Professional Documents
Culture Documents
!Dr71t Welltaoo'tt
Dep~••nt ~~ Phllosop~
RoOi11 Universlt", Kontrea1 JUDe, 1984
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The main aim of this work ie ·tq elucidate the meaning and
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significance of Kant' s not'ion of inte~lectual intbi t'ion. The
. problem " in
is made to place Kant's treatment of the '
~ts htB~o~iè~l
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mode of' '4u'roan cogll-i tion' ie ,~~ot-fn t.o be 'ce~,tral ,ta ,hi~ "Copern'ican
1 b,Y mân.Y' of' his ·successqrs).' , whil~ m~st of. th~ 4iBëu8Sio~ ,1S
exp~~i tor;y r'athe'~' ~han crÙ'ical.' sorne indi~~·tion ls giVl?n pt the
kind ot ·dit:ficulties which' ICant.' e Qverall <position in"lrolv8s. ~
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Ré.wné
Le but pr incipal de cet oeuvre 8'51 t dl eX&DIiner, d..e 1"'· ... ...--1-
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CHAPTUt ONE 1
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DEFINITION ABD DmIVATIOH 1
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CRAP'l'ER Tl!llB. INTELLECroAL IN~ITION ÂUD ,XAlf~m a..rAPH!~I~~,' - 54' ..
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1. Th~&" in 1108.1("
2. Ecrt7P.~, ar~et!p •• '
3. '.eqhani•• and teleo1087
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IaDt ' . oonoeption
c
ot -tatih•
4. Thè 11017 will
C~CIDDDa BaARD
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BIBLIÔ<IllPBf 124
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Prefaoe
litt le attention trom Most Kantian soholars whose warks are ~~ailable
ph110.ophi~1 ~rk.
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Instead of viewing Kant ~s one who refUtes the rationalists
while merely rebùking the empirioists, I have tried to understand
hi. as a philosopher intent upo~ oonstructing a system - le a
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the bibliography 'to 'a minimum, inctuding only those worka actually
Sb.ni.lel (UI:)
J(et, 1984
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CHAPTER ONE
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the idea ot intelleotuâl int11i tion has tor hila will hopet'ully emerge
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when Kant writesl "our intuition oari never be other than sensible".l
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As a mode of awareness, intuition may be either sensible or
pure "hen they arise Bolely out of the nature of the subject' s
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taculty of intuition, and are empirioal when they result from that
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What ia the nature of the kind of awareness whioh !'"ant ',#
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describes as intuitive? Obviously he is not ooncerned with su ob
tbeae abare witb the kind of intuitive swareness Kant has in mind
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Kant defends the legi timaoy of the former concept, he would regard
to deny that Kant frequently does use the general term "intuition"
when speaking speoifioally of Bensi ble intul tion, as, for example,
the immediate awareness we can have of our empirical selves (t'brough .....- '~
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intui tion.
the term. However the oonoept of intui tien had alre~dy been used
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eseential oharactèristio of int11ition, or intuitive knowledge, ,ia
of' knowledge whicb Leibniz labels It symbcli'O,,4 and which Kant refers
to as "discursive".
, . répreiën-tanen... Thus "nen Kant speaka 'Of intuitien, h& haB in mind
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~f tnteileoluai intuition.
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ci tëd more or less 8II~t te the clat. that, tor Kant, the COIlcept.
linked. It CEi.ll be sholG1, hovever, both that Eant .does not hoI4
this ~ew, and that tt. rejeotiOID 111 rec:;.uired. b7 the ~tral
Ro.., àacordiDg to Kant the on~ kiDd oC intuition whiob oould ;yield ".'
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1t aight be objeoted, ot ooUrse, that the pa••age oited
"t~e" position. .AI. ..ost 'oriUo. agree that Kant '. vriting. cOD'\ain
DWllerous ino0D8ist~01e8 '01' greater 01,' lesser i.portuoe, the
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Aocordj.ng to Kant our mowledge i8 a priori eUher when it
that we only DOW things aa th-.y appear. To lœow thug.. a. th87 '-
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are in thells.lves - ie. throup iDtellectual iDtui tion - meana t-o
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mow thell vi th out the sub ject1ve 1.pos1ti ~ of a t01'll wh1 ch ret'lecb
the tact that our Dature a110ws us on1y to e%peri.ce ~rt'ain Id.Dd.
'J:ant traces a11 the " priori ~ iD ouzo lœOvledge to those teatures of -'
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ar~t
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at the <0>
A.a~hetl0 tdlloh' ai... to
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~.tra"e that -8J)&Oe'''''' ,
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proposi ti,.one whtch are mOIdl to be true a priori, and whtch requ;J.re
Dl -oth.l" 'wardB, t'he l'_BOIl the truth., ot geOII.tr, hav. the peOQli~
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kj.nd ot o~taillt7 the,. do la tut t~e7 sUplat." Ut a general W\r,
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th. 8p&~ial pl'operiiés vhi~ aIl objeota an,et uMbit. 1Jr viriu. ot
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bë1q objeots tdl~ch .!!. int1l1t (through outer sese) •. si,.lIÎi~ar17 •.
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th~ ....... cm lM' cu be ~e 1ohat' the wor14' Ile .xperi8llcé ri'll ooQt~1"II .
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be one ot tlle pla.7VS and,woulti IlOt ~ reGlopi~ 117· u., ... pari 'ot
'the protluctiOill. ,
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iDtui tion?, Gi-V8I1 that. the •• qùestions are Haningt'ul. ilt is erid. .-t
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nbj.otlve ~,0J"1~ ,to. 'the oOllolusiQD that ,.ap~o., is a. tOl'll o~··
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there 18 DO . .~!o ,OOlm.OUOD b.t_en
._ei~le' ~t~ti~.' ., .,
1:h~ ~o..p". o~,
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fo ~l,H ·....t 'ha. b .... ,nidl i;Btv.1·U,Oa 1. "a .cs.. ~~
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n.o••sarilJ hav.'tn ~ vith a1l oth.r pheao-.aa,in Yirtu. of the
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,b, u.tu1te4. and iielda
'ordiDarilJ t~ ~, a.
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aen.e-p.ro.pti~.
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80 1. 'b7 th1.nking O~, b~ing. equipped with alternative a.aGr7
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~ha.:t 'Uler.'~ ~.
b. 1i.k., .ine 1t 1. n~ ,
.aàetb.t,'q with M1doh ft oould b~o_.'
aquaia-
t. rea.OI1. .
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. or No4tp'U.n:q. 1]Ih1ob, aooording to ha1i, oUmot' be pr••ent lA tut
, .oele ot OOCDiilGil thrOQgh, whrob alone Dowle. ot th., "hia« iD
tbat tbe aubjeot would "oreat ... thé objeo1i in the a<J1 ot' Jau~w1Dg 1t).
