Leg Prof
DAROY VS. LEGASPI not present any receipt to prove the alleged payment of P2,000. He
Facts:
♦ Fermina Daroy, Lydia Legaspi and Agripino Legaspi hired the Ramon
Legaspi in May, 1962 to represent them in the intestate proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the spouses Aquilino Gonzaga and Paz Velez-
Gonzaga. The complainants, together with their brother, Vivencio, who was
abroad, were adjudged as one of the six groups of heirs of the late
Gonzaga spouses, their deceased mother, Consuelo Gonzaga-Legaspi,
being a daughter of the spouses.
♦ April 11, 1969 – in a joint petition dated which Atty. Legaspi signed as
counsel for the complainants, agreed that the coconut land left by the
decedents would be divided into six equal parts, that the administrator be
authorized to sell the land, and that, after payment of the obligations of the
estate, the net proceeds would be distributed among the six groups of heirs.
♦ The land was sold. Fermina Daroy came to know of the sale only when the
Atty. Legaspi wrote a note dated November 28, 1969 to her father, Teofilo
Legaspi, wherein he stated "that the money we have deposited may be
withdrawn on December 8, 1969 at 9:00 o'clock". Atty. Legaspi advised
Teofilo Legaspito see him on that date so that the money could be
withdrawn. Complainants were not able to withdraw the money.
♦ December 9, 1969 – Mrs. Daroy received a note wherein Atty. Legaspi
informed them that he used their money to solve his problems and that he
would pay the, as soon as he receives the proceeds of his jeep.
♦ Complainants made several demands for payment buy Atty. Legaspi
repeatedly broke his promise and as such a complaint for his disbarment
was filed.
♦ Version of Legaspi:
o Teofilo Legaspi supposedly went to see him on October 21, 1969 and
at their conference they supposedly agreed that the sum of P700 would
be deducted from the P4,000 to cover the expenses which he
described as "expenses involved from the parties litigants, expenses
seeking evidence and other expenses relevant to the case" and "major
expenses" in the case and that his attorney's fees would be equivalent
"to a share of the petitioners", and that the balance of P3,300 would be
divided into six equal parts (six because of the four Legaspi children,
the father Teofilo Legaspi and the lawyer Ramon C. Legaspi); that
under such division each participant would receive P412 each (P3,300
divided by six gives a quotient of P550 not P412), and that he gave
Teofilo the sum of P412. No receipt was presented.
o First week of November 1969 Teofilo got from him the share of
Vivencio. Money left with him amounted to P2,476.
o According to Atty. Legaspi the complainants "refused consistently to
receive" the said balance from him because they wanted the full
amount of P4,000. He said that he had already paid to them the sum of
P2,000 and that only the sum of P476 was left in his custody. He did
said that he could deliver that amount of P476 to the complainants.
♦ Mrs. Daroy stated that there was no agreement that Atty. Legaspi would
participate like an heir in the partition.
WON Atty. Legaspi paid the money to Teofilo Legaspi? NO
Note of Atty. Legaspi to Mrs. Daroy dated December 9, 1969, overwhelmingly
belie his fabricated theory that he conferred with Teofilo Legaspi at the end of
October or in the first week of November, 1969. He was tempted to concoct a
story as to his alleged payments to Teofilo Legaspi because the latter is dead
and could not refute him. However, complainants' documentary evidence refutes
his prevarications, distortions and fabrications.
WON Atty. Legaspi is guilty of malpractice? YES
♦ Carbon copy of a supposed extrajudicial partition executed in 1968 by the
four children of Consuelo Gonzaga, by her surviving husband, Teofilo
Legaspi and by the respondent, Atty. Legaspi, all the six being described in
the document as "the legitimate children and sole heirs of Consuelo
Gonzaga, who died on March 12. 1941". Atty. Legaspi is not a legitimate
heir and he did not explain why he is referred to as one. The document
casts a reflection on his competency and integrity as a lawyer and on the
competency and integrity of the notary before whom it was acknowledged.
It was made to appear herein that respondent Legaspi was an heir of
Consuelo Gonzaga when, obviously, he did not possess that status.
♦ A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or
malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients.
He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come
into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or
use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. He should
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust.
♦ Money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgment in favor of his
clients is held in trust and must be immediately turned over to them
♦ Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded,
he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal
prosecution.
♦ A member of the bar who converts the money of his client to his own benefit
through false pretenses is guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct in his office of lawyer. The attorney, who violates his oath of
office, betrays the confidence reposed in him by a client and practices
deceit cannot be permitted to continue as a law practitioner. Not alone has
he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair
name of an honorable profession
♦ Sturr vs. State Bar of California: The conversion of funds entrusted to an
attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as professional
Leg Prof
ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves
severe punishment"
Holding: Atty. Legaspi is disbarred.
TANHUECO vs. DE DUMO [1989]
Hilaria Tanhueco filed a disbarment case against Justiniano de Dumo for
violationg CPE in failing to remit the collected money from Hilaria’s debtors and
refusing to return the documents entrusted to him.
Dumo denied all these in a rejoinder and answer to counterpetition.
The court in a resolution referred this case to solgen for investigation, report,
and recommendation.
A year after the resolution, Jose Florencio Tanhueco, nephew of Hilaria,
pursued the case by writing to Imelda Marcos. The complaint was referred to the
PIA staff, and Dep’t of Public Info for proper action. An administrative case was
filed.
Dumo filed his answer. The court in a resolution again referred it to Acting
Judicial Consultant Ricardo Puno for study, report and investigation. So since
there were already two admin cases filed, the solgen moved for a consolidation.
The Office of the Solgen held two hearings, but with a 12-year
interregnum,Dec 1976 and April 1988, Hilaria already died. In the 1st hearing,
Dumo was absent, the next hearing Tanhueco (jose) didn’t appear.
Solgen was able to get these from the evidence presented by both parties:
Petitioner: the agreed fees was 15% of the collection. There were
documents he didn’t return to her. Dumo borrowed money from her: 2k,
1.3k and 3k.The collected debt of Manosca worth 12,500 wasn’t remitted to
her.
Respondent: the agreed fees was 50% of the collection. He was to collect
from Tipace, Manosca, Morena and others. All the initial payment were
remitted to her, except that of Manosca because, he was able to obtain a
money judgment for 19k although debt was 12k. Manosca paid 12k, and
seeing that Tanhueco owed him 17k of atty’s fees, he kept the 12k. he
denies the documents and the borrowed money alleged.
Findings of solgen: atty-client relationship exists, the 12,000 from Manosca
was really taken, that there was no proper accounting given to Tanhueco of
this. No conclusive evidence on borrowed money and documents. De dumo
committed an unprofessional conduct subject but mitigated because it is
also in jurisprudence that the atty is entitled to his lien on his services. He
then is admonished and reprimanded. Repetition will be dealt with more
severely.
WON the recommendation of the SOLGen is proper. NO and WON the
agreed fees were proper. NO
Canon 11 dealing with trust property says that an atty must not
abuse of the confidence reposed in him, that money of client or other trust
property he receives should be reported and accounted for promptly and
should not under any circumstances be co-mingled with his own or used by
him.
Even in Sec. 37 of Rule 138 of RoC, he has a right to enforce his
lien on judgments and funds or documents coming into his possession
lawfully, by retaining the funds, documents, but only after reporting the liens
to the courts and giving written notice to the client and adverse parties.
Therefore, the lawyer having a lien on the client’s money doesn’t
relieve him from his duty to give prompt account, otherwise it is a
professional misconduct. And the court said he wasn’t even supposed to
get the lien yet because he must deduct only upon the actual amount
collected, here, not all the cases were finished. So he wasn’t entitled to his
lien, on the entire 12k, until all his fees for all the other cases have been
paid and received.
Knowing that the atty-client relationship is one of special trust and
confidence, an atty. Must exercise good faith and fairness, respondent fell
far short of this standard. He placed his private and personal interest above
his client’s. A reprimand is not enough.
Contingent fees are not prohibited by law but if it was obtained by
undue influence exercised by the atty upon his client or by any fraud or
imposition, or the compensation be excessive, the court will protect the
aggrieved party.
He actually collected 60% of 31, 390= 18,840 pesos from a 76yo
penniless (old and sickly)woman.(breakdown in page 769) Their agreed
contingent fees he said, were the 50% of the collected(both principal and
interest) and the legal atty’s fees charged to the other party. Knowing the
circumstances of the woman, she probably agreed only because she
wanted the debts paid before she died.
In Mambulao v PNB, the court said that even if there was an
agreement as to the atty’s fees, does not insulate such agreement from
review and modification by the court if found to be unreasonable for being
excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable. The lawyer is primarily a court
officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in admistering justice
between parties, hence the fees should be subject to judicial control. Public
policy demands that courts disregard stipulations on atty’s fees whenever
they appear to be for speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or
mortgagor. The courts then has the power to fix the fees between atty and
client.
The court must guard the client, especially an aged and
necessitous one. On a quantum meruit basis, no special difficulty was had
of the case, fees reduced to 15% of the total amount( including atty’s fees
stipulated as chargeable to the debtors) collected by him. The solgen’d
findings on the documents and borrowed money is upheld to be still
inconclusive.
Decision: 1. respondent guilty of violation of the atty’s oath and of serious
professional misconduct, suspended for 6 months and WARNED against
repetition. 2. only 15% is the entitlement of the total amount collected. 3. he
must return 10,200(12,000 minus 15%) to the estate of Hilaria 4. he shall also
return any document or collection received from client and debtors, accounting it
before subtracting the 15%.
Leg Prof
Leg Prof

FERNANDO & AMELIA CRUZ, complainants, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO

JACINTO, respondent [2000] Issues & Ratio:
 June 1990: Jacinto, lawyer of Cruz sps, requested latter for a loan in behalf 1. WON administrative proceedings vs Jacinto may proceed despite the
of Concepcion Padilla, who he claimed was an old friend in need of money. dismissal of the criminal case filed vs him. – YES.
Loan was for P285k, payable after 100 days for P360k to be secured by a  The practice of law, being intimately affected w/public interest, is subject to
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land in QC. Sps, believing & trusting the control & regulation of the State in order to promote public welfare.
their lawyer, authorized him to prepare documents relative to the Consti vests this power on the SC. SC cannot be divested of its power by a
registration of the mortgage. voluntary desistance & quitclaim.
 July 4, 1990: Jacinto presented Real Estate Mortgage Contract & a Transfer  A lawyer may be disciplined/suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
Certificate Title (TCT) in the name of Padilla. Sps then gave him P270k in professional/private capacity, w/c renders him unworthy to continue as an
cash & P15k in PBCom check. officer of the court.
 Oct. 15, 1990: maturity of loan. Sps demanded payment from Padilla.  Real party in interest in this case is the public/all good citizens who are after
However, they discovered that no person by that name lived in the address the proper administration of justice.
given by Jacinto. They also learned that the TCT was fake & spurious. They
failed to locate Padilla. 2. WON Jacinto is guilty of misconduct. – YES.
 Complaint was filed before the NBI:  Jacinto acted both as a lawyer & an agent. As a lawyer, he was tasked to
1. Sps claim that they relied on Jacinto’s reassurances and that their trust execute the mortgage contract, register & annotate the TCT & he even
& confidence in Jacnito made them decide not to meet Padilla. received a share in the interest earnings.
2. Estrella Palipada, Jacinto’s secretary, testified that she prepared the  A business transaction between a lawyer & his client is disfavored &
mortgage contract & receipt of the loan, however she never saw discouraged. If such is necessary, it must be characterized w/utmost
Padilla. She was also instructed by Jacinto to notarize the contract by honesty & good faith. A higher standard must be observed. A lawyer must
signing the name of Atty. Ricardo Neri. not take advantage of his client’s credulity & ignorance. No presumption of
3. Avegail Payos, Jacinto’s housemaid, testified that she simulated the innocence/improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an attorney’s favor.
signature of Emmanuel Gimarino, Deputy Register of Deeds of QC  Jacinto failed to perform his duties & responsibilities faithfully as well as to
upon Jacinto’s instruction. This was done to make it appear that proctect the rts & interests of his clients, thereby he is guilty of violating the
contract was registered & annotated in the TCT. Code of Professional Responsibility. Disciplinary measures are imposed for
 Sps filed a case for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents under his own good & the good of the entire membership of the Bar.
RPC Art. 315 against Jacinto. Counsel was arrested & detained by the NBI.
 Jacinto’s defense: Holding: Jacinto suspended from the practice of law for 6 months w/warning
1. Information filed vs him had already been dismissed because of sps’ that a repetition of the same/similar offense will be dealt w/more severely.
voluntary desistance.
2. He had no idea that Padilla will give a falsified TCT. He was a victim as
well.
3. He had not been negligent in collecting the proceeds of the loan. He
even advanced the full payment of the loan from his savings even if
Padilla had not yet paid.
 IBP Recommendation: Suspension from the practice of law for 6mos.
1. Dismissal of the case was because of sps’ voluntary desistance & not a
finding of Jacinto’s innocence.
2. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis (unique?). Its primary
objective is not so much to punish the individual attorney as to
safeguard the admin of justice by protecting the court & the public from
the misconduct of lawyers and remove lawyers who are unfit. It may
proceed despite the dismissal of civil and/or criminal cases vs a lawyer.
3. Advancing the payment will not exonerate him. It can only mitigate his
liability. A lawyer guilty of unlawful fraudulent or dishonest act may &
should be held administratively liable.
Leg Prof
RUBIAS vs. BATILLER [1973]
 Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Iloilo
 Domingo D. Rubias, a lawyer, filed a suit to recover the ownership and
possession of certain portions of lot located in Barrio General Luna, Iloilo
w/c he bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante in 1956 against its
present occupant, Isaias Batiller, who allegedly entered said portions of the
lot on 2 occasions (1945&1959). He also prayed for damages & attorney's
fees.
 Batiller, in his answer with counter-claim, claims the complaint does not
state a cause of action, as he & his predecessors-in-interest have always
been in actual, open & continuous possession since time immemorial under
claim of ownership of the portions of the lot in question. He also claimed he
suffered damages
 TC ordered a pre-trial conference where the parties agreed as to the
following facts:
o Francisco Militante claimed ownership of the subject parcel of land and
before the war with Japan, he filed with the Iloilo CFI an application for
the registration of title of the land. But during the war with Japan, the
record of the case was lost before it was heard, so after the war he
petitioned SC to reconstitute the record of the case. Record was
reconstituted and the CFI heard the land registration case & after trial
SC dismissed the application. Francisco appealed to the CA.
o Pending the disposal of the appeal, Francisco sold subject land to
Rubias and the sale was duly recorded in the Office of the Register of
Deeds
o CA dismissed the application for Registration filed by Francisco
o Rubias declared the land described for taxation purposes for 1957,
1961, and 1964.
o Militante, immediate predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, has also
declared the land for taxation purposes for 1945 and 1948 and paid the
land taxes for 1940, for 1945-46, for 1947, for 1947 & 1948, for 1948,
and for 1948 and 1949
o Tax Declaration in the name of Liberato Demontaño for the land
described therein was cancelled by Francisco’s Tax Dec. Demontaño
paid the land tax for the yrs 1938 (50%) & 1959
o Batiller had declared for taxation purposes the lots under certain Tax
Decs. and the land taxes for the years 1945 and 1946, for the year
1950, and for the year 1960.
o The land claimed by the defendant as his own was surveyed & a plan
approved by Director of Lands was issued
o Then, plaintiff filed a forcible Entry and Detainer case against Batiller to
which Batiller filed his answer
o Municipal Court decided the case in favor of the defendant finding that
plaintilffs complaint is unjustified, intended to harass the defendant and
that Batiller, has a better right to possess the land in question having
been in the actual physical possession thereof under a claim of title
many years before Francisco Militante sold the land to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff appealed. And SC decided the case in favor of the Batiller.
o During the trial of this case on the merit, the plaintiff & defendants will
each prove by competent evidence certain information.
 The appellate court further related the developments of the case.
Apparently, defendant's counsel manifested in open court that before any
trial on the merit of the case could proceed he would file a motion to dismiss
plaintiff's complaint which he did, alleging that plaintiff does not have a
cause of action against him because the property in dispute which he
(plaintiff) allegedly bought from his father-in-law, Francisco Militante was the
subject matter of a case filed in the CFI of Iloilo, w/c case was brought on
appeal to this Court and in w/c aforesaid case plaintiff was the counsel on
record of his father-in-law. Invoking Arts. 1409 & 1491 of the CC, defendant
claims that plaintiff could not have acquired any interest in the property in
dispute as the contract plaintiff had with Francisco was inexistent and void.
 Plaintiff strongly opposed defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that
defendant can not invoke aforesaid articles as Art. 1422, CC provides that
'The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose
interests are not directly affected'
 Lower court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff filed MFR w/c was
denied by the lower court, hence this appeal
WON complaint was validly dismissed outright
 YES. The stipulated facts and exhibits of record indisputably established
plaintiff's lack of cause of action and justified the outright dismissal of the
complaint. Plaintiff's claim of ownership to the land in question was
predicated on the sale made by his father-in-law, Francisco, in his favor, at
a time when Militante's application for registration thereof had already been
dismissed by the Iloilo land registration court and was pending appeal in the
CA.
 With the Court of Appeals' 1958 final judgment affirming the dismissal of
Militante's application for registration, the lack of any rightful claim or title of
Militante to the land was conclusively and decisively judicially determined.
Hence, there was no right or title to the land that could be transferred or
sold by Militante's purported sale in 1956 in favor of plaintiff.
WON contract of sale between appellant and his father-in-law over the
subject property was void as it was made when plaintiff was counsel of his
father-in-law in a land registration case involving the property in dispute
 YES. Purchase by a lawyer of the property in litigation from his client is
categorically prohibited by Art. 1491(5), CC, and that consequently,
plaintiff"s purchase of the property in litigation from his client (assuming that
his client could sell the same, since as already shown above, his client's
claim to the property was defeated & rejected) was void & could produce no
legal effect, by virtue of Art. 1409(7), CC w/c provides that contracts
"expressly prohibited or declared void by law" are "inexistent & void from
Leg Prof

the beginning" & that "(T)hese contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the
right to set up the defense of illegality be waived."
 Wolfson vs. Estate of Martinez relied upon by plaintiff was superseded by
Director of Lands v. Abagat w/c held that the deed was invalid by virtue of
the provisions of Art. 1459, CC, which prohibits lawyers and solicitors from
purchasing property rights involved in any litigation in which they may take
part by virtue of their profession.
 Art. 1491, CC prohibits in its 6 pars certain persons, by reason of the
relation of trust or their peculiar control over the property, from acquiring
such property in their trust or control either directly or indirectly and "even at
a public or judicial auction," as follows: (1) guardians; (2) agents; (3)
administrators; (4) public officers and employees; (5) judicial officers and
employees, prosecuting attorneys, & lawyers; & (6) others specially
disqualified by law.
 Fundamental considerations of public policy render void and inexistent such
expressly prohibited purchases. The public interest and public policy remain
paramount and do not permit of compromise or ratification. In his aspect,
the permanent disqualification of public and judicial officers and lawyers
grounded on public policy differs from the first three cases of guardians,
agents and administrators (Art. 1491, CC), as to whose transactions, it has
been opined that they may be "ratified" by means of and in "the form of a
new contract, in which case its validity shall be determined only by the
circumstances at the time of execution of such new contract.
 As applied to the case at bar, the lower court therefore properly acted upon
defendant-appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of nullity of plaintiff's
alleged purchase of the land, since its Juridical effects and plaintiffs alleged
cause of action founded thereon were being asserted against defendant-
appellant.

