STONE V. MISSISSIPPI, 101 U. S.

814 (1879)

U.S. Supreme Court

Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879)

Stone v. Mississippi

101 U.S. 814

Syllabus

1. In 1867, the Legislature of Mississippi granted a charter to a lottery company for twenty-five years in
consideration of a stipulated sum in cash, an annual payment of a further sum, and a percentage of
receipts from the sale of tickets. A provision of the constitution adopted in 1868 declares that

"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall
any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."

Held:

1. That this provision is not in conflict with sec. 10, art. 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which
prohibits a State from "passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts."

2. That such a charter is in legal effect nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege conferred for the
time, and on the terms specified, subject to future legislative or constitutional control or withdrawal.

2. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, commented upon and explained.

3. The legislature cannot, by chartering a lottery company, defeat the will of the people of the state
authoritatively expressed, in relation to the continuance of such business in their midst.

The Legislature of Mississippi passed an Act, approved Feb. 16, 1867, entitled "An Act incorporating the
Mississippi Agricultural and Manufacturing Aid Society." Its provisions, so far as they bear upon the
questions involved, are as follows:

"The corporation shall have power to receive subscriptions, and sell and dispose of certificates of
subscriptions which shall entitle the holders thereof to any articles that may be awarded to them, and the
distribution of the awards shall be fairly made in public, after advertising, by the casting of lots, or by lot,
chance, or otherwise, in such manner as shall be directed by the bylaws of said corporation; . . . and the
said corporation shall have power to offer premiums or prizes in money, for the best essays on
agriculture, manufactures, and education, written by a citizen of Mississippi, or to the most deserving
works of art executed by citizens of Mississippi, or the most useful inventions in mechanics, science, or
art, mane by citizens of Mississippi."

Sec. 7 provides that the articles to be distributed or awarded may consist of lands, books, paintings,
statues, antiques, scientific

Page 101 U. S. 815

instruments or apparatus, or any other property or thing that may be ornamental, valuable, or useful.

Sect. 8 requires the corporation to pay, before the commencement of business, to the treasurer of the state
for the use of the university the sum of $5,000, and to give bond and security for the annual payment of
$1,000, together with one-half percent on the amount of receipts derived from the sale of certificates.

Sect. 9 declares that any neglect or refusal to comply with the provisions of the act shall work a forfeiture
of all the privileges granted, and subject any officer or agent failing to carry out its provisions or
committing any fraud in selling tickets at drawing of lottery to indictment, the penalty being a "fine not
less than $1,000, and imprisonment not less than six months."

Sect. 11 enacts that as soon as the sum of $100,000 is subscribed and the sum of $25,000 paid into the
capital stock, the company shall go into operation under their charter and not before, and the act of
incorporation shall continue and be in force for the space of twenty-five years from its passage, and that
all laws and parts of laws in conflict with its provisions be repealed, and that the act shall take effect from
and after its passage.

The constitution of the state, adopted in convention May 15, 1868, and ratified by the people Dec. 1,
1869, declares that

"The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, nor shall the sale of lottery tickets be allowed, nor shall
any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold."

The legislature passed an act, approved July 16, 1870, entitled

"An Act enforcing the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, prohibiting all kinds of
lotteries within said State, and making it unlawful to conduct one in this state."

The Attorney-General of Mississippi filed, March 17, 1874, in the Circuit Court of Warren County in that
state, an information in the nature of a quo warranto, against John B. Stone and others, alleging that,
without authority or warrant of law, they were then, and for the preceding twelve months had been,
carrying on a lottery or gift enterprise within said county and state under the name of "The Mississippi
Agricultural, Educational,

Page 101 U. S. 816

and Manufacturing Aid Society." The information alleges that said society obtained from the legislature a
charter, but sets up the aforesaid constitutional provision and the act of July 16, 1870, and avers that the
charter was thereby virtually and in effect repealed.

By their answer the respondents admit that they were carrying on a lottery enterprise under the name
mentioned. They aver that in so doing they were exercising the rights, privileges, and franchises conferred
by their charter, and that they have in all things complied with its provisions. They further aver that their
rights and franchises were not impaired by the constitutional provision and legislative enactment
aforesaid.

The state replied to the answer by admitting that the respondents had in every particular conformed to the
provisions of their charter.
The court, holding that the act of incorporation had been abrogated and annulled by the constitution of
1868 and the legislation of July 16, 1870, adjudged that the respondents be ousted of and from all the
liberties and privileges, franchises and emoluments, exercised by them under and by virtue of the said act.

