

3. Early Involvementand Timely Preparation

9' Info Opsplanningmust startearly,because both planningandexecutiontaketime and results


canbe slow to emerge.Hence,a Commander'sintentanddirectionmustbe viewedright from
the startin relationto Info Ops capabilitiesandbe maintainedthroughoutthe planningprocess.
Targetingstaff and advison, suchas PsyOpsdetachment commanden,needto UeRrttyinvolved
in the planningprocessto integrateInfo ops within the overallplan.

10.Conceprualizing andprovidingresources for influenceactivitiesis ascomplicated as the


planningwork requiredfor physicalactivities. RecentCOIN experiences of our allies
demonstrate that info ops campaignsare far moreeffectivewheninfo opsplannenare amongsr
the fint on the groundin-theatre.Wheneverthe securityenvironmentallows,key penonnel
involvedin info opsplanningshouldbe amongsttheearliestelements deployedasttrlsenables
an early andaccurateassessment of the generalmoodof thepopulation.This fact shouldbe
reflectedin logisticsplanning.

4. CloseCo-Ordination and Sequencing

11.The very natureof Info Ops andthe large,divene targetsetmeansthat thereneedsto be very
closeintegration,
verticallyandhorizontally,
within a commandin termsof creating
complernentaryeffectsin supportof commonobjectives. Theprincipleof closeco-ordination
and sequencingis arguablyof greaterimportin a COIN campaignthanin anyothertypeof
missionbecause thereis an adversarywho'ssolepurposeis thede-legitimisationof thehost
govemmentandfriendlyforces.Contradictory messages or inaccurate
informationwill

Ch8: 3/18
L. 'l ' ppq1i'1

undermine credibiiityandlegitimacyanddo greathann,A11Info Opsplansandactivrties must


be coordinated, de-conflictedandsynchronised up, downandacrossthe chainof commandwith
othermilitary,politicalandcivil activitiesin thatoneactivitydoesnot compromise,
order negate
of the commander,
or diminishthedesiredeffectof another.This is the responsibilify by
assisted
targetingstaffandsubordinate commanden.The smoothintegration of influenceandphysical
andthemecontinuityacrossall governmentand
activitiesis criticai to maintainingrnessage
cooperating agencies.

5. Timely Counter-Info Ops


12. Even the most effectiveInfo Opsplanswill be frustnted in executionif deliberateactionsare
not takento counterthe Info Ops actionsof the adversary.A significantportionof the planning
shouldbe dedicatedto the preparationfor reactionto enemytnfo Ops.Therearenumerous
recentexamplesof a militarily weakeropponenteffectivelyconductingan Info Ops campaign
that has influencedforeign and indigenouspopulations.Failureto adequatelycounterthe
enemy'sstory in a timely and crediblefashioncanunderminenot only a public's morale,it can
also bolsteran enemy'spopularity,and rally public opinionagainstthe mission. lnfo ops
planningmust dedicatercsourcesto monitoringenemyInfo Ops and remainflexible enoughto
countererroneousinformationdisseminated by an adversary.Timelinessis paramountbecause
the fint story releasedis often the storythat getsthe greatestdistributionand attention.Measures
must be takento counterthe propagandaof adversaries and to revealtheir falsehoods.

r3. A numberof factorsserveto leavethe initiativeof Info Ops in the handsof the insurgent.
First, the insurgentwill haveno rnonl or legalcompunctionto useonly the truth in an Info Ops
campaign.Second,modem informationtechnologiesenablethe rapidandbroaddisseminationof
text, audio,video, and photographicmaterial.This meansthat the newscycle is now much
shorterthan in previouserasand thereforereactionto enemypropaganda cannotwait even24
'home turfl his sourcesof intelligence
houn. Third, becausethe insurgentwill be operatingon
will be superb.Combined,this servesto leavefriendly forcesin a defensivestance,forcedto
monitor local and intemationalmediaandothersourcesof informationin orderthat falsestories
can be rapidly counteredwith accurateinformation.This will likely be an unfamiliarstancefor
friendly forcesaccustomedand trainedto seizethe initiative in operations.Despitethis,
offensiveInfo Ops targetingthe key linesof operationsof the insurgentmusttakeplace
simultaneouswith defensiveInfo Ops.Only by carefulidentificationandanalysisof the enemy's
Centresof Gravity and tngical Lines of Operationcanfriendly forcesconductoffensiveInfo
ops.

tq. Given the pewasiveness of the intemational mediaandinformationtechnologythatenables


the real-timedissemination of information,PA will play a substantialrole in helpingto limit the
degreeof intemationalsuppofian insurgentforcerequiresto gainlegitimacyand resources.
N{oreover,PA will piay a critical role in counteringinsurgentpropaganda targetingthe will of
the Canadianpublic in thehopeof underminingdomesticpoliticalsupportfor a mission,This is
critical: intemationalopinioncanbe undulyandimmediatelyinfluencedby enemypropaganda,
PA must thereforebe considered an intrinsicpartof the info opscampaignplan.

C h8 : 4 / 1 8
, , ,' : F , . l -

:i.ti
DRAii'ti

6, AccurateIntelligenceand Information

t5' Like all COIN activities,accurateandtimeiyintelligence is criticalto a successful


Info Ops
campaign,This intelligencemustincludetimely,accurate, and relevantinformationabout
potentialadvenaries,the otherapprovedpafties,andtheoperatingenvironment.
The Info Ops
staff shouldwork closelywith the intelligencestaffto defineoquire..nts necessary to plan,
execute,and assess the effectiveness
of lnfo Ops.Inteiligencepreparationof the battlespace
(IPB) shouldincludeanalysisof humanfactors(includingculrure,religion,languages,
etc.),1T,
decision-making infrastructureandprocesses andnetworkvulnenbiliiies.Thisiortion of IpB
forms thebasisof the Info ops contributionto thecommandestimate.
The enemywill be operatingon familiar groundandwill be ableto gatheraccurate
]0'
intelligencewith comparativeeaseas long asthepopulationis not openlyhostileto his activities.
It will requirea signihcantamountof work for friendlyforcesto gaina si.nilaramount
of
accurateintelligence.Humanintelligenceis critical.For exampl.,in rany societiesrumour
is
considereda credibleand legitimateconmunication.Rumoursare spreadbetweenpersonal
contacts,not formal med.iums. The only way to determinewhat stories,positiveor negative,are
being spreadby rumouris to havea dependable humanintelligencenetwork.

7. ComprehensiveTargeting

17. At the operationallevel, targetingstartswith a detailedundentandingof the


operational
environment,its constituentsystemsand entities,andthecommander'sobjectives.
Commanders
and targetingstaff identify Info Ops effects requiredto achievethe desiredobjectives
and a
rangeof activitiesthat,when integratedinto theoveralloperationplan,will
aJhievetlose
effects' It is importantto realisethat any eiementof targeiingactiiity may influence
a rangeof
targetaudiencesand createunintendedeffects.The targetingstamtherefore
must analysethe
impact of suchactivity and proposeappropriaterneas,rrerto-avoidunintended
effects.lnfo Ops
targetingis not plannedseparatelyfrom the targetingof firesprocess,but in
conjunctionwith it
so that createdeffectsare complementary.

18. Influenceactivitieswill comprisethe bulk of a COIN campaign.The use


of f,rreswill be
severelycircumscribedbecauseof the possibilityof unintendedeffects.This is not
to saythat the
opportunityto physicallydestroythe insurgentwill not play a role in the campaign;
nthlr, it is
meantto reinforcethe fact that the primarycentreof gravityfor both the insuigeits
anOfriendly
forcesis the indigenouspopulation.Thusthe bulk of iargetingin a CoIN ca-iaign
will focuson
the neutraland indifferent portionsof the populace.

tl. Althoughtherearehistoricexampleswherethe underminingof insurgent


will hasbrought
aboutthe collapseof an insurgency,the comminedinsuqgent will be resistantto directinfluence.
Particularlyin groupsmotivatedby fundamentalist religiousideology,the coremembersof an
insurgentmovementarelikely highly motivated,dedicited,andunafraidof
mortalconsequences
of their actions,It is far moreeffectiveto targetthe neutralor indifferentmemben
of a

Ch8: 5/18
iPi ii, Iii- :[,]l

_ : I r , " : f - Il l J

populationthatindirectlyenabiethe survival,movement, andactionsof an insurgency tn an


effort to rum theseinto activesupportenof the govemment. The resultwili be a hostile
operatingenvironmentfor the insurgent. A secondordereffectof this may be theunderminingof
pubiicsupportforthe cause,
an insurgent'swill due to the inabilityto increase

8. Establishingand Maintaining Credibility

20. In order for Info Ops to be successfulin creatinginfluences,that is, in operatingon the
moral/cognitiveplane,the sourceof the Info Ops musthavesignifrcantcredibility in the eyesof
the targeiaudienie. Pooror non-existentcredibilityhasbeenidentifiedas a primary causeof
failure of Info Ops from Kosovoto Afghanistan.Whethera sourceis seekingto generatesupport
from an indigenouspopulationor convinceenemytroopsto surrender,the lack of credibilitywill
hinder success.For eximple, an indigenouspopulationwith strongreligiousandculturalbias
againstwesterntroopsmay distrustmessages createdby westerners.

