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A. Citizenship & Alienage
Art IV– CITIZENSHIP
Section 1. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at
the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance
with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance
with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost
or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who
marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unless by their act or omission, they are
deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law.
BOARD of COMMISSIONERS (CID) vs. DELA ROSA
FACTS:
July 12 1960: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of
William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of
Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following
the citizenship of his natural mother, Marciana
Gatchalian. Before the Citizenship Evaluation Board,
Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children with
his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose, Gloria, Francisco,
Elena and Benjamin.
June 27, 1961: William Gatchalian, then a twelve-year
old minor, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together
with Gloria, Francisco, and Johnson. They had with
them Certificates of Registration and Identity issued by
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the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong based on a
cablegram bearing the signature of the then Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, and sought admission as Filipino
citizens. Gloria and Francisco are the daughter and son,
respectively, of Santiago Gatchalian; while William and
Johnson are the sons of Francisco.
July 6, 1961: After investigation, the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision, admitting William
Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens. As
a consequence thereof, William Gatchalian was issued
Identification Certificate No. 16135 by the immigration
authorities.
January 24, 1962: the then Secretary of Justice issued
Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of
Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of
decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry. The same
memorandum directed the Board of Commissioners to
review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground
that the entrant was a Philippine citizen. Among those
cases was that of William and others.
On July 6, 1962, the new Board of Commissioners, after
a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the
Board of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the
latter and ordered the exclusion of, among others,
respondent Gatchalian. A warrant of exclusion was
issued alleging that "the decision of the Board of
Commissioners dated July 6, 1962 . . . has now become
final and executory.”
Sometime in 1973: respondent Gatchalian, as well as the
others covered by the July 6, 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing with the Board of Special
Inquiry where the deportion case against them was
assigned.
March 14, 1973: the Board of Special Inquiry
recommended to the then Acting Commissioner Victor
Nituda the reversal of the July 6, 1962 decision of the
then Board of Commissioners and the recall of the
warrants of arrest issued therein.
March 15, 1973: Acting Commissioner Nituda issued an
order reaffirming the July 6, 1961 decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry thereby admitting respondent
Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrant
of arrest issued against him.
June 7, 1990: the National Bureau of Investigation wrote
the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent
Gatchalian along with the other applicants covered by
the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged
with violation of Commonwealth Act No. 613, also known
as the Immigration Act of 1940.
August 1, 1990: the Secretary of Justice indorsed the
recommendation of the NBI to the Commissioner of
Immigration for investigation and immediate action.
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
August 15, 1990: petitioner Commissioner Domingo of
the Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued
a mission order commanding the arrest of respondent
William Gatchalian. The latter appeared before
Commissioner Domingo on August 20, 1990 and was
released on the same day upon posting P200,000.00
cash bond.
August 29, 1990: Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction before the RTC of
Manila, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa.
September 4, 1990: petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
the case, alleging that respondent judge has no
jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners and/or the
Board of Special Inquiry. Nonetheless, respondent judge
dela Rosa issued the assailed order dated September 7,
1990, denying the motion to dismiss.
September 6, 1990: respondent Gatchalian's wife and
minor children filed before the RTC of Valenzuela,
presided by respondent judge Capulong for injunction
with writ of preliminary injunction. The complaint
alleged, among others, that petitioners acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction in the institution of deportation
proceedings against William. On the same day,
respondent Capulong issued the questioned temporary
restraining order restraining petitioners from continuing
with the deportation proceedings against William
Gatchalian.
Argument of the Petitioners:
1) respondent judges have no jurisdiction over
petitioners (Board of Commissioners, et al.,) and the
subject matter of the case, appellate jurisdiction being
vested by BP 129 with the Court of Appeals;
2) assuming respondent judges have jurisdiction, they
acted with grave abuse of discretion in preempting
petitioners in the exercise of the authority and
jurisdiction to hear and determine the deportation case
against respondent Gatchalian, and in the process
determine also his citizenship;
3) respondent judge dela Rosa gravely abused his
discretion in ruling that the issues raised in the
deportation proceedings are beyond the competence and
jurisdiction of petitioners; and
4) respondent judge Capulong should have dismissed
the case in Valenzuela for forum-shopping.
Argument of the Respondents:
1) assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient
to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners have no
jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until
the courts shall have finally resolved the question of his
citizenship;
2) petitioners can no longer judiciously and fairly resolve
the question of respondent's citizenship in the
deportation case because of their bias, pre-judgment and
prejudice against him; and
3) the ground for which he is sought to be deported has
already prescribed
On Appellate Jurisdiction
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Petitioners: under Sec. 9 (3) of BP 129, it is the Court of
Appeals which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies,
boards or commissions, such as the Board of
Commissioners and the Board of Special Inquiry
Respondent: petitioners are not quasi-judicial agencies
and are not in equal rank with Regional Trial Courts.
Supreme Court: There are quasi-judicial agencies, as
the National Labor Relations Commissions, whose
decisions are directly appealable to this Court. It is only
when a specific law, as Republic Act No. 5434, provides
appeal from certain bodies or commissions to the Court
of Appeals as the Land Registration Commission (LRC),
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and others,
that the said commissions or boards may be considered
co-equal with the RTCs in terms of rank, stature and are
logically beyond the control of the latter. However, the
Bureau of Immigration (or CID) is not among those
quasi-judicial agencies specified by law whose decisions,
orders, and resolutions are directly appealable to the
Court of Appeals. Hence, B.P. Blg. 129 did not intend to
raise all quasi-judicial bodies to the same level or rank of
the RTC except those specifically provided for under the
law as aforestated. As the Bureau of Immigration is not
of equal rank as the RTC, its decisions may be
appealable to, and may be reviewed through a special
civil action for certiorari by, the RTC.
On the Bureau of Immigration’s jurisdiction to hear
cases against alleged aliens and determine their
citizenship
Petitioners: Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive
authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
an alleged alien, and in the process, determine also their
citizenship. And a mere claim of citizenship cannot
operate to divest the Board of Commissioners of its
jurisdiction in deportation proceedings.
Supreme Court: the Petitioners contention admits of an
exception, at least insofar as deportation proceedings are
concerned. Judicial intervention, should be granted in
cases where the claim of citizenship is so substantial
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
claim is correct. In other words, the remedy should be
allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in
a proper proceeding. It appearing from the records that
respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial, judicial
intervention should be allowed. The competent court
which could properly take cognizance of the proceedings
instituted by respondent Gatchalian would nonetheless
be the Regional Trial Court and not the Court of Appeals.
Ordinarily, the case would then be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court. But not in the case at bar.
Considering the voluminous pleadings submitted by the
parties and the evidence presented, We deem it proper to
decide the controversy right at this instance.
On Arrest as Necessary Consequence of Warrant of
Exclusion
Petitioners: the arrest of respondent follows as a matter
of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion issued
on July 6, 1962.