The judgment was, on error, affirmed by the supreme court, and Stone and others sued out this writ.

Ichong v Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act No. 1180, brought this
action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary
of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers,
from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
among others that: it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them
of their liberty and property without due process of law; it violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and its provisions against the transmission by
aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the
spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue
to engage therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death
or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act
or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of
citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to
engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a
prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business
of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually
engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business,
their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of juridical entities; and (7) a
provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue
such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

Held: The Court held that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power. It has been
said that police power is so far-reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit
its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to
be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co- extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework
where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields
of public interest and public welfare have become almost all- embracing and have transcended
human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public
interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to
attain or achieve public interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or
extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The
most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within
which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of
the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable,
arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived
be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private
interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees
are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means
for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute
power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty,
for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as
always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. And if distinction and
classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from
such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power
of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and
future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because
sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the
occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from
no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that
it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. The Treaty of Amity between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be
violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the
Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals
of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of
the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the
treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law , and the same may
never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State.

LUTZ VS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio
Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar
Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or
persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane.
Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for
aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose
is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause
unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus
this appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act
( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional.

Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax
under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar
production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection,
and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said
objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows
that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for
its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike
constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise
funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the
implement of the state’s police power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes
be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied
under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary of

Agrarian Reform
6 11 2010

“Equal Protection”

These are 3 cases consolidated questioning the constitutionality of the Agrarian Reform Act.
Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of
an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the
fruits thereof. RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted by Congress
on August 8, 1963. This was substantially superseded almost a decade later by PD 27, which was
promulgated on Oct 21, 1972, along with martial law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition
of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits
for landowners. On July 17, 1987, Cory issued EO 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of
the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by PP 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and EO 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation. Afterwhich is the enactment of RA 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which Cory signed on June 10. This law, while considerably
changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as
they are not inconsistent with its provisions.

In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is
also violated because the order places the burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners
only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed on the owners of other properties.

The petitioners maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under PD 27 to be the owners of the
lands occupied by them, EO 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process.
Worse, the measure would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are
deprived of their lands and the retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his comment the Sol-Gen asserted that the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the
sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a different class and should be differently
treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first distributing public
agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.

HELD: The SC ruled affirming the Sol-Gen. The argument of the small farmers that they have
been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Sec 6 of RA 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such
limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian
reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a
particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted
to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated.

Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:

(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;

(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and

(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.

The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as
arbitrary and discriminatory.

Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike
both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two
classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to
elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a
valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.

JMM Promotion and Management vs Court of Appeals

22 11 2010
 Police Power

Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the deployment of performing
artists to Japan and other destinations. This was relaxed however with the introduction of the
Entertainment Industry Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and
train performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA and the secretary
of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which included an Artist’s Record Book which
a performing artist must acquire prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent
Managers of the Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right to
travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their individual rights. JMM
intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of police
power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed
Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to
demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public
welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. The welfare of Filipino performing artists,
particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a
total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high risk” destinations, a
measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very
least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational
and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared
for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this
scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]

Monday, February 09, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the

petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending
that no offense was committed, as the statute is
unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The
petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for
relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was
premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court
the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the
Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the
review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a

proper exercise of police power of the State.

Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the

police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt.

The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and

issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law
is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against

property, but an offense against public order. The thrust of
the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
An act may not be considered by society as inherently
wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm
that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
23 11 2010

Police Power – Not Validly Exercised

Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE
CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY
AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF” The law basically
provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon
City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. QC
justified the law by invoking police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

HELD: The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no reasonable
relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.

City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

22 11 2010

Police Power

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES
IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars,
karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously
viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation
avers that the ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places
offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they
use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a
valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

Gudani vs. Senga

CASE DIGEST: G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006
Political Law, E.O. 464
FACTS:

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines assigned to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several senior officers of the military to appear at
a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an
audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections
Commissioner Garcillano. At the time of th e 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col.
Balutan a member, of ³Joint Task Force Ranao´ by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers als o received a letter invitation from Sen. Biazon to
attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from Sen. Biazon.

