Rise of China 6

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.
1, 2007, 373–404
doi:10.1093/cjip/pom003
China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN

Relations during the
Post-Cold War Era
Lai Foon Wong*
Downloaded from cjip.oxfordjournals.org at University of Madras on December 23, 2010

China–ASEAN relations developed quickly from an absence of diplomatic
ties in the immediate post-Cold War period to close interaction and
cooperation in the late 1990s. Japan–ASEAN political relations, however,
lacked the impetus for advancement during the same period. Japan had, as
early as 1977, established dialogue partner relations with ASEAN, and
began the process of institutionalizing its dialogue and cooperation with
ASEAN at various levels in the areas of industry, science, technology,
culture, trade, and investment. China, on the other hand, did not actively
seek to establish official relations with ASEAN until the 1990s, after the
Cold War. China first participated in the ASEAN Foreign Minister Meeting
in 1991 and became a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996. By the
beginning of the 21st century, the nature of China–ASEAN relations had
evolved from one based largely on bilateral relations to a multilateral
relationship built on expanded areas of cooperation including finance,
human resources development, health and quarantine as well as judicial
matters. In the spheres of security and military relations, China signed the
Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and
became the first major extra-regional power to accede to the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In 2002, China and ASEAN also
released a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional
Security Issues. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China’s military
relations with ASEAN counties had also shifted from one of unofficial to
official nature. The contrast between the rapid pace of development in
China–ASEAN relations and the lack of advancement in Japan–ASEAN
relations was most pronounced in the realm of economic relations. Since the
year 2000, the trade volume between China and ASEAN has risen at the
average rate of 12.4% annually, while the trade volume between Japan and
ASEAN has been decreasing at the average rate of 3% annually.1
1
These statistics are provided by the ASEAN Secretariat. See http://202.154.12.33/trade/
publicview.asp.
* Corresponding author. Email: laifoon@gmail.com
Reproduced from the Science of International Politics, with kind permission of the authors
and the Institute of International Studies, Tsinghua University
374 Lai Foon Wong
The key question raised in this article is: why have China–ASEAN
relations developed faster than Japan–ASEAN relations since the end of the
Cold War? In the first of its four parts, this article points out the merits and
shortcomings of current scholarship on the subject, and lays out the research
framework from which it proceeds. The second and third parts describe the
evolutional processes and characteristics of China–ASEAN and Japan–
ASEAN relations. The fourth part compares the regional integration
policies of China, Japan, and ASEAN, and discusses their influence on
China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN relations. The fifth part summarizes the
research conclusions.

Deficiencies in Current Scholarship and the
Research Framework
Today’s scholarship offers various explanations for the slow progress in
Japan–ASEAN relations and relatively rapid development of China–
ASEAN relations. There are two general explanations for the speedy post-
Cold War development of the latter. The first: that the collapse of the
bi-polar world system created a favorable political environment for
improved China–ASEAN relations because bilateral relations were no
longer constrained by differences in ideology and social system.2 Other
phenomena, such as globalization, regional integration and China’s
economic rise and consolidation of national strength were also contributing
factors to the rapid development of China–ASEAN relations.
The second explanation focuses on transformations in China and ASEAN
policies.3 Changes in attitudes and policies that occurred between ASEAN
and China after the Cold War closely related to respective internal
developments, and apprehensions of the new international environment in
view of the breakup of the Soviet Union, drastic changes in Eastern Europe,
and the Tiananmen Square incident. These events caused China to focus on
dynamic development and relations with its periphery and East Asia.4 The
common ground between China and ASEAN expanded after the Cold War
by virtue of identical internal objectives—economic development and
prosperity) and foreign strategies—as apparent in China’s promotion of a
multi-polar world system and ASEAN’s strategy of balancing great powers.
2
L. L. To, ‘China’s Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?’ Global Change,
Peace & Security, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2001), pp. 61–71.
3
For instance, see Chen Qiaozhi, Lengzhan hou Dong Meng guojia dui Hua zhengce yanjiu
(Research on Post-Cold War ASEAN Policy toward China) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui
kexue chubanshe, 2001); Derek da Cunha, ‘Southeast Asian Perceptions of China’s Future
Security Role in its ‘‘backyard’’’, http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF137/
CF137.chap6.pdf.
4
Zhao Quansheng, Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy (Hong Kong: Oxford University
Press, 1996), pp. 210–5.
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era 375
That their relationship represented a convergence of (Asian) values5 also

accelerated development of China–ASEAN relations.
There are, however, shortcomings to these explanations. The first
emphasizes the benefits that the end of the bi-polar world order and of
opposing ideologies brought to China–ASEAN relations. But it does not
explain the rapid advance of China–ASEAN relations in the late 1990s, at a
time when Japan–ASEAN relations made minimal progress. The second
explanation emphasizes the influence of changes in China/ASEAN policy
on the development of China–ASEAN relations, an approach with which
this article concurs, albeit recognizing that it is an explanation that does

not take into account all other possible reasons for accelerated growth in
China–ASEAN relations during the late 1990s.
There are also two general explanations for the slow development of
Japan–ASEAN relations. The first stresses the constraining influence of
Japanese domestic factors on Japan–ASEAN relations, such as its historical
problems, long period of economic stagnation, low public morale, political
upheaval, and a dearth of innovative thinking by the political leadership,
evident in its resolute protection of domestic markets.6 Scholarship in
support of this view argues that despite the need for a restructuring
of Japanese foreign policy, particularly that with regard to East Asia
(including Southeast Asia),7 Japan’s leadership generally gives precedence to
maintaining the domestic political and economic status-quo over its foreign
affairs.
The second view asserts that Japan’s post-Cold War foreign policy
underwent changes, but was unable to shed certain of its traditional
principles and psychological constraints. Japan’s focus on relations with the
United States, its clear intent to do what’s best for Japan and lack of a sense
of East Asian (including Southeast Asian) identity all constituted major
obstacles to Japan’s relationship with the region.8 Certain works within this
body of research highlight the role of the Japan–US alliance in constraining
Japan’s foreign policy; others cite Japan’s inability to ‘break away from the
US and enter East Asia as an inhibiting influence on the development of its
relations with East Asian nations. Another argument raised within the
5
Joseph S. Y. Cheng, ‘ASEAN’s Role in the Chinese Foreign Policy Framework,’ in Sharon
Siddique and Sree Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 430–4.
6
For instance, see Li Wen, ‘Riben yu Dongmeng guanxi de fazhan quxiang’ (‘Trends
in the Development of Japan-ASEAN Relations’), http://iaps.cass.cn/xueshuwz/
showcontent.asp?id¼239; Yoichi Funabashi, ‘New Challenges, New Frontier: Japan and
ASEAN in the 21st Century’, Asia & Pacific Lecture Series, No. 3 (Singapore: ISEAS,
2003).
7
T. J. Pempel, ‘Japanese domestic politics and Asian regionalism’, in S. Javed Maswood,
ed., Japan and East Asian Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 44–5.
8
See, for example, Liu Jiangyong, ‘Guoji luntan: Riben yanzhong de yazhou’
(‘International Forum: East Asia’s Japanese Eye’), Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times),
April 2, 2004, No. 15.

376 Lai Foon Wong
relevant research is that Japan does not take its relationship with Southeast
Asian countries as seriously as it does its dealings with the US, or with
China, South Korea, Russia and Europe.9
These two views are also problematic. The first explanation contends that
strongly conservative forces in Japanese domestic politics limited changes to
foreign policy. But it is inconsistent with the facts. Japan’s post-Cold War
foreign policy actually did commence restructure, particularly under
Hashimoto and Koizumi, both of whom took action intended to deepen
relations with ASEAN. The second view, which cites Japan’s preoccupation
with its relations with the United States and its lack of an East Asian identity

as a constraint on Japan–ASEAN relations, has its merits. But it disregards
internal changes that have occurred in ASEAN foreign policies, thereby
falling short of a full explanation.
Some research analyzes this phenomenon from an ASEAN perspective, as
regards the impact of changes in ASEAN policy toward China and Japan.10
Yet, the facts reveal that these changes had minimal influence on the
development of bilateral relations. For instance, ASEAN nations were
increasingly wary of China during the mid-1990s owing to intensifying
territorial disputes between China and ASEAN, and also the influence of the
‘China threat’. But this in no way impeded China from becoming a
consultative partner with ASEAN in 1991, or from being upgraded to full
dialogue partner in 1996. Conversely, ASEAN suspicion and wariness of
Japan has decreased immensely since the 1980s, yet there has been no
obvious progress in the relationship.
The factors influencing the development of China–ASEAN and Japan–
ASEAN relations are multi-faceted; there is no single factor that explains
developments and changes to bilateral relations. This article, therefore,
adopts a multi-factor methodology that integrates domestic and foreign
criteria.11 The relative progress in ASEAN’s political relationships with
China and Japan appear to the author to have been most apparent since
1997. The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 brought China and ASEAN
closer, as regards promoting East Asian cooperation and integration. China
played a stabilizing role during the crisis that gained it the trust and
appreciation of ASEAN. In the wake of the crisis, China worked in concert
with ASEAN toward strengthening East Asian regional cooperation;
it proposed establishing a China–ASEAN free trade area as a means
9
Lam Peng Er, ‘Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia’, in Derek da Cunha, ed.,
Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security (Singapore: ISEAS, 2000), pp. 144–5.
10
Chin Kin Wah, ‘Regional Perceptions of China and Japan’, in Chandran Jeshurun, ed.,
China, India and Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 1993),
pp. 3–25; Julius Caesar Parrenas, ‘China and Japan in ASEAN’s Strategic Perceptions’,
Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1990), pp. 198–224.
11
Yan Xuetong and Sun Xuefeng, Guoji guanxi yanjiu shiyong fangfa (Practical Methods of
International Studies), (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001), pp. 55–60.