2r. Credibility will taketime to developand is intimatelytied to the actionsof a military force
and the host govemment.The presence,posture,andprofrle(PPP)of a force will havea
significantimpact on credibility.Dependingon the specificcontext,a force may needto show
strength,deciiiveness,friendliness,or a limited footprint,or severalof theseat once.The
credibitity of a force may haveto be establishedin a planned,incrementalfashion. Evenwhen
possessingcredibility, indigenousproxiessuchas social,religious,or political leaderswho have
iredibiliti with targetaudiencesand are sympatheticto the missionshouldbe usedto broadcast
desiredmessages.it *ust be rememberedthat allactionsshouldreinforcethe perceptionof host
goverrrmentlegitimacy,credibility and competence; the useof indigenousvoiceswill furtherthis
soal.

Everyactionof the soldiermustbe considered partof InformationOperationsandmustbe


judgedfor potentialunintended effects.The simpleactof pickingfnrits from anorchardor
vegitablesfrom a field by restingsoldierscanalienatea villagedependent on thatproducefor
winter survival.rWithoutaskingpemrissionof thefarner andofferingsuitablecompensation,
this seeminglyharmlessactcouldbe misconstrued andusedby anadvenaryfor propaganda
purposes (ie. 'the wealthywesteminvadencarelittle for theaverage personandstealyour
food'). Every actionhaseffectsandall soldienmustundentandtherepercussions of eventhe
mostbenignact.

9, Performanceand EffectsMonitoring and Assessment

22. A,swith any military activity, the resultsof informationoperationsare assessedusing


measur€sof performance(arethings done right?)and measures (are
of effectiveness the right
thingsbeingdone,to createthe desiredeffects?)areemployed,
23. Measuresof performance(MoP) for info ops arerelativelystraightforwardas they arewith
otheroperationsand activities.They referto themechanismsof planningand implementation.
They can be viewedin the samemanneras the deliveryof indirectfire: reactiontimes;qualityof

Ch8: 6/18
i_rL_1.

! ] !
DILAI.IT

product:correctidentification
andassessment of target;andsuitability
of engagement to
means,
namea few. Measures of Effectiveness
referto thedesiredeffectsandwhetheror not the
actrvitiesconducted
createdtheeffects.
24. The successful prosecution of Info Opsrelies0n continuous monitoringandassessment of
the shortandlong-termeffectsof inter-related activities.
This is achieved by collectionof all-
sourceintelligence andotherfeedback on theInfo Opsactivities.Measures of Effectiveness
(MoE) mustbe includedin theInfo Opsplanandareintegrated in the inteiligencecollection
activities.Particularattentionshouldbe paidto changes in the adversrry',oi otheraudience's
wiil andactions,includingsuchitemsaschanges in theattirudeof thecivilianpopulation,
poiiticaiactivity,andexpressions of unrest.Also,changes in an adversary's .rpuUititymay be
usedasa MoE, suchas reducedefficiency,disorganisation andslowerreactions to eventsand
specificactionsin response to deception or destruction,
25. It mustbe clearlyundentoodthatinfluenceactivitiesmay takea significantamountof time
to takeeffect.In somecases,effectsmay not becomeapparentuntil well afteran individualunit
or colrlmander'stour hasended.Short-termsupportandfriendlinessshouldnot be mistakenfor
confidencein the govemment.Winning overthetrustof the targetaudiencewill taketime and
considerable effort, Changesin behaviourmay takeplaceover a lengthyperiodof time andbe
imperceptible.For example,the effectsof a radiobroadcast campaignmay takeyearsto become
apparent.Additionally,it is very difficult to developa causallink betweena singleinfo ops
actionandtargetbehaviour,evenwhendirectmessages areusedat the tacticallevel. For
example,changesin driving behaviouraroundmilitary convoysmay be dueto several
concomitantfacton: PsyOpsproducts, previoususeof wamingshots,or pastincidentsof
civilian casualtieswhenproximity to a suicidebombingtargetingcoalitionforcesresultedin
collateraldamage.DespitethesediffrcultiesMoE arecriticalto gaugingtheusefulness of Info
ops.
26, MoE are relativelysimple,objectiveandmeasurable for Counter-Command Activity and
InformationProtectionActivitiesbasedon the statedaim or desiredeffectof theactivity
planned.For example,if an attacksuccessfully destroysa targetedadvenaryC2 systemyet the
advenarycommandercan still effectivelycontrolhis subordinates, thenthe effectivenessof the
activity was poor eventhoughthe attack.rr*.y haveconducteda soundattackthatdestroved
thetargetedsystem.
zz. With influenceactivities,MoE areappliedto activitiesandchanges on thecognitiveplane.
Givenall of the individualandenvironmental variablesin thehumandecision-making process,
developingmeasures (MoE) for info opson thecognitiveplanemry ti oneof
of effectiveness
themostdauntingintellectual tasksfacinga commander.Influenceactivitlesseekto work
throughextemaland internalfilten in orderto eitherpenuadeor dissuadeandthusaffect
behaviourand action.Hence,theplanningandconductof theseactivitiesis an art requiringthe
commander'ssubjectivefeel for their potentialaffect, The resultsof theseinfluenceactivities
requireasdefineda setof indicatonas possiblein orderto detectchanges in perceptions,
attitudesandbehavioursand needto accountfor theeffectof the information-filters.
28. MoE will vary significantlybetweenmissionsandevenwithin missions. Commanders must
clearlydefinethe end-stateand ideally any milestoneson thepathto that end-state.MoE, using
whatevermeansaremostappropriate, measure andindicateprogressin thetargetaudience
towardsthat end-state.MoEs mustbe tailoredto thespecificsof not only theoverallchange

C h8 : 7 / 1 8
' . lf . rl - f i , l i ' i i\l , t . J t , i _

.i:
: ! _ rf i j i r i i , ii'r5ruq1.1,

desired,but to the environmenl, thatis, theconmander'sareaof operations (AO)' Because of


the intangiblefacton involvedandthe subjectivenatureof influencing, the MoE may very well
be subjective,at leastin part,andbecause behaviourinfluenceis the aim, theyrequirea
significantamountof tirneto determine Therefore,
effectiveness. theymustbe assessed asa set
routineto attemptto recognisechanges,trendsand slightyet significantindicaton.The
commanderexercises judgementasio whenan adjustment or changeto an activityagainsta
targetmust be madein reactionto behaviounlchanges in thetargetaudience.

29, Somebasicfundarnentalsexistthatcanaid in thedevelopment of usefulMoE:

a. Causality,2A dehnitivecauseandeffectrelationship mustbe established


betweenihe activity andthe effectattemptingto be measured. Therehasto be a
reasonablelikelihoodthat the plannedactivity will createthe desiredeffect.
Secondly,commandersand info ops staff mustbe ableto assessany otherextant
facton tiratmay be causingthe effectotherthantheir own activities,Likewise,
they must ascertainif the measuredeffect is merelycoincidental'
of the
b. euantifiable.3 An MoE that canbe countedhelpsto removesome
subjectivitythat plaguesMoEs on the moralplane.Quantihcationallows accurate
trend measurement. For example,during a tour in Iraq,2 BCT, lt'Armoured
Division monitoredand countedlocal and intemationalmediacovemgeof events
in 2 BCT's AO as a MoE. This allowedpositiveand negativetrendsto be
identifiedwhich helpedto discernthe effectiveness of ongoinginfo ops'a
c. Observableand Attributable.This principlemay seemobvious,however,when
dnfting MoEs considerationshouldbe givento the possibilitythat all of the
variablesinfluencingan activity andchangein behaviourcannotbe observed.The
MoE must be ableto recognisea trendor changeand conftrmthe connectionor
attributionto the activity,For example,if the presenceor absenceof negative
graffiti is being usedas an informalindicatorof supportfor a campaignand
military force in an urbanarea,observenwill ideallybe ableto ascertain:its
timing, that is, when it was done;its attributionto a particulargroup (political,
criminal, military) andtheir motive,and whetherit represents a minority or
majority viewpoint;its attributionin termsof cause,particularlyif it appearsas a
reactionto a specificeventor action;and,its locationin relationto the culfural
make-upof the environment.
d. Correlated to DecisivePointsand Objectives.Justasactivitiesareplannedto
reachsequential decisivepointsalonga line of operation,MoEs shouldbe
selectedto correlateto the achievementof eachdecisivepoint and shouldbe
reflectiveof the level of employment.Althoughstrategicinfo ops require

2 For a detaileddiscussionof causalityseeWilliam S. Murray,"A Wili to Measure,"Parameters, Vol.31,No'3'


Aurumn2001. CarlislePA: USAWC.Pp.134-14'7 '
3 The quantifiable,observable,and timelinessprinciplesareadaptedfrom LtCo1.David Grohoski,StevenSeybert,
ard Marc Romanych, "Measuresof Effectivenessin the InformationEnvironment,"Military Intelligence
a Z : U S A r m y I n t e l l i g e n cCee n t e r . p pl 2 -
P r o f e s s t o n a l B u l l e r tVno, i . 2 9 ,N o . 3 , J u l y - S e p t e m b e r 2 0F0o3r.tH u a c h u cA
16.
'Bake., 'The DecisiveWeapon:A BrigadeCombatTeamCommander's on Information
Perspective
Col. RalphO.,
Operations,"ilIilitary Review,May-June2006.Fort KS:
Lravenworth US Combined
Arms CenterfuSCGSC' pp.13-
32.