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
Supreme Court: From a perusal of Sec. 37 (a) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise
known as the Immigration Act of 1940, it is clear that in
matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as
deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of
Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid,
must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of
deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the
Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of
investigation only, is null and void for being
unconstitutional. It is not indispensable that the alleged
alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the
purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to
determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it
cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges
can issue the same.
Moreover, respondent Gatchalian, along with others
previously covered by the 1962 warrant of exclusion,
filed a motion for re-hearing before the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) sometime in 1973. The Board of Special
Inquiry, after giving due course to the motion for re-
hearing, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting
Commissioner recommending the reconsideration of the
July 6, 1962 decision of the then Board of
Commissioners which reversed the July 6, 1961 decision
of the then Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 and 2 the
lifting of the warrants of arrest issued against
applicants. The memorandum inferred that the "very
basis of the Board of Commissioners in reversing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a
forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, . . ., which was dispatched to the Philippine
Consulate in Hong Kong authorizing the registration of
applicants as P.I. citizens." The Board of Special Inquiry
concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the
issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity which took the
place of a passport for their authorized travel to the
Philippines. It being so, even if the applicants could have
entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of
the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country.”
On March 15, 1973, then Acting Commissioner Nituda
issued an Order which affirmed the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1 decision dated July 6, 1961 admitting
respondent Gatchalian and others as Filipino citizens;
recalled the July 6, 1962 warrant of arrest and
revalidated their Identification Certificates. The order
admitting respondent as a Filipino citizen is the last
official act of the government on the basis of which
respondent William Gatchalian continually exercised the
rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently,
the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of respondent
William Gatchalian..
On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (procedural)
Supreme Court: There should be no question that
Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian,
is a Filipino citizen. As a matter of fact, in the very order
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of the BOC of July 6, 1962, which reversed the July 6,
1961 BSI order, it is an accepted fact that Santiago
Gatchalian is a Filipino. In said order it was found that
the applicants therein have not satisfactorily proven that
they are the children and/or grandchildren of Santiago
Gatchalian. The status of Santiago Gatchalian as a
Filipino was reiterated where advertence is made to the
"applicants being the descendants of one Santiago
Gatchalian, a Filipino.” In the sworn statement of
Santiago Gatchalian before the Philippine Consul in
Hongkong in 1961, he reiterated his status as a
Philippine citizen being the illegitimate child of Pablo
Pacheco and Marciana Gatchalian, the latter being a
Filipino; that he was born in Manila on July 25, 1905;
and that he was issued Philippine Passport by the
Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila. In his affidavit
of January 23, Santiago reiterated his claim of Philippine
citizenship as a consequence of his petition for
cancellation of his alien registry which was granted on
February 18, 1960; and that on July 20, 1960, he was
recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino
and was issued Certificate No. 1-2123.
Furthermore, petitioners' position is not enhanced by the
fact that respondent's arrest came twenty-eight (28)
years after the alleged cause of deportation arose.
Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises." The petitioners'
alleged cause of action and deportation against herein
respondent arose in 1962. However, the warrant of
arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner
Domingo only on August 15, 1990 — 28 long years after.
It is clear that petitioners' cause of action has already
prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly
enforced by petitioners against respondent William
Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated
July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification
certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated
on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner
Nituda. The Court, therefore, holds that the period of
effecting deportation of an alien after entry or a warrant
of exclusion based on a final order of the BSI or BOC are
not imprescriptible. The law itself provides for a period of
prescription. Prescription of the crime is forfeiture or loss
of the rights of the State to prosecute the offender after
the lapse of a certain time, while prescription of the
penalty is the loss or forfeiture by the government of the
right to execute the final sentence after the lapse of a
certain time. Thus, in the case at bar, it took petitioners
28 years since the BOC decision was rendered on July 6,
1962 before they commenced deportation or exclusion
proceedings against respondent William Gatchalian in
1990. Undoubtedly, petitioners' cause of action has
already prescribed. Neither may an action to revive
and/or enforce the decision dated July 6, 1962 be
instituted after ten (10) years.
On Citizenship of William Gatchalian (substantive)
Respondent’s arguments on his citizenship: he has
continuously resided in the Philippines. He married Ting
Dee Hua on July 1, 1973 with whom he has four (4)
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
minor children. The marriage contract shows that said
respondent is a Filipino. He holds passports and earlier
passports as a Filipino. He is a registered voter of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila where he has long resided and
exercised his right of suffrage. He engaged in business in
the Philippines since 1973 and is the director/officer of
the International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman
International Corp. as a Filipino. He is a taxpayer.
Respondent claims that the companies he runs and in
which he has a controlling investment provides
livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000
dependents. He continuously enjoyed the status of
Filipino citizenship and discharged his responsibility as
such until petitioners initiated the deportation
proceedings against him.
Petitioner’s arguments on respondents alienage:
Santiago Gatchalian's marriage with Chu Gim Tee in
China as well as the marriage of Francisco (father of
William) Gatchalian to Ong Chiu Kiok, likewise in China,
were not supported by any evidence other than their own
self-serving testimony nor was there any showing what
the laws of China were. It is the postulate advanced by
petitioners that for the said marriages to be valid in this
country, it should have been shown that they were valid
by the laws of China wherein the same were contracted.
There being none, petitioners conclude that the aforesaid
marriages cannot be considered valid. Hence, Santiago's
children, including Francisco, followed the citizenship of
their mother, having been born outside of a valid
marriage. Similarly, the validity of the Francisco's
marriage not having been demonstrated, William and
Johnson followed the citizenship of their mother, a
Chinese national.
Supreme Court: absence of evidence to the contrary,
foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be
the same as those of the Philippines. In the case at bar,
there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises the presumption that it is the same as that
of Philippine law. The lack of proof of Chinese law on
the matter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian
much more on respondent William Gatchalian who was
then a twelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records
indicate, Santiago was not pressed by the Citizenship
Investigation Board to prove the laws of China relating to
marriage, having been content with the testimony of
Santiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost or
destroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.
Neither was Francisco Gatchalian's testimony subjected
to the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.
Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalian and
Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consular and
immigration authorities regarding their marriages, birth
and relationship to each other are not self-serving but
are admissible in evidence as statements or declarations
regarding family reputation or tradition in matters of
pedigree. Philippine law, following the lex loci
celebrationis, adheres to the rule that a marriage
formally valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. (see
Art. 26 of the Family Code). Thus, he who asserts that
the marriage is not valid under our law bears the burden
of proof to present the foreign law. Having declared the
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assailed marriages as valid, respondent William
Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father
Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child of the latter.
Francisco, in turn is likewise a Filipino being the
legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the latter) is
admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippine citizenship
was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration in an order
dated July 12, 1960.
Moreover, respondent William Gatchalian belongs to the
class of Filipino citizens contemplated under Sec. 1,
Article IV of the Constitution, which provides: “Those
who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution…” This forecloses any
further question about the Philippine citizenship of
respondent William Gatchalian.