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to UIq oritio. to bé Iogioal~ que.tionabl.. ~.tt, for in-'-oe,
be DO other ldada ,ot iIltlQ,tlO1l apart trOll tbe .'!D.ibl~ &Il~ the
iDt.;Ueoiual. AD. oné oan argue 'Chat .,tht. preais." 1e llBPl1oit~
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_lob, at le.ri to .000e en. .~, .1Ugate th. ottenoe. Firat of ail,
~t, ooulet, argue that aiao. th......l'bl. aad. th. 1at.l1.otllal are,
. lD the lIOat'l-er'al _••• , the 01117 'oop1~lve capao,"t1e. 'cd whioh _
have &IQ" d.t.nliDat. ldea, i t ':la ~ot so UDr. . s~abl. to label &IQ",
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18 a. natural, ae t~t b7, whtoh a "aÔll-"~B1"è" '80• • or'' copitl_
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d.eelMd ,to 'be ~.17 aot:l"e.
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'O~OD '. .~ lIIaiq ~t hia pr.d.oessor., that th. hUMil II1lbj,eot 0aD
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t~aoelld the 1:1a1~s . of 11811.11:»11:1. t7 aDd
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attain 1na1&ht,
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ihto a_UV•
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,b7 ..aa. 'of * II1!-peri.O!, pveq iat.lleO'tual lIOde ot
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ti,OD_, !bl.
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Pla\o _'" J)e.~e.. In the Pbaedo tor iDdaoGe, ... an told "tbat,
llev.~th.l_.,
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we ~ 'note q4lrtaiD' illporlailt
. , ai.ilarj:ti••·• B.oth
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"things in 1:h.... lv•• "J &Dd both tènd to de.orlbe th!. oopltlve
that tbe .ind P.roe! ve. the true nature of things arter reoei v:1ng
illuainaUon frOli the Ught of ae. .on'. And Plato too "Peak. 01 the
for that" . . .ing ri. th, th,e _bel'. .ye d , which hie pr.d~oe •• or. bel~e.e
the
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~perO'eptiOn", 1 t 1. botb Datural &Dd re••,ODable tor Kant to do
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and this 1a sotllething wh10h ve oQ.nnot avoid doing. The reasOD. this
avare bath that l have not thereby "made" anything aotual, and that
va oan fOrQI a 'ooncept 1s aotua:l we must see whe'ther .or not 1 t ls .,-
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pre8en:ted to us in i)ltui tion. Thus the 10~oal distinotion betveen
possibility and aotuality has tta souoe in the fact that our
to be necesll~11z
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the case tor aIl ~ow1ng subjects? Clear1y i t ie
possible than ill an a priori deduotion ,of our mortal1 ty. If suoh a
the dietinction
, bet~en pOdsibility
, and actuality was valid, no~
merely tor t'hings as we kn9w them, but for things &8 they are in
for knowing subjeots with a cognitive nature such aa our own, and
The faet that we diatinguish betweèn the possible and the l'
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actual la theretore explained by relating it to a contingent
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feature ot our cognitive apparatus. But in order for ihis prooeed- l
ure to make sense, in order tor us to reoognize the nature of our
other types of understanding, he has not shown the need for the
ls not that between our kind of understanding and ~ other kind, but
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arsenal.
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2. Snch a Ti."
ie Ï1Ilplied, for instance, by Wilkereon's olaim that
~a.nt "obviou-s-ly meant 'intuition' to lDean ·seDse-impJ'8iJsion'."
T .E. wi lkerson, Kant· s Critioue of Pure Ree.san; -A. Commenta for
studettta (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 197 l •
6. ill!!., p. 45
7. Future Meta
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14. R. Descartes, Rulee for the Direotion of the Kind, in The Philo$-
ophloal w.orts o~ Deaoartes, traus. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross
(CUJbrid.ge Unive'r13ity Pres8, 1911), Vol. l, p. 1.
nOUIDenal wor-ld. (It is worth remarki_ng that Plato ia, in fact, _,.-/
a knowl'edge ,of the Forms invôlves. One IlUst ei tber have first-hand
relate only to phenom8lla, never to thlngs ip. thellselve.a. ' And sino~,
knowledge ~f appearanoes.
chàraoter of our knowledge and i:ta consequent Uai tation, has otten
intuition Qut can never deduoe them from U. n5 And explaining th.
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our 'be,1ng' subjeots ol intelligible .experienoe,' d~pends upon
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the
4!lven th~_ a dream ... 7 Thes~ pure conG.pts, 'taken together, give us the
.oODoept of an abjeot in generall 1 •. wa reoognize onlY what ~ail8
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The~e,' ,then,' are the' mal~, rea.oDs Kant orter'. tor' h~lding
~hat ôur knowiedge ot objeots is dis~sive'. ' What !lUst now be
answer 'to this que.tion hall beau put torwàrd by Gloubel'1ll8D. ,and
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t,he aooount vh~9h tol19W8 ls ,l~ge~' ~aB.d on his bteJ"PretatiOD ~
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We oan begin b7 notin:g that this view Was not' original t'o
B.rk_ë1~ _ay ve,ll Han ditterent things by, the te~ "i~e,a", ,the,.'
lI'ever:theless.,
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i t ,is r ..irly olear tha~ both philO~Ophèr.
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8Ja.d dia~inpt, and ~h. notion of "dia'tinctn.ss" ip.volved h.re is' no~
'a ..ere ~onya" ~or oiaor1tj" put" al.o ~xprèaaeB ~he beHet that th.
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the sensès, are, r.al, th1ngs • • ." , and that 'thq ,oort"~spdnd, to,
or res ••ble, the ideas in God's ..lnd which 'ar. th.ir. arckety,peà. ,
that "ail
, 'thiagé that
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eiis't ar.. o~ly parti'C1ilar", while gener.a111;7'
&;pd "th.' qualit~.s or Ilodes ot ,things do' never real~ ,e:d.a~ • ,•• "l9
B.rkeley h ~ot to, be 'here underatood as only ,rej.,c'Ung cognition
_,J.r.
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NOrd~"
21 whioh' "are Sp' Apt t,o ....
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mpQs. ' h•
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erslll&Dd.wag." 22 lit
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~b&r. and. -naked"-, in 'the beli,e~ that,. .
