Pakistan - Politics

Military Coup: Pervez Musharraf

On 14 October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf, Army Chief of Staff, declared a state of
emergency and issued the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO), which suspended the
federal and provincial Parliaments, held the Constitution in abeyance, and designated
Musharraf as Chief Executive. Following the 12 October 1999 ouster of the government
of Prime Minister Sharif, the military-led government stated its intention to restructure
the political and electoral systems. Musharraf officially became head of the Pakistani
state on 20 June 2001.

Musharraf's takeover was unconstitutional, but there was silent approval by the majority
of Pakistanis at the time. The Pakistani people believed the Army would bring sweeping
changes to Pakistan by restoring the country's international image, eliminating
widespread corruption, stabilizing the security situation, and providing jobs and hope to
the general population. After 3 years of General Musharraf's rule, public enchantment
with the Army had waned.

The 1999 coup was not the first attempt by the military to intervene in the chaotic
political situation during the 1980s and 1990s. Musharraf's first blatant attempt to hang
onto power was on 30 April 2002, when he held a referendum to confirm himself as
president for the next 5 years. The government claimed a 60 percent turnout in which 97
percent of voters approved of Musharraf remaining as president. The press, international
monitoring groups, human rights organizations, and all domestic political parties accused
the government of electoral fraud. Independent observers put the turnout at between 10
and 20 percent.

Seeking to ease international concern about the nature of his regime and rise to power,
Musharraf sought to put Nawaz Sharif, and six others, on trial for attempted murder and
hijacking in relation to the October coup. The charges were centered around the
allegation that Sharif had ordered landing rights denied to a plane carrying Musharraf and
200 other people, said to have been dangerously low on fuel. Military forces eventually
took control of the Karachi airport and allowed the plane to land, an event followed just
hours later by the completion of the coup. The charges also alleged that Sharif had
attempt to collect men and arms in preparation for a counter coup and had sought to kill
Musharraf. Sharif was convicted in April 2000 and sentenced to life in prison. By May he
was put on trial again by the Musharraf government on charges of corruption. In July he
was convicted on charges of tax evasion. Sharif's legal defense team boycotted these
trails on numerous occasions in protest of the fairness of the proceedings. In December
2000, Sharif went into self-imposed exile in Saudi Arabia.

General Musharraf banned Sunni militants Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and its Shiite counterpart
Sipah-e-Mohammad in August 2001. After the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
were attacked on September 11, 2001, Musharraf pledged complete cooperation with the
United States in the war on terror, which included locating and shutting down terrorist
training camps within Pakistan's borders, cracking down on extremist groups and
withdrawing support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

In January 2002, he banned four more groups, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Tehrik-e-Jafaria

Pakistan, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi. The
latter was banned for "misleading thousands of simple poor people into Afghanistan and
being responsible for their massacre." The banned groups were reorganized under new
names. The Jamaiat-ud-Dawa (JuD) was the rechristened version of Lashkar-e-Taiba.
The banned Tehrik-e Jafaria Pakistan had renamed itself Tehrik-e-Islami, Masood
Azhar's Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) had resumed working as Khudam-ul-Islam and Al
Furqan. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, led by the slain Azam Tariq, was reincarnated as
Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan. The Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irsahd subsequently operated as the
Jamaat-ad-Dawa.

2002 Elections

New general parliamentary and provincial elections were held on 10 October 2002. A
total of 72 parties were registered to contest, but strict rules had been decided upon in
advance which barred the former democratically elected Prime Ministers to take part,
whereas their parties were allowed to participate. Final results to the National Assembly
elections:

• Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam), PML (Q) – 117 (led by Mian Mohd.
Azhar)
• Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians, PPPP – 81 (led by Benazir Bhutto)
• Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, MMA – 60
• Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), PML (N) – 19 (led by Nawaz Sharif)
• Muttahida Qaumi Movement, MQM – 17 (led by Altaf Hussain)
• National Alliance, NA – 16 (led by Imtiaz Sheikh)
• Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) – 5
• Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo) – 3
• Pakistan Peoples Party (Sherpao) – 2
• Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf – 1
• Pakistan Awami Tehrik – 1
• Pakistan Muslim League (Zia) – 1
• Balochistan National Party – 1
• Jamhoori Watan Party – 1
• MQM(H) – 1
• PSPP – 1
• Independent candidates – 15

The PML-Q, also called the "king's party" due to its perceived pro-military bent, won 118
of the total 342 seats, mostly from Punjab. The affiliated National Alliance won 16 seats.
This gave the pro-Musharraf parties a plurality in the National Assembly, but not a
majority. As expected, the PPP did well in Sindh, but was unable to form a working
coalition in that province's legislature. The PML-N suffered huge losses, winning only 19
national seats, all of them in Punjab. The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) did well
in Sindh's provincial elections. The MQM collected only a small percentage of the
national vote (winning 17 national seats), and aligned itself with the PML-Q. Small
parties and independents account for the remaining 31 seats. The previously influential
Awami National Party was shut out at the national level.

The the pro-military Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the Pakistan People's Party
(PPP) had been the prominent national political parties, while the Muttahid Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA), an umbrella group of six religious parties, including the Jamaat-I-Islami,
Pakistan's oldest religious party, gained significant influence during the 2002 election.
Other parties with a strong regional, ethnic, or religious base include the Muttahida
Qaumi Movement (MQM). After the elections held in late 2002, the Pakistani political
system remained highly fragmented, with no group winning a substantial majority of
seats in the legislature, and religious groups banding together in the MMA to earn a very
significant portion of seats for the first time.

In November 2002 Pakistan's National Assembly elected Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali as
the country's first civilian prime minister since the 1999 military coup. The 58-year-old
Pakistani leader was from the southwestern province of Balochistan. He won 172 votes
out of 328, defeating candidates from an Islamic alliance and the party of exiled former
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. For almost five weeks after the general election, Mr.
Jamali's party held several rounds of talks with the alliance of Islamic parties, the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, to form a coalition. The negotiations broke down over
differences over President Musharraf's constitutional amendments, which allow him to
stay in office for five more years. The amendments also gave the president power to
dismiss the elected government. Prime Minister Jamali's party accepted these changes,
saying they were needed to ensure a stable democratic system in Pakistan.

The multi-party Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD), which was made up of
liberal politicians of the PPP and the PML (N), included the political party of former
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto PPP, which emerged as the second largest party in
Parliament.

The Legal Framework Order and Renewed Political Crisis

In late 2003 Pakistan's year-long political crisis came to an end with a landmark
agreement between the ruling party and the opposition over controversial constitutional
amendments introduced by President Pervez Musharraf. The deal came following a year
of negotiations and debate between the pro-Musharraf ruling party and the leading
opposition alliance of religious groups, the Mutahidda Majlis-e Amal. In exchange for the
president's promise to quit his military post, the MMA agreed to support a series of
constitutional changes that give sweeping powers to the office of the president. However,
the opposition refused to recognize the amendments unless they were approved in the
legislature by a two-thirds majority, as called for in the constitution. The political scene
had been tense throughout most of 2003, which saw protests by lawmakers in the
Pakistani parliament on more than one occasion and the arrest of opposition leader Javed
Hashimi in October.