WHEREFORE, G.R. Nos. 95122-23 is DISMISSED for
lack of merit; G.R. Nos. 95612-13 is hereby
GRANTED and respondent William Gatchalian is
declared a Filipino citizen. Petitioners are hereby
permanently enjoined from continuing with the
deportation proceedings docketed as DC No. 90-523
for lack of jurisdiction over respondent Gatchalian,
he being a Filipino citizen; Civil Cases No. 90-54214
and 3431-V-90 pending before respondent judges are
likewise DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring-dissenting:
On Appellate Jurisdiction
I can easily agree with the summary of antecedent facts
in the ponencia of Mr. Justice Bidin and the reiteration
therein of the established doctrine that the Bureau of
Immigration has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction
to try and hear cases against alleged aliens, and in the
process, determine also their citizenship, and that "a
mere claim of citizenship cannot operate to divest the
Board of Commissioners of its jurisdiction in deportation
proceedings." I also agree with the conclusion that the
petitioners in G.R. No. 95122-23, the Board of
Commissioners and Board of Special Inquiry, hereinafter
referred to as the Boards, are quasi-judicial bodies.
However, I cannot go along with the view that the case of
William Gatchalian should be treated as an exception to
that doctrine and, above all, to the law which vests upon
the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
the Boards. Neither can I have solidarity with his opinion
that this Court should, in this instance, rule on the
citizenship of Mr. Gatchalian instead of remanding the
case to the Regional Trial Court. To grant him these
benefits would do violence to the law, liberally stretch
the limits of the exceptions or misapply the exceptionary
rule, and to unduly pollute the settled doctrine. No fact
or circumstance exists to justify the application of the
exceptions for the benefit of Mr. Gatchalian. On the
contrary, substantial facts exist to render immutable the
unqualified application of the law and the doctrine.
On Respondent’s forum shopping
William Gatchalian did not stop in his forum-shopping
in the regional trial courts. Under the guise of a counter-
petition, he is now before this Court in an active
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
offensive role. This is a very clever, albeit subtle, ploy to
bang directly to this Court the issue of his deportation
and to divest the Boards of their original jurisdiction
thereon. He could have done this at the first instance; he
did not. He and his wife and minor children deliberately
chose, instead, to separately go to the wrong court,
evidently to delay the proceedings before the Boards,
which they accomplished when the two judges separately
issued orders restraining said Boards from commencing
or continuing with any of the proceedings which would
lead to the deportation of William Gatchalian (Civil Case
No. 90-54214) and from proceeding with the deportation
charges against William Gatchalian.
On respondent’s citizenship
The facts before this Court do not constitute, or even
show, a conclusive or substantial evidence that William
Gatchalian is a Filipino citizen. On the contrary, very
serious doubts surround such a claim from the
beginning. His initial entry into the Philippines was
made possible through a Certificate of Identity (as
Filipino) which was issued on the basis of a forged
cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Then
on 6 July 1962 the then new Board of Commissioners
promulgated a written decision in I.C. Cases Nos. 61-
2108-C to 61-2116-C inclusive (Application for
admission as Philippine citizens of Jose, Elena,
Benjamin, Juan, Pedro, Gloria, Francisco, William and
Johnson, all surnamed Gatchalian) reversing the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of 6 July
1961 and ordering the exclusion of William Gatchalian
and the others as aliens not properly documented.
Accordingly, a warrant of exclusion, also dated 6 July
1962, was issued by the Commissioners commanding
the deportation officer to exclude William Gatchalian,
and others, and to cause their removal from the country
on the first available transportation in accordance with
law to the port of the country of which they were
nationals.
If indeed Santiago's parents, Pablo Pacheco and
Marciana Gatchalian, were married, what was his reason
for insisting, through his brother Joaquin, that he, is an
illegitimate son? The only possible reason is that Pablo
Pacheco is a Chinese citizen, in which case Santiago
would follow the citizenship of Marciana, a "filipina." But
to give full faith and credit to the oral insistence of
illegitimacy is to do violence to the presumptions of
validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds and the legitimacy of children. (Art. 220, Civil
Code). These are among the presumptions which the
ponencia precisely applied when it rejected the
petitioners' claim that Santiago failed to establish his
claimed marriage to Chu Gim Tee and Francisco's (father
of William) claimed marriage to Ong Chiu Kiok, both of
which were allegedly celebrated abroad. I cannot find
any valid justification why these presumptions should be
liberally applied in favor of claimed marriages allegedly
celebrated abroad but denied to purported marriages
celebrated in the Philippines.
Assuming that indeed William is the grandson of
Santiago, I find it rather strange why Santiago did not
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mention him in his testimony before the Citizenship
Evaluation Board. At that time William was already
eleven years old. It is logical to presume that the
proceeding initiated by Santiago was principally for the
benefit of his alleged children and grandchildren. It was,
as subsequent events proved, intended to prepare the
legal basis for their entry into the country as Filipino
citizens. Thus, eleven months after he obtained a
favorable decision from the Board, and on two
successive dates, his alleged children and grandchildren
entered the country. On 25 June 1961 his alleged
children Jose, Elena, Benjamin, and his alleged
grandchildren Pedro and Juan arrived from Hongkong.
On 27 June 1961, his alleged daughter Gloria and son
Francisco with his alleged children William and Johnson
also arrived from Hongkong.
That he has continuously resided in the Philippines
since 1961; he is married to Ting Dee Hua on July 1,
1973, and his marriage contract shows that he is a
Filipino citizen; he holds passports and earlier passports
as a Filipino; he is a registered voter of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila where he has long resided and exercised
his right of suffrage; he is engaged in business in the
Philippines since 1973, and is a director/officer of the
International Polymer Corp. and Ropeman International
Corp. as a Filipino, and that the companies he runs and
in which he has a controlling investment provided a
livelihood to 4,000 employees and approximately 25,000
dependents; he is a taxpayer; and he has continuously
enjoyed the status of Filipino citizenship, discharged his
responsibility as such until petitioning Boards initiated
the deportation proceedings against him, are not of any
help to William Gatchalian. For, they neither confer nor
strengthen his claim of Filipino citizenship since they are
all rooted on the illegal and void decision of then Acting
Commissioner Victor Nituda of 15 March 1973. A
decision which is void and invalid ab initio cannot be a
source of valid acts. Neither can such substantive
infirmity be cured by salutary acts that tend to confirm
the status conferred by the void decision.
On prescription
I disagree with the view advanced in the ponencia that
the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion
because it is already barred by prescription considering
that Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act states that
deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in
the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years
after the cause of deportation arises. Note that the five-
year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11
and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. Mr. Gatchalian is
covered by clause (2), which reads: “Any alien who enters
the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who
was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry.”