" 80 'l~g '.as l oœ~in• .} thoughtll 't~ 'rq, otin ideas,. -div••iecl
ot word" r do not, a•• hov 'r oan. ••lIlib' b_ .i~ak_'. ''!'he.
objecte l 'OoDBj,d~r" ,1 ole..rly and ad.equatè~ Jalov. 2 3. "'
'. The p!Oblelll with.' oonoep~a, ther.:e~.r~, 1s- thâ.~t .being ~riè.r~l :or ,
abstraot, ·th.ey do Ilot· d~B1gDat" thlngs ~ioh 'aub'8ist iJ1d.pen4ç'U~,
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i.D:toras .1qlas,. "U la a UAiversal17 r.oèived dlaXi.. tbat ever;ything "
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- Whiob eXista ls a part ioularft , , ~onoepts oan on~ be said' to
dif',f'eren~ thingA, or dif'ferent parts o:t the ·a~e thing. ' T)l-e diS'tin-
the)' are lèd to, falaely dist1ncuiel1 between, say, a thing's e~sténc.
Oertain aspeota ot the' objeot are einph~8i"ed at the expense of' oth'~8,
aa, far instance, when tbe subj'eot cb.oof!les t'o oon8~dér a thing's
th. kzao~JJg 8ubje~t. !Ji ;this -way it ia laio. oÎl4r s.s it appe~.
",0' a partioular _aubjeo,t, and, D,ot as i t ~. ~~ i taei:t •
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Jmovl-edge '18 11.;1".d -ta app'earance. beoauee th~y beUIit,fe the ,hUll8ll
aubjeot has .at his diaposaI: the -oapkoity, for a' non-discUrsive ,
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Qaae 11; 18 tl;le structure and the limitation!J of th,e hWD8l1 mincl -
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2. IdeattO!!ali'b'
01v~ that t!le ~tui ti ve unde~8tf:lllcU.ng doe. Ilot mow 'th. thing
in 'it.elt,
, thrO~.gh the u~e ot "lDer•, .concepts"." the question
. a.ri~eal
b7: what '.e&Bs~ exact,ly., 1a the thing in i tselt. to be known? The
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I.DiiW!IlBliIiJI."IIiIII••_ _ _Ial_.rr.IfIilll-IIIiIl"R~,!AAolI:'&'il'?, ~"',;:1.-.LM'_ _IIIIII_Iii'illtiIulJa
__p _ _ _.PIiiR"'...
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If Roh .. Ildnd, CGU1d be' "aid 'ta POSS"S8, ooncepts thé,. wou1d
bè sé1t-apeoU';ring down to t~e leV81 ot indi"idua1sl tbe
oODo.pts'tpéaàelveB vou1d detérmin_ wbat partiaulars'tè1l
under th•• , ,a"'\ller, that vaU- 'around tor app'liC!~tion to an:r '
nitabie particularB tbat might turn up .25 ,
The proble. vith ~his d.finition however, ae walsh ge8ms lo he'
pos.ese concepts. In the Loeio Kant poiDts out that ~'i t is ••re
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tautology to speak ot general or odmmon concepts". From thls it
, intuition.
rea80nably iDferred: tirst ot a11~ tram th. taet that the pre-,
I8:D t ians took 1d'ea.tional cognition 'to be the paradigu.tio 1II0Ü a't'.
oompàres w'i-
th, ,
'the kind ot bONIedgè 'whioh
, . i8, thougbt t~ pO ••esa.
God.
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seeka to represent both his own and his predecessors' views on the
a superior 1D0de 61' l$:nowledge not sililply beoause i t ia rree frOID the
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'thing OanDot have 'both ld.nde of property: ego be both a thinlting and
distinot idea whioh he has of his Otm mind oOlDJ)letely exoludee the
of God, lie are oert~in that he oan oarry into effeot aIl
that of which we have a st1nct idea 0 And even if we
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One might ask why we oannot say the same about hwnan oomprehension.
The answer 1a that \"e could, if we only ever employed 1n our thoughts
that through such clear and distinot ideas as that which he has of
Descartes holds that the world or the Reali ty whlch we knO\# i B the
The ohief olaim of this seotion (viz. that Kant must oonoeive
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divine knowlege. For 00 the one hand he agrees with Descartes and
without seosory organs, does not rely 00 sensation for hlS knowledge
and insists lnstead that the only genuine ideas we have are those
Acoopding to him,
reality Wlth perfect adequacy is beoause it, like the divine mode
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see the s&me ob Jeot tha t l'fe tee 1 • • • ,,34 ; for on ly th'D,s 0811 he
of thines.
Kant aIl agree). However from this Berkeley does not draw the Kantian
from that lChich God mows. (To be sure, he ooncludea that God' s ideas
sUIe confidence in the basic affini ty between our world él.nd the world
in the mind of God (for the only "things" which e%1st apart trom
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spirits are ideas), this aaounts to saying that our ectypal ide••
oommun1cate to us".37
Wha:1; has been _id above can be g1 ven final BUpport througb a
Kany orities feel that while this migbt stand a8 a reasonable state-
ligbt of vhat has already been sa1d, the above quo1;ation makes
.ode of COgll1 tion to t.hat vhioh w ~ tact have. For va do !.2! DOV
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errorB. The IdeoB in Guestion are those of the Boul, the world as
intuition, and the objeots in question can ~ever be intuited b.7 ua.
The reason for this ia si.ply that beoause the things designated b.y
tirst kind of failure, his beHef tbat he can come to know the
recognise the ditterence betveen the Idea.s of Pure Reason and the
.t.. trom the faot tbat he believe3 the idea. of God or the soul to
philosophies in his OND terme, so.e sense can be made of his olai••
then, tbat the mind "shapes" the objeot, it can, in so•• sense, be
pure~ generai ooncepts, and the objects they detereine are only
oertain vay. The Ideas of Fure Reason, on the other hand, purport
the faot that we have these a priori Ideas, nothing ean be aonoluded
existenoe", eo tbat the act o~ knowing the objeot tbrough the Idea
The conolusion we oan draw rro. this la tbat .!! the Ideas o~
'0.
