consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
to override the interest claiming protection
WISCONSIN vs. YODER
FACTS:
Respondents, members of the Old Order Amish religion
and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were
convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory school-
attendance law (which requires a child's school
attendance until age 16) by declining to send their
children to public or private school after they had
graduated from the eighth grade. The evidence showed
that the Amish provide continuing informal vocational
education to their children designed to prepare them for
life in the rural Amish community (children ages 14 and
15). The evidence also showed that respondents
sincerely believed that high school attendance was
contrary to the Amish religion and way of life and that
they would endanger their own salvation and that of
their children by complying with the law.
ISSUE:
WON the compulsory-attendance law violated their
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO: (state supreme court muna total the US SC
upheld their decision naman)
• their children's attendance at high school, public
or private, was contrary to the Amish religion
and way of life. It poses danger of the censure of
the church community and endanger their own
salvation and that of their children. These
religious belief were held to be sincere. Expert
witnesses (scholars on religion) testified that this
concept of life aloof from the world and its values
is central to their faith. Amish objection to
formal education beyond the eighth grade is
firmly grounded in these central religious
concepts.
• Formal high school education beyond the eighth
grade is contrary to Amish beliefs because it
takes them away from their community,
physically and emotionally. During this period,
the children must acquire skills needed to
perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or
housewife. And, at this time in life, the Amish
child must also grow in his faith and his
relationship to the Amish community.
(eto US SC ratio na)
1. The State's interest in universal education is
not totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on other fundamental rights, such as
those specifically protected by the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment and the
traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children.
In applying strict scrutiny, it was not shown that
there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude
consti 2 all stars
under the Free Exercise Clause. Fundamental
right to religion is protected, sometimes even at
the expense of other interests of admittedly high
social importance. Only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise
of religion.
2. Respondents have amply supported their
claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal
education requirement after the eighth grade
would gravely endanger if not destroy the free
exercise of their religious beliefs. It was
necessary for the court to determine whether the
Amish religious faith and their mode of life are,
as they claim, inseparable and interdependent
not merely philosophical nor personal. In this
case, the Old Order Amish daily life and
religious practice stem from their faith is shown
by the fact that it is in response to their literal
interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the
Epistle of Paul to the Romans, "be not
conformed to this world . . . ." This command is
fundamental to the Amish faith. This virtually
determines their entire way of life. Values and
programs of the modern secondary school are in
sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life
mandated by the Amish religion. Wisconsin law
contravenes the basic religious tenets and
practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent
and the child. Furthermore, Wisconsin law
affirmatively compels them, under threat of
criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at
odds with fundamental tenets of their religious
beliefs. The compulsory-attendance law carries
with it precisely the kind of objective danger to
the free exercise of religion that the First
Amendment was designed to prevent.
3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an
identifiable religious sect and a long history as a
successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society, the Amish have demonstrated
the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the
interrelationship of belief with their mode of life,
the vital role that belief and daily conduct play
in the continuing survival of Old Order Amish
communities, and the hazards presented by the
State's enforcement of a statute generally valid
as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the
difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy
of their alternative mode of continuing informal
vocational education in terms of the overall
interests that the State relies on in support of its
program of compulsory high school education.
In light of this showing, and weighing the
minimal difference between what the State
would require and what the Amish already
accept, it was incumbent on the State to show
with more particularity how its admittedly
strong interest in compulsory education would
be adversely affected by granting an exemption
to the Amish.
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
It is true that activities of individuals, even when
religiously based, are often subject to regulation
by the States in the exercise of police power but
religiously grounded conduct is protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the 1st Amendment.
Re discrimination: A regulation neutral on its face
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the
constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of
religion.
Some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system if we are
to preserve freedom and independence. However,
the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case
is persuasively to the effect that an additional
one or two years of formal high school for Amish
children in place of their long-established
program of informal vocational education would
do little to serve those interests. Separated
agrarian community is the keystone of the
Amish faith. That they would become burden to
society should they leave the community and
join the mainstream world with educational
shortcomings is highly speculative.
4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as
parens patriae, to extend the benefit of
secondary education to children regardless of
the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained
against a free exercise claim of the nature
revealed by this record, for the Amish have
introduced convincing evidence that
accommodating their religious objections by
forgoing one or two additional years of
compulsory education will not impair the
physical or mental health of the child, or result
in an inability to be self-supporting or to
discharge the duties and responsibilities of
citizenship, or in any other way materially
detract from the welfare of society.
The dissent argues that a child who expresses a
desire to attend public high school in conflict
with the wishes of his parents should not be
prevented from doing so. There is no reason for
the Court to consider that point since it is not
an issue in the case. The State has at no point
tried this case on the theory that respondents
were preventing their children from attending
school against their expressed desires. Parents
have a right to direct the religious up-bringing of
their children which may be subject to limitation
] if it appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens.
But in this case, the Amish have introduced
persuasive evidence undermining the arguments
the State has advanced to support its claims in
terms of the welfare of the child and society as a
whole. we cannot accept a parens patriae claim
of such all-encompassing scope and with such
sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable
application as that urged by the State.
(overinclusive)
consti 2 all stars
affirmed.
U.S. vs. BALLARD
FACTS:
- Respondents, Edna W. Ballard and Donald
Ballard were convicted of using and conspiring
to use the mails to defraud.
- The indictment was in twelve counts. It charged
a scheme to defraud by organizing and
promoting the I Am movement through the use
of the mails. The charge was that certain
designated corporations were formed, literature
distributed and sold, funds solicited, and
memberships in the I Am movement sought 'by
means of false and fraudulent representations,
pretenses and promises'
- Misrepresentations:
o That the words of 'ascended masters'
and the words of the alleged divine
entity, Saint Germain, would be
transmitted to mankind through the
medium of the said Guy W. Ballard,
Edna W. Ballard, and Donald Ballard
through their high spiritual attainment
and righteous conduct.
o That the respondent were able to cure
hundreds of people of diseases classified
either curable or incurable.
- Each of them, well knew that all of said
aforementioned representations were false and
untrue and were made with the intention on the
part of the defendants, and each of them, to
cheat, wrong, and defraud persons intended to
be defrauded, and to obtain from persons
intended to be defrauded by the defendants,
money, property, and other things of value and
to convert the same to the use and the benefit of
the defendants, and each of them.
- Defense: There was a demurrer and a motion to
quash each of which asserted among other
things that the indictment attacked the religious
beliefs of respondents and sought to restrict the
free exercise of their religion in violation of the
Constitution of the United States.
- Lower Court: Did not want to rule on the truth
or validity of the religious claims made by the
respondents but rather limited the scope of the
case to this issue: “WON these defendants
honestly and in good faith believe those
things? If they did, they should be acquitted.
I cannot make it any clearer than that”
o 'If these defendants did not believe those
things, they did not believe that Jesus
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
came down and dictated, the jury
should find them guilty.
- The Lower court convicted the respondents. The
latter, initially acquiesced to the verdict but soon
filed for a motion for retrial since the withdrawal
of the issue of truth and verity would run
contrary to the nature of the indictment itself.
“'it was necessary to prove that they
schemed to make some, at least, of the
(eighteen) representations * * * and that
some, at least, of the representations which
they schemed to make were false”
- Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
granted a new trial, with one judge dissenting.
- Supreme court: Ruled that Johnson v. United
ISSUE:
WON the 1st Amendment precluded the court
from judging upon the truth, verity, and validity
of the beliefs of the respondent.
Yes, decision of the Court of Appeals reversed.
- Misrepresentations ascertained by the
Supreme Court:
o (1) A portion of the scheme as to healing
which we have already quoted and
which alleged that respondents 'had in
fact cured either by the activity of one,
either, or all of said persons, hundreds
of persons afflicted with diseases and
ailments';
o (2) The portion of the scheme relating to
certain religious experiences described
in certain books (Unveiled Mysteries and
The Magic Presence) and concerning
which the indictment alleged 'that the
defendants represented that Guy W.