China Greater support for

Intensifying China–US Tension regionalization
‘Good Neighborliness’ Policy policies
China–ASEA
1997 East N relations
ASEAN Asian outpace
Greater support for
ASEAN Expansion Financial Japan–ASEA
regionalization
Economic Integration Crisis N relations
policies
Japan
Strengthening Japan–US Alliance
Seeking to become a major Pays lipservice to
political power regionalization

policies
Fig. 1 Research Framework.
to promoting East Asian integration. Japan, however, has been relatively

inactive as regards East Asian cooperation and integration. At this point in
the 21st century, ASEAN is still hesitant in the face of Japan’s Japan–
ASEAN FTA proposal and expression of support for East Asian
integration. It is, accordingly, this author’s belief that the differences in
Chinese and Japanese regional integration policies constitute primary
reasons for the disparity in extent of development of each country’s political
relations with ASEAN. A detailed analysis of the research approach to the
article appears in Figure 1.
China–ASEAN Relations During the

Post-Cold War Period
China and ASEAN did not establish official relations before the 1990s,
although China did establish diplomatic relations with three of ASEAN’s six
members: Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. China began establishing
formal relations with other members at the beginning of the 1990s.
It resumed official relations with Indonesia and established diplomatic
relations with Singapore and Brunei between 1990 and 1991, the year China
first participated in an ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting, as an observer.
Figure 2 illustrates the marked increase in high-level exchanges during this
period. The impact of the ‘China threat theory’ on ASEAN nations,
however, was substantial. Numerous ASEAN nations were uneasy at the
thought of China’s becoming the new hegemon of Southeast Asia, ultimately
destabilizing the region. Southeast Asian nations were further disquieted
when China, in February 1992, signified its interests in the South China
Sea by issuing a law on China’s territorial waters, and publishing a map

378 Lai Foon Wong
No. of Exchanges
60
50
40
30
20
10

0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Fig. 2 China–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges (1990–2005).
in 1993.12 China did nothing to allay such fears when it displayed an air of
non-chalance during a series of unofficial meetings sponsored by Indonesia
regarding disputes in the South China Sea.
The playing up of the ‘China threat theory’ and intensification of South
China Sea territorial disputes from 1994 to 1996 had negative impact on
the development of China–ASEAN political relations. China and the
Philippines clashed for the first time over the South China Sea issue
between 1994 and 1995. It was actually suspicion of China that made
ASEAN eager to promote China’s accession to the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), a move primarily designed to regulate Chinese behavior.13
China did not actively participate in such multilateral regional organization
as it wished to avoid the possible restraints of multilateral diplomacy
emanating from Western and other countries. During this period, however,
China and ASEAN began establishing mechanisms for lower-level dialogue
that enhanced trust and understanding, and dispelled tensions. The two
entities held the first vice ministerial level meeting, also known as China–
ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (China–ASEAN SOM), in April 1995. Its
purpose was to strengthen bilateral trust and understanding in both the
political and security spheres. During the meeting, ASEAN put the South
China Sea dispute on the agenda in an attempt to negotiate a common
solution to the issue. As regards economic matters, China and ASEAN
founded two joint commissions in 1995 to promote economic cooperation
12
Ang Cheng Guan, ‘The South China Sea Dispute Re-visited,’ IDSS Working Paper, No. 4,
1999, pp. 9–11.
13
Rosemary Foot, ‘China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organisational Processes and
Domestic Modes of Thought’, Asian Survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (1998), p. 426.

China–ASEAN Leadership Summit

(launched in 1997)
China–ASEAN China–ASEAN China–ASEAN China–ASEAN

Finance Ministers Transportation Foreign Ministers Economic Ministers
Meetings Ministers Meetings Meetings Meetings
(launched in 1997) (launched in 2001) (launched in 1991) (launched in 1998)

China–ASEAN Joint
Cooperation Committee
(launched in 1997)
China–ASEAN Joint China–ASEAN Joint China–ASEAN ASEAN–Beijing

Economic Science and Senior Officials Committee
Committee Technology Consultations (launched in 1996)
(launched in 1995) Committee (launched in 1995)
(launched in 1995)
Fig. 3 Major Mechanisms for China–ASEAN Dialogue and Cooperation.
in trade, investment, and technology. China officially became a full dialogue

partner of ASEAN in 1996.
Multilateral dialogue and mechanisms for cooperation between China and
ASEAN increased and entered a phase of systemic development (Figure 3)
from 1997 to 2000. China and ASEAN convened the annual ASEAN
‘10 þ 1’ leadership summit in 1997, and in addition to the ARF in 1996, the
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting (ASEAN FMM) also convened. Besides
through ASEAN SOM and ASEAN FMM, China and ASEAN also
conducted high-level political dialogue and exchange through the ASEAN
‘10 þ 1’ and ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ leadership meetings. The practical purpose of
the China–ASEAN Joint Cooperation Committee (ACJCC), created in
1997, was to strengthen policy cooperation and information sharing. This
level of work coordination promoted concrete cooperation in various fields,
particularly human resource development and personnel and cultural
exchanges.14 The ACJCC is responsible for dialogue and cooperation
mechanisms on four main levels, including ASEAN SOM, China–ASEAN
Joint Committee on Economic and Trade Cooperation, China–ASEAN
14
‘Joint Press Release: The First ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee Meeting,
Beijing, 26–28 February 1997’, http://www.aseansec.org/5880.htm.

380 Lai Foon Wong
Joint Science and Technology Committee, and the ASEAN–Beijing

Committee (formed in 1996).15 The Second Meeting of the ACJCC in
March 1999 led to four proposals: first, strengthen personnel exchanges;
second, convene a research seminar to help [familiarize] young ASEAN
officials [with] contemporary China; third, hold an ASEAN–China
economic and trade cooperation seminar; fourth, convene an ASEAN–
China work conference on scientific cooperation and exchange. China, in
1997, contributed US$700,000 toward establishment of the China–ASEAN
cooperation fund, its purpose being to assist the ACJCC in promoting
cooperation programs. China contributed a further US$500 million toward

assistance and cooperation with ASEAN on human resource development
in 2000.
Establishing mutual trust is the foundation of strengthened China–
ASEAN relations. China adopted a series of measures in the security sphere
at the beginning of the 21st century designed to enhance mutual trust, dispel
ASEAN misgivings about China, and promote further advancement of
China–ASEAN relations. The two parties signed the ‘Declaration on the
Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ in November 2002,
and China signed the ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’
in October 2003. China also indicated its intention to join the ‘Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty’. The Code of Conduct was never
regarded as a solution to the dispute, but it was an important confidence-
building measure. The Declaration states: ‘The parties undertake to exercise
self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate
disputes and affect peace and stability . . .’16 China and ASEAN also
established a working group to discuss the South China Sea issue. In March
2005, China signed a tripartite agreement on oil and gas exploration work
with Vietnam and the Philippines—countries which China had previously
had run-ins with over the South China Sea issue.
China’s joining of the ‘Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
Asia’ also enhanced trust in it among Southeast Asian nations, ASEANþ3
summits having provided a platform from which to implement security
cooperation. The Fifth ASEANþ3 Summit proposed that the body focus
not only on economic cooperation, but also on developing dialogue and
cooperation in the political and security spheres—a process that began with
the matter of non-traditional security threats.17 China and ASEAN signed
the ‘Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of
Non-traditional Security Issues’ in 2002, and two years later signed a
memorandum of understanding regarding its implementation.
15
Ibid.
16
‘Declaration on the Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’, http://
www.aseansec.org/13163.htm.
17
‘Press Statement of the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the 5th ASEANþ3
Summit, November, 2001, Bandar Seri Begawan’, http://www.aseansec.org/5317.htm.