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing. It was signed by Lt.
Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had been invited to attend
the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gud ani
and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that NO AFP
PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan had concluded their testimony, the office of Gen. Senga issued a statement which noted that the two had
appeared before the Senate Committee ³in spite of the fact t hat a guidance has been given that a Presidential approval should be sought prior to
such an appearance;´ that such directive was ³in keeping with the time[ - ]honored principle of the Chain of Command;´ and that the two officers
³disobeyed a legal order, in violation of A[rticles of] W[ar] 65 (Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer), hence they will be subjected to General
Court Martial proceedings x x x´ Both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were likewise relieved of their assignments then.

On the very day of the hearing, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) 464. The Office of the Solicitor General notes that the E.O. ³enjoined
officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval.
Now, petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from the President enjoining them and other military officers from
testifying before Congress without the President¶s consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending
preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court -martial proceedings, initiated within the military
justice system in connection with petitioners¶ violation of the aforementioned directive.

The Court has to resolve whether petitioners may be subjected to military discipline on account of their defiance of a direct

order of the AFP Chief of Staff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY

CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL is unconstitutional?

HELD:

The Petition is dismissed.

Is EO 464 constitutional or not, or may the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a

legislative inquiry?

Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before
Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The impression is wrong. The ability of the
President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to wholly different and
independent specie of presidential authority²the commander-in-chief powers of the President. By tradition and
jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as
that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander -in-chief, and that as

a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold
that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by
judicial order to compel the attendance of the milita ry officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress do es
not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive¶s power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The President¶s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the
same limitations as in e xecutive privilege. The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section
18, Article VII, which begins with the simple declaration that ³[t]he President shall be the Commander -in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines x x x Outside explicit constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the
commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Suc h authority includes the ability of the President to restrict the travel,
movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.

Reference to Kapunan, Jr. v. De Villa is useful in this regard. Lt. Col. Kapunan was ordered confined under ³house arrest´
by then Chief of Staff (later President) Gen. Fidel Ramos. Kapunan was also ordered, as a condition for his house arrest,
that he may not issue any press statements or give any press conference during his p eriod of detention. The Court
unanimously upheld such restrictions, noting:

³« to a certain degree, individual rights may be curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its dutie s under the law depends to
a large extent on the maint enance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed without question and rules must be
faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldier's personal views on the matter. It is from this viewpoint that the restrictions imposed on p
etitioner Kapunan, an officer in the AFP, have to be considered.´

As a general rule, it is integral to military discipline that the soldier¶s speech be with the consent and approval of the
military commander. The necessity of upholding the ability to rest rain speech becomes even more imperative if the soldier
desires to speak freely on political matters. For there is no constitutional provision or military indoctrination will elimin ate
a soldier¶s ability to form a personal political opinion, yet it is vit al that such opinions be kept out of the public eye. For
one, political belief is a potential source of discord among people, and a military torn by political strife is incapable of
fulfilling its constitutional function as protectors of the people and of the State. For another, it is ruinous to military
discipline to foment an atmosphere that promotes an active dislike of or dissent against the President, the commander -in-
chief of the armed forces. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey a President they may dislike or distrust. Even
petitioners are well aware that it was necessary for them to obtain permission from their superiors before they could travel
to Manila to attend the Senate Hearing.

Congress holds significant control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet
it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as commander -in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the
position. Again, the ex igencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that the President¶s ability to control the individual
members of the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obeying the President and obeying t he
Senate, the Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes that it is the
President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Judicial relief as re medy:

The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress
to interfere with the President¶s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress¶s
right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts.

Senate affirmed both the Arnault and Bengzon rulings. It elucidated on the constitutional scope and limitations on the
constitutional power of congressional inquiry. Thus, the power of inquiry, ³with process to enforce it,´ is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of
their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that
information and the power to compel th e disclosure thereof.

It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court¶s certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution. To avoid conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person
for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise

establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with
the Senate or House¶s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly
published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an
imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

In Senate, the Court ruled that the President could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive officials from
testifying before Congress without the President¶s consent notwithstanding the invocation of executive privilege to justify
such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the other branch¶s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts,
as the final arbiter if the dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or non -attendance
in legislative inquiries.

Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to arbitrate disputes betwe en the legislative
and executive branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule,
the duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the milita ry officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

Lastly, General Gudani argues that he can no longer fall within the jurisdiction of the court -martial, considering his
retirement last 4 October 2005. He cites Article 2, Title I of Commonwealth Act No. 408, which defines persons subject to
military law as, among others, ³al l officers and soldiers in the active service of the [AFP],´ and points out that he is no
longer in the active service. However, an officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered to
be outside the jurisdiction of military aut horities when military justice proceedings were initiated against him before the
termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.