On 29 December 2003 the National Assembly passed the 17th Constitutional

Amendment Bill, the Legal Framework Order (LFO), with a two-thirds majority, giving
sweeping powers to President General Pervez Musharraf and validating the military
takeover of 12 October 1999, and all subsequent acts of the military government. Two
hundred and forty-eight members voted in favor of the bill and no vote cast against the
amendments as the PPPP, PML-N and other opposition parties boycotted the vote. The
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was the only opposition party that supported the
government to further amend the Constitution. General Musharraf publicly pledged to
quit as army chief by December 2004. Musharraf would remain president after removing
his military uniform. He would then have to take vote of confidence from the National
Assembly, Senate and four provincial assemblies within one month of giving up his
military authority. Musharraf secured this political victory by striking a deal with six
hard-line Islamic parties. In exchange for his pledge to step down as head of the Army in
2004, he received a promise from the parties to support the ratification of constitutional
amendments. The passage of the LFO was followed by an assassination attempt in which
Musharraf narrowly escaped.

Pakistan significantly increased its military operations and pacification efforts in tribal
areas along the Afghanistan border in 2004. These operations affected al-Qaida, Taliban,
and other threat groups by disrupting safe-havens and, in some cases, forcing them back
into Afghanistan where they were vulnerable to operations conducted by the coalition of
nations of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Pakistan also secured
agreements with several tribes by successfully balancing military action with negotiations
and rewards to encourage cooperation and limit domestic backlash. Pakistan looked to
maintain and expand these operations in order to permanently disrupt insurgent and
terrorist activity.

By early 2004 Pakistan seemed on the verge of political destabilization. Islamic radicals
were seeking to overthrow Musharraf's regime for some time, but the beginning of the
US driven Global War on Terror created further tension. Musharraf supported the United
States' operation against the Taliban in Afghanistan. He also took steps to reach another
reconciliation with India in the conflict over Kashmir, inciting the ire of Kashmiri
militants, many of whom have been widely believed to be funded, directly or indirectly
by the Pakistani intelligence services. Musharraf was also been helpful in the Americans'
search for Osama Bin Laden and other al Qaida leaders said to be hiding in northern
Pakistan. He was ruling a country in which over much of the population hated America,
though whether that was a product of his support for US policy or US support for
Pakistani government policy has been unclear. However, the General and the largely
secular army command have been serious obstacles to Pakistan sliding into what many
have feared would become a regime as fanatical as that of Afghanistan's Taliban or Iran's
Mullahs. It is hard to imagine what would happen if Islamic radicals prevailed in
Pakistan.
The Pakistani political establishment was rocked by the nuclear proliferation scandal of
Abdul Qadeer Khan (more often referred to as a A.Q. Khan) during the early months of
2004. A.Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, had achieved an almost heroic
status in Pakistan. His popularity among almost all level of society and the state of the
regime ultimately led to the official pardon by President Musharraf in February 2004
following Khan's admission to transferring nuclear secrets to states like North Korea.

In July 2004 Pakistan's Prime Minister designate Shaukat Aziz survived a suicide attack
aimed at him by al Qaida militants. Aziz would go on to win two by-elections in August
paving the way to his assumption of the role of Prime Minister. Aziz had been
Musharraf's Minister of Finance, and his assumption of the role of Prime Minister was
aimed at attempting to focus energy on Pakistan's troubled economy. At the end of
August Aziz became Prime Minister of Pakistan.

In another move to stabilize the political situation, the pro-Musharraf ruling party pushed
a bill through parliament in November 2004 to allow the military leader to retain both
portfolios until 2007, when new elections were due. Thus on 30 December 2004
Musharraf formally declared that he would retain the army chief's post, breaking his
public pledge that he would give up his uniform by the end of the year. In a televised
address to the nation, President Musharraf asserted that to give up his military uniform at
the time would undermine Pakistan's political and economic stability. Musharraf said that
lawmakers of the opposition MMA had not kept their promise to avoid what he called
politics of confrontation. The MMA and other political parties strongly criticized
President Musharraf for breaking his promise.