Holding: Order of dismissal appealed from is hereby affirmed

Leg Prof
LAIG vs. CA [1978]
FACTS:
• Peter Galero was the grantee of a homestead patent for a parcel of land
located at Labo, Camarines Norte
• He sold it to Mario Escuta for P300; Escuta, in turn, sold it to Florencio
Caramoan
• Later, however, Galero sought to recover the land alleging that it violated
Section 118 of the Public Land Act1
• He was represented by Atty. Benito Laig
• After winning the suit, Galero sold the same land to Atty. Laig for P1500
plus attorney’s fees due Atty. Laig for his legal services
• However, Laig faied to solicit the approval of the Sec. of Agriculture
• It was only after his death that his widow, Rosario, noticed the deficiency
• Rosario wrote the Register of Deeds, Baldomero Lapak giving notice of her
claim over the property and requesting that she be informed of any claim of
ownership by other parties so that she could take the necessary steps
• After the Register took note of her letter and informed her that the title was
intact, she filed with the Bureau of Lands an affidavit that she wanted
ownership over land to be transferred to her husband’s name
• Bureau forwarded the letter to the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources with the recommendation that the deed of sale be
approved for it violated no provisions of the Public Land Act
• Undersecretary Camus approved the deed of sales
• Meanwhile, Galero, assisted by Atty, Lapak (son of the Register of Deeds)
sought in court the issuance of a second owner’s duplicate copy of title
(Original Certificate of Title) alleging that he had lost his copy during WWII
I.
• After a record-breaking 4 days, the Register issued the title sought
• On the same day, Galero sold the land to Carmen Verzo for P600
• Verzo addressed a letter through the Director of Lands to the Secretary
seeking his approval of the sale
• Director recommended that the sale be approved since it did not violate
pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act
• Undersecretary Camus approved the sale in favor of Verzo
• Verzo registered and declared the land in her name for taxation purposes
and has been paying realty taxes since then
1
No alienation after 5 years and before 25 year after issuance of title shall be valid without
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
• Register cancelled Laig’s title in favor of Verzo
• Rosario inquired with the Register if it was true that her title was cancelled
in favor of another person, after being informed that it was, she called the
Director of Lands’ attention to the existence of the 2 deeds of sale
• Director requested Galero to explain; Galero denied the sale to Atty. Laig
• Bureau reported to the Director that it is recommended that the heirs of Atty.
Laig to seek redress in court because the status of the property was no
longer within the jurisdiction of the Bureau
• Galero was charged and convicted of estafa through falsification of public
documents
• He died while serving sentence
• Rosario filed the present civil suit praying for the annulment of the sale in
favor of Verzo and the cancellation of the second owner’s duplicate title or,
in the alternative, ordering Verzo to reconvey the land to the Laigs plus
P5000 by way of damages
• Trial court declared:
a.that Verzo is the rightful owner
b.Lapak the Register guilty of negligence but exempted him from liability
c.Director and Secretary also guilty of negligence but exempted them from
liability on the theory that they are not responsible for the acts of their
subordinates
d. That Atty. Laig and his heirs slept on their rights in not having the first
deed of sale registered
• CA affirmed
ISSUES:
WON VDA. DE LAIG IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION. YES. Since Verzo was not acting in good faith and there is
no valid inscription, the widow has, in good faith, the oldest title.
• Article 1544 of the New Civil Code (paragraphs 2 and 3):
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who, in good faith, recorded it in the Register of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who, in good faith, was first in possession; and in the
absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith
• Records show that Verzo did not act in good faith:
 Leg Prof

a. At the time of the first sale, Atty. Laig was Carmen Verzo’s boarder, and
Verzo even received his clients, including Galero. Laig must have
mentioned the sale to Verzo considering the peculiarly intimate HOLDING:
relationship of landlady and boarder in a small town • Cancel the OCT in favor of Verzo
b. One of the witnesses in the first sale was Verzo’s own sister, who was • Issue a new one in favor of the heirs of Atty. Laig
living with her • All respondents, except Director and Secretary, ordered to jointly and
c. There is proof of conspiracy between Verzo, Galero and father and son severally pay petitioner P10T in moral damages, P5T as attorney’s fees,
Lapak: and costs.
 Procurement of second copy of the duplicate of OCT was done without
the required notice and hearing
 Issued only after a record 4 days, which would not have happened if
Atty. Lapak were not the son of the Register of Deeds
 Register of Deeds Baldomero Lapak should have informed his son and
Galero about the previous inquiry by the widow
 The second sale was done immediately after the death of Atty. Laig,
during the time when his wife was still in Manila and was seeking all
legal means to have the title transferred to her name
 Atty. Lapak was the same notary public before whom the second deed
of sale was executed; he was also the same lawyer who assisted
Verzo in writing to the Director and Secretary
d. Verzo was aware of the earlier legal battle over the property, where Atty.
Laig was counsel for Galero. She could not pretend to believe that the
owner’s duplicate copy was lost during the war since that litigation was
instituted only AFTER the war and the title was still intact then
e. She knew that the property belonged to Atty. Laig because, whenever he
was in Manila, Verzo communicates with him about his share of the
harvest from the land

II. WON THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND THE DIRECTOR OF

LANDS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE. NO. No malice can be gleaned. It
should be borne in mind that both officials daily attend to thousands
upon thousands of papers.

III. WON REGISTER OF DEEDS BALDOMERO LAPAK SHOULD BE HELD

LIABLE. YES.
• They violated the Land Registration act by assisting “in fraudulently
procuring or is privy to the fraudulent procurement” of the certificate of title
in favor of Verzo (Sec. 117, Act No. 496)
• (Only the Register) Article 27 of the CC, as a public servant or employee
who caused material or moral loss by refusing or neglecting, without just
cause, to perform his official duty
• They are also liable under Art. 19 of the CC (civil liability for failure to
observe honesty and good faith in the performance of their duties as public
officer and as member of the Bar), Art. 20 (for willfully or negligently causing
damage to another), Art. 21 (…in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and/or public policy
Leg Prof

DAROY vs. ABECIA [1998] the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
Facts: which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
♦ Abecia was the counsel of the complainant (Daroy) in a case for forcible
entry before the MTC. ♦ Guevara v. Calalang: the prohibition in Art. 1491 does not apply to the sale
♦ To satisfy the judgment in the case a parcel of land was sold in a public of a parcel of land, acquired by a client to satisfy a judgment in his favor, to
auction and this land was bought by Daroy. his attorney as long as the property was not the subject of the litigation.
♦ Daroy claimed that Abecia forged his signature in a deed of absolute sale, ♦ Abecia and Daroy thought that the transfer of the land to Abecia was
dated March 31, 1971, transferring the land to Jose Gangay. Gangay in prohibited and so they contrived a way whereby the land would be sold to
turn conveyed the land to Nena Abecia, wife of Atty. Abecia. Gangay and then Gangay would sell the land to Mrs. Abecia.
♦ Daroy claimed that he discovered the fraud only in 1984. ♦ Daroy never denied the claims of the notary public and a witness to the
♦ Daroy submitted in evidence a report of the NBI which shows that Daroy’s execution of the deed of sale. NBI writing was never called to testify in his
signature was written by a different hand. finding.
♦ Abecia maintained that on March 31, 1971 Daroy sold the land to Gangay
and the latter in turn sold the land to Nena Abecia on April 17, 1971. Holding: Resolution dated March 26, 1994 of the IBP Board of Governors is
Reconsidered and the complaint against Abecia is Dismissed.
♦ July 15, 1993 0 Commissioner Plaridel Jose rendered a report finding
Abecia guilty of Malpractice and recommending his disbarment.
♦ The Board of Governors of the IBP approved the report but reduced the
penalty to indefinite suspension.
♦ Abecia contends that Daroy very well knew of the execution of the deed of
sale dated August 6, 1973 where he declared that he was accompanied by
the complainant and his assignee, Nena Abecia, in implementing the deed
of conveyance and possession on August 4, 1973

Issue: WON Abecia is guilty of Malpractice? NO

Ratio:
♦ As early as August 4, 1973 Daroy already knew that the title of the land had
already been transferred in the name of Abecia’s wife. Nor does it appear
that the transfer was made without the knowledge of the Daroy.
o Certain documents pertain to Mrs. Abecia as the assignee of Daroy
o Erasmo Damasing, notary pubic who notarized the deed, affirmed that
Daroy and his wife appeared before him on March 31, 1971 and, in his
presence signed the document,
♦ It seems that the parties thought that Abecia cannot acquire the land
because it was acquired by Daroy in a public sale held in order to satisfy
the judgment in his favor in a case in which Abecia was the counsel. Article
1491 of the CC provides that:
o Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of
another:
o (5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the
administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory
they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act
of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to
Leg Prof

CANTILLER vs. POTENCIANO [1989]