China has also adopted economic measures aimed at countering anxiety

about a ‘China threat’. At the Fourth China–ASEAN Summit in 2000,
Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed creating a committee of experts that
would explore the possibility of a China–ASEAN Free Trade Area; it was a
gesture intended to ameliorate worry about China’s entrance into the WTO.
Plans for such an FTA were unveiled at the Fifth China–ASEAN Summit in
November 2001, which raised three recommendations: first, identify key
areas of bilateral cooperation, particularly in agriculture, information and
communications technology, human resource development, bilateral invest-
ment, and the development of the Mekong River Basin; second, create a

China–ASEAN FTA within a 10-year period; third, strengthen political
trust and support, constantly expand bilateral dialogue and cooperation,
and enhance mutual understanding and trust.18 China issued its ‘Country
Report on Participation in Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic
Cooperation’ the same year, announcing that, in support of the ASEAN
integration process, it would grant the least developed countries (Laos,
Myanmar, and Cambodia) preferential tariff treatment. China’s objective in
creating an FTA with ASEAN and participating in its regional integration
was to convince ASEAN nations that China’s opening, greater competi-
tiveness and growth since WTO membership presented not challenges, but
new opportunities for ASEAN. China also expressed a willingness to open
its markets ahead of ASEAN, provide financial assistance for infrastructure
projects and narrow the development gap between old and new ASEAN
members to help in promoting ASEAN integration. All these measures are
aimed at alleviating any economic worries in the ASEAN region that have
been engendered by China’s rise. The creation of a China–ASEAN FTA ties
the economic fortunes of the two together, heralding a gradual deepening of
economic cooperation. China and ASEAN signed the ‘Joint Declaration on
the China–ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity’ in
October 2003, thereby formally establishing a strategic partnership. The
following year, China and ASEAN formulated an implementation plan for
their strategic partnership.
Greater political and economic trust has also had a positive effect on
military relations between China and ASEAN nations. China has signed
memorandums of understanding regarding national defense and coopera-
tion with six ASEAN members since 2003. Military exchanges have also
expanded steadily in recent years. China sent 46 defense delegations to nine
ASEAN nations between 2003 and 2005, during which time 45 defense
delegations from 10 ASEAN nations came to China (Table 1). More
noteworthy still, a mechanism for bilateral defense dialogue, of deputy
secretary level, with Vietnam and the Philippines commenced in 2005.
18
‘Press Statement by the Chairman of the 7th ASEAN Summit and the Three ASEANþ1
Summits, Brunei Darussalam, 6 November 2001’, http://www.aseansec.org/5316.htm.

382 Lai Foon Wong
Table 1 China–ASEAN Military to Military Visits (2003–2005)
2003 2004 2005

Indonesia to China 1 3 0
China to Indonesia 0 1 0
Malaysia to China 0 0 1
China to Malaysia 2 3 5
Philippines to China 2 3 1
China to Philippines 1 1 1
Thailand to China 3 3 3
China to Thailand 1 4 3

Singapore to China 0 1 1
China to Singapore 1 1 2
Brunei to China 0 1 1
China to Brunei 3 1 1
Vietnam to China 2 3 6
China to Vietnam 0 3 1
Myanmar to China 1 1 1
China to Myanmar 1 3 1
Laos to China 1 1 1
China to Laos 0 1 1
Cambodia to China 1 1 1
China to Cambodia 0 0 0
Source: Xinhua News Agency Statistics, Ministry of Foreign Affairs website data statistics.
Post-Cold War Japan–ASEAN Relations

Of the six Japanese Prime Ministers appointed between 1990 and 2005, three
traveled to ASEAN nations (Table 2), the remaining three’s time in office
having been too short. Japanese prime ministers who traveled to ASEAN
countries had also chosen to delineate new directions in Japan’s policy
toward ASEAN, which included most notably the ‘Fukuda Doctrine’ of
1977, the ‘Takeshita Doctrine’ of 1987, the ‘Hashimoto Doctrine’ of 1997
and the Koizumi speech of 2002. Yet, the relationship between Japan and
ASEAN leadership had remained at arm’s length, owing to flux in domestic
Japanese politics during the 1990s, which saw a rapid succession of six prime
ministers within 10 years (Figure 2). Although Prime Ministers Kaifu
Toshiki, Miyazawa Kiichi, and Tomiichi Murayama traveled to ASEAN
countries during the period 1990–1996, and raised several propositions, they
were all verbal declarations rather than specific policies.
Japan–ASEAN relations were further institutionalized at the end of the
1990s. Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s speech19 during his visit to
19
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9701/policy.html.

Table 2 Former Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to ASEAN Nations (1990–2005)
Time in Office Prime Minister Destinations

1989–1991 (1 year, 7 months) Toshiki Kaifu 1991: Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand
1991–1993 (1 year, 9 months) Kiichi Miyazawa 1993: Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand, and Brunei
1993–1994 (8 months) Morihiro Hosokawa
1994 (59 days) Tsutomu Hata
1994–1996 (1 year, 6 months) Tomiichi Murayama 1994: Malaysia, Singapore,
Philippines, and Vietnam

1996–1998 (2 years, 6 months) Ryutaro Hashimoto 1997: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Vietnam, and Singapore
1998–2000 (1 year, 8 months) Keizo Obuchi 2000: Cambodia, Laos, and
Thailand
2000–2001 (1 year, 1 month) Yoshiro Mori
2001–2005 (Koizumi stepped Junichiro Koizumi 2002: Philippines, Malaysia,
down in September 2006) Thailand, Indonesia, and
Singapore
ASEAN countries in January 1997 proposed expansion and deepening of

exchanges, as well as promotion of dialogue at all levels.20 The previously
unscheduled meetings between Japan and ASEAN leaders became an
annual summit in 1997. Although Japan and ASEAN had convened their
first leadership meeting in 1977, a full 10 years elapsed between the second
and third (the second was in 1987 and the third in 1997). In 1998, Japan
also initiated cabinet-level Japan-ASEAN Consultative Group Meetings.
The same year, an economic and industrial cooperation committee was set
up under the AEM-MITI Economic Ministers Meeting to enhance Japan–
ASEAN industrial cooperation in order to help ASEAN countries be more
competitive and provide development assistance to new ASEAN members.21
Japan, according to Hashimoto’s proposal, would also establish a series of
new mechanisms for cooperation, such as the Japan–ASEAN Roundtable
on Development, plans for comprehensive Japan–ASEAN human resource
development, the ‘Japan–ASEAN South-South Cooperation Program’, and
a conference on counter-terrorism22—all of which were to be implemented
during Hashimoto’s tenure. Figure 4 shows that there were frequent high-
level visits between Japan and ASEAN from 1998 to 2000. (See Figure 5 and
20
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9701/policy.html.
21
‘Relationship between Japan and ASEAN’, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/
asean/pmv9812/relation.html.
22
Sueo Sudo, The International Relations of Japan and Southeast Asia: Forging a New
Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 45.

384 Lai Foon Wong
No. of Exchanges
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Year
Fig. 4 Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges (1990–2005).23
Japan–ASEAN Leadership Meeting

(launched in 1977)
Japan–ASEAN Foreign Japan–ASEAN Economic Ministers

Japan–ASEAN Finance Meeting
Ministers Meeting Ministers Meeting
(launched in 1978) (launched in 1992)
(launched in 1997)
Economic and Industrial

Japan–ASEAN Forum Cooperation Committee
(launched in 1977) (launched in 1998)
Japan–ASEAN Roundtable on
Japan–ASEAN Consultative Development
Group Meetings (launched in 1997)
(launched in 1998)
Fig. 5 Major Mechanisms for Japan–ASEAN Dialogue and Cooperation.
Table 3 for a list of major Japan and ASEAN mechanisms for dialogue and
cooperation, and of meetings held.)
Hashimoto proposed joint efforts with ASEAN to tackle terrorism, drug
trafficking, environmental degradation and other global problems in 1997.
By this time Japan–ASEAN dialogue had already developed beyond trade
and investment to discussions of political and security issues. Agendas at the
23
For original source, see Appendix.

Table 3 Japan–ASEAN Summits (1990–2005)
Year Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN

Foreign Forum Economic Finance Leadership
Ministers Ministers Ministers Summit
Meeting Meeting Meeting
1990 13th 12th
1991 14th 13th
1992 15th 1st
1993 16th 2nd
1994 17th 3rd

1995 18th 14th 4th
1996 19th 5th
1997 20th 15th 6th 1st 3rd
1998 21st 16th 2nd 4th
1999 22nd 3rd 5th
2000 23rd 7th 4th 6th
2001 24th 17th 8th 5th 7th
2002 25th 18th 9th 6th
2003 26th 19th 10th 7th
2004 27th 20th 11th 8th 8th
2005 28th 21st 12th 9th 9th
Source: http://www.mofa.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv9812/relation.html
*The first summit was held in 1997 and the second in 1987
Japan–ASEAN forum at the upgraded vice-ministerial level began, in 1993,

to feature regular policy dialogue on political and security problems.
The annual Japan–ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting was also upgraded,
in 1995, to become a platform for Japan–ASEAN policy dialogue on global
and regional issues. Japan and ASEAN began efforts to resolve regional and
global security issues in 1999, when Prime Minister Obuchi proposed
convening the first international conference on anti-piracy. The conference
was held in April 2000 and was attended by 10 of the 16 ASEAN members.
Koizumi restated, in 2001, Japan’s hopes of cooperation with ASEAN on
anti-terrorism, anti-piracy, the environment, the prevention of infectious
diseases, and other global issues.
Japan and ASEAN issued a joint statement on combating international
terrorism in 2004, and in 2005, Koizumi pledged US$100 million towards
the prevention of infectious diseases. Japan’s signing of the ‘Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ marked a big step forward in its security
relationship with ASEAN, as it is generally tentative about entering into
treaties because of its alliance relations with the United States. Japan’s key
reason for signing the treaty, was in order not to fall too far behind China,
which had signed the treaty in 2003.