C h8 : 8 / 1 8
'i']1-lf;1,:\1,r,
;

' t ' ' ! R l, I i r i _


DRAIi'f

measuresthat occurthroughoutthe iengthof a campaign,many MoEs at the


operationalandtacticallevel will measurethe incrementalpr'ogress
through
sequential
decisivepoints.
e. Flexibilfy. AlthoughMoEs shouldbe draftedat theplanningstagetheyshould
remainunderregularreviewandcommandenmustbe preparedto adjustthemas
requirtd.MoEs mustreflectmutableconditionsin an AO. They mustevolveasa
missionprogrcsses, particularlyasdecisivepointsarereachedandsecured.
Similarly,MoEs arelikely not transferable
from missionto mission.Evenif a
missiontakesplacein the sameAO the passage of time will forcereconsideration
of MoEs previouslyemployed.
f. Collection.The commandermustpossess the capabilitiesto collectthe
intelligencenecessaryto employa MoE andprovidethe directionandguidanceto
do so. Plansmustbe madeto collectand assess MoEsthroughall units in the
affectAO. Secondly,collectionmay be assistedby otheragencies,however,
absenta formal commandrelationshipthis may haveto be doneinformally.
Notwithstandingthis, non-militaryagenciesmay proveto be an effectivegaugeof
prcgressthroughinfo ops.
g. Relativity. Improvementssoughtin a given environmentrnustbe relativeto the
specificenvironmentand to what is considerednomral for that particular
environmentand culfure. Expectationsfor situationalimprovementmust be
reasonablegiven the startingstateand the normal stateof that particular
environment.It is imperativethat a baselinemeasurement of the overall
environmentin the AO be establishedas early as practicablein the campaign
planning.Absenta comparativebaselineit may be impossibleto accurately
detenninethe effectivenessof lnfo Ops. Somechangein the environmenrmay
occurquickly; for examplean immediatedrop in crimein a particular
neighbourhood may resultfrom the presenceof regularpatrols.However,
systemicimprovementsmay requirea substantialamountof time and be
measuredin multiple yeamor evendecades. Thusmeasuringan ovenll drop in
gang and criminal activity throughouta theatremust be measuredin relation to
the levels that existedunderpre-campaigncircumstancesand could take yean to
achieve.Furthermore,systemicchangewill be the resultof numerous
concomitantfactors.Expectations for changeand the relatedMoE shouldbe set
as incrementalmilestonesso that improvementcanbe measuredand
demonstrated as tangibleprogressover time.
30' Developingappropriatemeasures of effectiveness
to assess
info opson the cognitiveplaneis
a very difficult task.Willpower, perceptions,andbeliefsareintangiblevariablesthat defy simple
measurement. Observingandmeasuringtrendsis oneof the surestwaysof gauginga target's
atirude. Trends,however,requirea definablebaselineandthis will be a coiptJx but crucial
initial task.Difficulties aside,accurateMoEs canmakethedifferencebetweenmeetinedesired
objectivesor endinga missionin frustration.

C h8 : 9 / 1 8
n-Rarrr

of Propaganda'
SECTION 3: Characteristics
proportionof a COIN info opscampaignwill concentrate
: t . A substantial on refutinginsurgent
propaganda, TluJ it is usefulto illustratethemajorcharacterislics of hsurgentpropaganda to
betterinfbnn the commander of how to constructthemesand messages thatwill support the
desiredoutcomewhile underminingthe messages andthemesof the enemy.Deconstructingthe
themesof enemypropagandaallowsthe commanderand staffa betterundentandingof the
enemy'slines of operationand what counter-measures will bestundenninethe enemycampaign'
The characteristics illustnted below arebroadlyapplicableto all insurgencies'
32. Insurgenciesare supportedby a closelycoordinatedandmutuallysuppofiingtriad of political
goals,propaganda,tnO titit"ry action.Like info ops,propaganda cantakeseveralforms and
will be reinforcedwith action.Words will be supportedby deedsandvice versa.The insurgent
causeis advancedpredominantlyby discreditingthe governmentand securityforces,reducing
public morale,and vilifying pro-govenrmentmedia.lnsurgentswill utilize any government
mistake,especiallyinciOentsin which the policeand military may be seento haveover-reacted.
DemocratiCgovemmentsarethus morevulnerableto hostilepropaganda becauseof the value
placedon freedomof speech,
3r, Propagandamust be effectivelycounteredif a COIN campaignis to be successful.Like all
info opi, Jounter-propaganda t"qui*r a unified multi-agencyapproachthroughoutthe levelsof
commandand must inciudepolitical directionon approvedthemesand messages. Pnrpaganda is
effectiveand cannotbe ignored.It is throughpropaganda that the adversarybolsten his popular
support,gainsrecruitsand materialresources, andultimatelyseekslegitimacyand credibility.
34. All propagandacontainssomekernelof truth,howeverminiscule,which is distortedto play
upon the preconceivednotions,attifudes,andperceptionsof the targetaudienceas well as socio-
pbtiticat trendsthat have led to discontent.Advenary info opstargetthe samesegmentsof the
indigenouspopulationas friendly info ops-the neutralor waveringportionsfrom which
supportencan be drawn,
35, Thereare a numberof overarchingthemesthat characterise insurgentpropaganda.Although
someof thesethemesbecomemore prevalentasan insurgencyevolves,the themeswill likely be
usedsimultaneously,targetingdifferentspecificaudiences,tailoredto suit the ebb and flow of
the struggle.

A . Righteousness. Theinsurgent causeis rightandjustandsupported


by thedivine.
This themeis foundedin faithandideasratherthanfact'

B . Hatred. Thegovernment or opposing forceis paintedashereticalor


international
morallyandspiriruallycornrpt.Sincethegovemment opposestherighteousness of
the insurgentcauseandhassought to the
suppress people,it andits are
agents
desewingof hatredanddeath.

5 The term 'propaganda'is usedherein thepejorativesense.The vastmajoriryof this sectionis adaptedfrom


BrigadierMauriceTugwell'sdoctoraldissertation Revolutionary Propaganda and PossibleCounler-Measures
(l-ondon:King's College,Universityof London,March 1979).

C h8 : 1 0 / 1 8
,DRAF- T

Inevitable Triumph,Because thestruggleis portrayed asa moralandrighteous


affair,theiruurgency canonlyendir triumph,regardless of thetimerequiredto
achieve victory.Thisthemeis highlighted
in con{lictsinvolvinsfundarnental
ist
ideologies.

D. Allegirnce' "You arewith us or againstus." Althoughinsurgencies only requirethe


ambivalence of the populationto existandthrive,propagandawill leaveno
uncertaintyabouttheultimaterequirement to supportthe cause.This themeseeksto
paintthoseopposingthe insurgencyastraiton, cowards,or unfaithfui,

E. Moral Certainty. Usedto bolsteractivesupportersof an insurgency, this theme


seeksto implantthe notionthatthe moralhigh-groundlies with th.i*urgrnt andthat
all actscommittedby supportenarejust, bothlegallyandspirirually.

F. Terror. Althoughtenorismis a tactic,the therneof terroris usedin insurgent


propaganda to coerceassistance
from the civilian populationandto enforcediscipline
within an insurgency.This thememustbe supportedby violentactionwhich may U"
limited in scopebut cancauseterrorout of all proportibnto the act itself.

G' Martyrdom. Also known asglorificationof heroes,this themewill highlightthe


actionsof insurgentsand glorify the fallen to bolsterinternalmoraleariAiripress
tire
civilianpopulation.
H. Praiseof violence. violence is portrayedasa spirituallycleansing.

I. Justified Reaction.All actionsarejustified asnecessary


andjust reactionto
govemmentsuppression.

J' Long War. lnsurgenciesdo not succeedovemightand in orderto sustain


support,it
is necessaryto reinforcethe notion of inevitabletriumph by communicatingthat
the
strugglewill be long anddifficult andmay spansevenllgenerations. This ii often
portrayedin religious termsto exploit belief in the transcendental
natureof the divine
andthe afterlifeto give strengthto religiouslymotivatedinsurgents.

K. Guilt. This themeis directedat the enemygovemmentandsupporters.It


will play
uponthe sensitivitiesof thepopulationsof liberaldemocracier.^Today,this themeis
heavilyexploitedusingmoderncommunications technologies
to pubiicisereal and
contrivedincidents.

L. Bad Faith. This themeseeksto undermineattemptsby the govemmentto


reachout
to insurgentsupportersandto portraygovemmenteffortstolmprove the lot of
ne
peopleas a fagademeantto dupethepeople.

M' Security Force Incompetence.This themewill try to demonstrate an inabilitv of the


govemmentto providea safeandsecureenvironmentaswell as an impot.n.a
to ,,op
the insurgency.This themewill be supportedwith violentactionstargetingsecurity
forcesthemselvesas well assegments of the population.

C h8 : 1 1 / 1 8
i 1,)

N, Legitimacy.Insurgencies willultimatelyattemptto developlegitimacythroughboth


deedsandwords.An exampleof this is Hezbollah'sintemattonal propaganda
aid in
campalgnin the Summerof 2006 andthe immediateinfusionof reconstruction
war-devastated neighbourhoods in Lrbanonimmedialeto the cessation of hostilities
with Israel.The goalwasto demonstrate boththe illelitimacyof.theenemy,Israel,
and the powerlessnessof the seculargovemmentto prolide for the needsof the
peoPle.

O. Credibility. The ultimatepurposeof propaganda is to establishcredibility in the eyes


of the civiiian populationwhich will inevitablyleadto outrightsupport'
36. The goal of counter-propaganda is the refutationof insurgentpropagandaand to presentthe
counter-
truthful jirstificationfor inelegiti*u.y andcredibilityof the host government.Effective
supporters that
propagandais requiredto convinceboth domesticandintemationalneutralsand
ihe mirsion is legltimate.Public opinionmustbe considered throughoutthe campaignby all
role in
levelsof command,includingthe political element.Clearly,PA will play a leading
propaganda
communicatingthe truth to tie intemationalpublic.The effort to counterenemy
facts,and expose the fallaciesor the enemy
must explain governmentstrategyand goalsfpresent
messageand the illegitimacyof enemymotives'
SECTION 4: Information Operations Activities in COIN
psychological
37. The primary influenceactivitiesgroupedunderthe Info ops monikerare:
(CIMIC), presence-profile-
operations(psyOps),public affain (FA),^civit-militarycooperation
pbrru.. (ppp), and ij"c.ption. PsyOps,PA, and Deception haveoffensiveand defensiveuses'
All, savefor ppp are discusseO in Aetaitin their respectivemanuals,which shouldbe readin
are
conjunctionwith this chapter.The specificusesof eachactivity in a COIN campaign
discussed in this section.