The Pakistani government attempted during the early months of 2005 to try and show that
it was independent of its US supporters. In January it lodged an official protest over
incursions by US forces into border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, issuing
statements in February that US forces would not be allowed into the regions, that
providing security and counter-terrorism operations in these regions would be a matter
for Pakistani security forces

In April 2005, after reports suggesting a partial thaw with former prime minister's in exile
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the husband of Benazir Bhutto was arrested reentering
Pakistan. This particular arrest was one of a number labeled as a serious crackdown on
the political opposition during the month. Protests came not only from political and
religious moderates, but also from religious extremists and their political entities, who
continued to challenge Musharraf's alliance with the United States and policies against
Islamic oriented militants in Pakistan's tribal border regions. Political opponents were
incensed at reports in May 2005 that Musharraf was contemplating staying in power after
his term came up in 2007.

In October 2005 an earthquake in Pakistan killed over 80,000 people in the country's
north. It provided a brief respite for the embattled regime of Pervez Musharraf as various
political entities banded together to tackle the humanitarian implications of the disaster.
The disaster affected relationships between various militant groups and the Pakistani
government and contributed to one of what had been a number of Indo-Pakistani thaws
over Kashimir, despite Musharraf's assertion earlier in the year that government policy on
the disputed territory remained the same. The positive outcomes of the disaster were short
lived as spurts of violence between the government and militants continued by the end of
the year and into 2006.

In January 2006 Interpol issued fresh warrants, called "Red Notices" on behalf of the
Pakistani government for the arrest of Benazir Bhutto and her husband, who had been
arrested while in Pakistan in 2005. Bhutto denounced the charges as politically motivated
and an attempt to divert attention from Pakistani policies and an errant US air strike into
Pakistan that had claimed the lives of a number of innocent civilians. 2006 also saw a
major clampdown on militants and political elements pushing for independence or greater
autonomy for ethnic Balochis and the Pakistani province of Balochistan. On 26 August
2006 the primary leader of the movements for greater Baloch independence, Nawab
Akbar Khan Bugti, was killed by Pakistani security forces triggering massive protests,
riots, and other violence, subsequently followed by an equally harsh response from
government forces. Those many believed Musharraf to have personally ordered the attack
that killed him, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz publicly denied such claims suggesting that
the killing had been accidental, the results of nearby fighting.

A move in a different direction came when President Musharraf signed a peace deal with
tribal leaders to bring pressure to Taliban militants in Northern Pakistan. The deal was
much criticized by his Western allies, and even some in his own government, who
doubted whether the tribal leaders would hold their end of the bargain, and whether
essentially buying off his opponents was a viable strategy. Musharraf staunchly defended
the proposal in the face of rising Taliban linked violence in provinces like Waziristan,
coming just years after he declared the Taliban in these regions to have been eliminated.

2007: Year of Change

The year 2007 brought a massive political crisis to Pakistan. Rooted in President
Musharraf's initial idea of stepping down in 2007 and his subsequent plans to stand in the
long proposed 2007 elections, political crisis rapidly built up. Perhaps the most serious
inciting incident came on 9 March 2007, when Musharraf suspended Iftikhar Chaudhry,
Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court, who had largely been expected to rule that
it would be illegal for Musharraf to stand in the upcoming elections. Suited lawyers and
other took the streets in protest, leading to violent confrontations with Pakistani police
and paramilitary forces. Protests continued for months, while Musharraf attempted to tout
Pakistan's record in counter-terrorism operations as an indication of the success of his
leadership. That these claims had been called into question publicly by high ranking US
military personnel in the region did little to help Musharraf's case.

By May 2006 Pakistani security forces had been issued a shoot on sight order in Karachi
in response to political violence there, showing the magnitude of the crisis. In June the
Army was reported as coming out in favor of Musharraf, a reality seen as key to his
immediate political survival. Musharraf caved to popular opinion in July, reinstating
Chaudhry, but soon found himself embroiled in another domestic crisis. Radical Islamic
opponents of his regime had taken control of a Mosque Islamabad, and for a time held
hostages, before releasing them. The subsequent military operation in which most of the
militants were killed, was condemned as a use of excessive force, especially in the face of
the facts that many of hostages had already been released.