Moreover, the warrant for his exclusion was issued
within a period of five years following his entry.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, I vote to GRANT
the petition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23, SET ASIDE the
questioned orders of respondents Judge Joselito Dela
Rosa and Judge Teresita Dizon Capulong as having
been issued beyond their jurisdiction, ORDER the
DISMISSAL of Civil Case Nos. 90-54214 of the
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
Regional Trial Court of Manila and 3431-V-90 of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila and
to DISMISS for lack of merit the COUNTER-PETITION
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1. I agree that the Warrant of Arrest dated 14 August
1990 is defective in its language. The surrounding facts,
however, make quite clear that an amended warrant of
arrest or mission order, or a new one correctly worded,
may be issued by Immigration Commissioner Domingo
for the purpose of carrying out an existing and valid
Warrant of Exclusion covering respondent William
Gatchalian and his co-applicants for admission.
2. The 6 July 1962 Decision of the Board of
Commissioners ("BOC") and Warrant of Exclusion
remain valid and effective and enforceable against
respondent William Gatchalian, and his co-applicants for
that matter. That Decision reversed a 6 July 1961
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ("BSI") and held
that respondent William Gatchalian and his co-
applicants failed to subtantiate and prove their claim to
Philippine citizenship in 1961. Respondent William
Gatchalian does not claim Philippine citizenship by any
mode of entitlement subsequent to his application for
entry as a citizen of the Philippines in 1961, i.e., by any
act or circumstance subsequent to his birth and
supposed filiation as a legitimate son of Francisco
Gatchalian, also a supposed citizen of the Philippines.
3. In its Decision in Arocha vs. Vivo, 1 the Supreme Court
upheld the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962
Decision of the BOC and the Warrant of Exclusion not
only against Pedro Gatchalian, the particular Gatchalian
who was taken into custody by immigration authorities
in 1965, but also against Pedro's co-applicants, which
include respondent William Gatchalian. The validity of
the claim to Philippine citizenship by Pedro Gatchalian,
as a supposed descendant of Santiago Gatchalian,
allegedly a natural born citizen of the Philippines, was
directly placed in issue in the 1961-1962 proceedings
before the BSI and the BOC, and by the Solicitor General
and Pedro Gatchalian in Arocha vs. Vivo (supra). In
upholding the validity and legal effect of the 6 July 1962
BOC Decision that the Gatchalian applicants had not
substantiated their claim to Philippine citizenship, this
Court in effect ruled that the Gatchalian applicants were
not Philippine citizens, whatever their true nationality
might be.
4. Should this Court now determine to examine once
more the claim to Philippine citizenship of respondent
William Gatchalian, a detailed examination of the facts,
including the supposed status of Santiago Gatchalian as
a natural born Philippine citizenship, shows that those
claims to Philippine citizenship were indeed not proven
by respondent William Gatchalian and his co-applicants.
Since respondent William Gatchalian does not claim to
have been naturalized as a Philippine citizen after
rendition of the 6 July 1962 BOC Decision, he must
accordingly be held to be not a Philippine citizen.
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5. Should the legal results thus reached seem harsh to
some, I respectfully submit that the remedy lies not with
this Court which is charged with the application of the
law as it is in fact written, but with the political
branches of the Government. It is those departments of
Government which must consider the desirability and
wisdom of enacting legislation providing for the
legalization of the entry and stay of aliens who may be in
the same situation as respondent William Gatchalian
and his co-applicants.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition in G.R. Nos. 95122-23,
and to SET ASIDE the Resolution/Temporary
Restraining Order dated 7 September 1990 issued by
respondent Judge Dela Rosa in Civil Case No. 90-
5214, as well as the Order of respondent Judge
Capulong dated 6 September 1990 in Civil Case No.
3431-V-90; and to RE-AFFIRM that respondent
William Gatchalian is not a Philippine citizen.
QUA CHEE GAN vs. DEPORTATION BOARD
FACTS:
• In May 1952 petitioners were charged before the
Deportation Board with having purchased US
Dollars in the total sum of $130, 000 without
the necessary license from the Central Bank of
the Philippines and having remitted the money
to Hong Kong and to themselves.
• Warrants were issued but upon filing for a
surety and cash bond they were released.
• Trial Court upheld the validity of the delegation
by the president to the Deportation Board of his
power to conduct investigations for the purpose
of determining whether the stay of an alien in
this country would be injurious to the security,
welfare and interest of the State.
• Power to issue warrants and fix bonds were held
to be essential to and complement the power to
deport aliens under sec 69 of the revised admin
code
ISSUE (PETITIONERS’ ALLEGATIONS) AND HELD:
• WON the President has the power to deport
aliens and delegate those powers, under EO 398
of Pres Quirino which authorized the
Deportation Board to issue warrants of arrest of
aliens during investigation (on the ground that
such power is vested in the legislature and that
there must be a legislation authorizing the same)
~> The Pres has the power to carry out order of
deportation but may not order arrest during
investigation. And no, power may not be delegated.
RATIO:
• Sec 69 of the Revised Administrative Code
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign
power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in
6
consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled,
or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to
his own country by the President of the
Philippines except upon prior investigation,
conducted by said Executive or his authorized
agent, of the ground upon which Such action is
contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall be informed of the charge or
charges against him and he shall be allowed not
less than these days for the preparation of his
defense. He shall also have the right to be heard
by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in
his own behalf, and to cross-examine the
opposing witnesses."
• While it did not expressly confer on the
President the authority to deport undesirable
aliens and merely lays down the procedure, the
fact that such a procedure was provided for
before the President can deport an alien is a
clear indication of the recognition, and
inferentially a ratification, by the legislature of
the existence of such power in the Executive.
• Under the present and existing laws, therefore,
deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected in two ways: by order of the President,
after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69
of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the
Commissioner of Immigration, upon
recommendation by the Board of
Commissioners, under Commonwealth Act No.
613.
SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and
supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry
of aliens into the Philippines, and their
exclusion, deportation, and repatriation
therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-
nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred
and eleven which shall continue in force and
effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).
• Re: the extent of the Pres’ power to investigate-
does it include authority to arrest? May it be
delegated? Here’s the history…
• Pres Roxas (EO 69) in July 1947 provided for
filing of a bond to secure appearance of alien
under investigation
• Pres Quirino (EO 398) in January 1951
reorganized the deportation board to issue the
warrant of arrest of the alien complained of and
to hold him under detention during the
investigation unless he files a bond for his
provisional release <this is incompatible with….>
3. The right of the People to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may
consti 2 all stars
produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized." (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine
Constitution).
• Justice Laurel said that this consti provision is
not among the rights of the accused. Under our
Constitution, the same is declared a popular
right of the people and, of course, indisputably it
equally applies to both citizens and foreigners in
this country. This requirement — "to be
determined by the judge" — do not specify who
will determine the existence of a probable cause.
Hence, under their provisions, any public officer
may be authorized by the Legislature to make
such determination, and thereafter issue the
warrant of arrest.
• The contention of the Solicitor General that the
arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into
effect the power of deportation is valid only
when, as already stated, there is already an
order of deportation. To carry out the order of
deportation, the President obviously has the
power to order the arrest of the deportee. But,
certainly, during the investigation.
• The extent of the curtailment of liberty
dependent upon conditions determined by the
discretion of the person issuing a warrant. In
other words, the discretion of whether a warrant
of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one
upon whom the authority devolves.
