1 Lumberto Mendoza, University of the Philippines Diliman

Wittgenstein’s Conception of Moral Universality1

In contemporary ethical theorizing, the Wittgenstein is categorized as a particularist.2 Moral

claims are reached and advanced not in terms of abstract universal principles but in terms of acquired

sensitivities to the requirements of particular situations. Because of this, his position is taken to have the

same limitations that come with relativism. These include arbitrariness, self refutation and outright

endorsement of evil practices. In this paper, I shall argue that this reading is mistaken. Though

Wittgenstein emphasized flexibility and variability, there are passages in his later work which allow for a

notion of moral universality that escapes the limitations of relativism. Wittgenstein‟s moral position cannot

simply be assimilated with existing forms of ethical relativism and moral objectivism.

Why Wittgenstein is considered a particularist

Particularists do not appeal to abstract principles because they fear ethical rigorism and ethical

indeterminacy. Moral requirements arise from particular situations. Inclusive abstract moral principles are

incapable of addressing these requirements because they are general answers to particular questions.

Insistence of the use of moral principles leads to imposition of requirements that are inappropriate for the

situation or to the illusion of guidance expressed by conflicting interpretations.

There are two kinds of particularism, historical and radical. Radical particularists do not allow for

any principles at all. They anchor their claims on the judgments of virtuous individuals (e.g.

existentialists). Historical particularists, on the other hand, allow for the use of Universal principles

provided that they are derived from communities‟ unique history and moral experiences (e.g.

communitarians). Contemporary ethical theorists interpret the late Wittgenstein as falling under one or the

other but never as a Universalist.

Wittgenstein is interpreted as a particularist because of his view on the role of language games

and shared forms of life as the bedrock of meaning and justification. We learn the meaning of „good‟ and

„bad‟ though the responses that we have been trained to associate with them, and those responses

1
This is the longer version of the paper that got accepted for presentation at the 32nd International Wittgenstein
Symposium in August 2009. It became the starting point for my MA thesis.
2
O Neill, 1996 p. 78-79

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themselves become the framework through which we perceive and respond to moral requirements. This

training on the natural association of words to certain actions is what Wittgenstein calls language games. 3
4
Language games are prior to (ostensive) definitions or rules of language. They are the very means

through which language is learned and understood. In the same way, it is language games not moral

rules which have priority when we reason about moral requirements.

Wittgenstein is interpreted as a radical particularist because he is said to imply that when we

have mastery over different language games there is no need for moral principles. Competence in

morality, like competence in language, does not consist in knowledge of moral principles. The best moral

rules are useless to a person who does not know how to apply them in particular instances, but a virtuous

person is able to do what is required even in the absence of knowledge about moral principles. This is

because the skill necessary for doing what is moral cannot itself be contained in moral principles.5 It is a

matter of mastering a technique, something that can only be learned not taught. In as much as principles

are the attempt to define and explain moral knowledge, morality cannot be explained. It can only be

shown via examples.

The method of language games is the method of examples.6 It has the advantage of not imposing

any one conception of what should be done yet done, yet it is able to give a concrete guidance on how it

can be done. It takes on a certain projection of meaning but it leaves other projections open to allow for

judgment and variations in application. It says something about itself and at the same time points to
7
something beyond itself, prodding us to look for similar cases. Yet this method is perceived to be

insufficient because examples can be misunderstood and it is difficult to say whether the learner has

already understood the meaning of examples. This is the same question on how we can say that person

has understood a moral principle or not.

When we are taught the meaning of a moral principle we are only given a definite number of

examples, yet we are expected to apply them in an indefinite number of cases but it is not always clear

3
Investigations 7
4
Hintikka, 1996 p. 320
5
McDowell 1997, 148. He refers to this as the bias that to be rational is to be consistent with a ‘formulable universal rule”.
6
Baker and Hacker, 1985 , investigations 75, 133
7
Investigations 208

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how they apply to those cases at all. A child is told that it is wrong to lie. When a child sees an adult lying

to save a friend from trouble and the adult says that such cases allow for lying, the child refines the rule to

take account of such cases. When it‟s the child‟s turn to lie to save his friend who has done something

wrong and the adult says that it is wrong. The child is then confused on when to be honest or to lie.

Refining the moral principle to account for these cases will not help. Cases not covered by our existing

rule may always arise and the circumstances that govern particular applications of a rule are never
8
exactly the same. So whether the rule applies or how it is to apply at all will always be a question. Rules

do not contain their applications. Prior applications of the moral principle do not determine their future

applications.