As the year came to a close even more dramatic changes began to occur. The
reinstatement of Chaudhry led the judicial system to defy President Musharraf and order
the release of Javed Hashimi, who had been held since 2003. Even more daunting was the
return in August 2007 of Nawaz Sharif to Pakistan, with Benazir Bhutto suggesting that
she too would likely be returning to contest elections. Sharif's supporters rallied around
him and were influential in preventing his immediate arrest as had been threatened by
Pakistani authorities. Musharraf attempted to strike a deal with Benazir Bhutto while she
was still in exile to no avail, but did succeed in being cleared to run in the upcoming
election. In November 2007 Musharraf attempting to control the political situation
imposed an period of Emergency Rule, giving himself various authorities and putting
Benazir Bhutto, who had returned as she planned at the end of October, under house
arrest. The restrictions on her travel were lifted, only to be reinstated again before the end
of November.

Until 2007, two of the country's major politicians, former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto
and Nawaz Sharif, were in self-imposed exile in the Middle East, both wanted by the
government of Pervez Musharraf on charges of corruption. Bhutto's People's Party of
Pakistan (PPP), under the banner of the People's Party of Pakistan Parliamentarians
(PPPP), and Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) [PML (N)] were contesting
elections and hope to draw upon residual support for the exiled leaders. While the
Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) did not have nationwide support base, it remained a
major political force in the urban Sindh areas. Besides the PPPP and PML (N), key
national level players include the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) [PML (Q)], a
breakaway faction of the original PML, which acquired the label of the "King’s Party"
due to its strong government backing, the Grand National Alliance, a coalition of regional
parties and senior politicians supported by the government, and the Muttahid Majlis-e-
Amal (MMA), an alliance of first 4 and later 6 major religious parties that recently
received some government support to counter the influence of the PPPP. The Tehrik-i-
Insaf, led by Imran Khan, has received considerable publicity, but continued to be
considered less than a national-level force.

Indigenous and international terrorist groups continually pledged to assassinate

Musharraf and other senior Pakistan government officials and remained a significant
threat. International and indigenous terrorist groups continued to pose a high threat to
senior Pakistani government officials, military officers and US interests. The Prime
Minister and a corps commander were the targets of assassination attempts dating to the
summer of 2003. President Musharraf remains at high risk of assassination, although no
known attempts on his life occurred after the attacks in December 2003. Investigations
into the two December 2003 attempts revealed complicity among junior officers and
enlisted personnel in the Pakistani Army and Air Force. If Musharraf were to be
assassinated or otherwise replaced, Pakistan's it was highly expected that the new leader
would be less pro-US. It was also predicted that extremist Islamic politicians would gain
greater influence.

Musharraf survived final challenges to his stand for election by finally following through
on his promise to give up his military authority. He was sworn in as the civilian president
of Pakistan in November 2007. He lifted his Emergency Rule provision in December
2007, and all seemed on track for the election.

On 27 December 2007 Benazir Bhutto was assassinated during a political rally. Her death
drew international condemnation and various accusations and questions both inside and
outside Pakistan as to the perpetrators and any complicity on the part of Pakistani security
forces. No link was substantiated to the Pakistani government and elections were delayed
until February from January. Musharraf vowed to apprehend the killers, a statement that
drew some residual criticism as insincere.

2008 Elections

The elections in February went along as planned and the Pakistani Parliament became
filled with members of the opposition parties. Their success was in spite claims by
independent observers from the United States and Europe that pro-Musharraf parties
likely had serious benefits in terms of media exposure and permission to hold political
rallies, suggesting serious dissatisfaction with the government of Pervez Musharraf.
Musharraf called upon his opponents to form a coalition with his party, calls which were
summarily rejected. The PPP, led by the late Benazir Bhutto's widower Asif Ali Zardari,
looked to form a political alliance with Islamic parties who had fared poorly, despite
fears that anti-Musharraf sentiment would promote Islamic radicalism in government.

