OPERATION APACHE SNOW

AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 18 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry, 22 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 17 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow After Action Report 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Div, 25 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, XXIV Corps, 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Message, MACV, 20 May 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Messages on Tactical Air Support, 7 & 17 May 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Miscellaneous Messages and Memos, 20 May - 8 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Narrative, 22nd Military History Detachment, Aug 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Report Extract, 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1969
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 18 Jun 1969
 (dj Co D: C o n t i m e d t o proside security f o r FSB CURRAHEG, A t
2x00 hours, D C O LP vic: YC 405293 reported h e a r k g branches being brOk8n
and something o n t e r i n g the p t e r , Sml-1 arm were f i r e d , grenades wore
of t h o area was conducted w i t h negative

DS FSB Cmm,
Me, FSB

;:nits moved i n t o and oc c upie d NDP's a t 2020 hours, M u l t i p l e L P b

- -
YC 3C8919, CO B YC 324.939,
E (-) - FSB C L r n E E , RCM P h t ! -
(d) co D:
ar,d providing
(8) c o E (-)f FSB CUREIArnE,
 (f) RCN P l a t : QPCON 3rd Me, FSB BERCHTESGADEN,

( b ) Co B: Conducted r o c o m i s s a n c e in force operations in assigned

A0 and had no onomy contac% dwing t h e day,

(c) Ca C: ContinuEd Lo provjdo s s c w i t y for t h e Camand Group and

conducted rBcomaissamx in force oprations in assigned A l and had n e g a t i m
cozr?tact with thC3 el2my.
 UNCLASSIFIED 18 Ju.ne 1969

(a) Co A: Continuad soarch and destroy operations in assigned AO,

eneqy c o n t a c t was mde during t h o day,

XRHd3m condt;ctcd soarch and destroy operatior-s ja v i c i n i t y of Hi11 937.

It 0820 hours, CO 8 roportcd finding one f r e s h grave containing 1 IWA KIA,
c
 ( c ) co C: Conducted s e a r c h and desilroy operations in a s s i p e d M ,
v i t h negative enemy contact,,
( C) E (-) : Continued t o provide s e o u r i t y f o r FSB C'lf;i2iHEG,
 (26) B my -t- 25 ( 4 Juyio 1969):
(a) Go A: Continued security and construction of FSB CURW?m md
omployd mul-tipls TiJF operattons, L P ' s and A P k ,
ril" 26
ocru
I / - 27
u Nc LASSIF1 E Ll
t
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry, 22 Jun 1969
SL,;ECT:
.. Ccmbat Cpsratfons Aftor Action Report, Cparatim Akaclle
SliUW
7. Supporting Farces:
12. hecults:
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969
.
AVD.MGG
SUE3JEGT: Combat Wter Action Report OFOI'UI3-62
CL En&i.neer: 1 Plat B/32&h Enw.

e* Pathfinder: l6Oth Aviation Woup.

At YD337074, Co D found one (I) *UC&?rifle, one (1) SK? rule, 1 Model & rifle
with grenade tiuncher, ten (l.C) arM-tank grenades ad some miscellaneous small
arms ammuniti.on, CZothtig and equipment. During the hours of darkness, radar
and crew served starlight scopes located at ES3 Airborne, discovered movement
of small groups of indlividuals and various lights, A33 sighttip were engazed
by 81mmmortars after which the movement ceased. At 1616 hours, Co B was air
moved from their field location at yD309039 to FSB Airborne ts take over the
secux*ity of the fire base, The CA was complete at 1640 hoErsa

a, The mission was successtilly accomplished and vast quantities of

enemy supplies ati materials Were capture&

(2) KBAA: n'one

(3) KBA: Xcme

(r~) Captured: None

(C) Small arms ammo: 84,227 rds

(d) mortar ammo: 712 rds
6Onn-n
(t-3) hCinmmortar Base Plate: 1
(f) 82mm mortar arnno: IL,361 rds
(y) &mm mortar fuses: 100
(q) strut tares : Xl.9

(s) Bunkers: 302

 1 Class I 14,000 lbs

-2 Class II 300 lbs

/2 Clnss ITI 20 -&s
0
t. Class V 800 lbs
( c) Ccn:psny c
1 Class I 16~000 lbs
2 Class II 300 lbs
3 Class III 20 lhs

4 :1nss v 1,000 lbs

(d) Co~pmy 0
1 Class I 12,cr30 m-3
w.4
2 Class II 29 lbs
2 CLass III 20 lbs
4 Class v 700 lhs
c. Trcblm Areas - Lessons Learned:
(1) InitialXy, FSB A.irborne had insufficient helicopter landing area
for the czount of air tmffic which some days exceed& 9 swticse To d.hv~~te
this problem, the CI447 Pad, in the Artillery axa, ~2s ~31lar~f3j as well as im-
proved. The existing W-1 Pati was also enlarged to accomodate t;ur, (2) helicop-
ters and a new W47 I&d was constructed on the southern edge of the perimeter.

(2) d large resupply of demclitions was rz;iuircd tr, be on hand at all

times to 3115% fcs bunker destmction, clearinc 'ields o? fire 3n the perirneer
aF:ld cor;structi.on of la.ndj.gg zones. &I initial stocka- of 5000 1% is recornmer?dc

(3) ?Wh of t:w Fire ,%pport Base was alreac'y constructed when the
Z-506 Inf initially moved jn. Ctherwise a greater arnol;nt of IV material
C~S-S

resupply and maintain airnobility, landing zone

requirement. Time bein? d factor, it was SOOn
followin? items, ma;!euver elements could rapidly
 c* Execu ti.m :

( i) T1-x infantry mission required a careful and thorough search of

the imediate tcmain sumoundjng j?S?j hirb orne; cmequently, C/2-319th was wxy
limited in jrOVidii>? fix+ suppart due to the proximity of the maneuver clcmen-i;~
to FL33 Airborne,
 (2) solution: Extensive use of ~~3cl;n by indirect fire on planned
outes of advance and the use of Pik7k Teams to screen areas to the immediate
rant of maneuver elements reduces the possibility of this type of encounter
nd causes the enemy to dove, thereby exposing him and keeping him off balance.
requent reconnaissance by fire, additionally, benefits the ground commander
17that he is able to encage the enemy with tildirect fire quickly by shiftirjg
ram fired in targets.

b. Stay behind forw,

(2) 2;ulu i;;i 92 : Normal dip$ng and preparation of 8'DPs causes noise and
!veals friendly Zocations, To avoid indirect fire attack, the maneuver element
!nds a SiWI.1 reconcaissan~c forceto secure the proposed 8DP. After the hours
' darkness, tk;E: co?xpany m.oves slowly and quj_etly TV the location and further
Ito a perimter without digtig firhtjng positions, The arca for the PDP should
rntain epough brus'il and undergrowth to hide the eXe%ent from visual detection+
mekey to successful execution i s holdin(r movement t;lo a minimum.

d. ;3,dcWxkmal prstection for the poix?t man.

?. (C) Tl!RIWN: Operatzion I'iPACHESTQldWELT conducted ti the A Shau-k LUO~
GI..JAz~~,a traditianal NW/XT established base ama and infiltration mute. The
?-@6th lnf area af operation was located northeast 19 the A Luoi Palley bounded
qr <grids YD3Ox2, E&Ulg, m26O3 and YD30c)1e The valley varies in width from 150
xAers to two (2) kilometers. Average e~evat5.t~~ is from 575 meters in the valh:
Flanks to 17&O meters k, the northeast. Slopes on the roPlkq terrain vary frw
Z-l5 per cent and as s-lxep as 80 per cent CXIhigher elevations.
1 (C) VBETATICi$: Multi-canopied dense underzround forest dcsminate the C-1~s
iid muuntaixls throughout the area, The lower slopes are c~verzd with bn-shwxA
ind elephant grass.

b. Durinp the 9peratj.on: The EXI~Y moved the 800th and 802nd Battalions
If the 6th KVA.%@nent into the area of operatiorls. HOWeVer, in the latter
lart of May, both battalkxx FJere withdrawn frapl $he &II* Contact with enemy
'orces during the operatiola consjsted of engagements with trail wakhers and
iquad-size elements. Contact was broken by the enemy on each occasir>n.

c, Results and effects of the o,peration: Cc3Oued pnz~ure by US ,F'orces

II the AC forced the enemy to abandon his cache sifxs and coztinuauy relxate
is forces. This action resulted ti cache sites lxi~~g abandxed, which were
'ound and destroyed or evacuated by IJs %cjrces, During the operation, the enemy
'as required to curta II his res~~pply operatf;in$ to elements in t;he mountains,
lo thF: northeast, He was compd..led t;&wiQ~Iraw main fcrce tInits back across t&e
,autian border and resort to a role of observation and harassment of Allied
pzrations,
,/’ - - q
/
0
8h
E:
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 17 Jun 1969
 UNClASSlFiED

RHSAOED
UNCtASSlFlEDBY

2. %t~s, 9 May-7 June 1969.

8, IntelUgencc, Intsm 10 May - 7 Ame 2969.

 UNCLASSIF\ED

A, Item, Enfantry packs,

 (2) ~mnmendation. Fire base com3tmctim
should be done based upm a drmm pLan, Tic bases on hilltops should
havo lznding pada on t4he opposite side of the h$JJ.; one for log and
one for passengers,
Fim bases on flat terrain should leave two
150 foot+wide Lxnes between strands of defensive tie, iLgai.n theso
areas shotid be m the qqmxL%e s%des of -the fire base. Q-d-s area
wLl.2. be used for the parktig of aircraft and couId be expanded %EJinc1udc
&rQund level sctiel/ream po&ts if Dql~ed,

2 h.2
.
Incl* 1
UNCLASSIFIED
b&r Cavalry
.-..
4
insufficient for
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969
 UNCtASSlFlED

. '

3 4
3 32
2 2
33 25
71 62
45 52
0 0
0 0
6a 63
I 0
43 L3
-Q a
266 263
-
barrier
bottcm
LL
--fL
K-?8, m.2,
%d .i3r
Unlacatcd 835
 I.
2,
) ::
5.
6,
7,
EL
9.
- .__

UNCMSSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
121~ 3/P?? ~..~xLtshzd rr,et only light resistance by tOl5 hours, and continued
Still., the 3x1 CO, overhead

At IO??' hours, the En CO rcport;ed th2t all 3/187 units were zbreast, approx-
 c
-- -Ye.
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Div., 25 Jun 1969
 DEPARBSNT OFTI-I.EAiU'ff UNCLASSIF;ED 73 i
Headquari;ers 3d Brigade, lOlst brlmme Division (wbfie)
BP0 San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-E 25 Junl? 1969

SUi3jEcT: Co&at Operation@ !titer hctim fit?pUrt - S-7

APmz sxow

Comnding Gw5.ral
Headquarters lolst Airborne Divisim C~~obile)
kr)~ San Francisco 96383

1. Name rrr,d Ty-pe of Operation: Operation APACHEWOW; ReCWZsWCe

*, 7k Force.

2, Dates of Operation: 10 May - 7 June 1969,

3. Location: 'I"hfLs operation was conducted in l&m Hoa Db*ict, Thus

'kim Prodma. Map References: Sheets; l:f;O,CKXl 6i&Z It, 11, 111, Iv;
Series L7014 t L7015,

4. Control HcAdwarters: ~~~ 3d me, 10bt ki.rtr=me Ditision kirmobile~~

., Joseph B, Cmy Jr*, Colonel Infantry, Carrrmandingm
3'a &port;-hg Officer:
6. Task Organization:
~(-1 mt-1 N J-s Cav
. .
A-2-&5 OPCON 18-21May D4?-5& OPCON

+e Contra&
Bde Scty Plat ~326hgr (m)
Rcn l-506 A-158 BHB (A%
A-2-17 Cav Us8 AHB (DS)
2-319 drty (m) TACP2OTlrss
c-2-11 grty &m 58th Set Dog PLat
C-2194 Arty (GSR) 3d F'S%
C-1-83 Arty (GSR)

AE~FUDED
UNCLASSIFIED
BV l)OWGRADED AT 3 YEA3 IHTEIW'JS
DI3CLASSIFmkFTER 12-i
DOD DXR ~ZOO,lO

UNCLASSIF!E:-i
 4tkABsaA-E 25 June 1?69
SUBJECT: Combat Operations hfter AcCiOn %pOpt - SUtlWSy
XFum SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

:1 24.7 SW - supported 3d Bde by reconnaigaancc, the marking 02

J1 -'
_'I_.
. i:

prior to insertions, the screening of ground units and along the

,.,~.'..: border, and by ptipointing
Ji-.t,..;;n enemy mortar and rocket locations,
2% ':iicl 5 for further details).
-. I’\r&jJ-Jery
-:/” - units shown in task organizntion provided support
:<~.r~2i-l/ preps, units in contact, H & I: fires, and direct f5.z-o in deiensc
2:: Sx?s underground and sapper attack. (See &cl 7 for further details).
C* 7th 'l2.F - provided 30th preplanned and ixmediate air strikes ~5th
air prio;*ity to units in contact, LZ preps, u construction, and
j.ntclli,~cncc targets, (See Ino1 3,fo;o f&her detail&
-!fhl.
ri, ."JJGCl A-m %-cup - proviiecl airlift
for combat assauD- and
::~k%rnctims f establishment of fire suppmt bases, resupply sortkcs during
,t:.:: 0'1:21-2$, y!; and pathfinder control. on both Li: insertions and fire b;lscsu
(See ?nci ,$ for further details).
co IQ33tical su,ort - &&ed trv 3d FSSE, DISCC$ 102s-t Abn %.v,
elments of the 1~26Su ply and Serv&Batt&t.ion, co c 326 Medical %, .
CO D B0ls-t Maintenance % attalion, k 1002 Supply and Service Gmparry,
26th Group tJ/gOL Ptitoon, Laundr-3 and Bath Platoon and Graves &gistration.
Section, (See Lx1 h for detailed breakdown on support units, mission
rq~iremcnts and services rendered).

8* Iil-tsl ligenCf.2 : See &closure 1 for cqlete details.

Operation APACHEWW confirmed that elements of tht-: bth, 9th, and
29th k,gixxnts were using t.he NOrthem k ShaU VallCy 3s a pI'&lv WC
for novment of material and infiltration of troops to enemy units
throughOUt I c02?pS~ Using -%dis Research Unit techniques and qui&Ly
reacting to information gained through POWinterrogation, the 3d Brigmk
;~;:s a-ale La exploit hard intelligence and rondcr the 7th, 8'&,and 9th
~i-Ltaliona of the 29th &gt plus its technical units combat ineffeoti.ve.
-..
._ so identified were sappers of the Kl.2 battalion and the K6 (wcli 806th)
--l.II.,6th &qimnt, znd K35 h-by &n (Rock&), These units; after unit

2 UNCLASSIFIED
 .4VDG&I:,.-E 25 June 1969
SUBJFGT: Combat Operations After Action &port - Summary
APiiC!B SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

identification and lomtior, had hem confimcd, wore constantly

huL?dcd IJ-- '7~~2Air, i~rtillery, and pr:mqit by 3d Brigade ground
fOiT.cS. This klvariably resulted ir, the capture of a POWWhGSC
interrogation resulted in valuable information gainod~ i4.

90 Mission:
-3d Bde and 1st AW'Y 3eg-t; conduct combined air-mobile assmlts into
the Northern k Shau Valley in conjunction with the 9th Warines and the
3d iXJiJ hq$ to destroy NVA/VC forces, block enemy routes of egress into
Lc?OSJ interdict enemy LGC, and to loca-tt and destroy enemy caches.

3.2.. Concept of Operation:

a3 -Prior to Baay, 10 I4ay 69, the is-t and 3d ARm %gts and the
>I+ &iszcic
.,.. 101 established three i~~~-tualljr suppor%ing fire baSeS at
i'R Sr*:ldJ_oy (‘ij3278122), FB kirborne (YD355070) and FB Currahee (YC3P?P4P)e
Oil ll.~II3~;, following a fifty minute rT.K Air prep, an eighteen minute
-&--til:i~rji p:ap, Air Cav LZ examination, and a one minute ku LZ prep,
five maneuver battalions (three US and tTdo UVN) were inserted in%:,
five separate U's along the Laotian border overlooking the Northern
-4 Sha.1 Valley-, After searching and clearing the immediate LZ area, all
L'S b2ttalio~s began e,&,erisive mF operations to the East arlci i~OdleClS"c
to;-yard tile ValItey f'loore i&f&r the insertion of the maneuver battalions
had -tye;yLco;ilpieted at 200 harry, tj;e z-l(-) L!CN BE cambat, assaulted
i.jYlTi 6~~~I4mtab
C!..t, (X3253090) and secured FB Tiger for the jllsertiarl
,-,;.;
---,
.
3izt.tei-y 12 SVN iktjJ,~ery (10~~). ‘DE 3-5 C~V secured zoute 547 and
2 1;"2 &es Blaze (QQ4203), Bastogz (1YD62~~P5), and km.non (yD475028),
i>L~:~;~eS)J? -js the al!. weather route to SC used for resupplly of U.&t3
:~~rkL:lg -in, the valley and along its ridge lines,

be Operations Narrative: On BJ)ay, 1Q May 1969, utili&,ng lift

Ship from tlx 158th and 1Olst mB's, the l-J%6 hf at 073OH, 3487 hf
at 08OlI-I, and 2-501 lnf at loOlH, were combat assaulted into LZrs
-~i-~lzit-~
\,A X3129 49, YC320988, and YD288015~rcsp&tively. The 44 i,;RW
lnf bat'i;alion at 102@I and 2-l ARV'N.Inf Bn(-> at 13OOkicombat assaulted
into LZ*s ;;t YD2~004.2 and yD253OPO. The LZ for the 4-l ARVN was hot a3
t,;:o lii‘& t/ shins began to receive ~11 ar;ns fire upon exiting the LZ.
Sporadic firkg continued until approximately 13oaY. At Tiger IJIountain,
one CIi 47 was downed on the LZ by small ar7ns fire. mere were negative
casual-ties. The 1OsmmHowitzer being carried was undamaged and the
CH 47 XG extracted 1Tiths;r.t further incident. The enemy apparently
had no ndvancc kno-wledge of the prtia-ry LZ's and as a result, were
umbll: to effect a dcter?&nod or effective dcfcnse.
i&t 110220H May 69, FB Sxstogm received i; pobe by an unknown size cne,my
force. ~~pprrJx5zately
a. 10 RW rounds and a substantial amount of small
c?rns fire were directed into the perimeter, At the initial RPG fire,

3
UNCLASSIFIED
4 ‘.-L, SD 1L.f!-!Y 1 .- L
 On 1~00@3 May 69, the 3-l i&W Inf Bn combat nssaciltod into F mmhr
6 at ~1?70~. %z LZ was cold with negative snemy contact. At fi2%,
3 Cc, 3.-187 Infantry began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun
fire fr0r.i YC325982. '&is action marked t'nc beginning of the ten day
5.21^;fytEfor ihg Ap Bia Xinintai..n, Due to the continuous and heav fight-
:.r- to tilt capture of Hill 937, a separate Inclosure,
d.l,':'..I Inclosure 9, has
I)_E-12:j L-c;>2I-Ld p For aXL further details on the battle for DOng AP Bin
j.i;,;;&i;~ refer to Inclo.xrc 9.