Resson did oreate their objeots, then we would have intelleotual
intuitlon. And this gives turther support to the olai. mad~ above,
ideationally •
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3. ereativitz
intuition, ft provides one or the . .in supports tor hi. ~he.is that
least three reaSOUa tOI' JD8:!t1ng the conneption. 'l'he tirst, suggested
appear. to hia. Bowever the arguaent only holda for a aubjeot who
is aff.cted by objeots that are aimply given or preaented to hi••
If his perception w&s at the same ti.e a oreation of the objeot, there
The third reason Kant has for linking our passivity in sens&-
by the tact that the subject is able J.o idenUt'y separate exper1enoe.
intuition. But, tor the r.asons giv.n .arli.r, mowledge lIhiob r .....
on the use of gen.ral oono.pts oaD only b. ot things as the,. appear,
would not "think" at al1, in Kant 's liens of the word; for "thinking"
For as we have seen Kant himself argues thst, st the deepest level,
by a pure ly aot ive eub jeot • Snoh au idea 111&7, aB Kant speoiti oally
human knoNledge, Kant ia not simply attaoking stra)'. men. Por while
aotivity. And after casting aside aIl his previously held beliefs,
his own essential being, and after six days of meditation hls work la
aotivity through which God oreated the world ex nihilo. Thus our
4. SubJeot-Objeot Identity
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the PoubJect, and partly by the nature of the obJect. In turn, the
wh10h the subJect has of the object (eg. its adequacy or completeness).
exactly how the nature of our mind affeots the oognitive relation
between ourselves and the objeot to be knO\iIl, and thus to find out
exaotly how our nature (qua knowing subjeots) determines the oharacter
For instanoe, according the the Aesthetic, the faot that ~ll
the abjects we know through outer sense exist in spaoe refleots the
.
it from one particular perspective or vantage point ta the exclusion
\fuile this way of looking at Kant has certain merits, there are,
are appearances because they are 1n space, not simply because we know
Kant the relation between ourselves and the phenomena known througb
that we only know the object (1e. the thing 1n itself) as it appears
vantaf'"e point.
the fact that thinge exist in time entaile their merely phenomenal
status for the same reason that their existenoe in spaoe implies this.
But this reason cannot be that, due to the nature of our seDsibility,
the object. Suppose, for instance, that an abjeot w&s knOMll retro-
spectively - ie. trom the "va.ntage pOl.nt" of' the present ve apprehèn-
reason, l.n such a case, why we could Dot claim to mo", the objecrl
a. it ~ in i tself .
tbat U tails 'to reoopiae the ext~'t to whioh Kant separates the
phea...aal wor14 wh1ch ... mow trOll the ll0\M8aal world of whloh onq
Gocl ha. kaovlecl«e. l't iapl1e. tbat it we cou.ld sOlMhow overcOlie the
ttpattal ....t ......poiDt, 'b7 movi.Jls' i't trOll ....T1 po.aible perspecti...e,
_ 1IOU.l4 'he DOW the object Ilot ... AIl appearance, but as it is iD
-~flf "i
, -
-' <.
"J"
./1'
- 46 -
that the oognHive relation between subject and objeot be rree trom
, "
- 47 -
recogIll. tion of' the truth of this view. His denül that ve CM know
ob Ject are identical that the subJect could really clalm to know
o
Finally, this interpretation helps us to understand Kant 1 s
and infini te. 56 When subJect and objeot are identical, the
cir~erence o~ a circl ••
It should b. clear froca wbat has 'be. . aa1d tl1&t, dAce iDtelleo-
the subJeot, and the identity of subject ...nd objeot, the l.Dtuitive
part of the subject. One lIay, of oourse, choose to regard this idea
otherWl.se.
, HOt"ever it i9 perhaps 1I0re f'ruitt'ul to relate the idea
for in e1ther case tbe subJeot 18 beld to stand outside of ti11le (God
being eternal, and Hme being Dothi:ng but the fOnD of sensible
like his knowledge, does not depend on anythine other than. the
but must have i 10 giveD or preaeated 100 hi. ~rOfl elaevllere. The aubject
Thus WCI cau see hov the ooncepts vith vhich ... have b e .
etc. ~ are cODAeoted to each o'ther not only logical17,. but clialeatioaill.
- 49 -
separated from one another, despite the faot that they each have
by, or opp08ed to, the one i8 ~ntailed by, or opposed to, the other •
\
- 50 -
9. ~., A106.
10. Ibid., A68-B93.
--,.
11. nid., A68-B93.
12 . .!!!!., A68-B93.
13. Proleeoeena, Seotion 22, p. 64.
14. ct. M. Glouberm&ll, "Int.Uectual IntuitiOD _d CopiUve A.s1l1ila-
bi1it7" (Journal ot the British Sooiet7 tor P.h.Do.eao1ol7, 1919),
and "Conceptualit7& An Essay iD R.trien1" (lCsDt studie., 1919).
15. G. Berkeley, '!'he PriDa! le .. of Huaan lI1ow1 / in Berk.l'l's
Philoaophical Writings, ed. D••• Collier BoOka, 1965),
Introduction, Seotion 2, p. 45.
16. Berkel~, Prinoiple.. , Seotion 90, p. 98.
11. Prinoip1e .. , Introduotion, Seotion 13, p. 52 (oiting Look.'a
Essay on Huaan UnderstandinG, Bk. IV, Ch. 7).
18. Principles, Introduction, Section II, p. 50 (oittng Locke's
Essay, Bk. III, Ch. 3).
19. Princip18", Introduction, Section 7, p. 47.
- 51 -
29. Eg. T.E. Wllk.rson; of. Iau.t's Critique ot Pure Reason, p. 110.
35 ../ C~. Latt.r 100 Johnson, J(arch 24, 1130, Phl10aophioal 1Iriti.D.p,
p. 246.
44. Onoe again, it i8 worth noting at thls point that Kant 's whole
aooount of sensible intuition Is deoidedly proble...tl0. He
f'requently refera to sensible intuitions as "repreaentations".
Tet since a repreaentation, for Kant, ie normally aonsidered
to be, at least to some enet, the produot of intelleotual
activity on the part o~ the 9ubject (rather than aomething
which ia aillply "given lt ) , auch c.. description would seem to rob
sensations of the primitive i/IIIDediaoy whioh Kant elawere
aaoribes to them.· The underlyine problem here conoerns spaoe
and time. Kant argues that space and time are both illllDanm't to
sense experiance and, at the same tilDe, a priori forma ot
sensible intuition, and i t is this,in hie opinion,- whioh guaran-
tees bath the illlllediroy of !fensible intuitions, and i;heir
oognitive assiailability. Only if' both of these oonditions are
mei; can the critioal philosophy be saved from fa.lling !nto either
radioal sceptioi811 or complete idealism. But, as sOlDe of hie
early critios pointed out, the dual status thug eiven ta spaoe
and time r_ins probleaaatio. For th.re seHls ta be no good
rec..son wb;y, if-they are to be viewed as a priori forDs, they
should not be regarded ae products of tho intellect (in which
case that whioh is "given" in sensation ia alreac:Q- lDediated -
le. It i8 not simply "given" at a11).
46 • .!2!!!., Bl45·
\
"
- 53 -
57. Ibid.
"
-
if.'
,l:':
~1-
n."" ~
'." ..