This is the very concern expressed by Wittgenstein in PI 185. How do we understand the

meaning of “+”? A child who has been told to continue the series “+1” by being given tests up to 1000

may still be confused on how to continue the series “+2” beyond 1000. We may have different ways of

understanding what it means to go on in the same way with “+”and there may be no way to prevent those

differences. Rules or definitions can limit the interpretations or applications of a concept only up to a

certain extent. Linguistic activity is not everywhere bounded by rules. Because of this, any rule or
9
definition can be misunderstood. Definitions, rules and principles attempt to identify what is common. But

where the basis of meaning is in the flux of human activities, there will be differences and we always have

to pay attention to the way the word is used in a particular context.10 Otherwise, we will not be able to

recognize the wide array of meanings/moral requirements that are before us. Applications of rules in
11
particular instances are not bound by existing rules but by moves in language games. In such cases,

what is required is judgment and this is not aided by any rule. So Wittgenstein says that in continuing a

8
“Suppose someone gets the series of numbers 1, 3, 5, 7… by working out the series 2X+1. And now he asks
himself: But am I always doing the same thing or something different every time?” Investigations 226
9
See Investigations 84-85
10
This is the reason for introducing the notion of ‘family resemblances’. Investigations 67
11
The insistence to continue to search for further rules or specification of rules rather than to plunge into an
application is part of the Platonic inclination to view language as something that is everywhere bound by rules or
of reasoning as calculi that would automatically result to correct judgment. This is also the view which makes us
think that examples are insufficient proof of understanding or which makes us think that there is a gap between a
rule and its application.

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series, “we look to the rule for instruction and do something, without appealing to anything else for

guidance.”12

This particularism is radical because there can be no justification to language games just as there

can be no justification to particular moral judgments except that they are the ones naturally taken by the

competent. The hierarchy of the principles you will apply is determined by how you appreciate a given

case. Is it a case of truth telling more than saving a life or being caring? What is the best way to

appreciate a case? There is no best way only judgment. The virtuous person, in so far as he has practical

wisdom, is entrusted with the correct interpretation of what is the best way to deal with the case. The

judgment of that person becomes the basis for what is good and bad, and that judgment cannot be

justified by some other rule.

The reasoning by which we come to a judgment is non inferential.13 It is simply the way people

judge and act in that situation. There can be no reason for those judgments in the same way that there

can be no reason why one sees a particular thing that way. Those ways of judging or acting make up the

language game which provides the very condition through which we are able to justify. To insist on

justification is like cutting off the branch from which we are sitting. We would run up against limits of

language and fall into non-sense. What can be done is merely to describe how things are, and 'leave

everything as it is‟ by resisting the temptation to explain or justify.14

A major criticism against this interpretation is arbitrariness on the level of the individual or

subjectivism. Even morally competent people can be mistaken in their judgments but if the morality of an

action is based on the judgment of the competent person himself recognition of such mistakes is not

possible. There are also passages in the PI which does not agree with subjectivism. Among these is PI

202, “Obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence: it is not

possible to obey a rule privately: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as

obeying it”

12
Investigations 228, See also PI 292
13
Dancy, 2005
14
Investigations 109 and 124

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Subjectivism destroys the normativity that is embedded in the idea of following rule. It is like

obeying a rule privately. Whatever one judges as the correct application of the rule is the correct

application of the rule. But rules set independent criteria for distinguishing correct applications from

incorrect ones. If these criteria are no different from the judgments of the person himself, thinking that one

is obeying the rule would be the same thing as obeying the rule. There would be no such thing as failing

to follow the rule, and there would be no such thing as being able to follow a rule either.

Hence, Wittgenstein is also interpreted as a historical particularist. Under this view, the bedrock of

justification is not the particular judgment of individuals but the norms and practices of a particular

community. What will allow us to say that a principle has been followed or not are the practices of rule

following of a particular community. There is no such thing as individual rule following in the way radical

particularists suggests because language games are shared with the rest of the community. Following a

rule is like following a signpost. A person obeys a sign post only in so far as there is a custom or regular

use of signposts.15 This regular use presupposes that there are others who follow rules and their

application of rules provide constraints to my applications.

Following a rule is also like being fashionable.16 I cannot be fashionable just by myself. I can only

be fashionable if my sense of fashion accords with the judgments of those who are also fashionable.