Ballard, Edna W. Ballard, and Donald
Ballard actually encountered the
experiences pertaining to each of their
said names as related and set forth in
said books, whereas in truth and in fact
none of said persons did encounter the
experiences';
o (3) The part of the scheme concerning
phonograph records sold by respondents
on representations that they would
bestow on purchasers 'great blessings
and rewards in their aim to achieve
salvation' whereas respondents 'well
knew that said * * * records were
manmade and had no ability to aid in
achieving salvation.'
- The United States contends that respondents
acquiesced in the withdrawal from the jury of
the truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs
and that their consent bars them from insisting
consti 2 all stars
on a different course once that one turned out to
be unsuccessful
o Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189,
63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704. That case
stands for the proposition that, apart
from situations involving an unfair trial,
an appellate court will not grant a new
trial to a defendant on the ground of
improper introduction of evidence or
improper comment by the prosecutor,
where the defendant acquiesced in that
course and made no objection to it. In
fairness to respondents that principle
cannot be applied here
States cannot be applied in the case at bar. The
real objection of respondents is not that the
truth of their religious doctrines or beliefs
should have been submitted to the jury. Their
demurrer and motion to quash made clear their
position that that issue should be withheld from
the jury on the basis of the First Amendment.
o We do not agree that the truth or verity
of respondents' religious doctrines or
beliefs should have been submitted to
the jury. Whatever this particular
indictment might require, the First
Amendment precludes such a course, as
the United States seems to concede.
o The First Amendment has a dual aspect.
It not only 'forestalls compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship' but also
'safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion.' Cantwell v.
State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303,
60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128
A.L.R. 1352.
o 'Thus the Amendment embraces two
concepts,--freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second
cannot be.' Freedom of thought, which
includes freedom of religious belief, is
basic in a society of free men
o The First Amendment does not select
any one group or any one type of religion
for preferred treatment. It puts them all
in that position.
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
U.S. vs. SEEGER
FACTS:
Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York of having refused to
submit to induction in the armed forces.
He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in
1957 after successive annual renewals of his student
classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the
printed Selective Service System form, he declared that
he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war
in any form by reason of his 'religious' belief; that he
preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a
Supreme Being open, 'rather than answer 'yes' or 'no";
that his 'skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God'
did 'not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything
whatsoever'; that his was a 'belief in and devotion to
goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious
faith in a purely ethical creed.
He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the
section distinguished 'between internally derived and
externally compelled beliefs' and was, therefore, an
'impermissible classification' under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Jakobson was also convicted in the Southern District of
New York on a charge of refusing to submit to induction.
On his appeal the Court of Appeals reversed on the
ground that rejection of his claim may have rested on
the factual finding, erroneously made, that he did not
believe in a Supreme Being as required
He explained that his religious *168 and social thinking
had developed after much meditation and thought. He
had concluded that man must be 'partly spiritual' and,
therefore, 'partly akin to the Supreme Reality'; and that
his 'most important religious law' was that 'no man
ought ever to wilfully sacrifice another man's life as a
means to any other end
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that his claim
came within the requirements of s 6(j). Because it could
not determine whether the Appeal Board had found that
Jakobson's beliefs failed to come within the statutory
definition, or whether it had concluded that he lacked
sincerity, it directed dismissal of the indictment.
Forest Britt Peter was convicted in the Northern District
of California on a charge of refusing to submit to
induction. In his Selective Service System form he stated
that he was not a member of a religious sect or
organization; he failed to execute section VII of the
questionnaire but attached to it a quotation expressing
opposition to war, in which he stated that he concurred
In a later form he hedged the question as to his belief in
a Supreme Being by saying that it depended on the
definition and he appended a statement that he felt it a
violation of his moral code to take human life and that
consti 2 all stars
he considered this belief superior to his obligation to the
state.
Conscientious Objector
'personal scruples against war'
Individual belief--rather than membership in a church or
sect--determined the duties that God imposed upon a
person in his everyday conduct; and that 'there is a
higher loyalty than loyalty to this country, loyalty to
God.' Thus, while shifting the test from membership in
such a church to one's individual belief the Congress
nevertheless continued its historic practice of excusing
from armed service those who believed that they owed an
obligation, superior to that due the state, of not
participating in war in any form.
”religious training and belief”
'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation.' In
assigning meaning to this statutory language we may
narrow the inquiry by noting briefly those scruples
expressly excepted from the definition. The section
excludes those persons who, disavowing religious belief,
decide on the basis of essentially political, sociological or
economic considerations that war is wrong and that they
will have no part of it. These judgments have historically
been reserved for the Government, and in matters which
can be said to fall within these areas the conviction of
the individual has never been permitted to override that
of the state.
'The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation.'
By comparing the statutory definition with those words,
however, it becomes readily apparent that the Congress
deliberately broaden them by substituting the phrase
'Supreme Being' for the appellation 'God.' And in so
doing it is also significant that Congress did not
elaborate on the form or nature of this higher authority
which it chose to designate as 'Supreme Being.' By so
refraining it must have had in mind the admonitions of
the Chief Justice when he said in the same opinion that
even the word 'God' had myriad meanings for men of
faith:
'(P)utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions
of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies respect for
an innate conviction of paramount duty.
The test might be stated in these words: A sincere and
meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its
possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption comes within the
statutory definition. This construction avoids imputing to
Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs,
exempting some and excluding others, and is in accord
with the well-established congressional policy of equal
treatment for those whose opposition to service is
grounded in their religious tenets.
The test is simple of application. It is essentially an
objective one, namely, does the claimed belief
occupy the same place in the life of the objector as
an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one
clearly qualified for exemption?
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
ISSUES:
W/O the plaintiffs religious beliefs exempted them from
induction in U.S military training?
HELD:
Seager
Seeger professed 'religious belief' and 'religious faith.' He
did not disavow any belief 'in a relation to a Supreme
Being'; indeed he stated that 'the cosmic order does,
perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.' He decried the
tremendous 'spiritual' price man must pay for his
willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs
and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them,
we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose
today, would have granted him the exemption. We think
it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection
occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a
traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the
Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich's
thoughts:
'And if that word (God) has not much meaning for you,
translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the
source of your being, or your ultimate concern, of what
you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in
order to do so, you must forget everything traditional
that you have learned about God * * *'. Tillich, The
Shaking of the Foundations.
It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what
his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding
of the term 'Supreme Being.' But as we have said
Congress did not intend that to be the test. We therefore
affirm the judgment.
Peter
It will be remembered that Peter acknowledged 'some
power manifest in nature * * * the supreme expression'
that helps man in ordering his life. As to whether he
would call that belief in a Supreme Being, he replied,
'you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or
God. These just do not happen to be the words I use.' We
think that under the test we establish here the Board
would grant the exemption to Peter and we therefore
reverse the judgment in No. 29
Jakobson
The Court of Appeals found that the registrant
demonstrated that his belief as to opposition to war was
related to a Supreme Being. We agree and affirm that
judgment.
CASSIUS CLAY (MUHAMMAD ALI) vs. U.S
(1971)
Per curiam
FACTS:
consti 2 all stars
Petitioner was being drafted to fight in the Vietnam War.
To avoid it, he requested to be classified as a
‘conscientious objector’. The local draft board turned
down his request. He appealed. State Appeal Board still
classified him as eligible for unrestricted service then
passed it on to Justice Dep’t. FBI made an inquiry.
