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Snapshot 3
Decisions and Destinies:
Asian Security in 2010
Rory Medcalf September 2010
I
n Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, New Delhi, Seoul and or cooperatively;
Pyongyang, decisions and deeds this year have sharply • to shape, rather than simply follow, domestic public
illustrated how political choice can shape Asia’s security opinion;
environment. • to focus on regional or global imperatives;
• to invest seriously in inclusive diplomatic institutions;
From a North Korean torpedo strike to an India-China hotline; • to tolerate or respond to provocative actions;
from a US-Taiwan arms deal to new levels of Chinese • and to decide whether interests, capabilities, or some
maritime assertiveness; from coordinated displays of US definition of values should take priority in determining
naval presence to the reshaping of diplomatic architecture which countries to engage as security partners.
to accommodate America and Russia; from the tightening of
ties between Seoul and Washington even as they wavered Some choices are not clear-cut. Actions that may appear
between the latter and Tokyo: contemporary events underline unsettlingly assertive in one capital might seem defensive in
that Asia’s strategic direction is not preordained simply by another. Arms acquisitions can be destabilising or essential
shifts in economic weight and military potential. Whether the to keep the peace, depending on complex and shifting
region’s future will resemble a balance of power, concert of geopolitical circumstances. Dialogue, transparency and
powers, hegemony or some other arrangement will depend cooperation can go hand-in-hand with the advancement
also on the choices that governments make in responding of national capabilities and interests. Competitive military
to structural forces, as argued in Power and Choice: Asian modernisation might persist in a relatively low-risk fashion
Security Futures.1 alongside economic and social enmeshment.
Faced with strategic flux and the resulting sense of insecurity, Still, there have been worrying signs of late: indications that
nations have some clear choices, including: the threat and use of force, whether as a result of calculated
• to expand, consolidate or contract their military reach policy or of misperception, are going to remain a part of
and profile; Asia’s foreseeable future. Constructive steps have been over-
• to opt for unilateral assertiveness or to emphasise matched by a more risky kind.
dialogue and cooperation;
• to use defence diplomacy as a tool to reduce risk All at sea
of conflict, or to withhold it as a reward for political One notable feature is the maritime context of most of these
concessions; negative developments. It is no surprise that Asia’s key
• to reinforce power-balancing capabilities, whether security interactions should be in this domain, bearing in mind
national defence forces or alliances; the region’s geography and vast – and still-growing – reliance
• to seek regional stability through attempts at on seaborne commerce, including energy imports. What is
mutual threat reduction or through bids for military alarming is the degree of risk some powers seem willing to
superiority; incur in this Indo-Pacific commons.2
• to respond to transnational security threats unilaterally
Despite or because of its acute seaborne dependence, China Concerns have resurfaced in the past year about the prospect
in particular appears to have taken a decision to pursue of DPRK state collapse, and the need for coordination among
assertive deployments and uncompromising diplomacy in countries with a key stake in Korean stability.5 In the current
several maritime theatres. This April it ventured into the climate of mistrust, however, the prospects for a constructive
Pacific with its most powerful eastward foray yet, in which its contingency-related dialogue between the most crucial powers
helicopters buzzed Japanese patrol vessels at dangerously – China and the United States – appear slim. Beijing’s current
short range. Beijing has declared the South China Sea a core calculation appears to be that such a dialogue would involve
interest, suggesting a willingness to confront other countries unacceptable costs – perhaps because this might mean
in these disputed waters. After objecting to US-South Korean admitting that Washington has a legitimate role in Korea’s future,
exercises in the Yellow Sea it has proceeded with its own or because it might signal a lack of Chinese confidence in and
live-fire wargames there. And, amid all this, China has cited goodwill towards Pyongyang. Yet without such preparation, the
long-anticipated US arms sales to Taiwan as its reason to risks of China-US military confrontation during a future North
suspend precisely the kind of military-military dialogues Korean regime crisis will be great. They have, of course, waged
with the United States that both powers need to minimise bitter war over the existence of North Korea before.
accidental confrontations at sea.
Cross-currents
Broadly speaking, Beijing’s naval modernisation is the legitimate The news has not all been bad for peace and order. North
response of a vast trading power to deep insecurity about its Korea’s action is driving solidarity among US allies and
supply vulnerabilities. It was inconceivable that China would partners not much accustomed to direct defence cooperation
forever outsource the entirety of its sea-lane security to the with each other. Under its unsteady Democratic Party
United States. But that alone does not explain some of its key of Japan-led government, Tokyo’s new official attitude to
capability choices, such as ballistic and cruise missiles.3 At this a rising China has not yet crystallised, though will likely
time of unprecedented Chinese naval power, modernisation revert to mistrust.6 It seems that the Cheonan incident is
and audacity, it is troubling that confidence-building and bringing Japanese and South Korea closer together, now
dialogue mechanisms remain weak to non-existent, and that that they have a more clear and present maritime danger than
Beijing appears to want it to remain so. This is as bad for zealous citizens claiming the contested Dokdo/Takeshima
China’s interests as it is for everyone else’s. island. Further away, Australia contributed expertise to the
multinational panel that identified the origin of the torpedo
If China’s maritime adventures are becoming perilous, those attack. Aware of its crucial economic and strategic stake in
of its spoilt little brother North Korea have turned lethal. The a prosperous, secure North Asia, Canberra has been trying
sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in March to add substantial defence ties with Seoul to its deepened
appears to mark a new depth of risk-taking by the North. But links with Tokyo.