In March 2008, Raza Gilani, a Benazir Bhutto look-a-like from the PPP was sworn in as
Prime Minister. The Pakistani government at the time, led by a coalition of anti-
Musharraf parties, politically moderate by Pakistani standard, was engaged primarily in
discussions how to proceed with dealing with concerns in the tribal regions, the Taliban
and other militant organizations, the future of US-Pakistani relations, and perhaps most
importantly the fate of Musharraf. Reports in May 2008 suggested he was attempting to
contact opposition politicians to strike an agreement that would allow him to continue as
President but in a diminished capacity. The United States government continually
reiterated that it intended to work to continue its regional policy goals with any Pakistani
administration following the 2008 elections results, a major shift in rhetoric that had
traditionally been strongly in favor of a continuation of the administration of Musharraf.

On 12 May 2008, Nawaz Sharif announced that the PML-N was leaving the government
headed by the PPP, because of differences over the handling of supreme court justices
sacked by President Musharraf during 2007. Sharif and PML-N advocated for the
reinstatement of the justices with their previously held powers, while the PPP had been
advocating a compromise between various political groups that would see their return,
but with less authority than they had previously.
On 18 August 2008, under domestic political pressure from Pakistan's coalition
government, Musharraf resigned from the presidency -- marking the end of an era.
Musharraf, who seized control of the nuclear-capable state through a bloodless military
coup in 1999, was considered a key ally in the U.S.-led war against terrorism since the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. But Musharraf's critics alleged
that he was playing a kind of double game with the United States in the war on terrorism
-- arresting some Al-Qaeda militants but giving sway to local militants with ties to the ISI
intelligence service. Islamabad had consistently denied such allegations.

Several politicians emerged as possible successors to Musharraf, including the leader of

the country's largest political party, the Pakistan People's Party, Asif Ali Zardari. Other
political factions have named Zardari's sister or the current speaker of the National
Assembly, who is also a woman. Minority partners in the coalition government have
lobbied for prominent leaders from the volatile provinces of Balochistan or the North
West Frontier.

On 25 August 2008 Pakistan's former prime minister Nawaz Sharif announced his
Muslim League-N party is quitting the ruling coalition, putting the alliance at risk ahead
of elections for the country's Presidency. He accused Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of
slain leader Benazir Bhutto, of not honoring commitments to restore judges, sacked by
President Pervez Musharraf when he imposed emergency in November last year.

On 06 September 2008 Asif Ali Zardari won an estimated 482 of the 702 votes from
lawmakers to become what some believe will be Pakistan's most powerful civilian leader.
Asif Ali Zardari won the majority of votes in three of the country's four provincial
assemblies as well as in both houses of parliament. Zardari's win capped a remarkable
political revival for a man who spent 11 years in prison on corruption and murder charges
- without ever being convicted.

On 09 September 2008 Asif Ali Zardari, the widower of slain former Pakistani prime
minister Benazir Bhutto, was sworn in as Pakistan's new president. After his inauguration
Tuesday, President Zardari told reporters he is accepting the position in the name of his
late wife and, in his words, "in the name of all martyrs of democracy." President Zardari
replaced Pervez Musharraf who stepped down under pressure a month earlier. The 53-
year-old Mr. Zardari inherited a list of pressing problems, including a troubled economy
and international pressure to crack down on Islamic militants. Zardari's strong political
support in the legislatures and Musharraf's expansion of presidential powers could make
Zardari the country's most powerful civilian president. He had pledged to reign in the
presidency's broad powers, which include the ability to dismiss parliament, but many
Pakistanis are skeptical that he will follow through. After Zardari was elected by
lawmakers as Pakistan's new president, Islamabad began to make changes to the ISI --
eventually closing the section tasked with domestic spying on Pakistani politicians.