A. PsychologicalOperations(PsyOps)
behaviourof
:8. The primary purposeof PsyOpsis to influencethe perceptions,attitudesand
is oneof the few
selectedindividualso, group, in iccordancewith Info Ops objectives'PsyOps
'influence' as a first ordereffecton the cognitiveplane.Unlike
tools within lnfo Ops ttiat nas
pA, which simply irovides informationfor dissemination by others,PsyOpsretainsdirect
control over contentand disseminationof a message and focuseson a specifictargetaudience'
psyOpsis not propagandain the pejorativesense;CF PsyOpsonly disseminates truthful
r.qui*, timely provision of resources such as linguistic,support,
rrrr.g.r. Bffective"PsyOps
graptricsand print.up.bitity, and variouselectronicbroadcasting means.Mediums the for
the
broadcastof messagesincludeface-to-facecontact,print, radio,television,loudspeakeN,
intemet,faxes,pagers,andmobilephones.
of a COIN campaign'Coordinated with
39, psyOpsis one of the most cost-effective components
otherinfo Ops activitiesand anti-insurgent operations, PsyOps,properlyappiied,canensurethat
rheindigenouspopuiationreceivesand comprehends the activitiesof the CF andthehost
gou.**rnt. Strategicleveldirection,andclosecoordination betweenall commandlevelsare
Lquired to seamies-sly integratethemes,messages, andactions.All messages mustbe reinforced
with actionbecausedeedsand wordsmustnot be contradictory. Closecoordination doesnot

Ch8: 12118
DR-{tf'I,

indicatea requirement for rigid control;theneedfor consistency


in themeandmessage mustnot
be regardedasa requirementfor micromanagement of subodinates.Althoughthe distributive
meansrnaybe similar,thepurposes of operational
andtacticallevelPsyOpsdiffer,It is only
throughseamless integrationandcoordinationof PsyOpsinto the ovenil iampaignplan that
'information
fratricide'canbe avoided.
+o Canadadoesnot conduct.strategic levelPsyOps. PA is usedat thestrategic levelto
communicateinformation.The inabiliryto limit thetargetaudienceprecludJsthe useof psyOps
at the strategicIevel.At theoperational level,PsyOpsaretypicallydirectedat modifyinggeneral
attitudesetsgearedtowardslong-termbehaviourmodification. Typically,this will involvesome
form of rationalargumentthat may be forcefullyor subtlypresented. An exampleof a forceful
messagewould be continuedpublicisingof public infiastructureprojectsin a province.An
exampleof a subtlemessagewould be thebrcadcastof popularmusictargeting15-25yearolds
to emphasisethatreligiousidealsandliberalsocietiesarenot incompatibli.In m"ny ways,
operationallevel PsyOpscanbe viewedin marketingtermsas buildingbrandrecognition.In
essence,the message is trying to build a relationshipbetweenthetargetaudienceand the brand.
4r. At the tacticallevel,PsyOpswill prcsenta concisemessage gearedtowardsmodifying
specificbehaviours.The targetaudiencewill be morespecificthanat theoperationallevel and
emotiveand rationalargumentsmay be usedin the message. The goalis to causea target
audienceto act,ratherthan to think aboutandrationalizea message. Examplesof tacticallevel
psyopsare leafletsinforminga villageof an impendingoperationor postenhungalongpopular
thoroughfares demonstrating safedriving behaviourarounda military convoy.
42. A nuancedunderstanding of the socio-culturalenvironmentin which PsyOpsareconducted
is essentialto success. Mere awareness of the socio-cultural
milieu is imufficient for those
involved in the conception,design,andapprovalof PsyOpsproducts.Tribal relationsarealso
a
necessaryconsideration. Urbanoperationshold thepotentialfor vastlydifferentsocio-cultural
constructsin differentneighbourhoods. PsyOpsproductsmustbe speiificaltytailoredto the
targetaudience.The potentialfor unintendedeffectsis greatif an errorin taigetaudience
analysisis made.A poor productis worsethanno productat all.

hnmediatelyprior t9 thef.*
plannedto communicate the purposeof themissionto the Atgnan-pgople.The'nisi leafletttrat
wasto be usedpicturedB-52sbombinga greenvalley.Theteaflet,alrnostidenticalto oor ur.O
in the 1991Gulf War againstlraq wasdeletedfromthecaurpaign at thelastminuteout of
concemthatthe.pamphlet wouldcreatetheperyeption thattheAfghanpeo,pte werebeing
targetedfor retributionfor 9/11. Furtherconfusionoverthepropeiuseof Uotntne
dissemination method(leafletbomblets)andtheurget audiinci (p5yopsplanhendesignedthe
leafletfor a tactical,notstrategicapplication)
highhghtstherequirement for coorUi*UJo
the needto tailorkyOps productsto specifrcaudienies, "oO
Source:Christopher
L'an\'levlav of Psychological
OpoattonsLessonsLearnedFrom Recent
Operattonal
Experience,
wasbinglonDC: NationalDefenseUniversitypress,september
2005,p.71.

Ch8: 13/18
1, : , i : , ' jIl ,l. . - ' , . . ' i : - , , i ir' il : - j ' D r u U . f
.

43. Time is an uncertainaily. On theonehandPsyOpsthemesandmessages needto be lasting


andcontinuousto makean impression. On theotherhand,over-prolonged exposureto a single
messagemay result in boredomand initation.Consider the annoyance of a commercialthat one
views too often on television;it is aslikeiy to provokean avenion to the advertisedproductas
much as it will inducea desireto purchasethatproduct.Finejudgmentis neededto draw the line
betweenthe advantagesto be gainedfrom the consistentexploitationof a fact or themeand the
dangersof saturation.The audienceis not srupid.
+q. Political and military ovenight mustensurcthat PSYOPSandsupportingactivitiesare
consistentwith the host nationand Canadianpoliciesand conformto any specificpolitical
guidance.The psychologicaidimensionof counter-insurgency is so importantthat a PSYOPS
itaff officer should be nomirnted in all formation headquarten and indeedany Canadianbattle
grcup working within a Multirutional Brigade.Within a CanadianBrigade-Group, this
ippointment *ill no.-ally fall to a mernberof the operationsstaff, who will work directly with
the intelligencestaff. This staff offrcermustbe a permanentmemberof the headquafters, as
opposedto an augmentee,who hasa thoroughunderstanding of the commander'sintentions,be
conversantwith staff procedures,

B. Public Affairs (PA)


45. The aim of Public Affairs is to protectthe credibility andlegitimacyof operationsand
promote widespreadundentanding,therebygaining supportfor military operationswhile not
tompromising-EssentialElementsof Friendly lnformation (EEFI).It communicatesinformation
to audiences,through the medium of local, national and intemationalmediaand other
cornmunicationmeans.An imporlant facetof any military operationis to communicatethe
principal themesand rnessageswhile providing a clear and completeundentandingof the
bperation,whilst maintaining OPSEC, Although PA is primarily focusedon informing and
educatingaudiences,its impict is muchwider. It is thercforeessentialthat PA staff and thoseof
other Info Ops capabilitieswork closelytogetherto ensurethat a coordinatedmessageis
deliveredto the intendedaudiences. Particularattentionmustbe paid to local and regionalmedia
and to other media sourcesthat areinfluentialwith indigenouspopulations.To avoid giving the
falseimpressionthat the mediaarebeingmanipulatedin any way, a distinctionmust be
maintainedbetweenPSYOPSand PA, however,this doesnot obviatethe requirementof PA to
be fully integratedinto the Info Ops campaign.
46. In COIN operationsit is essentialto conductrnediarelationsin a positivemanner.They must
project an accurateand balancedpicfureof the role of the securityforcesin generaland of the
CF in particular, and demonstratethe practicalcontribution Canadiansoldien are making to the
solutionof a diffrcult and frequentlyhazardousconflict. Creatingand maintaininga positive
public imageof the Anny includescounteringpotentiallyhostilemediaactivity.
+7, Operationalpublic affairs is a G3 staff functionand shouldbe coordinatedat the level of the
highestformation headquartenin the theatreof operations.hrblic Affain Officen (PAffO) are
responsiblefor all aspectsconcerningthe authorizationof suitablefacilitiesfor the media,the
nominationof units to host visitors,and the requirementfor escortsand otherresources.
48. In periodsof intenseoperationalactivity or during major incidentsthe PAf0 sectionmay
needadditionalsupport,particularlyin urbanareas.Sub-unitsshouldbe preparedto help the
PAfro personnelin termsof escorts,movementand the controlof the media.If the PAffO off,rce

Ch 8: 14/18
is to providean authoritative,
considered, consistent andcredibleinformationsewice,thepress
office mustreceivepromptandaccurateinfonnationfrom subordinate headquartenandunits.It
must alsoreceiveearlywarningof projectedoperations togetherwith clearirutructionson how
to dealwith mediaenquiries,preferablyin theform of a questionand answerbrief.
49. In manyaspects, dealingwith the mediais no differentin a COIN campaignthanin anyother
operation.When speakingto the media,and in accordance with securityregutations, individuals
shouldrestrictthemselves to mattersof fact at theirown level.No statemerus shouldbe made
conceminggovernment policies,politicaldecisions, or on topicslikely to be politicallysensitive.
Similarly,no speculativestatementsshouldbe made.
50. A largenumberof journalistsrepresenting theprcss,radio,andtelevisioncanbe expectedto
reP9.ton COIN operations. To facilitatean effectivetwo-waypassage of informationandto
minimizeunnecessary mediaqueries,standingordersshouldgiur guiOance on the limits of the
informationthat may be disclosed.Beforeany informationis passedto the mediait mustbe
clearedfor releaseby the appropriatemilitary agency,e.g.,G2, G3, andthe appropriate host
nationauthorities,or policeauthoritieswherethis is applicable.