386 Lai Foon Wong
China, Japan, and ASEAN Regional Integration

Policies and China–ASEAN and
Japan–ASEAN relations
The Process of East Asian Regionalisation
The 1997 Asian financial crisis was a turning point as regards closer East
Asian regional cooperation and regionalisation. The ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’
cooperation mechanism evolved as regional countries sought to cope with
the crisis. Owing to certain East Asian nations’ (such as Japan) maintaining
a rather passive attitude toward East Asian cooperation, however, ASEAN

‘10 þ 3’ meetings during the initial two years of meetings tended to be low-
key, and did not produce any joint declaration.24 The accent within ASEAN
‘10 þ 3’ economic cooperation from 1997 to 1999 was on finance, with
particular focus on strengthening economic appraisal and policy dialogue.
For example, an early warning system and mechanisms to monitor short-
term capital flows were developed to enhance regional financial and
currency stability. The willingness of East Asian nations to strengthen
regional cooperation steadily grew after the Asian financial crisis. The third
informal ASEAN leadership meeting with China, Japan, and South Korea
in November 1999 produced the ‘Joint Statement on East Asian
Cooperation’, which called for wide-ranging expansion of cooperation
among numerous East Asian nations. Cooperation continued to expand
under the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ framework in 2000, each day more diversified
and multi-layered, by virtue of mechanisms for multilateral cooperation,
than the last (Table 4). Under the annual ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ summit
framework, East Asian nations also created a series of ministerial and
senior-level meetings, which multiplied and diversified mechanisms for
consultation and cooperation. For example, these nations began holding
annual ‘10 þ 3’ Economic and Finance Ministers’ Meetings and other
‘10 þ 3’ senior officials’ meetings in 2000, in addition to the ‘10 þ 3’ Foreign
Ministers’ Meeting.
East Asian nations gradually began to promote further regionalisation
after the turn of the new century. The Fifth ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Summit in
November 2001 decided that the East Asia Study Group should further
examine the report, ‘Towards an East Asian Community’, prepared by the
East Asia Vision Group (EAVG). It was recommended that governments
make East Asian integration their ultimate objective as regards regional
cooperation. Many forms of integration were proposed, including an East
Asia Free Trade Area.25 The final report of the EAVG was discussed at the
Sixth ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Summit in 2002, when it was agreed to carry out
research on and delineate specific methods of creation of a regional FTA.
24
Sueo Sudo, Evolution of ASEAN–Japan Relations (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), p. 53.
25
Report of the East Asian Vision Group, http://www.aseansec.org/pdf/east_asia_vision.pdf.

Table 4 Expanding the Scope of ASEAN ‘‘10 þ 3’’ Cooperation
Year Area of Cooperation

2000 Political and Security, Economic, Trade and Investment
2001 Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry, Human Resources, Science and Technology
2002 Environment, Travel
2003 Art and Culture
2004 Energy, Health, Information and Communications Technology, Social Welfare,
Transnational Crime and Counter-terrorism
Source: http://www.aseansec.org/AR05/PR-partnership.pdf

Leaders at the Seventh ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Summit in 2003 agreed to make the
East Asia FTA a long-term objective. At the Eighth Summit a year later,
leaders also agreed to make ‘East Asian Community’ a long-term objective,
and held the first East Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005.
Chinese, Japanese, and ASEAN Regional Integration Policies

Chinese Regional Integration Policy
China has traditionally operated via bilateral relationships rather than a
regional approach as regards relations with its periphery.26 It, however,
began participating in international organizations and strengthening
international interaction and exchanges in the 1980s. Since the beginning
of the 1990s, multilateral diplomacy as well as the concept of regional and
sub-regional relations appeared in Chinese foreign policy, which was
manifested in China’s new diplomacy. As it enters the 21st century, along
with its growing economic power and rising international standing, China’s
new diplomacy became even more prominent and it became more proactive
in the promotion of East Asian cooperation and integration.
China actively developed multilateral cooperation with ASEAN from
1990 to 1993, with the aim of achieving strategic partnership status.
Although the influence of ideology on China’s foreign policy had declined in
the 1980s, the degree of trust in China’s bilateral contacts with ASEAN
remained low, which impeded the development of multilateral cooperation
with ASEAN. China–ASEAN relations experienced a deep transformation
after the end of the Cold War. During the early 1990s China successively
resumed and established diplomatic relations with ASEAN nations. This
helped China build trust with ASEAN nations and created the conditions
for multilateral cooperation.
26
Men Honghua, ‘Canyu, chuangshe yu zhudao: yi guoji zhidu jianshe wei zhongxin tuidong
dongya yitihua’ (‘Participation, Creation and Leadership: International Institutions Build
the Core of East Asian Integration’) http://www.irchina.org/news/view.asp?id¼841.

388 Lai Foon Wong
China gradually accepted the regional concept between 1994 and 1996.
Entry into the ARF in 1994 finally dispelled China’s wariness of multilateral
organizations and mechanisms, born of the assumption that they would be
US dominated, that had caused China to keep its distance during the ARF’s
formation and early operation. After a couple of years’ observation and
adaptation, China acknowledged that the ARF would not evolve into a
US-dominated multilateral security mechanism.
China became more steadfast in its trust and participation in multilateral
diplomacy from 1997 to 2000, actively encouraging regionalism and sub-
regional cooperation. China not only participated in existing regional

multilateral coordination and cooperation mechanisms, but also initiated
and promoted efforts to create new ones. In 1997, it worked with ASEAN to
advance regional economic cooperation by creating the ASEAN ‘10 þ 1’ and
‘10 þ 3’ summits. At the same time, China also actively advanced East Asian
cooperation under the ‘10 þ 3’ framework. For instance, it proposed the
convening of meetings of deputy finance ministers and deputy heads of
central banks to discuss the restructuring of international financial
institutions.
China realizes that North America, Europe, and East Asia are the
international economic powerhouses of the 21st century, which makes East
Asian integration an important strategic objective and worthy of vigorous
advancement. China actively participated in East Asian multilateral
cooperation between 2001 and 2005, and also guided the construction of
an institutional framework for regional multilateral cooperation. China
proposed, in November 2001, strengthening economic cooperation with
ASEAN by creating a China–ASEAN FTA. The two entities formed a trade
negotiation committee in May 2005 to consider the question and begin
consultations on implementation.27 China and ASEAN signed the
‘Framework Agreement on China-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation’ in November of the same year. It included cooperation in
investment and the trading of goods and services, an ‘Early Harvest Plan’
and other measures to strengthen economic cooperation.28 The Framework
Agreement also identified 2010 and 2015 as respective FTA implementation
dates for the six original and new ASEAN members.29 China began the
‘Early Harvest Program’ to further the establishment of the FTA in January
2004, by granting ASEAN nations, particularly new members, preferential
tariff treatment.30 The ‘Agreement on Trade in Goods’ was signed in
November 2004 and took effect in July 2005, when negotiations on
investment and trade in services also began.
27
ASEAN Annual Report 2002-2003, http://www.aseansec.org/viewpdf.asp?file¼/ar03/pdf/
Chapter5.pdf.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.

In addition to its work with the FTA, China proposed, in November 2002,
cooperation with ASEAN in five major spheres: agriculture, information
and communications technology, human resources development, two-way
investment and development in the Mekong River Basin.31 China has been
active in its development of the Mekong Basin, having announcing that it
would narrow development gaps among ASEAN nations by means of its
participation in ASEAN sub-regional development. China utilized the
‘China–ASEAN Cooperation Fund’, a program under the ‘Initiative for
ASEAN Integration’ (IAI), to promote ASEAN internal integration, and
also improved funding for inland rivers and waterway projects in new

ASEAN member countries. China decided to expand its participation in the
IAI in 2003, through various sub-regional cooperation projects in the East
ASEAN Growth Area (EAGA). China officially became a development
partner of the EAGA in December 2005.
While Japan appears to prefer to forge bilateral FTAs with specific
ASEAN countries individually, China has concentrated its efforts on the
creation of a region-wide China–ASEAN FTA. China’s concern is that
bilateral FTAs might split the ASEAN market and undermine ASEAN
‘10 þ 3’ cooperation, ultimately hindering the emergence of an East Asian
Community. Since the creation of an East Asian ‘10 þ 3’ mechanism, China
has put forth numerous recommendations and programs to expand and
deepen multilateral cooperation under the ‘10 þ 3’ framework. For instance,
China recommended the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Agriculture and Forestry
Ministers meeting in 2001, and sponsored the Forum on Agricultural
Technology and Cooperation in East Asia. China also promoted the
exploration of theories and policies on East Asia cooperation and
integration. In November 2002, it proactively offered to implement one of
the recommendations made in the EAVG Report, i.e. the setting up of the
‘Network of East Asian Think-tanks’ (NEAT) under the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’
framework.32 The NEAT, which was speedily established in 2003, conducts
research on major issues relating to East Asian integration and produces an
annual report that is submitted to the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ informal leadership
summit.33
Japanese Regional Integration Policy
Japan has never been a proponent of regional economic integration and has
evinced anxiety about the rise of regionalism. Japan’s worry is that
heightened trade protectionism and regional economic groupings will have
negative impact on international free trade. Japan’s foreign economic policy
has always promoted global multilateral free trade, as manifest in its support
of the WTO and other international economic and trade mechanisms. It is a
31
Ibid.
32
http://www.neat.org.cn/chinese/gywm/index.php?topic_id¼001004.
33
Ibid.