Similarly, even the virtuous person can be mistaken if his judgment does not accord with the judgments of

other virtuous persons in the community. There are still independent criteria for what makes a moral

judgment good, because the standard for what makes a good application of a moral principle is

something that the virtuous person shares with the rest of the community. This is part of what it means for

language games to be a part of a form of life.

Thinking and judging itself involves membership in a community. It is possible for Crusoe to think

only in so far as he was once a member of a community17. A person that has been a Crusoe from birth

cannot think, at least in the way that we conceive thinking to be, for he was unable to share in the

relevant forms of life of a culture or community. In the same way, morality is the product of human

15
Investigations p. 198-199
16
McGinn, 2002 p.151
17
Baker and Hacker, 1985

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conventions. Independent of those conventions, we wouldn‟t know what it means to be moral because we

would not know the relevant practices and conventions which give words their meaning.

In this regard, historical particularists claim that there can be moral principles that apply to all

cases, but their scope is limited only to members or potential members of certain communities.18 Different

cultures have different moral requirements because they have different needs and different conventions

for articulating and responding to those needs. In this regard, certain virtues may be available only to

certain cultures because it is only in their practices which occasion such a need. The types of agreement

available determine the kinds of language games that can be made and played. So only those who share

a certain type of relationship or agreement with others who can make sense of concepts like hope, faith,

love.19 And in each of their occurrence, they would be different.

Moral principles become universal in so far as different communities may share certain overlaps

in their practices. In such a case, intercultural or international dialogues may be useful because they

provide the opportunity to identify and articulate which similarities are significant enough to be accounted

for by a common rule. It is in such cases moral principles come to have broader application. But there is a

limit to what can be agreed upon and there are cases when there is no sufficient agreement in practices

to even allow for the possibility of dialogue. It is also impossible to have universal conventions of meaning

because different communities have different experiences and naturalized ways of responding to words.

Practices may also change so as to render prior agreement on moral principles void.

This brings us to the limitation of historical particularism; arbitrariness on the level of the

community or relativism. The authority of moral principles advanced by historical particularists is limited.

Because it considers the patterns of judgments of communities as the bedrock of justification, it cannot

criticize existing norms and practices. It also offers no procedure for reconciling the conflicting judgments

of communities having different practices or forms of life.

18
O Neill, 1996
19
Garver, 1994

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Limitations of particularist reading of Wittgenstein

A major criticism of particularist readings of Wittgenstein is arbitrariness and incommensurability.

It can have no meaningful account of moral conflict because people who do not agree on a certain issue

may simply have different language games and forms of life. In such a case, they do not really disagree;

they do not understand each other. They do not play the same language game or are incapable of playing

the same language game because they have different forms of life. Some claim that if they have no

justification for judging as they do other than that they are trained or predisposed to judge that way turns

their judgment into biases or mere expressions of preferences. While historical particularists present a

communal criteria for evaluating judgments, these criteria when opposed by other practices turns out to

be nothing but another preference which cannot be criticized. Thus, it becomes impossible to criticize

other people‟s practices however unjust we think them to be (e.g. female genital mutilation, suttee, etc.)

Given this limitation, is it really accurate to interpret Wittgenstein as a particularist? Does

Wittgenstein‟s discussion of rule following view morality as the mere endorsement of preferences,

communal or otherwise? Given Wittgenstein‟s emphasis on the priority of approaching problems via

particular language games, on the importance of variability and judgment, does it make sense that

Wittgenstein has a conception of Universality at all? Or is it best to leave Wittgenstein as a particularist

who views that moral principles are dangerous, at best useless, in moral reasoning? When we reason

about morality, is it best to approach it via principles that allow us to be consistent with previous cases?

Or is the very notion of consistency, of going on in the same way, different in every case?

I think that another look at how Wittgenstein‟s rule following considerations relates with the

nature of language games and shared forms of life will show that the falsity of this dichotomy. There are

universal principles but those universal principles allow for different application in varying cases. While

not excluding the possibility of identifying violations, the varying ways of responding to moral

requirements need not conflict with the presence of universal principles; they are even mutually

determining. This notion of moral universality, however, can at best be presented in a form of paradox.