i3;ryg* 1-8 x,?y 69, the battle for Dong -9 %-a raged as heavy ground
r"igh-?,&g cgztmcd, The 3487th Infantry fought its way South to
tk-,c x!3.t~qV~ crest of Hill 937, while thci I-S06th Infantry assaulted
T:20r-Lh~m~d u; the slope, k-i tixe, cnmy fire frm heavily fortified
~~~kez5 slsxed the mmentum of the l+Z6th I~fmtry assaLLt. The 3-187
ix-ring pushed Pxther +xward the top,&egm W-receive fire from b3th
;r'lz.nks 2s ",h,e cnmy was reinforced. with little daylight remaining,
the dccis5.m ms mde to com'bat assault txo additional bat4iaki.on.s into
the bcttle to stem the flow of enemy reinforcements and add combat
Ixsc, -LOwhat would be the final assault on HZ.3. 937. i&t I.83W, k-2-506
I17Q-Ji-i
tlq- was lifted from Phong Dien -TV ?I3 &rrahee by C3-i b7 then co$mt
;3ss;::_'.A.
"Ld to ?tic-tity
?---)s YC320989 at r&i,ch tint they became OPCONto 3-187,

t UNCLASSIFIED
 On 39 I&-J 63, the Z-501 Infantry(-) at 15131 and the 2-3 r,RV!Jz:t :?27)!
were combat aSSaUlted frcm PZ vici-nit y YD36~81 rtSldMy Chanh resp+zctivciy
hAti U's at X332922 2nd YC33897b. hth LZ*s wrc cold and the remaindw
of the) dq 'GKISspent in preparation fx the assault on Dong '1~ Dia
scheduled for the next day, %e 3-r kv which had been protidiq security
for engineer worksites along rxte 547, became OPCONto the 2d Br&ade.
HEI&II~ becn rclicvcd of providin security for FB*s BastGgnc, Blaze and
Cannon, the elaents of the 3rd 8rigade were -then able "k~more
ef'ft:ctively marsh&l. their resources for the assault on &Cl 937,
Qr: 3; I.&- 69, the 30187th Infantry
with h-2-506 OPCOL'II,
2-501 Infantry,
&SOS &Gantry and 2-j iJim successf'ully assaulted and drove the 7th
;inc: 8th 31:s of the 29th NVA Regjment from their mountain stronghold atop
df-L1.r'
-4 29 Bi2 Pfutaj.n, (See J&l 9 fur cwmslete detaU.&
-
;
21 May 69, the 3-187 Infan+~ became OPCON to the 2d Bde
;’ .,-
Llj:r;.;;.i-gC

l(>&"i, &n Div, 1410in turn returned the 2-506 k-fantry to 3rd sde
cmtroir The time period 21 May 69 - 7 June was characterized by
decreasing enq contact and ever increasing discoveries of ene
caches, The 2-36 Infantry began their portion of Operation APA T I-Z SKN
3;' regainin.~ A-Z&~ Infantry which had been CFXE to 3-187 Itiantry
for the final two days of the battle for Done i;i-7%a Mountain. The
->att&ali Or: CP companies B, C and D(a) mo7ed frzz Ca.m~Groans, Thong Uen
&strict Eea&uari;ers and the An Lo @rkl..e to B &ze by CK 47. Upoil
u (7 move to FB Raze, the Battalion CP and .E Co(N)
ComplEtj.oil Of thfl? C-A
wx'uat assault& to 35 Airbor:i.e. k-2406, upon Amlease by the 3-27
hJ"Et~, combat assaulted f'rom Pz (YC32798~/ to LZ FB Mrborne.

'tie 2&CQ Infantry began RLF operations from vicinity Dong lip %,a3 dong
the bng So Qdge, heading for the Valley floor. The l-504 Infantry
'I---a,?,--extensive search and clear Rl@ qxrations
LJt$,L:li from Bong kp Ra
Ecuntcin &x.~Lfi tcr,mrd ??I krrahee. On 5 &E %9, the b-1 MVN Batklion
mGv& -to PZ vicinity D278066 and extracted to La vang. The move ws
corrrolate
A 2-t; 13sfrI.
 i-
IivlixuxME 25 June 1969
SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Suii
APACIB SNOW UNCLASSIFIED
12, Resclta: a, The 3d Erigade tit.h OFCOWunits successfbily accompIi.shzcci
its mission in Operation ;SJX,'IE SNOW, This multi-battalion ccxnbined
Operation was 2 classic campaign which found the enemy, fixed his
location, and methodically and devastatingly destroyed him in place.
The effect of this was to destroy the combat effectiveness of not only
the maneuver battalions of the 29th ENA %&nsnt, but also its central
headquarters with organic and attached technical units, forcing the
remaining broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos, whfic
at the same time preventing them from again. using the Northern A Shau
VaUey & eitfler a staging area for attack or as a large scale storage
base to outfit future operations.

5, hemy Losses categorized as frilLlows:

(1) KU (EKJ) NW&C

340

100

37

de 3ody to %apons %tio: vs . . AWN

69L/281 = 2,&l 229/400 = 1:1&J

ee Emmy to US killed ratio: g A!RVrrJ

&n/78 = 8,0&l 229&l = 7eOL:b
f, Captu-cd or destroyzd Equipment: US

(1) 337,250 Ids of sir Hmmo (4) 827 RF'G/RLfle Crencdes

(2) 2,426 rds CS hw (5) 32 Mine/BBT
(jj 2,386 rds Mortar bo (6) 3h,?76 lbs Rice

6
UNCLASSIFIED
 (7) 2!4l ~tn~cturc~s (10) 4 Radios
(8) 1205 F or tif ics:l;ions (11) 1-25 Iti Eqlosives

(12) Vehicles (trucks) 4

(7) 10 l22rmn Rockets

(2) &OOO rds Cs'd (8) 11,735 lbs rice

(yj 257 ~orti.fications

(10) 306 %ructwes

(11) 14,275 lbs explxzives
(6) 227 Mine/BBT h.2) 40 Vehicles itrucks
and dozers)

13. khixistra tion: (See lnclosure 2).

I.5 5 Non-Toxic chmical munitions for- the M-79 and lO!%m

Chemical:
Howitzer mm ex~lopd on several dif'ferent occasions on 15, i.6, 2nd 1'7
May during the attack on Dong q~ %.a i"lountati~, (2~ grenades, both
indivldualIy thrown by the foot soldier and bulk air dropped from
W-l.3 aircraft were also used prior to and during assaults (See
Inclosures 8 8,~ 9). Although the use of these chcrrrical muni.%ions met
with sme early success, the changing tin< patterns along the ridge i
lines of Dong up %.a Mountain. quickly dissLpaCted the agent. The ~~~~~, ;
rcnlizin,r the effect of CS in a confined area such as a static bunker i
defense, ceuntcractcd the use of CS by donninz new Chicom protective i
masks. %xausc of these factors, the further use of chemical munitions i
was suspended after 20 May 69.

16. hCl, ~~ffxirs (Omitted).

17. Psychological Operations (See Inclosure 5).

18. Comnuxications (See inclosure 6).

19. %~incer (Omitted).

20. ~~rtj&xy (See Inclosure 7).

UNCLASSIFIED
 i,v-DG&A4 UNCL/isslFl
25 June 136$
SUBJXT: Combat %erations 4Xer Lcti3n Report - Summary
A.TACHE
SNOW
21, Special bipment and Techniques:
fiigger and &ppelillg: Discussion - Several times during $erztion
ipliCH&NOW, aircraft were down in ho&j& terrain where easy ~CCWS WIS
impossible. k-i; timss the only feasible way riggers czGd get to the
r?ircraft in order to rig it for extraction was through the use of
rappeling techniques from UH-lh helicopters,

Solution cA,u,ing that this

- Rc?~' method of entry is not a normal technique
for rigger:1 , 9;~ 7infantry security elements, experience shows that as a
minitrnun, c? basic course of instruction to include actual helicopter
rap/poling is needed in all infantry <andrigger units.
b, Chest Flate Protectors: Discussion -Units of both the l-56
and 2-506 I-nf::ntry battalions employed aircraft crew memberceramic
v!?st $&es Tar their point men, %is body armor, while heavy and
CmbersoiXt, saved the lives of three men who were struck by 3~ at close
rangea
~olxtion - Rc possibT?Aty of adapting this aircraft type body armor
to USC by field troop s should be investigated by every inftintry unit
engaged in operations where contact is felt to be imminent.
22, Commander'siulalysis:
? bon by Fire - Discussion - At least one Companyof each
manor% bat-tvalion involved in Operation G'Xl"i;;i; SMOWinitiated pre,matura
enemy return fire placing the enemy in a poor defens&ve posture through the USC
of recon b;: fire, 4 an example, a unit rcconning by fire il.mg its route
of advance and using 2-17 Cav Pink teams (1 TC>H2nd 1 tiship) to screen
its advance reduces the possibility of 5ein.g engaged by NVA trail
watcfiers, or "Set-piece" ambushes. WUcLng fires" or the use of
&tillcry to recon a route of march makes for r&d employment of both
blocking fires and close in contact fires with less time lost through
h aphazard adjustments and confirmation of ma? lecation.
b, Qak vests: Discussion - The protective or "flak'" vest. SOZXEQJY
worn only by troops in either a static security role or convoy &Q,
si&ficaXi.y rcducod "uotii the number of KL 8: KL for the US M$talions
assaulttilg Dong q &.a Mountain, Many early casuaities were due to
Clay-more and S'G shrapnel. hs this ty-ge projectile does not have the
velocity, r-02: the penetrating power of smaJ.l arms fire except at very close
range, 6hc flak vest is an excellent defensive measure. The only
drawbacks are its weight which causes heat casualties, and its bulkiness,
S3lu.tlrln - issue "flak" vest as the situation dictates.

t3 UNCLASSIFIED
Solution o ii s!lort class to explain x~d demmstrate the proper use of
hir Cx b>- the ground commander should bc held ;xriodicaUy at
&i..gade 1zvel. This class should bc clttcnded by all commanders down
i;() C;llC! -~~c~~ur:-jnc L; the cornixxy level.

UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
 DEi?!&TMENT OF THE AllMY
Headq\rarters 3d Brigade, last Airborne Division
AiT) San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-D 25 .Jme 1.9

3rd Bde 1Olst Abn Div

ATTN: s-3

The following amlysis of the enew situation and supporting i3lfOrs'W

*>ion is submitted for inclosuro in the combat After Actions Renort (ApAc:
SNOW).

1 Incl
I InteUgence of Dong Ap %.a
AVDG-CA-D 25 June 1953
SUBJECT: Ccmbnt After Actions Report (APACE SNOW)

Terrain:
1. --MB The terrn?n azn?octs of the 3d Pde Area. cf' Operations generally
coti'Orined to the original intelligence estimate varying f rotn open vaJ.ley
to steep mountains,
32, The Valley; Ths A SHAUVdlley floor consists of flat open terrain
which varies in width from 300 meters(YD363032) to three kilometers near
TA BAT. Vegetation includes grass, 2 to 6 feet tall and scattered brush.
Foot and vehicle trafficability is excellent, and any portion of the valley
floor is condusive to helicopter landings.
be The Transitional Area: Bordering the Northern A SEAUon the wtstorn
hills ak depth of one to two kilometers the terrain is covered with matted
grass and brush vegetation which impedes foot traffic. The area is laced
with numerous trail networkb and trafficability is limited to their use.
Tracked vehicles could deploy a3 far north as YD3l.X.
C. The Mountainous Area: Rising abruptly out of the narrow-fingers
and uneven contours of the transitional, area, the canopy-covered, Steen
slcpes (&to 5s) of the mountainous region form an unbroken barrfer to
movement, observation, ,XI~ heXborne oper&&ns, Foot traf'fic is conffnad
to trails uld stre3m.beds. Observation and fields of fire were sever3.y
li~nited in somt3al"ftas due to undergrow% and elephant grass. Though no
patiicular area of the operational area was reported as impassable, 32-ezs
under triple canopy ~eizr stro?amswczx more difficult due to the amount of
tangle foot in the areas where no trails were established, All strem8
encountered were negotiable by foot troopers. Vehicles though not used in
operation Apache Snow~?ouLdbe generally limited to Route 54'7, valley floc~r
and its long more gradual slofing fingers,
Numerous suitable helicopter landing zones and trails were found in
the area. (Overlay :&ll be fwd under sep.erate cover),
Weather: Throughout the operational
2. B-*.-P period, the veather was consiycred .
e.XCeiIeIlt. GrU Jnd Fog was prevalent in early morning hours in most ravines,
usually cleating off around 0800 - 0830 hours,. Also immediately follow%ne
thundershowers cumulus clouds developed and remained in the area for a
short time. For the most part, thundershowers occured between 1430 hours
and 2100 hours drily with clear skies developing after rainfall. Temper-
atures were moderate to warm in afternoon prcceeding thundershowe=,
Weather in guleral was excellent for Airmobila Operations,
 a, 6th WA Rcgimcnt

(3) BG?rJ Pn - ?ossiblc

c, S5%h kms Group

de 675th Arty Regiment

Though the original estimate of enemydisxsition and commsition I+-

not ctinfillrcd .yltogetherp it is believed that, all' elemental WWEopcr~ting
in ana of the pknned o~mtiorr except the 9t;h WA Regiment, Cants&s
throughout the pcxri.od could have ;utd in all probability were madewith
elements listed in a, c - e. Contact was established on 10 May lob9 by
the 3,&7 and 1/5Cf) Infantry %ttal.ions and was maintained thmwhout the
duration of the operation. The sticond dag of the opemtion, the 36 &,
I.mth made aprndic contact with snipers that were dug'in as well as tm
borne, ‘kb contact continued cmd the fighting increased as the 3,&?7 had
enccuntered the two EnenpgBattalions and sections of an NVARegimenta3i.
HeadquarteF3 size unit which ww Later identified throwh documents and
Prisoners as the 29th NVARegiment. The 7th and \Sth Battalions cd element8
of the 2,oth Regt Hqs were located on Dong Ap Eia mountain (YCz289el). A3
the intensity of the fighting increased, the 3/187 wa3 join&d by three (3)
additia?al battalions in routing the 29th NVARegiment. The 29Lh WA
Hegtie& was the only new -unit identified in the area, (se0 Inclo3ilre
# I f0.r information on Hill 937). Elezn&x of the 8O%h Battalion, 6th
NVARgimmt and the K10 Sapper BattaUon remained active throughout the
opertiion.
&. Skew Tactics: The X&h Battalion located North of F'SB Airborne
generally remained in a defensive posture of enemeycaches and base areas
path limit ed recomaissanc e missions. Elements of the 86th did particiDate
.:-na sapper attack on 13 May 69, Remaining element3 of the 6th NVA were
nor, contacted during the operation, The 29th NVA Regbent was deoloyed in
a defensive role. The 7th and 0th bttalions were de loyed in depth
utilizing concentric knkeL-s on Done Ap Bia (HiU 937P Bunkers were
heavily fortified, retnforcod ("A'! Frame) with thick oier head cover and
covered with DXU~U~supporting fires, An intficate series of interconnec-
ting troches enabled the enerqpto reinforce any portion of his perimeter.
%~ip~.~ and 2-3 man listing post wert" deployed along all Dossible avenues
of approach at sufficient distancefram the enolrgrs* pomter to orwide
 early umniry,:. With the cxcoptian of the battl.e for DozqqAp Pia fmm
11-21 May, the moMlo defense tactic was employed by the enemy. In this
role, UT,and ARVNunits most frequently encountered trailwatchers, small
recon parZ.03 and snipers during rcconn~xissance h for-co operations.
The enemyelex~ents ~ploying t,his tactic would attempt to infLict matim
friendb xsualties initially and break contact immediately. Sapmr
attacks increased during the peri& indicating the eneq's hcreased
reliance upon this txXc to inflict maximumcasualties and deatn:ction
cf instKLl&ions 2nd equipment with a mjnimu.mof forces which are highly
trained with suicidal motiviation, Direct and indirect fire attacks on
Fire Bases PAd night defensive positions alas increased during the reo~fid
pCiOd. Fir-e attacks were usually by enemey animrs deplofing harassing
txfrmiques with small arms and rocket propelled errmade, Indirect fire
attacks were conducted with 6Ommmortar, EQmmmortar, 122~~ rockets, 1ZYm
artillery (Tiger Mtn) and infrequently by rocket promlled gmnadea
Cnly one indirect fire attack was followed by a ground attack and that
occured on 13 May 69 with a combined sapper and ground attack. Mines and
booby traps zerc employed in the area of operation generally along m’s
that the erxzny suspected 16 and AWN use. Cache sites were heavily boo@7
trapped in a hasty manner appearing to be a last resort of preventing
L.6 and Marlincapture of these desperately needed 3upplies and munitions,
Commandand trip-device claymores were encountered along XX>Crsand nsrt-
icuhrgr in defense of Dong Ap Bia, The claymore's were staggered and
placed in depth to provide coverage both in front and to sides of bunkem.
Grenades, 60 and Nmmmortar rounds with trip devices placed in ordnance
containers and left in open areas were al.03 employed,

5. Trtining: bqy individual and unit trxin~ was considard to be

excellent. &.r%iculary noteworthy is the excellent marksmnshi~ and
conceaXement axployed by e3xmmts of the 29th NVA Regimmt. Detection of
individuals and bunkers were extremely difficzalt in the initial chases of
the operation aroumi Dong Ap E&a and improved as ordnance was nlaced. in
heavy jungle terrain. The excel1 mt marksmmship of the 29th Regt showed
a marked improvement over previous contacts with enemyunits, The special.
training of the Sapper elements remains in a very high state.
6. The overall supply posture of enemyfoxes was not COW
l&$.&d. cs : '
sidered good, however the only known shortages were food. Caches of
munitions and other supplies indicate the enemy's ability to infiltrate
and store large quantities of supplies in Base areas, Thoughnumerous
medical supplies were captured in the area it is believed that the energy
is experiencing a critical shortage of medical personnel in adrmi.xx&ering
treatment,
7. Combat effectiveness and Morale: The overall combat effectiveness of
enec;;7elcments contacted was considered to be good and consider3bl.y better
thzn the enemya.elanents previously contacted in lotis and alv the
rocks% belts, The 7th and 8th BatWions, 2oth WA Refi was considred to