51. No unnecessary hindranceis to be offeredto a joumalist'sfreedomto operate.Itis in the


intercstsof law andorderthat the pressshouldhavefacilitiesto exposetenorism,actsof
violence,and the intimidationof civilians.A memberof themediahasthe samerights,liberties
and obligationsunderthe law asany othercitizen.
52' If an on-scenecommanderbelievesthat themediaareprejudicingsecurityduringan
operation,the mattershouldbe dealtwith by persuasion, admonition,o, ur a lastresort,andonly
if a criminal offenceis suspected, by physicalrestraintor arrest.It is possiblethat reponersmay
delibentely wish to exposethemselves to dangeragainstthe adviceoitr. securityforces.If thiy
do not yield to persuasion, a clearwaming mustbe given,in front of witnesser,oi th. possible
consequences of their actionsandthat they mustacceptresponsibilityfor themselves.

"You haveno influerrcewith thepressif youdo nottalkto them...Not talkingto thepressis the'
-
equivalentof cedingtheinitiatiVeqopreinsurgents,
who[were]quiteaOeptaispinniog ,
mromutlonrn adverse waysto furthertheir,objectives." ,

C. Civil Military Cooperation(CIMIC)


53. Civil-Military Cooperationis definedas: "coordinationandcooperationin supportof the
mission,betweencommanders and civil actors,includingthenationalpopulationanCtocat
authorities,as well as intemational,nationalandnon-govemmental organizationsandagencies.f
CIMIC is a coordinationand liaisonfunctionthat facilitatesoperationsin relationto civil
authoritiesand non-militaryorganisations and leadsto activitiesthat supportlocal authorities.
oTaken
fromAAP 6, Theus militaryrefento CIMICasCivil Affain (cA).

C h8 : 1 5 / 1 8
i l . r = i i / - , . i - , l i r : t l i - i i , ] , .I l . - . . ] t j i , i r l i i l i : , ; r 1 p - 1 1, . ,

' , ' , - - iI , , ' l ' , _ , i t ' l : : - i , - l l!.i .rrl : a l D n a F t

Becauseof theirability to tnform,demonstrate andinfluenceandevenco-opt,CIMIC related


activitiesarea key ,rp.rt to the infonnation operationsplan' CIMIC is centnlto anyCOIN
campaignbecausithe perception of hostgovernmentcompetence mustbe reinforced'The
of
perceptionof competence is tied to securiiyandtheabilityto providefor the day-to-dayneeds
is a
thepopulace.Improvingthesocial,physical,andeconomicweli-beingof the populace
..ni*i goal of any COIN mission.Thus,CIMIC actionsaimedat infrastructure development,
reconstruction and assislance to governance arecrucialto achievingSuccesS'
credibility,
54. CIMIC providesinformationin the form of physicalevidenceof the legitimacy,
proportion of the
and competlnceof the host government.CIMIa will comprisea significant
,deeds'thatmustsupportthJ 'words' of a campaign. Failureto follow throughon promisesmade
arenot
will alienatethe populationanddamagecredibility,Caremustbe takenthatexpectations
be
createdin the populationthat cannotbe met. CIMIC relatedactivitiesthereforeneedto
upon civil audiences,their
coordinatedwithin the overalltnfo Ops plan, in termsof impacts
overall
leadersand their informationsystemsin-orderto ensurethat activitieswork to support
objectives. CIMIC facilitatesiooperationbetweenmilitary forcesand the civilian environment
by:
(l) Considering and assessing social,political,cultural,religious,economic,
infrastrucfuraland environmentalfacton in supportof military operations
and objectives.CIMIC staffshouldbe a valuablesourceof informationto
intelligencestaff in creatinga knowledgebaseof the environment'but
CIMIC cannotbe perceivedas intelligencegatheringassets.
(Z) Liaisonand coordinationwith domesticagencies,governmentofficials
and elementsof power,intemationalorganisations (Ios), and non-
goverrlmentalorganisations (NGOs).

Forgingan effectiverelationshipbetweenmilitary and civilian authorities,


(3)
agenciesandpopulations'
organisations,
it
55. It is critical that CIMIC projectsreflectthe needsanddesiresof the population'Moreover'
is pointlessto build a schooformedical facility that cannotbe staffedor funded.A satisfied
populationis a benignpopulation.CIMIC is a mostusefultool to addressthe underlyingcauses
bf in insurgencyasit has^thepotentialto directly influencetheday-to-daylives of the people'

During the 1899-1902 PhilippineWar, CIMIC formeda significantportionof theUS Army


rtot.fy to gainthe supportblttt"population on southern l,uzon.Theimprovement of civil
gou.rirrr.ri, thebuildingandoperation of schoolsandtheprovisionof medical servicesenticed
ihe populationbackto tft'. viliagesfromjungle refuges.Thestrategyintegntednativepolice
andviilagepresidentes(r*yorr) into theeffort.This increased supportfor the US missionand
isolatedtnJi^u.g.nts from the population.Sepantedfromtheirsourcesof foodandother
provisionsandharassed by consiantUS patrols,theinsurgents wererobbedof theinitiativeand
iorced to attackUS occupiedtownsandvillagesin a desperate andultimatelyunsuccessful
attemptto defeatthe US strategy. Althoughnottermed'CIMIC'at thetime,theimprovement
of theday-to-daylivesof thepopulacewasinstnrmental to thesuccessof thisCOINcampaign'
Chapel
in thePhilippinell/ar, 1899-1902'
Source:BrianMcAliisterLinn,rhi us ,l,rmyandCounterinsurgency
of NorthCarolina
Hill NC:University Press, 1989,p.164'

Ch 8 : 1 6 / 1 8
-1
;: ql

__i-,-
DRA.FT

Posture,profile
D. Presence,
56' Theappearance, presence andanirudeof a forcemayhavesignificant impacton perceptions
andattirudes, particularlyon neutralor potentiallyadvenarialaudiences. Deiloyingevenlimited
capabilityto the rightplaceat therighttimecanaddsubstantial credibillryto messiges being
deliveredthroughotherchannels andprovidea majorcontribution to detemence. Siriilariy,ioo
heavya footprintmaycausemisperceptions andmistrustas to thepurposeof a mission.The
posfureof troopson the groundcandemonstrate both commitmentandintentandmustbe
considered andbalanced with therequirements of forceprotection.Thedecisionto wearberets
insteadof combathelmetsandbodyarmourcanmakeaionsiderabledifference
to the
perceptions of boththeadversary andlocalpeople.Thepublicprofileof commandenat all
levelswill impacton perceptions andthereforethepublicrole of the commander mustbe
carefullyanalysedandopporfunities usedto tnnsmit key messages. Commanders must
undentandand assess the attendantrisk thataccompanies any decisionregardingposrureand
profileagainsttheneedto senda particularmessage.

one of the prioritiesof theRegionalAssistance MissionSolomonIslandswasto presenta


sjrong' competent,yet friendly posturethat would reassurethe populacewhile
intimidating
th9-w-allordsand gangswhich had underminedlawful orderon Guadalcanal.Initial planning
calledfor the landing of C-130sloadedwith infantry simultaneousto the
arrival offshoreof
theHMAS Manoora' Soldien disembarkingfrom the C-130swere
fully armedand readyto
engageany resistancg.butheld their weaponsin a relaxed,non-threatening
manner.
Significantly,the soldierswereaccompanied by policeandcivilian membersof the mission.
The postureof the soldien andpresenieorpotice andcivilianssuccessfully
crgted a
competent,non-threatening,and reassuringpresenceto thepopulace,
while the presenceof
HWls Manoora andotherpatrollingnavaive-ssels clearlycommunicated a decftivemilitary
superiorityand commitmentto the mission.Moreover,througho"irrrr
rirri"",
soldien were allowed only limited freedomon the islandto minimize "ii<rrv
disnrption to t11elocal
economy.The early considerationof presence,posture,andprofile
in the pl^anningprocess
provedinstrumentalto displacinga developinginsurgency.
source:RussellGlenn, counterinsurgencyin a rei ribe, ,lnalyzing
the successof the Regional Assistance
Mission SolomonIslands (MMSI). SantaMonica CA: Rand. 2ffi7.-

E. DECEPTION
57' Deceptioninvolvesmeasures designedto misleadadvenariesby manipulation, distortionor
falsificationetc' Deceptionis a complexart,whichdemands considerable effort,a high levelof
securityand a soundundentandingof an advenary'sway of thinking.
It is normallyusedto
dislocatethe attentionand combatpowerof an advenary.In operations
it candirectlycontribute
to the achievementof surpriseandindirectly,to securityandeconomy
of effort.Deceptionwill
likelyusea combinationof physicalmeans(suchasa feintor demonitration)
supported by orher
informationcues.Info ops plannersmustbe involvedin deceptionplanning
in o.d.. to ensure
thatInfo ops objectivessuppoftdeception objectives
andInfo ops iupportlngactivitiesare
employedin supportof deception operations.