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Wittgenstein’s conception of moral objectivity: the paradox of moral universality

We learn rules via language games and language games are possible because we share a form

of life. But a form of life is not to be understood as mere conventions or institutions made possible by

social pressure or human agreement. This puts human agreement in an external rather than internal

relationship with the creations of rules and concepts, and confuses Wittgenstein‟s stand with

conventionalism.20 In applying a concept or rule, we do not decide individually or communally. Though

there are still different ways of applying the rule, we all experience a natural compulsion to apply the rule

in one way rather than the other. This agreement or natural compulsion is non linguistic and often

inarticulate as it is part of the very framework through which language games are possible.

When we say we will use a word this way we do not just agree to it in words. There are uses of

words that sound awkward or appear too artificial to be successfully put into practice. There is a natural

acceptability that comes with the use of certain words (applications of moral principles) that is

independent of individual or communal preference and these uses are things we just take for granted or

notice only when violated. We agree on the level of actions not on the level of words, words only come

later to seal what was indeterminate. This natural agreement on the level of words which precede any

linguistic articulation is a form of life. In so far as following a rule is also part of a form of life, the particular

applications of a moral principle can be viewed as something that is independent of both individual and

communal preference. This makes it possible to identify mistakes made by individual and community or to

evaluate whether a practice is evil or not.

This however does not to situate criticism and evaluation from a view that is external to human

responses. What is emphasized is that there is a regularity that characterizes those responses that

becomes the basis through which conventions and customs become possible. See for example the

distinct human forms of life necessary for an ostensive definition to be intelligible. Does „This‟ refer to the
21
object, to a feature of the object, to the pointing gesture? Though an ostensive definition can be

misunderstood in many ways, the fact that we share a form of life allows it to be understood in the same

20
Baker and Hacker, 1985.
21
Investigations 6,28,38,45

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way. This is not to say that there is only one form of life or that our form of life doesn‟t change. It means

that even differences occur within a framework of commonalities which we take for granted.

Form of life refers to the regularity in action which makes the formation of concepts possible.

Sometimes it is interpreted in terms of convention but it is more fundamental than convention because it

is the means through which conventions become possible. There are different language games and there

are different forms of life. Different language games may come from different or the same form of life. But

all language games come from a form of life that is basic to all human beings.

Language games and forms of life are mutually determining. Primary language games are

possible because we share a human form of life. Once we have shared a form of life, secondary

language games are created which leads to the creation of new forms of life, which in turn leads to the

creation of new language games and forms of life and so on.22 We always create different types of

agreements (are on our way to establishing new forms of life) when we engage in language games.

Hence, the number and type of language games that can be played is determined by the kind forms of life

or relationships that is or are established. Dialogues or any linguistic activity are always moves towards a

shared form of life.

Moral dilemmas (or what McDowell calls hard cases because they cannot be resolved by moral

principles) are cases calling for attempts to share a form of life.23 Once we examine via language games,

via different perspectives and details, our views overlap no matter how much divergence is left. So while it

does call for a creative decision on what to say. This decision is not totally unguided for a shared and

often inarticulate sense of what will count as creative also emerges, such that even if we do not take the

same decision we can come to understand or even agree to the decisions others take. This shared sense

is also what allows for the recognition of mistakes, even from the perspective of the individual or

22
Hintikka, 1996
23
McDowell, 2000, 45-46

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24
community itself. The same thing happens when we acquire the ability to recognize the varied

applications of a moral principle while being able to separate it from its violations.

This also provides an answer to how a Wittgensteinian view can provide an account of moral

persuasion; via attempting to engage others in language games and creating new forms of life. This

method is holistic. It includes non rational modes of persuasion as it involves appeals to feelings attitudes,
25
emotions and ways of looking at things; it includes all aspects that make up the self. But it also raises

problems for constructivist accounts of the good (e.g. Rawls, O Neill). This method is no longer something

that constructivists will consider as neutral or impartial. Yet it is an account of moral reasoning that can

secure agreement without sacrificing the normativity of rules.

Human forms of life are not static. It is a complex combination of biological disposition, facts of

nature, and cultural training that defies any analysis or further simplification because it will fail to give due

attention to the part that other aspects play.26 Hence Wittgenstein‟s stand cannot be reduced to

behaviorism, conventionalism, or solipsism. Suffice it to say that it is the changing regularity that those

things make possible which allows for the formation of concepts, rules and the acquisition of language.