• an implied grant of power, considering that no
express authority was granted by the law on the
matter under discussion, that would serve the
curtailment or limitation on the fundamental
right of a person, such as his security to life and
liberty, must be viewed with caution.
• The guarantees of human rights and freedom
can not be made to rest precariously on such a
shaky foundation.
WHEREFORE: Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951,
insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue
warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges
against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe
the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is
declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest
issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order
of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing
modification, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
HARVEY vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO
FACTS:
7
consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
• The case stems from the apprehension of
petitioners on 27 February 1988 from their
respective residences by agents of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of
Mission Orders issued by respondent
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the
CID. Petiioners are presently detained at the CID
Dentention Center.
• Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22)
suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended
after three motnhs of close surveillance by CID
agents in Pagsanjan, Lahuna.
• Two (2) days after apprehension, or on 29
February 1988, seventeen (17) of the twenty-two
(22) arrested aliens opted for self-deportation and
have left the country.
• On March 7 1988, Warrants of Arrest were issued
by respondent against petitioners for violation of
Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.
• On March 14 1988, petitioners filec an Urgent
Petiion for Release Under Bond alleging that their
health was being seriously affected by their
continuous detention. Upon recommendation of
the Board of Commissioners for their provisional
release, respondent ordered the CID doctor to
examine petitioners, who certified that petitioners
were healthy.
• On April 4 1988, as heretofore stated, petitioners
availes of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
ISSUES:
Petitioners question the validity of their detention on
the following grounds:
1. There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration
Act og 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code, which legally clothes the
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain
petitioners pending determination of the existence of a
probable cause leading to an administrative
investigation.
2. Repondent violated Sevtion 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid
Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the
said provision.
3. Mere confidential information made to the COD
agents and their suspicion of the activities of petitioners
that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association
with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal
grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are
caught in the act. They further alleged that being a
pedophile is not punishable by any Philippines Law nor
is it a crime to be a pedophile.
HELD:
1. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa (G.R> No. 24576, July
29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155) that “the issuance of warrants
of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for
purposes of investigation and before a final order of
consti 2 all stars
deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section
1 of Article III of the COnstistution” (referring to the
1935 Constituion) is not invocable herein. Respondent
Commissioner’s warrant of Arrest is issued on 7 March
1988 did not order petitioners to appear and show cause
why they should not be deported. They were issued
specifically “for violation of Section 37, 45 and 46 of the
Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Cede.” Before that, deportation
proceedings had been commenced against them as
undesirable aliens on 4 March 1988 and the arrest was
a step preliminary to their possible deportation.
• The denial be respondent Commisioner of
petitioner’s release on bail, also challenged by
them, was in order because in deportation
proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of
right but a matter of discretion on thepart of the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation.
• The use of the word “may” in said provision
indicates that the grant of bail is merely
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the
Commissioner. The exercise of the power is wholly
discretionary
• Section 37 (a) is not constitutionally proscribed .
The specific constraints in both the 1935 and
1987 Constitutions, which are substantially
identical, contemplate prosecutions essentially
criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on
the other hand, are administrative in character.
An order of deportation is never construed as a
punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process.
It need not be conducted strictly in accordance
with ordinary Court proceedings.
2. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on
probable cause determined after close surveillance for
three (3) months during which period their activities
were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified
the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives,
photographs and posters without warrant.
• Those articles were seized as an incident to a
lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in
evidence. (Section 12, Rule 126, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure).
• But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of
petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that formal deportation charges have
been filed against them, as undesirable aliens, on
March 4, 1988. Warrants of arrest were issued
against them on March 7, 1988 “for violation of
Section 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Administrative Code. The
restraint against their persons, therefore, has
become legal. The Writ has served its purpose. The
process of the law is being followed.
3. The petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not
make their arrest illegal. Petitioners were found with
young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with John
Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the
COID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that
petitioners had committed “pedophilia” defines as
“psycho-sexual perversion involving children”.
8
consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
“Paraphilia (or unusual sexual activity) in which children
are the preferred sexual object”.
• While not a crime under the revised Penal Code, it
is behavior offensive to public morals and violative
of the declared policy of the State to promote and
protect the physical, moral, spiritual, and social
well-being of our youth (Article II, Section 13, 1987
Constitution).
• Every sovereign power has the inherent power to
exclude from its territory upon such grounds as it
may deem proper for its self-preservation or public
interest The power to deport aliens is an act of
State, an act done by or under the authority of the
sovereign power. It is a police measureaginst
undesirable aliens whose continued presence in
the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
YU vs. DEFENSOR - SANTIAGO
1989
FACTS
In 1971 Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport,
valid for 5yrs. He renewed it for the same period upon
presentment before the proper Portuguese consular
officer. On Feb 19, 1978, he was naturalized as a Phil.
Citizen. On July 21, 1981 applied for and was issued a
Portuguese passport by the Portuguese Embassy in
Tokyo. Sometime in April 1980, he declared his
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he
signed like the Companies Registry in Hongkong.
Commission on Immigration and Deportation are holding
him and are about to deport him. He petitions for habeas
corpus, seeking release from detention.
ISSUE:
WON he should still be considered a citizen of the
Philippines despite acquisition and use of a Portuguese
passport
HELD:
No
RATIO:
The foregoing acts considered together constitute an
express renunciation of petitioner’s Phil citizenship
acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners vs. Go Gallano, express
renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
interference or implication.
Yu, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having
renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as
a Phil citizen 1) resumed and reacquired his prior status
as Portuguese citizen, 2) applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and 3) represented himself as such
in official documents after he had become a naturalized
consti 2 all stars
citizen of the Phils. Such is grossly inconsistent with his
maintenance of Phil citizenship.
Material facts are not disputed by petitioner. He was
given an opportunity to show proof of continued Phil
citizenship and has failed. As such, while normally the ?
of WON a person has renounced his Phil citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary
proceedings, this has become unnecessary as the SC, no
less, upon insistence of petitioner, looked into the facts
and satisfied itself on WON petitioner’s claim to
continued Phil citizenship is meritorious.
Phil citizenship is not a commodity or were to be
displayed when required and suppressed when
convenient.
Fernan and Gutierrez, dissent:
Citizenship shouldn’t be held to have been lost in a
summary proceeding such as this.
Gutierrez and Cortes, dissent:
Evidence was too informal.Mere use of foreign passport
is not ipso facto express renunciation. One may get a
foreign passport for convenience, employment, avoidance
of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at
heart a Filipino. Full day in court must be given to
petitioner.
Disposition:
Denied petition. Lifting of TRO on deportation procedure.
LABO vs. COMELEC
August 1, 1989
Ponente: Cruz, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City on
January 20, 1988. A petition for quo warranto was filed
by the private respondent, Luis Lardizabal, on January
26, 1988 seeking to disqualify the petitioner on the
ground that he is not a Filipino citizen, but no filing fee
was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on
February 10, 1988, or twenty-one days after his
proclamation.