C h8 : l 7 1 1 8
i-i) i i ir
r i\ rllt

'r.
: I l : i l i l - l D : I : i | + ? E l . i l l r - i l i . l r l i : i \ r[ S i ] i - l ' i:
DRAFT

to sophisticated level
strategic
SS.Deceptionis a broadconceptthatspanstacticalcamouflage
is definedasthose
Deceptionalsoincludestheplantingof infonnation'Deception
operations,
or falsification
by-marupulation,.distortion' of
measures designedto mrsiead theopponent
Lnterests' Insurgents
evidenceto inducehim to reactin a mannerthat is prejudicialto his
by goue"ntntntforces'For example' an insurgent
constantlyattemptto causean over-reaction
or inaccurate targeting'
couldplant falseintbrmationwhichcouldcausean ovelTeaction
its mainpurposesareto give a
SS,While deceptionaimsto gainsurpriseandmaintainsecurity,
aSto CF actions'andto
commanderfreedomof actioirto operateby deludingan opponent
misleadthe insurgentinto adoptinga disadvantageous courseof action,which canbe exploited'
mind andall deception
All typesof deceptionui,n to impt"a'ta falseideain theopponents
presupposes effectivecountersurveillance andOPSECto preventtheenemyfrom observing
genuineactivity.

SECTION 5: Conclusion
60. The successof any counterinsurgency campaignh.inge;9l tht supportof the indigenous
portionsof thepopulace'
population.The primarycentreof gravityis ttreneutnl andfriendly
a significantamountof the activitiesthat a military
Info Ops influenceu.riuirl., witl c-omprise
forceundertakesin a camPaign
plan in all of its constituent
6t. Informationoperationsform an integralpart of anyoperational
planningoccurs
activity areas.aff activity areasrequireiur"-tttplanning.Themostcomplex
of the effectsacrossa
with inJluenceactivitier,tnrt is, thoseactivitiesthatrequireconsideration
wide spectrumof targetaudiences andenvironmental systems'undentandinghow to influence
thoseaudierrr., ."ffis carefulconsideration by commandenandstaff' All activitiescreate
influencesandthus commanders at all levels,evendownto thelowesttacticallevels'must
undentandme tastini impresrionsand ramiircations, be theypositiveor negative,intentionalor
unintentional,that aliactivitiescreateon targetaudiences'

Ch8: 18/18
DRAFT

CHAPTER9

SUSTAINMENT

SECTION1: SUSTAINMENTPRINCIPLESAND PLANNING

1' Princioles.Sustainment
doctrineis explainedin LandForcesustainment. Theplncrples
of sustainment
in coIN argno differentfiornlhosein othertypesof operations,
aithoughthere
arechangesof emphasisin theirapplicatron.fhe principiesare.
a. Foresight;
b. Economy;
c. Flexibility;
d. Simplicity;
e. Cooperation;
f. Self-sufficiency;
g. Visibility;
h. Responsiveness;and
i. Survivability.

2' FactorsAffectingSustainment. Somemodifications


to normalCSSpracticeand
arenecessary
to allowfor thecircumstances
under whichCOIN operations
ll:t_tdut.t take
Drace:

a. Disoersion.Non-contiguousdeploymentof the securityforces


in small
detachments over a wide areaincreasesdifficulty in the provisionof support.
Theremay be a tendencyto fragmentand dispersecSS units
to supportwidery
deployedsecurityforce elements.However,th. ,upport of isolated
sub-unitsand
platoonsmay be a problembettersolvedby increaiingthe
revelof serf-
sufficiency. Nevertheless,somedispersionof cSS ,riit, rnuy
be inevitableundcr
the "hub and spoke"system.

b. Securitv.Therewill be a hostof securitythreats:

(1) A surfaceto air missiieand smallarmsthreatmay complicate


the
provisionof replenishment by air.

(2) Dependence on local resources/labour


for suchthingsas,construction,
purchase,storageand perhapsdistribution,addsto ihe
overall security
problem,

(3) The NationalSupportElement(NSE) andits staticinstallations


shouldbe
sitedin an areasecuredand protected, commensurate with operational and
geographical factors.If the scaleand intensityof the opcrationwanant
the
establishmentof forward supportgroups(FSG) their e]ements
are likelv to

t8
DRAFT

be more at risk and will requiremore securityforce effort to defendthem


While a safeareais desirable, easeof accessto the NSE, pointsof entry
(POE)or convenience for onwarddistributionmay be the detennining
factors.

(4) Air Supporl.The greaterthe amountof air and helicopterlift that is


availablethe more it will be possibleto cut out intermediatebaseswith the
advantageofeconomiesin groundresources,guardsand theatretransport.
Wherepossiblethe useof a seabasedNSE would easethe physical
securityand protectionof thesevulnerableinstaliations

(s) OperationalSecuritv.Caremust be takenthat CSS preparationsdo not


prejudicethe securityof informationand pians.Suddenincreasesin stock
levels,exceptionalamountsof road,rail and air movement,the arrival of
new CSS units in certainareasand the localpurchaseof unusualitems are
just someexampiesof changesin a normai patternof replenishmentwhich
might betraya future operation.A combinationof secrecy,insofaras it is
possibleto hide CSS preparations, and convincingdeceptionplanshelp to
preservesecurity.Discretionin dealingwith contractorsand taking care
not to discussoperationalmatters,especiallyfuture plans,in the hearingof
local labour are essential,if elementaryprecautionsareto keep our
intentionssecret.

)
Lt. Manpower. BecauseCOIN operationsare manpowerintensivetherewill be
pressurefor economyin CSS manpower. While, on the one hand,low ratesof
expenditureof combatsuppliesreducethe CSS burden,the disperseddeployment
mentionedin sub- paraa aboveincreasesit. Manpower iimitationsmay increase
dependenceon local labour.

Multi-national Forces. Canadawill most likely deploy as part of a multi-nationai


securityforce. This could lead to potentialcoordinationand standardization
problems.

Plan
CSS Reconnaissance

3. Party. Pointsto note are that:


Reconnaissance

q
The recoruraissance party sentto a new theatrewil1be organizedon a joint service
basis.The party will aim to make early contactwith the HN governmentthrough
the local diplomatic representativein order to assessthe resourcesavailablein the
theatreand to provide an estimateof the requirements,which must be sentout
from Canada.

b. The reconnaissance party must include a strongCSS elementheadedby a


sufficiently seniorofficer, who is fully awareof the kind of operationenvisaged
and of rhe CSS requirements to supportit. He shouldhavethe authontyto arrange

7,8

8 - 2 - 0 0 0519
A020231
DRAFT

liaisonwith the IIN and allies,to takedecisions


andto makerecomniendations
ro
the TaskForceCommanderand,throughthe diplomaticstafl to the HN ministry
of defence

c' The earlierthe reconnaissance parly is sentout andthe soonerCSSpreparations


for the arrival of our forcesaremadethe bener.

4' S t r a t e g i c R e c cJe4' L o g s t a f f a n d t h e J S G w i l l c o n d u c t t h e s t r a t e g i c r e c c e .
TheCSS
elementof the reconnaissance party must makearrangements with the hJst govemmentfor
facilitiesandprocedureswithregardtothereceptionandlogisticsupportofourforces.
The
followingpointsmustbe considered:

c
Liaison.Liaisonprocedures
for coordinating
cSS requirements
with the IN, any
otheralliesand CEFCOM mustbe established.

b. Accommodationand Real Estate.The estimatedrequirementfor operational


and
logisticaccommodationand real estatemust be given to the FIN's ministry
of
defenceas soon as possible.The proceduresfor obtainingaccommodationon
ioan,by requisition,by leasingor by purchase mustsimilarlybe workedout with
the FfN's authoritieswith all possiblespeed. fhe availabilityof local labour,
building material,services(eiectricity,warer,sewage,etc) must be ascertained
quickly.

Provisionof Resources.The capacitiesof the HN or Coalitionpartnersto provide


combatsupplies,servicesand consumeritemsmust be determinedbefore
frnalizingwhat must be broughtin from canadaor neighbouringcountries.

d. Infrastructure.Availability and capacityof HN infrastructureincluding:

(1) Port Facilities..


Alongsideberthing,discharge ratesusingexisting
unloadingfacilitiesand storageaccommodationat and nearthe main
nort
of entry' Unloadingand lighteragefacilitiesat small ports. Inlandwater
transport.Road and rail exits.Liaisonwith the harbourauthorities.

(2) Airports. Agreementon the main entry airfield and availabilityof forward
airfieldsor airstrips_in
conjunctionwith the air force elementof the
recomalssance party. Agreementon aircraftschedules leadinsto a
plannedflow of reinforcementsand supplies.

(3) Railroads.

(4) Road System.

Anival of cSS Units.The build up of cSS unitsmust be plannedto support


the
combatelementsas they arrive,taking into accountthe assistance
availablefrom
the FIN.

l8

Ananttao. ^nAr^^
DRAFT

f. Accounting.Therewiil be a needfor financialstaff on any aovanceparty.


Agreementwith the host government will be neededon the foliowingtopics:

( 1) Cost sharing.

(2) AccountingProcedures.

(3) The needfor bankingfacilities.