be highly effective until after the battle for Dcmg Ap Bia.
&rale of the enemy continues to be mar, The poor state of morale is
 8. I'ntelli~~~~ Opcrztions: UNCLASSIFIED

z.. FAC '855:- :Y : ~.:-xrly FebMiz::,- 1969, 3d Brigade FkC3 bqan

aii iztanse systematic \:il progrim of the r,otihern A Shau Valley. Pilots
were! debriefed by S2 personnel after completed missions, and furnsihed
valtlablc data on roads, trails, HLZs and enemy locations.

17, s2 vn - the assist,ant S2 and S2 Air conducted reconntissance

of tI:c TAOE in fixed-wing aircmft from the 220th RAC and accompained FAC3 on
i2.I.s si. on5 D Hz.nd held photos were taken of HLZ's and enemy locations.

C. A-247 Cav VR - armed helicotier reconnaissance missions

were flmm by the 2-117 cm in supy?oti of 3d Brigade Operatinns,

2. Airbm:x Pessomel Detector - sniffer missions were frecuently

condact,d i;o foc;:,e er,emey concxxtrations and were a valuable source of
intelligcncc,

FW Interroga-LIc):l z,id :ja~~ent; Readout - a team fmmthe 3d Brig&e

Ifi! zgction was maintained at the foreward TACP for rapid ex@.oitation of
prisoners znd c,?,ptl:red encq documents,

TDTAE-
720
5
581
140
437250
7462
1367
26002
46511
14460
47;
44
1462
547
UNCLASSIFIED
Inclosure 1, of' Cunbat M'ter Action Report,(INTEILI~CE) to A?ACHESNOW.
UPOASSIFIED
SUbJECT: IntelLgenee Exploitation of QONG AP BIA"
IIJ'L"RODUCTIGN: Intelligence played a major part in the success of the
3d Drigadc in Operation "APACHESNOW"and more specifically, intelligence
was the major factor that caused a battle for the 937 hill. in the battle
of Dong kp 8-a just about every available source of intelligence gather-
ing was exploited,

The mems of gathering t'his information were: Prisoners, scar reuorts,

visual reconnaissance and Agent &qx&s.
13ACKGROUND:Ir! mid February, during Operation Ohio Rapids conducted in
southem and eastern portion of Base Area lOl,the!3d Battalion, 187th
Infantry caflured a prisoner from the 806th Battalion, 6th Regt. During
the interrogation of the PW, he stated that hi3 elements received suunlies
from a warehouse ccanplex in vicinity of the northern A Shau Valley, The
prisoner indicated that his element3 would move for two (2) days to the
west and three (3) dnys to the southwhere warehouse 54 was located, Based
on this data, exploitation of this area began within the &igade'3 carp= '
ability.
EXPLOITATION: I,mmedi.ately, Air Strikes were planned and flown in the area
uf Warehouse 54. These airstrikes received numerous secondary exnlosicms
and many secondary fires. Suspecting that the warehouse complex had been
Located, additonal air strikes were placed in the area and the area north
of warehouse 54. One airsWi.ke further north 7;as 33tiicu32q~1y -reveali.~
and that was the di.scover;y of a large t&l, well used with what apneas&
to be spider holes along it running 5.n a Norttiouth direction. About
this time, an extensive Visual Reconnaissance Frogram wav initiated. These
V'R missions were coordinated and established with Air Force FACls attached
to the 3d Bde for direct acir support. The program was sethup to have the
FACIs make VRgs of the entire area whiltz Airstrikes were being flown 3.~
the area and when no fighters were available the FAC's would siRt$& recon
the area, After each flight into the area, the FAC would renort to S2 and
draw all trails, possible landing zones and just generally brief the S2
on his observations in the area. The area of warehouse 54 and the trails
leading out of Laos into the Dong Ap Bia were particularly interesting
because of the obvious heavy use, after a short pericd, the FACts had
established a number of trailnetwoljcs andpossible areas of enemy con-
centrations. Results of the visual Reconnaissance missions were three
fold; First, they were able to n&de the s2 with immediate Information
on specific areas of interest, 2P he added to or improved the dat& base
of information on the area for future Operations and third,. he becm very
familiar with the terrain so when firiendly troops were denloyed in the
ama, no difficulty was experienced in providing very close air support,
In late February andearly March of 1969, indications from UPS showed
an unusual increase in Spar readings in the upper part of the Va12ey,
Concurrently with the beginning of O$.eration Massachusetts Striker, E URS

i
UNCLASSIFIED 1
1
 UNCLASSlFlED

indicated deployment of a Major North Vietnamese Commvldin the A Shau

area and in Base Area 611 in Laos. Three of these commandsv:ere identified
as Regimental size headquarters, each regiment having under its command
three or more battalions, Discovery of parts of a Coaxial cable tended
to battress the idea of a mljor cormno facility located scmewhere in the
valley, By early May, a I(Rs report had identified a regiment& headouarkers
as being 5-8 kilometers west of Dong Ap Bia and was moving easterly,
Photographs and captured documents played a major role in selecting
the landing aunes ‘and general axis of advance of the Battalions patiici-
paWig in the Combat Assaulting of multiple battalions along the Laotian
border. The f3de II and Ass't S2 officer under the guidance af the S2 and
S3 selected specific areas for photographs, The study and analysis of
these photographs were instrumental, both to the S2/3 and later.to the
b Commandersin their planning of assigned missions,
&thou.& Igent reports were plentiful in the early stages of formt&Jt-
ing a dat;a base and preparing plans for Apache Snow, the information was
general kind not in deflh, The Bde S2 made a liaison visit to the 525th m
Det in Hue and directed specific questions concerning the area of interest
to the Det OIC. He was able to respond immediately with some oft he
information and levied the remaining requirements on his agents,
As the data base grerw or developed, plans werrg made by the 3d Bde to
begin Operation Apache Snow to fully explajit the situation, The Operation
'ticked off on 30 &y with a multiple batt.alian CA into selected U's
along the Laotian Border, All assaulting elements reported cold Ws
and moved out on mx&tiple axi.3 of advance, On the 2d day of Amche Snow
the 3d Battalion, lmh met heavy ezxqy resistance frum a well trained,
well concealed and dug in eneqy force, The fight continued for the next
eight ($1 days with some of the hardest and costliest fighting enter
experienced by an WAforce. As the EL1 was finally taken by a four
allied battalion force on 21 May 69, a FWcaptured reveal&t&&the 29th
Regt &s with two of its three orgatiic battalions was located on Dong
Ap %a. Further interrogation revealed that elements of the 29th Regt
on Don& Ap &.a suffered extreme heavy casualties, One FWestimated that
over 80 percent of his Companywas destroyed,

UNCLASSIFIED
~m1Osure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Co'mbht Operations X%er ACT#LQ~
'{sport, Operation Apache Snow. UNCLASSIFIED

I. U-nits Strengths:

a. Initial:
Officers Warrant Officers
HFIC!3h.i3de 38 14
1st Bn, 506th Inf 37 2
2d Bn; 506th Inf 43 2
3d Bn, 187th Inf 43 1

b. Final:
Officers Warraizt ‘bfficcrs EN
'13X 3d'Bde 36 14
1st Bn, 506th Inf 31 1 z!
2d Bn; 506th Inf 40 2 778
3d Bn, 187th Inf 28 629
A' l
c1 Casualties:
Officers Wasrant Officers Elyl
K-XC 3d'Bde 1 1
la-t; En, 506th Inf 13 0 L;!
2d Rn; 506th Inf 8 0
3d Bn, 187th Inf' 22 0 318

d. Roplnoemonts:
Officers Warrant Officers EN
HFiC 3d*Bde 2 0 5
1st Bn, 506th Inf 3 0 164
2d Bn; 506th Inf' 0 81 -m
3d Bn, 187th Inf 1 118

e. Thorn wao an averago of fifty poop10 sn leave and R&R during Operation
lpache Snow.
>-. Other Aspects:

a. AG F'unctions: An additional administration load was incurredduo to th

:lumorouo casualties and tho correspondence required on each one. Other admini-
:tration remained at a normal level,
b . PM0: The Provost Marshal reports .had no increase in crime during this
.-.
4 od.
c. Fimnae: There was no change in financo,functions at the 3d Bde during
lis period. ,
cl . Chaplain: The brigado chaplains, as a matter of courx?, visited all
its on Q regular schedule, no matter whore they were looatod, in order to
,ld religious scrvicos, The 'chatilains also briefdd rGplacemonts and visited
rsonnel of the 3d Bde in hospitals in the mea. During this time the chap-
building project for a Catholic Orphanage in tho local
Cr\L j-1 UNCLASSIFIED
 .

Cc!~l r
UNCLASSIFIED
Extrnct, After Act ion Reports, Operatim Apache Snow - Logistical, Ha,
3d Ekie
Reference: a. ADMIE!Ol-69, Hq, 3d Bde, lOl& Abn Div (AM), dtd
:ii Feb 69.

0. OPCRD3-69, HCI, 3d We, ?Olst Abn Div (AM), dtd 6 May 690

2. Operation Apache Snow was initiated by a Brigade planning ronfer-

ence: ADKIN 7-69, dtd 2R Feb 59, initiated the logistical support
for the operation*

3* Logistical Task Organization (as of 6 1By 1969):

3d FSSE, DISCOM

Elements, 426th Supply and Service Battalion

Co C, 326th Medical Battalion

Co D, 8Olst Maintenance Battalion

Detachment, 1002d Supplv and Service Campan,

FOL Platoon
Laundry and Bath Platoon

Grave 3 Registration I'

Detachment 2, 571st Ordwnce dcmpmy (Ammo)

17&h Maintenance Ccmpany

287th Explosive Ordnance Detachment

15th Aerial Fort (US@)

4 3 General: Logistical support for this operation cmsisted of sup-

port rendered to the 3d Brigade Task Force, to the Ist A..RVUBeplment,
and to the 3d AWN Regiment.

5. Preparation: a. In antic+ti.m of expenditures, a buildup of

Class IV cvld barrier materia1ws.s effected at Camp Evans.. The stockage
level of all other classes of supplies at Camp %Wm cm 6 rJI,?Y1969
w,i’s sufficient for extended field operations by this Brigade.

b. Levels (Camp Evans)

(1). Ammunition: a seven day level is maintained in the

CrampZvms SP by the Da Nang Support Conanande
(2). POL: 70,000 gallons of Jp4

.- UNCLASSIFIED
i, rt:,.’. [ f 4
/ cm-’ hrT~
 .,’ .
UNCLASSIFIED
(3)* Rations: a five day level of C-Rations and LWPs.
cm Facilities: All logistical facilities required to 6support
Brigade-sized operations were in place on 6 Kay 1969.

6 Tactical Conduct: a. Operation Apache Snow cQmnenced on 7 May

l

1969, (D~-3)0 The 1st AXVN Regiment, the 11th; 12th, and 34th .I'WX
Artillery J%ttr?:*l- t and the 3+ Brigade (l/506, 3/lW, 2/501, 3/5,
Z/319) moved into positions and conducted CA’3 from D-3 to II+1.
Tne 3d brigade forward ccanmandpost was located at FB Dertches-
garden. The 1st AWN Regiment forward command post wa3 located at
FE Br dlcy. The 11506 FSB was locatcc! at FB Currahee, the 3/187 F%
tr;cs located at FR Bertchesgarden, and the 2/5O1 and 2/Y% FSR wasat-
FB Airborne. The forward caanmandpost of the 3/5 was at FB BLa%,
and the forward command post of the Z/319 was nt F3 Eagles Veste
The 3/1R7 wcl3 extracted from the operational area on 21 %v
1?69:’
?* Lofiistical Support: a* The plan for logistical support entailed
sl2ng-lEded car?0 movement by CH-47 helicopters from Camp Evans to
fire bases. IJpon arrival, cargo ?ms stored or further broken dcrwrl to
~ompnny lo,?ds for resupply to units in the field by UH-1H helicopters.

b. Cargo consi3tSng of mail, personnel, and loads which were

deemed uneconcznical to move by CH-47wore hauled by W-IV directly
fram Camp Evans to FSBs.or to the unit in the field.

c. USAF Support: Vo additional munitions or supplies were flm

into Camp Xwns Army airfield in direct support of the operation=

d. Ground Line of Ccmmunications: 26th C-S Group continued support

et a normal rz.te via ground transportation.

e. Helicopter Support:

(1). UH-1H: Assets of the 15&h MB and the 3d Brigade !W.a-

tion Section flew in direct support of committed combat elements.

(2) l CH-47: Assets of the 159th AWl3 flew 1188 sc;lties in

support of committed ccanbat elemnts as follows:

CL I CL III CL IV CL V !ITimTR MISC

33 >Arborne 16 1;’ 29 168 52 6

FB Currahee 17 18 230 78 16
FB Ikrtchesgarden 6
FB E~glss IZest :: I46 14
19 172 24
81 2
FB Bradley ;i
F'; Rakkasan 2 5 2 67 41 13
Ti<yer Mt 6
TCTAL 47 86 82 654 276 43
UNCLASSIFIED
u i~~,u- - rnc
. f. Medical Support: Seventyseven d&t-off missions were flown
UNCLASSIFIED
in support of the operation.

60 Maintenance: Maintenn:lcc work order s in direct support of the

operation were processed by Co D, 8Olst Maint Bn and the 178th Maint Co.

h.
Graves Registration: The remains of 63 1USpersonnel and G AWN
personnel were processed.

Laundry and Bath: Unit standowns were provided to 19 ccanpany-

i..
sized units irrrmediately prior to. Rnd follovring Operation Apache Snow.
Service consisted of hot showers, DX of ciotning and boots (as needed),
ice cream issue, ‘and super contact teams*

j- GLCC MSiJlteLUlce : KMCB 10 was responsible for QL 1 mainten-

ance. Ko significant problems were encountered during the conduct of
'-,he operation.,

l! Problem Areas:
l a- Anmunition: Serious problems were encountered
~l:th ;'I% items, i.n particular 81 rrpnHE, M-79 HE, and M-26 Fra@nent.?tion
1 ::!"e%il&se The requirement for H83 fires and close in of man-
suppoz*t

&-WY elements in -close proximity to the Fire Support Bases far exceed-
:.d &he hE8 for the period covered. The ASR based upon experience factors
or' operations on the costal plains is not representative of the reauire-
ments for operations in the A Shau valley and surrounding mountains.

Recommsndation: Consideration should be given to operational missions

when AS'% are determined and increased usage should bc forecasted when
terrain and security reouirements change*

be Personnel Movements: The turbulence of replacement personnel

and normal administrative personnel reouiring transportation forward
created a potential problem, ti sort&d by UH-1. Logistics resupply time
was not sufficient to resupply units in the field and move personnel
simultaneouslyW Maximum utilization of #l-47’s helped solve this pro-
blem. Personnel were loaded internally in CH-4'7's along with the ex-
1 ternal loads to achieve maximumutili~tian~
Recommendation: One central location should be established where per-
sonnel from all organizations of the Brigade would be shuttled to for-
>rard areas on CH-47's* This would better utilize resources by central-
izing the requirement, increasing CH-4.7 payloads, and decreasing blade
time of UH-7's.

ce Chain Saws: Significant problems were encountered bv the high

deadline rate of chain saws when operated by untrained personnel. Parts
for deadlined saws were in short supply. The maintenance reouirement
to keep c?!ain saws operational is directly correlated to the usagc-fac-
tar- A temporary solution Was found b,.71 establishing a maintenance float
cf saws and conducting field location training on proper technicrues of
opcrating the chain saw.
3,eco~ncndation: All combat units bo given practical demonstrations mc!
instruct ion in the operation and maintenance of chain saws.

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
. d. Shortage of Air Items: of air items frm ftic bases
Was a serious problem. 'fhen opehing a fire base, supplies flow so rap
iU.,- that units tend to drag their feet derigginlr; sorties delivered.
At time-s urgentJy needed supplies are unnecessarily delayed or nat, de-
livers! dud to air items not being avaaable for ri@$ng.
Rccommc:YMior: Comndcrs at all levels should stress the importance
of rcliurn53~ air itom frl>m fire bag&s at the earliest possible moment.
. *,e* Vatcr : Forward elements const&tly in contc7ct and unable to
clear ZZt s were operating in areas where water was nd available’ In
order to sqply water to these elements, a container which could be
kicked out of .e heliccyter without broakixp and one which held an ad-
c?.s-:o C.InxO'~-t_ of water had to be found. The immcdiato solution was
to use the 1~5x1 povde~ c&mister. However, servorcl draw backs were .
fou:ld which YRC?~ this solution lees than satisfactory* '.Jater trans-
pcvted in thsse contc?iners had a particularfy unpleasant taste; many
~L%onnel developed dysentary which was thought to be caused by scme
cl.h~S..ic~lresidue in the cannisters and the cannisters had to be left
J-2 *;qi: opextional area where they can be salvaged by the enemy
:.; L:~xux?ndation:SC-n light disposable water container, which cdn be kic-
LA mt rJf helicopters without breaking should be found. Commanders
2-i; all keels should submit recmendations for a possible solution*

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
Psychological Operations
1, General: During Operation APACHESNO'JJ, Psychological Operations
was confined to Aerial Broadcasts from J.JI-MHhelico&ers, aqd mass
leaflet drops in support of the 3d Brigade, 1Olst Airborne Division
(Aimlobile),
2. Programs: Aerial Broadcasts used the main WA Chieu Hoi theme
interjected with the aspect of unnecessary death in false cause, Mass