The petitioner says that he allegation that he is a
foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether
or not the public respondent has jurisdiction to conduct
any inquiry into this matter, considering that the
petition for quo warranto against him was not filed on
time since the petition itself is only deemed filed upon
payment of the filing fee which was done beyond the ten
day reglementary period provided for under Section 253
of the Omnibus Election Code.
Private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out
of time since when he first filed his petition for quo
warranto it was treated as a pre-proclamation
9
consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
controversy and it was only on February 8, 1988 decided
to treat his case as solely for quo warranto. The Court
has considered the arguments of the parties and holds
that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time.
Considering that the sole issue raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against
him, this matter should normally end here. However, as
his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and
considering the necessity for an early resolution of
that more important question clearly and urgently
affecting the public interest, we shall address it now
in the same action.
There are two administrative decisions on the question of
the petitioner’s citizenship:
1. rendered by COMELEC on May 12, 1982 –
petitioner found to be a citizen of the Phils.
• no direct proof was presented that
petitioner had been formally naturalized
as an Australian citizen.
• this conjecture, which was eventually
rejected, was merely inferred from the
fact that he had married an Australian
citizen, obtained an Australian passport,
and registered as an alien with the CID
upon his return to this country in 1980.
2. rendered by Commission on Immigration and
Deportation on Sept. 13, 1988 – petitioner found
to be an Australian citizen.
• took into account the official statement
of the Australian Government dated
August 12, 1984, through its Consul in
the Philippines, that the petitioner was
still an Australian citizen as of that date
by reason of his naturalization on July
28, 1976.
• That prior to 17 July 1986, a
candidate for Australian citizenship
had to either swear an oath of
allegiance or make an affirmation of
allegiance which carries
renunciation of "all other allegiance.
The petitioner also categorically declared that he was a
citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements
voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the
jurisdiction of the barangay court on the ground that he
was a foreigner. The COMELEC in 1982 said that these
mistakes did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship.
This is rejected by the Court. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through
a formal and positive process, simplified in his case
because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a
condition for such naturalization, he formally took the
Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of
Allegiance.
Petitioner claims that at worst his naturalization as an
Australian citizen maed him only a dual national and did
not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such an
consti 2 all stars
argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of
CA no. 63 which enumerates the modes by which Phil.
Citizenship may be lost: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and
(3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which
are applicable to the petitioner.
The claim of petitioner that his naturalization was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to an
Australian was bigamous does not concern us here since
that is a matter him and his adopted country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently
rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean
that he has been automatically reinstated as a
citizen of the Philippines.
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear
in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods.
The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the
local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the
Philippines. In fact, he was not even a qualified voter
under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21
He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of
Baguio City, under Section 42 of the Local Government
Code providing in material part as follows:
Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective
local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines, at least twenty-three years
of age on election day…
The petitioner claims that a mere technicality like
citizenship should not be allowed to frustrate the will of
the electorate. In any event, even unanimously, the
people of that locality cannot change the requirements of
the Local Government Code and the Constitution.
a
The fact that petitioner has been disqualified does not by
default make private respondent, the person who
obtained the second highest number of votes, the mayor
of Baguio City. The doctrine in Geronimo vs. Ramos
states that, “…The fact that the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the
office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of
the elective office…”
On the importance of Phil. Citizenship:
Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can
be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be
restored only after the returning renegade makes a
formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured
10
consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This
may not be accomplished by election to public office.
AZNAR vs. COMELEC
Ponente: Paras, J: May 25, 1990
FACTS:
On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito"
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.
On January 22, 1988, Aznar as the Chairman of the
Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private
respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a
Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of
America. On January 27, he submitted a Certificate by
then Immigration Commissioner Defensor-Santiago that
Osmeña is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March
27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
He asked the Comelec to issue a TRO to enjoin the Cebu
Provincial Board of Canvassers from canvassing the
votes. On January 28 however, the Comelec en banc
ordered the Board to continue the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation.
Petitioner’s evidence to show Osmeña is a US
citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of
the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent
dated November 21, 1979; Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 015356 in the name of private
respondent dated November 21, 1979; Permit to Re-enter
the Philippines dated November 21, 1979; Immigration
Certificate of Clearance dated January 3, 1980.
Osmeña: maintained that he is a Filipino citizen,
alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio
Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25,
1987; that he has been continuously residing in the
Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the
country for more than six months; and that he has been
a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed
the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. Having obtained the highest number of
votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial
Governor of Cebu.
consti 2 all stars
Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division)
dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having
been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that
private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE: W/N Osmeña is a US citizen. NO
Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy on Nov. 19,
1987 and that the petitioner filed for his disqualification
only on Jan. 22, 1988 which was beyond the 25 day
period as required under Sec. 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. However, it is a matter of public interest
to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and
qualification to hold the public office to which he has
been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us
(SC) to rule directly on the merits of the case.
• There is lack of substantial and convincing
evidence to support the assertion that private
respondent is not a Filipino citizen and therefore
is disqualified from running.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner
failed to present direct proof that private respondent had
lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided
for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an
oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of
a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine
citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or
by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been
naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America,
the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private
respondent was issued alien certificate of registration
and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the
Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the
foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an
American", private respondent "must have taken and
sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.
Naturalization Laws."
Philippine Courts are only allowed to determine who are
Filipino citizens or not. Whether a person is considered
as an American under US laws do not concern us here.
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the
presumption that private respondent is a Filipino
remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove
that private respondent had lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Frivaldo and Labo are not applicable here since in both
cases the evidence, as well as by their own admissions,
shows that they were naturalized as US and Australian
citizens respectively and therefre no longer owe any
allegiance to the Philippines.
11
consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
In the instant case, private respondent vehemently
denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United
States. He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine
passport and has continuously participated in the
electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus,
private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he
stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained
Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen,
the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the
second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as
having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To
Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not
follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he
has a Certificate stating he is an American does not
mean that he is not still a Filipino.
Also the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. In any case it shall be dealt with by a
future law which has not yet been enacted.
B. Juridical Persons
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO (supra)
CENTRAL BANK vs. MORFE
FACTS:
1. the First Mutual Savings and Loan Organization,
Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the
Organization — is a registered non-stock
corporation, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated
February 14, 1961, is "to encourage . . . and
implement savings and thrift among its
members, and to extend financial assistance in
the form of loans," to them. The Organization
has three (3) classes of "members,"1 namely: (a)
founder members — who originally joined the
organization and have signed the pre-
incorporation papers — with the exclusive right
to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating
members — with "no right to vote or be voted for"
— to which category all other members belong;
except (c) honorary members, so made by the
board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion"
thereof — due to "assistance, honor, prestige or
help extended in the propagation" of the
objectives of the Organization — without any
pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary
members.