-54-
CBAP'l'm 'l'HREE
and negative senses whioh attaeh to the lde. ot the noumenon, and to
la theretore necessary.
ohapter "On Phenomene and Noumena" where Kabt bringe in the oonoept
AlthOUtn Kant revrote parta ot this chapter in th. seoond edit ion
fo110'Ns:
i) If the objeota lie bow are appearancea, ". IllUst have the
intuition.
mate.
and our employment of this ooncept. Kant' 3 vieN 1S that 'He neoeaearlly
posses8 or arrive at this notion, and cao undeTstand 1t, or detine it,
l,
1:
ln two ways. Either way 1t 1s extremely indeterminate, but 1t la not 1
,
\i
i'
l 1_
lIo,f ' : . \ : ' _ ' • r':.. :1
~,
,...
{ ,
- 56 -
J'or 110 expre •••• a r.oopition o~ the ~aot that there 18 sCMlething
J:
," i:
l'
1 •
- 57 -
Kant ooncludee from this tbat the root oC the problem lies not in
the nature of the vorld, but ln the way that we think. Our under-
. .late\ ap, ......08. oaa be oalled the liOUtellOll, and tbat i't ahould
\ '
an ..
.. _1le4 tIle ~ca. I1s lIOrdiDC ta 'th. . . passapa 1 •
l
'
.
- 58 -
following way.
obJec~". Here we have the concluslon of lI.ant 'a critlque of h15 own
concepts a..nd noumenal obJects vas merely an assumptlon WhlCh had not
- 60 -
It mieht be obJected to Nhat héoS been sald that Iole have off'ered
flrst of' aIl that lt sl.gnlfied the limlts of' our understand1ne, but
f"eneral. Thl.S l.S true; but 1.t should not be difficult ta see that
sees 1. t, the 1imi ts of' our knowledge are a f'unction of ",hat we can
offered that it 1.5 far too sympathetio to Kant and overlooks some
first two pOlnts Walsh makes are both made by Kant hlmself. They need
uoes not UGe the contrast between & disoursive and an lntuitive
Y-ênt doee tend to uphold that oid Platonio vay of tb1nking Mhioh
thl;' 1 -sue, and a number of point:> cr--n be made wh1ch to sd.. erten't
--..
-\.~ ["'~x_----------------------------------""""-----
- 62 - 1
really says that our jud.gements are "less true" beca.uee they only
ll.m1.ted due to the nature of our understanding, ond is, in this way,
lng would enjoy. Second ly, KL.nt does have re6-sons ror holding that
of WhlCh 1.8 not dependent upon any-thing other than itsE:lf. In Kant'e
upon us. Now one mi&bt be tempted to say here tbat 1f there are
th1.ng' in themsel vos the,. DlUst a180 be idee1, Slnce they have being
be mE-de l.n à.fence of Kazst, but which at the f1&8e t1ae shova ho.
· '~;*~i&",,--------------------------------------------""""""""""B3------"----".~
- 63 -
the hum~ mind and are not intrinsic features of things in themselvee.
not, and cannot be, Kant's view; and to think of his Copernican
position. In his view, if both form and content were "given from
th81r source within the subJeot. Thus, the tuDdamental reason that
< •
- 64 -
particulér things in the spatio-temporal world are what they are, and
possess the properties they do, becsuse of their conneotion with the
immutable Forms. Pléto does not specify the exact nature of this
connectionj but on the basis of his aooount one oao point to three
archetypesl
l '
- 65 -
we have in sensation are caused by God' s i,ieas, the latter are more
hons are ODes whioh are wbol~ the product of 8uch afteotion, suéh
object, Cor the object ia oreated by, and aooording to, the Idea, and
their objects, for they are produoed by the object aCfecting the
not the kind of' "aooordanoe" with whioh Kant ia ooncemed. What he
How, then, oan .,. laIow that there 1s a ooof01"ll1 t.1 b.tveen such oonoepts
'l'~
.SJi.I had, ln effect, denied). For whlle they do not create their obJeots
olusion of t~e Aesthetio that the objects we know are only appearances.
now see to what e%tent Kant's uae ot the di.tinction between the
said to be siai lar to tbat wh.iob obta1na b.t . . . . .otnea and arch.t7j)e.
- 68 -
doctrine also involves the id~a that ectypes in some \iay resemble
does not hold, even when writlng dogmatically, that there are
objecta (in the way thnt Berkeley believes there are distinguishable
speaking, only one noumenon, and that ia God, who ia (or, if one
believe that a blue idea in the mind or a man resembles a blue id.~
in the mind of God. And trom Plato we hear, for instance, that the
.
as the pheno.anal world la oharaoter1zed b.1 oaus~l necessity, being
spheres.
not, of' course, confined to the firet Critique. In the Dialeotic of'
relevance. Firat o'f' all, Kant here employa the ooneept to help explain
why suoh prlnoiples can only be regulative, and '.'Illy meohaniBll and
1 Zlng the out lines of' Kant' 9 argument ln the D1aIect1c of Teleological
Judr,ement.
0:-lg1n, and the reasOD they oooupy the1r relat1ve positions in the
c.) The parte of an organ1.sm can only come to exist, and can only
have the fOnD they do,. in relation to ',the whoie. (An oak leat, for
cause <md effect of the other part 9. (Thus, leaves are produced and
sustained by other parts of the tree, and at the same tlme provlùe
from a purely meohanlstio point of Vlew. Nor can lt account for the
concept ~ that le, unless we see it from the out set as something
and exp laln how, ond \olt thlD \o,hét limita, they may be legi tl.!Dl1tely
God c.E its ultlmate ground . . HO\'Iever thlS solution i8 still dogmatic;
that the humun mind cannot fully understand Nature from a purely
declsive. de oould then make a vaUd move from the f,· ct that w6 ce.nDot
at least sorne thlngs ln Nature could not have come into existence
des1.t;n - and hence a.s depenaent for the1.r e:U3tence upon a supra-
the stage- where we refleot upon experience. ;ihen Kant says that,
con cept S (even thougb a refusa 1 t 0 do so would serious l.y hinder our
dlfferent arder; and far from bel.n€, cont,radlctory oan, and do,
Our';'OSl va ly)?
111 whJ' cac teleolog2cal prl.Jlclples only heve regulé_ tl. va statua,
cle .. rly C<>.D11ot an8wer the first ouestion, for they deny the preml.s8
1s a whole, the parts of which are combined in < certain way. To our
\,
7
( \
- 76 -
omblnatl.On, as the "ground" of' the whole. 3ut we do not se. why
the pé:.rts bave to be comblned 1n the way they é:.re. Tb~ r&ason for
whole; but it does not enable Us to see them, and their manner of
,
\.