Hearing officer recommended that he be classified a
conscientious objector because of testimony from
‘inquiry’ of petitioner, parents, attorney and religious
minister proved that petitioner was sincere. Nevertheless
Justice Dep’t advised denial of request. Appeal Board
denied the request w/o stating reasons for such a claim.
Petitioner refused to be drafted and was convicted.
ISSUE:
HELD:
RATIONALE:
In order to be classified as a conscientious objector, a
registrant must satisfy three basic tests. He must show
1) that he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form;
2) that this opposition is based upon religious training
and belief;
3) and that this objection is sincere.
In applying the test, the Selective Service System must
be concerned with the registrant as an individual, not
with its own interpretation of the dogma of the religious
sect, if any, to which he may belong.
Justice Dep’t believed that Clay did not satisfy any
requirement. 1) Clays belief did not preclude war in any
form but are limited to service in the US Armed Forces.
He objects to certain types of war in certain
circumstances, rather than a general scruple against
participation in war in any form. 2) Clays religion did not
preclude fighting for the US because of political and
racial objectives to US policies instead of objections to
participate in war in any form. 3) Clay as a conscientious
objector only surfaced when drafting was imminent. He
has not shown ‘overt manifestation’ of his opposition.
However, in this Court, the gov’t has conceded that
petitioners belief are based on religious training. His
beliefs, like those in US vs Seeger, are clearly founded on
the tenets of the Muslim religion as he understands
them. The gov’t also conceded that it no longer questions
the sincerity of petitioners belief. The hearing officer who
decided on the sincerity of the petitioner with info from
FBI inquiry was convinced of his sincerity and
recommended his classification as a conscientious
objector. Justice dep’t was wrong to disregard such a
finding.
Since the Appeal Board gave no reasons for denying
Clays request, no one knows which ground he did not
pass. But since two of the grounds no longer hold, it is
clear that the dep’t was wrong.
This case then falls in Sicurella vs US. There, the Court
was asked to hold that an error in an advice letter
prepared by the Justice Dep’t did not require reversal of
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
a criminal conviction because there was a ground on
which the Appeal Board might properly have denied a
conscientious objector classification. This Court refused
because in cases where it is impossible to determine
exactly which grounds the Appeal Board decided, the
integrity of the Selective Service System demands, at
least, that the gov’t not recommend illegal grounds. (in
other words: the grounds must be clearly legitimate from
the first and finding a clearly legitimate ground
afterwards won’t work.)
DISPOSITION:
Judgment reversed. Ali is free!
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Douglas, concurs:
Sicurella vs US: Congress couldn’t possibly mean
conscientious objector must go to ‘participation in war in
any form’.
Negre v Larsen: Petitioners church did not oppose war
in Vietnam but provided guidelines for unjust wars. His
conscience did not allow him to go to Vietnam. Court
said screw his conscience, go and fight!
Clay is different. As a Muslim he follows Koran. Koran
proclaims jihad by believers against non-believers. All
other wars are unjust. Clays believes only in war
sanctioned by the Koran. Therefore, it becomes a matter
of belief, of conscience, of religious principle.
Harlan, concurs in the result:
Justice dep’t gives bad advice. Not all conscientious
objectors are weasels trying to get out of fighting in
Vietnam.
Academic Freedom
ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS
EDUCATION
Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of
all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall
take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
Sec 5(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
consti 2 all stars
BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL
CONCERN OF THE 1ST AMMENDMENT
J. Peter Byrne
I. INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment protects academic freedom but
there has been no adequate analysis of what academic
freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it.
Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine
floats in the law.
Author’s definition of academic freedom: non-legal term
referring to the liberties claimed by professors through
professional channels against administrative or political
interference with research, teaching and governance.
Of constitutional academic freedom: essence is the
insulation of scholarship and liberal education from
extramural political interference  insulate the
university in core academic affairs from state
interference
II. FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS
Concern is only with the substantive protection of
academic freedom by the 1st Amendment isolating which
has been difficult because 1) courts have used legal
doctrines not based on academic freedom to protect
liberties of professors and students; 2) courts have
declined to recognize a constitutional shield for many
forms of classroom speech that seem at first blush to
implicate general principles of free expression.
Central paradox: The institutional right seems to give a
university the authority to hire and fire without
government interference those very individuals
apparently granted a personal right to write and teach
without institutional hindrance.
 Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neither
collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits
from the tension between the independence of a
scholar's judgment and the university's
evaluation of her professional competence.
A. Academic Speech
Students and junior professors (considered neophytes in
the field) suffer real punishment for speech deemed
inadequate by the masters. Compared to general civil
society where the 1st Amendment opposes prior and
subsequent restraint based on determination if the
speech is valuable or not.
The First Amendment value of academic speech rests on
its commitment to truth (however partially understood
by the discipline), its honesty and carefulness, its
richness of meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
invitation to criticism.  society ought to strive towards
speech that is truthful.
Academic freedom resembles other free expression
values insofar as it protects the individual scholar's
point of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects those
structures that permit the individual scholar to engage
with others in collective scholarship
B. Student Speech and Extracurricular Political
Activity
The term "academic freedom" should be reserved for
those rights necessary for the preservation of the unique
functions of the university, particularly the goals of
disinterested scholarship and teaching.
First Amendment rights w/c should not properly be a
part of constitutional academic freedom:
1) no recognized student rights of free speech are
properly part of constitutional academic
freedom, because none of them has anything to
do with scholarship or systematic learning (e.g.
wearing of armbands, demonstrations, etc.)
 while the Constitution affords students at
public institutions extensive civil rights, it
affords them no rights of academic freedom at
all.
2) the right of a professor to participate in political
activity off campus and on her own time without
institutional reprisal should not be viewed as a
matter of constitutional academic freedom
 academic freedom should be understood to include
only rights unique or necessary to the functions of
higher education; exist as a necessary incident to
university's commitment to the pursuit of truth and the
controvertibility of dogma.
C. Tenure
Tenure is not equal to academic freedom but it promotes
academic freedom since it requires public airing of
explicit and categorically neutral reasons for dismissal.
 does not protect academic freedom of untenured since
they will direct their scholarship to those likely to be
accepted by the tenured.
III. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Early History and Structure
The structural elements that would give shape to
academic freedom were established early: legal control
by non-academic trustees; effective governance by
administrators set apart from the faculty by political
allegiance and professional orientation; dependent and
insecure faculty.
consti 2 all stars
B. The Rise of the Scientific Research Value
Higher education began to be seen as scientific training
for practical jobs rather than moral training of
gentlemen for elite professions.  The change is
usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movement
from a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed by religious
faith to one of relative truths continuously revised by
scientific endeavor.
Changes in the structure enlarged the status of the
faculty – now highly-trained professionals. Yet low salary
and uncertain tenure remained  They were no longer
dependent on the will of clergymen but answerable to
businessmen. Academic freedom became rallying cry for
professors seeking more control over their professional
lives.
C. Development of the Concept of Academic
Freedom
Problem was the interference by the lay board of trustees
or regents. Professors demanded that no ideological test
be applied and evaluation done by professional peers.
The American concept of academic freedom emerged
from this ideological and practical conflict between
academic social scientists and their lay employers.
American Assoc. of University Professors (AAUP) insisted
on a clear distinction between speech that was academic
and that which was merely political or sectarian.
AAUP’s vision of academic freedom:
1) noble vision of the academic calling;
2) eliminates gravest evils of lay control over
universities;
3) concept of peer review according to professional
standards.
D. The Challenge of other Academic Values
Humanistic values: valuable knowledge includes ideas
that aren’t scientifically demonstrable and that students
must receive a coherent education in the traditions of
civilized thought, writing and art.
The democratic value in higher education reflects the
demands placed on our colleges and universities by the
society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social
mobility and general prosperity.