390 Lai Foon Wong
policy in which bilateral economic and trade cooperation are viewed as a

secondary avenue through which to expand world trade. Japan indeed lacks
a clear strategy at the regional level. As the sense of regionalism grew and
the trend of regional integration deepened in various parts of the world in
the 1990s, the overall approach of Japan’s foreign economic policy also
underwent some changes.
Japan maintained a combative and critical attitude toward regional
integration from 1990 to 1993, and appeared generally disinclined towards
promoting regional cooperation. Its response, for example, to further
integration within the European Community was that the European market

should not become protectionist or a ‘closed region’ but be open to the
world. Japan also offered firm support for the strengthening and
improvement of international free trade institutions.34 It was unwilling to
support East Asian integration or institutionalized cooperation because of
its adherence to policies in line with those of the United States. Japan
consequently opposed a strong economic bloc from which the United States
would be excluded and actively supported the role of APEC, primarily
because it is an Asia-Pacific multilateral institution with the capacity for
discussion and consultation. It lacks, however, the power to adopt joint
action, which limits the body’s potential. Mahathir, then Prime Minister of
Malaysia, proposed in 1991 the creation of an East Asian economic
organization, with Japan playing the key leadership role. But Japan refused
to lead such a move, emphasizing that East Asia should, on the contrary,
open to the outside, and not become an EU—or North American-style
economic bloc. Japan’s passive attitude is attributable to strong US
opposition to an East Asian economic organization. This was evident at
the APEC foreign ministers meeting in 1991, when Japan publicly expressed
its firm support of APEC in favor of an East Asian economic organization
that risked embodying a ‘closed regionalism’.
Japan realized during the period 1994 to 1996 that East Asian cooperation
and regionalism was strengthening to the extent of becoming inevitable, as
increased intra-East Asian economic activity became more apparent.
It began reluctant participation in East Asian group activity, but was still
doubtful about East Asia integration and cooperation. Japan first acknowl-
edged that it should adopt a three-level framework—international, regional,
and bilateral—35 approach to its cooperation abroad in its 1996 Diplomatic
Bluebook. The Bluebook first proposed a regional-level policy, emphasizing
Japan’s strengthened cooperation with other East Asian nations.
It nevertheless actively supported the US presence in East Asia and its
role in regional affairs, and continued to promote APEC as the model for
34
See the Conclusions of Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebooks, 1990–1993, http://www.mofa.go.jp/
policy/other/bluebook.
35
Japan’s 1996 Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996.

regional cooperation. When ASEAN requested Japan’s participation in

convening the East Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1995, Japan demurred;
it did not approve of the creation of ASEM, initially because the United
States, Australia, and Singapore were excluded. Japan’s attitude shifted only
when East Asian regionalism eventually gained EU approval. Japan
participated in the first ASEM meeting in March 1996, in order to avoid
being excluded from the initiation of cooperation between the EU and
East Asia.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 made clear to Japan the importance of
regional finance and currency cooperation, as financial instability in

ASEAN and East Asian nations could affect Japan’s economy. Japan
proposed in July of that year the Asian Monetary Fund to offer emergency
financial assistance to Thailand and other ASEAN countries affected by the
crisis. The ASEAN warmly received and supported this proposal, but it
sparked off strong American opposition that ultimately forced Japan to
abandon its vision of regional financial cooperation, and rendered it
incapable of performing an active function in East Asian regional
cooperation. Japan declared in October 1998 the ‘New Miyazawa
Initiative’, whereby it would distribute financial aid through the traditional
bilateral channels. At the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Finance Ministers’ meeting,
Japan also put forward the ‘Chiang Mai Initiative’, which provided financial
resources through bilateral currency convertibility arrangements. Yet, Japan
was still not overly active at the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ leadership meeting; it was
unwilling to use the venue as a means to advancing the regional integration
process. Japan was still underscoring the need for East Asian nations to
promote ‘open regionalism’ at the first ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Foreign Ministers
meeting in 2000.
East Asian cooperation experienced rapid expansion and deepening in the
early 21st century under the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ framework, which caused
Japan to take a more active approach to regional cooperation. Japan
recognized that China’s powerful economic development was exerting
increasingly strong influence in the region, and that ASEAN was honing
competitiveness by accelerating regional integration and expanding its
scope. Japan had to conform to the regional trend in order to maintain and
strengthen its bilateral relationships in East Asia. The topic was raised in
Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2001, which pointed out that regional
cooperation was an important characteristic of the Asia-Pacific, and that
Japan must promote regional dialogue in order to strengthen its bilateral
relationships.36 Japan had altered its opposition to FTAs in 2000, when it
opened economic partnership talks with Singapore. The Bluebook stated
that a Japan–Singapore economic partnership agreement would perform
an auxiliary function within the multilateral trade system with the WTO
36
Japan’s 2001 Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2001.

392 Lai Foon Wong
at the center.37 Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2002 reiterated the

importance of Japan’s promotion of multi-level regional cooperation in
the Asia-Pacific.38 At a policy speech in Singapore, Koizumi proposed an
FTA with ASEAN in order to strengthen economic cooperation with
ASEAN countries on multiple levels.39
Japan’s attitude toward FTAs and Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPA) had become increasingly clear by the end of 2002. The Economic
Affairs Bureau at Japan’s Foreign Ministry issued the first Japanese FTA
strategy in October 2002. Soon afterwards, FTA and EPA affairs
departments were added to the Bureau to ensure integrated policy-making

and implementation. After Japan and Singapore signed the JSEPA and
declared it a model in November 2002, Japan actively promoted FTA
negotiations with other ASEAN members and Mexico. (See Table 4 for a
history of Japan efforts to forge EPAs with ASEAN and ASEAN nations.)
Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook of 2004 was the first to add new sections on
the promotion of FTAs and EPAs, citing the rapid development of EPAs
and FTAs around the world and the stalled WTO negotiations as requiring
Japan to seek other avenues such as FTAs and EPAs to promote and
expand economic relations with other countries as well as economic
cooperation outside the scope of WTO.40 In addition, Japan would need
to utilize FTAs and EPAs to consolidate its partnership relations with
countries and regions that it regarded as important.41
At the same time, Japan gradually transitioned away from its stance
against East Asian integration, and began openly to disseminate the concept
of regionalization. But Japan’s attitude toward an ‘East Asian Community’
was nonetheless indecisive and lukewarm. Koizumi first raised the notion of
an East Asian Community during January 2002, with a proposal to create
a ‘Enlarged East Asian Community’ incorporating Australia and New
Zealand into the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ framework.42 Koizumi again proposed,
at a Japan–ASEAN special leadership meeting during December 2003,
that Japan and ASEAN become the central axis of a Japan–ASEAN þ 2
37
Ibid.
38
Japan’s 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/
2002.
39
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi gave a speech entitled, ‘Japan and ASEAN in East Asia:
a Sincere and Open Partnership’. Koizumi stated that Japan and ASEAN would
strengthen future cooperation in five spheres: first, education and human resource
development; second, strengthen economic cooperation by establishing a comprehensive
economic partnership; third, launch an East Asia development initiative and discuss the
development of the cooperation; fourth, make 2003 a year of exchanges between Japan and
ASEAN; fifth, strengthen security cooperation, including on transnational issues. See
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech-e.html.
40
Japan’s 2004 Diplomatic Bluebook, http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/
01/14speech_e.html.
41
Ibid.
42
See http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/01/14speech_e.html.