Leg Prof
RAMONA VDA. DE ALISBO & NORBERTO ALISBO, petitioners, vs. ATTY.
BENITO JALANDOON, SR., respondent [1991]
 March 16, 1970: Ramon Alisbo (Ramon), then insane, engaged the
services of Jalandoon to commence an action to recover his share of the
estate of the deceased sps Catalina Sales & Restituto Gozuma, decided on
April 29, 1961 (action related to this will prescribe in 10 yrs. or April 29,
1971. Thus, Ramon had roughly a year more to go before cause of action
prescribes). Ramon failed to file a motion for execution of the judgment w/in
the 5-yr period. They agreed that Jalandoon will:
1. decide WON to file suit for the recovery of the share/claim
2. shoulder all expenses of litigation
3. be paid 50% of the value of the property recovered
 Jalandoon prepared a complaint for revival of the 1961 judgment on April
18, 1970 but such was only filed on Sept. 12, 1970 (5mos later). Plaintiff
included Ramon & his brothers but was signed by Jalandoon alone.
Defendant: Carlito Sales, judicial administrator.
 First complaint was w/drawn by respondent who filed a 2nd complaint
w/Ramon as the lone plaintiff. His brothers were impleaded as defendants.
Signed by Atty. Bernardo Pablo & Jalandoon.
 Dec. 8, 1971: an amended complaint was filed w/8 other plaintiffs joining
Ramon. Signed by Atty. Pablo alone as plaintiffs’ counsel.
 Carlito’s defense: action for revival had already prescribed.
 CFI Negros Occ: dismissed complaint on ground of prescription. Although
1st complaint was w/in the 10-yr prescriptive period, such was null & void for
Ramon was insane & w/o legal capacity to sue when he instituted the
action. Amended complaint was filed beyond the prescriptive period.
 Jan. 2, 1974: petitioners charged Jalandoon w/:
1. having deliberately caused the dismissal of the complaint
2. having concealed from them the material fact that he was the former
legal counsel of Carlito, their adversary in the probate proceedings.
 Jalandoon’s defense: he only discovered his previous professional
relationship w/Carlito on Oct. 6, 1972, when the 1970 case was called for
pre-trial. Period for revival of the judgment had already expired & so he
asked for Ramon’s permission to allow him to w/draw from the case. He
likewise informed the court. Request was granted.
 Sol Gen observations:
1. Respondent erred in not verifying the status (capacity) of Ramon before
filing the case.
2. Respondent wasted precious time in postponing the motion to revive
judgment & giving way to a motion to resolve pending incidents in the 1961
case.
3. Respondent erred in dropping Ramon’s co-plaintiffs. The complaint would
have been defective only in part had he not done so. (Wholly defective
complaint could not stop the running of the prescriptive period unlike a
complaint defective only in part.)
4. Mistakes led to case’s dismissal on ground of prescription.
5. Mistakes were not deliberate or made w/malice there being no proof of
collusion/conspiracy. He even stood to gain substantially.
Issue: WON Jalandoon is liable for the dismissal of the case. – YES.
Ratio:
1. His errors are so gross & glaring. They could not have resulted from mere
negligence/lack of due care.
2. Defense that he was not aware that defendant in the 1970 case was his
former client is unbelievable:
a. He had several interviews w/ Ramon & his brother Norberto before he
filed the complaint.
b. He must have done some research on the court records of the case.
c. To prepare the complaint, he needed to inform himself about the
personal circumstances of the defendants.
3. In view of his former association w/Carlito, he should have declined
Ramon’s offer on the ground of conflicting interest. He should have done so
at the soonest possible time to give Ramon enough time to find a new
lawyer. Canon No. 6, Paragraphs 1 & 2 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics requires a lawyer to disclose to his client any conflicting interest w/c
might influence the client’s selection of counsel. He cannot represent
conflicting interests w/o express consent of all concerned given after full
disclosure of the facts.
4. Jalandoon used his position as Ramon’s counsel to favor his former client,
Carlito by delaying Ramon’s action & thereby depriving latter of the fruits of
his judgment w/c Jalandoon, as Carlito’s counsel had vigorously opposed.
Proof: errors noted by Sol Gen. Although Jalandoon learned about Ramon’s
insanity on July 7, 1971, he only amended the complaint 5 months later
(Dec. 1971 complaint) to implead Ramon’s legal guardian as plaintiff.
However, by then, prescriptive period had run out.
5. Jalandoon betrayed his client’s (Ramon) trust & did not champion his cause
w/the whole-hearted fidelity, care & devotion he’s obligated to give. This is
more than simple negligence. There’s a hint of duplicity & lack of candor.
Holding: Guilty of serious misconduct & infidelity. Suspended for 2 yrs.
Feliciano, concurring & dissenting: Suspend him for 5 yrs.
1. Penalty is not commensurate w/the very serious character of the
misconduct & infidelity.
2. Jalandoon utilized lawyer’s craft & profession to defeat & dissolve the rts of
one client for the benefit of the other client. This is infidelity to the client’s
cause.
3. Those dealing w/members of the legal profession have the rt to expect not
just a reasonable amount of professional learning & competence but also
whole-hearted loyalty to client’s cause.
4. Client must be free from the intolerable apprehension that his counsel may
at some other time turn around to betray his confidence & to deliberately
destroy the very rts that he went to him to defend & prosecute.
Leg Prof
NGAYAN vs. TUGADE [1991]
 Admin. Case in SC. Violation of subpar (e) & (f), Sec. 20, Rule 138
 Atty. Faustino F. Tugade was formerly a counsel for complainants
(Fulgencio, Tomasa & Bella Ngayan) either as defense counsel or private
prosecutor in 5 Criminal Cases for light threat, for unjust vexation, for grave
threats, for trespass & for threats, for grave threats & trespass & for grave
defamation
 Complainants alleged that they asked respondent to prepare an affidavit to
be used as basis for a complaint to be filed against Rowena Soriano &
Robert Leonido as a consequence of the latter's unauthorized entry into
complainants' dwelling.
 W/o thoroughly reading the same, Tomasa allegedly signed it as she was
rushed to do the same. After signing, Tomasa noted a par. w/c didn’t
mention that Leonido was w/ Soriano when both suddenly barged into
complainants' residence. Tomasa allegedly told Tugade about the omission.
He crossed out the part Tomasa complained of in front of her & promised to
make another affidavit. Complainants filed motions to discharge Tugade as
their counsel
 Complainants allegedly made a follow up after the discharge and found that
the name of Leonido was not included in the charge. Since the omission
was remedied by their new counsel and the case was subsequently filed in
court, the adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation & attached
thereto the 1st affidavit of complainants w/c was crossed out.
 Complainants averred that:
o the motion was filed by Atty. Apolo P. Gaminda, a former classmate of
Tugade.
o that he was also Leonido’s brother’s lawyer in an insurance co.
o that he himself executed & submitted an affidavit for Leonido & Soriano
controverting complainants’ affidavit despite having prepared
complainants’ affidavit when he was still their counsel
o that before he executed & submitted his affidavit, Tugade sent a
personal letter to Fiscal Beza denouncing complainants and stating
that he is filing criminal and civil cases against them.
 Complainants charged Tugade for violation of par. (e) and (f) of Sec. 20,
Rule 138, ROC:
"(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself,
to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in
connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval;
"(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless
required by the justice of the cause with w/c he is charged;"
 Par. (e) was violated when the Ngayan’s edited affidavit was submitted as
evidence against the Ngayans in the motion for reinvestigation while par. (f)
was violated it when he sent a letter to the fiscal.
 Tugade was required to answer but failed to file one. Sol. Gen. set a
complaint for hearing but Tugade never appeared on any date.
 Sol. Gen made findings of facts and said: “The inaction of respondent to the
resolutions of this Honorable Court…indicate that respondent has not
obeyed the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities and he has not
conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients (Sec. 3,
Rule 138, ROC). Further, lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court
orders and processes…This lack of concern shown by respondent
regarding the matter that involved the very foundation of his right to engage
in the practice of law would show how much less he would regard the
interest of his clients.”
 He thus recommended that Tugade be disbarred & his name dropped from
attorney's roll.
WON Tugade’s conduct was unprofessional and violated Sec. 3 and pars.
(e) & (f) of Sec. 20, Rule 138, ROC
 YES. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, & for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, case against
Tugade must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
 Tugade furnished the adverse parties in a certain crim. case w/ a copy of
their discarded affidavit, thus enabling them to use it as evidence against
complainants. This actuation constitutes betrayal of trust & confidence of
his former clients in violation of par. (e), Sec. 20, Rule 138, ROC. Inasmuch
as Tugade failed to answer the complaint filed against him and despite due
notice on four occasions, he consistently didn’t appear on the scheduled
hearing set by the Office of the Sol.Gen., this claim is still uncontroverted
 This partiality could be explained by the fact that respondent is the former
classmate of Atty. Gaminda, the adverse parties' counsel & the fact that
respondent is the lawyer of the Leonido’s brother
 Executing & submitting an affidavit as exhibit for Leonido & Soriano
demonstrates clearly an act of offensive personality against complainants,
violative of the 1st part of par. (f). Likewise, respondent's act of joining the
adverse parties in celebrating their victory over the dismissal of the case
against them shows not only his bias against the complainants but also
constitutes a degrading act on the part of a lawyer.
 Tugade's failure to answer the complaint against him & his failure to appear
at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful order, of
the court & illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Sec.
3, Rule 138, ROC
 But the Court held that disbarment is too harsh & thus penalized him with
suspension from the practice of law for a period of 1 year.
Leg Prof
LEGARDA vs. CA [1992]
FACTS:
• Victoria Legarda was defendant in a civil suit filed by New Cathay House
(NCH) seeking to compel Legarda to sign a lease contract over property
that the petitioner intended to use as a restaurant
• Atty. Antonio Coronel (former law school dean) entered his appearance as
counself for Legarda, and asked for an extension of 10 days in which to file
an answer
• Despite the fact that the extension was granted, Legarda failed to file an
answer within the extended period
• She was declared in default and the decision was rendered in favor of NCH
and ordering Legarda to execute the contract and to pay damages and fees
amounting to almost P389T
• Atty. Coronel received a copy of the decision but failed to appeal within the
reglementary period; thus, the decision became final
• Upon motion of NCH, a writ of execution was granted where the property in
question was levied by the sheriff and sold to NCH, who was the highest
bidder
• After the one-year redemption period expired, the sheriff issued a final deed
of sale
• Legarda, represented by her attorney-in-fact Ligaya Gomez, filed a petition
with the CA for annulment of the judgment against her on the grounds that it
was obtained through fraud and not supported by the allegations and
evidence submitted in court (she alleges that a representative of NCH
assured her that he was agreeable to the terms of the lease she imposed
and that NCH would withdraw the complaint, which prompted her to tell her
lawyer not to file an answer anymore)
• NCH filed a consolidated comment, after which Atty. Coronel filed a reply
• The CA found the allegation too improbable because:
1. if it was true that there was an agreement between Legarda and the
representative, her lawyer would have asked NCH to file the proper
motion to dismiss or withdraw compaint with the court
2. if NCH had refused to do so, the lawyer would have filed Legarda’s
answer anyway to prevent her from being declared in default
3. or the lawyer would have prepared a compromise agreement
• It dismissed the petition, saying that:
I. WON THE EXTENSION SHOULD BE GRANTED. NO. Although the reason
1. any conscientious lawyer, and more so a former law dean, would
normally have done these in order to protect the interests of his client,
instead of leaving it to the initiative of the plaintiff to withdraw its
complaint
2. This is simply a case of negligence on the part of defendant’s counsel,
which is not a grounds for reopening a case because, if it were
allowed, there would never be an end to a suit for as long as a new
counsel could be employed who could allege that the prior counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned
3. Thus, Legarda is bound by the acts of her counsel and could not
complain
• Again, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file a motion for reconsideration or
to appeal the CA decision to the SC
• NCH sent Legarda, through the Coronel Law Office, a notice to vacate the
property 3 days from receipt thereof.
• Atty. Coronel did not inform his client of the demand
• Legarda only learned of the demand from Atty. Coronel’s secretary after she
(Legarda) persistently phoned.
• Legarda, now represented by new counsel, filed a petition contending that
the decisions of the courts below are null and void as she was deprived of
her day in court and divested of her property without due process of law
through the gross, pervasive and malicious negligence of previous counsel,
Atty. Coronel.
• SC granted the petition:
1. nullified prior decisions of the lower courts
2. nullified sheriff’s certificate of sale
3. directed NCH to reconvey the property to Legarda
4. directed the Register of Deeds to cancel NCH’s registration and to
issue one in favor of Legarda
5. required Atty. Coronel to show cause within 10 days from notice
why he should not be held administratively liable for his acts and
omissions which resulted in grave injustice to the petitioner
• On the 10th day, he asked for a 30 day extension, alleging as reason
“pressure of work consisting of daily hearings … as well as the more than
80 civil and criminal cases against the Marcoses”
• The extension was granted, but it expired without answer
• A day after the expiration, he asked for another 30 day extension because
he was, at that time, confined at the St. Luke’s Hospital for various ailments
ISSUES:
seems to warrant another extension, it was not granted because it was
filed one day late. Motions for extension of time is addressed to the
sound discretion of the Court in view of attaining substantial justice.
• The show-cause resolution was addressed to him not in his capacity as a
lawyer of a litigant, but to him in his personal capacity as a lawyer subject to
the disciplinary power of the Court
Leg Prof