2. On February 14, 1962, the legal department of
the Central Bank of the Philippines —
hereinafter referred to as the Bank — rendered
consti 2 all stars
an opinion to the effect that the Organization
and others of similar nature are banking
institutions, falling within the purview of the
Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3,
1963, the Bank caused to be published in the
newspapers the following:
Announcement: xxx operations similar in nature to said
"associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO ACCEPT DEPOSIT OF FUNDS
FROM THE PUBLIC NOR TO ENGAGE IN THE BANKING
BUSINESS NOR TO PERFORM ANY BANKING ACTIVITY
OR FUNCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES.
Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General
Banking Act, Republic Act No. 337, should they engage
in the "lending of funds obtained from the public
through the receipts of deposits or the sale of bonds,
securities or obligations of any kind" without authority
from the Monetary Board. Their activities and operations
are not supervised by the Superintendent of Banks and
persons dealing with such institutions do so at their
risk.
3. April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank
directed the coordination of "the investigation
and gathering of evidence on the activities of the
savings and loan associations which are
operating contrary to law
4. on May 18, 1962, a member of the intelligence
division of the Bank filed with the Municipal
Court of Manila a verified application for a
search warrant against the Organization
5. Upon the filing of said application, on May 18,
1962, Hon. Roman Cancino, as Judge of the
said municipal court, issued the warrant
commanding the search of the aforesaid
premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and
the seizure of the foregoing articles, there being
"good and sufficient reasons to believe" upon
examination, under oath, of a detective of the
Manila Police Department and said intelligence
officer of the Bank
6. Organization commenced Civil Case No. 50409
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an
original action for "certiorari, prohibition, with
writ of preliminary injunction and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the
Manila Police Department, and the Bank, to
annul the aforementioned search warrant, upon
the ground that, in issuing the same, the
municipal court had acted "with GADALEJ"
because: (a) "said search warrant is a roving
commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the
use of the word 'and others' in the search
warrant . . . permits the unreasonable search
and seizure of documents which have no relation
whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and
(c) "no court in the Philippines has any
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
jurisdiction to try a criminal case against a
corporation . . ."
- pending hearing of the case on the
merits, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued ex parte restraining the
aforementioned search and seizure, or,
in the alternative, if the acts complained
of have been partially performed, that a
writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction be forthwith issued ex parte,
ordering the preservation of the status
quo of the parties, as well as the
immediate return to the Organization of
the documents and papers so far seized
under, the search warrant in question.
After due hearing, Judge Morfe issued.
7. Bank moved for a reconsideration thereof, which
was denied on August 7, 1962. Accordingly, the
Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the
present action, against Judge Morfe and the
Organization, alleging that respondent Judge
had acted with GADALEJ in issuing the order in
question.
ISSUE:
WON Judge Cancino, in issuing the order (was it
unreasonable) acted with GADALEJ?
HELD:
No. Preliminary mandatory injunction issued by
Judge Morfe annulled. Writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the SC made permanent with costs against
the organization.
RATIO:
- it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional
injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures seeks to forestall, not purely abstract or
imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones.
Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature
of things, a condition dependent upon the
circumstances surrounding each case, in much
the same way as the question whether or not
"probable cause" exists is one which must be
decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations.
- Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not
clear from the order complained of whether
respondent Judge opined that the above
mentioned statement of the deponent — to the
effect that the Organization was engaged in the
transactions mentioned in his deposition —
deserved of credence or not. Obviously, however,
a mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who
issued the warrant, on the credibility of said
statement, would not justify the conclusion that
said municipal Judge had committed a grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
- Again, the aforementioned order would seem to
assume that an illegal banking transaction, of
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the kind contemplated in the contested action of
the officers of the Bank, must always connote
the existence of a "victim." If this term is used to
denote a party whose interests have been
actually injured, then the assumption is not
necessarily justified. The law requiring
compliance with certain requirements before
anybody can engage in banking obviously seeks
to protect the public against actual, as well as
potential, injury. Similarly, we are not aware of
any rule limiting the use of warrants to papers
or effects which cannot be secured otherwise.
- The deposition of a member of the Intelligence
Division of the Central Bank, that after close
observation and investigation, the office of a
savings and loan association, illegally engaged in
banking activities, is being unlawfully used, is
sufficient for the issuance of a search warrant.
The failure of the deponent to mention particular
individuals does not necessarily prove that the
had no personal knowledge of specific illegal
transactions of the savings and loans
association, for the witness might be acquainted
with specific transactions even if the names of
the individuals are unknown to him.
- The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might,
perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed to the
Organization consisted of isolated transactions,
distinct and different from the type of business
in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it
may be necessary to specify or identify the
parties involved in said isolated transactions, so
that the search and seizure be limited to the
records pertinent thereto. Such, however, is not
the situation confronting us. The records
suggest clearly that the transactions objected to
by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the
business of the Organization. Indeed, the main
purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to
extend financial assistance, in the form of loans,
to its members," with funds deposited by them.
- It is true, that such funds are referred to — in
the Articles of Incorporation and the By-laws —
as their "savings." and that the depositors
thereof are designated as "members," but, even a
cursory examination of said documents will
readily show that anybody can be a depositor
and thus be a "participating member." In other
words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the
"public" for deposit accounts, and the funds so
raised may be lent by the Organization.
Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds
is placed under the exclusive authority of the
"founder members," and "participating members"
are expressly denied the right to vote or be voted
for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being
limited to those which the board of trustees
may, in its discretion, determine from time to
time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the
"participating members" is purely nominal in
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
nature. This situation is fraught, precisely, with
the very dangers or evils which Republic Act No.
337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance
with the requirements of said Act, before the
transactions in question could be undertaken.
- It is interesting to note, also, that the
Organization does not seriously contest the main
facts, upon which the action of the Bank is
based. The principal issue raised by the
Organization is predicated upon the theory that
the aforementioned transactions of the
Organization do not amount to " banking," as
the term is used in Republic Act No. 337. We are
satisfied, however, in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in this case, that the
Municipal Judge did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion in finding that there was probable
cause that the Organization had violated
Sections 2 and 6 of the aforesaid law and in
issuing the warrant in question, and that,
accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of
First Instance (64 Phil. 33), the search and
seizure complained of have not been proven to
be unreasonable.
C. State Action Requirement (who
are subject to constitutional
prohibitions)
PEOPLE vs. MARTI
J. Bidin: January 18, 1991
FACTS:
Appeal from a conviction under RA 6425, aka the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
Appellant Andre Marti and his common-low wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to “Manila Packing and Export Forwarders”
with 4 giftwrapped packages. Proprietress Anita Reyes
attended to them and they presented the packages to be
sent to a friend, Walter Fierz, in Zurich, Switzerland.
When Anita asked if she could examine and inspect the
packages, appellant refused saying that the packages
merely contained books, cigars and gloves. The boxes
were then packaged for shipment.
Before delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, Job
Reyes, husband of Anita, opened the boxes for final
inspection (SOP). He smelled a peculiar odor and felt
dried leaves inside one of the packages. He opened one
of the packages and took several grams of the contents
and sent a letter to the NBI requesting a lab exam of
what he had found.