The only meaningful conception of universality possible is one that is grounded in a changing

form of life. Universality is a family resemblance concept. It is a universality that is a matter of degree

where the scope is not something fixed or predetermined and the application is always varied. Though

that universality cannot be defined or articulated, it continually shown in the flux of action. The fact that

our criteria for going in the same way may be different and variable does not mean there is no such thing

as going on in the same way. Following a rule both consists of doing the same thing and doing something

different at the same time.27 While you are applying the same rule, different situations call for different

applications of the rule. Given another situation the same use of the word or rule can be interpreted

differently but this does not mean that no rule was followed or that we are now concerned with another

24
“While rules exist only within a framework of institutional activities which depend on basic human propensities
to agree in judgment. Those rules are also understood as supplying standards though which we are able to say that
those judgments (even upon consensus) are correct or incorrect. (consensus based on mistake)” Wright 2007487.
25
Crary, 2000
26
Garver, 1994
27
Investigations 226

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rule. Rules can change and yet remain the same. Similarly, the fact that there are different situations

seems to call for different ways of applying a universal moral principle does not mean that there is no

such thing as universal moral principle. Universality is an indeterminate concept but it doesn‟t mean it is

meaningless.

Universality becomes nonsensical when its demands are conceived metaphysically; confused

with platonic ideals that situate right and wrong applications of a rule from a point of view outside shared
28
human responses to act, feel and understand. Such ideals are incoherent and impossible to satisfy.

This view expresses itself in the notion that rules always need specification so that they will allow for less

judgment because the less judgment a rule allows the more objective it becomes. This is also ideal that

inclines us to think that examples are insufficient proof of understanding and that there is something else

we have to look for which will fill the gap between a rule and its application.

Wittgenstein‟s conception of universality and objectivity is not legalistic or deterministic in this

sense. Rules even with very elaborate specifications do not pre-empt judgment for the cases where they

apply or the ways on how they can be applied is cannot be contained in the rule itself. There will always

be room for style and technique in judgment and this is something that cannot be taught or explained.

The best that can be done is to give examples of how to go on the same way. It is in those very examples

that we are able to grasp the universal, it is in them that the universal exists.

It is also important to note that while Wittgenstein emphasizes judgment amidst variability and

difference, he does not idealize differences. There are differences and family resemblances concepts but

Wittgenstein does not say that all concepts consist of family resemblances or that family resemblance

concepts can have any meaning they have. Even if family resemblance concepts are permissive, it also

has exclusion criteria for a particular application. If this were not the case, they would cease to be

concepts. There is no such thing as a concept that is totally unbounded by any rule that they can be

applied in all cases. Concepts are possible because of rules. Even with family resemblance concepts,

there are still rules which determine what particular applications make sense and which does not. All

judgments, though distinct from rules, are made possible by means of rules.

28
Crary, 2000

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So Wittgenstein is not saying that we do not employ rules when we attempt to understand or

learn. All activities, including moral evaluation, are rule governed. But if we conceive of rules as

something that comes prior to the activities, rather than as rules that are discovered or made in the

course of those activities then we will be mistaken. The applications of moral principles do not exist

independently from us in the way rails of a train are already there even before the train gets there.29 If we

think in that manner we will be unable to distinguish variations of the moral principle from their violations,

or those cases not covered by existing moral principles cannot deal with as they might call for the creation

of a new one. Even if the circumstances for the application of the rule are never completely the same, this

does not mean that rules are do not guide us at all in dealing with cases. Even if cases are characterized

by differences, they also contain overlaps similarities that allow us to treat them in the „same‟ way. This

also does not mean that rules do not need specifications. It means that specification may only be relevant

or useful when the need arises. Precision has a limit; rules can only be as precise as relative to the

purposes they satisfy. Viewed in this manner, specifications will aid, rather than prevent, us from

attending to the needs of different cases.

Thus Wittgenstein‟s view on how to approach morality via language games and forms of life to

account for both the sensitivity to different cases and the sense of consistency to allow for accounts of

justice or fairness. Appeals to language games and forms of life also allow or may even require the use of

moral principles. They also do not amount to the mere endorsement of preferences because they are the

brute conditions of sense. Also, they are still able to provide independent criteria for identifying mistakes

that it is possible for the community to evaluate the morality of their own practices.

This view leaves everything as it is. It does not count as another account of moral universality and

objectivity in place of Platonism. An account of universality grounded in evolving language games and

forms of life should not be interpreted as relativism or another thesis on objectivity. It merely undercuts

unreasonable demands on how we ordinarily conceive of objectivity and universality in the guidance and

adjudication of moral judgments.

29
Investigations 218, 219

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 Crary, Alice. “Wittgenstein’s philosophy in relation to political thought” in The New

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 Onora O‟Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1996

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