leaflet drops consisted of an assortment of VIA Chieu Hoi themes: appealin
to sense of survival; referring to stamina of American Goons in pursuit
of their goals3 and m& fakness*of OIQJforcres deaU.ng tith NVA W.~'~oi*s
-
30 Results: 'Ihe NVAtroops were attacked with Aerial Broadcast and mass
leaflet drops. Since vast areas had to be covered in short intervals of
time the propaganda medias were considered best suited to effectiveness
of such an operation. The material was spread over the areas of hea-&&
concentration and reached targets with adequate accuracy*
A total of 5,310,OOONVAQxieu Hoi leaflets were disseminated in the
28 days of the operation. A total of &' hours of Aerial Broadcas+;swere
also iwluded in support of the operation,,
CONCUSrnii:
&IL-thougha &ieuHoi.*s an& only a slight number of E%&J were
taken in t&operation, the effectiveness of Psychological Operations
should not be cons5dered a t&al. lo&, All POWs stated that all
broadcasts were heard and Leaflets were mc&.ved. However, discipline
in the indii&dual unj.t plus 'the fear of fol%ticali officer% pressure
in the unit and in homebase disrupted -Be mi.nLmal, chances of total success

UNCLASSIFIED
 Inclosure 6 - to Combat kfter Action Report - Opertion Apache Snow

SUBJECT: COM4UbJIC~TIOIEHPIiXME3JT
DURIKGOPEJ&.TTON
"kF%CHESIuOW".

1. The folio* FX and Ratt radio nets were employed from Brigade to Divis
and Subordinate units in support of operation "kpache Snowff and wrzre effect
during the entire operation,
ETS Moml TYPE EgUIPbmU'T
Civision CommandNet FM Secure AI\:/vRC- 46/K&8
Division CommardNet F&i Nonsecure M/VRC - 46
Division Intel1 Net FM Secure AN/PRc - 7'7/KY-38
Division Spt Net 1 Ratt Secure kN/VSC - 2/K W-7
Erigade Comtnati Net FiI Nonsecure AN/VRC- i+6 (see fi,
Me Comm3n3Ops/Intell. FM Secure kN/miC -46/w-B
Lrigade Admin/.Log FIb1Nonsecure AN/W - 46/kN/~ti,
2. VHF communications were employed extensively throughout the entire oper-
?,t.i nr.', and was effective.
. ..I VHFwas employed from the following locations
FROM To MODE TYPEEQUIPME%T
Porchtesgaden CampEvans VHF AM/GRC- 163
II 173Currahee VHF AIu/GRC- 163
rt II3 EaEl.e Nest VHF I;N/GRC- 163
I? FB Blaze klJ/GRC- 163/Ah/MRc-r'
II CampEvans VHF AN/plRC- h9(Sec note
11 CampEagle VHF AN/&X - 69
camp 2lkuls FB Rakkasan VHF AN/MC - 68
3. All other means of camrmunications were employed 1AWtith the Brigade SOE
experiencing no major difficulty.
rJOTE!S
1. Radio Set Ar\t/VRC- 49 (Automatic Retrans)nas located at FB Eagles 1Jest
to communicate with units operating from the wlley floor of the A Shau VaUi
2. Six (6) channels were strapped dver at CampEagle to CampEvans.
I

3
UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTHEHT OF THE ARNY

HEADQU,mmRS, ZD E%l%JJION, 319TH ARTILURY
APO SfLN FRlLlxIsco 96393
18 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Apache Snow

Co:Xlanding Officer v UNCLASSIFIED

m
3d Brigade, 1Olst Airs&bile Division
LTTN: s-3
I20 96383

1, l%ission: Direct support of the 3d Brigade and controI of artmcrY

fires in the 3d Brigade i;rea of Operations.
9
a-e. Concept of Operationsz

a. Organization of the a,rti&ry was as follows:

(1) 2/319th Arty DS 3d Bio

(2) E/11 Arty GSR 1Olst kbn Div
(3) C2/11 Arty GSR 101st AIn Div
(4) Al/B Arty GSR 1Olst ntn Mv
[i{ Cl 83 ArtyGSR 101st Abn Div
J 77thARAGSR 2/319th Arty
b. Concept of the operation was to previde artillery coverage with
,aJl batteries' for a33 friendly elements as needed.
3. Execution:

a. This Battalion was in DS of the 3d Brigade in the area of operation,

the A Shau V&&y, duriq the entire operation, Apache Snow. W Battery was
the first battery to support Apache Snow when they mved from Camp Evans to
Bertchesgarden on 25 April 1969. On 9 May 1969 ~~A~~ Battery m~ed from FSB
Blaze to FSB Currahee, ati on Q May 1969 ~'C" Battery wved from FSB Rakkassan
to FSB Airborne, aU roved in suppofi of operation Apache Snow. Part of the
Battalion TOC moved to FSB Blaze on 25 April 1969, ard the complete 'IW m~ed
to Eaglets Nest on 10 May 1969. On 13 May 1969 %I' Battery 2/319th Artillery
came under mrtar and grouni attack from the South ati Southwest grid 35Xl52
2nd from the hili to the East. Personnel loses were as follows: 49 b/IA's and
13 KItIs and 1 died of wounds later, king total of KIAts to 14. Equipment
1osCs were as follows: 1 1Ofdxn Howitzer destroyed ard 1 damaged. Both were
replaced the same day, Other equipment loses include:

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
D/i. Hq 2/319 F1, 1Olst ,1bn Div ;8 June 1969

,SUBLTR: Combat Opns ;, fter ,;ct,inn Report, Apache Snow

(?) Radio Set, Control ,Ir\r/GRk39 3 ea

(2) Radio Set, ilN/PRC-4'7 i ea
(3) Radio Set, liN/PRC-25 3 ea
(4) Container, Insulated, Thermal 1 ea
(5) Antenna, RG-232 6 ee
(6j Launcher, Grenade 1 ea
('7) Light Set, General Illumination 1 ea
(8) Computer, M18 lea
(9) Rifle, Ml&l 1 ea
(10) Trailer, $ Ton 1 ea
(11) Generator Set l-5 kw 1 ea
(12) Headset, 144 C/V 7 ea

Operation ,\pache Snow ended 2400 hours 8 June 1969, Ik that time the below
list& units in support of Apache Snow were disposed as follows:

(1) Hq T0C at Ea&els Nest

(2) Ld319 Arty at FSB Curraheo
(3) Si/319 Arty at FSB Bertchesgarden
t 41 C2/319 ixty at FSB Airborne
(5) B2/1 ‘i dirty at FSB Cwr,dW
(6) C2/9f+ r&y at FSB Nancy
(7) X6/33 Arty at FSB Thor
t 8) Cl/83 Arty at FSB Blaze
(9) Au77 AU at CampEvans

b. Number, type of missions and mnition expenditues for organic

batteries foI&w:

TYPE OF MISSION NO OF MiSSIONS

CS HE WP ILL EH FC SK
Conftimcd 528 172 15062500 0 0 3:
0.
0
Acquire3 1829 0
&ant erbattery 62 0 1:7:64 0 0 0 0 0
Preparation 112 0 1008 603 0 0 0 0
Interdiction 2116 0 10 583
Special Purpose 643 0 3850 5402 62!: 0 0 21:
ARViJ, CID3 0 0 1+2 0 0 0
Register&ion 0 T 0 0 0 0 0
ii 3%
oti1er a2 0 1818 0 030 0 0

40 I’JEJysis : The operation was a success fromthe artillery point of view.

The effect of H&I fires as a deterrent cannot be detertined since results
are norm&Ly unobai.nat9.e. Enemy rocket & g:rc?tlr,d &%a&.~, such as the V,"

UNCLASSIFIED
. ,
UNCLASSIFIED

D/i; Hq 2/319 F!! 1Olst Ah Div 18 lhus 1969

SJB LTR: Comb&
' Opns After Ixtiori Report, &x&b tic;
&tkr$,i.ncident, have made it necessary .for,the artmery to rr)$@d @.ClsY.
This t$@ of response has ~~-ovento be very effecf;ive against such &tack8 on
Fire apport Base3 in the Ekigado IhO.

CPT, I?2
Adjutant
B

UNCLASSIFIED
I1I 1 . c.i-
?nc-&j.c:l Ajs Support (Operation Apache Snow) UNCLASSIFIED
1. Xission:
The ession of the 3d We, 101 Ah lJS&J?Tactical Air control
parkJ+ to Operation Apache Snow can be divided id:, 5 phases:
ai. Pre-operation reconnaissance, map;>ing, and intelligence
gather-in@.
kddsing the Brigade concernin, v f& best use of Tactical Airpower
(TNb&.r).
co Planning and coordinating the Tactical Birpower employment
for D&W.
d. controlling airstrikes in support of the ground elements.
e. Visual reconnaissance during the operation.
7 Concept of Operation: TAC Air tqould be used prior to D-Day to vz
i&n enemy routes, cut tiraiJ.s and roads in the A snau VaUey floor,
and prepare LZls for .future use. After D-Day, constant Fxc coverage
would provide timediate coverage for units in contact with the ability
to rapidly direct already airborne TAC A&+ for additional destructive
power on heavily defended enemy emplacements.
a. The pre-operation reconnaissance program was initiated approximately
one month prior to D-Day. J-t consisted primarily of working with
the Brigade S-2 yin mapping enemy trails and probable enemy Locations.
Another important part; of this phaS8 consisted of taking the Brigade
and Battalion Comanders and key staff members on flights over the
area of operation , thus allowing them to become familiar with their
areas before Daay.
b+ The advice of the ALO and FAC*s was sought concerning the
most probable areas of enemy concentration, the best locations for
LZ!s and the best way of using TAC Air j_n preparing LZ*s, covering the
insertions, and supporing troops in contact.

3. Execution:
STATISTIGL SUNURY
Date FAC Sorties Airstrikes &mbs(lbs) iJapalm(lbs)
10 May 27 118,503 29,500
11 : a 119,000 21,000
12 4 16 118;500 16,500
13 6 16 W,O@) EJ,~O
14 !z s 103,m 16,000
1.5 13 99,5+~ 14,000
 ....--.-(w - - -

UNCLASSIFIED
Tactical Air Support (Operation Apache snow)
Jhtc FAG Sorties Airstrikes aOmb&ba) Nap&d-d
*
16 12 106,000 i2im
17 ; 14 115,000 I;;;=&
18 12 Ir&oQo
19 ; 17 123,ooo i7loaO
20 4 16 81;000 2t;OOO
21 4 ll g:g 5;ooo
22 3 8 Up0
23 3 1s l?,S@J
24 4 7 96:ooo
26
25 !4 139 75po
59,ooo 2%
4:m
27 0 0 3 0
28 4 0 0 0
29 4 0 0 0
z: 3 t l.l,ooo 2,000
3&O@
1 June : 3 13,000 6;co:
2 4 3 22,000 , 0
:, 43 10 Lo,000
58,0(30 lS,occ,C
72,OQJ
2 2 10
ii 76,~ 3rd
7 3 7 66,500 0
27 D+ Ill2 Sorties 287 Aixstrtis 1,937,ooo 285&m

NOTE: These fimres include only those airstriketi actually controlled

by this TI+CF. They do not ticlude those controlled by the ARW TACP
in .SU~~CX%of the P8VN portion of Operation Apache Snow. Nor do they
include &clights or Combat skyspots.
NOTE: 27, 28, and 29 May were bad weather days, requiring all TAC Air
to be controlled.by Combat skyspot. 27 May through 2 June were also
bad weather days, requiring most of the TAC A3.r to be controlled by
combat Sk&Spot.

KMBRAMAGE~LS~';ESSMENT
TOTALSFOR&.PhCXl3SNOW
Killedby& 102
Secortiary "&plosiona 81
Secondary Fires 52
Forttiicationa 332
Destroyed
r/ii.litcuy SXuctures 47
Destroyed
Crew-%rvedweapons 4
ositions Destroyed
iGood %ts 7
UNCLASSIFIED
Tacticn~. t&r Support (Operation &acho Snm) UNCLASSIFIED

a* *tic Brigade i;u3 did considerable pXarnin end coordineting

with the Brigade and division staffs, the %Lst 8itiTion km, the
AWN WI>, and the Direct lair Support Center, llzis involved plannihg
the ordnmce load, timing, controlling, ent,ry and oz& routes and
altitudezz, and holding locations and altitudes of 32 airstrikes on
D&y, rxi.3 planning arid coodins+Wx resulted in an extremely smooth,
orderly, effectiva, and accident - free TX Ai.z operation on DJ)ay.
b.LI important part of this TACPtwcorrtri?~~+~onto the success of
Operation i;pache Snowwas the day-to-day controlling of airstrikes in
support of the ground corcnanders. Izirstrikes played an ospecialb
~~ortant part in the Battle of &ng lop %a, selda in this or any
other conflict has TAClti been employed so massively as in the hC2.e
OX Dong iq Bia,

co -&en not, busy controlI.ing airstrikos the Fomard U..r Controllers

conducted extensive visual reconnaissance of the area of operation
and possiKLe routes of enemyresupply or retreat, Although the area
is not conducive to effective visual reconnaissance due to the thick
jungle canopy, on enemyroad used for resupply was detected and '
;~ortially intetiicted,

a. The absolute necessity of gveciso, detailed planxing and

coordination for large operations like the prepping of LAGSand
the nircxpping of the insertions of Daay, The sidLt$;sneau~ preppFng
an6 aircapping of several WS in close prox5mityto each other, in
different mtS, controlled by several FX*s from different TAWS and
using diffmt ~%qlc-WioS, &d,~tith t&8 irrterW0 Wt~erpfire
and multitude of helicopters in the area all comaed to pre8&
an excellent opportunity for mid-air collisions, short rounds, or
some other disaster. Only by very deteiled planning and coordination
was this gotentia3, disaster turned into a smooth, efficient demonstration
of air dower.
b. The selection and construction of LZ*s. U. uniti had good Lz's
because the s$tes selected were on relatively level terrain that was -
origimlly covered by scrub brush or elephant grms. These Lz sites
were selected after- several fWS.e attempts were madeat constmcj-ng
LZls on karst pinnacles or razor-backed ridges coverecl with triple
canopy jw?glc. The Daisy Cutter bombs ~yx)B Ibs with fltse extensions)
used foiq LZ construction eas33y cleirr out the scrub &ash and
elqimnt grc?ss. However, 3.t takes many airstrikes and a great deal
of tine to construct an LZ on a jungle-covered mountain top; first;
bccsuse the mountain top Is extremely d&ffkult to hit, and secoo~,
bccausc mom hits a~ required to klcar out the dense jungle.

UNCLASSIFIED
b'- 3
.
UNCLASSIFIED
. ,‘.

axporienccs of this operation seem to indicate that in the future '

t;h8pmxss of JJ sslec~ion, where TAGf&r constxuction is required,
&ould be more of a compromisebctwcen the highest ground, which is
naturaUy desirable, and the mora level ground, which is more practical
to constn~ct.
: ., .’ .
Cl3 Use of fire power to dislodge the enemy f&m deeply &i-d,
henvily protected positions, such aswere encoun%eredon Dow AP By
Mountain, ;Gthough the usual ordnance for ;L troops-in-contact airstrike
(500 round bombsand napalm) does destroy some fortified positions and
produce mazy casualties, it is not suffic$ent to dislodge a determined
GWIQ-from ready heavily protected bllnkcrs. It Would seem that the
best my to accomplish the task would be for the friendly troops to
back to safe positions and thoroughly cover the enemy pcsitibns
I$$: large (at least 1000 pounders) bombswith delay8d (at l.mst ,025
scxncj) fuses. The larger the bomb and the mwe delay, up to 1 second,
the better.

UNCLASSIFIED
Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, XXIV Corps, 1969
 -~ .- -----
& .
J .
w 0.1
a ?

,
4
I
1
GNC~A~SIFIED

Fro171: Cornmar,ding General, Third iizrine Amphibious Force

TO: CorMdanting General, United States PUitary Assistice Cctrrimnd,
Vietnam

7
4-7. ~orwxrded in accordance with reference a.
 /’ 3 ,.-.L
il fl” *-’
DEPAN!'MENTOF'Tm i&hr: UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUNITEXG,XXIV CXBPS
APOSan Francisc~ 96308
27 Aupzf3t l-969
AVII-CCT
SUBJECT
: Comht Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC53-32) (KI)

THRU: CommandingGeneral
IX1 Marim Amphibious Force
ET'0US Forces 96602

TO: Commdiag Generai

united states MiIPt?my Assistance coti, View
ATTN: NE J343
APOus Forces 96222

1, (U) COD3NM@k Operation Apache Snow.

2, MOOCU.H
(U) DATE3OF OBEXAT~OW~ Hay I.969 to 0724OOHJune 1969.
3* (U) LOCATION: Nam HO~ Dihrict, Thus Thien Province and wuthwestem
Quarig !Pri Protics astride the southern Da Krong Valley. @hprefePcm%3:
Yl*
va0+e,wn
uuaurp1:50,000; Series L7014~
: ~h88tt3 &3&l+ I; 6342? II; 6441, 1-m;
tilG.4, III,
4,, (U) COM'ROLHEADQUARTERS:
XXIV Corps,
se (U) REPORTIBG
OFFICEB: LTG Richard G. St;llwell.,
4, (C) TASK ORGAXIzBTION=

3d Bde, 1Ols-b Atm D~v (AM) - Joseph B, CORW~~~ Jr

1st 9 506th Inf
2d BR; 504th Inf
w ER, 187th Iaf
3d Sqdn, 5th CavJ
A-2d Sqdn, 17th Cav!
B-32&h IEn@ (DS)
A-158th AHB CDS)
E&8th AHB (DS)
2d Bn, 319th Arty (DS)
GROUP
4
DOWNGRADED AT 3YEAR INTERV
DKCLASSIFI~ AFTER 12 Yl3A.R~
AVII-CCT 27 Augu& ir:
STJ
B.JEC?lT
L Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (KI)

C4d Bn, 11th Arty (CSR)

ea2d .an, gl+th Arty (GsR) UNCLASSIFIED
c-1st 139, 83d Arty (CSR)
58th Set Dog Plat
TACP20 TASS
1st ARVNRegt - LTC Diem
l-1 ARVNBnw/Fo party
2-l Am? Bn w/F0 party
:JlARw Bnw/Fo Party
&-LkRlQJ Bnw/FOPar%y
Battory 34 ARVNArty (GSR)
Battery l..l ARVXArty (DS)
1 ~LNO
Farty
y NivFJRegt - COLHoa
l-3 ARmJI3.nw/F0 Pmty
a-3AmN Snwp?OPady
39.3ARvNBnx/FQP?u?~
Battery 12 ARVNArty (Ds)

De& Hq Co, 9th Mmfnes

Det, Scout Dog Plat, 3a MP &s
2dBn, l2thkbes
B-D (B-105rmra,Towed)
Btry E (~-~O~IEUU,Toved)
Stry F (6=lofhxm, Tared)
Mortar Btry (6-107)
23 PrOT HowB-try b155-, Towed
33 Pm-v HowBtry b$-155m, TQ~)
7, (S) SUPPORTING
FORGES:

(1) Forces: See Task Organization,

(2) Eqaoyment md Effectivemzss:

UNCIASSIFIED
AV ll.-.?;CY d.I JaHp.8 Id J-737
su BCTECT : Combat Oparations After Action Report @XS: MAC 33-32) (KI
UNC iA SSlFlED
CdUnits provided support for SZps prior to insertions, units in
contact, R&I fires, and d-trect fire in defense of bases under ground and
sapper attack.

(b) The artillery support was provided by utilizing a series of

mutually s:zpporting fire bases which were establfshed Drier to D-Day.
Artillery after D-Day was provided by shiftin;artfflery ttita to additiona?
fir& bases as required by troop dispositiorm,.

(1) Tactical Air: 7'77 FAG and 128 CSS sorties (905) were delivered
by Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft during Apache Snow, A total of
1,387,9 tons of bombs and 221.5 tons of napalm were dropped by tactical air.
Sorkies flown were as follows:

Bombdamageassessment credited the air sorties with 482 atra;lcturea destroyed,

29 enemy killed, 72 secondary fires and 87 aacondary explosions,

&J Diverts 1

(b) There were 7 Arc Light strikes in. preparation for Operation Apache
Snow and 12 during Apache Snow,

(c) The following is the avtilabla BDA,

&, Damage or Destroyeds Numerous trenches, bunkers, huts, traiis,

and canopy were destroyed or damaged,

z. Fires and %xplosionsz There were approximately 25 secondary axplosio~s