5. OperationalRecce. The Task ForceJ4lG4 will conductan operationallevel recceto


detcrminethe following:

a. Bases, Detailedplanningfor the establishmentof CSS installations,rnedical


facilities and the siting of unit campsneedsto be concurrent.In conjunctiorrwith
the intelligenceand operationsstaffsit will be necessaryto draw up a plan for the
provision of protectionfrom blast,mortar bombs,RPGs and shellsfor key or
exposedheadquarters, installations,isolatedbasesand positions.

b. Allocation of Main SupplyRoutes.ln a country with a limited road network it


may be necessaryto allot time blocks for the road movementof resupplyconvoys
and routine troop movements.

c. Level of self-sufficiencyrequired. Basedon the deploymentof the Task Force


elements,basic load quantitiesmust be established'

d. Equipment Support.The equipmentsupportplan must be gearedto providing


specialrequirements:

(I) Enhancedelectronicrepairfacilitiesto deal with extra radios,CCTV


systems,alarmsand EW equiPment.

(2) Modifications to vehicles,t$, armouring'

(3) Operationalstocksmust be estimatedand maintainedas, unlike PKO,


there will be vehicle casualtiesin significantnumbers,

Security. The G4 must work with the G2 and G3 to establishthe securityplan for
CSS elements,convoysand activities.

Labour.Detailedrequirements must be developedfor eachinstallationand areain


terms of skilled and unskilledlabour.

48

an2n?a1R-4-onnl61
DRAFT

S E C T I O N2 : S U S T A I N M E N T
ANDRESoURCES

Sustainment
Svstem.In developingthe sustainment
systemthe G4 staff must:

Decideon the stocklevelsto be held in the supportgrouplocatronsand


the self-
sufficiencylevel of units to providefor:

(l) The predictedintensityof operations;

(2) A cushionof reserves to meetintenuptionsin the replenishment


systemby
rnsurgentaction and; and

(3) The changingdependency


ofunits.

Demandcommoditiesthroughthe nationalLoc or contractthroughthe


IN and
work out a movementand distributionplan to transportmaterialfiom
the entry
pointsto the baseinstallations.

organize distributionfor commoditiesin the operationaiareasand


ailocate
dependencyfor units basedon the nearestor most appropriatesource
ofsupply.

d. Arrangerail transport,road convoys,inland and coastalwater transport,


fixed or
rotary wing airlift or air dropping.

Traffic control and route protection;it will be necessary,


in conjunctionwith the
G3 staff, to arrange:

(1) Escortsand pickets;

(2) "Road open days',in high risk areas;and

(3) Avoidanceof a routineand predictablepattem of convoy movements


in
areaswhere thereis high risk of insurgentattack.

f' Unit responsibilityfor the movementof materialfrom the distribution


porntsor
CSS installationsto their own areas.Unitsmay requirehelicopterlift or evenpack
animalsin difficult country.

1. . SA is criticaito sustainmentin COIN


operations.Enemyforceswill likely put a high priorityon destroying
or disruptingCSS
elements.CSS unitsdown to the lowestlevelmust havethe abilityto
reactimmedlatelyto
enemy actionor changingsupportrequirements.

8' Air Replenishment. Fixed or rotarywing aircraftmay becomethe methodof choice


for
replenishment
for the followinereasons:

y8
DRAFT

a r e a sa v o i d i n gt h e n e c e s s i tfyo r a
F o r c e sc a nb e s u p p L i eidn i n a c c e s s r bal e
vulnerablesurfacesuPplvroute;

b. Troopsarebefterableto move with light scalesof equipment,unencumbered with


echelontransport,thus exploitingthe principleof flexibility to give thema good
level of tacticaimobility;

c. weatherand terrainair replenish-


Subjectto the capacityof the airlift resources,
ment is quickerthan overland resupply;

d. of
Reservestockscan be reducedand held centrallyallowing the establishment
fewer but larser basessituatedin more secureareas;

e. Reducingthe dependencyon surfacerouteslessensthe risk of ambushand cuts


the convoYProtectioncommitment;

e. Rapid casualtyevacuationimprovesa woundedsoldierschancesof survival,


improving morale;

g. The urgentneedsof the civilian popuiationin isolatedareascan be met quickly;

h. Air Dropping. This method is lesseconomicthan air landedresupplybut is often


necessaryin very broken country where thereare no landing zones,evenfor
helicopters,without engineerwork. The penaltiesfor air dropping arethat the
recovery of parachuteequipmentmay be difficult or impossibleand theremay be a
risk that the suppliesfall into enemyhands;

i. Landinq Strips and Helicopter Pads.Theseshouldbe constructedwhenever


possibleand as soon as possibleto economisein airlift;

j Cooperation,There is a need for closecooperationbetweenthe CSS,operations


and air staffs; and

k. Anti-Aircraft Threat.SAMs and small arms may pose a seriousthreatrestricting


the use of air suPPlY.

9. S e aB a s e dL o g i s t i c s .T B D .

10. Use of Local Resources.While the maximumusemust be madeof local resources to


reducethe CSS lift resourcesdeployedfrom Canada,care must be taken not to causeshortages
in the host country's home market and consequentprice rises,althoughthis may haveto be
balancedagainit the advantages to be gainedby boostingthe local economy,If the civil
population suffersfrom shortagesand inflation the tnsurgentswiil be handeda readypropaganda
weapon.

11. Security.

68

63
aoz0.2318-6-00n1
DRAFT

InsurgentInfiltrationof Labour,It mustbe assumed thathostileintelligence


agentswill infiitratelocal labour.It will be difficultfor incomingunitsand
securitysections to distinguishbetweenIoyaland disloyalelements. To reduce
the porentialthreatto baseinstallarions, ports,airports,roadsand railways
reliancemust be placedon good unit and installationsecurityand an efficient
localvettingsystem.The methodof veftingmustbc agreedwith the host
governmentwhosepolice and securityunits may be largelyresponsiblefor its
rrrrprurrrvrlLolrurr'
imnlemenlafin. Trrrc
h o SlStem
may neverbe foolproofandmeasures must be taken
to guardvulnerableinstailationsfiom tenorist attackand to preventthc leakaseof
p l a n sa n d i n t e n t i o n sA.l l s o l d i e r se, s p e c i a l lcyS S t r o o p se m p l o y i n gc i v i l j a n s .
must be carefullybriefedon sccuritymatters;

b. Protectionof Labour.Labour must be protectedfrom insurgentattackand


intimidation.If the LIN cannotprovidesuitableprotection,
additionalcombatunits
may haveto be deployedin an escortand protectionrole; ancl

Installations.
CSSinstallations mustbe suitablysitedfor securityand defence.
and effectiveiyguarded.In the bestcasethe HN willprovide protection.f f this is
not possible,extracombattroopsmay haveto be providedbecauseCSS units do
not have sufficientpersonnelto carry out their functionsand guardthemselves
exceptagainstthe lightestof threats.Nevertheless, cSS trooDsmust be
sufficientiywelltrainedin combatskillsto be ableto defendthemselves.

S E C T I O N3 : PERSONNEL

Moraie

12. Soldiersand their Families.Troopswill often be operatingin small groupsfor long


periodsin trying conditions.Soldier'sfamiliesmay be wonied by presscov-erage
of actionand
casualtiesin the areaswhere the soldieris stationed.When u cu*piign lastsfoia considerable
time, lack of progressmay discouragesoldiersand their families.Thi insurgentsmay
rry ro
aggravatea discouragingsituationwith a propagandacampaign.With or wiihout hostilc
propaganda'rumoursspreadand may be difficult to dispelor refutewhen troops
are deployedin
smalldetachments over a wide area.

l3 PromotingGood Morale,While motivatingsoldierswith goodand soundreasonsfbr


the
Army's interventioninto the CON operationandthe needfor continued, patientcommitmentis
the duty of the commanderand a function of leadershipat all levels,certarnother measures
can
be takento help maintainmorale. They include:

a. Reliableinformationservices,internetand nationaland local newspapers;

b. A quick and frequentmail serviceto and from home;

c. welfare telephones
and internetcafesat reasonable
ratesor free:

78
d. plusDVD and videos;
Sateiittetelevisionand radio receivers

e. Gymnasiumequipmentin protectedareaswhereoutdoorrecreationis not


feasible:

f. Local leavecentresin secureand attractivesurroundings,if possiblein a


temperateclimate,and periodichome leave;and

as
g. A rapid and efficient systemfornotifying relativesof deathsand casualties
they occur.

Medicai

small and
14. Small Detachmentsand Wide Deployment Providingmedical supportfor
The problem can be
widely scatiereOd.tu.h.n*tt placesa strainon the medicalservices'
alleviatedby:

a. Refreshertraining for all ranksin first aid;

courseand
b. Training at leastone member of isolateddetachmentson the TCCC
providiig TCCC trained soldierswith additionalmedicai supplies;

b. Providing sufficientcombat medicaltechnicians;

c. provision for quick casualtyevacuationon all operations,including armoured


IEDs;
ambulances,eipecially in urban areasor on routessubjectto snipingand

d. Using helicoptersto evacuatecasualtiesdirectto hospital;and

e. health briefing beforedeploy-


Ensuringthat all ranks receivea comprehensive
ment.

to the
15. Acclimatization.Units despatchedon operationsoverseasmust be acclimatized
SeeLand Force sustainment
local conditions and their workloa-dadjustedon initial deployment.
suchasjungle and
Chapter g for the adjustmentsneededio meet particularspeciaienvironments,
desert.