(China and South Korea) þ 2 (Australia and New Zealand) East Asian
community. Koizumi elaborated further on Japan’s plan in December 2005
when addressing the media. He expressed hope that Japan could contribute
to East Asian development through the framework provided by the East
Asia Summit, which should include three pillars: ‘open regionalism’, ‘respect
[the] common values of democracy, human rights, and global rules of the
WTO’, as well as ‘promote international cooperation in social and economic
affairs and the realm of non-traditional security’43 (the author uses the exact
English language used by the Japanese government as it is a direct citation).
Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso delivered a speech the same year,

emphasizing that ‘First and foremost, Japan is, for the countries of Asia, a
‘‘thought leader,’’ . . . With regard to the establishment of both democracy
and a market economy, Japan has amassed a wealth of experience without
comparison anywhere else in the countries of Asia . . .’44 Foreign Minister
Taro Aso also reiterated that India, Australia and New Zealand must join
the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ structure, and that ‘internally, ASEAN should have
common democratic values’.45
The Japanese government’s policy on East Asian integration in 2002 is
generally considered as ill-considered, under-researched, and insufficiently
formulated, its main goal being to limit China’s expanding influence.
Japan’s proposal of an FTA with ASEAN in 2002 was motivated primarily
by a desire not to fall behind China. Japan’s attitudes and positions
regarding East Asian integration are still unclear. Japan energetically
pursued EPAs with the six original ASEAN members, but remains
uncommitted to the East Asian integration process as regards support of
a regional FTA. It is clear that Japan desires to strengthen economic
relations with ASEAN nations by means of bilateral EPAs as a strategic
means of preventing China and ASEAN from growing too close.
In 2003, Japan began conducting broader research into an East Asian
community, prompted by concern that China might lead the regional
cooperation and integration process through shaping the theoretical and
policy research of NEAT on regional cooperation and integration. Former
Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone became Chairman of the
Japanese-sponsored Council on East Asia Community (CEAC) in May
2004. It held a series of seminars on how Japan should assess East Asia’s
strengthening regional integration, and discussions as to appropriate policy
responses. The Council released its first report,46 advocating three principles
that should accompany East Asian integration in August 2005. First,
it should promote regional peace, progress and prosperity. Second, the East
43
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0512.html.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
http://www.ceac.jp/e/pdf/policy_report_e.pdf.

394 Lai Foon Wong
Asian Community should be open, transparent and compatible. Third, the

community should focus on functional cooperation rather than institutional
development. The report also suggested that the Japanese government
arrange a ministerial level conference for the specific purpose of considering
East Asia policy.
Japanese official and academic circles recognized that, regardless of
whether or not Japan supported East Asian integration, the region’s
interdependence was increasing day by day and a new type of regional order
was taking shape. To this day, however, the Japanese government speaks
prolifically while acting minimally as regards East Asian integration. The

Japanese Foreign Ministry official for Asian affairs released a document47 in
the autumn of 2005 that raised the notion of East Asian cooperation,
regionalism and integration, but failed to explicate any substantial plan of
action.48 The Japanese government, moreover, is still extremely concerned
about the American view of the East Asian Community as it regards the
United States as an irreplaceable partner in the security and economic affairs
of East Asia. The view from inside Japan is that East Asian cooperation
should be open to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, and that
an East Asian Community should not influence the Japan–US alliance.
ASEAN Regional Integration policy

Two events had major influence on ASEAN development during the 1990s.
ASEAN membership rose from 6 to 10 members between 1995 and 1999,
making it an organization that spanned the entire region. Although ASEAN
expansion maintained regional peace and improved its international status,
development gaps between original and new members were apparent,
creating a duality that hindered ASEAN unity. The second event was the
Asian financial crisis, which ended the economic growth that ASEAN
nations had experienced since 1990, sending some members into political
and social upheaval. Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Vietnam each sustained different degrees of economic
damage between 1997 and 1998. The entire ASEAN economy fell by 8.4% in
1998. Indonesia, the largest member, was hardest hit, and experienced
unprecedented changes to its political system in May 1998, when Suharto
was forced to step down after more than 30 years in power. These two events
accelerated ASEAN integration and played huge roles in spurring East
Asian cooperation.
47
Yamada Takio, ‘Towards a Principled Integration of East Asia: Concept of an East Asian
Community’, 18 November 2005, http://www.ceac.jp/e/commentary/051118.htm.
48
Ibid. The article raises four principles: first, East Asian regional cooperation must be an
‘open regionalism’; second, East Asian cooperation and integration must be a functional
cooperation but without pursuing institutionalization as in the EU model; third, the East
Asia Community must rely on democracy and freedom, and respect human rights; fourth,
the East Asia Community must strengthen trust and cooperation in the security realm.

As ASEAN faced the tremendous political and economic changes in the

international environment, it began, between 1990 and 1993, exploring ways
of adjusting its political, economic and foreign policies to strengthen its
cohesion and increase its international standing. The Fourth ASEAN
Summit in 1992 proposed a new policy direction, first and foremost toward
expanding the scope of the organization. After the Cambodian issue had
been resolved, ASEAN began exploring channels of membership within its
body for nations of Indochina, thereby enhancing its international status
and influence. Establishing an FTA was another objective. The ASEAN
recognized that globalization was making economic competition increas-

ingly fierce and engendering the rise of economic blocs such as the EU and
NAFTA. In order to meet the challenges of globalization and regional
integration, ASEAN decided to establish a regional FTA within 15 years,
from January 1, 1993 onwards, whose function was to promote internal free
trade, establish a genuinely integrated market and manufacturing base, and
lure foreign investment.49 The ASEAN also wanted to strengthen relations
with China and Russia, both of whom were invited to an ASEAN foreign
ministers’ meeting in 1991. The ASEAN summit in 1992, moreover, decided
to enhance dialogue on regional security issues; this was the first time
political and security problems appeared on the agenda of a foreign
ministers meeting. The ASEAN also launched the ARF—the only regional
multilateral mechanism for political and security dialogue—in 1993.
It could be said that ASEAN nations were focused more on ASEAN
economic integration and strengthening the role of ASEAN in regional
political and security problems during this time, rather than being active in
East Asian regional cooperation and integration issues; they had no unified
vision of how to proceed. Mahathir’s call for the establishment of the ‘East
Asia Economic Community’ (EAEC) in 1991 got a lukewarm reaction from
other ASEAN nations.50 Despite Mahathir’s insistence, ASEAN agreed to
the organization only on condition that it changed its name to the ‘East
Asian Economic Caucus’, and integrated into the APEC framework.51
Although ASEAN agreed to EAEC’s exploration of possible expansion of
ASEAN regional cooperation into East Asia, it had no plan to hold regular
meetings, and emphasized that it would not allow the EAEC to become
institutionalized or a trading bloc.52
The ASEAN was devoted to the creation of an AFTA. At the ASEAN
economic ministers’ meeting in September 1994, it was decided to accelerate
realization of the AFTA by shortening scheduled common tariff treatment
from 15 to 10 years hence, and bringing the implementation date forward to
49
‘Singapore Declaration of 1992’ http://www.aseansec.org/5120.htm.
50
Richard Stubbs, ‘ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?’ Asian Survey,
Vol. 42, No. 3 (2002), pp. 441–2.
51
Ibid.
52
ASEAN Annual Report 1991–1992, http://www.aseansec.org/11491.htm.

396 Lai Foon Wong
2003 from 2008.53 The ASEAN proposed, in July 1994, the achievement of
its larger vision. This included economic integration of a larger ASEAN, and
the advancement of economic cooperation and development among
ASEAN nations. This would ultimately promote economic competitiveness
and the ability to resist foreign pressure, as well as ensure the health of the
regional economic bloc. The AFTA schedule was further shortened from
2003 to 2000 at the Fifth ASEAN Summit in December 1995, when it was
agreed that the six original members of ASEAN would reduce tariffs to no
more than 5%.54 At this meeting, ASEAN also made membership
preparations for Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.55 Perceiving future

excessive development gaps among its members, ASEAN decided to
promote development of the Mekong River Basin. The ‘Basic Framework
for ASEAN–Mekong River Basin Developmental Cooperation’ was passed
in November 1996 at the First Informal ASEAN Heads of Government
Meeting.56 The ASEAN enhanced its attractiveness to foreign investment
the same year by establishing the ‘ASEAN Investment Area’ and ‘ASEAN
Industrial Cooperation Scheme’.
As the financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 had shaken the confidence of
foreign investors in ASEAN countries, ASEAN realized that the only way to
reverse the downward trend of foreign investment was to prevent economies
from slipping any farther into recession. This required accelerated creation
of an ASEAN FTA. The Second Informal ASEAN Heads of Government
Meeting in December 1997 adopted Vision 2020. It outlined ASEAN’s long-
term objectives, namely establishment by 2020 of a stable, prosperous,
highly competitive economic region that allows the free flow of personnel
and goods.57 ASEAN elected to form the ‘ASEAN Investment Area’ by
2010 and liberalize intra-ASEAN investment by 2020. The primary goal of
Vision 2020 is obviously that of boosting the morale of ASEAN nations and
strengthening business and investor confidence in the region. The ‘Hanoi
Plan of Action’, which formulated specific policies for implementation of
Vision 2020, including accelerating ASEAN’s economic integration and
strengthening cooperation in finance, science and technology, infrastructure,
telecommunications, and human resources development, was passed at the
Sixth ASEAN Summit in December 1998. ASEAN also shortened its AFTA
schedule one more year to 2002, at which time the six original members
would eliminate their tariffs.58
53
ASEAN Annual Report 1994–1995, http://www.aseansec.org/9435.htm.
54
‘The Fifth ASEAN Summit’, http://www.aseansec.org/9375.htm.
55
Ibid.
56
‘Press Statement of The First Informal ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Jakarta,
30 November 1996’, http://www.aseansec.org/5206.htm.
57
‘ASEAN Vision 2020,’ http://www.aseansec.org/5228.htm.
58
‘Hanoi Plan of Action,’ http://www.aseansec.org/8754.htm.