from 1 to 30 times normal. size, Several large sustained (white smoke) fires
were also observed.,

,& Enemy Castities: A mass grave con+ain-5ng 40 hodies, believed to

be NVA killed by 6 strfkes, was discovered in one target box,
A0 Enemy Equipment: During operations ia tht tar@.seas subsequent
to the Arc Light strikes, Allied forces found large quantities of enemy
equipment end munitions to include the following::
UNCLASSIFIED
 20 Ku:;sian trcrcks 16 C930R and 3000 rds of60 a?. 8z?r!.!E
r?lrJr
go bicycles UNCLASSIFIED I.00 122snmarty r&3
yx t:- L?Ckheadlampa ,4 8%mn nortar base plates
6 bul.dozsrs 2 6Ommmortar base plates
1 jeep 2 C&l .50 w;
2090 kg rice 6 1.2,7~~manti-aircraft %
5co@meters of ccxmnowire 2m
Unknown type of auto tools 3M60m
,woo lb !mT 45 SKS rifles
50 fhzes 40 AKL$7%
&X0 ft dst cord 82Hnnmortar aiming stakes
10,003 ant"l-aircraft rds 1 East Germ4n MG
5000 SA rds i. K&3 rifb%J

Ant~tioated in Objec$&ve Area Prior fo Operatioq Order of Battle holdings

prior to -6pg&tion Apache Snow showed at least two and probably three NVA
Infantry Remnts, the 6th, 9th and one other Rcgimn$astrids the nor*~cxm
end of the A Shau Valley along &th an unknownnumber of smaller rear service
and combat support units, The 6th and 9th Regiments had been recalled or
pushed by the prsssure of two earl&w operaMona, Dewey Canyon and Mastsechw ~3t.+:
Striker, to draw closer to the present tertirms of the enemy line of comnm-
icat2.m (IAC) from Laos in aasc Ama dial, It ~19.3antfcfpatcd that the enemy
had stific5ent strength in and around Base Area 6~. to offer signtficant
opposition to an Allied penetration of the northern A Shau Valley if he elected
to stand and fight for the supplies undolJb%edly cached there and for the
la?ariously constructed LOG wMch wou3.d ti interdicted by Operatian Apache
Snow,

b, &ap& mth md S&,&~&y&Jy Fpd As Oneration Was Co&cted:

While the elements of the 3d Marine Division met only light and sporadic
opposition in the southern Da Krong Valley, elements cl' the 1Olst Airborne
Division (AN) and 1st ARV?IDivision met considerable ansmy resistance in the
northern A Shau Valley, In the early morning hours of 13 May 1969, FSB Airborne
vas atticked Qy a large enemy force which was identified by a PU as the entire
K6 Battalion (,&CA 806th Battalion), 6th MVA Regfmsnt, On 16 May 1.969, 3/l
ARVR Battalion captured a map and several documents, including a battle plan
dated 22 April 1969, which indicated that the enemy force charged with the
mission of protecting transportation routes and road junctions in the northern
porM.on of the A Shau Valley was the 37th Battalion (possibly AKA 33 figineer
Rattalion~, Binh Tram 42, These same documents indicated the presence of the
45th Battalion (possibly AU 4th Engineer Battalion), Binh Tram 42, which was
responsible for the routes and road junctions in the southern A Shau Valley,
While these u.n5*"s *vere not confirmed by contact, other documents provided
additional evidence that rear service units of the 559th Transportation Group
were actkve in the Apache Snow area of operation (AO), The 3d Battalion,
187th Infantry established contact with a well entrenched and determined enemy
force of the 29th NVA Regiment mediately follaJing their combat assault
UNCLASSIFIED
 “‘+ ,@m
_.-uIII .‘;~~~t~~d~d_Ot~~iflc~t
units ini;e~;bgmf2q: Dxr3-q;
Oper~;ion Apache Sn<~w, units 5f the 6th and 29th WA Regiments and 559th Trans-
portat-Lc.2 Croup 'were XdantlfZed, Tha 806th Battalia and K12 Sapper Ebttalion,
6th &WARsgimen,lt, were Sdenttffed In the attack at FSB Airborne while the 7th
and 8th En%talionrt, 29$,h WA Rcg%.ment, ware identified in contact on Done AF Bia.
Documents cap-tured fn. the ~xorthem A Shau Valley outlined the miszian and
operstfoss of the lY?th and &5%h Battalions, B.%nhTram 42, Tenuous evidence
indicates that element s of Wese and other service and support units were
contacted during the opesa‘@%on, It was also learned that elements of the
9th WA Xegimn% had oecupbd tbe area just prior to tieration Apache Snow,
but could not be identWLed in contactc

(I.? PSYGF actieitlas ,Ln support of !.pache Snow were primm3l.y leaflet
disse&.xatioc and ae~faT. 1.oudspeakcr 't?madcasts,,
 (3) The 181st Airborns Division (AM) supported tha operation with the
dissemination of 5,31O,@QO leaflets (Anti-WA and Chiau Hoi) and aarlaf
broadcasts totalltig 47 hours and 40 minutes.

(&) Total Leaflet dissemination by both d2~visions in support of Gperation

Apache Snow wag 7,35Z,OOO while aarfal broadcasting time totalled 50 hours and
35 minutes 0
(5) Captured food-stuff: A small percentage of the food-stuff captured
during Apache Snow was destroyed due to its condition. The remafndar was
distributed to the paopla of Phung Diein, Quang Dien, Eueng Tra, and Barn Efoa
Districts,

Commencbg D-Day9 XXIV Corps, in coordinat;fon and cooperation with the

1st A.RW D%visfon, conduct ~pasations in northern A Shau Valley - southern
Da Krong Valby to destroy enemy forces a.rxI lmt;allat~o~~fic the AC,

(1) Occiipy suwthtrn Da bong Valley on DJhy,

(2) Block enemy escape into Ima &Long Da Krong Vdlay Road, Concmmmntly,
int@rdPctRoute 922 b fl%re,

(3) Conduct operations in zone to destroy enemy fcrses and install.ations,

co -@Be DSvisXcm t&b&: In coordlna%ion wfth 1st ARW Beg-t:
(1) Occur northern II Shau Valley on D-Day*

(2) Black enemy oscapcs into Laos alorg Route 922 bxbd interdict RUKI~XJ548.

(3) Conduct operations in zone to destroy enemy forces and installations.

UNCLASSIFIED
6
 d* Coord~natina Xn:,truct&=g: UNCL.ASSlFlED

(I) The operational nickname for this operation is "Apache Snow".,

(2) Effective on Corps order, !'Apache Snov?"A0 till be established as
follows : From YJI 018200 to YD Z22200, to 32 &75970, to YC :Nf;WO, thence no.
west along the Laotian border to YD 018200.i The boundary be",;4een 7015-t
Airborne Division (KM) and the 3d &rine Division will be as follows: Fl-OIQ
YC 160985 north along grid line 16 to YD 160037, north to YD 165057, northea
to YD 180078, north to YD 180093, east to YD 195097, northeast to YD 245150,
then northeast along stream to A0 boundary at YD 263"167,
(3) The road running northeast from YD 076025, crossing the Da Krong at
YD 153097, then to YD 24.5151, then south generally following stream to YD 25
is temperarily designated as Da Krong Valley Road,

Prior to D-Day9 10 May 1969, the Ist <rnd3 ARVNRements and the
3C; Btigade 10'9st Airborne Division, established three forward mutually
supporting'fire bases at FSB Bradley (YD 278122), FSB Airbcrne (YD 355070)
and FSB Currahee (YC 399949>. The 3/5 Cavalry, OJiWM3d Brigade, assumed
FSB Blaze (YD 535C20), FSB Bastogne
and provided security for engineer
forces upgradtig Route 543' .tiom I;fue to the A &au Vali.sf. Three US Infantry
Battalions, one AWN Infa.ntry B8ttalion, and one ARW Infantry Company (Rein
were staged into a marshalling wea in the vicinity of FSB Blaze. In the
northern portion of the AO the 9th Marine Regiment (m)(Reinf) staged twe
battalions in the upper Da Krang Vail,ey north of i'ne 36 E4 gr$d lfV.O. n-8-3
ALUQ QULA
e&.&lish& i%B ii-aor (‘x”u =l&3igt;), k D-Day, sti sx?an~-~ver 'battalioils
(3TJSkmy, 1 US4Cand2ARVN)madea vcombatessault .j,iltO six serbrate Lz!s
along the Laotian border in the A Shau Valley and & Krong Valley, After
searching and clearing the &urnediate LZ areas, these six battalions along
with 2/9 Matines began extensive RIF operations away from the Lzs?to locate
and capture or destroy enemy forces and supplies and to interdict Route 54.8
and the Da Krong Valley Road. On D-Day, additional fire support bases were
established at FSB Erskine (YD 164107) and FSB Turnage (YD 2&50(X), coqleti:
a chain of mutually supporting fire bases,, OR D+7, another AilVN infantry
Battalion made a combat assault into an LZ along the Laotfan border and
commencedRIF operations, The 3,/5 Cavalry continued to provide security
for the fire -bases and engineer forces along Route 547 and prqared for
armored cavalry operations in the A Shau Valley upon completing of the road
construction,
b, &Day ("10 May 7969), after extensive coordinated air and artillery
preparations, the combat assault- began% At 073Ofi, l/506 Infantry (-> comba-
assaulted vicinity YC 312949; at 0801H, 3/187 Infantry combat assaulted vi&
YC 320988; at 0918H, l/9 Marines com)lrat assaulted into F'S3 Erskine; at 1001H,
2/5Oi Inf.xdxy (-1 combat assaulted vicinity YD 288015, At lWOH, 4./7 ARVN
UNCLASSIFIED
:nl'sl?,ry &.ttdA.on ~rnb~k aesmlt;od v5ciA.ty YI4 25004% rino at 13ij(_H c reinforce
k~t‘.xn‘kt~ &xxkpany of 2/l ARVN Infantry B;ltta:!.ion combat assaulted into FSB
Turlxlge o Smll &T-m5fire W!ISreceived during the combat assaults by 4/1 I-RVN,
2jl ARVfi ad l/9 Marines., At FSB Turnage, ;; CL-47 wws domed vrl Liie LZ Kiti
no casuulties and ~r.!inor damage, At FSD Erskine, a CJL4G received fl.re Firirj
ci*ashed resulting in 7 fr%endJy KIAbs :Lnd 5 WIA (WAC), Concurrent with
the con&t assaults, Z/9 Wines conducted RIF operations vicinity and south
of FSB Razor while J/2 ARVN Tnfsnixy Battalion conducted RIF operations
immediately south of the A0 bounclarg vicinity Ta Bat,
T-t+1 (11 May 1969): 3/l ARVH Infantry Ba,ttaJ..ion combat aasatited vicinit:;
XD 197044 with negatdvo contact,, At 1625H, E/3/187 Infantry began to
receive SAY and % fire vicirsitg YC 325982 which marked the beginning of the
battle for Dong Ap Xa Mountain, Details of this battle are covered in
Inclosure J.,

Dj-2 (12 May lys): The operation continued generally as planned, tith
tinor contact, except for l/506 and 3/18'? Infcr,try enjoined fin the -&ttle
of Dong Ap Bfa Mountain,,
D+3 (13 May 19691);: The f irst devia%i.on to the original pl.~ occurred on
thiLs date after 5+‘2/5OI.. Infantry and artillery at FSB Airbone received a
hemy sapper attack at 0335Ho 2/501 Infantry (-) was extracted from PZs
along the Laotian border to the vicinity of FSB Airborne and began extensive
RIFs to pzlrsue and destroy the enemy in the area,

II+23 (1.8 M&y 1569): In the tattle for" Dmg Ap Bfe Mountain, the 3/187 Infantry
fought its way to the military crest on t,h,p north while the l/506 Infantry
assaulted up the slope from thei. SOPIL~I., The 3/X87 Infantry began to receive
hea%? fire from Xy~th.flanks and, wYth little daylight remaining, the decision
was made to reinforce for the final sssault, At 1830R A/2/506 Infantry
was combat assaulted vicinity YL 32OW? and became OPCON3/18? Infantry.

D-+9(19 M%y19693 s At 1317H 2/3 ARVI?combat assaulted ticiaity YC 338974

and st 1515X 2/501 Infantry (-> combat assaulted vicinity YC 332?22.
3/5 Cav%lryp provi.dLng sec??_r.i+,yalong Route 547A, was chopped OPCW to the
2d Brf.gnde reducing the spm of cont~rol for the 3d Brigade,
Dt.10 (20 Iby 1969; 1: 7,62X7 InTatry (Reinf), Z/501 Infantry, l/506 Infantry
and 2/3 ARVN succe~sfullg assaulted and drove the 7th and 8th Battalions of
the 29th WA Regiment from the mountain stroughold and began a detal.1g.d
search of the area,,
D-b11 !2.l May 19@) 3 3/187 *ins chopped OPCONto the 2d Brigade and moved
to the coastal. arm of the dlv:isiou A0 w9i?le 2/506 becxme OPCORto the
jd Erigade and the BattnlMn. (-.) moved to and commenced RIP operations
UNCLASSIFIED
 a 1 y?s;:
Ali .lI-CGT 27 Augmt w33
$&&JECT: Corn&t Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3=32)CKI! UNC~SSIFIED

D+12 (22 Nay- lc)@): The semai~de~ of 2/506 rxwed to FSE Airborne and began
extensive search of ,the Warehouse 54 area0

D-k93 -tf;r~@h C-w (23 - 27 l&y 1969 j 2 ii?/501 Infantry, l/f336 Infantry an?
213 A.NS Infantry continued clear and search of Dong Ap Bia Mountain with
YL/50t.-~moving south, %/3 ARVNmoving southwest, and Z/501 continuing to
search on the crest, Dur'ag this period, engineers w$.th the 9th M&rine
Regiment completed a series of four cuts and 'blocks of the Da Gong Valley
Road to deny the enemy immediate future use of the road,
m-18 (28 May 1969): The 9th Marine RegSment began withdrawal from Operatioa
Apache Snow with l/S &rines lifting to Vandegrift Combat Base and the closing
of FSB Erskine,
Imy (29 May 2969): The 9th I4ar.m~~Regimz:t withdrawal continued with the
lift of 2/9 I43rines (-) to Vandsgrfft Combat Base,

D-220 (30 b!ay 1.969): The 9th Marine Regtient withd:awaL continue4 with the
lift of a.dxi.ll~ry elements to Vandegrff~ Combat Base,
lx-21 (31 ida? 1969): The remainder of the 9th Marine Regimenat lifted to
Vandegrfft Comb& E&se and 3d Harlne DB~isS.on participation 5n Operation
Apache Snow terminated at 3L180SM May 1yh90

Ix-22 -td-lrOU~ilDe5 (1 = pcJune 1969) E The >d Airborne Brigade and 3d ARVM
Regimat contjinued opera-Uons, with l/506 Infantry and 2/Y A.RVHInfantry
continuing RliF operations southwest to FSB Cwrahee and vicinity, Ths
2/50l. 1nfmtr-y conducted RIP operation nort;Sleast toward the A Shau Valley
23.50X+0
~26 (5 he 1969): The 4,/I ARVN Infantry was extracted from vicinity
YD 278066 to La Vang and terminated thee participation fn Operation
Apache Snow*
DA-27 (6 June 1y69a Operaticm continued vicinity FSB9s Currahee, Airborne,
Bradley and Turnage and northeast of Dong Ap B5a.
D-i-28 (7 June 1969) z The 3d Airborne Brigade and 3 ARVN Regiment terminated
Operation Apache Snow effective 072400N June 19690
12 (c) lGESULTS: The objectives of Operation Apache Snow were successfully
cyy-pjgj (Jut, A series of mutually supporting fire support bases from FSB
Curr&ee OHXthe south to FSB Razor on the north was established,, The multi-
battalion combined operation in the south was a campaign in which the energy
ws9 d f5xed and ~thod.%cally destroyed, The 9th Marine Fsghent success-
fu.E.~~obked on the north thus denying the enemy reinforcing entrance or
withdrawal from the A Shau'Valley along the Da Krong Valley Roarf., and interdicted
the road to deter enemy use of’ it in the future. The resui.t ,:f fhis ojz:i'.iti.on
 UNCLASSIFIED 1
AVII-GCT 27 August 1969
SUBJEXT: Comba~t
Operatfcms After Action Report (RCS: MAC 33=32)(KI)
was the destruction of the combat effectivemms of the mawever batkIlo=
of the 29th IWA Begfmant and .Cts Headquarters and Technical Unite, V%C%
forced the broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos, It alao
denied them use (sf the northern A Shau Valley as either a staging area for
attack or as a storage area for

TmAL

1021

.I 6

413

UJ.

555,451

7,426
8,346

1,375
Other 26,002

Grain (Tbs) 56,486

Demolitions (Ibs) l&475
Docmmnts (Ibs) 47025
Vehicles 53
BunkePs 1575
Struct;arres 731

TOTAL
KU 121
km n9

UNCLASSIFIED
.I%‘, A&.oUtJA

SUBJSCT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32)(KI)"

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIYE MUTERS: UNC~SSiFirrCf

a., w: The resupply to troops in the field was accomplished exclusive:6

by helicopter, e from Yandegrift Combat Base and Camp Evans for Marine Corps unit:
and from Camp Eagle, Camp Evans or FSSE at FSB Birmingham for Amlp* units. Be-
supply by US to ARYN units was accomplished by 1Olst Airborne Division (AM)
helicopters,

(1) mtity of supplies prcvided to combat units by class:

CLASS US MARIFlECORPS(S/TON1

I arid Water 1572 u.5

11 12
IXX 2238*

xv G9 n
v 43u 736

other em Ill
+ Includes al1 Class XXI and IIIA

(2) LsgfstieaJ. aviation requirements by sortbes:

TXPEI%LICOPTBR us l4ARIrn CORPS

a=%53 276

XXIX Corps Headquarters e&tablfshed an intersetice support agreement

"k-keen lOlst Airkrne Division (AM) and 3d Marine Division to provide
additional CH-47 helicopter support to Marine Corps units and for the Army
to issue munitions from Army stocks at Camp Evans to Marine Corps units on
a reimburseable basis, 3d Marine Division would credit USMCASP at Quang Trl.
where the Army pick&. up the munitions and transported them to Camp Evans.
The CH--L$?~~lifted supplies from Camp Evans to Marine Corps cambat units.
By lriftiw supplies from Camp &a?ls, the 1Olst Airborne Division (AM)
controlled the use cf the helfcoptars but provided helicopter support to
3d Harine Division units Zn the Apache Snow area of operation.

UNCLASSIFIED
 (1) The handling of cesualti.ea during Apache Snow wes considered satfs-
f&@%OX=~” Evacr;atfaa. 0 f and care far rim personnel followed ~OXTIZLT~channels,
see In@l.osu"e 2, The large nurnbr UP casualtfes in Army personnel required
a change 5.11normal aeromedical evacuation channels from site of wound to
hospit.al, The SOlst I&borne Div5.siom (AM) met this requirement by:

(b) Evacuating casualties from FSB Blaze to Ilospita'ls wlf9;h G%-d? and
non-medical IJIL-4 helicopters,

(2) Due to the large number of caszlalties during Apache Snow, Corps
medical personnel operated a Forward I4ediea.l Regulating Offlce (m0).
This office insured that aX.I. available medical facilities were used and