• That he failed to heed the directive reflects an unbecoming disrespect
towards the SC’s orders
• As a lawyer, he is expected to recognize the authority of the SC and
obey its lawful processes and orders.
• His failure to show cause is considered a waiver of his rights to heard
and to due process.
• For failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the
interest of his client and causing material prejudice to the latter:
1. Motion for extension is denied
2. Found guilty
3. sentenced to 6 months suspension from practice of law with a warning
that a repetition shall be dealt with more severely

II. WON ATTY. CORONEL SHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY

LIABLE. YES. He violated Canon 18, which mandates that a
“lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence”;
and particularly Rule 18.03, which requires that a “lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.”
• Legarda would not have gone through the travails attending the disposition
of the case against her and the devastating consequence on her property
rights had Dean Coronel exercised even the ordinary diligence of a member
of the Bar
• A well-know practicing lawyer and deal of a law school is expected to
extend the highest quality of service as a lawyer to his client. Unfortunately,
he appears to have abandoned the cause of his client and did nothing more
than enter his appearance and seek for an extension of time to file the
answer
• Moreover, this is not the only case where Atty. Coronel appears to exhibit a
pattern of negligence, inattention to his obligations as counsel, sloppiness
and superciliousness (e.g. In Imelda Marcos v. PCGG, it was only in the last
day of the period granted to him that he showed initial efforts to comply with
the Resolution by filing a motion for a 20-day exension)
• He was both unfair and disrespectful to the SC and has unduly delayed the
disposition of the case

• The moment a client’s cause is taken, the lawyer covenants that he

will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion.
• A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client’s
cause makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.

• Moreover, he owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to the Court
of which he is an officer.
• Lawyers are indispensable part of the whole system of administering
justice; strict compliance with one’s oath of office and the canons of
professional ethics is imperative. The profession is a matter of public
interest.

HOLDING:
Leg Prof
WACK-WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB vs. CA [1959]
GR No. 15910
♦ Petronilo Arcangel, a former employee of the Wack Wack Golf and Country
Club, Inc., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a money claim for
overtime services rendered to said employer, for unenjoyed vacation leave,
moral damages and attorney's fees. The employer having filed its answer to
the complaint, the case was accordingly set for trial. At the hearing of May
6, 1955, however, neither the defendant (employer) nor its counsel, Balcoff,
Poblador and Angel Cruz appeared notwithstanding the fact that they were
duly notified of the hearing since March 22, 1955; hence, the plaintiff was
allowed to continue presenting his evidence without the presence of
defendant.
♦ May 5, 1955 – Wack Wack manifested its desire to replace their counsel
Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador in this case with Law Office Juan Chuidian.
Atty. Jesus Sayoc of the Law Office Juan Chuidian conferred with Atty.
Angel Cruz of Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador for the purpose of securing
the court file in this case and effect the substitution of attorney.
Unfortunately, Mr. Balcoff was not in the office at the moment and attorney
Angel Cruz declared he had no authority to turn over to Law office of Juan
T. Chuidian the court papers and file in this case; besides, there were
unpaid bill due Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador. It was agreed that
inasmuch as Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador were still the attorneys of
record in the case, Atty. Balcoff would sent a representative of his law office
to appear at the hearing of the case of the following day, May 6, 1955 in
order to ask for postponement of the case. Consequently, nobody in Law
Office Juan Chuidian appeared in behalf of defendant-appellant on May 6,
1955 before the Trial Court. The records of the case were turned over to
Law Office Juan T. Chuidian only on May 13, 1955 after Law Office Juan T.
Chuidian had received on May 12, 1955 through Messrs. Paredes, Balcoff
and Poblador a copy of the decision dated May 10, 1955 of the Trial Court.
On the other hand, Atty. Angel Cruz or any associate lawyer of Messrs.
Paredes, Balcoff and Poblador did not appear for defendant-appellant on
May 6, 1955.
♦ May 10, 1955 – Lower court rendered a judgment awarding Arcangel
7,702.78
♦ May 14, 1955 - law firm of Juan Chuidian, on behalf of the defendant
employer, filed a petition to set aside the judgment on the ground of
misunderstanding, mistake and excusable neglect, which petition was
denied by the lower court in its order of May 31.
GR No. 15902 – R
♦ February 18, 1953 – Antonino Bernardo filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila a claim against the Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc. for
overtime pay, unenjoyed vacation and sick leaves from 1946 to 1951 and
attorney's fees. As the employer denied the claim, the case was set for trial.
♦ May 12, 1955 – after about 8 previous postponements, nobody appeared
for the employer although said defendant was represented from the
commencement of the proceeding by Atty. Angel Cruz and was duly notified
of the hearing since March 26, 1955.
♦ May 14, 1955 – the lower court adjudged the plaintiff entitled to the claim,
and sentenced defendant-employer to pay the total sum of P26,422.78.
Wack Wack represented by the law office of Juan Chuidian, filed a petition
for relief from the order authorizing the Deputy Clerk of Court to receive
plaintiff's evidence and for the re-opening of the case. This petition was
denied.
♦ Arguments of Wack Wack:
o It was only in the afternoon of May 11, 1955, that the records of this
case were sent to the Law Office, and that Atty. Juan T. Chuidian was
then out of town and, consequently, nobody knew what action to take in
this case
o May 12, 1955, Atty. Juan T. Chuidian telephoned the law office and
requested that one of the assistant attorneys appear at the sala in
connection with the scheduled hearing of the above-entitled case, and
to move for the postponement thereof on the obvious reason that the
undersigned law firm was not prepared right then and there to proceed
with the trial of the case inasmuch as the facts of the case were not
then sufficiently known to any of the associate attorneys. Efforts to
postpone the trial was fruitless.
♦ Wack Wack assailed the decision of the Trial Court on the following
grounds:
o that counsel's tardiness or delay as well as his unpreparedness to go
to trial are accidental or may be considered as excusable negligence
o that the trial court should have allowed the motion for postponement
Issue: WON the trial court abused its discretion in denying its petition for relief
from the order authorizing the reception of plaintiff's evidence in the absence of
the defendant and the judgment rendered in the case? NO
Ratio:
GR No. 15910
♦ As of May 6, 1955, the law firm of Balcoff and Poblador and Angel Cruz
were still the employer's counsel of record, the law office of Juan Chuidian
having entered its appearance in the case only on May 14, 1955. As such
counsel of record, said law firm must have known that, its impending relief
as counsel for the defendant notwithstanding, it is under obligation to
protect the client's interest (which includes appearance at the hearing) until
its final release from the professional relationship with such client.
♦ The court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client
except such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is
effected. Thus, any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and
its client may reach regarding the presentation of the client' case in the
court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in the court cannot be
made to depend on them. The lack of coordination or understanding
between the two law firms in the instant case cannot be considered as a
legal excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the
Leg Prof

granting of relief from the order declaring the client in default, or as in the
case, from a decision entered after presentation of evidence in his absence.

GR No. 15910 and GR No. 15902

The lack of coordination or understanding of counsel cannot be considered as a
legal excuse or falling within the ambit of excusable negligence to justify the
granting of relief from the order declaring to justify the granting of relief from the
order declaring the client in default or from a decision rendered after
presentation of evidence in his absence.

Held: No error in the decision of the CA.