NBI and Job Reyes went to the latter’s office and
proceeded to open the packages, finding dry marijuana
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leaves. The NBI then took custody of the contents of the
packages. Appellant could not be contacted, but was
later “invited” by the NBI when he was claiming mail at
the Central Post Office. On that same day, a forensic
chemist in the NBI certified the contents of the packages
as being marijuana leaves.
ISSUE:
WON the opening and seizure of the contents of
appellant’s packages warranted an unreasonable search
and seizure.
HELD:
No it did not.
RATIO:
Illegal search and seizure
Sections 2 and 3 of Art. III provide for the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure. These
provisions were taken from the 4th amendment of the US
constitution.
In deciding WON the case at bar was an instance of an
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court said that it
was not, for the main reason that it was done by a
private individual, namely Job Reyes. What the law
contemplates is a protection against actions of the state
against individuals, not those between individuals.
Cases cited:
Villanueva v. Querubin: “This constitutional right...refers
to the immunity...from interference by the government...”
Burdeau v. McDowell: “...its protection applies to
governmental action...it was intended as a restraint
upon the activities of sovereign authority...”
State v. Bryan: A parking attendant searched an
automobile and found marijuana without aid of
authorities. Marijuana was deemed admissible.
Walker v. State: “...search and seizure clauses are
restraints upon the government and its agents, not upon
private individuals...”
Bernas v. US: “...the amendment only proscribes
governmental action.”
Presence of NBI
The Court also said that the mere presence of the NBI
did not make the search and seizure unreasonable. Mere
observation is not a search. The search was conducted
merely by Job Reyes. The Court cited Gandy v. Watkins:
“where the search was initially made by the owner there
is no unreasonable search and seizure...”
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection
The Court here again stressed that “the Bill of Rights is
not meant to be invoked against acts of private
individuals” and this is seen in the intention of the
framers as Bernas states that they are a protection
against the State.
In this case we see that the search and seizure was done
by Job Reyes, a private individual. As such, the
Constitutional guarantee cannot be invoked by the
appellant.
Other issues
1) Informed of rights – Court here said that he was
informed of his constitutional rights by the NBI,
and even availed of their Constitutional right not
to give a written statement.
2) Not being the owner of the packages – untenable
as he gave his name as the owner. Also
unbelievable that he would send a package for
someone who he merely met in a bar. Moreover,
appellant was also convicted of possession of
hashish by the Kleve Court in Germany.
PRUNEYARD vs. SHOPPING CENTER supra
BORJAL vs. COURT of APPEALS
Justice Bellosillo, 1999
FACTS:
1. Between May and July 1989, a series of articles
written by petitioner Borjal was published on
different dates in his column Jaywalker. The articles
dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an
"organizer of a conference" without naming or
identifying private respondent Wenceslao. Neither
did it refer to the First National Conference on Land
Transportation (FNCLT) as the conference therein
mentioned.
2. Wenceslao reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to
The Philippine Star insisting that he was the
"organizer" alluded to in petitioner Borjal's columns.
In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, he
refuted the matters contained in Borjal's columns.
3. Wenceslao filed a complaint with the National Press
Club (NPC) Borjal for unethical conduct. He accused
petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of
leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations
firm. In turn, Borjal published a rejoinder to the
challenge of private respondent not only to protect
his name and honor but also to refute the claim that
he was using his column for character
assassination.
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4. Wenceslao filed a criminal case for libel against
petitioners Borjal and Soliven (publisher). The
Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence. He
instituted against petitioners a civil action for
damages based on libel subject of the instant case.
The RTC decided in favor of private respondent
Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and
Soliven to indemnify private respondent P1M for
actual and compensatory damages, in addition to
P200K for moral damages, P100K for exemplary
damages, P200K for attorney's fees, and to pay the
costs of suit.
5. The CA affirmed the decision but reduced the
amount of the monetary award. The CA ruled that
private respondent was sufficiently identifiable,
although not named, in the questioned articles;
that private respondent was in fact defamed by
petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a
"self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer
associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash
tucked inside his closet," "thick face," and "a
person with dubious ways;" that petitioner's claim
of privilege communication was unavailing since
the privileged character of the articles was lost by
their publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
6. The petitioners brought the action to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the CA was correct in its ruling that Borjal was
guilty of libel. – NO.
RATIO:
1. In action for libel, the victim shall be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named. The
questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify
Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. There
were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution and
anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an
"organizer of seminars and conferences.
2. Borjal wrote about the so-called First National
Conference on Land Transportation whose principal
organizers are not specified. Neither did the FNCLT
letterheads disclose the identity of the conference
organizer since these contained only an enumeration
of names where Wenceslao was described as
Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a
conference organizer.
3. It is also not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed. It must be shown that at least a third
person could identify him as the object of the
libelous publication. Wenceslao himself entertained
doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's
columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal
to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was the one referred to
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consti part 13: scope of constitutional protection

in the subject articles. Identification is grossly

inadequate when even the alleged offended party is
himself unsure that he was the object of the verbal
attack.
4. Publications which are privileged for reasons of
public policy are protected by the constitutional
guaranty of freedom of speech. A privileged
communication may be either absolutely privileged
or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith. Qualifiedly
privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have
been made without good intention justifiable motive.
5. Borjal's questioned writings are not within the
exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code for
they are neither private communications nor fair and
true report without any comments or remarks.
However this does not necessarily mean that they
are not privileged. The enumeration under Art. 354
is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters
of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on
privileged communications had its genesis not in the
nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of
the press. The concept of privileged communications
is implicit in the freedom of the press.
6. Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action
for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily
actionable.
9. To be considered malicious, the libelous statements
must be shown to have been written or published
with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of whether they are false or not. "Reckless
disregard of what is false or not" means that the
defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of
the publication, or that he possesses a high degree
of awareness of their probable falsity. The articles
subject of the instant case can hardly be said to
have been written with knowledge that these are
false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not
10. SC declares Borjal to have acted in good faith.
Moved by a sense of civic duty and prodded by his
responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to
expose and denounce what he perceived to be a
public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him
for that. Every citizen has the right to enjoy a good
name and reputation, but we do not consider that
petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this case
nor abused his press freedom.
11. Freedom of expression is man's birthright
-constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that
it has become the singular role of the press to act as
its "defensor fidei" in a democratic society such as
ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the
press is the servant, not the master, of the citizenry,
and its freedom does not carry with it an restricted
hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.

7. The SC applied the Sullivan v NY Ties doctrine in

considering the respondent as a public figure. The
FNCLT was an undertaking infused with public
interest. It was promoted as a joint project of the
government and the private sector, and organized by
top government officials and prominent
businessmen. For this reason, it attracted media
mileage and drew public attention not only to the
conference itself but to the personalities behind as
well. As its Executive Director and spokesman,
Wenceslao consequently assumed the status of a
public figure.

8. The guarantees of freedom of speech and press

prohibit a public official or public figure from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice, i.e.,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.
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