E. Professional Competence as a Regulatory
Standard
The integrity of academic freedom depends on the good
faith of the professorate and on its collective ability to
distinguish between scholars who disagree with accepted
findings and those who do not understand them.  what
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
defines competence? When this question arises trouble
develops.
Without agreement about basic paradigms, competence
loses much of the neutrality that might ordinarily be
assumed, as there may be no shared criterion for
evaluation.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND THE INDIVIDUAL SCHOLAR
Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy:
university freedom for teaching and scholarship without
interference from government is a positive right and that
the state here had failed to provide a compelling
justification for questioning an academic about the
content of a lecture
 the four essential freedoms" of a university--to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study
Three significant oddities about the plurality and
concurring opinions in Sweezy:
1) never before had the Court suggested that
academic freedom was protected by the 1st
Amendment.
2) Frankfurter’s decision looks solely to non-legal
sources to describe the contents of acad.
freedom
3) Although the content of acad. freedom was
drawn from non-legal sources, they praised acad
freedom by stressing the social utility of free
universities.
Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of
academic freedom with a legacy of triumphant rhetoric
but also with an ambiguous description of the
relationship between academic custom and positive legal
right. The Court's decision not to ground its ruling on a
positive right of academic freedom, moreover, presaged
the Court's refusal to give this right the practical force
that its rhetorical enthusiasms promised.
Also in other cases, Barenblatt and Keyishian, the
Court's use of rhetoric to define the content of academic
freedom increases the ambiguity already created by
basing the case's holding upon vagueness. However,
despite their analytical shortcomings, Sweezy and
Keyishian contributed substantially to the virtual
extinction of overt efforts by non-academic government
officials to prescribe political orthodoxy in university
teaching and research.
Constitutional Academic Freedom and the State
Action Doctrine: An Aside
Faculty and students at state universities enjoy
extensive substantive and procedural constitutional
consti 2 all stars
rights against their institutions while faculty and
students at private institutions enjoy none. Thus, the
state action doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of
constitutional liberties against institutional
infringements for half the nation's academics and denies
it to the other half for reasons which, if desirable at all,
are very far removed from the realities of academic life
The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention
Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to resolve these
disputes. Asked to protect the academic freedom of a
candidate denied tenure by faculty vote, a court would
need to determine what, in fact, are the requirements for
tenure, whether the candidate met the requirements,
and whether the faculty rejected the candidate for some
non-academic reason. Such an inquiry, backed by the
coercive power of the state, would put the department or
school into intellectual receivership, with the court
determining the appropriate paradigms of thought.
 Courts then should only ascertain if the
administrators can establish that they in good faith
rejected the candidate on academic grounds.
The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role to
excluding non-academics from imposing ideological
criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to
impose substantive limits on academic administrators
who in good faith penalize faculty for academic speech
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND THE PROTECTION OF
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY
While the right to institutional academic freedom has
arisen at the time in our history when universities have
been most subject to federal regulation, no federal
regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in
Sweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academic
freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more than in
holdings and rules
A. The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic
Freedom
Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a
limitation on the grounds or procedures by which
academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of
governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a
university."
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v.
Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowledgment
that universities must and should distinguish among
speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and
a pioneering inquiry into which university administrative
decisions the First Amendment should protect.
Thus, core academic administrative decisions--
determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study--
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without
impairing the unique virtues of academic speech.
When judges are asked to review the substance of a
genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they
should show great respect for the faculty's professional
judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is
such a substantial departure from accepted academic
norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee
responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.
Academic Abstention
It describes the traditional refusal of courts to extend
common law rules of liability to colleges where doing so
would interfere with the college administration's good
faith performance of its core functions. The recognition
of authority over internal affairs and the exclusion of
judicial governance go hand in hand; they amount to a
substantial degree of common law autonomy.
Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as
academic abstention raised to constitutional status, so
that judges can consider whether statutes or regulations
fail to give sufficient consideration to the special needs
or prerogatives of the academic community.
State Constitutional Law
The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state
universities seems to have contributed to the
development of the federal right of institutional academic
freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the persistence of
the view, inherent in academic abstention, that civil
authorities ought to respect the special needs and values
of universities, even when erected and supported by the
state.
Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best be
seen as a principle that regulation should not proceed so
far as to deprive the university of control over its
academic destiny. This principle has been fashioned by
courts, explaining why they restrain themselves from
imposing farreaching constitutional or common law
duties on the university. As such, it represents academic
abstention raised to a constitutional level.
Institutional Academic Freedom and the First
Amendment
And what are the indigenous values served by
universities?
1) the university is the preeminent institution in
our society where knowledge and understanding
are pursued with detachment or
disinterestedness.
2) The disinterested search for knowledge fosters a
manner of discourse that, at its best, is careful,
critical, and ambitious
consti 2 all stars
3) The university aspires to instill in those entering
adulthood a capacity for mature and
independent judgment.
Preserving the fundamental academic values of
disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse,
and liberal education justifies a constitutional right of
academic freedom. These goals give intellectual and
educational expression to the vision of human reason
implicit in the Constitution.
Who are do be protected by constitutional academic
freedom?
Universities that do not respect the academic freedom of
professors (understood as the core of the doctrine
developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual
freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought
not to be afforded institutional autonomy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy
has come to be understood as the four freedoms offered
by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught,
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study. The four freedoms adequately express the degree
of autonomy necessary for a university to harbor liberal
studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they
recognize that liberal studies involve more than the
simple act of speaking--that they require "'that
atmosphere which is most *340 conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation. This requires
security, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the
hiring of competent people, and the reward of excellence.
Constitutional protection can preserve the possibility
that academics might attain the goals of learning and
scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less.
SWEEZY vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE
June 15, 1957
Ponente: Warren, CJ:
FACTS:
 Defendant, Paul Sweezy, was convicted of
contempt for failure to answer questions asked
by the Attorney General of New Hampshire
 In 1951 a statute was passed by the New
Hampshire legislature to regulate subversive
acts. In 1953, legislature adopted a joint
resolution authorizing the attorney general to
make full and complete investigations with
respect to violations of the subversive activities
act of 1951 which includes among others
authorizing him “to act upon his own motion
and upon such information as in his judgment
may be reasonable or reliable.”
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
o Statute defines a person to be
subversive if he, by any means, aids in
the commission of any act intended to
assist in the alteration of the
constitutional form of gov’t by force or
violence.
 Sweezy was summoned to appear on two
separate occasions in 1954 under suspicion of
subversion in connection with the membership
of his wife in the Progressive Party, an article he
wrote wherein he affirmed that “he styled
himself as a ‘classical Marxist’ and a ‘socialist’”,
and a lecture he delivered on March 22, 1954 for
a humanities course at the university.
 Petitioner answered most of the questions but
declined to answer certain questions about his
knowledge regarding the Progressive Party in his
1st appearance and about the lecture he
delivered and his opinions or beliefs in his 2nd
appearance stating only that he hat never been a
member of the Communist Party. Because of his
continuous decline to answer he was cited in
contempt.
ISSUE: W/N the investigation deprived Sweezy of due
process of law under the 14th Amendment
HELD: Yes.
 It is recognized that the right to lecture or
associate are civil liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution but they are not absolute rights.
o In this case, it is believed that there was
an unquestionable invasion of the
petitioner’s liberties in the areas of
academic freedom and political
expression – areas in which the
government should be extremely reticent
to tread.
 To impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our
Nation.
 In this case, the record does no reveal what
reasonable or reliable information led the
Attorney General to question petitioner (no
showing of probable cause) therefore, if the
interrogation of the Attorney General was in fact
entirely unrelated to the object of the legislature
in authorizing such inquiry, the Due Process
Clause would preclude the endangering of
constitutional liberties and can be treated as an
absence of authority to conduct the inquiry.
Because of this there can be no showing of a
sufficient state interest to infringe the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.
Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter:
consti 2 all stars
 Whether the Attorney General of New Hampshire
acted within the scope of the authority given him
by the state legislature is not for the US SC to
determine but is a matter for the decision of the
courts of that State.
 Petitioner as mentioned answered most of the
questions asked of him, making it known that
he had never been a Communist, never taught
the violent overthrow of the Government, never
knowingly associated with Communists in the
State, but was a socialist believer in peaceful
change…
 He refused to answer questions regarding: 1) a
lecture given by him at the University of New
Hampshire, 2) activities of himself and others in
the Progressive political organizations, and 3)
“opinions and beliefs,” invoking the
constitutional guarantees of free speech
 SC stated that: For society’s good – if
understanding be essential need of society—
inquiries and speculations into the natural
sciences, into anthropology, economics, law, etc.
must be left as unfettered as possible except for
reasons that are exigent and obviously
compelling.  exclusion of governmental
intrusion into the intellectual life of a university.
 Cites a quote from the Open Universities in
South Africa:
“In a university knowledge is its own end, not
merely a means to an end… A university is
characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, it ideal
being the ideal of Socrates – ‘to follow the
argument where it leads.’ This implies the right
to examine, question, modify or reject traditional
ideas and beliefs… Freedom to reason and
freedom for disputation on the basis of
observation and experiment are the necessary
conditions for the advancement of scientific
knowledge… It is the business of a university to
provide that atmosphere which is most
conducive to speculation, experiment and
creation. It is an atmosphere in which prevail
‘the four essential freedoms’ of a university –
to determine for itself on academic grounds
who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study.”
 The inviolability of privacy belonging to a
citizen’s political loyalties has so overwhelming
an importance to the well-being of our kind
of society that it cannot be constitutionally
encroached upon on the basis of so meager a
countervailing interest of the State as may be
argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy
threat to the security of New Hampshire
allegedly presented in the origins and
contributing elements of the Progressive Party
and the petitioner’s relations to these.
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE
Epicharis (wat a name) Garcia vs. The Faculty
Admission Committee represented by Fr. Lambino
1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted
Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology;
2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to
enroll for the same course for the first semester, 1975-
76, Respondent told her about the letter he had written
her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her
from re-admission in their school;
reason in the letter: Pet.’s frequent questions
and difficulties had the effect of slowing down
the progress of the class although she ahd the
requisite intellectual capability
3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19,
1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for
expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of
the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross
misconduct;
4. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time
and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a
compromise that would not duly inconvenience the
professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the
kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in
vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the
school's Director, that the compromises she was offering
were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it
were better for her to seek for admission at the UST
Graduate School;
5. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said
school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her
graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she
was informed that she could enroll at the UST
Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill
their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in
order to have her degree later in Theology — which
would entail about four to five years more of studies —
whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is
being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail
only about two years more;
6. Considering that time was of the essence in her case,
and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for
gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled
as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties,
even if she would not thereby be credited with any
academic units for the subject she would take;
7. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the
President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the
First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the
Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of
the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for
registration; ... "
8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of
allowing her to enroll in the current semester
consti 2 all stars
Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee had
authority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continue
studying or not?
Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution
(seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit
Ratio:
1. Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to admit
her into further studies since the respondent had no
clear duty to admit the pet.
-That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J.,
and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru its
Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has
discretion as to whether to admit and/or to
continue admitting in the said school any
particular student, considering not only academic
or intellectual standards but also other
considerations such as personality traits and
character orientation in relation with other
students as well as considering the nature of
Loyola School of Theology as a seminary.
- technical aspect of admissions:
the Chairman of the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which
is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights,
Quezon Cityis in in collaboration with the Ateneo
de Manila University, the Loyola School of
Theology allows some lay students to attend its
classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School
of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained
from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de
Manila University and not by the Loyola School of
Theology; For the reason above given, lay students
admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take
up courses for credit therein have to be officially
admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate
School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order
for them to be considered as admitted to a degree
program
Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was
admitted by respondent to take some courses for
credit but said admission was not an admission to
a degree program because only the Assistant Dean
of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can
make such admission; That in the case of
petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of
the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given,
so that she was not accepted to a degree program
but was merely allowed to take some courses for
credit during the summer of 1975;
Being admitted to the school is a privilege and
not a right.
-There are standards that must be met. There are
policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of
the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology,
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
what a student in the position of petitioner
possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She
cannot therefore satisfy the prime and
indispensable requisite of a mandamus
proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty
imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a
rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner,
who unfortunately did not have counsel, an
attempt was made to dispute the contention of
respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain
her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It
is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay
person rather than a practitioner that was evident.
While she pressed her points with vigor, she was
unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear
legal right that must exist to justify the grant of
this writ.
2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of
higher learning enjoying academic freedom.
-It is more often identified with the right of a
faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular
specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the
result of his endeavors without fear that retribution
would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions
are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that
be, whether in the political, economic, or academic
establishments
- For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right
claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as
investigator, to interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without being subjected to
any interference, molestation, or penalization because
these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted
authority within or beyond the institution
- philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version:
"What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom
of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover,
publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of
their competence. It is subject to no control or authority
except the control or authority of the rational methods
by which truths or conclusions are sought and
established in these disciplines
3. Court further discusses “academic freedom” that its
reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon.
- Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the
University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political
Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the
right of academic freedom to the university as an
institution as distinguished from the academic freedom
of a university professor."
- Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University
of Dijon, France, "It is a well-established fact, and yet
one which sometimes tends to be obscured in
consti 2 all stars
discussions of the problems of freedom, that the
collective liberty of an organization is by no means the
same thing as the freedom of the individual members
within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even
necessarily connected. In considering the problems of
academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,
between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate
body, and the freedom of the individual university
teacher." (2 types)
- "the four essential freedoms" of a university —
to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and
who may be admitted to study.
4. The decision is not to be construed as in any way
reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There
was on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of
her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in
the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best,
considering the interest of the school as well as of the
other students and her own welfare, that she continue
her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing
arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed
relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even
petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other
institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned.
At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of
the controversy was touched upon in this decision.
ISABELO vs. PERPETUAL HELP
J. Vitug
FACTS:
Petitioner Isabelo was a criminology student in Perpetual
Help College of Rizal (PHCR). Being the PRO and acting
Secretary of the student council, he was asked to sign
Resolution No. 105, which would increase tuition
payments by 20%. He refused to sign and asked for a 2-
week period to talk it over with his fellow officers. After
they met on the matter, the council presented a 9-point
proposal. With an assurance that the request of the
student council would be considered favorably, the
petitioner finally signed Resolution No. 105. PHCR then
announced that its application to increase school fees
was approved by DECS. The student council then filed a
motion for consideration. DECS then put the
implementation on hold pending talks on the matter.
In the meantime the CMT commandant gave a list of
students with CMT deficiencies, with petitioner Isabelo
being on the list. As such, he was expelled and not
allowed to enroll for the next semester on the following
grounds:
* Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS
Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S.
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007;
* No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology
course;
* Official Admission Credential not yet submitted;
* Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and
22) which are docketed in the registration card.
Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelo sent
a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS then issued
Order No. 9 which stated:
. . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due
process of the students petitioners . . . , Manuelito
Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending
resolution thereof, the propriety of allowing the students
to continue attending their classes to protect their
interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjoined.
In this connection, it is hereby directed that the above-
named students be re-admitted to classes and be
allowed to take all examinations that they have missed
pending final resolution of this case/issue.
PHCR did not comply with the directive.
Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not being
admitted was due to his being against the increase on
tuition payments. Respondent school invokes academic
freedom in the expulsion of Isabelo.
ISSUE:
WON Isabelo’s expulsion was within the school’s
academic freedom.