Leg Prof
BLAZA vs. ARCANGEL [1967]
Canon 18.04, a lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for
info.
Blanza and Pasion complain that way back in April, 1955, Arcangel
volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims to their
husbands’ deaths as PC soldiers.
They gave Arcangel documents and affixed their signatures in blank
papers. But, subsequently respondent had lost interest in the progress of
their claims.
6 years later, they asked for the documents back and resp refused to
return them.
Arcangel answered to Fiscal Rana, to whom this case was referred for
investigation, report and recommendation by the SolGen.
He admits receiving the documents, but only for photostating purposes.
He didn’t return them because of the complainant’s refusal to hand him
the photostating costs, preventing him from getting the documents from the
Photostat service.
HE had advanced payment and turned over everything, documents and
Photostat and all to the court.
Fiscal Rana recommended resp’s exoneration after finding out that the
latter didn’t charge for his services. At most he be reprimanded only.
But Solgen feels that resp deserves at least a severe reprimand
considering his failure to attend to nthe claims for 6 yrs., failure to return
immediately the documents despite repeated demands, and to Pasion for
allegedly failing to return all her documents.
Only resp thru counsel appeared at the hearing, resp submitted his
memorandum, annexing an affidavit executed by Blanza asking for
dismissal.
Resp submits tht he wasn’t obliged to follow up the claims since there
was no agreement for his compensation as t6heir counsel.
HE FORGETS that he volunteered his services, and was not legally
entitled to fees, but having established the atty-client relationship
voluntarily, he was bound to attend to the claims with due diligence.
Issue: WON Arcangel is guilty of violating professional ethics. NO and WON
he should be reprimanded. YES he deserves to be reminded of the nature
of being a lawyer.
The evidence adduced is insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary
action against resp.
There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the
accusations against him. Resp’s explanation as to the delay infilling the
claims and returning the documents has not been controverted by
complainants. On the contrary they said that they were asked to shoulder
the photostating costs, but they didn’t give any money for it. Moreover the
documents and their Photostats were actually returned by respondent
during the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for it.
The condition of the Photostats themselves, support resp allegations that
they remained in possession of Photostat service for the failure of the
owners to withdraw upon payment. Complainants are partly to b lame for
the delay in filing their clqaims.
As for the allegations of the documents of Pasion, resp denies it. Fiscal
Rana made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Blanza cannot
prejudice Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet.
Still there is equiponderance of evidence which must necessarily redound
to resp’s benefit.
Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to substantiate her charges
in the hearing set for Oct. 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she or her
counsel appeared.
Court is constrained to dismiss the charges against resp for being legally
insufficient, yet, the court must counsel against his acts as a member of the
bar.
A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in the community than
merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of
law her is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model
citizen. RESP HERE HAS NOT LIVED UP TO THAT IDEAL STANDARD.
IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO HAVE COMPLAINANTS WAIT AND HOPE
FOR 6 LONG YEARS. UPON THEIR REFUSAL TO CO-OPERATE, RESP
SHOULD HAVE TERMINATED THE PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP,
INSTEAD OF KEEPING THEM HANGING.
Voted not be reprimanded but in a legal sense let this be a reminder to
Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of
him.
Dismissed.
Leg Prof
ANGEL ALBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA,
respondent [1967]
 Disbarment case filed by Albano vs. Atty. Coloma
 Albano’s version:
1. During the Japanese occupation, Delfina Aquino, Albano’s mom, &
Albano engaged the services of Coloma.
2. Albano alleged that after liberation & reorganization of the courts,
Coloma failed to expedite hearing & termination of the case.
3. They then hired another lawyer. However, Coloma intervened to collect
her atty’s fees.
4. Coloma presented a document stipulating that Albano & his mom
promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33 1/3% of whatever could be
recovered in land/damages.
5. Albano alleged that his signature & the writing after his mother’s name
were forged. NBI studied the document along w/the sample signature
of Albano & it concluded that the signature in the document was not
Albano’s.
6. He further alleged that he’s a poor man who could hardly pay for the
services of a lawyer in this disbarment case and that Coloma is a very
influential woman in their province who was a member of the Provinical
Board.
 Coloma’s defense: specific denial
1. There was an agreement between her & complainants that she will
receive 1/3 of whatever land & damages could be obtained for the
plaintiffs.
2. She filed more than 20 papers & pleadings, went to trial for several
days and she finally obtained a favorable judgment for the petitioners in
the CFI & CA. CA took note of the fact that she has been petitioner’s
counsel for 7 yrs rendering valuable service. Favorable decisions were
almost wholly result of her efforts. She’s been a member of the Bar
since 1940 & thus, she’s entitled to have reasonable compensation for
her services. She’s entitled to 1/3 of the land & damages recoverable
by plaintiffs.
3. She served her clients faithfully, efficiently, continuously, & to the best
of her knowledge & capacity. Thus, her dismissal was w/o cause & w/o
her consent. After the case was won, plaintiffs stopped seeing her &
even disowned their own contract.
4. Plaintiffs really signed the contract in the presence of attesting
witnesses who confirmed such. She denies NBI’s findings & further
invoking the trial court & CA’s findings that the contract is genuine.
Albano & his sister attest to such fact too. Determination of WON a
document is genuine lies w/in the knowledge & competence of a judge.
Testimony of instrumental witnesses will suffice w/o the court being
bound even by real experts.
5. Albano is not a poor man. Through her efforts, he was richer by about
P100k (P85k in realty + P15k in cash as damages).
6. She was not using her influence as a board member. She was not yet
part of the board when she became complainant’s lawyer.
7. She has been a lawyer for more than 20 yrs & she strictly adhered to
the ethics of the profession & has been guided by the principles of
justice, fairness & respect for individual rights.
8. People of Ilocos Norte well know that Albano has no sense of justice,
no integrity to preserve, no honor to treasure & no future to build while
they (people) have supported Coloma in her aspirations.
9. Cause of action barred by prior judgment & by the statute of limitations.
 Sol Gen: case be dismissed.
Issue: WON Coloma was remiss in her duties as Albano’s lawyer & thus
not entitled to the contingent fee. – NO.
Ratio: (mostly based on Sol Gen’s report)
1. Sol Gen’s findings reveal Coloma’s utmost diligence & conscientiousness.
2. Genuiness of the contract was affirmed by the trial court & CA and
strengthened by the ff:
a. Sergio Manuel, witness to that document, testified that Albano & his
mom indeed signed the document. Negative testimonies of Albano &
Aquino will not prevail over the positive testimony of Manuel & Coloma.
b. Verbal agreement re attorney’s fees witnessed by Rosario Lagasca,
related to the plaintiffs, and Silvina Guillermo.
c. Plaintiffs’ claim that Coloma agreed to a P2k contingent fee. Court
however finds that no lawyer in his right mind would accept such a
miserable fee.
d. Testimony of Felicidad Albano, petitioner’s sister, who testified that she
authorized her brother & mother to give 1/3 contingent fee to Coloma.
3. CA ruling is now res judicata & bars Albano from raising the question anew
in these disbarment proceedings. Party can’t escape the bar of a previous
judgment against him in a new suit on the same cause of action by varying
the form of his action/adopting a different method of presenting his case.
4. NBI’s findings lacks persuasive force there being no reason or basis for its
conclusion.
5. Contingent fee was reasonable.
6. If there’s anyone guilty of bad faith, it’s Albano & his mom who tried to deny
their agreement. Even if the case was not barred by res judicata, evidence
would still exonerate Coloma from liability.
7. RELEVANT PART: Counsel, any counsel, who’s worthy of his hire, is
entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. A lawyer’s only capital is
his brains & skill acquired at a tremendous cost not only in money but also
in the expenditure of time & energy. Thus, he’s entitled to the protection of
any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape
payment of his fees. Such acts of a client must be avoided & condemned.
Reputation in the legal profession is a plant of tender growth & its bloom,
once lost, is not easily restored. Coloma’s good name was marred by
petitioner’s reckless disregard of the truth & this calls for the severest
censure. Had there been any showing of nonfeasance/malfeasance on the
Leg Prof
part of the lawyer, Court will not hesitate to take the appropriate disciplinary
action.
Holding: Charges against Coloma dismissed.
QUIRANTE vs. IAC [1989[
 APPEAL by certiorari to review the judgment of the then IAC
 Dr. Indalecio Casasola (father of respondents) had a contract with a
building contractor named Norman Guerrero.
 The Philippine American General Insurance Co. Inc. (PHILAMGEN) acted
as bondsman for Guerrero.
 In view of Guerrero's failure to perform his part of the contract w/in the
period specified, Dr. Casasola, thru his counsel, Atty. John Quirante, sued
both Guerrero & PHILAMGEN before the CFI Manila, now the RTC of
Manila for damages, w/ PHILAMGEN filing a cross-claim against Guerrero
for indemnification.
 RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff by rescinding the contract; ordering
Guerrero & PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff actual damages, moral
damages, exemplary damages & attorney's fees; ordering Guerrero alone
to pay liquidated damages; and ordering PHILAMGEN to pay the plaintiff
the amount of the surety bond.
 PHILAMGEN’s MFR was denied by the TC. PHILAMGEN filed a notice of
appeal but the same was not given due course having been filed out of
time. TC thereafter issued a writ of execution
 A petition to quash the writ of execution & to compel the TC to give due
course to the appeal was filed with the IAC. But the petition was dismissed,
so the case was elevated to this Court
 Meanwhile, Dr. Casasola died leaving his widow & several children as
survivors.
 On June 18, 1983, herein Quirante filed a motion in the TC for the
confirmation of his attorney's fees. He claims, the oral agreement regarding
the fees between him and the late Dr. Casasola was allegedly confirmed in
writing by the widow and the 2 daughters of the deceased. He avers that
pursuant to said agreement, the attorney's fees would be computed as
follows:
o In case of recovery of the P120K surety bond, the attorney's fees shall
be P30K.
o In case damages are awarded in excess of the bond, it shall be divided
equally bet Casasola’s Heirs, Atty. Quirante & Cruz
 TC granted motion for confirmation & denied the MFR of the order of
confirmation. These are the 2 orders w/c are assailed in this case
WON counsel may already claim his attorney’s fees
 Counsel's claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate
action. If the 1st alternative is chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim,
even if its amount were less than the min. prescribed by law for the
jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney's
fees is but an incident of the case in w/c the services of counsel have been
rendered."
 What is being claimed here as attorney's fees by petitioners is, however,
different from attorney's fees as an item of damages provided for under
Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the
litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment
creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution.
 Petitioner's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional
services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the
debtors.
 However, the confirmation of attorney's fees is premature. The petition for
review on certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN "may or may not ultimately result
in the granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages"
awarded by the TC.
 Since the main case from w/c the petitioner's claims for their fees may arise
hasn’t become final yet, determination of the propriety of said fees & the
amt thereof should be held in abeyance. The remedy for recovering
attorney's fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only
when something is due to the client
 An attorney's fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has
been decided and the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court.
The issue over attorney's fee only arises when something has been
recovered from w/c the fee is to be paid
 Besides, the supposed contract is subject to certain contingencies
 Moreover, the issue on the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by
some of the heirs of the deceased should be likewise determined by the
court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same
contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of
recovery of attorney's fees by both petitioners herein.
 The Court thus takes exception to and reject that portion of the decision of
the respondent court which holds that the alleged confirmation to attorney's
fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto, since it is also
premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence
the same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be
preemptive of factual and evidentiary matters that may be presented for
consideration by the trial court.
Leg Prof
Zulueta vs. Pan American World Airways, Inc. [January 8, 1973]
 Mr. Zulueta, Mrs. Zulueta and Ms. Zulueta were passengers of Pan Am.
 Mr. Zulueta left the terminal and went to the beach in search for a place that
would be suitable for his purpose (where it would not be visible for the
people in the plane and in the terminal). He came to a place abound 400
yards away from the terminal.
 Mr Zulueta was gone for almost one hour (but before the plain left) and Pan
Am was contending that it could have not taken him that long relieve
himself and that there were 8 commodes at the terminal toilet for men. (his
search for a place to answer the call of nature)
 Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been off-loaded “due to drinking”
and belligerent attitude but according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-
load all Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects handcarried
by them came as a result of the altercation that happened between Capt.
Zentner and Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the arrogant
tone of Capt. Zentner.
 After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the intention of keeping
him stranded for a minimum period of one week at a cost of $13.30 per day.
 Mrs. Zulueta filed for the dismissal of the case as far as she is concerned
because she settled all her differences with Pan Am for P50,000
 Lower Court awarded P75,000 as attorney’s fees.
 PANAM impugns the award of attorney’s fees upon the ground that no
penalty should be imposed upon the right to litigate; that, by law, it may be
awarded only in exceptional cases; that the claim for attorney’s fees has not
been proven; and that it is patently exorbitant.
Issues
1. WON the amount of damages awarded were excessive
2. WON Mr. Zulueta has the right to recover moral or exemplary damages
3. WON the award of attorney’s fees are proper?
4. WON the non-enforce of the compromise agreement between the
defendant and Mrs. Zulueta was valid. NO
Ratio:
1. NO
 Award for damages is purely academic value.
 Zuluetas had a contact of carriage with Pan Am which binds the latter, for a
substantial monetary consideration paid by the Zuluetas, to transport them
to Manila with utmost diligence. Pan Am did not only fail to comply with its
obligation but they also acted in a manner calculated to humiliate Mr.
Zulueta, chastise him, make him suffer, and cause him the greatest
possible inconvenience, by leaving him in a desolate island.
2. YES
 Exemplary damages are not recoverable in quasi-delicts except when the
defendant has acted with gross negligence. In the present case, the agent
of Pan Am has acted with malice and evident bad faith. If gross negligence
warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason it is
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and
tainted with bad faith.
3. YES
♦ Article 2208 of the CC expressly authorizes the award of attorney’s fees
when exemplary damages are awarded as well as in any other case where
the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees be recovered.
♦ The court deems it equitable to award attorney’s fees considering the
exceptional circumstances, particularly the bad faith with which the
defendant’s agent acted, the place where and the conditions under which
Zulueta was left at Wake Island, the absolute refusal of the defendant’s
manager in Manila to take any step whatsoever to alleviate Mr. Zulueta’s
predicament and the racial factor that had tainted the decision of the
defendant’s agent.
♦ Factors that were considered by the court in awarding attorney’s fees:
o Quantity and quality of the services rendered by the counsel appearing
on record
o Nature of the case and the amount involved therein
o Prestige as one of the most distinguished members of the legal
profession
4. NO
 The payment that was made to Mrs. Zulueta is effective insofar as it is
deductible from the award, and, because it is due (or part of the amount
due) from the defendant with or without its compromise agreement with
Mrs. Zulueta. It is ineffective insofar as the conjugal partnership is
concerned.
 Article 113 of the Civil Code provides that the husband must be joined in all
suits by or against the wife except (2) if they have in fact been separated for
at least one year. – This provision refers to suits in which the wife is the
principal or real party in interest. In this case it is the husband that us the
main party in interest, both as the person principally aggrieved and as
administrator of the conjugal partnership he having acted in this capacity
when he entered into the contract of carriage with Pan Am and paid the
amount due with funds from the conjugal partnership to which the amount
recoverable for breach of the contract belong.
 She is not allowed by law to waive her share in the conjugal partnership,
before the dissolution thereof. She cannot even acquire any property by
gratuitous title, without the husband’s consent, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth
degree.
 The law does not favour a settlement with one of the spouses, both of
whom are plaintiffs or defendants in a common cause, such as the defense
of the rights of the conjugal partnership, when the effect, even if indirect, of
the compromise is to jeopardize “the solidarity of the family”.
 The award was made in their favour collectively. Presumption is that the
purpose of the trip was for the common benefit of the spouses and that the
money had come from the conjugal funds, for, unless there is proof to the
contrary, it is presumed that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Leg Prof
 Pan Am claims that the damages are not among those forming part of the
conjugal partnership pursuant to art. 153 of the CC.
Sison v Suntay
On May 14, 1934. Jose Suntay a Fil cit died in Amoy, Fookien China,
leaving properties in the Phils and China and children of the 1st marriage
with deceased Manuela Cruz, namely Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel,
Manuel, Federico, Ana Aurora, Emiliano and Jose, Jr. and a child by 2 nd
marriage to Ma. Natividad Lim Billian(alive), named Silvano.
And intestate estate proceeding was instituted and letters of
administration issues to Apolonio, and when the latter died, to Federico.
Oct. 31, 1934. The surviving widow filed a petition for the probate of a last
will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed by the late
Jose Suntay. The petition was denied because of the loss of the said will
and insufficiency of evidence to establish its loss.
Appeal was taken from this order and it was held by the SC that there
was sufficient evidence to prove the loss of the will and the case was
remnded for further proceedings. The petition for probate was subsequently
dismissed by this Court because an attesting witness who was in China
couldn’t come to the Phils.
War broke out, After liberation, Silvano filed an alyternative petition
praying for the probate of the will which was allegedly executed by Jose B.
Suntay in the Phils. In Nov 1929 or of the will allegedly executed by said
deceased in Amoy , Fokien China on Jan 4, 1931. Administrator Federico
filed a motion thru his lawyers Roxas, Picazo, and Mejia asking for
dismissal of the petition.
The alternative petition for probate filed was heard before the court, and
in all the hearings, Federico was represented by his lawyers. After the
hearing was terminated, the parties filed their respective memorandum.
Federico’s by his lawyers.
The lower court Judge Pecson issued an order(1st) granting trhe petition
of Silvano. Federico filed thru his attys a MFR and new trial. Written
opposition to this petition was filed by Atty. Claro m Recto for Silvano.
While Federico’s MFR and new trial was pending resolution, Atty. Sison was
engaged as counsel by Federico in substitution of his former attys without
any contract as to the amount of his services, the agreement being that
claimant would be given a reasonable compensation. Atty. Sison filed a
reply to the opposition of Atty. Recto and appeared and argued orally at the
hearing of the mfr and new trial.
The lower court issued an order(2nd) granting the MFR and denying the
alternative petition of Silvino. Atty. Recto filed an MFR of the 2nd order of
Judge Pecson and Stty. Sicon filed a simple opposition to this moption. The
MFR of Mr. Recto was denied and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.
The SC finally rendered a decision affirming the validity of the order of the
lower court. The MFR of the decision having been denied, the decision
became final. Sison had also acted as counsel for the resp-administartor in
the motion filed by Recto on behalf of Silvino, asking for the removal of
Federico as administrator. Denied.
Sison had further rendered service as counsel for the Federico in the
approval of the latter’s accounting, in the motion to fix the fees of the
administrator and in the motion asking that the administrator be authorized
to mnortgage this estate in the sum of 150,000 various times during the
period that claimant was respondent-administrator’s coun sel, he secured
from the latter sums amounting to P67,000 on account of his services.
After the termination of the case in the SC, Sison, made demands on
Federico for the payment of his professional fees in the sum of 400k, but
the latter refused to pay this amount alleging that the amount of 67k which
had already received from Federico as fees is sufficient compensation for
claimant’s services. In view of the refusal of Federico to pay the remaining
claim of 333k as atty’s fees, Sison filed a petition in this case asking for the
annotation of the charging lien and for the allowance and payment of his
atty’s fees of 400k.
The lower court reached the conclusion that the professional services
rendered were not chargeable to the estate and that even if chargeable, the
amount of 67k already received by Sison constituted sufficient
compensation for his professional services. Consequently claim was
denied. Accdg. To lower court, Sicon’s work in connection with the alleged
will did not redound to the protection or benefit of the estate of the Suntays,
because will or no will the estate continued to be the same.
It appears however, that the parties agreed in the pre-trial conference,
“that claimant Atty. Sison was engaged as counsel for resp-administrator in
the latter’s capacity as such in the motion of said claimant, under the
circumstances alleged in said motion……”