.(
- TI -
Nt.: sh COU:'1 be used ta brinr, out the contrast 1.0 question. The
,ense beyond thnt WhlCh lt. has in the flrst Cr1tlcue. There, lt
13, for the most part, loterpreted mathamat1ca11y. The 1dea of space,
contineenoy.
- 78 -
why ... e lllUot regard SO.. e things in Nature as purpos1 vell" produced.
form a whole appears oontingent to our minds. If lofe oould see the
HOl/ever our minds are not able to cognize things in this way;
idea of the whole. This idee of the whole 1s then viewed aB the cause
the who le, and the form of their oombinetion, 1e s1milarly seen as
belne determined by the idea of the whole. This kind of causali ty,
purposive oausslity; for the only way in whioh Iole can conceive 1t
\
1lIi!K'''' , ~.
1
-kE";{~' ~J.!" ..
T
- 79
i \
rtrst instance, 1>7 the idea o~ the "hole - the production ot the
dratm t'rom what has been said above. First of aIl, 1t lIay be not.d
~
Ma.y we theret'ore conclude.that, sinoe, an intuitive unders\anding
in~ui tion would yield insll.)ht lnto the neoesstty of things (ie.
would enable the subjeot to see both the existenoe and the forlll of
~.
-~- l. '
lm~lies that suoh a subJeot MUst re~rd its own existence and
that things .!!!!!!!i be the way the,. are simply because it ls È!.!!l that
thines be that way. And this" one might assume, 13 how God (tDe
necessary in the sense that they are in aocornance with the lawa of
Reason.
On the other hand, however, there are grounds for rejeotine this
But this does not Mean that a. different kind otl'Wlderstanding would
necessity only has significance where sODle kind of- oontraet with the
- 81 -
each other':' Certainly, he does not state his pooition very oharly.
it fo110115 that i t must exist; and t'rom the faet that it exists one
can infer that it must be possible. If, on the other ha.nd, a thing
nor, from the fact that 1t exista, may one oonolude that it.s existenoe
l S necessary.
priori concepts ror the sarne basic reason tha.t it has to construct
..
- 82 -
Between these two sets of limite lie Ideas such as thosi of God, the
there can be no distinction between the ideal and the reel (ie.
i tse1f a mere possibili ty. It would simp1y say: "AIl objeota that
.
between contingency and neoesaity (concepts which are logically
- 8) -
abjects that l know ~". The pOlnt Kant 18 lIIaking in the passage
arlse, and only have meanine, for subJeots like ourselves, whose
ual intuition must be thought of ae one who, unlike us, could "infer"
intuitlon, would not, and could not, look at things in this way.
,.;hole ltself. 19
balne sUbsumed under them. But the faot that this iB so, the fact
be ita effects. Of course the same could be aaid about the pure
which assures the concept of its objectivity, at the Bame time proves
l'
that there ia nothing contingent about the aocordance between it and
..
- 85 -
of purpos1. ve causali ty .
18 pure chance. The problem, says Kant, ls th<;>t ,,.,e c&nnot concluslvely
concepts 18 irreducible:
. ' been produced solely by meoh~iBttc me8Da, it ~an be proved that the
~~
"
- 86 -
'-;Jpears contlneent to UH. ThlS lB due to the fnct that our concepts
One should not conclude from tbis, nOHever, that intellectual intuition
•
- 8ï -
\ioule. dlso obviate the need, peculiar to the hUJD8ll mind, for teleologr.
---/
,
/'
/
~i .
- 88 -
2. Ibid., A249.
3. 1!?.!.!! ., A2 52 •
4. Ibid., A253.
b. ~.
7. Cf., tor instance, his htter to Herz, Feb, 21, 1772, Zweig,
p. 7li a180, Crltique of Judeement, pp. 256-1.
I8.
I9.
Cri tique of Pure Reason, B72.
-
It 18 worth noting that these oonsiderations .ight throw some
light 011 Begel's thinking in his Phenoa_oloR ot Spirit.
Begel is COllllllon13' crit~eiz.d tor attemptlng to oonter
neoessitl" on wha:t h m~ifeBtly oontingent. Be 1s also
aocused of treat1.ng hi." ~jeot. in an illegi timately
teleological atanner. Bowev4tr, given that in the Phenomenology
Hegel 18 trying 'to demonstrate the possibil1tl", for man, of
that ltind of oomprehension whioh Kant believes to be possible
on13 through intelleotual intui tien, the validity of these
and ai.ilar critioisms ia questionable. liith regard to the
tirst point, Hegel oould well argue that 1t rests on a
dogmatio assertion of an unbreakable oonnection between the
eapirioal BDd the contingent. What he 18 tt71.ng- to do is not
deduoe a priori what o&Il CIlly be known .lIpir1cally; for
through inteUeo'tual intuition everything Is cognized ln an
empir1cal vay. Rather, he 19 attellpting to show, contra Kant,
how the h1Ul&D a1Q.&is capable ot divestint; of Us ccmtingency
that whioh h kndIIP 8IÇirioally.
\
Wi th respect to th. question
of whether Hegel 's out look ahou1d be claesif'ied &s t.le010«1oal,
this .a.ch at l ...et oan b. said. If' Hegel is indeed tr;ying to
d_OIllJtrate th. pOllsib111ty ot that kind ot kIlovledge which
~t aoeredih to th. intuitive underatanding, and 1f he bas
aaal1111ated what Iant 8&7e in the nialectie of Teleological
J'udgeaent, then there are good grounds tor believlng that he
himeelt would dispute t~e idea that h1s system oan, atl'ictly
speald.ng, be de .. cr1bed as teleolopeal. It would OIlly appear
th1s -7 to one who _s not a Hegelian.
f
-90-
r"
!ntelleotul Intui tiCll BDd Praotical aeasœ
being BD und.rlying m:1 't7 'bet. . . . the theoret ica1 and the praot1oal,
,1
the nou.enal aad tbe pbeDOIIenal, treed.oe ad neo.sai t7. Thi. lari
a100e the basio unit, ot, tor instanoe, tre.dOll aad Deoe•• i t7. Ali
Pure ReQson tells 'WJ that _ have no reason to suppose that the
OVD beins. '!'he pheDouaal world t. Dot 'iapq th. wor14 whioh 1.
uni t,. o~ nCMmena _d p~OMIla, or trNd_ ad. n.o•••i t7. Hi. 01&1_
'11'
'U
~'!..
"
And ot thi. latter kind o~ proble., the d••pest aad .oet general are
possible 80de ot o08l'dtlaa. for the human subjeot. Por tro8 thie 110
/
apparent17 -M}ove tbat _
we
--
oamaot DOw whether '" are rr.e, nor
.-
oan we ."sr 1Iak. a oonolus1..e .-n.luatlcm <at tbe theoretioal 1....1)
explata h01l, aa4er ftoh eaaditlœ., .-raliq (as oOlloeivecl b.J bill)
1. po••lbl. at all.