The East Asian financial crisis also made ASEAN realize the importance
of broader East Asian cooperation. After the crisis, the gap in economic
strength between ASEAN and Northeast Asia grew, ASEAN’s gross
domestic output dropping from 9.7% to 7.6% of the East Asia total.59
As China has replaced ASEAN nations as the world’s most low-cost
manufacturing center, certain manufacturing chains relocated directly to
China. Recognizing that economic recovery for some of its members and
achieving economic integration would be impossible unless this trend were
reversed, ASEAN sought integration with Northeast Asia and a closely
cooperative relationship with China, Japan, and South Korea. This was to

prevent the economic marginalization of ASEAN, and possibly allow it to
become the heart of East Asian economic cooperation. The ASEAN
launched the ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ mechanism in 1997 to promote dialogue and
cooperation with the three countries. The second such ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’
meeting in 1998 led to the decision to institutionalize the ‘10 þ 1’ and ‘10 þ 3’
frameworks and hold annual meetings. The ASEAN primarily focused on
promoting financial and currency cooperation with Northeast Asia from
1999 to 2000, in order to formulate risk prevention and resistance
capabilities that would effectively prevent financial crisis. The ASEAN
signed the Chiang Mai Initiative with China, Japan, and South Korea in
May 2000, strengthening the cooperative frameworks at the disposal of
monetary officials. The ASEAN proposed the East Asia Summit and the
establishment of an East Asia FTA and Investment Area at the Fourth
ASEAN ‘10 þ 3’ Leadership Summit in November 2000.
As it enters the 21st century, ASEAN began actively to promote the East
Asian cooperation and integration process in addition to advancing the
ASEAN FTA and the institutional development of ASEAN. Plans for
completion of the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020 were discussed at
the Eighth ASEAN Summit in December 2002. This marked a significant
change in the ASEAN attitude toward integration. During the 1990s
ASEAN had no intention of letting ASEAN integrate as the EU had done;
the ultimate goal of the ‘ASEAN 2020 Vision’ of 1997 was indeed not the
establishment of an ASEAN Community. The 9th ASEAN leadership
summit in October 2003, however, issued the ‘Declaration of ASEAN
Concord II’, which provides a framework for establishing a broader
ASEAN Community.60 The ASEAN Community comprises three compo-
nents: the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Security Community
and the ASEAN Social and Cultural Community.61 The Tenth ASEAN
59
Pang Zhongying, ‘Dongmeng yu Dongya: weimiao de ‘‘Dongya diqu zhuyi’’ ’ (‘ASEAN
and East Asia: Subtle ‘‘East Asian Regionalism’’ ’), http://www.neat.org.cn/chinese/xsdt/
contentshow.php?content_id=59.
60
‘Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)’, http://www.aseansec.org/
15159.htm.
61
Ibid.

398 Lai Foon Wong
Summit developed a work agenda from 2004 through to 2010 which it calls
the ‘Vientiane Action Plan’. It proposes specific policy measures to unify the
ASEAN market and production bases, establish a regional FTA through
dialogue partnerships with ASEAN nations and form EPAs with major
countries outside the region, to consolidate economic and trade relations.62
The first East Asia Summit in December 2005 confirmed ASEAN as the
driver of the East Asian regional cooperation and integration process.
Regional Integration Policies and the Development

of China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations
Table 5 gives a brief summary of China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN
relations during the post-Cold War era. China–ASEAN relations underwent
major transformation in 1997 and strengthened rapidly from 1997 to 2000,
through institutionalization of the relationship under new mechanisms for
dialogue and cooperation. Although Japan–ASEAN relations have also
made progress, the pace of development has been relatively slow,
particularly in view of Japan–ASEAN relations having begun much earlier.
Japan and ASEAN began multilateral negotiations in 1977, with the
establishment of multilateral dialogue and cooperation mechanisms and
regular leadership exchanges. China and ASEAN did not begin official
contact and exchanges until 1990.
Figure 6 and Table 5 suggest that coherence as regards China and the
ASEAN regional integration policies is the result of rapidly developing
China–ASEAN relations since the late 1990s. Figure 6 shows that the
number of exchanges between leaders of China and ASEAN began to
increase in 1999, surpassing visits between Japan and ASEAN leaders in
2000. Moreover, in less than 10 years (1997–2005), China and ASEAN had
established 27 mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation, six at the
ministerial level—only six less than those of Japan and ASEAN, which
have created 33 such mechanisms in 28 years.
Table 6 below demonstrates how the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis made
China and ASEAN regional integration policies more congruent.
The table essentially indicates that China, Japan and ASEAN policies of
regional cooperation and integration were intimately related to the pace
of development in their bilateral relations. Malaysia initiated the creation of
the EAEC in 1991. Although Japan did not respond positively, this had no
negative impact on Japan–ASEAN relations as other ASEAN countries
were also tepid in their response. By the end of the 1990s, however, the
situation had changed. After the Asian financial crisis struck, ASEAN
countries reached consensus on promoting cooperation in East Asia.
62
‘Vientiane Action Programme’, http://www.aseansec.org/VAP-10th%20ASEAN%20
Summit.pdf.

Table 5 Japan’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with ASEAN and ASEAN
Members
ASEAN Member EPA Histories

Singapore Japan–Singapore EPA (JSEPA): Signed January 2001, effective in
November. This was the first EPA between Japan and an ASEAN
member. Japan later used this model in its EPA negotiation with other
countries.
Malaysia Japan–Malaysia EPA (JMEPA): The two countries published a report in
December 2003, agreeing to begin EPA talks. They issued a joint
agreement in May 2005 that the principle content of an agreement had
been reached. In December 2005, they signed the JMEPA.

Philippines Japan–Philippines EPA (JPEPA): The two countries created the JPEPA
working research committee in August 2002. In December 2003, they
decided that talks would begin in 2004. They issued a joint statement
in November 2004 that agreement had been reached on the main
content and that they would work to revise and finalize the agreement.
Thailand Japan–Thailand EPA (JTEPA): Thailand’s Prime Minister Thaksin and
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi agreed in November 2001 to conduct
research on the possibility of a bilateral FTA. They agreed in April 2002
to begin negotiations on an EPA, and talks officially began in February
2004. They issued a joint declaration in September 2005 that they had
reached agreement on the main content.
Indonesia Japan–Indonesia EPA (JIEPA): The two countries announced in June 2003
that they would begin research into the feasibility of an FTA. They
issued a joint statement in June 2005 that talks would begin in
July 2005.
Brunei The two countries agreed to begin EPA negotiations in December 2005.
Vietnam After finishing discussions regarding Vietnam’s entrance into the WTO,
in December 2005 the two countries agreed to form a joint research
group in preparation for EPA negotiations.
ASEAN ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP): Japanese
Prime Minister Koizumi proposed a FTA with ASEAN in January 2002.
Japan and ASEAN signed the ‘Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation Agreement’ in November 2002. The Ninth Japan–ASEAN
Summit declared in December 2004 that negotiations would begin
in April 2005, in the hope that agreement could be reached within
two years.
China’s and ASEAN’s enthusiastic promotion of regional cooperation and

integration in East Asia naturally pulled them closer at this point. Japan,
on the other hand, was less enthusiastic. After the 1997 crisis, the Japanese
made efforts to build the AMF, but gave up in the face of US opposition.
Meanwhile, China and ASEAN joined together in promoting East Asian
cooperation, by means of the ‘10 þ 3’ arrangement. The Japanese did not
begin to exhibit a positive response to the promotion of regional cooperation
in East Asia until the 21st century, but in reality, Japan still lacks sincerity
and does nothing (Table 7).