Gudani vs. Senga

G.R. No. 170165, Aug. 15, 2006

• The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members
of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

FACTS:
On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including
Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections
wherein allegations of massive cheating and the “Hello Garci” tapes emerged. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col.
Balutan and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before
said Committee, prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to General Court
Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. In the
meantime, President Arroyo issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

• Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from

testifying at a legislative inquiry

RULING:

We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who
defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, we also hold
that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military
officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify
before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of
the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.

Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress is

based on Commander-in-chief powers

As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a blanket
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to
attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable
limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally
invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent
military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives
as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive
privilege.

RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, require military
officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Congress is based
foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes the prerogatives of
the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant control over the
armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the approval of higher-
rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution vests the title as
commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the
position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command
mandate that the President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed
forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-
chief of the armed forces.

Remedy is judicial relief

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not
come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today
that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by
which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries
even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief
Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to
the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify
before Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative
and executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is
only as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode
of behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not
enjoy a similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever
weakness inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies
and legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the
Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of
government.

MUNICIPALITY OF PARAÑAQUE VS. VM REALTY CORPORATION [292

SCRA 676; G. R. NO. 127820; 20 JUL 1998]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner sought to exercise its power of

eminent domain based on a resolution by the municipal
council. Petitioner cites a previous case wherein a
resolution gave authority to exercise eminent domain.
Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which
provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government
Unit to exercise eminent domain.

Issue: Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of

eminent domain pursuant to a resolution by its law-making
body.

Held: Under Section 19, of the present Local

Government Code (RA 7160), it is stated as the first
requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent
domain if there is an ordinance enacted by its legislative
body enabling the municipal chief executive. A resolution is
not an ordinance, the former is only an opinion of a law-
making body, the latter is a law. The case cited by
Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous Local
Government Code, which is obviously no longer in effect.
RA 7160 prevails over the Implementing Rules, the former
being the law itself and the latter only an administrative
rule which cannot amend the former.

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - City of Manila v. Chinese

Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October 1919]

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila [GR14355, 31 October 1919]

First Division, Johnson (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 11 December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Manila praying that certain lands (extension of Rizal Avenue within Block 3 of
the district of Binondo) be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement.
The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] alleged in its answer that
it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine
Islands, having for its purpose the benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the
City of Manila; that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in paragraph 2
of the complaint; that it denied that it was either necessary or expedient that the said parcels be
expropriated for street purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of
communication for the public in the district covered by such proposed expropriation; that if the
construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were
available, which would fully satisfy the City’s purposes, at much less expense and without
disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that
the lands in question had been used by the Chinese Community for cemetery purposes; that a
great number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be carried into
effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large
sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and in the
purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of existing monuments and the
erection of new monuments in their stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the
Chinese Community and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments
which would have to be destroyed; that the City was without right or authority to expropriate
said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in
fact, was not necessary as a public improvement. Ildefonso Tambunting, answering the petition,
denied each and every allegation of the complaint, and alleged that said expropriation was not a
public improvement. Feliza Concepcion de Delgado, with her husband, Jose Maria Delgado, and
each of the other defendants, answering separately, presented substantially the same defense as
that presented by the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila and Ildefonso Tambunting. Judge
Simplicio del Rosario decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of
land and absolved each and all of the defendants (Chinese Community, Tambunting, spouses
Delgado, et. al.) from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to costs. From the
judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether portions of the Chinese Cemetery, a public cemetery, may be expropriated for
the construction of a public improvement.

Held: No. Section 2429 of Act 2711 (Charter of the city of Manila) provides that the city
(Manila) may condemn private property for public use. The Charter of the city of Manila,
however, contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect. Act 190
provides for how right of eminent domain may be exercised. Section 241 of said Act provides
that the Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of
any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to
condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner prescribed by
Section 242 to 246. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon
it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or
authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Herein, the cemetery in question is
public (a cemetery used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church) and seems to
have been established under governmental authority, as the Spanish Governor-General, in an
order creating the same. Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of
the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. To disturb the mortal
remains of those endeared to us in life sometimes becomes the sad duty of the living; but, except
in cases of necessity, or for laudable purposes, the sanctity of the grave, the last resting place of
our friends, should be maintained, and the preventative aid of the courts should be invoked for
that object. While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still
within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to
pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law
expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated.

PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [104 Phil 443; G.R. No. L-12172; 29 Aug 1958]

Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The municipal council of baao, camarines sur

stating among others that construction of a building, which
will destroy the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and
therefore be destroyed at the expense of the owner,
enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant filed a written
request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit
to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on
a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located along
the national highway and separated from the public plaza
by a creek. The request was denied, for the reason among
others that the proposed building would destroy the view
or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned
down the request. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with
the construction of the building without a permit, because
they needed a place of residence very badly, their former
house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
they had been living on leased property. Thereafter,
defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and
subsequently convicted. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance is a valid exercise

of police power.

Held: No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The

ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it
operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to
use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of
police power, and amounts to a taking of appellant’s
property without just compensation. We do not overlook
that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and happiness
of residents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be

erected on appellants' land, regardless of its own beauty,
stands condemned under the ordinance in question,
because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza
from the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the
obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in
character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality
must give appellants just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.

Constitutional Law II - Book 2005 - Republic vs. Vda. de

Castellvi [GR L-20620, 15 August 1974]

Republic vs. Vda. de Castellvi [GR L-20620, 15 August 1974]

En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 7 concur, 4 took no part

Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi, the
judicial administratrix of the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi, from 1 July 1947, by virtue
of a contract of lease, on a year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to June 30 of the
succeeding year). Before the expiration of the contract of lease on 30 June 1956, the Republic
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased
premises after the termination of the contract, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff of the AFP on
11 July 1956, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had decided not to continue
leasing the property in question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the
general public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt of the letter,
and that the premises be returned in substantially the same condition as before occupancy. The
Chief of Staff refused, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of
the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 that were erected and
already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the
property by means of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President.
Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pampanga (Civil Case 1458), to
eject the Philippine Air Force from the land. While this ejectment case was pending, the
Republic filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent domain against Castellvi, and Maria
Nieves Toledo Gozun over 3 parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market value
of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of
Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and
prayed, that the provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259,669.10, that the court authorizes
the Republic to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints 3 commissioners to ascertain and
report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the
court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation. The Republic was placed in possession of
the lands on 10 August 1959. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1959, the CFI of Pampanga,
dismissed Civil Case 1458, upon petition of the parties. After the parties filed their respective
memoranda, the trial court, on 26 May 1961, rendered its decision, finding that the unanimous
recommendation of the commissioners of P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject of the
action is fair and just; and required the Republic to pay interests. On 21 June 1961 the Republic
filed a motion for a new trial and/or reconsideration, against which motion Castellvi and Toledo-
Gozun filed their respective oppositions, and which the trial court denied on 12 July 1961. The
Republic’s record on appeal was finally submitted on 6 December 1961, after filing various ex-
parte motions for extension of time within which to file its record on appeal. On 27 December
1961 the trial court dismissed both appeals for having been filed out of time, thereby . On 11
January 1962 the Republic filed a “motion to strike out the order of 27 December 1961 and for
reconsideration”, and subsequently an amended record on appeal, against which motion Castellvi
and Toledo-Gozun filed their opposition. On 26 July 1962 the trial court issued an order, stating
that “in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be properly and finally determined
by the Supreme Court,” and at the same time it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record
on appeal containing copies of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated 19
November 1962, the trial court approved the Republic’s record on appeal as amended. Castellvi
did not insist on her appeal. Toledo-Gozun did not appeal.

Issue: Whether the taking of Castellvi’s property occurred in 1947 or in 1959.

Held: A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of
eminent domain. First, the expropriator must enter a private property. Second, the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period. Third, the entry into the property
should be under warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a
public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property. The “taking” of Castellvi’s property for purposes of
eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the Republic
commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. Two essential elements in the “taking” of
property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the
condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to
public use the owner was ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
present when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. The “taking’ of
the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first
occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for
the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of
that year. Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking
of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation
proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of
the court, on 10 August 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 June 1959
when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

Phil. Press Institute, Inc. v. Comelec

244 SCRA 272

Facts: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order. PPI, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers, asks us to declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any
of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers
to give free "Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready,
constitute impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of
expression.

On the other hand, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent
Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon the publishers any
obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or
administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor
General, the questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection
with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and mode of allocation of such
space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the
"Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if
the questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the
same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State. The Solicitor
General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information
operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair,
impartial and credible election.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent Commission on Elections is
valid.

Held: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution
No. 2772 in its present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby MADE
PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it relates to Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.

Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22
March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print
space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set
aside and nullified. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or
controversy.