prev6;nted o~vercrawding of one facility uhlle others were idle, Durkng
Apche Snow the FHtO accompPi.shed 9ta xissfon by 1186 of telephone. This
re@red the hospital. selected to receive casualties or tha unit whose
aircraft was transpor%ing the casualties to notify the aircraft at which
hospital to land, This method, although not satYsfactory, did accomplish
the tission during Apache Snow, Fsr satfsfactory operati.on the FMROshould
be a@pped with a radio to make direr:t contact with the avacuation heI.Scopters.

5 0 ~O~iGitiQ~$~ Communications support provided throughout the

operation, over and above organic dkorisional assets, consisted of a 12
cha.nnsl VHF sysa;srlininstalled from Camp Eagle (HQ, lQ2st Airborne Division)
to fTJ3 &wchtesga;-den (Ra, 3d Brigade (ND), X&t M.rborne DivM-on).
XXIV Corps 0PLA.NZO49 (DStisfon Support Conxunicat5oas Contingency Plan)
was implemented prk~r ts the operation to comm.i%the necessary assets,
On 10 Eqy 1969p eqtipment and personnel of the 63d Signal Battalfon,
22ti Si nal Group, were helilifted to FSB Berchtesgarden and the system
(FFH-58 k was actzbated, This 12 channel system provided the required command,
control and fire dllrectioo communications between HQ, lOl.st &borne Division,
3d Brigade (F'dD) at FSB Berchtesgarden and 3d Brigade (BEAR) at Camp Evans.
0rgan.b~ %LE equ.%pment of the divisions provided the normal tactical ratio
communicatious0 '1ch.e.'M Mxrbe Division installed a 4 channel VBF system
from Bandegrifb Comld Base to FSBRAZOR(HQ, 9th Marine Regiment) to
supplement the radio n&s, 101st Ajsbrne Division installed 4 channel
systems frum FSB Berchtesgarden to FSB Blase, FSB Currahee, and FSB Eagle's
Nests to comp1et e the multLchanne1 system installed tithin tkmir A0 of
Apache srzow, l.st AEY'.?~Dfvisiun 3nstalled ~a *au/'?RC-1 system from Hue Citadel

%.2 UNCLASSIFIED
 I‘ . %&J2&&_ &&gj&&~,~ ,' The system of mrjdicaf evacuation us& 5~ the
1.~71st Airborne lliv-l.aion prowd YLZs~ccesuful that they are going to contirzur?
this practice,. The 326th Medical. Battalion is planning to incorporate LOH
helicopters into ;Xts air a&&awe platoon,, They found on Apache Snow that
tie LOH uas able to land and pick up casualties in areas where the large
UK-iH motif?. have to use a sling,, The use of the IUH also increased the speer!
of tbc? ev9,cuation of ca:3ualties,,

(1) Discussion: Sevwrtl .times during Operation Apache Snow, bireraft

-were downed ic hostile terra:izl where easy access was impossible, At times
the only feas?hle w&y .r#,ggere could get to the aircraft in order to rig it
for extractiw was through the use of rappelt,ng techniques from UH-3.E hellcpoter~

i. 2) j%-&Jkhtse :' Rea.l:izJ.ngthat this method of entry is not B normal

tm.diniqa1e 3s %afantry security elcmeilts, experience shows that,
for r:iggerw y
as a minimtm:, a bRs.ic COllrSe of iEl.struc3i0a, to include actual hellcopier
rapeiing, is seeded :ic aLI. -xnfan-iry rind rigger units.,

(2) D*scnss.~o.u.; Units of both ti;e L/506 and 2/506 Infantry

Battalions
employed aircraft Oreo membw aeram5:: VW& pI.%tes for their poini; men. Thfa
body ariwr, while heaq nnd cumberzome, saved the lives of three men who were,
struck by SA at close range,
(2) Solu.t,:iorL> lhe posslb;XSty of adapt;.!2 this aircraft type body armor
to uw tl*oops shou!..d be LwestXgated
by fieid by every infantry unit engaged in
operatSfo.os in which mL't.ad, .ls fsl-f, ,t.o be i&neat,

C” Fbfde~~ Cpri~~ter~
- _A--
.-a.*.-.
_a__A-.-2 Extens3.ve use of potier
cannisters as supplementary
water containers was made thrwghou'; the operation, Camlsters 83-e not
subject to leakage and may be discarded, elimzinating the need for extraction
and retrograde to supporting LSb"a,,

d,% aI zr.,i I .w.I_.._L

K~tjAmS
- __x.- I>..-.. " As a Sllpplement to the no=i
su~~~.~mc$ws; supply of rations
and water, axtenslv e nse was made of canned fruit juices by the Marine units,
Normally four cases (12 cans per ease) were included in each company load. The
txctensi~e use of &3ces, by those units operating in the field, ~o&ributed
significantly ‘to the reduction of heat casualties and dehydration,
AViLGCT 27 Auguet 1969
SUafECT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MACJ3-32)(K1)
teamvcrk bvolved ArqyP Marine md two regiments of the 1st AEVBDid-don,
b, The operation focused on titerdiction of enemy Pines of communice%iion
and search for enew forces, supply caches and base areas. To this end,
Gperatiolo Apache Snow was succtssf'ul with the destruct?.on of two enemy
battalions (630 XIA) on Dong Ap Bia Mou.ntain, Hill 937, In addftion, the
A S~NI Valley infiltration route was closed to Lhe enemy and large quantities
of ammmition and equipment were destroyed or captured,

2 lncl R. Do J!W.XO
I- Battle of Doxag, Ap Ma 4f K4J, AGC
2- Medical Evacuation @hart Bsst AG
GF:
Ill MN? 1 - 15
3d Mar Div 16 - 20
10is-t Abn D~v (m) 21 - 25
7th AF 26
3-k-t Xi.1 Hist Det 27
G3 28 - 32

UNCLASSIFIED
 b, The movement toward Dong Ap 1!ia l.mmediately encountered a ~el.2 4.~4: iri
enmy, who fought hard to prevent penetration *.--.I.
of his 'base Use,*.? The enemy
appeareit to be well dressed and was well supplied with weapons and ammunition.
Se made good use of h.Is concentric rings of fortified positions hnri employ&
RRI and aut.omat5.c weapons extensively,

c-h7 j, yi;: t;‘p*s f”‘:T- /‘., .

iI. <’ _ k-L,”-0IA+L;‘r.A”
d&r AI,-Pt*t.r
--- e!;ie:iii-,7 <jl:.,; i :A 1 .: f-)ils t ‘tt? 2~3 8th j of the 2%h
X'GA Eieg~menl; -&re 1.,;m mp;,;.~...~.iij.document; found in the area and et
.~dent.iif:~ 633 F-% ,>

appears that reg.i.menLaI. an3 o%her suppc::ttlng units (anti-afrcraft, heavy

weapons and engineer) wsre a&r.: fnvulved, These units had not been identified
in-countzy since the fall of ?968 and it appears #at they had just recently
returned, presumably ::.L~increase en:?my m:li.tary activity .'n Thus Thien hovincc
Confirmed total body count of 5'XI entzmy kiLled accounts for shout one-half of
the total enemy fQrce, Tn addition< to these conffrmed enemy killed, there
were substantial enemy casualt%es which could not be counted directly, but whit
significantly reduced the effectiveness of the 29th MIA Regiment, A ?4 stated
that only 20% of the -Y;w ::ompnrl.i,e:! xi.tn which he was familiar survived the
Allied attack. L-i additX!x, to enemy casualties, a major base area was neutrul-
ized and sign!Lficant quantities of enemy supplies were captured including 17'7

'i'hp effectiveness
e .- wi d;h which P'i.re power and maneuver were combined is
shovn by the !O T-0 1 eneruy tat- f'~~.!;.emilgkj1.1 ratio that was achieved, despite
the -rugged terrain? dF,,;-Jsevegetjction u.nd the enemy's use of prepared positions.
IS-52 s%rlbes nnd tact:Lcai aIT" strikes wu. &l?-eplaced on bases and infiltration
routes tc inflict. fix the.r casualties on the enemy forces attempting to reinfore
07 escape fr,iJm the Dong Ap Bia area,
c,
,, As a result of the? c I.nsses It/ i-3 estimated <hat two enemy battalions
 5’ c L':iI I'JO8L'!H &3y I$J69, the 3-I 27th infmtr-- CO&at tisvaul t,ecl irI?/> :1ri ii<
in : !I::? vicinity of k’C314988 jUjt WfZYt of i.h>Ilg iip i?it%, 9/3-l 07 imr33I!1.;:tel;r :rfidc;
ci:ntnct, with :FD.unknown size enemy force, APP roxmteij- two hxss 1i:ter ;;hile
roving from the U, B//3-187 made cuntitct, returned fire and kille?I two I;'Jf-.
hitial ImPressions were that‘ the Ni ltt were probably trail watchers, but ilfter
sustaining three :a)unded the battalion cor~cl.~~Ioti 'ihat the firir,g was tri,- well
controiied and that stiffer resistance might be encountered, (The fo: 'iwing
morning Z more enemy bodies were found in the underbush).

bc Lb Ii l&y, the +187th placed artillery and TAC air or, Q I.;::-ge baker
complex located astride their axis of advance,, RiE' operations fo?low& the
:;trikes ns the .%187th moved to the southeast toward IIfll 937. 'dhile seerch-
ing the hut. and bunker compl.ex, the '+187th found 3 NVA bodies killed by the
ar::y,i_,..; cr~y/T:,.c-
%I tiir- JX~FJ.W~%~CI~~ (, t: $jipQycrl.nt; lli.,z:Ccm?rUL’ ir, t1-1e :2rea ‘d&S h grC’2p

of docWents idc.d-ifymg the unit a~ the 29th NVA Regiment, I'he CIccants
showed that the 29th NVA Reg,iment had returned from Worth VictnaIi; in April
and had been conducting reconnaissance operations bet\;een fi? 611 in Laos and
Route 548 in the A Shau Vs>Iey,

C” On 12 ,?!.a~the 3-187th continued ttlalr Push along the rough, canopied

rj dp;sr: f Bv iKYl<bI
,-r fhrrv mar?~
;.. I. J ___-_- hon’LrV i-c~nt:wi*~+
-...- - vi..-.. t,.h
.._a f:, ual
_____ ? d-i
____SC>3
__ r$j,nEd f’nrr:F. e?“‘tj.=

m.t& at tko co:nF;lniez dug in-$sut %W., mi.t:.:-r; to their front, They man-
euvered against the fores and krlied 3 Fw-h., The battalion c&led in AXA a&
artillery fire in orde? to dis&odgc: the enemy from his fortified position.
The enemy held fast, however, and throughout the day the 3-18'7 received hearf
automLstfc weapons end HPG fire and llmited mortar fire. Heavy TAC air and artil-
lery fires were placed on theencmy positions,

de The situation
rematnecf l?nr:hanged on 73 by as the enemy stayed in
bunkers and employed small arms2 FUG, automatic weapons and mortars against
maneuvering siements of the 18'7th? The _'$=!87th returned fire and employed
additional artilller-y a-nd TU air,

e, On the mornfng of the lL+th, B:, C, and D companies of the 3-387th once
again began slou and deliberate maneuver under artillery, TM air and gunship
support, Under thfs heavy attack the ene.xy fell back, Contact terminated
about 17UO and the '187th swept the bunker area to find 13 NVA killed in action
by artillery, 47 NVA killed by .small arms fire and 23 killed by air strikee.

f, The 187th continued its drive along the ridges to Hi.11 937 on the
mcrning of 15 May. As the line companies maneuvered toward their objective
they discovered 14 NVA bodies from the previous day's contact, By 15OOH they
W3TP M in heavy contact. and realized the force was more than a normal NVX bat-
tiLioo size elaracnt .$ Rates of fire were extremely heavy and the enamy trocps
sk-i.l.lfu'lly employed command detonated Clay-more mines in large quantities.
Enemy reinforcements were being= browht into the contact zone, The neu trc>oF hat
UNCLASSIFIED
,.
 1!, f)n !.T ;&JJ, the 187th occupje& an overwatch Awsitj.on nn4. iii~cc!,iG 52
gas strikes, 'The l-506 continued to mneuver tcJ reinforce the 18'lth, i-1-
though the enemy had gas masks, the CS attacks were effective and C:~US& h5
to leave some or" his burikers.

k 0 IAte in the morning of 20 MayP 4 ba%talions executed a coordinated

assault on Hill 93’To Tns Jti~?8'P'-
C,I Inf, w!..th k/&~b-th Inf attached, assaulted
the hill fron the north; the '7- 306 Inf from the south and southvest; the 2/3d
UNN from the southeast; and the 24OlsL InE from the northeast, The J3-18'7th
swept up the hli.11 from the north, while the 1-5O6th and the 2-50lst blocked
possible routes of escape, The 2/3d AWN moved onto Hill 937 Cr~m the south,
By 1200 hours battalion Tbjectives on the Dong Ap Bia Ridge wmetaken. The
determined enemy resis tame disintegrated as rriendly forces .~;'.:rran enemy
pcsitions resulting fn i+ total body count for 20 May of 1099
:i 0 on 21 May 1969 Allied forces swept over the hill to check the enemy
'o:ise urea in detail, After ten days of hard fighting the 3-187th Inf had
mrned a ~sll deserved rest and returned to the coastal plains, The l-!506th
Inf secured the abandoned enemy positions while the ?-50lst Inf conducted RIF
operations to the west, The 2/3d AWN conducted RZF qerations to the east.
Friendly reconnaissance of the area encountered only isolated and sporad.ic
resistance, An additional 5') enemy killed were discovered and Sg wecpom r;ere
CFi@Lll.Te~!.o

El" T'ne Dong Ap Blu CFWd.,iOu. cost the enemy a total of 630 hTvi KLk,
In additior, to these confirined casualties, a PvJcaptured during the operation
j.rdicn+,ed th3.t the units in his area suffered 80% casualt.ies. On 22 h&y the
~NCf.ASSlFlED
 UN(-j;i&&jlf+-J
,\ ,*.:;Q ;
)_ 9t ‘inf mxi the 2/'3d AliVN continued
search operations in the vicinity Of
iiill 93'1, :xcouxAifi.g for 72 NVA killed and 3 crew served weapons captured. The
search ojperation continued on the 23d of 14ay with the l-50& Inf finding 10
more NVA bodies and the 2-501st Inf finding 3 bodies,, on 3.4 M&y the L5cah
discovered 51 individual weapons and the +501st Inf found 1 NVA KIk, thtj end-
ing the battle of Dong Ap Bfa Mountain, Hi.11 937

UNCLASSIFIED
 .3 I ”
L.
., .
. , I +a
i, .,
I. (,
:, ‘;, _
c c.‘Z !
. :;
: .
.:- ,
, .-
.
Operation Apache Snow, Message, MACV, 20 May 1969
Operation Apache Snow, Messages on Tactical Air Support, 7 & 17 May 1969
Operation Apache Snow, Miscellaneous Messages and Memos, 20 May - 8 Jun 1969
e
 _*
:
I ’
,
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-_-_ -._.. -...-_ ,
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b.tar, ., . . / V 5: A ‘\
 ,

lIN\IED STATES ICE CON

b 96222
Q
P
Operation Apache Snow, Narrative, 22nd Military History Detachment, Aug 1969
.
c

The incloaed narrative of the actlozm involving elamgnts of the

oprrationtookplaoo IUiher~k andlnboqitrrbls AshraVw

fkon lo MtQ to 7 Junb 1969. It i8 hopedthatthis narratlpb will
beofaome benef$tto studentsand 8-0 schoob,andwillgi+s
th~reader8betta.rdemtandiag ofconbatin theVletnm..s~
 On the kningof9lbythe lrDlstU.rbomeMrlaW--FIti-
thoThIrdBrigads~~~inconjunctI.on withthsIstW Mvfsion
ad NinthPIrrineBe~nt-- poised for the attack a&aiast 6~
forCea,b88 rrdlW5sofco~cation6 In a& crd*ti to the
Northern AShauVJlrq, TenarWle~batterlua hsdt?nslrtube~~
in pwition at iire buses Brsdlsy (TD 27323), &borne ('ID 35507l),
currahee (m39e5%9),Berchtssgaden (YD424oll),urdcann8n (n,474aw*
Thstroop4bparticipat$q lnthe w*ata#8aultothe follawfng~ninst
werebsingrrr8hdledintheviclnity of FE Blaze(l[D 536020). The
paratroopers of the Ist Battalion, 506th Infant-; 3d Battalion,
187th Infantry; and2d B&t-n, !SOlut Infautry hurriedly prepared
_.-
their gear, cleaned their weapom , and wrote the letters that they
would rmthavetheti.me to writs in the co&ngdaya. The following
mx-ning theyuouldbe heililiftedintothe inhospitable A Shau Valley.
XL!!&
At H-hour,lOCV~Hey 1969,thelead elements of the four
battalions were picked up by sixty-five UH-1H helicopters from
 *ior to the aorabat waaulta each larxilng u)ne m bodsrdad for
seventy mlnutw by tmtlcal aircraft MM ertlllwy tith fbul

ori nlultAp10 ucelb ticimrd the La&Ian Borar.

By l&OH aLi. coppanie~ and the battxllodu commaadpost of t&s

3d Battallon,187th lnfantrJIcombat auatited fPomrBma.se to t&&r
two ahip landing sone (PC 320988)e Once on the elephant gram
hovered la!sli.ng son0 uhstii opened to high grmxi in the w9ot, thy
began thslr reconna%imancein force operationlr in ths ticitlitf of
the Laothn Border. D Conpany, which wan firet on the landing zone,
movedalong a ridge to the aouthead ~b plrumed. I5omnte of A

andCCompanlsa,oncstheywer6 ontbu land% zone, aecurdtb

rxwthweat and aouthsrnpartims ofthe landing aona perimeter
lwqmctivttly. Oncethelandlngzonewa~ secured ACoqmny
reconnoitered to tha northwest and C Company reconnoitered to the
southwest. B Company's amadltwm co~?etd by16OOH. They
nerved from the landing zone southwest to the battalion's location
where they received instructims to mve southeast toward Hill 937
(the number reDresenting
w its height in mter8). B bnpany established

2
 t%tlr night, defensive position on the lower abpsa of kng Aga
Bia (Hill. 937) and began preparatlms to mm out at flrstll@
the followlxqmrnlngrai eecum the hill. Hoone atthir,tiPlb
realised the riseoftha msa~pforac, positionsd onth Mfl or
whatwaa ahead for the battalion before this order could ba
fUfSUed.
The third of the four battalion8 conducting the co&at aarratiLt8

inta the area of operatiorm us6 the 2rJ Battalion, 50lst Infe.
I& C, and D Companionad the bat%d.ion comnaxrlpmt amaulted onfo
a landing cone (TC 28001$), at 1047Hwhile A kqaqy emcured and
continusdmim6truationofW Alrbome.
The la& battakh to be helilifted into the area on 10 &y
wb8 the4t&Battallan, l8t~%9gimbntWbiCh a88dkOdbl'b~
landing sono at coordinate8 YD 24Ul.and begantheiropsrafi4ite
in theimmdiateama ofthefentian Border.
To rotxxi out one of the mat fantaatia days of airrobS.le operatkm
for the IDW. Airborne Mvision, one conpaqy fkcvmthe 26 Battullm,
httAM?#'bgimedwa6 Ssnt into F8Tigar (n> 25209o)to 8eCUJ-Othe
firebam for the a88aultof2/1ARVN on the followlngda$. This

brought the total units lifted to four battalion8 ami one wqmny
and coupled with the ten batteries of artllletry which ware tm~ed

the dG,plefora, indicated the thorou@;t~ass of planning arxi precieemsa