HELD:
NO
RATIO:
Here the court sites Garcia v. Faculty Admission
Committee, which upheld the rule that admission to an
institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the
school and that such an admission is a mere privilege,
rather than a right, on the part of the student. Like any
other right, however, academic freedom has never been
meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that
assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly.
With regards to contracts, the court said that the
contract between student and school is not one that is
only on a semestral basis, but the student has a right to
be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his
course.
Finally the court says that the punishment of expulsion
appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had
some deficiencies in his CMT course. There is, however,
an administrative determination to be made whether
petitioner does indeed deserve to be a senior in PHCR.
consti 2 all stars
Case remanded to DECS for further proceedings.
REYES vs. COURT of APPEALS
(Ponente: Medialdea, 1991)
FACTS:
Respondent-students as then applicants to the
University of the Philippines College of Medicine (UPCM)
obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the NMAT
which was the cutoff score prescribed for academic year
1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of
January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council
(UC) on April 8, 1986.
However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile
cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its
meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year
1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med
students, the BOR in its 996th resolution reverted to the
NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile.
The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the
BOR directive for them to admit the students. This
prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus
with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction for their admission.
After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction,
the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved that "the act of
fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination
required in any college of the University is within the
authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding
the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved
finally by the University Council of the autonomous
campus."
In the interim, the RTC's order was questioned before
the SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, which
was dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted to the
UPCM and passed three years in the college.
Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students,
upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with
"three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the
College" as well as the BOR's 1001st resolution, wrote a
letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that
they never intended to question the Faculty's right to
academic freedom; that they believed the issue was
simply on the question of observance of the proper
procedure in implementing admission requirements; that
they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue
the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the
determination of humanitarian consideration of their
case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and
that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in
the college.”
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and
attached was the letter to the UPCM Faculty. The RTC
dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this
development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency
meeting where it denied the appeal of the students by a
vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualified for
admission to the UPCM. The students filed with the RTC
a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. The RTC
issued an order for the admission of the students to the
college.
The BOR in its 1031st meeting resolved to approve the
admission of the students in the interest of justice and
equity and to order the petitioners to admit them.
The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the
CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to
follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President
issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against
them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive
Suspension. The CA dismissed the petition of the
petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue before the
SC.
ISSUE:
WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the
petitioners. –
NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit
the students to the college of medicine.
RATIO:
1. The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the
UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are clear: to the BOR
belongs the governance and the general powers
of administration of the university and to the UC
the power to fix the admission requirements to
any college in the university. The University
Code grants to the College Faculty the power to
determine the entrance requirements of the
college subject to the approval of the autonomous
UC.
2. Any entrance requirement that may be imposed
by the College Faculty must bear the UC's
approval. Otherwise, the same becomes
unenforceable.
3. At the time the students took the NMAT, the new
UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of
90 percentile was without the UC'S and
University President’s approval.
4. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix
admission requirements is vested in the
University Council of the autonomous campus
which is composed of the President of the
University of the Philippines and of all
instructors holding the rank of professor,
associate professor or assistant professor
(Section 9, Act 1870).
consti 2 all stars
5. The UC has the final say in admission
requirements provided the same conforms with
law, rules and regulations of the university. In
the event the power is abused or misused, it
becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest
governing body in the university, to step in and
to correct the anomaly.
6. The questioned order of the Board of Regents in
upholding the admission requirement approved
by the University Council in 1986 is supportive
of right of the University Council to fix or
approve admission requirements, against the
UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the
admission requirements approved by the
University Council without following the
prescribed rules and procedures of the
University.
7. We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners'
arguments that the BOR's 1031st is contrary to
justice and equity because the students
themselves judicially confessed that they have
no right to admission. In their letter to the
Faculty, The student's aforesaid feeling does not
amount to a categorical admission of the
absence of a legal right. Considering such
antagonistic conditions, We can empathize with
the students' mental anxiety and emotional
strain in their three years in college in the
company of some professors who looked down
on them as academic pretenders. Furthermore,
the students were pressed for time as they have
only one more year before graduation. These
circumstances combined with the advice of the
U.P. President unduly influenced the students to
write this reconciling letter.
U.P. vs. COURT of APPEALS
Ponente: J. Romero
FACTS:
Petitioner UP questions, in this petition for review on
certiorari the Order of the lower court denying the motion
to dismiss the complaint for damages filed against two of
its professors for alleged derogatory statement uttered
concerning the Tasadays, the cave-dwelling inhabitants
of the rain forest of Mindanao.
August 15-17, 1986: The "International Conference on
the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent
Anthropological Issues" was held at the Philippine
Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City. Jerome
Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP)
Dept of Anthropology was the designated conference
chairman. He presented therein the "Tasaday Folio," a
collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading
anthropologists who disputed the authenticity of the
Tasaday find and suggested that the "discovery" in 1971
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
by a team led by former Presidential Assistant on
National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde,
Jr. was nothing more than a fabrication made possible
by inducing Manobo and T'boli tribesmen to pose as
primitive, G-stringed, leaf-clad cave dwellers.
In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus
Salazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of
the Tasadays to T'boli and Manobo ethnic groups. He
likewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped television
documentary showing interviews with natives claiming to
have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays.
Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sent
Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the
12th Int’l Congress of Anthropological and
Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen
reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax.
Their allegations were widely publicized in several
dailies.
In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the ff causes of
action:
1. defendants' conduct and statements that the
Tasadays were nonexistent or frauds deprived them
of their peace of mind and defiled the Tasadays'
“dignity and personality”
2. defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the
Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory and
pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and publicity-
seeking persons, thereby besmirching their
reputation and causing them serious anxiety
3. defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly deny
plaintiff Tasadays' personality and their existence as
a distinct ethnic community within the forest area
reserved under the Proclamation (No. 995) unjustly
becloud or tend to becloud their rights thereunder
4. defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaign to
vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of "false
and perjured 'evidence' to debase and malign" them,
caused them to incur attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
The plaintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code and
pegged their claims for moral and nominal damages at
the "amount equivalent to defendants' combined salaries
for two (2) months, estimated at P32,000.00."
Procedural crap:
Plaintiffs (defendants herein) filed a complaint for
damages and declaratory relief against the UP professors
stating the above causes of action. UP filed a motion to
intervene, stating that the UP profs were under their
supervision. Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to
dismiss, which was denied. With the MFR denied in the
lower court, they filed a petition for certiorari for gadalej,
which was dismissed by the SC. Meanwhile, UP filed a
motion to dismiss in the lower court, but it was struck
off the record. In the CA, everything else was denied,
because petitioners’ allegations were not stated in the
complaint. Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE  HELD:
consti 2 all stars
1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of the
UP profs’ petition for certiorari  NO
2. WON the UP professors are covered by the protective
mantle of Academic Freedom  YES, but UP should
have defended its profs in the course of the trial
case, instead of trying to terminate the proceedings
prematurely
Hence, the CA’s denial of the profs’ motion to
dismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded.
RATIO:
1. Super daming procedural crap… nakakahilo.
While it is true that the instant petition and the previous
case revolve around the issue of WON the lower court
correctly denied the motion to of the UP profs, there is
an aspect of the case which takes it out of the ambit of
the principle of res judicata (final judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in
any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of
action). The said principle applies when there is, among
others, identity of parties and subject matter in two
cases. Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner here
while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in the
previous case is not a hindrance to the application of res
judicata because the situation is akin to the adding of
other parties to a case which had been finally resolved in
a previous one. UP was not an original party-defendant
in the original suit, but it intervened and made common
cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the case
should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate academic
freedom, both individual and institutional. There is,
therefore, a resultant substantial identity of parties, as
both UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on
the other hand, represent the same interests in the two
petitions.
However, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the
two petitions is wanting. Private respondents identify the
subject matter as "the trial judge's refusal . . . to dismiss
the complaint against Bailen and Salazar. It should be
noted, however, that two motions to dismiss the same
complaint were filed in this case and they were
separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen
and Salazar. The second motion to dismiss was filed by
UP but on February 15, 1989, the lower court struck it
off the record. Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to
herein facts would be stretching to its limits the
requirement of identity of subject matter.
2. Academic Freedom
UP has no cause of action because there are insufficient
allegations in its new complaint. It cannot invoke the
same allegations in its original complaint because that
has been previously struck off the record by the lower
court. On its face, herein complaint, however, does not
allege any right or interest of the petitioner that is
affected by the complaint simply because it was not an
original defendant. As correctly observed by the lower
court, the complaint does not even show that petitioner
authorized Bailen and Salazar to conduct a study on the
Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to
Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned
or sponsored by the petitioner. Hence, by filing the
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
motion to dismiss the complaint against Salazar and
Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which
amounted to invoking lack of cause of action as a
ground for dismissal, the petitioner confined itself to the
allegations of the complaint.
On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and
Salazar can be made out from the complaint: their acts
and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of
the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to have staged
a fraud.
This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was
improper. Coming to the defense of its faculty members,
it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and
utterances of Bailen and Salazar were circumscribed by
the constitutionally-protected principle of academic
freedom. However, it should have championed the
cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course of the trial
of the case. It erred in trying to abort the
proceedings at its inception through the device of
filing the motion to dismiss. This procedural lapse,
notwithstanding, no irremediable injury has been
inflicted on the petitioner as, during the trial, it may still
invoke and prove the special defense of institutional
academic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Paño and in
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School
of Theology.
Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby
forfeited their right to notice of subsequent proceedings
and to participate in the trial, petitioner's answer in
intervention shall be the gauge in determining whether
issues have been joined. With respect to the prayer of
the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays
to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory
defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the
lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a
prayer for a judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship
which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory
relief.
The issue of WON Bailen and Salazar infringed on
plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they maliciously
and falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs
Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax
or fraud upon the public with and under the supervision
of plaintiff Elizalde, is not within the province of the
court to make pronouncements on for these are matters
beyond its expertise.
DECS vs. SAN DIEGO
J. Cruz
The basic issue of the case is whether or not a person
who failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) thrice, in violation of the ‘three-flunk rule’, is
entitled to take it again.
consti 2 all stars
FACTS:
Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the
University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of
Science in Zoology. He took the NMAT THREE times and
flunked all of them [Court found that he actually failed
FOUR times – a ‘misplaced persistence’ like a ‘hopeless
love’]. When he applied for the FIFTH time, the DECS
and the Director of Center for Educational Measurement
rejected his application on the basis of the ‘three-flunk
rule’:
MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports] Order
No. 12, Series of 1972:
‘A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take
the NMAT. After three (3) consecutive failures, a student
shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.’
San Diego went to the RTC to compel his
admission to the test. Through a petition for mandamus,
he invoked his rights to academic freedom and quality
education. He also raised the issues of due process and
equal protection. By agreement of the parties, he was
allowed to take the NMAT.
RTC declared the Order invalid because it
deprived San Diego’s of his right to pursue a medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.
‘Angles’ of the Case :
1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the ‘three-flunk rule’
is a valid exercise of police power.
- In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, which upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAR in limiting the admission
to medical schools to those that initially proved their
competence and preparation for a medical school,
Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point:
- The test is the reasonable relation between the lawful
method, which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR
as condition for admission to medical schools, and the
lawful subject – the securing of the health and safety of
the general community.
- The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
- The power to regulate and control the practice of
medicine includes also covers the admission to the
practice.
- For MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the lawful subject
is the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools by upgrading
through selectivity in the process of admission like
limiting admission to those who passed the NMAT
(lawful method).
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
- Furthermore, the use of admission tests is widely used
in the United States (Medical College Admission Test)
and in other countries with more educational resources
than that of the Philippines.
- Ultimately, the measure contributes to the protection of
the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance that could infiltrate the
medical profession.
- Test for the valid exercise police power involves the
concurrence between:
a. the interest of the of public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State;
b. the means employed are reasonably necessary to
the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.
2. Right to quality education is not absolute
- While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor,
he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor… A
person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a
menace to his patients. If one who want to be a lawyer
may prove better a plumber, he should be so advised
and advised.
- San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact that
there are other people who are more prepared than him,
considering the crowded medical schools that we have
today.
3. The order does not violate the equal protection
clause
- A law does not have to operate with equal force on all
persons or things. There are substantial distinctions
between medical students and other students who are
not required to take the NMAT and not subjected to the
three-flunk rule. The medical profession have a delicate
responsibility towards society that warrants a different
treatment towards them.
Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police
power. Court said that San Diego’s intellectual capacity
is not ‘depreciated’, rather, he may be meant for another
calling. The rule is intended to avoid a nation of misfits
– square pegs trying to fit into round holds.
The decision of the RTC declaring MECS Order
No. 12 invalid is reversed.
consti 2 all stars
TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ
J. Feliciano
FACTS:
Teresita Tablarin and other students, in their
behalf and in behalf of other applicants for admission
into the Medical Colleges who have not taken or taken
but failed the NMAT during 1987-88 and for the future
years to come, wants to be admitted into schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However,
Tablarin and company either did not take or failed the
NMAT which is required by the Board of Medical
Education (Board) and conducted by the Center for
Educational Measurement (CEM).
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical
Education and the CEM from:
a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No.
2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and
5946, known as the ‘Medical Act of 1959’ provides
that one of its objectives the standardization and
regulation of the medical education. It created the
Board of Medical Education composed by
representatives from education government
institutions, private medical specialty societies,
association of medical schools and dean of the UP
College of Medicine. The one of the administrative
functions of the Board is to prescribe requirements
for admission with necessary rules and regulations
for proper implementation.
The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the
minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility
given by the Board.
b. requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985
provided a uniform admission test called the NMAT
as an additional requirement for the issuance of
the certificate of eligibility.
c. proceeding with accepting applications for taking the
NMA, and
d. administering the NMAT.
The petition was denied by the RTC and the
NMAT was conducted and administered. It was noted
that the petitioners were not able to present a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome the
presumption of constitutionality.
‘Angles’ of the case:
1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as
amended [Medical Act of 1959], and MECS Order No.
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
52, s. of 1985 do not violate the provisions of the
1987 Constitution presented by the petitioners.
- The petitioners cited ‘State Policies’ which include
Article II, Section 11 on the dignity of every human
person and human rights, Article II, Section 13 on the
vital role of the youth in nation building, Article II,
Section 17 on the priority to education. They also cited
Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to the phrase
‘right of ALL citizens to quality education.’ Furthermore,
the NMAT requirement is challenged as a violation of the
‘fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements’ stated by Article XIV, Section 5 (3).
- Court said that the petitioners did not demonstrated
how the measures provided by the Board collide with
these relatively specific State policies. In short, they
were not able to present a prima facie case with regards
to the State Policies angle.
- About the ‘right of all citizens to quality education’, this
phrase should not be construed as compelling to State to
make quality education available across the board.
Quality education, will be shouldered by the State in so
far that the citizens were able to quality under ‘fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.’
2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as
amended [Medical Act of 1959], is not an undue
delegation of legislative power.
- The general principle of non-delegation of powers
(delegates non potest delegare or delegati potestas non
potest delegare – a delegated power may not be further
delegated by the person to whom such power is
delegated) flows from the fundamental rule of the
separation of and allocation of powers among the three
great departments of government. However, this rule was
made to adapt to the complexities of the modern
government referred to by Justice Laurel in
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public
Service Commission. This is known as the principle of
subordinate legislation.