the dangers do not end with the loss of sailors’ lives and
the possibility that the North might attack again. For reasons Further south, China’s new tone of dominance in the South
of credibility and deterrence, Seoul and Washington have China Sea is prompting firm reactions. In July the United
been confronted with the delicate task of preparing a range States has used the region’s most inclusive regional security
of responses – including displays of force. Notable in this dialogue, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), to affirm its
regard has been their decision to proceed with major warfare own interest in peace and freedom of navigation in these
exercises (see Strategic Snapshot 1: Cheonan Choices).4 international waters. In August, in a demonstration both
material and intensely symbolic, a US destroyer visited
For its part, Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn the sinking, Vietnam7 and a high-level Vietnamese delegation visited a
its criticism of the US-South Korea exercises, and its rejection US aircraft carrier offshore. Although Vietnam’s official media
of maritime confidence-building serve to worsen tensions in sought to play down the power-balancing message, and
Northeast Asian waters. This marks an even deeper problem. some ASEAN countries say they want to limit US involvement
It has been widely speculated that North Korea’s latest in ‘resolving’ the South China Sea issue,8 it appears that
phases of provocation – dating back to the 2009 nuclear China’s assertiveness in Southeast Asian waters is reaching
and missile tests – could relate to struggles for influence the limits of what the rest of the region is prepared to accept.
within Pyongyang in preparation for a leadership transition. Interestingly, the tone of some Chinese commentators has
If, however, an effective handover of power requires such already begun to moderate, with one even suggesting that
external risks, it is further evidence of the profound fragility China consider referring the disputes to the International
of the DPRK. Court of Justice.9
Strategic Snapshots 3
Strategic Snapshots
Notes
1
Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf and Andrew 9
Shen Dingli, China’s regional relations: Australian can help, The
Shearer, Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures, Lowy Interpreter http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/19/
Institute MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Project, 2010 Chinas-regional-relations-Australia-can-help.aspx
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1306 10
First Plenary Session, Dr Robert M. Gates, Shangri-La
2
The present analysis covers the same geographical footprint as Dialogue 2010 http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-
Power and Choice: Asia defined as an essentially Indo-Pacific la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2010/plenary-session-
region of large and middle powers, in particular the United speeches/first-plenary-session/robert-gates/
States, China, Japan, India, South Korea and Australia, also 11
Wider questions of the choices involved in US grand
taking into account Russia and potentially influential Southeast strategy and its relation to the maritime commons in Asia are
Asian states, notably Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. considered in Michael J. Green, America’s Grand Strategy
3
See, for instance, Annual Report to Congress: Military and in Asia: What Would Mahan Do? Strategic Snapshot 2,
Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of Lowy Institute MacArthur Foundation Asia Security Project,
China, 2010, Office of the Secretary of Defense, pp 29-33. September 2010. http://lowyinstitute.org/PublicationPop.
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2010_CMPR_Final.pdf asp?pid=1374
4
Malcolm Cook and Andrew Shearer, Cheonan choices,
Strategic Snapshot 1, Lowy Institute MacArthur Foundation
Asia Security Project, August 2010 http://www.lowyinstitute.
org/Publication.asp?pid=1361 About The Author
5
A strategic shock explored in Power and Choice, pp 72-76.
6
Andy Forrest, Learning to live with rivalry, The Interpreter, 17 Rory Medcalf is the International Security Program Director at
August 2010 http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2010/08/17/ the Lowy Institute, where his areas of interest include Asian
Japan-China-Learning-to-live-with-rivalry.aspx geopolitics, nuclear issues, Australian security, and Australia-
7
Appropriately, the USS John S McCain. India relations. His professional background spans intelligence
8
Manila says US not needed in South China Sea row, analysis, journalism and diplomacy.
Agence France-Presse, August 9, 2010 http://www.google.
com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hoOYtZyAGVIZe-
JcqZ42nTScZl5g
The Lowy Institute’s MacArthur Asia Security Project explores evolving strategic relations among Asia’s major powers. Based
on a realistic understanding of the region’s competitive dynamics in a range of key domains, the Project aims to develop a
practical agenda for security cooperation across Asia and a suite of measures to ensure that competition does not lead to
miscalculation or conflict.
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