of execution of the Mvision alrmblle operations. The day8'
activity pointed out the tremndou8 influ6nce of the hdicoptar
02 modern military operations.
3
casualtior itwaa evldantthatthe flrewm too w&coatnalUd
for trail WhtChCW8 axI that stiff- re818tnnc. Imild be mm3tmtdoLLbd.

‘he other battakha Involved is tie operation Coat- to

ssamnmr in their re8pectioe zone8 and dimzovsred -tab 8ti

cache8 containing mixed amall arms, mortar rounds and crau4mmed

weapon amunition. I

u
On UHay,B Cornam, 3487th conducted a first light check of
the previous day's contact and found numerous blood trails (seven)
and threeadditional hodies, besides cne M-47, one ll@t machinegun,
one Wcf rocket launcher, and misoellaneous equipment.

4
 .. . n
/-
- I

UkY EJravoCanpany pntrolU.ngtowmi )till~?nm8imto

a well defended hut, and bunker complex(327982). After f'%@b

ingtorecove~utmnded, the company pills bgckto artight

defcsf*?- yrsltion,

4-a
 &tar that day a~ they manurtrrovd In the viciAtr cf Qw LotIm
Bordar duo ueat of A xoul, B Co-, 3-le7tb mad. cont*t w24.a

ama fimuhichreuultedin fireNVA )cillrd. Theseuercdi~~~mred

ir,lile the unit was searchimths hut and tn&mr ccraple~~. I3 -*=w@8
1~4 platoonsuffered +AreekllledMdnine~wbuxxiedifithe~t
and ~88 forced to withdraw a 8kwt distance to repxm. leaving tbd
WuuIxiedwhere thay ,fell. The company lnitlated a 8ecolxl adlraYsxJta
retrieve tho8e init- wounded and 8ufSmed addUi43ml cmualtlea.
On the third atteqt LTC HonaJrcutt, the battalion co-, iiletslrcted
themto incrsamtheirvolumeof iireazxipxahupoestth~rrotoded
rather thes t,rying to retrieve them undm direct eh~p~ fire. Thilr

At IL7OOH
drwlag a medavac for B Compul(va cobra gumMo acoompa@ag
the zmd-evac indvertentlybankedcurl firesixrpckeM into the
BattaUonmmmaxmipolrt, DCow,and themrtarplakmlearing
one killed axxi thirtv-five wmndeadin ita wdre. The battalim

conmander,S2, S3,andartilleryliai8oa offlcerweretrsomdais aad

aU.wsre evacuated accept the battalion comandar and thes3. By
1~Hfihsuwnded~ bean evacuatedandthe co@esbegan eatlbliahing
t
thslr night defanaive po8ltiona.
 With the battalion% commd post at FB Brdley, a- of t&
2/l ARVNBattaUon co&at ssmulted 8outh of Fire Bake T-r (ID 2W)
to search out the area of operations.

12
3n I.2 Hay the 348'7th continued their push through the thick ba&oo
ad tibpha,nt grass along t?x rsq$ ririgw of Dow & Ma. TWO
air strikes were XXK@e8ted8nd coqleted at 0804H in uupprt of B
Copsarsp% advance up th~hillarrl C Coxgmy'e advancetothsmrtb-
east of B Coqmny. At 09'IUH B Conpaqp beg- receiring sniper f'lm
from their rear and by 092lHthey were receiving lntenme automtlc
fire fromthe fkont and incomlngmAar munds. To aid in the
evacuation of the wcmxied the battalion coxmmder requeuted englmer

6
 \

32 33

12 Msry Bravo Companycannot dislodge the enemy from theti

bunkera. Delta and CharUe move to assist.
support to blow a landtip: sane for B Cowany. Att&ing in
bmrt~onatl024Hthe rrgineer shipwlrs hitt?yIlpGd s4U
arm6 fire causing it to crasha& burnrasulting Fh sevm
Ca8ualti88.
BcOapsny contl.nuedtomsneuvera#nstfhe~disciollzrsd
.
force, estimated at two conpa,n%es,which mrdr dug in about 200
m&em to the- fkwnt (See Sketch 2). The battaUon c&led for
MUand artillery flretiorderto dislodgetheeqtimhib
fortified position, but the en- hald fast and thugbe t)re 4
the 3487th contimmd to receive hea- autmatic kapons 81Ki lipc
fire interspersed with mortar fire. Hsav air strties consisting
of SO and1000 poundbode, (highdraganddelayed tie),ln addition
ta napalmand artmew fire,were continuaUy p2acedonthe em18
position.
Me-e, the other battal.ions - 2-5018t and 1+06th- contAmed
to conduct reConnaiSSmcs in force operations throughbut their srW#
of operation encountering lited contact. B colmpw, 1-506thtiile
maneuvering in the vicinity ofcoordinat8sYC 30994l,mcomtersd
three lWA,kUlhg one sml cspturinghls M-47.
While on reconnaissance in folu:a operatialra in the j.mmdiate area
of the titian Border 3/l ARVNBattalion discovered a smll cache of
miscel.lansous equipment and weapons-z&@.t inditridual and twelve
crew-servsdueal~)ns.
SimiNaneous with the maneuvering of the battalions on the pound,
e

7
 A’bup, ZdSquulron, 17thCavJrJconducWd~ XWOfIMb8UlCO~
support oftha ground fames thmug&utthe srsaofopsratieae.

The s%tuatAon rwuined mow for the 3487th on l,3 w M

the coqmniee conducted rec~nm&~ssnm in force operattins ia i;'ncdr
imaediate areas* ACo~novsdtothebattdion~aPlanbpostud
rdievsd DCoapsnyofthe securitym%ssiori, & D~kqany~~vmlto
aasiat BaxxiCCompanies. Thro~ut the day the ew emp,lo)ed anall
ame, RFG, automaticweapons,and?&wtsrs rrOtpwU entrsnchodpoulMone
q@nat the maneuvertig slexmnts of the 187th. The 3-3.87th retm%ed
fire& enployed sdditionalartUl~az%l tactical&wh%CII hea-
pounded Dong Ap H.&I western slopes.
During the dsyamed-evac helicopter,uMle axtractingwunded pipa
D Company(1536H), uaa shot down by small arm fire from suspected
enemy locations YC 328993 and Yc 324988, rmultlng 2x1 six kXLbd und
one wounded. 'The third platoon of AConp~mvad toUnkuptith
D Coqan.y at the crash site and assisted in the evacuation of the
wowxisd back to the battalian headquarters.
Earlier in the m0Mn.g of the 13th (0330H) Fire Base &borne,
defendedbyACoq.my, 2d Battalion, 5Olst Infantry snd three
Artillery batteries, C-2-U (4 155 How), B-2-319 (2 105 How) and
G-2-319th, was assaulted on three sides by ele~nts of tw NVA

battalions supportml kq 82mm1mrtam andRFG ~flre. After Infiltrating

through the concertina wire on the north side of the per-tar the

8
 attackiq force eyatenratically crfrs-cmssed the northerly pfiioa

I theyonoountemd. Intho glowofthe~pmdertith6

. amunition storage area the mm of 1urborne dmve the attam
..-
. force
. f'romthe hix1, kUng fort7 of the attacu fof‘ce, &l&e
mfferingtwenty-two killedand eixty+newurrd&fncrdditionta
fivehoniteerethatuere damagedor destroyed. tter lntbs dy
B, C, and D Coqmnieer, 2-5Olst were axtrscted from the fidd,
minsertedinto Mrborne,and cond~&ed recoXmlaibbaZlc8 in force
operations to the north, south, and east of FB Airborne in search
of the attacking force.
The l-SO&h continued search and da&my xrdsaions in its af,sw
area of operationa mpovingmrthweat along hU?h grourrd checking a#temi+e
along the slopea o,f the AShauVtiey. king the deg ACow- found
eight huts, which were considered to be part of a possible staging amI
and small amounti of anmunition.
While searching the cache area discovered the previous, day, 3/l
dipi{ Battalion found a large cache consisting of e&ht vehic1e8,
seventy-eight individual., and twenty-five crtw-sermd ueaponae

On the morning of the E&h, B, C, and D Companies of the 3018'7th

once again received intenaiva axnaJJ army, ~utmatic, and FzlpGfire M
they began a d&berate fire on the Dang Ap Bia comglax,
and BEUK+U~~~
8 under artillery,tactical a3r and gunship cover, TMsuastha fir&
r! 9
32

UMay lb first concerted drive to gain RUl 937. C

and D Ccnqxnies run into commanddetonated claymores and
stiff resistance. B Canpany gets two squads on top of 937
but is forced to withdraw when C and D can not advance.
 concerted effort to seize Hill 937. B, C, and D COlqp4&tli88
were in the
attack' echelon, when heavy contact wm establtihed (See Sketch 33.
By lmHB ~mpanyreportedhavingtwo squadson topoftthe hill,
but B and C Companies had received heavy camzslties due ta comwnd
detoriated claymores and WWQunable ti advance snd the battalion
.
was forced to break: contact. Throughout the day Light Observation
Helicopters used a8 md-evaca were c&&xi in to evacu&e ain the
S~~OUS~WOIXI~~~ from a 8~~lllmdingson8onthe Adge dawnto the
attalionlSUii.llg zone* This mthod of shutttig the wounded wmrkai
g wall and drew much praise From the XMII on the ground. A rapid
cwnt on the battlefield r8su"t.d in forty-sevan NVA killed b 8ti
ams fire and twenty-nine killed by aJr Arikes. The 30187th lost
-*Y five killed and fifty-eight uourxied.
The other maneuver battalion8 involved in APACHESNOWcontimmd ti
accomplish their search and destroy missions in the area of operationa
encountering light enemy resistance. Many of the contacts were with
en- trail watchers and the rennants of the retreating Airborne
attack force.

!DI~ 34Wth, with A Coxtpanyrelieving C Coxnpw, continued its

drive along the ridges of Hill 937 on the morning of 15 May. As the
line companies maneuvered toward their cbJective tier heavy enaq
fire they discovered fourteen NVAbodies from the previous days'
contact. B md C &4mnies, once thag reached the U.ne of departure,

10
 4

15 MY A Companybroke out of the tree line and secured

the smallknollwhen BCcmpany cillhe under heavy fire, Thep
ARAships attmpting to suppress the enemy fire inadwrtent2y
hit the lead platoon of B Company.
fad clapmxes implaced.by the mew the night before. By l,300#
all conpanles were in extremely heavy contact ati Buffering cammlttfeb~
B Colppoxsy
requested an ARA &%ce to aupprsss the heavy enemy fire
to their front. AConpnywas on the right ofB Compe~lyw%thC
Companyapp~tuly 200 m&n-a to theleft when the ARAB)p1pIved
on'etation at U&OH. (Sue Sketch 4) Instead of cam& in from the
rear ofB Coqmny and fixxiing it8 taPget on the hi& the ARAship8
cane fbmttheright overnying ACco~aplutyanciraked theleadptitoon
of 3 Compeaywith rockets &owing the mmntum of tha attack. A
Companyat the sam t&n8 earn u&e heavy enepDTfim and at 163OH
the companisa had to withdraw waler heaoy'preame ta the landing
zone inorder im ev&xatethe wmmded. fater in the day thu battstlian
CodpostwaS hit bgtFpcround8umnding 8eoar~oftheparatmopePs.
Amongthose wounded ua8 the battalion conmar&r, LTC Honeputt, who
received RPGf?a@ent8 in the back* with one piece lodged clibse
to his apIne. He refused evacuation and mmeine;d in control and w8,8
able to contirnr8 hi8 &tie8 folbwing medic&l. aid zwistered fifiii

Rates of fire scperimced du.zzg the dq were extremly heav

and the enerqgskillfully employed commxi detonated claymres,
satchel charges, and grenades, which thny x&Led down the W-into
the advancing us fOrc98. &tilIl!%tO8 of the size of the eneqy force
rangedas high a8 aregQmnta2headquartera. Theenamy werewell
entrenched-occup@ng bunkers in concentric mw8 which afforded
 xmdmm utSUzation of the terrain avaUable. Sitilsrb thw me
wdl. trairzed, experts at concmalnmnt and carmuflage, hard to detect,
sndde~~ar9datrsmsndbusvolwnroit~~tar iire into advancing
11stZYIop8. It me 8U8pctsdthateMEqyreinfo~~t8 -robe*
brought
. into the contact zom contlmously because each day the
eneqy force had fresh haircuts, clean uniforBI8, and new weapoxla~
The intensive bunker to bunker fight of thd-l8?thleftlaom than
sixty-tuaNVA soldiers dead; A8 of iiha l%h, *ration flkcm mw
liasses,in terms of friw casualties were thirty-efght m killed
and 245 woumied.
Due to the heavy contact 1'-37thwas experiencing, the l+Cl6th Wa8
ordered tomovamrthwardtO linkup with 3-mh ami aupp~rt thsatb~~k
tin Dong Ap Bia with 3487th +c&ing as a block- force on thu northea&
id&& contact ~58 gtperienced & the l-506 on it8 IMUMUVB[C
into the
vicinity of Hill 937.
2+Olst, still on reconnaisssnce in force operations in the area
surrounding FB Airborne, encountered light enemy resistance in 6he force
of trail watchers, two to three men &rot438which continuil~ harassed
the lf%d 818IQkWIt8.Z3 Airbrne at 1%5H on ths 15th received six 82nm
mrtar rounds causing little damage, Micating that the NVA were still
very much interested in this.area.
Throughout the slight of 1516 Xsy elemmts of the 3-187th were
involved iI; mderata contact. At2J10HCCompaqyheardmmmsntout-
side of their perimt~ and responded with grenades until the mvement
.
12
ceased at 2330H. kter that night (~&lOrJ,) they begm receiving

grenades, satchel. charges, and SIII&~ 8rms ii.233 from probe8 on a fOy
sides of their night defensive position. A Spoo& (AC-47 flare ahip
with mini-guns) was requested and arrived on station working in

conjunction witF I a Snadow (Cl19 with aearcM&jht). AR-Agun tern

were also emloyed, workin* under the searcM.igh% throughout the rest
of the night. One rocket pass restited in three secondary exploatinse
The enema broke contact at 053OH and a first l&&t check of the area
~surraundine: their night defensive position revealed fourteen bodies
and mmy blood trzkti.
Dxbg the dav of 15 a5t 16 May, 3/l ARVNBattaUm continued
to exploit the cache area discovered on the l2th w& or" tiz Dut.
Added to the already imaressive list of captured item6 w8re ten
individual weapom, one 82am mortar tube, in addition TV Large
quantities of ammanittin and the graves of forty NVAsoILdims recerrtly
killed by air strikes,

Throughout the mwning of 16 May, l+%th maneuvered mrth to effect

Ux3'link up with the 3-187th lead3ng with the reconnaissance platoon
and followed lqy A and C Compmies. At 083OH A Cozqmm received RPG,
automatic weapons and mach.i.mgun f%re f'rom heavily fortified bunkers
in the vicinity of Hill 9.l6 (YC 3196), Artillery, gumhips, air
S~I%C~S and the battalions‘ orgadC weapons were t31@0yed to supprees
the ene@s fire, but as soon a.13the friendly fires let up the energy

13
 would re-engage the advancing troope. Contact was broken at lk35H
resulting in one U!3k-d and 88-n woumied. 3Blnaapr
lo8888 mre
one Mlled and one AK47 catiwBd. BCamp8nylaturinthum~
--
engamd one trafl watcher with small ama fire which broughod
..- Artillery and air strikeswure empl0p4
additional. enezqyfire.
kd contact wae broken at l335H resultinn in one IS kLLl.ed and
seven wunded with unknown ensmy restilt8.
Because of the heavy era- fire A, B, l-506th were haofng
difficulty getting into position for the attack on DOW!AP ?!%
and reported that they would probably not be in positiolr before
the morning of the 17th. Thr CS a,rtXLLer~ preparattin of the
h3ll. was then delayed tmtil the 17th in anticipation of the link
up of the two b&AxUons and the coordinated attack on Icibl 9%
Protective masks and *fl& jackets were drop& to both battalions
(1406th aid 3-237th). The flak jackets were reque8ted as a
preventative mmmre agaimt the increasing amunt of shrapnel
wounds of the chest, abdomen, and back regfom of the body.
Three companies of the 2-50lst continued on 16 May to conduct
reconnaissance irk force operations and saturation patrols in the
vicinit~ofF2 Airborne. The day’8 contacts resulted in one WA
killed*
‘Ihe l-506th began closing on HU.l 937 to the southwest of the
3-18'7th and began roving up the hill An the early morning. while
roving up they received twenty 82mn rumtar rounds all of which *acted
 out of the line of the advancing troops. To counter the engry'a
he& fire three air atrikes wwe placed on the high ground to the
1+06th% front. Throughout the morning they aqmiencEbd W&t
and sporadic contact which smp>eded
their movsrpentconsiderabu.

. At 0945Hthe 3487th qrienced radio interfereme on the comannd

net when a Vietnamese voice repeated “BlackJack, BlackJack” for
siwertrl minutes vem rapidly. U!C Honeycutt, whose call sip ia
W.ackjack,n answeredwithartilleryffreand the resulting qbsionrr
were heard over the net.
At 0955HIX Honeycutt wall evacuated by the Assistarat Division
ConmlAnder,Colonel Smith, to ':ave the shrapnel removed f+om his back.
Major CoUier amsum3 comand of tk,s 3-L87th as they moved into the
blocking positions they tJbUld occupy the hext morning in support of
the main attack by the l-50&h. Atl&&H~Corps Ccmmnder,
Ueutenant General StilweU arrived at the 3-18'7th's location to
receive a first hand briefInE on the situation on Dong Ap Bia.

The plan of attack on Mll B7 was formulated on 17 May. lQ.ements

of the 3-W&h -were roved to the west up to the high ground and wmld
support the attack from vicinity YC 323983 with 90x1, machinegun and
small arms fire, In addition there was to be a one minute art=-
preparation utilizing the 1051~~CS howitzer round (approximPtelg ZOO
roumis). The wind on the morning of the attack was ideal with the
flow 4x3the east, The CS preparation would be followed by fifteen
minutes of VT and HIEartillmy fire. At UOOHthe attack umild
comence with A, B, C/l+06 on line. At that time the artillerg

fire vmld be shifted to the east and Pink Teams, Air Cavalry
iieconnaissance forces consisting of one Huey gunship and one U&t
Observation Helicopter, would screen the area and & strikes w&id
.
beoncall. The attack was de&eyed u&U WH when it was learned
that SL elements were not in position.
As the elments began their attack the fkra they faced was intm8e.
Additional CS drops were &quested at WOH by the 1406th and placed
to the front of A cOmpanyqsposition to get the company across the line
of departure; the drops were :ompleted at l405H. At USOH an add.itiond