- Standards for subordinate legislation may be
expressed or implied. The body of the statute and the
goal to standardize and regulate the medical profession
satisfy the necessary standards required.
3. The NMAT is not an “unfair, unreasonable and
inequitable requirement” which results in a denial of
due process.
- The petitioners did not specify what factors in the
NMAT support their claim. If they are questioning the
burden imposed by the NMAT, which would pertain to
the utility and wisdom of the NMAT, then these are
matters that should be addressed by the administrative
and legislative bodies – not by the Court.
consti 2 all stars
4. The provisions questioned are part of the valid
exercise of the police power of the State.
- Police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power
of the sovereign to promote the important interests and
needs – the general order of the general community.
- The provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of
police power: concurrence test between lawful subject
and lawful method.
5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changed by
the Board after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges does not violate the
equal protection clause.
- The measure is not arbitrary or capricious. It is a
flexible measure that takes into consideration changes of
different factors that would merit a commensurate
change in the cut-off score like: number of students who
reached the cut-off score in the previous year, available
slots, average scores, level of difficulty of the
examination. Setting a permanent cut-off scores would
result to unreasonable rigidity.
HOLDING:
Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to pass
successfully pass it as requirements for entering medical
schools are not unconstitutional impositions.
Decision of the RTC DENYING the petition for a
writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.
NON vs. JUDGE DAMES
FACTS:
• Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not
allowed to re-enroll because they participated in
student mass actions against their school the
preceding sem
• On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of
classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued
their rally picketing, even though without any
renewal permit, physically coercing students not
to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the
scheduled classes and depriving a great majority
of students of their right to be present in their
classes
• Together with the abovementioned fact, the
lower court considered that in signing their
enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be
re-enrolled. “The Mabini College reserves the
right to deny admission of students xxx whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the
efficient operation of the college xxx”
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
• In addition the students signed pledges saying
they respect their alma matter, that they will
conduct themselves in a manner that would not
put the college in a bad light.
• Judge Dames’ decision considering these facts
said that what the students assert is a mere
privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini
College is free to admit or not to admit the
petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the
academic freedom enjoyed by the school.
ISSUE/HELD:
WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it
allowed schools to bar the re-admission or re-enrollment
of students on the ground of termination of contract
should be reversed. The re-admission or re-enrollment of
students on the ground of termination of contract should
be reversed. YES
RATIO:
• In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a
written contract for one semester and contracts
are respected as the law between the contracting
parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is
deemed terminated.
• However, this case is not a simple case about a
school refusing re-admission. The refusal to
readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided
upon and implemented by school authorities as
a reaction to student mass actions
• This is a case that focuses on the right to speech
and assembly as exercised by students vis-à-vis
the right of school officials to discipline them.
• The student does not shed his constitutionally
protected rights at the schoolgate. In protesting
grievances disorder is more or less expected
because emotions run high. That the protection
to the cognate rights of speech and assembly
guaranteed by the Consti is similarly available to
students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right
to discipline cannot override constitutional
safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the
court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom
of assembly could not be a basis for barring
students from enrolling. Under academic
freedom, students my be barred from re-
enrollment based on academic deficiencies.
• Permissible limitations on student exercise of
constitutional rights within the school.
Constitutional freedom of free speech and
assembly also not absolute. However, imposition
of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of
procedural due process and penalty imposed
must be proportionate to the offense committed.
(procedural due process: right to be informed in
writing, right to ans the charges, right to be
informed of the charges against them, right to
adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be
duly considered)
consti 2 all stars
• The nature of contract between a school and its
students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued
with public interest. The Consti allows the State
supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1)
]. According to par 107 and 137 of the
respondent school’s manual, a student is
enrolled not just for one sem but for the entire
period necessary for the student to complete
his/her course. BP blg 232 gives the students
the right to continue their course up to
graduation.
• Academic freedom not a ground for denying
students’ rights. In Villar, the right of an
institution of higher learning to set academic
standards cannot be utilized to discriminate
against students who exercise their
constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for
otherwise there will be a violation of their right
to equal protection.
• School said most of them had failing grades
anyway. In answer students say they are
graduating students and if there are any
deficiencies these do not warrant non-
readmission. Also there are more students with
sores deficiencies who are re-admitted. And
some of the petitioners had no failing marks.
• The court held that the students were denied
due process in that there was no due
investigation. In fact it would appear from the
pleadings that the decision to refuse them re-
enrollment because of failing grades was a mere
afterthought.
• Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be
commensurate to the offense committed with
due process.
• But penalty, if any is deserved should not
anymore be enforced. Moot and academic.
They’ve already suffered enough.
ALCUAZ vs. PSBA
Justice Paras:
FACTS:
• Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and
barricaded the school because they wanted to
admin to hear their grievances with regards to
“not being able to participate in the policy-
making of the school”, despite the regulations
set by the admin with regards to protest actions
• During the regular enrollment period, petitioners
and other students similarly situated were allegedly
blacklisted and denied admission for the second
semester of school year 1986-1987.
• court ordered the school authorities to create a
special investigating committee to conduct an
investigation, who made recommendations which
the school adopted
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom
• a lot of procedural crap, petitioners and respondents
filing and answering the complaints
• petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due
process when they were barred from re-enrollment
and for intervenors teachers whose services have
been terminated as faculty members, on account of
their participation in the demonstration or protest
charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a
violation of their constitutional rights of expression
and assembly.
• Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of
procedural due process which requires that there be
due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due
process which requires that the person or body to
conduct the investigation be competent to act and
decide free from bias or prejudice.
ISSUE:
A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of
due process ?
B. WON there was contempt of Court by the
respondents
HELD:
A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.
1. There is no existing contract between the two parties.
Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
states that when a college student registers in a school,
it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the
"written contracts" required for college teachers are for
'one semester. after the close of the first semester, the
PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with
the students or with the intervening teachers. It is a
time-honored principle that contracts are respected as
the law between the contracting parties The contract
having been terminated, there is no more contract to
speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter
into another contract with said students and
teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or
the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for
the parties."
2. The Court has stressed, that due process in
disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed
for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
Standards of procedural due process are:
a. the students must be informed in writing of the
nature and cause of any accusation against them;
b. they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired:
c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their
own behalf and
consti 2 all stars
e.the evidence must be duly considered by the
investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were
distributed at the beginning of each school
Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature
and upon admission to the School, the Student is
deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all
rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he
agrees that he may be required to withdraw from
the School at any time for reasons deemed
sufficiently serious by the School Administration.
Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school
with regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was
taken by the school when the court issued a temporary
mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the
first sem & the creation of an investigating body.
4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to
the students and teachers on the one hand and the
school on the other, ordered an investigation to be
conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of
November 12, 1986.
Findings of the investigating committee:
1. students disrupted classes
2. petitioners involved were found to be
academically deficient & the teachers are found
to have committed various acts of misconduct.
5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of
students for academic delinquency and violation of
disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by
this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's
refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools considers academic
delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs
as valid grounds for refusing re-enrollment of students.
The opposite view would do violence to the academic
freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the
Constitution.
Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual
findings of administrative tribunals, unless :
1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence;
2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or
collusion;
3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings
is irregular;
4. when palpable errors are committed; or
5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
capriciousness is manifest.
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consti part 11: unusual religious beliefs and practices & academic freedom

investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive

and adequate.

.B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors

to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise
untenable.

1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz

respondent school explained that the intervenors were
actually reinstated as such faculty members after the
issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction.

2. respondent school has fully complied with its

duties under the temporary mandatory injunction
The school manifested that while the investigation was
going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching
and it was only after the investigation, that the
recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the
school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case
for having become moot and academic

consti 2 all stars 21