., '
93 -
oOD.oiou~e•• , IUld tlai.• "~aot" auet serY. a. the ba.ic da~ UpOID
recosnit1on ot the ob11gatory power of' the aoral' law ill not a part
ho,,",".r, . 'thi. kind of' o.rtaint7 1. 110,", pOllsibl.. The oonôep,", 'ot
8114 .0 . .y not enelld. to th. 1l0000000ai r . . l... But a "pOli! t1ve à_aept"
t.
o~ h ••do. - which N'OlIl4 . .ble 118 to 1Uld..rriand the 1"_1 DA'tur. o~
rreedo., and 110 Ialow- 1;bat our OWil will 1.8 tr. . - oould, in EaIlt
"-
vie .., on17 'b. arrived. . , b7 ..... ot an tnte1.1eotual in'\u1:t101l.
SiDc. ... do not bave "hi. kiAd ot i".i.pt bDt oDllolu4•• tba't, lt 1.
ll1po••1ble tor ua "'ft' ",0 Jalow. in the tull (i•• apeoulatt".) • _ _ •
If. lNet 1;1~ ooat . ." with a ratioaal17 .crawacled hf.'tb ,:ln tr......
i..or:\ali't7, an4 the ed.llteao. of God. SUob a tat'ÜI oaa 'De OCIIIÛ. . . . .
.
- 94 -
"iD the iDtereri __ ot R.... OD~ to t'ol1ow thls l'ath. 'l'hi rd ly , sine.
this taith Dot on17 at't'ira. the objectiv1t,. ot the .oral la.... but &'1.0,
While this doe. Ilot t.ll ua & ~...t d.eal, it clMa 1Dd1cate the
aion whioh 1 .. nei ther " proo••• ot thouaht, Ilor a t'cnw of' iDtrollJ)eo'tlOD tL
('througb 'llhioh Ne would senllibq intuit our phen.....al lIel..... ). Bor
18 this 'th. only WI&7 lD Mllob thi. "t'aGt. ot rea• •tt ia QlÜQ.ae. It ia
q1Üte po.sible to ~terpr.t Kant •• ar~ 'tbat th. lav ha. objeoti....
..
J
95--
the la" _tails the objecti'rit,. ot the la". 'l'be sill1larity betwe_
int.ll.ot1l&1 iAtuitiOD. ft1s, a't l_at, wafl the vie. ot Iaa't ' .
)
- 96 -
settiDC hi.selt goals. ()Qr Idea ot Roh l\Il Act can th.-retor. oa17
th. OODo.p"ta ot s.dble iAtui t1011 01' ot an;, oth.r Jd.Ad ot repre• •ta-
,
tioa Ar. ~117 abstractions.
aot 01' 1Iltelleotual iDtu1t101l. '!'hi. inai_t, eq. ptch"t., oan 'he
~
ts the sroua4 ot the .e00ll4. Th. question nov ls. .œat just1t'i•• ua
111 A••erU.!I« that pr.oi •• ~ !!!!!. i . ihe ditt.r_oe be'twe. th. -tvo
onq one ne08e.&.I7, i . th. tao~ that iD th. s.oOllld Oio.. IN bave IID
a8 tvo different Jd.nds of ac't. The latter is really only the former
subject and &Il obj.ct lillkecl by an act o~ knowing, but just one aot,
Hi) Iant 'a philo.opJb- requir•• that th. huaan llind be capable ot
bt.llecillAl iDtui tiona theref'ore h. cnydIt to have allovecl 1 t to be
the very notion o~ the thing in itself' as "a wraith whioh ~ades when
nothing but th1s very act1vity). And these are the more sign1f1cant,
here. Certaillly there are ,ocoasions when Kant seellls to concede the
Now as we have seen, in the second Cri tique Kant geems to come olose\
The mystery which surrounds the statua of this "fact" - that i8,
whioh we apprehend our obligation under the moral law - may reasonably
moral obligation ean only have genuine sienificanoe for free agents;
how, then, can we be sure that the moral law applies to us? The
ting the possibilit;y that tle are free, and ,dth showing how the
- assumption that we are indeed t'ree and are bound by the moral law
of man nS both oogni tive subject- and practioal agent. But to a man
1
actue.lly engaged in the world, confronted with more.l issues and "
moral Judgments. 'le cL.-n, hOllever, have ~Ihat may be called existential
the effect, perhape, of complf'x causes which thour;h unknown are not
SCl.ence. But at the existential level, thls possibility l.S ruled out;
for the l.mmediate apprehension of the moral law c~rries wlth It, or
:..
Kant therefore avolds invoking an intellectual intuition on
"rer;.li ty" of moral obligation being brought about by our "idea" o~ the
-.n, in actual fact the lcnowl.ng subject of the first Cri ti~ue and' the
indi viduala.
.,~~.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
- 101 -
...
It i5 in order ta avercome this unsatisfaotory state o"f
1ntui tion wh1ch oan provide the common foundation of both theoretical
(the self anù its freedom being Dothing but this setivity). Here
aware of the moral law, we have te assume that we are t'ree, although
consciousness which the subjeot has, or oan have, o"f his OWD heedDaI
- 102 -
sensible world va experienoe, whioh attempts 1.0 show how and why ve
preoisely at the point joining two worlds, from whence they may be
bringing to light.
----"i,:•••IIlI!!lJ.tt·..~"""''!II;;:as-------------------
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and the manner in' whi ch i t i 8 known are not, ul t ima te ly , independent
obvio\l9 point that the underlying unit,. of the noumenal and phenomenal
The Iaok o~ identity between 3ubjeot and objeot i3, at the deepest
level, the reason we oan never have genuine knowledge of the thing
Kant assigna to moral or re1igious tai th, and the role i t pl1Q'8 in
•
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extent he too could argue that faith must rest on the will. However,
wh en the speoula ti1re going ge't s rough. For Kant, however, tal th,
The ides that the will muat bear the burden o~ our oosnitive
tuaI aotiv1ty of God. 'l'he di:t':t'arenoes between man and God are not
the speoulnti ve enterprise. For instanoe, unl1ke God 118 use eensory
that our will has a rider range than our understanding19 - sOllethiDg
di ffloul tl'l
difterence between lI8:n and God whloh llAke. i t 111lpossible :t'or our
knowledge to resemble his ln any way: n. .ety, tbe taot that our
God the t"o are united. Consequentq, whereas we ooq intui t objeots
consoiousness, God oreat •• the objeot in the aot or lalowing 1't, and
2l
so la identtoal to 1t.