drop missed the target and as a result A Companywas still pinned down
andunable to mvee B and C Companies were nraneuver~~ to a883.h A

Company, but due ,to the intense fire the three companies were unable
to get to their objective,
Although the enemy possessed gas asks, the (23 attacks were
effective and caused them to leave their bunkers and wer5 thus exposed
targets to the attacking forces, At 155OHA Company, l-506th an&
gunships caught eight WA co-g out of their bunkers and killed a13,
eight,
Throughout the 17th ths 3487th remained in bbckfng positions on

the northeast of Dong Ap Bia support- the l-506th tith organic fires
snd in conjunction with th3 3d Drigade'a forward ati controller, directed

16
if-w Joined by the l-fK% Inf., 3-18'7 continues to t-7 and dis-
lodge the eneary.
 air strikes on the bunker co~lsxes to their front. The N’VAcontin#d4
pop*dviolet smokegenadesto confuse the forward air control d
pilots as thm cam in for their runs.
--
The 2-~l&,continued theti eearch and destroy mlssions to the
.-- north, and west,of P'BMrbqraa mvuntering bunkers and eque
.
caches. LU&le contact wase#perienced during$he l?th.
The 2/l ARVNBattalion SaarchSng an area southwest of FB Br&w
discovered four Rus+m
I ,,,,,,trucks,
~., five bulldozem, and 3,000 potis
..
. of TNT, 6ti Of,whiCh~m/Fe &m5yed.

By l&Y717# May the'tm bo"U.ions were in position aromd Dong

ap Bi.a zmd stsrted up the h5l.l.. (Sm Sketch 5) Two air strikes
..
~fomsa began their mve and six
mre put in as the attacking .I,
add%tionaJ.stx%.ky wm bc+p~sd.bg O@OHto art@preasthe ena~qyfire.
- ,.
1+0&h madeinitial &&act early ti the mtm%g with m unknown
size enen&'force on the southaide of the ridge and contact cmtinued
periodically throughout the day. Theeneraprdelivereda heavyvolw
,,..,1 ,.
of I@Gsnd small arms fire as ths attackIng forces tmplopd air
strikes, artillsry,~~~ md smallsmm fire.
._ At 0800Hartille~was registaredon~get;nith~5~honitzers
in position at F%Currahee. At O@OHa fifteen ndnute artil&y
preparatiun comuencsd. Whenthe artillery preparation was completed
three companies of the 10506th attacked from the south and three
. ..
companies of the 348'7th attacked &vxn the north.
 AtllOOH~Co~any,3-U??th, ulth AComMgron its rl@tw,
madeinitial contactbpkiJ.Uagtwo IWL AtlI32H D&qmnyww

d;irecQ to their f'wnt ftiing RFG'a ux! wto~Micweapns, Atl2OOH

DCompanyComuunderwassewwelynowxMandbp1225HDCo~

had depleted their r&ourcss=&both~man ti amanitlinn. .D Coqrtljr

ai this tim hsd a totAloff~t+sevol~'who us~?ecrbbto fight.
In order to evacuate the wwxied and dead the 3487th had to withdrm
from the crest of tL hill tc 5Le I- 55on0. The 4bne drry tlm

2+06th was alerted'and ,dq&&$to FB Bliim for a possible combat

,,.
assault ix&o $he 8~8~ ta'&einior+ths .j-ltih. At 1645H A h-any,

2+0&h was co&at assaulted Into tha area to rsinforco the belaagpmed
187th. The remainder of the 2-506th was to stay at FB Blaze and on
the Zest wuld assumeresponsibU.%ty for Airborne.
At 17OOHthe I-506ti was still in contact and still advancirq,
fighting frombunker to bwker. At POOHthesgwithdrewand wtablished
tbir night defens$,~ pocrition jwt b&w the cmiet of the hill.
In the evening of18 Mayagresroent between fiieutenant General
Stilwell,&jorGeneral. ZaiaandGeneral Troungthelst ARVNDivision
Comder was madeto e@q the 2/3 ARVNBattalion to assist the 3d
Brigade. The battalion was to be picked up the folloti,ag day at &e
and heXLifted to FB Currahee (Ssp,,M~p). They wu~3.d then combat
aaa&,t into a landing Bone east of ting Ap Bit ti attack we& tzp
the'%mg Ap BLa rid@~
iL5Laz
me 2J3 m43Battallonm~edbyCW7 atlW@OHProm~e~ rz/pz
at FB c+lrrahee. Fmdu,mih~the~battaltanwa~ air a-d-at
,1305Hinto a two ship landing cone vicinity XC 3a97p arid begain
adva&ngup theridgeto anattackpos%tionap~tefy %)&es
from the crestc
Following the IX$?~of the Z/3 ARVMBatMUon three &ompdeS hwec
the 2dBatt&Liun, SOlst &fan&rywere extracted FromaPZ invicinitf
ofFB Airborne and asisauZted Ltrr a IandIng son8 vicinity Yc 333997
.
for the pwpose. of r&nfoxying the attack on Dong Ap Bla. Their
extracttin MM ddsgacll due.6 a downed sW,p on the pick up %oneat
O$?XIH,but by 1515H the air a&s&t we coapl&d. From the Ww
zone the three Tppcoqmnies were to move to thati attarlck- position
tidn.ity PC 3329920
The l-506th encountered heavy enemy I3.m daring the day as thq
pme;restssd up the hill. to their attack posittin~ Air strikes were)
called in again and a&n on the etl[lzIp1p%
IacationB in addition 4x1
a.rtUerg barngem. The 3-187 roving timthe north encou&~~ed no
en- reaist&nce. Q late af'termon the three forces had discovered
numerous en- bodies in bunkers that had been coU.apaed by air strikea.
The l+Obth moving north emcountered bunker complexes as they
continued up the hiU i'ighting f'rom bunker to bunkur. C Camp-

19
 1 A 99
1

.
l* \

I 1 \{ 98
/ I I

ZQ WY Four battalions attack Hill 93'7. 3-187 reaches top of hi.33

at lU5 Ho
work&?? In conjunction Keith A Collqporr;g
uure faced with the pmblm

dark when the contact tapered off. At the t+m&ation of the contao%
A and C Conqmnieswere only 2OO'mstars fkom the crest of the hill
tithBCompanysUghtly belowthem.
The ARIRJBattalions- 4/land 2/l-maneuvering in zone encourxterad
mderate enemy contact tith u&mwn size 0neq forcea. Contact lasted
for a short period of time th .n terminated.

bite in the 111y)rning(UXXIH) of 20 May, following an artlf

preparation, the four battalions executed a coordinated ass&.t on
I-&L!. 937 (See Sketch 6).
3r167
At XLOOH343'7th with A Coq~anyon the right, C &-any in the
center and attached A Company, Z+506th on the left, named southeast
for a coordinated attack on the HZU when they received concentrated
RPGand smallamm fire. The attacking elemmts returned the fire
with organic weqxms and continued to fire and maneuver up the h3.l.l.
As the elements approached the crest they aLgaincam under heav
mallarnm fire fiomthe west andRPGand mall arms fire fmnthe
south, inadditionto CS gas (it was laterdetemrdnedthatthe gas
was erra& friendly 4.Omngas gm~&es). The attacking elements al" the
 %l@?th mturned the fire with organic weaponsand srqibyad art-#
ARA, and gunships on the suspected enemylocation (XC 324997) and
continued with A Cbqmny, 3-lIyI rsaching ths top of Hill 97 fh&t
at U5H. The attacw fon=e received addItional. Fire as the mw
attqted ts cover its withdrawal to the tiouthuest Into the 1406th
.
locations. Th8 dlmnts continued to return smdl arms fire and
.
anrpl~yedARA,artfusacg~ and gu&Wpsonthe retreatingmemqgt The
contact terminated at 16WH and a'aweep of the area revealed seventy-
eight WA ki3bd and one prisoner of wzar*
Throughout the day- 3-3.mth company conmu&rs noted-the noise
level was so great that they p xZd not ascertain if friendly artill-

was be- em&&, the crack of small. arm fire dmwned out w
other sounds~ The tibility to use radios due to the noise level
made it imperative that mbessangersb8 used tS relay mgsaagesmd
directims to the forward efements, In addition varfous colored
sake grenadesugredatonatedbytheNVAmaking it estbreme~
difficult to place effective air strikes on the desired targets, and
to control. friendly fires.
l-506
At 1055H A and C cbmpanies, l-506 roved north to assault the h5.U
and encountered heavy eneqy resistance. F;lameats continued to receive
small arms, FPG, and xmrtaz fire from the same location throughout
the day. The coqmniss invalved ret-urned sma.liarms iire and employed
ARA, artiUary and gunships for support on suspected enemy locations.
9..
Contact terminated at approldmately l&OH, but the attacklng elmmts
continued to receive sporadic fire throughaut the night. A ~wddp of

the ar8a revealed eight NVA MXbd.

B Company, i-506 continued to attack the hill from its position
on the left of A and C, and encountered heavy resietame while mom
north toward the hill. TO counter the eneqyymallarm~~ m, and
mrtar ffre they employed air s‘upport on the suspected eneq locaU.ons
with B company lxing between the enemy and the titian Border.
2-501
A, B, and C Companies of the 2-501st while moving southwest up
Hill 9.37 encountered no ene--, ~~r3sistance. As the alaments Contimred t0
mve they discovered meroue huts and bunker complexes vacated by the
retreatina enemy,

At 0'715H the 2/3 ARFNBattBUOn WfiiIe roving northeast for the

coordinated attack on Full 4r37 encountered ught enmqv resistance and
discovered moderate sized caches of assorted amunitiOn, in addition
to a six foot dd8 road with a power cable which they followed to
their objective. Continti to advance toward the top of the hUl
th8y received concentrated sti arms fire and etaployed air amk,
artillery support to destroy the enem location. Contact terminated
at approXimat8~ 16OOHand a sweep of the area was made revem
six N'VAlxxiies and W-66 AIt-47'~.
Rudina the day PSYOPmissions were conducted in the vicinity of

22
 Dong AD Bia entreating the ensmqptn ,&ve up and live or be destrom.
To txdng out what pressure the defarriers of Dong Ap Bia wore under,
several shirts were captured&h sign8 sewn on themd~ding~ "u
heriama, lKll the Vietnamme, "and "Stayai~Fightand&t6hol."

. A8 the attacking elements maneuveredup the hill they encountered

W~pl?~aNdpOSitionS. The nmcrl bunker8 the encountered ware
4x4 foot with 8-16 inches of over head cover, aml were constrtlcted of
rrod and tige, tiing port8 to the front and 8upplemntary fo%o%es to
athe side& The Urger bunkers were 8xlOx5 foot tithaae foot of
overheadcover andwere similarly conskuctedof sod and tige. Them
larger bunker8 appeared to hve been slm!@.a& area8 with the fi&ting
poaitiontothe front. Qneveryuniqua feature ofthebunkera
discovered on bpng Ap Bia ~88 their tent like constmtion, forming
an tire&y sting fighting position (se Sketch).

The coordinated four battalion assault on 20 May resulted in the

succesaf&l seinrre of Dong Ap Bia and rendered the 29th WA &g-at
co&at ineffective. A r?ystematic search and destruction of the bunker

comlex wadlUitiated on 21 &w, while pursuit operations wre

Launched by the 247th Cavalry Squadron followed tith a ground pursuit
by the 2-501. The 2+Olst mcountared extensive bunker coxxplaxea
in the vicinity PC 32% which it meticulously searched and destroyed
wfiih xwing on a !sniktipfAl p&~toor, axea west to the kotim &>rdero
The l-%&h continued to encou~&er pockets of resistance of platoon

23
 size elenente in hew!& fortified bunker positions almg the aeutb

ridgea of &mg Ap Bia which uwe Alted tith orepnic W-M*

airandartillerymrp~rt. Tboughout the Zlut, 1-506ul accom-
for forty-alx NVA kSiied in these small u&t actimu.

2/3 ARm Battalbn made a detaIled march of the high cp'o\eri lpllf th8
.
ridges to the saet of Dong Ap MA. At the sad’of the day tm bed
accounted for tuenty-n.Ine NVAk%lled.
The 3487th wae -acted From the Northern A S'~ILUvd.w OsLd
inrsertedatFB3lazswheretbybscaas~ to the 2dBrlgade.
FoUotig a short respite at FB Blase the battalion urn wed on
standdown statur, and ite eILlrrrPta wentto &@a Beach for Rest
and Recooperation.
The 20506th deplopai from the la&nds to the msntains of the
northern A&au Talky in placsofthe 3-16'7th. AandBCoq&s
con&bd thek aba~ve to p8 Abbome tiththe mat af the
Bdalion to be depkmed the foUm&?uz d8y.
The DOIIR Ap Bia operation cost the enemya total of 630 8oldiars
killed. In addition to them cunfirmd ca8ualtie8, a priacmw of
WJUcaptured duriag ths operation Micated thaf E#$ of the amkta
in hi8 unit ware camaltles.

On 22 May tha 1-50&h continued to systematically search and destroy

the bunker coml.exea of Dorm Ap Bia and ad,jace& (upea~~in addition to
destroyinR pcifnts of resMamce am.iLiaccounting for fifty-four mew
killed. The 2-506th deployed hrom F’EIBlue to FB AMDOXTW-B ww),
C (I.l26H), B (l455H)-and contimred bmrch md daatregr Operati6n8
in ilh d&?ectiona aromd FB Atrborns mcountrring a largs en-

base cppp area.

The 2+Olat contimed ground pur8td.t operati&a against the

retreatinp enemyforce8 , follming the 2-l%! cavalry Squadron’8
pW8l.lit. While on the pursuit keet to the &&Len Border the battalion
continued to asarch the exte&ive bunker eonqprsrXvfcmty m 329
that wm discovered the prevzbus day.
The 2/3 ARVNBattalion ~9 given the task of searching and destr@M
enemy in the area bounded by mxdinatss ]II: 3399, 3599, 3595, Bled339%
While patro&g the area they discovered a large ammanition and uW@onS
cache which they evactitsd.

23
&I a &y 6dwlUnit8 COIItjaaed lNi88iDn8 in their re8pective area8
of operation. l-%&h continued it8 Search arxi destroy operation8
ofths of bng Ap Bia and e;ijacentareas,
bunker COBl&BXeS silencing
pocket8 of resietance and discovering tan additional WA bodies.
They also found treea with the bark stripped off and inscriptions
written with IXU@Cmarkers telling the NVA eoXdi~a to "stay and .
figM, this is a good place to fight fro110 2-506th, which was
conducting reconnaiamnce in force operationa and saturation pstroti
in the vicinity of FE!Airbme, ~encountered light enenprresistmce
composed of two to three NVA sold&ers in gmups in addition to a bunker

25
 complex and mlscrollaneous equipment. 2-j0lst continued the3.r ptreait
wwst'to the LBbtlan Bcmier sti continued to search and dezrtrafred IUI

&ene,iw btmker complex discovered two duye prariou&y f-g

additional NVI bodies. The 2/3 ARVNB&&i.igxz continusd raeonnais8mm
Jn force operatiolrs in their arm of operattin concmtratw olb the
south central port&m of the A 3v Valley. USC, ap1the 2% the
4/X UW Battalion diecovered forty huts containing four &ma
mrbr tubee, one -2 lamchar, one -7 ~uN~?x!@,and em’
1 MYAkilled Iqy air:etri.k&.

On 24 Hay opqratAons corL.nued a8 3n the pravloue dry wl.th si.&.fi-

Bia and diecovered by l-506th of fifty-ot~~~ individual ueapone. 2-5;om

continued PUPSuit of th8 ensaprwest to the I&Mm Border tumiw
north along the bord& and then back to the east.

25
Operations on 25 My continued with Uttle change from the pretriou8
day. BCompany, 2-5OlSt Xnfantrybwame involved at lzG5Htith an
edmhd enemy squad while on reconnaiesa,nce in force operatime
. near the ;taotian Border. The contsct continued throughout the day
with mndl ar~ps, artilbry, and gunsMps add% support, re8ultkrg
InoneN'VAkiUed.

26
The misstin of the three infan- battalions continued without change

26
 on 26 Ma;pwith prepsration being mrde for redirection of rsconnai88~
in force and eearch and deatroy operationa. 1+06th nab to be prSprr&
to conductreconnaia8ance ti force oper&Aonr to the east to loe8temd
a*
. destroy enemyforCab, b&868 and cazhe8 ti the tic%.nity of Pa h (2)
_-
I (Yc 361973) and Pa Du (1) (rC 394966). The 2-5Olat wae ilso alerted
to redirect their reconnaiseanca in force operationa to thanorthand
esat in the ticinity of Ale Ninh (2) (YD 323013) and Ale II& (1)
(YD 344003). The 2/3 AEm B&ttalion w&e 8~~ alerted and w&8
tci bepreparedto ConduCtreConnai88aIIco in forCeoperation 8outhweat
fa r=&U 996 (PC 314948) and conduct a detailed aearch of the area0
Opar&ione continued unt?Z 7 JUIMD,but the NVA forces were no lomger
bhreeted in mabtablngootiact. wrcrdic anrgagaarsntawith &
e
~0~8Wk8t~~@8iturrtidn. On7 June the forceewera reoriented
- towards the east and %er&ion APACHE SNOW
~88 tezarinated. The
combined Allv!l axxi u% etatietice were 898 en- kIlled, four prisonsa.
of war, 560 individualweapona and J&2 crew-served weapon8captured.
Operation APACHESNOWuse directed toward defeating the North
Vietnamese w in the Northern A shsu Valley. Through intenee
close-in fighting the 103.8t Airborne troopere contributed another
gallant v%ztory to the Vietnamsae War effort & almost coqAetely
eUminatingoneNorth Vietname8e RegAmntanci puttingtheVsllay
.
under Free World control for the firat tinm since 1965. Though APACHE
SNOW
is over the lolat Airborne Division continues their aggreaaivu
.
-hitting attack to return contrcaJ of Thus Thien Province to the

27
 hpulilAc of Vietamm~

..-
.

.
, .

.
.*

.
-

.. ;?
.’ i

.;.
/’
,, .’
: ?
,.+

-. ,’
I. ; ,
c
,

--..“.- -.I _... .-.:,

- ‘.- ‘I- -‘ ”

i 0
-- .-
--. _

--.- - L___.w -_
.

P
.,,. \
 - . -‘. --.- __. _

r’-
,I
_A--

i
c- - 1

_-- y
-
,
Operation Apache Snow, Report Extract, 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1969
 238 kxmm~issa~ce. For every combat assault, provisions must be
mado to permit the AMC and his key persorxnef to make visual recowiss~c~
of prepared 12 * s and routes, Simj&rly the hlc and MT% a, wkth
designated assL%x&s, must make a join% reconnaissance cf Ut s to enswe
rm;itua3, understanding and agreement as to theix exact locatior! and user
IV

j.
k.
-~Y*u\rY WA. J+J” --- -- yy* .-.--“.I -Jr-- -

UNCLASS1FIED
en,c;urctttjr~apa ara divided tito ACL mups far aacOaabrrafi, fat each
 UNCLASSlFiED

UNCLASSlFlED