Issue: WON Sison is entitled to compensation. YES
Sison rendered legal services for the benfit of the intestate proceedings,
and pursuant to his understanding with the administrator should be paid a
reasonable compensation.
Courtys agreed that the fixing of such compensation is a difficult and
delicate task. §22 of Rule 127 of the RoC provides that “ an atty shall be
entitlked to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation foe his services, with a view to the importance of the subject
matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the atty.”
The SC “ has held the ff. circumstances to be considered in determnining
the compensation of an atty.: a.) mount and char of services rendered; b)
labor, time and trouble involved; c) nature and importance of the litigation or
business in which the services were rendered; d.) the responsibility
imposed; e.) amount of money or the value of the property affected by the
controversy, or involved in the employment; f.) the skill and experience
called for in the performance of the services; g.) the professional character
and social standing of the atty; h.) the results secured; i.) WON the fee is
absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an atty may properly
charge a much larger fee when it is to be a contingent than when it is not.
Leg Prof
The claim of Sicson is principally based on his services in connection
with the reconsideration and setting aside of the order of the lower court
admitting to probate the last will and the recording of the Chinese will of the
deceased Jose Suntay and for his services in connection with the appeal
taken from the order of the lower court, reconsidering its order denying the
alternative petition of Silvino Suntay.
Sison lays stress in having secured the reversal of the 1 st order of the
lower court, because he alleges that if this order were not reversed 2/3 of
the estate of the deceased Jose Suntay would have gone to Silvino and the
latter’s mother, whereas, with the deceased being declared as having died
intestate. The heirs participated equally in the distribution of this estate
which would be 1/10 share for each one of the ten children.
The SC does not agree that the credit for such reversal should go to the
former counsel of Federico since the 2nd order setting aside the previous
order is principally based on the arguments embodied in the MFR by Sison.
Sison had been a successful practitioner before he became a Governor,
a Senator, Sec. Of the Interior, Justice of CA, not to mention other high
positions he now held. Precisely because of those qualifications that the
Federico sought his services to convince Judge Pecson “ to reverse himself
“- a task very difficult indeed, partly because judges render their verdicts
only after mature deliberations, and partly because of the natural human
reluctance to admit one’s error. It may be added that such a task appeared
to be doubly difficult by the opposition of the winning side, represented by
the brilliant and successful lawyer Recto among whose qualifications may
be mentioned his having worthily occupied a seat in this SC.
The case for the Federico in opposition to the will had been competently
handled by Sison. That he has been helped by anassistant in his office,
cannot in any way reduce the compensation he is entitled to receive; he has
paid such assistant. He was not expected to do everything personally; he
could employ his assistants to do research for him, under his supervision
and responsibility. The general does not fo the fighting; he directs and
supervises. YET nobosy denies him credit for the victory won in battle.
What is the reasonable compensation for the services rendered by
Sison.?
In determining what would be a reasonable compensation for the atty for
an admninistartor or executor, the size and value of the decedent’s estate
should be taken in consideration. But the services performed should be
considered.
Accdg. To Sison the value of the property involved in the estate is P4m.
Therefore, Sison concludes “ at 10% my atty’s fee should be 400k from
which 67k may be deducted; and that entitles me to demand as I demand
333k as additional fees. He introduced the testimony of Marcelo Balatbat, a
real estate expert native of Hagonoy , Bulacan.
After examination submitted by Balatbatr, court concludes that the estate
should be assessed roughly at P3,695,000. The price at which some heirs
disposed of their shares may not be taken as the basis of computation,
because the sales had taken place during the war emergency in 1942 or
were affected by the uncertainties resulting from the pending contest of the
wills.
Henjce the purpose of computing the claimants compensation, we could
say that the litigation or the intestate involved over 3 i/2 million pesos or that
his services to the intestate prevented the loss to it of 2/3 of such amount
(2,462,000)
Sison insists on 10% of the value of the estate, relying principally on
Quintillan v Degala, wherein this Court approved payment of P50k for
professional services in opposing two wills concerning an estate or half a
million pesos. But there was a contract for contingent fees: 30% if
successful, none if unsuccessful. HERE no such contract!
Although it is usual to insert in promissory notes or mortgage deeds, a
stipulation for payment of 10% atty’s fees in case of litigation, still we doubt
if the same rate would be fixed where the amount involved ran into
hundreds of thousands or millions.
Jurisprudence have resulted to many rates , howevere none of these
involved more than half a million.
Federico brings to the attention of the court an instance where the atty
got P15k only after handling 2 cases involving P1,182,952(“Delgado v
Rama) This precedent could certainly clinch this debate for the appelle; but
the court finds three telling circumstances which need no comment: a. the
atty withdrew from the case before its termination b. the client lost and c.
the atty before filing a suit, had sent to this client a bill for services in the
amount of P10k
A fairly diligent search has uncovered several representative cases in the
US fixing reasonable professional fees for litigations of the million or half-
million class. In Columbia Law Review the result of an investigation showed
that atty’s fees allowed inm stockholder’s derivative suits ranged between
20% annd 33-1/3 per cent of the benefit to the corporation.
Bearing in mind all these precedents and variables, in the light of the
difficult situation of the intestate when it engaged the professional skill and
prestige of the claimant, together with resultant benefits accruing to said
intestate. The Court arrives at the conclusion THAT AN ADDITIONAL 75K
TO THE CLAIMANT WOULD BE ABOUT AS FAIR AS AN AWARD AS THE
FACTS OF THE LITIGATION COULD WARRANT. That gives trhe lawyer a
lump sum of P142k which represents 3.8% of the P3,695,000 total value of
the estate. Or 5.7% of P2,462.000 the amount preserved or won for the
intestate through his services.
Silvino Lim and Natividad LIM Billian should not be made to contribute to
the addt’l fee; they had pleaded for approval of the wills therefore were not
benefited by appellant’s main accomplishment.
Judgment: the appealed order is revoked and one is hereby entered allowing
appellant the above addt’l fees in the amount of 75k with legal interest starting
from the finality of decision .
Leg Prof
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and ARTURO ALAFRIZ & ASSOCIATES, respondents
[1990]
 Background:
1. Javier brought 7 parcels of land (about 10 hec) owned by Alejandro, et
al.
2. Javier mortgaged properties w/Metrobank (MB) to secure a loan
obligation of Bautista and/or International Hotel Corporation. Obligors
defaulted, thus MB foreclosed the mortgages. Certificates of sale were
issued in favor of MB.
3. Alejandro alleging deceit, fraud & misrepresentation by Javier in the
sale of the properties, brought suits against Javier, et al., including MB.
4. MB sold land to Service Leasing Corp. (SLC), a sister corp. SLC sold
such to Herby Commercial & Construction Corp. (Herby) for P2.5M.
Herby mortgaged property w/Banco de Oro for P9.2M. Transfers &
transactions were unknown to Alafriz & Associates (Alafriz), then
counsel of MB.
5. MB filed an urgent motion for substitution of party since land has been
transferred to SLC.
 Aug. 16, 1983: Alafriz filed a verified motion to enter its charging lien
pursuant to S37, Rule 138 of the ROC, equivalent to 25% of the actual &
current market values litigated properties as its attorney’s fees. Lower court
granted such & ordered the annotation of such on the certificates of title of
the parcels of land. Alejandro subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
complaints w/c was also granted.
 May 28, 1984: Alafriz filed a motion to fix the attorney’s fees .
 MB manifested that it had fully paid Alafriz amounting P50k. However, latter
claims that such cannot be considered as full payment since it was merely a
cash advance. Alafriz tried to offer a compromise amount of P600k but
negotiations were unsuccessful.
 Lower court & CA: MB & Herby ordered to pay Alafriz amount of P936k as
its proper, just & reasonable attorney’s fees.
Issues & Ratio:
1. WON Alafriz is entitled to an enforceable charging lien for payment of
its attorney’s fees. – NO.
 Sec. 37, Rule 138 provides a lien shall only apply to judgments for
the payment of money & executions issued in pursuance of such
judgments w/c he has secured in a litigation of his client. Such
must be entered upon the records of the court & the client must be
notified. The dismissal of the complaints in the aforementioned cases
was not the judgment for the payment of money or executions issued in
pursuance of such judgments contemplated by Rule 138.
 Charging lien therefore was w/o any legal basis. There’s nothing to
generate it & to w/c it can attach in the same manner as an ordinary
lien arises & attaches to a real/personal property.
 No actual damage was suffered, thus damages can’t be awarded. And
there being no amount awarded to the defendant, Alafriz’ lien could not
be enforced. But he could by appropriate action collect his attorney’s
fees.
 Alafriz’ claim that the lien attaches to the proceeds of a judgment of
whatever nature is erroneous. Both American & Phil jurisprudence
(including those cited by Alafriz) support SC’s interpretation of Rule
138.
 The lien does not attach to the property in litigation. Court has no
power to fix the fee of an attorney defending the client’s title to property
already in the client’s possession.
 While a client can’t defeat an attorney’s rt to his charging lien by
dismissing the case, terminating the services of his counsel, waiving
his cause/interest in favor of the adverse party, or compromising his
action, rule is not applicable when the termination of the case was not
at the instance of the private respondent’s client but of the opposing
party such as in this case.
2. WON a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of the lien.
– NO, only if it’s valid & enforceable.
 An enforceable charging lien, duly recorded, is w/in the jurisdiction of
the court trying the main case & such subsists until the lien is settled.
3. WON Alafriz is entitled to 25% of the actual & current market values of
the litigated properties on a quantum meruit (as much as he deserved)
basis. – SC refrains from resolving this issue.
 So as not to preempt the proper court in hearing & deciding the
controversy in a proper proceeding.
 Petition for recovery of attorney’s fees must prosecuted & allegations
must be established as any other money claim.
 Guidelines for fixing a reasonable compensation:
a. importance of the subject matter in controversy
b. Extent of the services rendered
c. Professional standing of the lawyer
*plus other factors. These require nothing less than a full-blown trial so
that both parties may be heard.
 SC however, does not wish to impose an unnecessary burden on
Alafriz in collecting fees to w/c it may rightfully be entitled. SC’s merely
saying that proper legal remedy should be availed of & the procedural
rules be duly observed to avoid abuse & prejudice. Law advocacy is
not capital that yields profits, its returns are simple rewards for a job
done/service rendered. It’s imposed w/public interest thus, subject to
State regulation.
Holding: Petition granted & CA decision reversed & set aside w/o prejudice to
appropriate proceedings as may be brought by Alafriz to establish its rights to
attorney’s fees & amount thereof.
Leg Prof