~,
t
/
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and through whiob ve oreate the object (ie. the encl at which we aill).
qual1ty or the world in which we live d.penele upon us; the MOunt
, ,
.,
- 101-
tha't ft oan, 8Dd ehould, ••ek to eeoure )œow1edge atter the aanner
&ot raUonally 8Dd puraue the good in .ooordallce vi th the Itoral la••
peraonall t7' to the poirat where h. Dever hall 8IQ' desire or mo11natiOD
"ho17". KeAt r.ooph~e that tor a beillg lI1Ioh as 1INl, who beaidee
poeeesiDg rat lom.1 i'ty 1a al.o obaracterl ••d b7 ut_U:'7, thie id.al
.. 1l1tiut.l,y unattainab1e. COIleequent17, be iasue. th. tol10wln~,
iJlperat:l.",e. For Oocl (:I.e. tor a hoq vill) there :l.a' neYer a oontl:l.ct
beoaus. Ood t., will oaDDot b. det.md.ned 1»7 aDTthing other tlum
Reason. COIlaequent17, tor Ood the aoral la. wo.ll'd not appear in ..he
fora ot aD t.p.ra~iY.1
"1 oapt" :l.s hera out ot place, because "1 will" la alreaq
ot 1 t.eU lleoe.aarilJ' iJ1 ha.rrIaD7 tdt.h the la". 24
'!'ha reason tIb;r _ expert__ the aoral la. a. a OOIIIIlIaDd t. tbua
., L~
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sinoe we are .ere17 baaan, the .oral law does Dot al~8 deteraine
the object, or in the aooordanoe between the lall and the deed; rar
Olle mght also clrav an &11&1017 between the paradoxes whioh are
trOm ".1 •••• 1".... God's mowle4p, on the other band, whlch one
A hoq vill, on the ot!Mr haDcl, whioh n.ver aot. otbervi •• thM
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in Kant 'a philosoplq. Both oono.pt., are ueed to olarit) and e%plaiD
the huaan .,i tuat ion as Kant see., i t • But lIberea., the foraer notion
0/
wrq. The att . .pt to ,mow thinga a8 God knOWII the. ia, in Kant ~.8 view,
tutUe, and oazmot even partial~ BUoo.ed. But the attelllPt to will
.0 tar ipor.el, but Waioh l i•• at the "ePT b-.rt ot IaDt t s oOiloep-
.
oontinpDG,1 ln this reali t,.. PrOli this 1t .....el rea.OIlable to Wer
pJ"illoiple tut "all ia for the beat in this ben ot all possible
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sion to Goel (a8 cODceiveel b;y Kant), since it would involve some
understanding would have no use. 'l'bWI, a Kazltian God woo.ld not say,
"Thinga are neoes.arily the vay they are beoause it 13 beri that
th.,. b. thb ~"J rather, Ue would say, "AlI thinea thnt 1 mON
'!'he çue.t1OD her. OOll081'1ls the point ot doine so. ~. Idgbt sa:, 'tJaat
for one Oarl still asle: wby -19 it rational to perform an action for
aot in accordance with the moral law for no apparant reason whataoever,
Kantian context. The concepts of Reason, the holy will, and the
01' ReaaODJ but this is Il8re1J' to say that Be thereby gives expression
only to say that His will i5 determined by His nature. One mieht
aak: why does God act as He doee? Natura.lly, in Kant's vieN the
aimply have fa1th that what He does ls for the best. However it 15
diffioult to see how even the God we have been desoribing oould
Naturally, Kant doea not view his own ph~losophy in this l1ght.
Spinoza who, he saya, "takes away aIl intelligenoe from the original
explains, is a view of the world which must deny that the unit Y of
the basis o~ the preoeeding discussion, however, one has to say that
5· Ibid.
8. ~., p. 38.
9· ~., p. 40.
12.
•
I. Kant, Groundwork of H. J.
Paton in The Moral Law , p. ,1
1
1
I3. Ibid ., p. IIr. 1
.
1
17. Cri tique of" Practieal Reason, pp • 148-9.
.'
- II5 -
21. Iole might note here the exact point of disagreement between Kan't
and Desoartes. It 19 sometimes tbougbt to lie in Kant' s
insistance that knowledge requires intuitions. However, 1t
should be clear frolll our discussion that Kant' s well-known
dictum tha't concepts without intuitions are empty need not
provoke ~ rat10nalist reaotion. Kant· s appos! tion to Descar1;ee
really resta on his olaim that our intuition 18 always sensible.
Concluci.ing Remarks
the eub ject oogni zes the ob jedt in an unmedi& t ed ,~y. It i a nei ther
mode of cognition the subJect determines the objeot not merely with
knowledge cao arise only where the objeots known are phenomenal •
both his own and his predeoessors conception of the divine understand-
to bring out the sharp contrast between this paradigm and the klnd
of the redicDl difference between man and God (and their respective
the difference betweeD his OWll pbilosophy and the views of thinkers
intuition plays a more specil'ic role. Kent uses i't, tor instance, to
granted regulE'.tive status, and to justif) his claim tbat moral beliets
The tradition gOp.s back at Ieast as far as the Delphic Oracle'a t'amoua
parent of the Socratlc diotum that "the unexamined life is not worth
from the tradition, yet it would not be difficult 100 argue that Plato
•
- 119-
something of' this tradition whon he declarea (in the third o~ the
the Delphic OraoleJ a ori tique .2! pure reason St pure reason le, in 1
his view, 'the only lIIeans by which a phi10sophy can oOlDe to understand
1
!
its OWll nature and liMitations. However, Kant dlffers t'rom Most 01'
.
Kan't and thinkers like Deaoartes, li'ichte, and Hegel, as ailllp17 a
JCant t.
And who would dare to aN':il'lll vith oonfidenoe the po.e:ibility 01' pu-e
and was the l'eaaon why, deapite Kant's critique, they af'tirmed not
on~ the possibllity, but also the neoessity (in philosophy) 01' the
intellectual intuition.
ot aQ7thing at a1l.
the .tatus of' the judge.ente 'set out in the critique o~ Pur. Reaeon.
lant th.re describes the nature o~ the aind and i te varlous op.ratiCIDel
- 122 -
of thi S pOBsi bili ty or, more preoiaely, ot the poa8ibility 01' our
attaining the kind of" oomprehension which in Kant' s view would onq
b. accesaiblV» to an il!-tuitive understanding. And by traoing the
Spiri t" t rather than ot intelleotual intut tion. And one 111&1 concede
•
. \
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Blbli°sr&Phl
WOrks br Kan"
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