400 Lai Foon Wong
China–ASEAN
Exchanges
Japan–ASEAN
60
50
40
30
20

10
0
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Fig. 6 Comparing China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges

(1990–2005).
Conclusion
There are various explanations for the relative pace of development in
China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN relations during the post-Cold War era.
Structural factors, such as the disappearance of the bipolar world order,
explain why China–ASEAN relations caught up with Japan–ASEAN
relations in 1996. But they do not explain the acceleration in China–
ASEAN relations since the late 1990s, or why Japan–ASEAN relations have
lacked similar vigor. This article holds that the uniformity of China’s and
ASEAN’s regional integration policies and the inconsistencies of Japan’s
and ASEAN’s regional integration policies are significant factors in the
contrasting pace of development in their bilateral relations.
Closer China and ASEAN regional integration policies since 1997 have
caused China–ASEAN relations to broaden and deepen. China’s decision to
pursue regional integration with ASEAN was based largely on strategic
considerations; it did not want to stand by and watch ASEAN continue to
weaken after the financial crisis. China’s concern was that once ASEAN lost
its capacity for independent action, it would turn to the United States. The
American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 highlighted
fissures in the US–China relationship, making China believe more firmly still
in the need for multi-polarization in order to prevent the United States from
working with other countries toward containing China. China’s positive
response to the ASEAN policy of promoting regional cooperation and
integration in East Asia has enhanced mutual trust. Other countries
questioned the importance of, or lost confidence and interest in ASEAN
while China cast ASEAN as a faithful partner. It had proposed a free trade

China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Relations during the Post-Cold War Era

Table 6 Development of China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN relations (1990–2005)
1990–1993 1994–1996 1997–2000 2001–2005

China–ASEAN Weak bilateral relations, Lacked mutual trust, ‘China Bilateral relations strength- Mutual trust strengthened,
relations nonexistent multilateral threat theory’ and the ened as multilateral dia- economic and political
relations South China Sea dispute logue and cooperation dialogue expanded to
have a far-reaching was institutionalized on security dialogue and
impact; ASEAN wants more levels and in more cooperation
help from multilateral fields
institutions to control
China’s behavior
Japan–ASEAN Japan sought to become a Japan proposed several Multilateral dialogue and Japan wished to raise its
relations major political power, ideas for strengthening cooperation expanded international standing;
and hoped to expand the cooperation with ASEAN, and deepened, and attempted to team up
scope of Japan–ASEAN but they were just verbal cooperation occurred on with ASEAN to resolve
relations from the declarations more levels and in more regional and global
previous accent on fields (especially during security issues. Worry
economic relations Hashimoto’s tenure) that China–ASEAN
to political and relations had grown to
security issues close pushed Koizumi
to strengthen bilateral
relations with ASEAN
401
402 Lai Foon Wong
Table 7 The Evolution of China, Japan, and ASEAN Regional Integration Policies
1990–1993 1994–1996 1997–2000 2001–2005

China Actively strove to establish diplo- Began participating in ASEAN-led Actively responded to ASEAN’s Positive approach to regional
matic relations with ASEAN multilateral organizations, efforts to create the ASEAN cooperation, took genuine
countries in order to participate through which it gained experi- ‘10 þ 3’ mechanism action, actively promoting EA
in regional multilateral activities ence and shed suspicion of cooperation and building of EA
multilateral organizations community

Japan Opposed regional integration; Realized the inevitability of regional Still passive attitude toward Participates in EA cooperation, but
lukewarm reaction to regional cooperation; participated in mechanisms like ASEAN talks much and does little; pays
cooperation limited regional activities like ‘10 þ 3’, primarily concerned lip service to EA integration and
ASEM in 1996 with monetary and currency an EA community but adopts no
cooperation real action
ASEAN Promoted economic integration; Accelerated the ASEAN FTA and Again accelerated ASEAN integra- Institutionalized ASEAN integra-
inactive on EA integration, no ASEAN integration, as well as tion; actively promoted integration, embraced ultimate goal of
unified view promoted the enlargement of tion with NE Asia, strengthened ASEAN community; actively
ASEAN cooperation with NE Asia in promoted the expansion of EA
a number of fields cooperation and regionalization
with hope of ASEAN occupying
central position in regional
arrangements

area with ASEAN in order to reduce the impact of China’s accession to the
WTO. China’s policies have indicated to ASEAN that its development will
spur that in Southeast Asia.
Japan’s regional integration policies are inconsistent with those of
ASEAN, primarily because the United States is at the core of its foreign
policy. This leaves Japan no choice but to abide by the United States rather
than East Asia (or Asia) policies. Japan has actively promoted regional
cooperation in the broader Asia-Pacific because it does not support regional
cooperation that excludes the United States. Japanese leaders, particularly
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, have strongly advocated ‘open

regionalism’ and ‘soft regionalism’, because Japan is unwilling to sanction
[what they see as] the closure of East Asia into a highly institutionalized
community like the European Union. Japan persists in following the
United States, thereby depriving itself of the ability to unite with and
promote regional cooperation and integration. Japan can participate in the
integration of East Asia only by returning its focus to Asia. The US factor
aside, Japan’s financial and economic difficulties have impeded it from
playing a larger economic role in the region. Domestic political turmoil is
a contributing factor to Japan’s regionalization policy remaining in a state
of paralysis; the rapid succession of prime ministers in the 1990s also
inhibited necessary adjustments to it. During the time that Koizumi took
office in 1990 to 2001, Japan had six prime ministers. Three so-called ‘major
policy statements’ promoting political relations with ASEAN and regional
cooperation were issued, but the overall impression ASEAN countries have
of Japan is that it talks much and does very little. China has displayed
enthusiasm and flexibility since the late 1990s, as ASEAN countries
have become increasingly dissatisfied with Japan. Japan’s efforts towards
building better relations with ASEAN and promoting regional cooperation
in East Asia are largely perceived as lacking sincerity. One example is
that of Koizumi’s search for ways to broaden participation in the
East Asia Summit, his main objective obviously being to balance the
‘10 þ 3’ cooperation in order to prevent China and ASEAN from growing
too close.
ASEAN’s active promotion of regional cooperation and integration with
Northeast Asia is a means to prevent its own marginalization. After the
Asian financial crisis, the economic gap between ASEAN and Northeast
Asia widened. China’s economic development also put the ASEAN
economies under increasingly strong competitive pressure. China has
responded positively to the idea of cooperation and integration in East
Asia and is a source of support and reassurance to ASEAN. The ASEAN,
therefore, seeks China’s economic strength in order to promote its economic
recovery and development. The ASEAN’s long-term goal, of course, is to
become the main link to outside countries, acting as East Asia’s center of

404 Lai Foon Wong
cooperation and integration, thereby solidifying and enhancing ASEAN’s

international status.
Appendix
China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges
(1990–2005)
Year China–ASEAN ASEAN–China TOTAL Japan–ASEAN ASEAN–Japan TOTAL

1990 9 5 14 4 10 14
1991 9 7 16 11 5 15
1992 25 10 35 9 10 19
1993 18 13 31 10 9 19
1994 9 11 20 6 6 12
1995 10 13 23 11 11 22
1996 9 13 22 9 8 17
1997 14 12 26 10 13 23
1998 8 11 19 15 16 31
1999 11 25 36 14 16 30
2000 17 18 35 17 25 42
2001 28 28 56 13 13 26
2002 21 15 36 10 10 20
2003 17 20 37 8 17 25
2004 18 18 36 13 3 16
2005 22 25 47 11 12 23
Leaders include Minister-level personnel and higher.
Source: Xinhua News Agency, Japan Times and Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites.

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol.

China–ASEAN and Japan–ASEAN

Lai Foon Wong*

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* Corresponding author. Email: laifoon@gmail.com

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

That their relationship represented a convergence of (Asian) values5 also

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

China Greater support for

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Fig. 1 Research Framework.

to promoting East Asian integration. Japan, however, has been relatively

China–ASEAN Relations During the

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

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Fig. 2 China–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges (1990–2005).

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

China–ASEAN Leadership Summit

China–ASEAN China–ASEAN China–ASEAN China–ASEAN

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China–ASEAN Joint China–ASEAN Joint China–ASEAN ASEAN–Beijing

Fig. 3 Major Mechanisms for China–ASEAN Dialogue and Cooperation.

in trade, investment, and technology. China officially became a full dialogue

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

Joint Science and Technology Committee, and the ASEAN–Beijing

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

China has also adopted economic measures aimed at countering anxiety

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

Table 1 China–ASEAN Military to Military Visits (2003–2005)

2003 2004 2005

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Post-Cold War Japan–ASEAN Relations

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

Table 2 Former Japanese Prime Ministers’ Visits to ASEAN Nations (1990–2005)

Time in Office Prime Minister Destinations

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ASEAN countries in January 1997 proposed expansion and deepening of

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

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Fig. 4 Japan–ASEAN Leadership Exchanges (1990–2005).23

Japan–ASEAN Leadership Meeting

Japan–ASEAN Foreign Japan–ASEAN Economic Ministers

Economic and Industrial

Fig. 5 Major Mechanisms for Japan–ASEAN Dialogue and Cooperation.

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

Table 3 Japan–ASEAN Summits (1990–2005)

Year Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN Japan–ASEAN

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Japan–ASEAN forum at the upgraded vice-ministerial level began, in 1993,

Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

China, Japan, and ASEAN Regional Integration

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Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 1, 2007, 373–404

Table 4 Expanding the Scope of ASEAN ‘‘10 þ 3’’ Cooperation

Year Area of Cooperation

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Chinese, Japanese, and ASEAN Regional Integration Policies