Manning and Miscellaneous

it will be
16. InterpreterSupport.In a theatrewhere English is not the primary language,
forces and the civil population.
necessaryto engageinterpretersto communicatewith allied

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DR-AFT

C H A P T E R1 O

COUNTER-INSURGENCY
TRAINING

SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION

I. Trainingfor conventional warfareprovidesa soundbasisfor the conductof CON


operations.However,in preparationfor COIJrl,thereis a requirementfor addition
trainingthat is campaignor missionspecific.fhe trainingandpreparations acrossall
ranksis as much intellectualas it is physical. Not only do units and sub-unitshaveto
undertakeskill training in preparationfor the likely tacticaltasks(urbanpatrolling,
cordonand searches,vehiclecheckpoints)but they haveto be trainedin the principles
uniqueto coIN, the importanceof the supportof the civilian popuiaceand the
importanceof local cultureand socialdynamics.

2. It must be remembcredthat doctrinefor COIN operationswill provide guiding


principlesand methodsfor the conduct. The most successfularmiesin COIN ooerations
havenot treateddoctrineas dogmabut haveaffordedcommanderstrust and confidence ,
and freedomof action within the allocatedmission, SoundTTPs can be identifiedand
practisedprior to any deployment,but TTPs will changedrapidly in a theatreof
operations,as the insurgentscome to learnthe TTPs usedby securityforces,and vice
versa. Commandersat all levelsmust be flexible and dynamicand lessonslearnedat the
lowestlevelspassedquickly for wider implementation.

SBCTION 2: OPERATIONAL LEVEL, JOINT AND COMBINED TRAINING


AND PREPARATIONS

3. The military is only one of potentiallymany agencies thatwill be usedin the


conductof a COIN. At thc earliestopportunity,allagencies, civilianand securityforces,
shouldcometogetherto conduct.ioint training. In somecasesthe military may haveto
takethe lead in the educationof agencieslessknowledgeablein the conductof COIN.
This training can begin with seminarsand conferences and developto actualfield
exercises.Standingpoints of contactand positionsfor liaisonteamscan be iclentifiedrn
much of this traininq.

4. All securityforce elementsdesignatedfor COIN operationsshould cometogether


at the earliestopportunity.Training shouldbegin with seminarsand wargamesfor Gaders
andprogressto tacticaifield exercises for all levels.

5. Training in simulatedenvironmentsand in the field shouidencompassfull


spectrumoperations.Hence,FTXs should,wheneversuitable,ensurethat scenarios
reflectthe continuumofoperationsand the requiredchangesto forcestructures, tactics
and intellectualchallenges.For example,a scenariomay beginwrth entry into a major
combatcampaignand thenprogressto an insurgency situationthat will requirea greater

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DRAFT

balancebetweenoffensive,defensiveand stabilityoperations. This rvill force


commandea r sn ds o l d i e r as t a l i l e v e l st o a d i r r st th e i rn l a n so. r d e ' sT T P sa n dm : n d s e ti sn
o r d e rt o r e f l e c t h es c e n a r i o .

6. Training with coalition partnerswiLi readily identify differencesin approaches


and methodsin a COIN operationand wiil identifypotentialfor liaisonpositions,
particularlyin the eariy stagesof a campaign.

SECTION 3: LESSONS IDEI.{TIFIED DURING CAMPAIGNS

7. It is vital that as actualcampaignsprogress,lessonsidentified,often at the cost of


lives, are captured,assessed by doctrinestaffs,schoolsand training systems,and arethen
implementedpervasively.This will requireformal and informal reportingmethods,the
submissionof detarledafter-actionreports,their widest dissemination,and staff visits to
operationaltheatres.Formal links betweenlessons-learned staffs,doctrinewriters,
training authoritiesand trainersneedto be establishedand exploited.

SECTION 4: TRAINING PRIOR TO UNDERTAKING COIN OPERATIONS:

8. Training plans in preparationfor a COIN operationshouldconsiderinclusionof


the followins:

a. training in TTPs for COIN operations,with greatemphasison the sub-unit


level, probably in a non-contiguousbattle-space.Theremust be an
emphasison junior leadertraining.Computerbasedtraining in simulated
environments offers very little benefit for section and platoon
commanders.Their skills will only be truly developedwhen leadingtheir
subordinatesthrough physicaland intellectuaichallenges,rangingquickiy
acrossthe full spectrumofoperations;

b. instructionin the causesand conditionsof the insurgencyand links to the


motivationsof the non-committedpopulace;

c. instructionin the insurgentoperationaltechniques,their TTPs, structures


and equipments.All forces,particularlythoseof the echelons,mustbe
made aware of, and trainedin, the pervasive,asymmetricthreatthat is
posedby insurgentforces;

d. acclimatisation training,reflectiveof the planned


and environmental
operationaltheatre;

e. culturaltrainingregardingthe indigenouspopulationsto be encountered,


their customs,laws, beliefs,etc, includingtheir motivationsfor supporting
or not-supportingthe insurgency;

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DRAFT

specialist trainingrequiredto expandthe forcecapabilities in urban


o p e r a t i o n si n. r e l l i g e n co ep e r a r i o nPsS
, y o p S ,C I M I C ,t h el o c a
language(s), healthaspects, IEDs and mines;

t h es k i l l sr e q u i r e df o r H U M N T c o l l e c t i o n
t h r o u g hf r a m e w o r kp a r r o l l i n g .
Soldiersand their commandersmust understandthe importantrole that
they play in gatheringinfonnationand intelligencefor the developmentof
TAIs andmeasures of success;

h intensivetrainingto ensurephysicalfitness,as troopsacclimatisemore


quicklyif they arein goodphysicalconditionupon arrivalin the theatre
;

intellectualtrainingfor all ranksto ensurethat they all understandthe


uniqueaspectsof a colN campaign,the potentialoperationaland
strategicimpactsthat low level decisionsand actionscan have,and the
needto influencethe will of the Iocalpopulation;

J. ROE training;

1,
A . mediatraining;

l. crowd control operations.The useof cco equipment(which can cause


deathif not usedcorrectly)and cco rrps cannotbe learnedin theatre,at
the time of its employment.It must be part of pre-deploymenttrg and
refreshedin theatre:and

m. trainingteamsfrom units alreadyin theatre,reversetechnicalassistanse


visits (TAVs) or just retumedfrom theatreshouldbe usedto train on the
local situationand up-to-dateTTps and threats.

SBCTION 5: IN-THEATRE TRAINING

9' When deployedon operations,trainingmust continueand commandersmust


ensurethat they aliocateappropriatetime, resourcesand supervisionto it. Commanciers
shouldensurethat regularrefreshertraining of TTPs and equipmentis conductedin
theatre,throughoutthe mission.In addition,commandersanditaff shouldconsiderthe
following:

reconnaissance and advancepartiesmustquickly assess the operational


and tactical situationand identify any aspectsin trainingthat troopsmay
.'
r r d v e nunut r )v cc tr er u
heve n rvr e
crl ocdu nurr frhrqr td. p,rrnsl ir" lor r i l c Bf t rr ot ro at drrc r-e* m
*l^^^;^
p h a s i s . tI if. tt^h^ -g s e ^t r a i n i n g
requirements cannotbe met prior to deployment, thenthey must seek
training venuesfor the units to usefollowing their arrival but prior to
operational commitment.Temporarybattleschoolsmay be esiablished by
the in theatreforce to provide trainingto troops,on new enemyTTps or
equipment,which was not availablein canada.Staffplannersmust
balancethe trainingneedwith the needto at ieastbeginto underlake

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DRAFT

tacticaloperationsin supportof the besiegedauthontyand a coaiition


commander.

b. commandersmay precedetheir main bodiesand be attachedto units


aiready.committed to operations. The lessonsthey learncan thenbe used
to hone final training or guide in-theatretraining,

c. physicalfitnesstrainingshouldcontinuein theatre;

d. troopsshouldbe given regularsituationupdatesin terms of the overall


missionand campaign.They shouidbe briefedon what measuresare
proving successfuland they shouldbe given feedbackas to the usefulness
of the intelligencethat their patrolsare providing.This will keepthe
troopsmotivatedand focusedon the successof the mission.

10. Units engagedin counterinsurgency operationsshouldundergocontinuous


training at all levels,to ensurethat basicindividual and collectiveskills are maintainedto
a high itandard. Particularattentionshouldbe paid to the maintenanceof individual skills
during periods of low activitY.

SBCTION 6: CONCLUSION

I i. Good tacticaltraining will preparesoidierswell in the conductof a COIN


operation.At the sametime however,commandersmust ensurethat all ranks,particularly
thosein daily contactwith the populace,understandthe pervasivethreatposedby
insurgents,and the vital importanceof gainingand holding the supportof the local
populace.

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DR4FT

SUGGESTEDREADNG IN COTNTER-INSURGENCY

1. andTerrorism- InsideModernRevolutionary
Bard E, O'Neil, 1990,Insurgency
Warfare,Brassey's,New York.

2. GalulaDavid., 1964,Counterinsurgency
llafure; Theoryand practice,New
York: Praeger.

3. JulianPaget.,7967,Counter-lnsurgency
Campaigning,Faber
and FaberLimited,
London.

4. Kitson,GeneralSir Frank.,19J7,.Bunchof Five, Faberand FaberLimited,


London,

5. Kitson, Frank., 1971, Low Intensityoperarions. subversion,Insurgency,


Peacekeeping, London: Faberand Faber.Limited,London

6. Nagei, John A., 2002,counterinsurgencyLessons from Malaya to vietnam;


Learning to Eat soup with a Knife, westport,conn., and London: praeger.

7. Thompson,sir Robert.,1966, DefeatingcommunistInsurgency; The Lessonsof


Malaya and Vietnam,New York: Praeger.

8. Trinquier Roger, 1964,Modern Warfare. A French View of Counterinsurgency,


Ncw York: Praeser.